

Turkish Area Studies *Review*

Bulletin of the Turkish Area Study Group

SPECIAL EDITION




1923 – 2013

90th ANNIVERSARY

**OF THE FOUNDATION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**

www.tasg.org.uk



The 2014 John Martin Lecture

Professor Talât Sait Halman

Bilkent University, Ankara

on

**Shakespearean Art in the Turkish Heart:
The Bard in Ottoman Times and in the Turkish
Republic**

at

The School of Oriental & African Studies, London
The Khalili Lecture Theatre

Friday 24 January 2014 at 6 pm

For further information **and to reserve a seat** see also www.tasg.org.uk

Spring Symposium 2014

Emmanuel College, Cambridge

Saturday 26 April 2014

10.00 am to 4.30 pm

Details will follow (see also www.tasg.org.uk for more information)



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Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.

Editorial

Nine decades ago, on 29 October 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established. This momentous event brought an end to over a decade of continuous warfare and suffering, in which most of the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire were lost to Balkan nation states and European mandatory powers and even Istanbul and parts of Anatolia came under foreign occupation. Turks remember with gratitude the achievements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and others who led the movement of national resistance after the Armistice of 1918 and eventually secured the international recognition of an independent Turkish state. In the ninety years that have followed, the Republic of Turkey has become a major regional power with a democratic form of government, a population of 75 million and the 16th largest economy in the world. This issue of the *Review* joins in the recognition of the Republic's 90th anniversary with a special cover design and discussion of aspects of Turkey's political, economic, and cultural development as reflected in the TASG 2013 Spring Symposium. The 90 years' span is covered expertly from a political stance (Clement Dodd) and from a literