Spring Symposium 2014

and

Annual General Meeting

Emmanuel College Cambridge

Saturday 26 April 2014
10.00 am to 4.30 pm

Details enclosed (p 64). Please act now!

The Website

The website address: www.tasg.org.uk
The email attached to it: info@tasg.org.uk
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Editorial

Turkey faces challenges of several sorts. Although the country’s world economic ranking remains higher than ever, the Lira has recently weakened. Progress in one area accompanies set-backs elsewhere. Turkish contractors make profitable deals in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq while chaos in another neighbour, Syria, has driven half a million refugees into Turkey. Meanwhile the disquiet across Turkey sparked off by last year’s Gezi Park demonstrations in Istanbul has not gone away, while further discord involving the increasingly influential Gülen movement divides Turks. To add to such concerns, as the country moves towards elections, Prime Minister Erdoğan has faced allegations, based on mysterious recordings, of financial irregularities. Those with a special interest in Turkey follow events with both interest and concern.

This Review tries to reflect awareness of major political and social changes in Turkey but also aims to cover cultural and historical aspects of the Turkish area. These objectives will not change although we are now the bulletin of the British Association for Turkish Area Studies – the recently agreed new name for what was previously well known as TASG. In this issue Gamon McLellan surveys the Turkish political scene. Oğuzhan Göksel focuses specifically on the split between Gülen priorities and those of the governing AK Party while Gülnur Aybet takes a broad view of Ankara’s foreign policy. Clement Dodd up-dates us on Cyprus – not least about the long-term prospects for agreement between the two sides which seem to show no signs of significant compromise. And we have a statement from an Israeli policy unit on that country’s relations with Turkey. Other contributions include three rich offerings under the rubric ‘Arts & Poetry’. Aspects of archaeology are covered, as is the case of the riots in Sivas in 1993 and that of a notable vali of Smyrna. We are indebted to all these contributors for helping to shape a varied offering for our Review.

Under its new name (although please note that the website address continues to be www.tasg.org.uk for the time being), BATAS looks forward to our 2014 Symposium at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. There will be a varied programme of lectures and both members and non-members will be welcome as usual. Some BATAS members also plan to attend the fourth World Congress for Middle East Studies (WOCMES) at Middle East Technical University (METU) from August 18 to 22. We expect that Turkish area studies will be well represented there.

Sadly, we have to report the death of Osman Streater who made an important contribution to our Association over many years. Osman had been in poor health for some time but, as recently as last year, he contributed an article about his family origins to this Review. He will be greatly missed.

Brian Beeley
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor
CONGRESS

IV. World Congress For Middle East Studies – WOCMES 2014

Venue: Middle East Technical University – METU / Ankara
More information: www.wocmes2014.org
Dates: 18 – 22 August 2014

The Fourth World Congress for Middle East Studies (WOCMES) is to be held at METU in Ankara, Turkey from 18 to 22 August 2014. The Turkish Social Sciences Association and the Middle East Technical University (METU) invite scholars, researchers, educators, students, professionals and other groups interested in studies on North Africa, the Middle East, Muslim states of Central Asia as well as other regions of the world which are directly or indirectly affected by affairs in these areas.

The World Congress seeks to address questions, exchange and explore information on the Middle East in the broadest sense, to offer the possibility of sharing and exchanging research, experiences and ideas between more than 2000 interdisciplinary experts from all branches of the humanities, social sciences and related disciplines, from all over the world. A large number of associations, research centres, universities, international organizations and other institutions will organize meetings, exhibitions, symposia, plenary sessions, panels, roundtables and poster presentations. Cultural and artistic works on different aspects of the region will also be placed under the spotlight, thanks to a variety of exhibitions; a film festival with roundtable discussions and a book fair attended by booksellers, publishers and authors; as well as a selection of artistic events. The conference’s working languages are English and French.

CONFERENCE

Ottoman Pasts, Present Cities: Cosmopolitanism and Transcultural Memories AHRC Research – Network

Venue: Birkbeck College, University of London
More Information: http://ottomancosmopolitanism.wordpress.com/events/international-conference
Date: 26 – 27 June 2014

Plenary speakers include Professor Karen Barkey, Columbia University; Professor Edhem Eldem, Boğaziçi University; Professor Ulrike Freitag, Freie Universität Berlin; and Claudia Roden, chef, writer and cultural anthropologist. The conference also includes an exhibition entitled ‘East and West: Visualising the Ottoman City’ which features the work of four lens-based artists representing the Ottoman city through a perspective of transcultural memory. The exhibition will explore key ideas from the network’s research within a contemporary art framework.
TALKS

Cartography between Europe and the Islamic World
Venue: Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Rd, London E1 4NS
More Information: www.qmul.ac.uk
Date: 8 – 9 September 2014

The Ionian Cities: Myth, migration, and the origins of Greek settlement in Anatolia
Venue: The British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, SW1Y 5AH.
More Information and Tickets: www.biaa.ac.uk
Date and Time: 14 May 2014 - 18:30 to 20:30

EXHIBITIONS

Traces of Ancient Ages
Venue: Sadberk Hanım Museum, Büyükdere Piyasa Cad. No: 27- 29 Sarıyer/Istanbul, Turkey
Date: 6 December 2013 - 14 May 2014

As part of the Vehbi Koç Foundation Sadberk Hanım Museum temporary exhibition programme, *Traces of Ancient Ages* will be open from 6 December 2013 to 14 May 2014. The collection consisting of nearly 7000 objects ranges from the Late Neolithic Age to the Byzantine Period, making it possible to trace the course of successive Anatolian civilizations through their material culture. 150 works on display include stone tools and figurines belonging to the Hacilar culture that represent the Late Neolithic and Early Chalcolithic ages in the Lakes Region; idols, spouted jugs and bronze weapons belonging to the Yortan, Troy and Alacahöyük cultures of the Early Bronze Age in western and central Anatolia; cuneiform tablets, seals and libation vessels belonging to the Assyrian trading colonies, Hittite and Mycenaean cultures of the Middle and Late Bronze Age; pottery and jewellery belonging to the Urtartian, Phrygian and Lydian kingdoms of Iron Age Anatolia; Geometric Period Carian pottery with its wealth of forms and decoration; Attic red and black figure vases decorated with mythological and epic scenes representing cultures of the Archaic and Classical periods; Hellenistic Period gold jewellery, terracotta figurines and mould-made red slip pottery; statuary, glass vessels and jewellery from the Roman Period, and finally mainly metal artefacts representing Byzantine culture.

The Sadberk Hanım Museum opened on 14 October 1980 as Turkey’s first private museum and this year celebrates its thirty-third anniversary. The collection of Turkish and Islamic artefacts gathered by Sadberk Koç formed the original nucleus of the museum collection, which has since been greatly expanded by donations and purchases. The collection is housed in Azaryan Yalısı, a beautiful historic waterfront house on the Bosphorus strait dating from the late 19th century, while the archaeological collection is exhibited in the adjoining Sevgi Gönül Building.
MUSIC

Istanbul Music Festival

More information: http://muzik.iksv.org
Date: 31 May 2014 - 27 June 2014

The 42nd Istanbul Music Festival, organized by the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (İKSV) will be held between 31 May and 27 June with the theme of ‘Song of Nature’.

The festival will host approximately 800 local and foreign artists including Steven Isserlis, Isabelle van Keulen, Alexander Raskatov, Nelson Freire, Pepe Remero, Krzysztof Penderecki, Xavier de Maistre, and Yuja Wang as well as examples of two of the world’s leading orchestras Sinfonia Varsovia and Teresa Carreño Youth Orchestra of Venezuela in Istanbul. Twenty-six concerts including orchestral concerts, chamber music, vocal concerts, and recitals within the festival program will take place in different venues including Burgazada Square, Hagia Eirene Museum, Süreyya Opera House, Surp Vortvots Vorodman Church, İş Sanat Concert Hall, Zorlu Performing Arts Center, and Boğaziçi University Albert Long Hall. The festival will also present free-of-charge concerts entitled ‘Classical Sundays’ in venues such as Maçka Cumhuriyet Parkı, Istanbul Toy Museum, Sakıp Sabancı Museum ‘The Horse Mansion’ Garden and the Austrian Cultural Office Garden.

An ‘Honorary Award’ of the 42nd Istanbul Music Festival will be presented to Gülşin Onay, who leads the way for promotion and popularity of compositions by Ahmed Adnan Saygun, and for her successful career with world famous orchestras and prominent conductors. A ‘Lifetime Achievement Award’ of the festival will be presented to Zubin Mehta, who is one of the greatest conductors alive.

CINEMA

19th London Turkish Film Festival

More information: http://www.ltff.co.uk
Date: 22 May - 1 June 2014

A celebration of Turkish cinema in various venues across London. Opening night: Yozgat Blues, directed by Mahmut Fazıl Coskun, starring Ercan Kesal, Ayca Damgaci, Tansu Bicer, Nadir Saribacak, Kevork Malikyan.
THEATRE

‘Çalıkuşu’ (The Wren)

More information: www.taasny.net

Renowned Turkish novelist Reşat Nuri Güntekin’s famous work ‘Çalıkuşu’ (The Wren) will be performed by the Turkish American Art Society of New York (TAASNY). The work was staged on 15 March at the Manhattan Park West Hall in the Turkish language with English subtitles. The play, supported by the Turkish Embassy in New York, Culture and Promotion Office and the Federation of Turkish American Association, will then go on tour in Philadelphia, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Boston – to meet Turks living in the USA – after the New York show.

‘The Wren’, adapted for the stage by İpek Kadılar, is directed by TAASNY founding chairman İbrahim Yazıcı. There are fifteen actors in the play and the Wren character is played by award-winning Dilek Aba. Another leading character, Kamran, is played by Ali Ozan Akın. The play is about the destiny of a young Turkish female teacher named Feride. The events in the novel take place in the early twentieth century, in a war-weary Ottoman Empire that is about to collapse. Most of the novel is narrated in the first person by Feride.

MUSEUM

The Women’s Museum

Address: 1298 Sokak, No: 14, BASMANE / İZMİR
More information: www.izmirkadinmuzesi.com

The Women’s Museum in İzmir’s Basmane is set to show the perseverance, power and creativity of Anatolian women of the past and present. The museum includes thirteen rooms for temporary exhibitions, video art, women from past to present, women in Anatolia in the ancient era, pioneering women, collection artworks, protests and women, installation, workshop, archive, storage, library and management. Each room has a different concept. The entrance to the Museum welcomes visitors with a photograph showing Mustafa Kemal Atatürk dancing with his adoptive daughter Nebile Hanım at her wedding with Vienna Head Clerk Tahsin Bey in 1929 in the Ankara Palace Hotel.

Through the stairs, visitors see the photos of 50 female figures, including Turkey’s first theater artist Afife Jale, the first gravure artist Aliye Berger, one of the first deputies Benal Arıman, the first female nurse Esma Deniz, the first female athlete who competed in the Olympics, Üner Teoman, the first female petroleum engineer Halide Ural Türkatan, the first female military pilot in the world Sabiha Gökçen and the first female supreme court member in the world Melahat Ruacan. Women who made their mark in Turkish history, such as archaeologist Muazzez İlmiye Çığ, Afet İnan’s daughter Ari İnan, actress Aysen Gruda, singer Nurhan Damcıoğlu, politician Güldal Mumcu and designer Zuhal Yorgancioğlu, have also contributed to the Museum by donating their personal belongings.
Shakespearean Art in the Turkish Heart: 
The Bard in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic

by Talat Halman
Bilkent University, Ankara

This happens to be, as Shakespeareans happily call it: Shakesyear. It was 450 years ago, in 1564, that the Bard was born. This Shakespeare year is a year of glee in Turkey. In a nationwide celebration, we shall be doing scores of productions of Shakespeare’s tragedies and comedies.

What a great love affair this is! Turkish theatregoers, young and old, will pay tribute to their beloved Shakespeare. We Turks adore Shakespeare. Our theatres have presented countless productions in the past 140 years. Shakespeare is Turkey’s most beloved playwright. More Shakespeare productions have graced the Turkish stages than all of the Muslim nations combined – more in Turkey than in most European countries.

We have translated him over and over again since the second half of the 19th century. By January 2003, the complete tragedies, comedies, histories, and sonnets had been translated into Turkish – some of the major plays nine, ten, eleven times. Except for French, German, Italian, Spanish, Scandinavian languages, Russian, and Japanese, there are few, if any, languages into which all of Shakespeare’s plays have been translated and published. Turkish is proud of having achieved this – of the Sonnets and some of the Bard’s shorter narrative poems, too.

The only gap we have consists of such long Shakespeare poems as Venus and Adonis, The Rape of Lucrece, and A Lover’s Complaint. Translating these heavily rhymed, difficult poems – Venus & Adonis 1194 lines, Lucrece 1855 lines, A Lover’s Complaint 329 lines, plus poems of more dubious authorship like The Passionate Pilgrim, 338 lines, and several others, like The Phoenix and The Turtle, Shall I Die?, etc. add up to a total of 3,873 lines.

That was the huge gap. No one had the intention of closing it until I decided to tackle it. For my sabbatical in the past academic year, I chose it as my project. From September 2012 to September 2013 I was busy in New York City, affiliated with CUNY (Graduate Center of the City University of New York). In 8 months I translated all of them in meter and rhyme; now, I am finishing the second draft plus the scholarly apparatus, notes, bibliography, etc. The book, with English originals and Turkish translations on facing pages will come to about 600 pages and will be published in April 2014. With that publication, everything by Shakespeare, every single line, will have been translated into Turkish.

The first Shakespeare play in Turkish was Othello – not a translation, but a version of the libretto of an Othello opera in Italian – 1876. This was followed by the translations of The Merchant of Venice in 1884 and The Comedy of Errors in 1887 by Hasan Sirri who did his translations directly from English. It sounds anomalous that most of the Shakespeare translations into Turkish prior to the 1940s were done not from the English originals, but from
other languages, principally French. Also in 1884 Mihran Boyacıyan published three chapbooks of Charles and Mary Lamb’s stories of *Romeo & Juliet*, *The Comedy of Errors*, and *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. 1884 also saw the first Sonnet translation (Sonnet 132) done in prose by Hüsnu Osman of Salonica. In 1888 Mehmet Nâdir, a mathematician and educator, published his prose translations of 41 Sonnets and small sections of *Venus & Adonis*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, and *A Lover’s Complaint*.

More than a century ago, a foremost Turkish intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet asserted: “Shakespeare is the second greatest creator after God Almighty”. In the Turkish experience, Shakespeare has grown in respect and admiration since he made his debut in the Ottoman capital Istanbul in the 1840s – late compared with Germany, Italy, and France but early compared with China and Japan. The first performances took place in 1842 in Istanbul’s Concordia Theatre, but not in the Turkish language. 1885 saw the first printed Turkish translation: *The Merchant of Venice*. Shakespeare’s major tragedies were staged by the enterprising Armenian director Güllü Agop.

Another Armenian theatrical personality, Bedros Atamyan, gained renown as Hamlet. He was so conscientious that to gain insights into Hamlet he went from Istanbul to Elsinore…to study Othello he traveled to Venice and Cyprus, to learn about Romeo to Verona. Armenians and Greeks of the Ottoman state as well as travelling Italian troupes were the pioneers of productions in their own languages. Some Armenian priests (Minasyan, Hekimyan, Terziyan, Baronyan) took a special interest in Shakespeare. In the mid-19th century they wrote and presented plays in the Shakespearean vein relating to the early Armenian history. Hekimyan stated that he read and was influenced by Shakespeare. Terziyan’s historical play *Santuht* bears similarities to *King Lear*, a play by Baronyan shows the influences of *Othello*. Turkey’s first woman Hamlet was also an Armenian: Miss Siranuş Nigosyan. Decades later, two Muslim actresses appeared in the role of Hamlet.

Shakespeare loomed large in the Ottoman imperial city of Istanbul. As Ottoman power was waning, even some sultans developed a passion for Shakespeare. Sultan Abdülhamid II, who ruled about 34 years and earned fame as a despot, was a theater buff with an intense interest in Shakespeare’s tragedies and comedies. It was rumored in the late 19th century that when *The Merchant of Venice* was presented at the special exclusive palace theatre in Istanbul, and Shylock began to sharpen his knife to take his revenge, the Sultan became apprehensive, actually so scared that he ran out screaming and caused the play to come to an abrupt end. The Sultan later reportedly said: “Abandon such frightening scenes; instead, present performances that will make us laugh”. Abdülhamid knew some Italian. The Italian Shakespearean actor Ernesto Rossi was in Istanbul in 1889. He hoped to do *Macbeth*, *Hamlet* and *King Lear*. But censors did not permit these. He did obtain permission to do an abridged version of *Othello*. Sultan Abdülhamid watched a performance at the palace theatre with considerable excitement. Rossi mentions in his memoirs that the Sultan had tears in his eyes in Act V when Desdemona is killed and Othello commits suicide.

But Shakespeare has also appeared popular in the metropolitan areas and rural villages of modern Turkey. Last year, in the ‘New Yorker’ magazine, the talented young Turkish-American writer Elif Batuman, told the fascinating story of uneducated village women in Adana, southern Turkey, doing Shakespeare to assert their identity in defiance of male chauvinism. So, Shakespeare also serves as the foremost propagator and hero of Turkish feminism.

So Turks love the Bard. But is this a mutual feeling? Does Shakespeare hold good thoughts or at least neutral feelings about us Turks? Or is the Turkish love for Shakespeare unrequited? Well, we think he is great, but he is an ingrate. He makes about 33 references to us Turks. Not one is complimentary. Sometimes he uses dreadfully disparaging adjectives: “lustful” (maybe that’s not too bad!) But, “barbarous, infidel, cruel, malignant”. Othello boasts: “I took by the throat the circumcised dog and smote him thus.”
Iago, too, scandalizes us:

“Nay, it is true, or else I am a Turk.”

Before he becomes King Richard III, Duke of Gloucester says:

“What, think you we are Turks or infidels?”

We love Shakespeare although he felt no love for us.

Sometimes he characterized us in terms of cruelty: In All's Well That Ends Well, Lafeu puts this curse on us Turks:

“If they were sons of mine, I’d have them whipped; or I would send them to the Turks to make eunuchs of.”

In King Henry IV, Prince Henry who is about to become King Henry V, defames the Ottoman Sultan Murad who, upon his accession in 1574, executed his five brothers. Henry praises the smoothness of accession at the English court as if nothing nasty occurred there:

“Brothers, you mix your sadness with some fear. This is the English, not the Turkish court; Not Amurath an Amurath succeeds, But Harry Harry”.

In King Lear, Edgar hands the macho Turks a wonderful back-handed compliment:

“Wine lov’d I deeply, dice dearly, and in woman out-paramour’d the Turk.”

Perhaps our only consolation is that the Bard has many of his characters say nasty things about other nations and ethnic groups as well. In Ottoman productions they used to expunge the negative references to Turks, and sometimes went beyond that, i.e. The Merchant of Venice was censored on the grounds that ‘it might offend the feelings of the Jewish minority’.

Hamlet, as everywhere else, is the jewel in Turkey’s Shakespearean crown. In the past 100 years there have been 20 full-dress productions – and in 2004 a ballet version entitled Naked Hamlet. Nine different Hamlet translations have been published in book-form. When Istanbul’s venerable City Theater did its first Hamlet in 1914, there were only seven people – all men – in the audience, one of them the hapless chauffeur of a rich spectator. Less than fifty years later, at the same theater, Engin Cezzar gave 170 consecutive performances. A total of 70 thousand people watched his energetic Hamlet. 170 consecutive performances became a world record, which was broken six or seven years later by Richard Burton on Broadway.

But Othello, too, was compelling for Turks. Travelling troupes and circuses presented it for many decades as ‘Black Man’s Revenge’. Many actors achieved fame with names from Othello's cast: Iago Lütfi, Othello Kâmil, Brabantio Fuat, Cassio Ahmet... Circuses did abbreviate and altered versions of it. Following the tight-rope walking act, a fearsome Othello, face blackened with charcoal, used to come out, gesticulating wildly, speaking his lines in a deep declamatory style and grandiloquently playing on the audience’s emotions. Iago would get boooed and cursed vehemently. Old ladies used to call out to Desdemona: “You poor little thing. They are slandering you.” And as Desdemona and Othello were dying, most adults would weep profusely... Children would scamper about in fear. Circuses and touring companies gave countless Othello performances at hundreds of locations in Turkey through many decades. In view of that fact, it is safe to assert that Othello stands as the most performed play ever in Turkey's history of the theater.

Our City Theater of Istanbul had a marvelous tradition, from 1927 on – throughout the 1930s, 40s and 50s – of opening each season with a new Shakespeare production. This became for young and old Istanbul residents a brave new education in Shakespeare and in the theater. It was started by the great mentor of modern theater in Turkey – Muhsin Ertuğrul – who was a distinguished Shakespearean actor and director. He and his colleagues did not have it easy. Some of the leading critics were writing in the 1930s: “Even if playwrights like Ibsen, Schiller and Shakespeare are geniuses or more powerful than geniuses, even if they are world-renowned, they are detrimental to our theater at this juncture. They are destroying our nation’s refined taste.”
Shakespeare pioneers in Turkey had to brave so much. They had to be ingenious and innovative. Sadi Tek was a popular actor who headed a touring company. In 1946, I attended Sadi Tek’s production of Hamlet on the Asian side of Istanbul. Before the curtain was raised, Sadi Tek addressed the audience: “Ladies and gentlemen, my fellow-actors who play Horatio and the Ghost are unable to appear tonight due to illness.” (Obviously Tek was not able to pay their salaries, so they were refusing to take the stage.) So the veteran actor announced: “With your permission, besides Hamlet, I shall play Horatio and the Ghost as well.”

The curtain went up. Act I, Scene V. All three – Horatio, the Ghost and Hamlet – are supposed to be on the stage. Sadi Tek speaks Hamlet's lines... runs out... wraps himself up in a sheet and runs into the stage as Ghost... Exits as Ghost, comes back as Horatio... In and out – as Hamlet, Ghost, Horatio. At that time Tek is past fifty, already slightly old for Hamlet and Horatio. Also, he’s on the fat side. He keeps running on and off stage, out of breath, panting, his tongue hanging out. Despite all, he manages to do his triple threat, a ‘historic’ first.

There is more to this. 25 years later, I was serving as Turkey’s Minister of Culture. One day, my Under-Secretary said: “Sadi Tek would like an appointment.” “By all means,” I said, “I’d love to see him.” He came. He was now close to eighty, but sprightly. Half-way into the conversation, I said to him: “I wonder if you remember the occasion: 25 years ago you acted three roles in Hamlet – even in the same scene”. He paused for a moment, then he smiled, and responded:

“Of course I remember. But, it was even more interesting the following night: Horatio and the Ghost didn’t show up. Also, the Queen and Ophelia failed to come.”

Since the middle of the 19th century, Turkish Literature and Theatre have been in a feverish quest for innovation. The earlier part of this process was dominated by French culture, followed (from the 1950s onwards) by the increasing impact of Anglo-American values. But of all literary figures from abroad, Shakespeare has been the most potent and enduring source of inspiration – certainly the most pervasive influence on modern Turkish theatre. The Shakespearean art is vibrant in the Turkish heart. I once tried to express this fact in a piece of doggerel of my own, which I would like to end with:

The Bard is “the” playwright for Turks of all ages:
In Turkey, “all the world’s a stage” on all stages.
Our lullabies are from the folio pages . . .
Desdemona’s willow song, Macbeth’s rampages
Mesmerize our babes in the woods, and our sages.
To Corneille, Racine, Noh Plays we might say “Niet!”
But we love and mourn Romeo and Juliet.
As soon as Richard the Third’s evil starts to lurk,
Our emotions stir, our eyes pop out, our ears perk
With our countless full-dress productions of “Hamlet,”
We have a princely boom or a royal boomlet.
He fought against Turks, but we adore Othello:
He lets out a bellow, and our braves turn yellow.
Queen Elizabeth is Liz Taylor to some Turks;
Yet, Shakespeare scholarship is one of our great quirks.
To us, the music from the spheres is from “Twelfth Night.”
We eat the stuff dreams are made on: Turkish delight.
People claim Turks are macho, but Lady Macbeth
Scares patriotic, patriarchal Turks to death.
It belongs to Turks: this scepter’d isle of John Bull,
Stratford on Avon is as dear to us as Istanbul,
We’re involved: Lear can blame us, Richard can maim us;
lago can defame us, the shrew can tame us.
Shakespeare, like Atatürk, condemned those who make spears:
They both sang loving praises of those who break spears.
Our nation is Atatürk’s but also Shakespeare’s.
TALAT HALMAN served as the first Minister of Culture of the Turkish Republic. Currently he is Acting Chairman, Department of English Literature and Dean of Humanities and Letters, Bilkent University. Formerly he was on the faculties of Columbia, Pennsylvania, and Princeton Universities for many years, and from 1986 to 1996, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures at New York University. He served as Ambassador for Cultural Affairs and Turkey’s Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations. He has published 3000 articles and more than seventy books including 12 collections of his own poetry in Turkish and English. Honours and awards include Distinguished Service Awards of the Turkish Academy of Sciences and the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and “Knight Grand Cross, G.B.E., The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire”, (counterpart of “Sir”) conferred on him by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

Turkey’s Politics since October 2013: a Survey

by

Gamon McLellan, SOAS - University of London

Last summer’s Gezi protests in cities throughout Turkey, inflamed by extreme police violence against a peaceful demonstration in Istanbul, eventually subsided, but, as reported in the October bulletin, the anger did not. Around the country, demonstrations against the AK Party government continued sporadically. In the autumn, the felling of thousands of trees by the Mayor of Ankara for a motorway through the Middle East Technical University campus and (since December) corruption allegations have fuelled public outrage.

But last summer’s fury and resentment resurfaced on 11 March, with the death of Berkin Elvan, a fifteen-year-old boy living in the deprived and predominantly Alevi district of Okmeydani in Istanbul. He had gone out on 16 June 2013 to buy bread for the family, but was shot in the street at close range with a tear gas canister. He was left in a coma with severe brain damage and died in hospital nine months later. People had been gathering outside the hospital even before he died, and more arrived after the death was announced. The police responded yet again with tear gas. Outside the hospital, his distraught mother was emphatic: “It wasn’t God who took my son – Tayyip Erdoğan did”.² Sezgin Tanrıkulu, a deputy leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), made the same accusation,³ citing the Prime Minister’s declaration in Erzurum on 24 June that it was he who had given the orders to disperse the Gezi demonstrators.⁴ The boy’s funeral on 12 March was attended by many thousands in Istanbul, and there were sympathy demonstrations in cities all over the

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1 © Gamon McLellan, published Turkish Area Studies Review 23, Spring 2014, pp 11-18
country. Again there was police violence. In İstanbul, crowds following the funeral cortege through the streets were later dispersed with water cannon and tear gas. People gathered in Ankara, İzmir and other cities on 11 and 12 March and were also subject to violent police action. In Kadıköy in İstanbul a recording was made of an order to “aim for their eyes” apparently being given to police facing a large crowd. In Adana a woman was shot and blinded in one eye by a police plastic bullet.

The Prime Minister was in Siirt on the day of the funeral. With him was Egemen Bağış, the minister leading Turkey’s EU bid until December, when he was dropped in a reshuffle. As crowds were gathering in cities around Turkey, Bağış published a tweet dismissing them as necrophiliacs who will get their response on 30 March (the local government elections). Berkin Elvan was Alevi, and this comment seemed to be an insult to the Aleviler, who have been prominent amongst the Gezi protestors. The police issued a report on 25 November stating that 78% of detainees during the Gezi demonstrations had been Alevi: this figure seems improbable unless Aleviler were being specifically targeted. It is unclear how the police established that suspects were Alevi, but the message appears to be that Gezi was a largely Alevi affair. This does not correspond to the contemporary observations.

Abuse of ‘the other’ has become more common in utterances from those around Erdoğan. The Pennsylvania-based preacher Fethullah Gülen, now a bitter foe of the Prime Minister, struck a contrasting note by offering his condolences to Berkin’s family and “asking God to give our Alevi brothers patience, for they have suffered a lot of pain but maintain their poise and dignity”. The statement regretted that “instead of taking steps to defuse the events sparked by an obsession to build a shopping centre, polarising language was used to incite them further, and this has caused the death of a number of our youth”. On 10 March, Gülen had written a piece in the Financial Times, roundly condemning the government’s recent activities: “a small group within the government’s executive branch is holding to ransom the entire country’s progress,” he wrote. What was now needed, he argued, was a new, democratic constitution, drafted by civilians, with full respect for diversity.

In fact the parliamentary commission charged with producing a draft new constitution for the Turkish Republic broke up in mid-November in a procedural wrangle. Cemil Çiçek, Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, announced that he was withdrawing from its proceedings. The AK Party members said this meant the de facto dissolution of the commission. The opposition parties disagreed – but the commission’s work ended.

The commission had begun in autumn 2011 amid optimism that a constitution could at last emerge from consensus amongst the parties by mid-2012. The commission heard extensive evidence, but only reached agreement on some 60 articles. Gaining consensus was not

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5 Cumhuriyet 12 March 2014
8 Turkish Grand National Assembly press release 18 November 2013: http://www.meclishaber.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=126760. MHP member Faruk Bal said the Speaker did not have the power to dissolve the commission
9 This was not the first AK Party attempt to replace the 1982 constitution: after the 2007 election, a constitution was drafted by a panel of experts led by the constitutional lawyer Professor Ergun Özbudun, which never gained opposition assent
made easier by the Prime Minister’s setting tight deadlines (which were then missed) and by the ruling party’s arguing for a presidential model, fiercely resisted by the opposition. With the commission in deadlock and the AK Party lacking sufficient parliamentary strength to submit its preferred model to a referendum, the decision to end the commission’s work was not surprising. Consensus between government and opposition was in any case not much in evidence in the autumn following the Gezi demonstrations.

In early 2014, after abandoning the quest for a new constitution, the government introduced three controversial pieces of legislation to reinforce further the power of the executive: a law to give the government greater powers over internet access in Turkey and to block access to sites; a law to give the executive more control over the judicial system (see below); and a third bill to increase the powers of MIT, the National Intelligence Agency, but this last has been shelved until after the local elections at the end of March – critics say it would turn Turkey into a classic Middle Eastern mukhabarat state.

These moves triggered a barrage of criticism from domestic and international critics, culminating in Washington on 20 February with a ‘bipartisan’ letter to President Obama. Signed by some 84 former senators, Congressional representatives, ambassadors, government officials and national security specialists, the letter accused Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and many in his party of having abused their positions and compromised the rule of law by shutting down investigations into corruption allegations, “dismissing or reassigning hundreds of prosecutors and thousands of police officers, muzzling the media, demonizing critics, and incriminating imagined foreign conspirators, including the US ambassador”. And it went on: “Worse, the ruling AKP has pushed through institutional change – such as bringing the judiciary under executive control and expanding state authority to censor the internet – that would eliminate the hallmarks of democracy: separation of powers, checks and balances, and civil liberties.” The letter called on President Obama to “make it clear that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s autocratic actions and demagoguery are subverting Turkey’s political institutions and values and endangering the US-Turkey relationship”11: strong language from some of that relationship’s staunchest supporters. The day before the letter was delivered, Obama had spoken to Erdoğan for the first time for over six months – evidence that the relationship had not been in good health. A laconic White House press release after the call concluded: “the President noted the importance of sound policies rooted in the rule of law to reassure the financial markets, nurture a predictable investment environment, strengthen bilateral ties, and benefit the future of Turkey.”12

Washington had also not been impressed by Turkey’s selecting a Chinese government-owned company, China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corporation, to supply a long-range air and missile defence system. In October, the State Department commented on the Turkish deal: “We have conveyed our serious concerns about the Turkish Government’s contract discussions with the US-sanctioned company for a missile defense system that will not be interoperable within – with NATO systems or collective defense capabilities.”13 Defence specialists and diplomats from other NATO countries reiterated the message that integrating the new system with NATO systems would be impossible, and that this would weaken both the alliance and Turkey’s own defences. In December, Merrill Lynch declined a request from the Turkish military electronics manufacturer Aselsan to advise and underwrite Aselsan’s second public share offer, saying they would not work with Aselsan because of the Chinese missile deal. It was not clear at the time of writing whether the government was determined to press ahead with the Chinese deal regardless of the consequences, or whether it was waiting for an improved offer from a western supplier.

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11 http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/open-letter-president-obama-turkey
12 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/19/readout-president-obama-s-call-prime-minister-erdogan,
13 State Department Daily Press Briefing 7 October 2013
http://translations.state.gov/st/english/ctxtrans/2013/10/20131007284165.html#axzz2uSc2gSZ6
Obama’s remarks to Erdoğan echoed another unwelcome message to Ankara from Washington a week earlier. On 11 February, the US Federal Reserve published its Monetary Policy Report to Congress, identifying Turkey as the most vulnerable of 15 emerging economies which were particularly susceptible to external shocks. This underlined concerns about the current account deficit and excessive reliance on foreign credit to power Turkey’s ambitious growth targets.

Yet it was only on 14 May last year that Turkey had paid off the final instalment of its IMF loan. The Prime Minister had announced triumphantly that Turkey would be lending the IMF $5bn. “We are now a country that the IMF negotiates with to borrow money,” he declared. That was before the Gezi demonstrations and the government’s violent response – and before the corruption scandal which erupted on 17 December. Since the summer, foreign investors have been withdrawing money from Turkey, and the Turkish lira has depreciated significantly: at the beginning of May the $US traded at TL1.8; by mid-March 2014 the dollar was worth around TL 2.2, down from a peak of TL 2.3 on 27 January.

Commenting last summer on the government’s ambition to make Turkey the world’s 10th largest economy by 2023 (the centenary of the Republic), Rahmi Koç, the doyen of Turkey’s entrepreneurs, observed “the most important structural problem Turkey faces is its excessive reliance on foreign capital inflows in its growth model, which makes it difficult to attain a sustainable growth path.” By December, the International Monetary Fund was predicting a widening current account deficit and warning that “this, combined with the short-term nature of the foreign financing, will imply gross external financing needs in excess of 25% of GDP annually... The medium term baseline requires a continued willingness of investors to finance large and growing external deficits, which carries significant risks... A sudden stop in capital flows would trigger a significant economic adjustment.” In January Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, suggested that Turkey “might very well be the next ‘sudden stop’. The Central Bank eventually raised interest rates on 28 January, noting “Recent domestic and external developments are having an adverse impact on risk perceptions, leading to a significant depreciation in the Turkish lira and a pronounced increase in the risk premium.”

The AK Party was first elected in 2002 on a platform of being different from the parliamentary parties of the 90s. It was perceived as a party which was clean – and which could get things done. And by continuing policies initiated by Kemal Derviş in the 2001 crisis it was largely successful: perceptions of its economic competence helped it to deliver the economic success of the last decade, in turn the key to the electoral successes of 2007 and 2011. Another perception was that it offered istikrar, stability, prized by investors and conspicuously lacking in the 90s. Since last summer, however, it has become questionable

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16 Equivalents for £sterling were TL2.8 in early May to TL 3.7 in mid-March, down from TL3.8 on 27 January (http://www.oanda.com and www.doviz.com)
20 The overnight marginal funding rate went up from 7.75% to 12%, and the one-week repo rate from 4.5% to 10%. Full details in the Central Bank release giving the Monetary Policy Committee meeting decision of 28 January 2014 at: file:///L:/AA%20Turkey%20file%2020160214/Finance/Central%20Bank%20Interest%20Rates%20Press%20Release%2020160214.pdf
whether the AK Party can still provide Turkey with competence, stability and clean government.

The party now faces three critical votes: local government elections on 30 March, the first direct presidential election by the people on 10 August,21 and a parliamentary general election in June 2015. So it is puzzling that last summer the Prime Minister so over-reacted to the Gezi demonstrations and alienated the 50% who did not vote AKP in 2011. This alienation continued in the autumn. In November, the Prime Minister condemned mixed student hostels and unrelated students of different sexes sharing flats. The police promptly raided a number of shared flats on the pretext they had had complaints about prostitution.

Administrative and other reprisals followed against Gezi demonstrators and people helping them: students found they were unable to go on to postgraduate studies,22 a graphic designer working for a municipality in Bursa was sacked,23 the Chamber of Architects in Ankara, which had prominently criticised the government’s construction projects, was the subject of a police raid,24 head teachers who had allowed their students to attend the demonstrations when they should have been in class or did not discipline absentees were re-assigned to distant locations,25 and grants to 15 private theatres that had supported the demonstrations were cut.26 A new law regulating doctors makes it illegal to provide medical treatment without official authorisation27 (medics had given ‘unauthorised’ emergency aid to those injured during the disturbances). This law was approved by President Gül in January.

It is even more baffling why in the autumn Erdoğan chose to antagonise Hizmet – the movement led by Fethullah Gülen.28 Until early 2012, Hizmet had been a powerful element supporting the party. Yet the government prepared legislation to close the private cramming schools (dershaneler) attended by high school students all over Turkey to boost their chances in the all-important university entrance exams. Many of these are run by the Gülen movement. Their advocates claim they plug a gap in the system and enable poorer students to compete on a more equal footing with their counterparts in expensive private high schools. The Prime Minister argued that they are a hang-over from the 80s and 90s, and that the government will replace them with proper schools.29 This change, incorporated into a new National Education Bill, deprives Hizmet of a large chunk of its income, and in a series of messages and sermons delivered with increasing vehemence from 16 November onwards, Fethullah Gülen condemned the move. The law was approved by President Gül on 12 March.

Thus began an all-out struggle between Erdoğan and his erstwhile ally. Relations had been cooling since May 2010, when Gülen expressed unease with the AK Party encouragement of the flotilla attempt to break the Gaza blockade and with the war of words between Ankara and Israel.30 But it became serious when a special prosecutor close to the movement

21 Hürriyet 7 March 2014 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/25961004.asp If no candidate wins an absolute majority of votes, there will be a second ballot on 24 August to decide on a simple majority between the two leading candidates from the first round (article 102 of the Constitution as amended in 2007)
22 Cumhuriyet 4 October 2013
24 Cumhuriyet 5 October 2013
28 For more on this movement see elsewhere in this issue: Göksel, Oğuzhan “The ‘Silent Revolution’ in Turkey and the Endgame for Power”
30 See McLellan, Gamon “Turkey 2010: The Political Scene”, Turkish Area Studies Review 16, Autumn 2010
summoned Hakan Fidan, the Head of the National Intelligence Agency MIT, for questioning about contacts his organisation had had with the outlawed Kurdish guerrilla organisation PKK – contacts apparently authorised by the Prime Minister. The government responded by introducing a law to exclude MIT from such criminal investigations without the Prime Minister’s permission.31

But as Gülen’s criticisms of the government became more strident in late 2013, the AK Party leadership started publicly to identify the movement as the most serious threat to the state – as a parallel organisation which had infiltrated the police, the prosecution service and the judiciary. On 28 November, the government was embarrassed by the publication in Taraf newspaper of a leaked document from the National Security Council (MGK), suggesting they had been preparing to move against the Gülen movement as early as 2004. The document, dated 25 August 2004, recorded an MGK meeting two months earlier about Nurcu activities32 in Turkey and Fethullah Gülen which recommended the government prepare an action plan to counter these activities both at home and abroad. The document was signed by the Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül as Foreign Minister and Cemil Çiçek as Justice Minister, as well as by President Sezer and the service commanders. Mehmet Baransu, who wrote the story for Taraf,33 now faces a charge of espionage.

On 17 December, the Istanbul Prosecutors’ office launched a series of raids on addresses in İstanbul, detaining sons of three cabinet ministers (including the son of the Minister of the Interior – responsible for the police), an Azeri businessman and the General Manager of Halkbank. The prosecutors were investigating bribes allegedly paid for illegal permits for construction as well as movements of gold and money between Turkey, Iran and Russia. Large sums were seized, including US $4.5 million in banknotes stuffed into shoe boxes.34 The huge amounts of cash uncovered were highly embarrassing to the government and precipitated a number of moves overriding such niceties as the separation of powers in the state and constitutional checks and balances, provoking the international criticisms articulated in the letter to President Obama. The police and prosecution services were purged of suspected pro-Gülen elements. On 25 December, the three ministers whose sons had been detained (including the Interior Minister who had just sacked the Istanbul police chief) resigned, and the Minister for Europe Egemen Bağış – also suspected of involvement – was replaced. In March it was reported that the European Commission was investigating alleged misappropriation of EU funds in Turkey while Bağış was minister.35

Meanwhile, the rhetoric against Gülen was stepped up. Yalçın Akdoğan, an MP who works closely with the Prime Minister, accused the movement of organising a conspiracy that resulted in hundreds of military officers ending up in prison in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, 36 which had been condemned internationally as politically driven and based on

32 Activities, that is, of the followers of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1876-1960), a preacher and religious teacher of Kurdish origin who came to prominence in the late Ottoman Empire. He joined the nationalists, but dissented from the drive for secularism and came under suspicion after the 1925 Şeyh Said rebellion. He spent most of the one-party era in internal exile or prison, writing his major work Risale-i Nur, a series of commentaries on the Qur’an. He became close to the Demokrat Parti leadership in the 50s. His followers form one of the largest religious communities in Turkey, and his ideas were a major influence on the leader of another such community, Fethullah Gülen. The two movements today are distinct, although this is not always acknowledged by their critics.
dubious and fabricated evidence.\textsuperscript{37} The party, having been strident in its demands for the punishment of those alleged to have been plotting to overthrow the government a decade ago, was now distancing itself and directing the blame at Gülen and at prosecutors allegedly following orders from \textit{Hizmet}. The General Staff formally requested an investigation.\textsuperscript{38} Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç ruled out an amnesty for the Ergenekon and Balyoz defendants, but hinted that retrials might be an option.\textsuperscript{39} One of the AK Party Chairmen, Mehmet Ali Şahin, a former Justice Minister, spoke of an Appeal Court judge consulting Fethullah Gülen in Pennsylvania before deciding on a case.\textsuperscript{40} The Prime Minister himself began almost daily attacks on the movement. The corruption case was an international plot, he maintained, orchestrated by ‘gangs’ and a ‘parallel state’. Decisions by the Constitutional Court had already led to the release of Cumhuriyet journalist and now CHP MP Mustafa Balbay on 9 December. Former 1st Army Commander General Çevik Bir (prominent in the so-called post-modern coup of 28 February 1997) was released a week later. And General İlker Başbuğ, Chief of Staff 2008-2010 and sentenced to life imprisonment, was released on 7 March. There have been other releases as well, of suspects in the 2007 murder cases of the Malatya Protestant missionaries and Hrant Dink: critics have attributed these to administrative disorder caused by the new judges’ and prosecutors’ law.

In its determination now to root out the Gülen movement and its sympathisers, the government prepared a bill to alter the process whereby judges and prosecutors are appointed, reversing some of the changes the government had itself introduced when the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) was restructured in a constitutional change ratified by referendum in 2010. The new law, which appeared in the Official Gazette on the evening of 27 February,\textsuperscript{41} brings the judiciary and prosecutors under the effective control of the executive and has been criticised as a move away from the internationally recognised norms of a democratic state. Early on 28 February, hundreds of judges and prosecutors were reassigned or sacked.\textsuperscript{42} Within hours, all those detained in the 17 December operation and still in custody were released, and it was reported that the substitute prosecutors appointed in İstanbul had ordered the destruction of evidence in the 17 December case.\textsuperscript{43}

The feud with Gülen then became even more embarrassing for the Prime Minister. In February, audio recordings appeared on YouTube, apparently of the Prime Minister phoning his son with instructions to remove nearly a billion US dollars’ worth of cash deposited in various addresses around İstanbul. The Prime Minister denounced the recordings as “dubbed and edited”. They cannot be fully verified, but they are certainly believed by a large section of the population. They have been followed by other recordings, apparently from the same source. The continued appearance of apparently genuine tapes reinforces their credibility: it becomes increasingly improbable that concocted recordings of such quality could continue to be produced. The Prime Minister railed against Gülen and threatened to close down YouTube and Facebook after the local elections.

It is not yet clear how all this will impact on voters’ choices. There appears to be some public acceptance of a degree of government corruption. The scale and sums involved in these cases, however, are quite unprecedented. The AK Party has a strong core vote, and it is hard to see the party not getting the largest number of votes nationwide, but Gülen

\textsuperscript{37} See McLellan, Gamon, “Turkey’s Politics since March 2013: a survey,” \textit{Turkish Area Studies Review} 22, Autumn 2013
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Hürriyet} 30 December 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/25465751.asp
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Resmi Gazete} 27 February 2014 no. 28926 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/02/20140227M1-1.htm
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Resmi Gazete} 28 February 2014 no. 28927 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/02/20140228-1.htm
supporters will not be voting for the AK Party at the end of this month, and the resurgence of the Gezi disturbances will not help the party. Nevertheless, traditional supporters were pleased at the lifting of the headscarf ban in the autumn: on 12 September Candemir Çelik became the first covered woman to speak in Parliament.

The CHP has an attractive candidate in İstanbul in Mustafa Sarıgül, a successful Mayor of the Şişli district in the city. However, the CHP nationwide remains disorganised and ineffective. A new party, Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples’ Democratic Party – HDP) was founded in October with the blessing of Abdullah Öcalan, to represent his ideas outside the traditional Kurdish areas of Turkey. It is expected to fight the parliamentary election next year in alliance with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) which will contest constituencies in the south east. The HDP's principal effect is likely to be to split the opposition vote: its candidate for İstanbul mayor is Sirri Süreyya Önder, former BDP MP who played a prominent role in the Gezi demonstrations. The opening of the Marmaray rail connection under the Bosphorus on 29 May, despite initial hiccups, should help the ruling party in İstanbul, where the sitting mayor Kadir Topbaş remains popular. If the AK Party were to lose İstanbul it would be a devastating blow for Erdoğan, who will also view a nationwide vote of less than 40% as a setback.

The 'Silent Revolution' in Turkey and the Endgame for Power

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"Revolution is like Saturn, it devours its own children."

Georg Büchner (1835) Danton's Death, Act I.

Recently, the already heated scene of Turkish politics has witnessed a new political crisis, the ever-intensifying conflict between the AKP (Justice and Development Party) administration and an influential Islamic fraternity known as the 'Gülen movement' (referred to mostly as cemaat or Hizmet in Turkey). There were indistinct signs of an emerging difference of opinion between the government and the fraternity over many political issues such as Turkish-Israeli relations, negotiations between the government and the pro-Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) as part of the 'Kurdish opening program' and, most recently, the treatment of protestors during the Gezi Park protests of the summer of 2013. For instance, when the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referred to the protestors as "looters" and the police had adopted a heavy-handed approach that resulted in the killing of 11 protestors and wounding of thousands, the leader of the fraternity, Fethullah Gülen, urged restraint for the government and called for an end to police brutality.44 Nevertheless, the key event

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that triggered the ongoing conflict was the government plan to close down dershanes, the private weekend schools that prepare high-school students for the national university entrance exam.

As the Gülen movement and its affiliates own a considerable portion of dershanes such as the FEM and ANAFEN institutions, speakers of the fraternity, including some members of parliament from the AKP such as Hakan Şükür, had vehemently objected to the government plan in their public speeches. While the crisis was intensifying as a result of the refusal of PM Erdoğan to shelve the plan, a corruption inquiry initiated by prosecutors and police chiefs who are said to be affiliated with the Gülen movement shocked the government as sons of three AKP ministers, the mayor (from the AKP) of the Fatih district of Istanbul, the chief executive officer of the large state-owned bank Halk Bankası and a number of pro-AKP businessmen have been arrested.\textsuperscript{45}

If their positions had not provided them with immunity from prosecution, three ministers of the government would also have been arrested alongside their sons. Moreover, there were rumours that the son of PM Tayyip Erdoğan, Bilal Erdoğan, was also going to be arrested on charges of corruption.\textsuperscript{46} The corruption inquiry immediately became the most popular topic of discussion in the country as a result of extensive media coverage. Many newspapers and television channels affiliated with the Gülen movement such as the STV, Zaman and Today's Zaman have focused on the issue, surprising many observers by adopting an overtly critical stance against the government, particularly targeting PM Erdoğan. The media corporations of the fraternity had supported the government during many serious crises of the last decade.

The AKP administration immediately recognised the corruption inquiry as a direct attack against the authority of the government rather than a regular investigation, PM Erdoğan and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç giving many public speeches that branded the investigation as a 'conspiracy' and a 'coup' against the democratically-elected government.\textsuperscript{47} The government spent no time in trying to contain the challenge of its former ally, initiating a country-wide and large-scale purge campaign towards public officials suspected of being affiliated with the fraternity. Thousands of police officers, prosecutors and bureaucrats from various ministries were removed from their positions and appointed to non-active duties. As part of AKP's large-scale purge reminiscent of the McCarthyism of the 1950s which targeted communists in the USA, the prosecutors who allegedly possessed evidence and were getting ready to start an inquiry against Bilal Erdoğan and many other members of the AKP were also removed from their positions. Thus, the government proved successful in preventing further imprisonment of the AKP members while severely violating the rule of law in the country and entirely eliminating the objectivity of the judicial processes. The crisis further deepened when a number of members of parliament sympathetic


to the fraternity resigned from the AKP in protest at the way the government dealt with the corruption inquiry.

This is the second major crisis the AKP has faced within the last year after the Gezi Park protests which had shaken the country in 2013. When the AKP won its third successive victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections with an increased vote reaching about 50 percent, it seemed as if the AKP administration would have no difficulty in managing Turkey for a third term. Emboldened by the electoral victory of 2011, PM Erdoğan had claimed that his third term in power would be his ‘period of mastery’, implying that the government was now highly experienced after two terms and that its power was completely consolidated in contrast to the preceding years when the AKP had to struggle with challenges from an interventionist Kemalist military, an anti-AKP Constitutional Court and a largely critical media as well as the usual opposition of its rival parties in the parliament.

Paradoxically, the most significant challenges to the hegemony of the AKP in recent years emerged when the party reached the zenith of its power, first with the street protests of the Gezi Park, followed shortly by the ongoing struggle with the Gülen movement. Arguably, the second one is much more surprising for the AKP as well as observers of Turkish politics because the anti-AKP protestors of the Gezi Park movement were from a more familiar origin, consisting largely of secularist and left-wing critics of AKP rule. However, the Gülen movement had been a close ally of the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan from 2002 in their political struggle against the Kemalist elite.

The Gülen movement is a vast network of private schools, charity organisations, foundations, business associations, banks and media corporations which operate in more than 100 countries across the world. Unlike many other Islamic fraternities, the movement does not keep official records of its members, so it is not fully possible to know the extent and limits of its influence in Turkey and abroad. What unites thousands of people from different sectors of the economy and different parts of the world is their belief in the teachings and leadership of an Islamic scholar, Fethullah Gülen (referred to by his supporters as hocafeendi which can be translated as ‘master preacher’) who left Turkey in 1999 and currently lives in Pennsylvania, USA, allegedly to receive medical treatment for an undisclosed illness.

It is known that the support of the Gülen movement was crucial for the AKP to win elections and defeat its Kemalist opponents as the fraternity had used its financial resources and influence in the media and judiciary to promote the interests of the AKP. Now that their common enemies have been eliminated, however, it seems that the partnership has come to an end, resulting in the diverging interests of the government and fraternity to express itself as a struggle to be the sole power in the country. The roots of the conflict between the Gülen movement and the AKP should be traced to the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics the dramatic impact which is the

equivalent of a political revolution. The AKP has risen via democratic elections yet its real power lies in its ability to neutralise the restrictive influence of the Kemalist elite on policy-making through a number of democratic reforms, constitutional amendments and two referenda (in 2007 and 2010) approved by voters.

Many of the former members of the long-repressed Islamic political movement of Turkey, the ruling cadre of the AKP has managed to alter the conventional balance of powers within the country by curbing the influence of the Kemalist state establishment over the policy-making of the elected government. The 'Kemalist elite' within the state establishment mainly consisted of the military, the Constitutional Court and their ideological allies within the business world and media, all united in their dedication to preserve the official ideology of the Turkish Republic derived from the ideas of its founder, Kemal Atatürk. The Kemalist ideology which emerged during the nation-state formation of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s is based on two key tenets, Turkish nationalism and assertive secularism. Self-proclaimed protectors of the Turkish state, the Kemalists had long defended the regime against challenges from Kurdish nationalism and political Islam through banning political parties, issuing memoranda on civilian politicians and even orchestrating the collapse of governments as was the case in the 1997 intervention of the military that resulted in the resignation of the RP-led Welfare Party government (the RP – Refah Partisi, the Islamist predecessor of the conservative AKP).

The military tutelage which had granted Turkish armed forces and their chief of staff an extraordinary ability to shape political affairs had long been a key characteristic of Turkey's defective and unconsolidated democracy. Since the start of AKP rule in 2002, the influence of the Kemalist military in Turkey has been eliminated through the democratisation reforms implemented as part of the EU accession process and the so-called Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations which severely tarnished the reputation of an institution once the most trustworthy in the eyes of the public. The legal foundation for military tutelage was based on an institution, the MGK (National Security Council), with an official mandate to advise the government on matters related to national security – yet in practice it also covered political affairs unrelated to security such as education curricula and the clothing style of university students.

The MGK consisted of six high-ranking officers from the military and five ministers from the civilian government, the former outnumbering the latter, thus being able to pass resolutions on political issues even without the approval of the government. The EU harmonisation packages of 2002-2005 had radically changed the structure of the organisation, increasing the number of civilian representatives at the expense of their military counterparts and strictly limiting the agenda of the institution to security matters. The elimination of the legal bases of military tutelage was accompanied by a much-publicised investigation that resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of officers and journalists who were critical of the AKP administration, on charges of planning to organise a military coup to overthrow the government. Even though the trials still continue, public opinion polls show that the military has lost the legitimacy and public support it once possessed as its image has been negatively affected. For the elimination of military tutelage, the support of the Gül en movement was


instrumental as many media corporations affiliated with the fraternity had sided with the prosecution during the investigation, portraying the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases as 'Kemalist conspiracies' against the AKP and the imprisonment of its alleged culprits as a 'victory for democracy'.

After the authority of the military was eroded, all that remained of the Kemalist monopoly of the state was the Constitutional Court. The Court had started an inquiry against the AKP in 2008, noting that the party had become a 'centre of anti-secular' activities, yet it failed to ban the party when the majority vote was not reached among the judges. This prompted the government to change the structure of the institution. A constitutional amendment package was approved by voters in the referendum of 2010, increasing the number of judges appointed by the parliament and the presidency (both of which were controlled by the AKP). Again, the fraternity was the closest ally of the government plan, its newspapers and television channels heavily supporting the amendment package and arguing that it would enhance the quality of democracy in Turkey.

While the elimination of military tutelage was a positive development for consolidating liberal democracy in the country, conversely it also resulted in the AKP increasing its hegemony as the military had previously acted as an 'extra-judicial check' on the executive power of the government. Moreover, when the government changed the structure of a legal institution, the Constitutional Court which ensured the separation of powers in the country, the autonomy of the judiciary from the executive branch was severely reduced. As a result, the AKP which already controlled the parliament, government and the presidency, also gained influence over the Constitutional Court, emerging as the sole power in the country. The fraternity which facilitated the rise of the AKP to power, however, began to be increasingly alienated from the AKP. The latest dershane case showed that the government and the PM Erdoğan had become so powerful that they could defy their old ally and even purge it.

The Prime Ministry of Turkey has recently published a book entitled Silent Revolution, which summarises the reforms and policy changes implemented by the AKP during its rule since 2002. Indeed, the term 'silent revolution' is an apt one to define the radical transformation which has been witnessed in Turkey albeit one that was non-violent and a product of gradual change in contrast to most revolutions which occur suddenly and are violent. Revolution is an accurate metaphor as the current situation in Turkish politics is also rather reminiscent of the aftermath of major political revolutions such as the French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In the years following these revolutions, once the elements of the old regimes were purged by the Jacobins in France and Bolsheviks in Russia, those who led the revolutions began to fight among themselves, many leaders of the revolution dying at the hands of their revolutionary comrades. Following the elimination of the old Kemalist elite in Turkey, the fraternity and the AKP, which once joined forces to initiate the 'silent revolution', now clash with each other. Until recently, there were still those who hoped that the two sides could agree to end the dispute, yet recent statements of the leaders of both camps show that there is no

55 Yavuz (2013) Towards an Islamic Enlightenment, p. 75.
more space left for compromise. While Fethullah Gülen has called for 'God's vengeance' on those who threaten the fraternity in a sermon broadcast on Turkish television, PM Erdoğan has labelled the fraternity 'the parallel state' and 'a criminal group of hashishins'\(^{57}\) aiming to destroy the government.\(^{58}\) It is uncertain which side will prevail in this struggle, yet it is becoming clear that the ‘silent revolution’ to advance and consolidate liberal democracy in Turkey has only bred a new power struggle to follow the Kemalist regime. Regardless of the victor in this struggle, the loser in the endgame of Turkish politics is democracy.

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**Turkish Foreign Policy:**

**Continuity and Change in Relations with the West**

Part I

by Gülnur Aybet

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Turkey has had an enduring though changing relationship with both Europe and the United States since the early days of the Cold War. We can say that Turkey was not a founding partner in the post-war relationship between Europe and the United States yet it was functionally indispensable and strategically of growing importance in each decade. Although the country was never quite central in the transatlantic project of a post-war order in 1945, it was nevertheless part of it, but saw the Western orientation as a vital legitimiser of the identity of the modern Turkish state. Turkey’s orientation was therefore ‘inward’ looking, justifying its own existence, quite different from the intrinsic transatlantic bond between the founding fathers of the post-war order from George Kennan and Dean Acheson to Jean Monnet. Yet one line of continuity in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, which we can observe from the early days of the Republic is pragmatism, for example, courting mutual interests with the Soviet Union towards a changing region, whilst successfully balancing this with curbing the influence of communism within. We can also see this in Turkey’s foreign policy during the Second World War, where the priority was to remain neutral and thus preserve its recently hard won sovereignty over its territory. It was only after an Allied victory was evident that Turkey declared war on the Axis powers. Therefore the main foreign policy priority up to the end of

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\(^{57}\) The Hashishins was a secret religious order that operated in Persia and Syria in the 11th century, assassinating many influential statesmen of the time (cf. Eng. ‘assassins’).

the Second World War can be seen as preservation and flexibility to ensure this goal in relations with Western powers and regional states.

Turkey’s Cold War foreign policy saw it evolve as a member of a transatlantic security community, sealed with its NATO membership in 1952 and followed a decade later with what would become the beginning of a long standing aspiration to join the European Community. Although Turkey’s position within the Alliance for much of the Cold War and early post-Cold War era can be characterised as a ‘functional’ ally with little input into wider transatlantic strategic planning, in the past decade as Turkey has emerged as a regional player, it is becoming a strategic partner for both the US and the EU in the region. But underlying this shift is Turkey’s long term pragmatism in its foreign policy, right from the early republican days to the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), regardless of the latter’s public rhetoric of foreign policy dictated by principles. Therefore, what ‘seems’ like radical change can in fact be an element of continuity as the title suggests. Of course the element of ‘muddling through’ the Arab Spring is not an ailment which only affects Turkey, although it, more than most countries, has suffered the consequences of unpredictable events, due to its geographical proximity and its initial aspirations to be a key player – even a role model for the region.

Regional Shifts and Policy Choices

Relations with the West have taken a new twist with Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. The oft cited question in relation to Turkey’s place within the West seems to be: is Turkey turning its back on the West in order to face the East? Or is it a bridge between the East and West? However the complete picture is much more complicated than this two-dimensional view.

First of all there are several factors that overlay each other in Turkish foreign policy choices: the dynamics of internal change, issues of identity, old traditions, old alliances, new friends and new trading partners, realpolitik, national interest; the intricate balances between Turkey’s neighbours themselves – Russia, Iran, Syria, the EU –, the EU’s internal divisions, the regional role of the US, transatlantic relations, Turkish-US relations, US-Russia relations, the evolving situation in Cyprus (from closed chapters, to a gas exploration crisis to a promising new presidency) the post-Sarkozy-Hollande era in Turkish-French relations, and slow progress in the EU accession process. Then there are questions about the issue of energy dependency and regional geostrategic considerations which lead to an interesting state of affairs between Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. There is also the question of the stalled damage repair exercise with Israel. Then there is Turkey’s stance in regional conflicts and tensions: the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iran’s nuclear programme. All of these issues have their own ups and downs and inevitably affect one another. Therefore Turkey’s foreign policy choices are not confined to or driven by an east-west nexus but rather form a fine balancing act between all of these interdependent issues.

Over the past decade, Turkish foreign policy under the AKP Party has come to straddle three spheres:

- its traditional transatlantic relationship,

- its religious and ethnic ties to the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and Central Asia, and
a pure realpolitik reasoning in its relations with regional powers such as Russia and Iran, particularly in the field of energy dependence as well as Turkey’s aspirations to become an energy transit hub.

While Turkey has been able to juggle its interests between these three spheres through its regional soft power, the Arab Spring and particularly Turkey’s turnabout policy on Syria and its attitude towards the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt have put it at the crossroads between regional intervention and non-intervention. Meanwhile the use of its hard power versus soft power has, at times, put it at direct odds with its NATO allies, whilst maintaining the long-term important strategic aspects of that relationship such as agreeing to host the radar for the NATO missile defence shield in 2010.

Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel can also be seen as a transformation from traditional hard power, particularly in the area of military cooperation, to a reflection of the country’s growing regional soft power, which has made it one of the most prominent critics of Israeli policy towards the Palestinian Territories – notably Gaza. Both the cases of Turkey’s relations with Syria and Israel illustrate how Turkey straddles the three spheres of transatlantic relations, regional religious and ethnic ties and regional realpolitik considerations.

While its approach is innovative and new, the AKP’s regionally proactive foreign policy is based on the legacy of President Turgut Özal during the 1990s. However, there are two marked differences between the Özal era and the AK Party decade: while Özal put an emphasis on ethnic ties with the new opening towards the Central Asian and Caucasus countries for expanding Turkish businesses, he also steered clear of putting Turkey in a leadership role in the Middle East. To a large extent this was a continuation of the traditional parameters of Turkish foreign policy – namely the principle of non-involvement in regional conflicts and disputes especially in adjacent regions with an Ottoman past. The Middle East still looked too complicated, distant, troublesome to be a region where Turkish influence could probe and establish itself. That is why the shutting down of the pipeline with Iraq in 1991 was also a very difficult decision. This crucial decision in 1991 shattered for the first time the comfortable separation of Turkey’s strategic interests embedded in its Western Alliance with NATO and the US on the one hand, and its regional management of neighbourly relations by keeping a comfortable distance on the other.

What we see today in Turkish foreign policy is the continuation of that breaking point: Turkey’s erstwhile predominantly Western security relationship has become impossible to separate from its policy towards the Middle East and the wider region. But even back in the 1990s, Turkey’s new found role of bridging East and West was presented to its Western allies as a strategic ‘asset’. In other words, any regional pro-active role during the Özal era was still presented as an asset in terms of its Western/transatlantic relationship. The AK Party years have seen a diversion from this state of affairs. Instead of a regional role that is linked as an asset to Western policies, Turkey has pursued a more independent regional role and therefore, rather than a functional ally for the West, it was increasingly seen as a strategic partner for future regional management. **So Turkey’s regional role is very much determined by its changing relations with its Western partners.** Whether this state of affairs continues, given the increasing security threat for Turkey from Syria and Iran’s new rapprochement with the West, remains to be seen. However, although the AK Party have driven this shift from functional ally to strategic partner, we cannot attribute it
entirely to the Party’s doing. There are many other milestones of this unique past
decade that are also accountable for this shift – the transatlantic fallout after Iraq;
NATO in flux; changing attitudes within the EU towards Turkey’s EU membership;
Russian regional resurgence; the global rise of the BRIC; religious identity as an
important driver in the region, and the Arab Spring. A further significant milestone
accountable for this shift was the 2007 decision by Turkey to approve military
incursions into northern Iraq following the intensified attacks from the PKK. This had
a profound effect in the US seeking ‘damage limitation’ in its relations with Turkey. It
also changed Turkey’s relations with its other NATO allies, whereby Turkey’s regional
security concerns started to be taken ‘seriously’ by the US and NATO, leading to
closer collaboration with Washington in intelligence sharing. As these shifts in
Turkey’s relations with its transatlantic partners and its regional neighbours took
place, there were also wider trends, such as a less confident West looking towards
regional management on its own, the US ‘pivot’ away from Europe towards Asia, a
rise in Turkish regional influence – political, religious, economic –, and the increasing
importance of energy transit routes. If we add on to these changing regional and
global dynamics a Turkish government willing to take on a regional role of influence
and to engage with their Western allies as a strategic partner in regional strategic
management, the unprecedented decade of Turkey as a rising power becomes
inevitable. But this rise has come together with challenges. The maintenance of
strategic partner status in the transatlantic relationship depends on three things:

1. Turkey’s priorities within that relationship, particularly its future with the
   EU;
2. Turkey’s position of being caught between its soft and hard power in
   regional policy choices and, finally,
3. its energy dependence and relations with Russia.

The Transatlantic Relationship

Turkey has been embedded in Turkey’s security relationship with the west since
the early 1950’s. Since that time Turkey has been a member of the transatlantic
security community. There are common values, norms and principles centring on
a ‘common way of life’ which the security community strived to preserve.

However, throughout the Cold War, the norms and values of the transatlantic
security community were very loosely defined under a ‘Western’ identity that relied
on the definition of its way of life as contrasted with that promoted by the Soviet
Union. ‘Loosely defined’ because some of the essential norms of the community
such as democratic governance, free market economies and human rights were not
even consistently adhered to by many of its member states. However, because
these member states firmly belonged to a geographically and ideologically defined
‘Western bloc’, their place and identity within the transatlantic security community
were unquestionably solid. Therefore Turkey’s belonging to the West was defined in
terms of ‘security’ and belonging to a bloc but one which had wider connotations of
being a security community with democratic principles and adherence to free market
economics. In the 1990s these norms of democratic governance, stability and free
markets would be expanded through the rule of institutions, and their capacity to
absorb the post-communist space. Also in the immediate post-Cold War era of the
1990s, the interest in military intervention was no longer solely confined to
geostrategic logic or resources, but to the ownership of international norms. This
became the driving factor for Western military intervention in the Balkans.
All of these developments undoubtedly affected Turkey’s place within the transatlantic security community. The centrality of the military/security dimension in defining Turkey’s place had been overtaken in the early 1990s by a developing vision of collective security as the framework of legitimacy for the security community. In the early 1990s, Turkey took part in various missions, such as SFOR in Bosnia, which underlined the growing collective security profile of the community to which it belonged. Nevertheless, the growing divergence between Europe and the United States plus the regional complications over implementing the new mission of collective security (such as Russia’s opposition to Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999) meant that Turkey’s place within the security community was not as clear cut. But much of the real damage to the transatlantic security community came in 2003 over Iraq. Furthermore, France and Germany’s reluctance to pave the way for NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest summit in 2008, followed by a hastily patched alliance after Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, did not do much good for Alliance cohesion. While the original security community was clearly moving away from its 1990s cohesion built around promoting norms, Turkey was going through its own transformation.

It has been an eventful and interesting decade since the AK Party came to power in 2002 – one of transition from old checks and balances to new ones. The old ones consisted of a secularist elite and a politically powerful military as guarantors of stability. The watershed challenge to this tradition came with the 2007 elections where the AK Party won a second term in a landslide victory. The newly emerging checks and balances included a new Islamist centre-right elite, committed to liberal economic policies and support for Turkey’s accession to the EU, and the gradual eradication of the so-called ‘deep state’ support for the old checks and balances. It also heralded in a new political and reform process induced by the conditions laid by the EU accession process. During this transformation critics of the present government have also pointed out that this is leading to a new unchallenged authoritarianism. However, this can be seen as a direct result of such an overwhelming transition particularly when there is no unified robust opposition to provide meaningful scrutiny.

In foreign policy, the reflection of these internal changes were at times interpreted as a shift away from Turkey’s traditional membership in the transatlantic security community. Ironically, while relations with the EU improved in the AK Party’s first term with the opening of accession negotiations, it deteriorated with the US after 2003, while the Turkish parliament refused permission for the transit of US troops into northern Iraq, and Turkey’s growing frustration with US nonchalance over the PKK presence there.

In the second term of the AKP after 2007, the EU accession process also slowed down. Meanwhile relations with the US improved again from the ‘damage limitation’ undertaken by the last leg of the Bush administration in 2007 after the Süleymaniye incident (where Turkish military personnel were captured by the US military in northern Iraq and interrogated – to the detriment of diplomatic relations) – to the ‘new model partnership’ promised by the incoming Obama administration in 2009. Therefore, during this time Turkey’s relationship with the EU on the one hand and the US on the other oscillated, showing that Turkey’s transatlantic relations are not homogeneous. Of course the EU itself has also been changing: it is not the same EU waiting for the promises of the Lisbon treaty to be delivered. The euro crisis has brought about a fundamental shift in perceptions of the structure of Europe. If the
eurozone countries opt for further integration, leaving the United Kingdom and others in an outer zone and thereby creating a less cohesive, multilayered EU, this could be a positive development for Turkey’s accession. Otherwise, it would seem that, within the current treaty structure, the accession process is likely to drag on with waning interest on both sides. But incentives to keep Turkey engaged as a strategic and trading partner are not likely to disappear. The attraction of business in Turkey will undoubtedly be a bonus for Turkey-EU relations – especially in terms of bilateral trade which is not directly related to the accession process. However, any talk of an alternative model of a Turkey-EU partnership should not be seen as an alternative to EU accession in the short run.

Part II to appear in No 24

Update on Cyprus
2013/14
by Clement Dodd

Readers of the last update (Review, No. 22, Autumn 2013) will recall that a new coalition government was formed in the TRNC in August 2013. Significantly it replaced the government of the National Unity Party with a government of moderate and left complexion and more inclined to join in government with the Greek Cypriots than its more nationalist political opponents. The NUP has always favoured a two-state solution of the Cyprus problem, as does Turkish Cypriot public opinion. The electoral defeat of the NUP owed much more to domestic issues than to the Cyprus question. Also it did not mean a change of president. Dr Derviş Eroğlu, formerly head of the NUP, remains in office, the next presidential election not being due until 2015. By common consent it is the President who enters into negotiations with the Greek Cypriot President on the Cyprus issue, the latter being, of course, the head of government in the Greek Cypriot presidential system. On the Greek Cypriot side it was expected that President Anastasiades would support a federal solution, especially as on his accession to office he spoke in favour of the Annan Plan, which the Greek Cypriots rejected by referendum in 2004.

Varosha/Maraş
It was therefore surprising, as reported in the last ‘Update’ that, before agreeing to enter into negotiations, President Anastasiades called on the Turkish Cypriots to cede Varosha (Maraş) to them, as ‘a gesture’ before negotiations began. This heavily built-up former tourist suburb of Famagusta, stretching down the coast, has been left to decay by the Turkish Cypriots, who keep it under tight military control. Despite support by the American and British ambassadors, the Turkish Cypriots have refused to surrender the area, seeing it as a major factor to be discussed in negotiations. They also do not wish to lend strength to Greek Cypriot claims to Famagusta itself. They have even rejected informal suggestions to allow, in
exchange for the return of Varosha, the opening of Ercan Airport to international
traffic since this offer did not also include recognition of the TRNC.

**Failure to start negotiations**
During the period under review the major issue has been the
difficulty experienced by the UN in seeking to bring the two sides
together to work towards a federal solution. It was hoped that a new
round of negotiations would begin in October 2013, but these hopes
have not been fulfilled until now, in February 2014. As a result
relations between President Anastasiades and the UN
Representative in Cyprus Mr Alexander Downer, have been
anything but harmonious.

As a harbinger to the talks it was proposed by the Greek-Cypriot side that they
should be able to deal directly with Turkey over the Cyprus issue, a long-standing
aim that has always been rejected, mainly on the grounds that it implied Turkish
recognition of the Greek-Cypriot state. It was now agreed that the Greek-Cypriot
official head of their negotiating team could visit Ankara to talk directly with officials
there, a long-standing Greek-Cypriot ambition underlying their dismissal of the TRNC
as a ‘pseudo-state’. This was agreed, but provided the Turkish-Cypriot official
negotiator could similarly visit Athens. It was accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, but
not without concern since it would imply Greek recognition of the Turkish Cypriot
state! The visits eventually took place, but without any marked impact, it appears, on
the course of events.

This was evident when, before negotiations began, President Anastasiades declared
that he saw the point of the negotiations was essentially ‘the transformation of the
Republic of Cyprus into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state with a single
international personality, a single sovereignty, and a single citizenship in accordance
with UN Security Council resolutions’. President Eroğlu protested vigorously that the
object of the negotiations was certainly not to reform the Republic of Cyprus, but to
establish a completely new federation of two equal states. Nevertheless
Anastasiades, revealing his hand, and influenced by nationalist opinion in the South,
insisted that unless both sides signed a Joint Declaration incorporating the agreed
principles of a settlement, he could not enter into negotiations: without such an
agreement the negotiations would otherwise drag on and have no result.

**The Joint Declaration**
What then were the principles on which Anastasiades was insisting? They were, he
particularly emphasised, not new, but derived from UN Security Council resolutions
that called for a settlement that ‘must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single
sovereignty, an international personality and a single citizenship and comprising two
politically equal communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation’.

This statement of principles first appeared in UN Security Council Resolution 750, 10
April 1992, and has been referred to in subsequent resolutions. An interesting, and
curious, feature of this resolution is that it claimed that it was reaffirming the position
set out in two previous resolutions, 649 (1990), and 716 (1991) though, in fact, by
sleight of hand, it altered them: the earlier resolutions had made no mention of the
crucial issues of either ‘single sovereignty’, or ‘a single citizenship’. They merely
stated that ‘the fundamental principles of a Cyprus settlement are the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus’. 
The later, 1992 formulation is subject to serious criticism on two grounds. First, a federation does not have a ‘single sovereignty’. In a federation ‘the powers of government are divided between a government for the whole country and governments for parts of the country in such a way that each government is legally independent within its own sphere: neither is subordinate to the other’.\(^{59}\) The second objection to the later UNSC formulation is that it does not match what is said about sovereignty in the UN Charter. Chapter 1, Article 2, simply states that the UN is based on ‘the sovereign equality of its members’, this surely implying that no member state may claim sovereignty over another. It is difficult to see how this can support a claim that a new federal state in Cyprus has to have the single internal sovereignty that Anastasiades had in mind. The UN does not demand it of other federal member states like, for instance, the United States.\(^{60}\)

President Eroğlu insisted that single sovereignty was unacceptable, but some members of the Turkish Cypriot Government questioned the need to object to it. On a visit to the TRNC on 14 December by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, some members of the government were inclined to play down the importance of the reference to a ‘single sovereignty’. They reasonably pointed out that it was not made an issue in the negotiations leading up to the Annan Plan put to referendums in 2004. Nor had it caused any difficulties in later negotiations between President Christofias and President Talat, who did not make an issue of it. According to reports, the Turkish Foreign Minister seemed persuaded but, whereas in the past it had been possible to let sleeping dogs lie, that was not now the case: Anastasiades was determined to make the acceptance of a single sovereignty, and a single citizenship, conditions for starting negotiations.

**Agreement on the Joint Declaration**

This impasse in negotiations was only resolved when both parties met on 6 February in the office of the UN Special Representative in the presence of the Deputy Representative Lisa Buttenheim. A sudden visit to the island by the American diplomat, Victoria Nutland, was undoubtedly a factor in encouraging agreement. Some Greek Cypriot commentators indeed believe that it was American pressure that obliged Anastasiades to yield. They may well have a point given American political and, now, economic, interests in Cyprus arising from American investments in the development of hydrocarbon deposits in the eastern Mediterranean. After the meeting a draft communiqué, which was subsequently confirmed, established principles for the beginning of talks.

The chief features of the communiqué were as follows:

1. The united Cyprus shall have a single, international legal personality and a single sovereignty, which is defined as the sovereignty which is enjoyed by all member states of the United Nations under the UN Charter, and which emanates equally from Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. \[my emphasis\]

2. There will be a single united Cyprus citizenship, regulated by federal law. All citizens of the United Cyprus shall also be citizens of either the Greek-Cypriot constituent state or the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state.


\(^{60}\) It would be interesting to determine who, in April 1992, promoted, and supported, the introduction of ‘single sovereignty’ into Resolution 750, and for what reason.
This status is internal and shall not substitute in any way the united Cyprus citizenship.

3. The Federal constitution will provide for the residual powers to be exercised by the constituent states.

4. The federal laws will not encroach upon constituent state laws within the constituent states’ area of competences, and vice versa.

These are normal features of a federal state. Of particular interest is that while sovereignty is described, unnecessarily, as ‘single’ (as a sop perhaps to the Greek Cypriots) the agreement underlines the proposed federal state’s sovereignty as that defined in the UN Charter, thus rejecting the internal single sovereignty that the Greek Cypriot leader was trying to assert.

The Start of Discussions

At the time of writing discussions between the two sides have begun. It is interesting that the Turkish-Cypriot official negotiator aiding Eroğlu will now be Kudret Özersay, who is very experienced in the complexities of the Cyprus problem. He was a former aide to Ergün Olgun, the chief adviser to late President Denktaş. In 2012 he resigned from the post he is now taking up again in order to develop and lead a programme for the political enlightenment of the ordinary people of Cyprus: he has a commendably altruistic desire for a solution for the sake of all ordinary Cypriots. The new Turkish Cypriot Government seems optimistically to believe that a solution can be found, and intends to become more involved in the negotiations. This will be worrying for a number of Turkish Cypriots. Yusuf Kanlı, a Turkish Cypriot who writes often for Hürriyet Daily News, reports, after telephone conversations with a number of Turkish Cypriots, that ‘while there is general support for a federal solution, some sceptics are crying foul, and complaining that Turkey – if not the left-dominated coalition government in northern Cyprus – has sold them out’.  

They will be encouraged in their scepticism by an assertion made by Anastasiades’ assistant interlocutor, Andreas Mavroyannis, that there is only one joint sovereignty, which cannot be divided, despite what was agreed in the Joint Declaration. The two communities in their ‘provinces’ have authority in certain respects, he maintains, as agreed in the Constitution, but they do not have sovereignty: that belongs to the state. He rejects, in fact, the basic principle of federation, namely that sovereignty is purposively divided between the central federal and the constituent state governments, as in the Annan Plan, in accordance with the Constitution approved by the electorate on both sides, the ultimate source of authority.

The Turkish Foreign Minister has declared that this set of negotiations must be the last chance for a federal solution. If it fails, the way forward, he says, has to be with a two-state solution. To speculate, this could perhaps take the form of an independent Turkish Cypriot state as a member state of the European Union. This shared membership with the Greek Cypriot state would certainly be a way to encourage the two sides to work together with EU support.

This alternative, EU-based, solution is worth bearing in mind, especially if the Greek Cypriot approach turns out to be that envisaged by Mavroyannis. Moreover, two-state federations are notoriously difficult, especially if one partner is much larger than

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62 This is an abbreviated account of an interview with Mavroyannis by the Greek Cypriot newspaper Politis, as reported in Kıbrıs, 17 February, 2014.
the other, as in Cyprus. A two-state solution could certainly be more satisfactory for Cyprus than a fractious federation of two mutually deeply distrustful and antagonistic communities. They both feel a deep sense of the injustice they have suffered over the years, for which they blame each other, and the states that have supported one side or the other in their own interests. There is a new urgency about the negotiations now, but that does not guarantee their success.

The Path to Israeli-Turkish Reconciliation: Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies

by Gabriel Mitchell
Israel-Turkey Project Coordinator (Mitvim)

Mitvim, a foreign policy think tank established in 2011, aims to reshape Israel’s relations in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean. Its goals are

(A) To promote a paradigm shift in Israel’s foreign policy by introducing a coherent peace-oriented and multilateral foreign policy paradigm, making foreign policy considerations more prominent in Israeli decision-making, and transforming Israel’s inward-looking culture;

(B) To promote regional-belonging for Israel by enhancing knowledge and understanding of regional issues, defining Israel’s desired relations with its adjacent regions and advancing regional-belonging possibilities and

(C) To promote Israeli-Arab peace by engaging in policy dialogue with Arab and Muslim think-tanks, identifying, creating and maximizing opportunities for peace and providing process-expertise to support peace-making efforts.

See: www.mitvim.org.il, www.facebook.com/mitvim, info@mitvim.org.il

One critical strand in this initiative involves Israel’s relations with Turkey which have experienced several peaks and troughs in the last six decades. Yet the dominant narrative between the two countries consistently emphasized their shared strategic interests in the Middle East. This narrative reached its apex in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993. Ties were so positive, the media called it a ‘love affair’.

However, since then Turkey-Israel relations have experienced a severe deterioration. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process faltered in 2000, quickly turning violent. The Turkish government, in step with historical trends, became increasingly critical of Israel’s policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, Turkey underwent a domestic political transformation that limited the role of its once-prominent military. New leadership in both countries lacked familiarity with the perspectives of the other, and a series of diplomatic debacles – starting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s outburst at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009 and ending with the Gaza flotilla raid (including the attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara) in May 2010 – demonstrated that the narrative once shared by Turkey and Israel was no longer viable. Since then, both states have
labored to repair their diplomatic ties and, even when rapprochement is reached, the grievances that remain will take many more years before they are forgotten. Moreover, as the traditional narrative is now unlikely to be reincarnated, there is a demand to create new narratives that can serve to support the development of cooperative relations.

As one of the few think-tanks actively supporting the official rapprochement process between Turkey and Israel, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute of Regional Foreign Policies – strongly believes that Track II diplomatic initiatives can play a critical role in defining post-reconciliation bilateral relations. This is not only because of the strategic importance of mending ties but also due to an understanding that relations with Turkey are crucial for Israel's regional integration, for its ability to engage with political Islam, and for advancing peace. In order to achieve these goals, Mitvim has taken a multi-layered approach through the publication of op-eds and academic articles in policy journals and newspapers in both countries, conducting public opinion polls on Turkey-Israel relations in order to accurately measure Israeli attitudes towards rapprochement, and signing a cooperation agreement with the Global Political Trends (GPoT) Center, an Istanbul-based research institute. Mitvim has also kept in constant contact with various Turkish partners, participated in international and bilateral conferences and workshops, and held meetings and briefings with senior politicians and diplomats. Mitvim experts are also taking part in the initiative to establish the Turkey-Israel Civil Society Forum.

In 2012 and 2013, Mitvim and GPoT conducted a number of policy dialogue initiatives that brought policy experts from both Israel and Turkey together in order to discuss and develop strategies for cooperation, and to jointly analyze regional developments. These dialogues, hosted both in Istanbul and Tel Aviv with the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, have become a vital artery of communication during this period of reduced diplomatic ties. Conversations such as these are no simple tasks. Israelis and Turks come from contrasting cultural and political traditions, making dialogue, at times, a measured process. This form of dialogue has rarely occurred in the many decades of Israeli-Turkish cooperation. But the partnership between Mitvim and the GPoT Center has successfully educated both parties in the interests and priorities of the other, in addition to identifying opportunities to develop a new narrative once diplomatic relations have been restored.

As a result, and particularly following the successful policy dialogue held in Israel in October 2013, Mitvim and the GPoT Center are continuing their partnership into 2014. The third policy dialogue between the two think tanks is planned to take place in Turkey, and an event at the Knesset on Israel-Turkey ties is currently under deliberation. Moreover, the two institutions are planning to expand and deepen their cooperation on a number of Track II initiatives in the hope of further improving bilateral relations.

Despite progress towards the mending of Israeli-Turkish relations, the development of a new narrative requires increased dialogue between Israeli and Turkish policy makers and civil society actors. Mitvim hopes that its role in the process of mending relations will continue to evolve as both countries take the steps necessary towards advancing regional peace.
With a background in political science and history, Gabriel Mitchell publishes in Israeli, Turkish, and American periodicals. In 2012-13 he was Israel Research Fellow at Shalem College, Jerusalem.

Gülay Yurdal Michaels
Poet and Translator

Medusa, Perseus’un Kalkanı ve Görüntüler

Medusa, the shield of Perseus and Appearances

Her sabah uyandığımda aynaya yazılı
Azılı değil bu yüz - göz, kulak, burun, ağız
Yumuşatamıyorum gerçekleri bir türlü
Derinden kazılı hepsi ışıl ışıl
Haykırıyorum ileri gidemeden.
Kişkırtıyor düşünceye yansıması -
İşyanların var senin de kamyonlarda bile boş ya da dolu
Plakaları Siirt Yozgat Adana ya da İstanbulu
“Havan bıatsın”
“Çatla e mi”
“Belalım”
“Kılmadım”
“Bedduanla ölmédim ki
Hayır duanla yaşayayım.”

Each morning on waking it’s written on the mirror
This face is not demented - eyes, ears, nose and mouth.
I’m not able to soften the truth at all
All so deeply engraved in brilliant light
I cry out without going far.
Its reflection provokes thoughts -
You too have your rebellion even on trucks empty or full
With license plates from Siirt, Yozgat, Adana or Istanbul
“May your showing off sink”
“Hope you crack up – right”
“Calamity heart-throb”
“I did not practise”
“Since I haven’t died of your curse
How can I live on your kind prayer”
A Life-Cycle Poster from the Turkish Republic

by Malcolm Wagstaff
Professor Emeritus
former Secretary of TASG (now BATAS)

A little while ago I received an excited e-mail from my friend Gray, who is a serious print-collector. ‘I am the happy owner of a Turkish life-cycle poster’, her message began. A Turkish poster in a London saleroom is unusual enough, but one printed in yellow, pink, green and blue, made it particularly desirable. My friend immediately began research on her new acquisition. She searched websites and contacted sources by e-mail with growing joy as the story behind the poster was gradually revealed. This article is the result.

It owes much to the kindness of people Gray has never met: Murathan Özgen, of Turkish Folk Art, and his uncle, Vedat Karadağ, of Cultural Travel; Tim Stanley, Senior Curator, Asian Department, Victoria and Albert Museum, who specialises on the Turkish world; John Scott, editor of Cornucopia; and to one person Gray has met, Maria Vilaincour, who restored the poster.

The poster's title is in the two roundels at the top left and right: İnsan Hayatında / Yaş Eşikleri. Together they can be read as ‘The Age Thresholds in a Man's Life’. On the mustard yellow arch below the title are seven stanzas of a poem in modern Turkish lettering. Below this are the nine steps of the man's various stages of active life. On the bottom left is the infant tucked up in his pram; on the bottom right is the 100-year-old man hunched over in his chair. Pink labels describe each stage of his ascent and descent. They translate as:

Coming into the world
10 years: Childhood
20 years: Youth
30 years: Young adulthood
40 years: Maturity
50 years: Full maturity - mid-life  
60 years: Growing old  
70 years: Entry into old age  
80 years: Old age  
90 years: Frailty  
100 years: Departing this world.

The man is shown not only with his natural strength waxing and waning with age, but also as a social being. The dress is western, including short skirts for the woman and suits and hats for the man. This immediately dates the image to sometime after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The Republican period was characterised by a drive to modernise society and to improve the quality of both the individual Turk and the whole of Turkish society, especially in the more rural areas.

In the arch below the stairs is an image of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. The presence of the serpent suggests that the artist did not have in mind the Koranic version of the temptation story (Sura 7). The serpent does not feature there, only Satan, who deceived both Adam and Eve. The inspiration of the poster is, then, clearly western (specifically Christian) and this points to a probable archetype for the print.

The Turkish poster measures H: 39.4cm x W: 53.2cm and is printed on fairly light-weight pulp paper that feels more rough than smooth. It is black and colour printed, rather than hand-coloured, and the inks seem pretty stable. The poster is a bit discoloured by age and light degradation, particularly near the bottom.

The first big breakthrough in the story came with Tim Stanley's report on the poster of September 2013. He recognised the poem instantly as being by the famous seventeenth-century poet, Karacaoğlan (c.1608 – c.1680), who was rediscovered in 1923, the year of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. This troubadour poet, who seems to have spent most of his life around the Çukurova region, is said to have travelled in Anatolia and visited Egypt, Tripoli, and the Balkans, accompanying his love songs with his saz. His poetry is direct and simple; his themes are those of domestic, village and nomadic life. The contrast with Ottoman court poetry could not have been greater. However, these particular lyrics fit the theme of the poster perfectly.

We are grateful to Tim Stanley for his translation of Karacaoğlan's poem:

I came on my journey after travelling for nine months.  
You set me down in the place called the world.  
You did not leave me be for a moment to work out what to do.  
You made me regret that I had come here.  
I enjoyed so much time as an infant in arms.  
I enjoyed it though I was swaddled in rags.  
For a time, too, I rocked in my cradle.  
You gave me enough of my mother’s milk to drink.  
My mind driven mad by the chase, always chasing after it.  
Mills turn, driven by my tears.  
As soon as I reached the age of thirteen or fourteen,  
You beset me with passions and desires.
At twenty, I was a grey and turbid flood
At thirty, I had created a lake all around me
At forty, I knew my fate, good and bad
You made me chase wildly after passions of all kinds.
At fifty, my path had turned into an upward slope.
At sixty, everything I had known as the present had passed
At seventy, the change in me was now bewildering.
In the end, you wore me down slowly.
At eighty, my bones were battered.
At ninety, my scrap of a warrant was written.
At one hundred, my bit of a grave was dug.
You have assigned me to this black earth.
Karacaoğlan says, You have set me on fire. You have made me burn.
You have given me the full whack of passion. You have sated me.
And last of all you have dispatched Azrael.
All of a sudden you have sent me back to not having been born.

Azrael is the Angel of Death in some Islamic traditions. He is not named as such in the Koran, but in that Holy Book the Angel of Death takes the soul of the deceased and returns it to God.

Research on the poster got no further until January 2014, when Murathan Özgen emailed that his uncle, Vedat Karadağ, thought the poster might have appeared in a magazine. This led Gray eventually to Cornucopia, whose editor, John Scott, not only volunteered to put the poster on the magazine’s blog, but also said he would ask a few friends about its origins. The first person to reply was Orlando Calumeno, of the Orlando Carlo Calumeno Collection and Archives, an astonishing array of Ottoman memorabilia, medals and other ephemera from 1890 to 1919, which includes 15,000 postcards. Like his collection, Mr Calumeno was a treasure trove of information.

Mr Calumeno commented that the general concept of ‘steps in the life of man’ came from France, which used similar slogans and designs in the 1920s and 1930s. Hints to the poster’s origin are the game played by the young child, the robe worn by the old man and the [Christian] design of Adam and Eve. Mr Calumeno said that the ‘poster’ was commonly seen in Turkey in the media and postcards. It was typical of the 1940s when the State was trying to ‘teach’ the virtues and various steps of life to Turkish people. He said that this theme was heavily used in the 1940s and 1950s, although there were some earlier examples in the mid to late 1930s.

This very useful information led quickly to the discovery online of the exact inspiration of the print, a colour lithograph from the first quarter of the twentieth century, printed by Leiber and measuring H: 37cm x W: 42.2cm (considerably smaller than the Turkish poster) and entitled ‘Les Âges de l’Homme’. The lithograph can be found in the collection of the Musée des Civilisations de l’Europe et de la Méditerranée in Marseille, where it bears the inventory number 44.10.7C.

The Turkish artist greatly simplified the design and added bright colours, but kept the postures of the man at almost every stage, dressing him in the style of the new Turkish Republic and banishing all the animals from the Garden of Eden, but retaining the snake.
During a subsequent telephone conversation, Mr Calumeno told Gray that he had seen examples of her poster with and without the poem. He also said that there was another version, common in Istanbul stores, on a merchant’s steps of life. The motto below is, in Turkish, ‘Cash, not Credit’. The poster portrays a merchant who becomes rich from taking cash in payment for goods in his store – a safe overflowing with banknotes confirms this – but later, he stops taking his own advice, begins taking credit and descends into bankruptcy.

Mr Calumeno was certain that the Turkish poster was not an official one, sanctioned by the new Republic. Had it been, it would have been printed on better paper. This led him to say that the poster was probably printed in the 1940s or 1950s, when many artists were designing simpler, more straightforward posters and when high quality paper was very difficult to source. He added that all posters of the 1940s and 1950s were printed in Istanbul, as was the tradition.

NB: Thanks to the help of Orlando Calumeno and others, we now know a great deal about the poster, but several questions remain unanswered. Who was the artist who created this delightful work of art and where did he come from?
The story stops here – for the time being. If readers have further information, we would be grateful to hear it.

PS: This is the link to access the colour version: Cornucopia Magazine The ascent, and descent, of man: Blog: https://www.cornucopia.net/blog/the-ascent-and-descent-of-man

THREE POEMS

by Tuğrul Tanyol, translated by Ruth Christie

VAN GOGH

the sun is born from the moon’s perfect centre
pollen writhes in pain inside the petals
self-indulgent as a queen bee, I give myself to the wind
a wilderness opens in the centre, my palms stick to my palms
the flower looks at the moon and sees there old suns
there must be a flower the Dutchman forgot...
now it springs from his missing ear

güneş ayın tam ortasından doğuyor
çiçektozları zonkluyor yaprakların içinden
bir arıbey kadar bencil, kendimi rüzgâra bırakıyorum
tam ortada bir kır açılıyor sanki, avuçlarım avuçlarına yapışıyor
çiçek aya bakıyor ve orada eski güneşleri görüyor
bu Hollandalı’nın unuttuğu bir çiçek olmalı...
şimdi olmayan kulağından fışkırıyor

VAN GOGH

Van Gogh

the sun is born from the moon’s perfect centre
pollen writhes in pain inside the petals
self-indulgent as a queen bee, I give myself to the wind
a wilderness opens in the centre, my palms stick to my palms
the flower looks at the moon and sees there old suns
there must be a flower the Dutchman forgot...
now it springs from his missing ear

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DUVAR

rüzgar
çatı tırmalayan bir kedi
ağaçın dalı
kırık su şişesi
avuçlarında kanayan

kanarya
sustu uzaklarda
çana durmadan
çarpan
göğsünü kanatırcasına

gözlerindeki sisi sil
duvar hâlâ orada

bazen genç ölünür

Selim Berkkan’a

Uyku kuşu gözüme yuva
Yapmak için yaklaştığında
Kirpikleri görüldü ve ağların korkusuyla
Kaçtı uzaklara’

Ebu Emir ibn El Hammarah

gözlerini kapat, ölüm
açık pencereden süzülür gibi
girmesin içeri

kirpiklerini siper et
ya da bir kafes yap
ölmü gözlere hapset

aslında bir uyku kuşuydu
endülsüslü şairin bahsettiği
ama bilinir,
ölmünün bazen uyuyla gelmesi

güzel oglum Selim!
almında
bir kuşun gölgesi

WALL

wind
a cat clawing the roof
tree branch
broken water bottle
in my bleeding palms

the canary
went quiet far off
someone never stops striking
a bell
as if to make the heart bleed

wipe your eyes clear of fog
the wall is still there

sometimes a young person dies

for Selim Berkkan

“When the bird of sleep approached
To nest in my eye
Seeing eyelashes and fearful of nets
It flew away”

Ebu Emir ibn El Hammarah

close his eyes, death
might glide through the open window
don’t let it in

make a shield of his lashes
or make a cage
imprison death in his eyes

it was surely a bird of sleep
the Andalusian poet mentioned
but it’s well-known,
death sometimes comes with sleep

Selim, my lovely boy!
the shadow of a bird
is on your brow
JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Part 1

by Jill Sindall,
Ottoman historian

When Sultan Mehmed II conquered Constantinople in 1453, finding a city that was depopulated, in ruins and destitute, he ordered Jews, Muslims and Christians in his empire be brought to live in the capital to reconstruct and revitalize it. At that time, Jews lived predominantly in Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad. There being no restrictions on freedom of trade on non-Muslims, Jews flourished as perfumers, carpenters and blacksmiths. By 1535 there were 8,070 Jewish households in Constantinople – five times the number in 1477. The districts of Balat and Hasköy were the centres of Jewish life, and there were few limits on the construction of synagogues, whereas many churches were converted into mosques or closed down. Mehmed II also encouraged Jewish immigration from the Balkans and the rest of Europe. A letter from German-born Ashkenazi Rabbi Yitzhak Sarfati (who became the Chief Rabbi of Edirne) to his persecuted brethren in Europe urged them to migrate:

Here in the land of the Turks we have nothing to complain of. We possess great fortunes; much gold and silver are in our hands. We are not oppressed with heavy taxes and our commerce is free and unhindered. Rich are the fruits of the earth....everyone of us lives in peace and freedom. Here the Jew is not compelled to wear a yellow star as a badge of shame as is the case in Germany where even wealth and great fortune are a curse for a Jew because he therewith arouses jealousy among the Christians and they devise all kind of slander against him to rob him of his gold. Arise, my brethren, gird up your loins, collect all your forces and come to us.63

Following the Spanish reconquest of Granada in 1492, Sultan Bayezid II sent a formal invitation offering sanctuary to refugees escaping persecution, resulting in a huge influx of Sephardic Jews to the Ottoman Empire. Their arrival coincided with the expansion of the Empire, and immigrants were directed to areas where their expertise in international finance, banking and commerce was most needed. In the seventeenth century a wave of Ashkenazis fled to the Empire in the wake of Russian pogroms as they swept through the Caucasus.

Jews and Christians were respected as ‘people of the Book’ by the Ottomans, and as such were protected minorities (dhimmi(s)). However, in common with Christians,

63 Quoted in Philip Mansel Constantinople (John Murray, London, 1995), p. 15
they were regarded as second-class citizens. Jews, Orthodox Christians and Armenian Christians were organized into officially sanctioned millet(s) (hierarchical organizations performing a role similar to modern day local government – though without the territorial element), ordering the affairs of their community as they saw fit as long as they were loyal to the Sultan. The synagogues ran local schools, benevolent societies and arranged the payment of taxes to the government, and rabbis acted as judges. Ottoman tolerance of non-Muslims was undoubtedly partly guided by pragmatism. Until Selim I’s conquest of Arab lands in the early fifteenth century, Christians and Jews outnumbered Muslims in the Empire. Thereafter, the Ottoman Sultans – now also Caliphs – considered observance of the Sharia of prime importance, and non-Muslims were treated less favourably.

The early Ottomans were uninterested in commerce, partly because Islam forbade the practice of usury and partly because the majority of Ottoman Muslims lived in rural areas. Thus economic activity largely fell to the dhimmis. Most Sephardim moved to Salonika, some having moved on from first ports of call such as Italy where they had encountered anti-Semitism and persecution. They brought with them Western culture, technology (the printing press, for example), modern medicine and political ideas, and were the most economically dynamic group in the Ottoman Empire for some time. The French diplomat, Nicolas de Nicolay, wrote:

> The shops and stalls best stocked with all the varieties of goods which can be found in Constantinople are those of the Jews. They also have among them very excellent practitioners of all the arts and manufactures, especially (those) not long since banished and expelled from Spain and Portugal... (they) have taught the Turks several inventions, artifices and machines of war such as how to make artillery, arquebuses, gunpowder, cannon-balls and other arms.64

In the sixteenth century the Ottomans took a closer interest in their economy. Venice was beginning to challenge Ottoman dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, attempting to gain footholds on Ottoman territory to carry out their trade. The Ottomans sought to gain potential allies among other Europeans by proffering special dispensations for trade, usually in the form of lower tariffs. France was the first beneficiary of a trade treaty and, by the end of the eighteenth century, several European nations held what came to be known as a ‘capitulations’. There now existed a need for translators and middlemen (dragomans: cf.Turkish tercüman, translator) to liaise between the Ottomans and the Europeans. Since the Sephardim had maintained their links with Western Europe and had knowledge of Western accounting procedures and languages, they were the obvious candidates. Although these dragomans remained subjects of the Sultan, they enjoyed similar privileges to those accorded to their European patrons. Importantly, the protégé status of dragomans enhanced their political standing and, whereas non-Muslim merchants were subject to the vagaries of local courts, dragomans could petition to have their cases heard in Istanbul where they could expect fairly confidently a more lenient hearing.

Thus Jews became invaluable and increasingly influential members of Ottoman economic society as clerks, shipping consultants, insurance agents, cigarette manufacturers, bankers and even diplomats. Jewish doctors were employed at the

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64 Ibid p. 124
palace. Not only did they dominate middle class professions: in Salonika they formed the majority of labourers, stevedores, fishermen, and cigarette factory workers. They formed craft guilds and, by the early nineteenth century, formed a large proletariat who, by employing means such as the closed shop and intimidation, kept Greeks and Slavs out of their industries. Some wealthy Jews became extremely powerful. Joseph Nasi, for example, enriched his family in the sixteenth century during the reign of Süleyman the Great through commercial concerns including the operation of tax farms. His wealth meant that

He was in a position to make large cash advances to the treasury...
He played an important role in the peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Poland in 1562.... In 1569, he encouraged the Dutch to rise against Spain, promising them Ottoman assistance.65

This same man and his wife also engaged in philanthropy, and founded a rabbinical academy at Tiberias in Galilee where he rebuilt the walls and encouraged Jewish settlement. He became a close advisor to Selim II who appointed him Governor of Naxos, a singular honour for a non-Muslim.

In the Arab provinces, although immigrant Jews spoke Arabic and became assimilated as fully into the Arab-Muslim culture as had their Christian neighbours, there was more friction between Jews and Arabs than there ever was between Ottomans and Jews. Nevertheless, in Egypt, for example, for the first two centuries of Ottoman rule Jews had served as the principal moneylenders, customs officers and were masters of Cairo’s mint. There were thriving Jewish communities in all Iraqi cities, and Baghdad was one of the leading intellectual centres for Arab Jews throughout the Ottoman period, and produced rabbis of wide renown. Numerous Jewish scholars from West and Eastern Europe escaped to Palestine to seek freedom from persecution and solace in a growing intellectual community there.

The capitulations had been something like a Trojan horse in the Empire. Europeans – competing with each other for trade – championed their co-religionists, and began to demand equal status for them within the Empire. By the early nineteenth century the Sublime Porte, with several military failures behind it, was in deep financial debt and government administration was bloated, outdated and incompetent. Moreover, the Ottoman military arm, the one-time crack Janissaries, had become corrupt and out of control. The power vacuum was often filled by local lords. Jews were sometimes targeted by these quasi-autonomous rulers, perhaps resenting Jewish wealth and influence. One such was the Egyptian Ali Bey Al-Kabi (1760-83). He confiscated the wealth of Jews, several were removed from public office and some were executed. A similar fate befell Jews in Baghdad. In Egypt Syrian Catholics took their places, and by the end of the century most of the coastal trade of Syria and Egypt was in their hands. Naturally, this gave rise to intensifying animosity between Catholics and Jews in the Levant. What had been commercial competition developed into sectarian conflict. Jews were alarmed by what they perceived as

65 A. Levy in The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, ed. A Levy (Darwin Press), New Jersey, 1940, p. 32
Christian attempts to displace them, and Christians were perceived by Muslims and Jews alike as jumped-up.

As part of a series of reforms (Tanzimat) introduced by the Ottoman government from 1826 in an effort to modernize the Empire’s infrastructure, Christians and Jews were no longer to be considered as protected minorities, but should henceforth enjoy the same status as Muslims and be referred to as Osmanlı or Ottomans.

In parallel, a burst of evangelical fervour in the early nineteenth century by Protestant British and Americans Christians tried to focus their governments’ attention on religious communities in the Empire and to proselytize among the Jewish population. In Britain, for example, there was the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews and in fact at one point the Bishop of Jerusalem was a converted Jew. However, in this there was a signal lack of success. The Jewish communities responded to the West’s intrusion into their environment in the Empire with alarm, fearing that this interference might jeopardize their hitherto peaceful position as Ottoman subjects.

By the mid-nineteenth century Greek and Armenian Christians had eased the Jews out of their superior position, both economically and politically. This decline may be charted from the end of the eighteenth century when the Ottomans began to lose their grip on their lands. The Greeks in the empire were the first to benefit from the Jewish decline. Nationalism detached Greece and the Balkan States from the Ottoman Empire and so, from the 1830s, many Ottoman Jews found themselves under Christian rule. With the establishment of the Greek kingdom in 1832, Greek merchants began to benefit from low interest loans and grants supplied by their new motherland at the expense of Jewish businessmen.

Furthermore, the increased power of the Europeans after the Tanzimat reforms meant that the empire was flooded with foreign goods. The Jews in Salonika, for example, were hit hard. They had been masters of the cloth trade and enjoyed the exclusive right to supply the Janissaries with their uniforms. With the demise of the Janissaries and the importation on a large scale of cheap mass-produced British garments, the cloth trade plummeted. But, as their businesses collapsed, their population increased steadily. Marauding bandits and rebellious nationalists in Salonika’s hinterland wreaked havoc on trade and agricultural production in the once-thriving port. Jews’ solidarity with the Ottomans in the Balkans gave rise to their persecution by Christian nationalists and led to an influx of refugees, putting huge pressure on the infrastructure in their millet. Tens of thousands of Jews were packed together in unsanitary conditions; poverty paved the way to vagrancy for boys and prostitution for girls. The less well educated Sephardim spoke only Ladino, the language brought with them from Spain. This began to prove a barrier to their employment, as well as increasing their sense of isolation. For example, in 1873 the first railway lines opened near the city but Sephardic Jews could not work on them as they spoke only their own dialect. Armenians, flocking to Constantinople to flee wars and rebellions in Eastern Anatolia, also began to rise through the professional and social classes. Eventually they replaced the Jews in many areas, especially banking. In its drive to modernize its military, diplomatic, medical and educational institutions, the Ottoman government
needed Western languages and Western skills. By now, the Jews had little to offer, having lost their European cultural connections and regressed educationally, mostly due to the opposition of traditionalists in their communities to opportunities offered by foreign institutions (predominantly missionary) of which Armenians and Greeks took advantage. Furthermore, many wealthy Greeks went on to study in Italy and returned to act as physicians and translators to leading Ottomans, thereby gaining prestige and power and eventually replacing Jews as financiers and international merchants. European companies began to make inroads into the Empire, preferring to deal with Christians who were also more numerous than Jews.

Even the humbler jobs which they had retained... were taken from them by the Armenians. While the other communities, Christian and Muslim, familiarized themselves more and more with the languages and affairs of Europe, they continued to remain stationary, and with apparent indifference saw their riches pass into hands of their rivals.66

The view of Jews by many Ottoman Christians at that time is articulated in a passage written by the nineteenth century Armenian Istanbuli C. Oscanyan:

`... [they] are by no means exempt from the sorrows and curses of their race. As if conscious that there is no escape from the contempt of the rest of the world, they are willing to undertake the meanest of earth’s callings, literally “to eat the dirt” of their Muslim masters... Content to appear like the refuse of humanity...peddling the meanest of wares in the streets, rag-picking and filth-gathering...are their means of earning a livelihood....`67

Such attitudes, coupled with physical attacks, provoked hatred of Greeks and Armenians, to the extent that Jews helped attacks by Kurds on Armenians in Constantinople in 1896 and 1908, and possibly galvanized the revival of Ottoman Jewry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Persecution was not limited to Jews in the new nations which had seceded from the Empire. Muslims were also subject to attack. During the Greek revolution, Shaw estimates that in Morea in the early nineteenth century 5,000 Jews were slaughtered together with most of the Muslims, totalling about 20,000.68 He believes that this, together with mutual poverty,

...created a feeling of brotherhood in suffering...It was the Jews and Muslims against the Christians, with the Jews extremely grateful for the protection provided by the Ottoman government.69

The Baghdadi Jews fared better since they were mostly craftsmen rather than merchants. But only about five per cent of the population could ever have been considered reasonably affluent.

I shall – in Part 2 – outline how the Jews began to regain their position in the late nineteenth century, and explore the rise of Zionism.

66 Ibid pp. 95-96
67 Ibid p. 96
68 Stanford S. Shaw The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (NYUP, 1991), p. 190
69 Ibid p. 210
Rahmi Bey – Vali of Aydın and Smyrna

by Antony Wynn
Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (retired)
Writer and Lecturer

Put yourself in the position of an Anglo-Argentine family at the beginning of the Falklands War. Your family has lived there for generations but your adopted country is now at war with your homeland. Where does your loyalty lie and, more importantly, where does the Argentine government think that your loyalty lies, or the British government for that matter? Now put yourself in the position of a British, French or Italian Levantine family in Smyrna in November 1914. Turkey has declared war and all nationals of hostile countries are to be interned for the duration.

The Levantines of Smyrna were lucky in their Vali, or governor. Evrenoszadeh Rahmi Bey70 came from a large landowning family of Salonika. As a young man he had joined the Committee for Union and Progress. After spending four years in Europe he had served as a member of parliament in Constantinople and, in 1913, was appointed Vali of the province of Aydın, which included the city of Smyrna. Like many Young Turks, Rahmi Bey was a freemason of the Macedonia Risorta Lodge of the Grand Orient. He was an educated man in the European fashion and an Anglophile. Dashing and handsome, his Anglophilia extended to one or two of the Anglo-Levantine ladies of Smyrna.

One of the largest Levantine companies in Smyrna at the time was the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, a consortium of industrial wool spinners, dyers and carpet merchants who had got together in 1908 to form a cartel. By 1911 this cartel controlled about 90 per cent of the Turkish carpet export trade and employed some 90,000 weavers all over western and central Anatolia. An endless stream of camel caravans delivered carpets to Smyrna for export to Europe, the USA, Argentina and Australia.

The OCM, as the company was known, did not produce just carpets. Wool that was unsuitable for carpet weaving was woven into cloth, most of which was turned into blankets and uniforms for the army and gendarmerie. The principal European shareholders were the Giraud, La Fontaine, Baker, Sykes, de Andria and Aliotti families, with the Armenian Spartali family. Some of these firms had been in business since 1840, while their families had been in Smyrna since the French revolution. The de Andria family had been in Smyrna since 1595. They all benefited from the ‘capitulations’, trade treaties with the Byzantines and then the Ottomans divided into sections, ‘capitulae’, which gave them many privileges and exemptions from taxation. Their whole lives were tied up with Turkey and, although they were British, French or Italian citizens subject to their own laws administered by their respective consulates in Smyrna, they were looked on with some suspicion by their compatriots at home. Their privileges were resented by Turkish nationalists and by merchants, who found it hard to compete with them.

70 Dr Ahmet Mehmetefendioğlu (9 Eylül University, Izmir) has done much research on the life of Rahmi Bey.
When war was declared, the Turks interned all Allied nationals in Anatolia for the duration and placed severe restrictions on those in Constantinople who had not already left. There was no movement allowed between Constantinople and Smyrna. European-owned businesses were sequestered. By the grace of good fortune for the Europeans of Smyrna Rahmi Bey ordered matters differently. He had been against the war movement from the beginning, predicting that it would bring disaster to Turkey. He summoned the Europeans and told them that, if they wished to leave, he would grant them twelve days to settle their affairs and depart with safe conduct. Those who wished to stay would be welcome to do so, he said, and their property and businesses would be protected. Most of the young men dashed off to join up, but the older ones, whose only home this was, decided to accept Rahmi Bey’s word and stay on to take care of their property and businesses.

The carpet export trade, for lack of freight, of course dried up. The cloth business was quite another matter. Seeing what was coming, the OCM had written to the authorities in London in the lead up to the war asking whether, in case of war, the OCM should continue to supply the Ottomans with cloth, but answer had come there none. Rahmi Bey politely informed the OCM that the Turkish army required cloth for their uniforms and that they expected the OCM to provide it. If they refused, the government would have no choice but to sequester the factories. If they agreed to continue the supply he, Rahmi Bey, would ensure that they received proper payment for whatever they delivered. The OCM were now in a dilemma. What was their patriotic duty as British citizens? What was their duty to their business and families? After a great deal of correspondence and soul-searching they concluded that, since they had been ignored by London, who considered them to be Turks anyway, and since cloth was only cloth and not armaments and since the war would not last for more than a few months, they might as well continue as before. If not, they would lose their businesses and there would be nothing left for them after the war.

Rahmi Bey was as good as his word. At some risk to himself, he made sure that the cloth was paid for and that nobody molested the Europeans, who were left at complete liberty within his province. He even let them keep their sporting weapons and supplied them with a gendarmerie escort whenever they wished to go duck shooting. From time to time, when reproached by the war party in Constantinople for being too friendly to the Europeans, he felt obliged to put them under house arrest for a week or two, but he did this with such exquisite courtesy that nobody minded.

At the end of the war, when the Allies occupied Constantinople, they arrested Rahmi Bey as having been a member of the Committee for Union and Progress and exiled him, together with other members of the war party, to Malta. It took a great deal of effort on the part of the British directors of the OCM to persuade the military authorities to release the man who had saved them, their property and their business. Long afterwards, after the final peace treaty had been signed, they were able to show their gratitude by making him a director of the OCM.

More of this story is told in Antony Wynn’s *Three Camels to Smyrna*, obtainable from *Cornucopia* magazine.
Officializing difficult pasts in Turkey’s sites of atrocity: the Madımak Hotel
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On 2 July 1993, the city of Sivas in central-eastern Turkey saw a rioting mob take to the streets in their thousands. Judging by their slogans, the rioters were anti-secular Islamic fundamentalists protesting against a culture festival held in the town and against its participants. The mob’s actions culminated in their setting ablaze the Madımak Hotel where the festival participants had been accommodated. The then state authorities failed to prevent the arson despite their on-the-scene presence. By the time the fire was put out and the mob dispersed, the building was already in ruins. Thirty-three of the festival participants and two hotel workers lost their lives inside the hotel, while the ensuing chaos took the lives of two more people from among the crowd on the streets. Today, this atrocity is known to many in Turkey as the Sivas Massacre (Sivas Katliamı).

The festival whose guests were targeted in the arson was organized by associations representing Turkey’s Alevis, a multi-ethnic belief group whose practices and rituals differ fundamentally from those of the Sunni (the demographically predominant sect of Islam in Turkey). But its scope was much wider than that of an intra-community event. Likewise, not all festival guests, in other words, the survivors and victims of the 1993 atrocity, were necessarily Alevis. Nevertheless, the foremost actors to identify with the victims, and pursue the case on legal, social and political platforms have been associations representing the Alevi community. One of the most important forms this pursuit has taken is the demand for the site of the atrocity to be converted into a museum in memory of the victims.

In spite of the demand for an on-site memorial museum, the Madımak Hotel was repaired, rather swiftly after the arson, to continue serving commercial purposes. A couple of years later, a charcoal grill restaurant opened on its ground floor. Over these years, associations representing the Alevi insistently raised the museum demand, and voiced it during the on-site demonstrations they held every year on 2 July. It was due to the pressure exerted by these demonstrations that state authorities decided in 2010 to expropriate and transform the hotel. After a very secretive process in which the wider public was uninformed about the site’s upcoming function, the building was inaugurated in May 2011 as a ‘Science and Culture Center’. Although the architectural program of the center has not been wholly commemorative, the transformation still ascribed a very significant memorial role to the building which materialized in a wall dedicated to the 1993 arson, called the ‘Memory Corner’.

‘Memory’ is something that for those familiar with Turkey connotes the notion of ‘absence’ rather than that of ‘presence’. Scholars of Turkey have repeatedly demonstrated that the foremost method in which the state has dealt with the legacy
of the atrocities in the country’s past has been one of suppression by silencing and forgetting— a view so widespread as to dominate popular opinion. Some have suggested these methods to be among the pillars of the Republic of Turkey from its establishment in 1923 onward—to be employed throughout the different political periods in the country’s history regardless of the specific actors governing in any one period. Recently the transformation of the former Madımak Hotel has also been discussed as an example of state-sponsored forgetting. Indeed, such an analytical approach prioritizing the two notions of remembering and forgetting, while discussing the ways people and societies relate to the past, is not unique to studies on Turkey and has been shared also by many a present-day scholar around the world.

But, against that background characterized by ‘state-sponsored forgetting’, consider this scene. It is 10:00 am on 2 July, 2010, in Sivas. Minister of State Faruk Çelik arrives at the Madımak Hotel with a large entourage of state officials and press, to become the first representative of the state ever to pay a commemorative visit to the site of the Sivas Massacre. After the observance of a moment of silence, Minister Çelik takes the floor and delivers a speech:

The 2nd of July, 1993, is one of the painful days of our history... Insidious power groups sought to stage dark scenarios... to destroy our fraternity by way of manipulating our differences... The pain that the Madımak Hotel bears is ours altogether; it is the pain of the whole of Turkey. There can be no sides in this incident; to take a side in this incident means to not extinguish the fire... I vehemently condemn those who hatched this event... Nothing was able to ruin our unity and togetherness and will not be able to do so unless we allow it. We will not forget this event which took place seventeen years ago but will also remember our fraternity, and will embrace each other tighter than ever. The screen of fog surrounding this incident has not yet been lifted... I say that we should take the necessary steps to advance our unity and togetherness in spite of those who are disturbed by our unity, and that I remember with grace and respect our thirty-seven citizens who lost their lives on the 2nd of July, 1993.

Understanding the contestation over the past as a dichotomy between remembering and forgetting, whereby the latter is the method associated especially with the state, may indeed hold relevance most of modern Turkey’s history. But, consider how that


72 Meltem Ahiska and Biray Kolluoğlu Kırlı, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 34 (Spring 2006), pp.5-8: 5.


dichotomy is complicated by Faruk Çelik, who refuses to “forget this event which took place seventeen years ago”. In many ways this refusal to forget indicates a methodical shift in the state’s stance towards difficult pasts. The shift is one from the ‘forgetting’ and ‘silencing’, which have long characterized the state’s attitude toward difficult events of the past, to remembering in its own way and repurposing the past for present-day needs.

Evidence for this shift is plentiful. Take for instance the 2010 referendum where the public was asked to vote on the need for a new constitution, the date of which was chosen as 12 September 2010 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the 1980 military coup. This is but one gesture through which members of the governing AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party) have sought to position their rule against the rubric of a ‘coup-era’, in vague reference to the several military interventions in politics Turkey has seen in the past five decades. In order to ground such arguments in practice and demonstrate their sincerity, the AKP launched a set of initiatives in the run-up to the referendum. The most important case in point was the 2009 initiative Milli Birlık ve Kardeşlik Projesi (National Unity and Fraternity Project), known popularly as Demokratik Açılım (Democratic Opening). The initiative consisted of a series of workshops with NGOs and representatives of historically underrepresented groups such as the Kurds, Alevi and non-Muslim minorities. As part of the specific initiative which concerned the Alevi Çalıştayları (workshops) – the coalition of associations representing the community found the opportunity to raise five key demands, one of which was for Madımak to be turned into a memorial museum. Minister Çelik’s 2010 visit to the hotel took place right after the Alevi workshops, and was thus taken as a token of the state’s commitment to engaging with the museum demand. Also around this time, Ankara’s Ulucanlar Prison, which is another site associated with socio-politically difficult pasts, was turned into a ‘Prison Museum’ under the auspices of a consortium whose members included the Ministry of Justice and the AKP-ruled district municipality where Ulucanlar is located.

Despite the considerable support it has enjoyed, the ruling party’s self-proclaimed ‘post-coup-ness’ has not gone unchallenged. Groups whose members identify with the victims of difficult events in Turkey’s past have called for the government to acknowledge publicly the state’s responsibility in the atrocities of the various periods which members of the government have often referred to indiscriminately as the ‘coup-era’, and for the law to hold perpetrators legally accountable. But a number of judicial and legal shortcomings suggest that these demands are far from being met. These include court cases unresolved or ‘lapsed’ due to the statute of limitations, limited investigations that fail to account for the official authorities’ role in the atrocities, and numerous perpetrators who have managed to flee justice. Interestingly, these shortcomings have occasionally been alluded to also by state officials, such as Minister Çelik’s speaking of a “screen of fog surrounding” the Sivas Massacre, which “has not yet been lifted.”

It was in an atmosphere marked by such sense of injustice that the site of the Sivas Massacre was architecturally transformed to become a ‘Science and Culture Center’. The building now serves children between the ages of six and fourteen. In term time, pupils from elementary schools visit the site in groups to hear lectures by teachers employed in-house, read books in the library on the ground floor, and observe basic physics experiments on the upper floor. However, if the 1993 atrocity seems excluded from the building’s educational program, it is explicitly commemorated in the specific architectural element of the ‘Memory Corner’. Occupying a whole wall on the building’s ground floor, the Memory Corner presents a list of thirty-seven names which include the two arsonists and two hotel workers who died during the arson. The names are written in alphabetical order, which means that one of the arsonists tops the list.

Speaking of the Science and Culture Center project and of the specific element of the Memory Corner, state authorities argue that they have maintained a ‘human-centric’ approach in that they “do not distinguish between the people who died in the incident.” This alleged ‘objectivity’ is reflected also in an anonymous quote in the Memory Corner, which is effectively a one-sentence summary of the speech Minister of State Faruk Çelik gave when he visited Madımak in 2010. The theme of ‘objectivity’ materializes in the Memory Corner not only textually but also architecturally and visually. This has to do with the structure’s striking resemblance to a well-known architectural element from the context of Republican Turkey. Colloquially known as ‘Atatürk Corners’, various examples of this element are found across Turkey in state buildings. Such appropriation of the ‘Atatürk Corner’ indicates that this architectural element which is associated strongly with a bureaucratic neutrality is called upon in order to consolidate the theme of ‘objectivity’.

But this alleged ‘objectivity’ continues to be challenged every year on 2 July outside the former Madımak Hotel. Whether viewed as a gesture toward the historically marginalized sectors of society or considered a contentious attempt to colonize memory, the transformation of the building has yet to subdue the grassroots ways in which the site is ascribed memorial significance. The fact that its transformation has taken place simultaneously with developments in court that have prompted a strong sense

80 The statement reads (translation by the author from the original Turkish): “In the deplorable incident which happened on 2 July 1993, our thirty-seven people have lost their lives. With the wish that such pains are not lived through again…”
81 The Memory Corner also presents a statement which it attributes to Mustafa Kemal. It reads (translation by the author from the original Turkish): “Whatever be the different ideas, different beliefs in society, there is no task that cannot be fulfilled, no obstacle that cannot be overcome for a nation which knows how to act in national unity and togetherness.”
of injustice in the hearts and minds of those who identify with the victims, has rendered the site only second to the courtroom in terms of its role as a platform where the atrocity is negotiated with judicial undertones. As a leading Alevi spokesperson suggested in his speech during the on-site commemoration in 2012, “this is where the court case is being held”. Such statements show that, vis-à-vis feelings of injustice aggravated by judicial shortcomings, attempts to officialize difficult histories by way of transforming sites of atrocity only adds to the ‘difficulty’ of the pasts with which it claims to engage.

Stay-at-Home Migrants in Antalya
by Brian Beeley

Most rural-urban migration involves physical relocation. But cities can also grow by absorbing existing nearby settlements which are then progressively transformed into urban places by spatial and functional reorganization. This procedure, which may be haphazard or organized or a mixture of both, has a long history across the urbanizing world but in Turkey it is of special significance nowadays because of the scale and speed of urban expansion and the distinctly top-down Turkish system of spatial readjustment and planning. Carefully determined decisions guide the changes to land use and the introduction of ‘urban’ functions. Thus a village or sub-district becomes one or more administrative urban neighbourhoods (muhtarlıklar). Officially designated urban services progressively introduced into the newly annexed areas range from road and public transport improvements to the provision of electricity and piped water where these were previously absent. But the main change is the reorganization of land holding and use (imar)\(^82\). This differs fundamentally from the largely spontaneous growth, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of cities such as London where, even today, one-time villages such as Croydon, Eltham, and Hampstead, retain their names and distinctive local identity. Typically imar in Turkey involves

(1) the identification (by planning authorities) of an incorporated area to be reorganised,
(2) approval of a new lay-out plan for that area, distinguishing public spaces and those which are to remain private,
(3) return to the original private land holders of the equivalent of 60-65% of their pre-reorganisation holdings and
(4) construction in the public area of roads, amenities and infrastructure in the 35-40% retained for the public domain. Holders of the new-design private plots returned to them are free to build or to retain their land for agricultural use except where special planning restrictions have been made – as when a farmed area may be ‘protected’ for recreational or other special purpose, as is the case in the villages discussed here.

\(^{82}\) See ‘The applicability of urban land acquisition methods for the provision of serviced residential land in the Turkish case’, International Development Planning Review, 26(2), 2004, pp.141-166.
The focus of this enquiry is the impact on a group of Turkish villages of their annexation into an expanding metropolis – Antalya. Villages affected are transferred from the rural to the urban, with further impact on villagers themselves and on the city. Meanwhile, although our stay-at-home migrants in this case do not physically relocate themselves they nevertheless experience levels of socio-economic and emotional ‘relocation’ from a more self-sustaining, traditional way of life to the wider national – and, ultimately, world view – from within the expanded city. Furthermore, even before annexation by the city, villages and villagers have become increasingly more ‘urban’ as a result of modernisation, including decades of state attempts to develop the rural hinterland and to integrate its people into the national social and economic space. The spread of literacy and rural infrastructure has progressively reduced rural distinctiveness. Adjacent villages and the individuals within them may, however, increasingly differ from each other – blurring both traditional-modern and rural-urban dichotomies across changing boundaries. These variations may be much less immediately obvious to outsiders than administrative lines which can be altered on a map by decree and which may suggest sharper spatial contrasts than in fact exist. The need for sensitive approaches to reorganization by developers is clear because rural people who become townspeople, with or without their physical relocation, are not as unfamiliar with urban life as might be assumed. At the same time urban-rural migrants move into villages either because they seek a rustic lifestyle or because they wish to commute to employment in the city – or both. The village community becomes less homogeneous with the potential for alienation between newcomers and established villagers.

Implicit in the deliberations producing ‘development’ plans for new urban areas is the assumption that a village benefits from becoming part of the town – whether it wants to or not. Although account is taken of the wishes and reactions of villagers, decisions in the Turkish system are overwhelmingly those of administrators and planners who look out from the city towards the newly acquired areas. To this extent the annexed village has the town thrust upon it. Inevitably within the village proposals for incorporation are assessed by individuals according to how they think they might gain or lose. Inevitably, too, links which a village may have had with other villages or rural areas may escape the attention of urban planners who see their role as bringing the town directly to the village, the urbs to the rus. Such pre-existing links between villages and their rural hinterlands (e.g. with upland yayla pastures) may be affected.

Antalya, possibly the fastest growing urban centre on the Mediterranean littoral in recent years, has expanded from a population of fewer than 100,000 in the mid-twentieth century to well over one million in summer time now. This has involved a vast increase in the officially defined urban space to include many hitherto independent villages. Thus do ‘rural’ people become ‘urban’ without leaving home. The spread and nature of the growth of built-up Antalya has been such that thinking about defining an open ‘green belt’ round the city gained momentum later rather than earlier. Now, however, there is awareness of the need to control unorganized urban sprawl and plans (nazım imar planları) are routinely taking a wider spatial view.
The case of villagers who experience ‘static rural-urban migration’ while moving nowhere is well illustrated by the group of a dozen villages in an area some twenty kilometres to the west of the core of Antalya city which saw particularly rapid expansion, much of it effectively uncontrolled, during the last decades of the twentieth century before the modern system of spatial planning regulation was firmly in place. During the past century one of these villages, Çakırlar, developed a central role and status within the group of villages, some of which are now redefined as ‘urban’ by decree – while others are not. Two of the redefined villages, Duraliler and Hurma, were progressively built up as residential areas within the expanded Greater Antalya. In both cases one has to search for the vestiges of their previous village status and character. Even the old village names are no longer in official use as both village areas are now known by the introduced names of the several new urban neighbourhoods – or ‘wards’ – into which they have been divided.

Çakırlar’s central function within the group of villages was reflected in its larger size, its official designation as the centre of a sub-district with, for example, the office of the sub-district officer and a police station, and by the fact that people in other villages in the group regarded it as their ‘centre’ for exchange and contact. Now these villages look directly towards the city brought relatively closer to them by improved communications as well as administrative redefinition. Equally villagers from the Çakırlar group are moving to the city while retaining links with their roots – perhaps leaving a house or some land to be visited at weekends or on vacation days. Where property is vacated altogether it may now be acquired by incomers, some of whom use it as a base for commuting.

The larger villages of the group lie mostly in the alluvial plain fed by three rivers which join together before entering the sea nearby. The alluvium permits profitable irrigated farming, including extensive orchards, while the agriculturally poorer settlements further up into the valley traditionally emphasised animal husbandry. All the villages and hamlets in the valley grew markedly in population size throughout the twentieth century, particularly after the eradication of malaria by the 1950s. Many people speak of their origins as nomads (yürük) and talk of their predecessors moving down from their mountain pastures (yayla) in the Taurus Mountains to the north and west. Prior to the 1960s the villages of the group were relatively remote from Antalya city because road communications were poor and vulnerable to flooding – as, quite seriously, in the winter of 1960-61. Barter...
figured prominently in the local economy at that time and there was limited export of produce. Many villagers – particularly women – rarely left the valley. Individuals tended to be acquainted with (or often related to) fellow villagers and traditional social structures were the norm with separation of the sexes in public and formal respect for older men, some of whom ran old-style guest rooms (misafir odaları) alongside the newer and more open coffee-houses (kahveler). Settlements with the status of ‘village’ took guidance from a Council of Elders (Köy İhtiyar Heyeti) the very title of which reveals a lot about the ‘old ways’, and its genderless language obscures the fact that elders were invariably men. From the 1960s it was clear that social patterns were changing. Transistor radios, visiting officials, agricultural extension agents, soldiers returning from national military service (or even the occasional foreign academic researcher) brought outside news into homes and into the coffee-houses which were replacing traditional private guest rooms. Following the national military coup in 1960 (27 May) identification with political parties strengthened in the villages as traditional family power structures weakened. Gradually day-to-day behaviour changed. Where a young man in the past would have been strictly deferential to a much older person, he might now cheerily (and cheekily?) greet a foreign stranger with “Sprechen Sie Deutsch?” More positively, village children were attending school more consistently and, increasingly, the gender balance in the classroom was becoming more equal.

Change came to the villages in the group with increasing rapidity from the 1960s with the construction of a substantial all-weather road out towards the city of Antalya to the east. Where a horse and cart had taken two to three hours to reach the city on a good day in earlier times, motor vehicles could make the journey increasingly quickly and predictably. In the wake of Turkey’s First Five Year Plan (1963–67) there were improvements in village infrastructure. Some village roads were asphalted. An office of the agricultural credit system opened. Agricultural extension agents appeared in the villages with advice and projects. The high levels of self sufficiency of the past gave way to incorporation into the wider national economy. Tractors and trucks appeared and together permitted the export of expanding production. Other innovations included a concrete cover over an irrigation channel where it crossed a track or the shared acquisition of a tractor or cultivator. All this in villages where a horse and cart was a rarity prior to the 1939-45 War. Camels were already almost a memory when cattle and goats were phased out in the 1960s in favour of expansion of profitable peanut-growing and then citrus to take advantage of the economic prospects which were becoming clear to villagers. New wells were sunk by individual farmers and the field irrigation system, which was supervised by the village council, was improved. Meanwhile the authorities began extensive flood control and barrage building projects to constrain the river which flows past Çakırlar to the south – and which was the main source of the extensive flooding previously experienced in the area from time to time.

From the 1960s onwards, production for export sale became the priority, with hitherto largely self-sufficient families now buying more of their needs for home
consumption both in the city and from itinerant vendors. Incomes rose markedly, if not evenly. There was increasing investment in agricultural equipment, in land, and in new and improved housing. A man from a middle ranking family in Çakırlar accumulated enough profit to go on the pilgrimage (Hac) to Mecca and to finance the extension of the main mosque in the village. Entrepreneurship spread along with growing awareness of the wider economic context of village life. The enthusiasm for citrus was followed by the spread of vegetable growing (aubergines, peppers, beans, tomatoes, etc) in greenhouses (serler), most of them built from resilient plastic sheeting.

All of this became part of Metropolitan Antalya by decree and the procedures of imar were put in place. But the planners, realistically enough, saw different development potentials in the various villages of the group. Two newly urban villages were speedily redesigned and built up with residential blocks and support facilities and amenities. Smaller settlements further up the valley were excluded from the changes and retain their village status. The remaining four larger villages, including Çakırlar, have been included in a special planning project area. This substantial area, newly partitioned into ten administrative muhtarlıklar, explicitly recognizes the agricultural richness of this central part of the group of villages and sees the rustic beauty of the citrus orchards and the flowing irrigation channels as something to be preserved and made more accessible to leisure seekers from the city. A small part of the project area is designated ‘recreational’ while most is to be a protected agricultural tourism zone (ekolojik tarım turizm alanları). New housing is to be largely restricted to the existing built-up village areas while there are to be new and improved roads, including a new major highway slicing through village lands. There is even the suggestion of a railway passing to the west of the project area and ending at the Free Port nearby! Villagers await action with a mixture of optimism and concern – and a realistic sense of inevitability.

In short, Çakırlar and the group of villages of which it is part are nowadays developing in two ways. They have experienced the economic progress and social change common to Turkey as a whole and they have also had urbanization thrust upon them by law and design. The result is twofold. The rate of ‘modernization’ is accelerated and much of that change is directed by urban priorities. In material terms the ex-villages benefit from a sort of development bonus but perhaps they stand to lose their ‘rural’ structures and connections so that the strengths of village community and identity fade away.

83 See Antalya Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Batı Bölgesi: 1 Etap Kırsal Planlama Çalışması, 1/5000 Nazım İmar Planı, April 2012, and other plans and documents.
The ancient city of Tlos (Dalawa to the Hittites and Tlawa to the Lycians) is one of the most popular tourist sites in Western Lycia. It lies in the foothills of Ak Dağ, the White Mountain, about an hour east of Fethiye and an hour west and then north from Kalkan. It is a compact site and from a vantage point on the acropolis Lycian, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman remains are all in view – and the archaeologists are busy revealing more. A decade ago you had to accept that the dense patch of greenery with a few trees poking out was ‘the church’. Now, the three-aisled basilica with a colonnaded atrium is fully revealed – sadly, no mosaics though. A small (10 x 5m), partially restored distyle temple has sprouted on the opposite corner of the agora. There are still small patches of painted stucco clinging to its stones serving to remind us that the gleaming marble we admire was not at all how the ancients saw it. The tarpaulin covering the floor of the bath house hints at exciting mosaics beneath it; the ruins of the theatre stage building are being excavated and the archaeologists have already uncovered a number of over life-size statues, now in the Fethiye Museum. All these revelations, and more if the pace of archaeological excavation and restoration continues, will appear in the next editions of the guide books and tour company brochures if they haven’t done so already. But there are ancient remains at Tlos which probably won’t ever appear in the glossy pages.

The road up to the city runs north, for about 4 km, from the village of Güneşli, earlier known as Düwer. About half way up, on the left hand edge of the road is a huge black rectangular stone standing on its side. We will take a closer look at this on our way back down the road. Shortly after the Ottoman fort capping the Tlos acropolis is sighted, a sharp left hand turn brings the great sheer face of the bastion into view – a sight which never ceases to thrill. About half way up the road running parallel to the bastion, on the right hand edge, is a small rocky outcrop which has obviously suffered from the hand of man. Closer inspection shows that it was once a two- or three-stepped pedestal on which stood, without doubt, a typical Lycian sarcophagus with its ogival or ‘Gothic’ profile. Using the pedestal as a marker, we can turn to face the other side of the road where the sheer face is densely overgrown. We can see a
short stretch of revetment wall of indeterminate age, then a curious semi-circular structure, barrel vaulted with two rings of large and well-fitting ashlers. Beyond that two small sarcophagi rise and hint at yet more relics above them. Altogether, it looks as though the road builders carved their way right through a small necropolis. And if we can get down below the road, this becomes a certainty.

Below the rocky pedestal there is a sheer drop of 20m or so before the surface levels out and then runs, ever more steeply, down to the torrent which gurgles its way around the base of the bastion. About 100m back down the road from the pedestal, we can scramble down without danger to life or limb and start to work our way back along the cliff face. The first surprise, shown at fig.1, is a semi-circular, barrel-vaulted shaft or tunnel driven under the road for about three or four metres. The vaulting is formed by huge limestone ashlers; the shaft where a sarcophagus will have stood is backed by marble slabs, and there are enough decorative pieces lying in the vicinity to suggest that the tomb once had a classical façade. This type of late Roman chamber tomb, classed, we believe, as Aediculae, are relatively rare in Western Lycia. There are a number to be found, both subterranean and above ground, at Cadyanda but that is about all. Many more are to be found, however, in ‘Rough’ Cilicia, far to the east. A few metres more and we find another aedicula, barely visible in the rubble and shrubbery.

Advancing a few more metres brings us immediately beneath the roadside pedestal which, as we can now see, sits on a vertical rock shaft. Cut into this are two Lycian chamber tombs or, to be precise, one and the remains of another (Fig.2). The left hand tomb is badly ruined although the kline or couch to take the corpse can still be seen cut into the right hand side. The right hand tomb is a well-preserved example of a typical early Lycian house tomb fashioned to represent the façade of a wooden dwelling – giving rise to the expression "the Lycians lived in wood and died in stone". The right hand panel of the façade has been smashed in but the left hand carries an eight-line Greek inscription in beautifully carved letters. On the left hand lintel there is a small three-line inscription (Fig 3) which has been partially erased by a sharp implement. The position of this inscription, its brevity and the erasure are sufficiently unusual to warrant further investigation. We found a transcription, made in 1895 by two Austrian epigraphers (Rudolf Heberdey and Ernst Kalinka), in Volume 2 of Tituli Asiae Minores: Tituli Lyciae lingua conscripti which is held in the British Library. Moreover we were able to call upon good friends to provide us with this translation:
The first inscription is typical of the type of sepulchral inscriptions found on Lycian house tombs; one can only imagine why the second inscription was never finished and subsequently erased. Based on the letter forms, Heberdey and Kalinka thought that the first inscription could have been made a little before the 1st century BC and that the second was made almost a century later.

There is more. About 10m in front of the first aedicula is a patch of shrubbery consisting mainly of the painful Kermes Oak, known colloquially as Holly Oak on account of its leaf shape. However, lying around among the boulders were sufficient pieces of worked masonry to suggest that it would be worth investigating the bushes – and indeed it was. Fig.4 shows the back of a massive structure measuring over 5m across and standing over a metre high. A number of 10cm square location sockets indicated that there had once been a second course of masonry and there was certainly sufficient cut stone lying around to account for at least two more. The front of the structure had slumped down the slope and it would take clearance of the shrubbery and some excavation to estimate its original shape. Lying in front of the structure, half buried in the greenery is a badly damaged sarcophagus. Apart from a simple linear design on the front blocks, we saw no other forms of decoration on any of the stones. Our best guess at the monument’s original shape is a three-sided structure enveloping a free-standing sarcophagus along the lines of the tomb shown in Fig.5 (which was taken at Sura, a small city site 100km or more east of Tlos).

Perhaps, after our exertions, a lunch break would be appropriate. Continue up the road for about another 3-4 km to find the Yaka Park – but be sure to find the Orjinal (sic) Yaka Park and not its upstart competitor lower down. Here, in an astonishing waterworld, freshly-caught and grilled trout is on the menu.

Thus fortified, it is time to investigate the black stone. Approaching it from downhill we can see, despite the domestic clutter, that it bears an inscription – 19 lines of it in the Lycian language (Fig.6). Closer inspection shows that the letters taper down in size from top line to bottom. This is a trompe l’oeil device intended to give the impression that, when viewed from below, all letters are the same size. The stone, clearly then, formed part of the superstructure of a larger monument. The inscription, unfortunately, cannot be fully read. Although the structure of the Lycian language is well-known – it is an Indo-European language from the

(i) Antiphilos son of Sarpedon of Achaia and Porphyra daughter of Eirenaios of the town of Malis [set up this] monument for themselves and for their descendants and for any who may be joined with them.

(ii) Lysimachos son of Hyperainetos together with his father...
same family as Luwian and (so-called) Hittite – the understanding of its grammar and lexicon is inadequate. Even the tri-lingual inscription, Lycian, Greek and Aramaic, discovered in 1973 at the Letoön sanctuary, added little. Even so, names and places can sometimes be read. The transcription, found in the aforesaid volume in the British Library, yields the name Ikuwe (line 1), who was certainly the owner of the tomb, and a place name, Wazzis, the location of which is not known. The name Arttumpara can be recognised (line 7) and Alakssaňtra (line 9) which is known to be the Lycian version of Alexander. Arttumpara is a name found in a number of other contexts and he was possibly a local or regional ruler, extant 380-360 BCE. Some authorities believe that the Alexander referred to was no less than Alexander the Great. If that is so, the close association on the stone of Arttumpara and Alexander, separated in time by at least a generation, does not help us interpret the inscription. As we said earlier, the stone must have been part of a larger structure but there are no other elements of it to be seen. To the side of the stone there is a sharp drop down to a stream and there might be traces down there. On the other hand, the road builders might have rejoiced at finding a source of hard core. As we leave Tlos, it is with a quiet prayer that when the road needs widening or re-surfacing, which it will inevitably, the road builders keep their hands off the big black stone.

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Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

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**In Memoriam**

**OSMAN STREATER**

1942 – 2013

Osman Streater who acted as a Council Member of TASG (now BATAS) from 1996 to 2009 came from a distinguished, partly Turkish and partly English, Levantine family. His father was Jasper Streater, who worked for a subsidiary of Unilever, first in Istanbul and then in Ankara, and his mother was Nermin Menemencioğlu, the great-granddaughter of the Turkish patriot and writer, Namik Kemal, whose poetry she translated into English. She is also the co-editor (with Fahir İz) of the *Penguin Book of Turkish Verse* (1978).

When Jasper Streater fell in love with Nermin Menemencioğlu, special permission for their marriage had to be obtained from President İsmet İnönü as it was not allowed at the time for Turkish girls to marry ‘foreigners’ even of Levantine origin. The couple married in Cairo in
1941 and Osman was born a year later. He spent most of his childhood in Ankara (Ayşe Abla İlkokulu) while during his adolescent years he was schooled in the UK (Sherbourne School for Boys in Dorset), visiting the Turkish Embassy in Paris during the holidays – the Ambassador Numan Menemencioğlu was Osman’s maternal great-uncle. (Turgut Menemencioğlu, Nermin’s brother was also a diplomat who served as Turkish Ambassador both in London and Washington.) It is reported that at Sherbourne he participated in a small group of ‘Arabists’, spending free afternoons in ‘a safe house with conversation, Chianti and tobacco’, and holding secret meetings with a Catholic priest (although Sherbourne School was strictly Protestant) ‘to discuss philosophy, music and art history’ (see Sir David Spedding, by Richard Norton-Taylor in The Guardian, 14 June 2001).

In Ankara his parents were famous for the cocktail parties they threw for the artists and writers of the capital, and their house was packed with established or ascendant personalities like Abidin Dino, Turgut Zaim, Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu, Mahmut Makal, Fakir Baykurt, and many others. After the Army Coup in 1960 life became difficult financially and the family moved to London, but still returned to Turkey regularly to spend their summer holiday there. On one of these occasions Jasper Streater passed away (1977) to be buried in the Protestant Cemetery of Feriköy (İstanbul).

Nermin Hanım continued living in London until 1977 (her ashes were later interred next to her husband in Istanbul) and hosting parties for Turkish expatriates based in the UK. It is at one of these parties that my husband and I met Osman to whom we took an immediate liking. His intelligent analyses of historical and current affairs, his gentle style and polite manners were all too impressive and inspiring. David Barchard describes “the combination of shrewdness, courtesy, and gentle humour that he inherited from his father [and which] made him a very singular person” (‘A Tribute to Osman Streater’, Cornucopia, 10 December 2013). While this is true, Osman also had characteristics which one can relate to his mother’s side especially when it came to diplomacy, determination and sociability. It was no surprise therefore that he conducted some high level PR work in London and also served as President of the Savile Club for several years (1990-1996). He regularly contributed articles, always starting with ‘From England…’ à la BBC’s Alistair Cooke reporting from America, to an online publication Açık Gazete [Open Newspaper], on social, historical and political matters. His letters, reviews and articles constantly appeared in The Daily Mail. He researched the family history of his mother’s side and published the findings in this Review (2013, No 21 pp 38-43; No 22 pp 38-42) and on the online website Levantine Heritage (http://www.levantineheritage.com/testi20.htm).

In 1997 Osman Streater very generously donated his mother’s highly valuable library of about 3000 Turkish books of literature, history, and sociology to the Turkish International Lycée at Sawston Hall (Cambridge). In 2002 this rich collection was passed on to the Turkish Embassy in London where it is kept now. The collection also included a copy of the 1932 edition of Kafatası with Nazım Hikmet’s autograph in it. Apparently the Streaters met the poet briefly in Istanbul in 1950 when he was released from prison – Nermin Hanım had been the first literary critic to write in the international media about him (see Mouvafak Nermin [Nermin Menemencioğlu] ‘A Poet of the New Turkey’, The Bookman, New York, Jan-Feb 1932, pp 508-15).

Osman Streater passed away on 22 November 2013. We send our deep sympathies to his wife Kabby, his daughter Olivia, and his grandchildren Enzo and Savuka. May he rest in peace.

Toprağı bol, mekani cennet olsun.

Arın Bayraktaroğlu
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<td>10.40</td>
<td>Opening remarks (Celia Kerslake, Chairperson of BATAS)</td>
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<td>10.50</td>
<td><strong>Dr Michael Axworthy</strong>, University of Exeter</td>
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<td><strong>Dr Kerem Öktem</strong>, St Antony’s College, Oxford &amp; Sabancı University's Istanbul Policy Centre</td>
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<td><em>The contested territory of political Islam in Turkey: From coalition to fratricide</em></td>
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BATAS Council is discussing the possibilities of an electronic version of this Review and would like to hear from anyone who is able to offer relevant technical advice. Please contact
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Request for contributions

TAS Review welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at bw.beeley@gmail.com and/or sigimartin@hotmail.com. Submissions for the Autumn issue would be particularly welcomed by 31 July 2014.
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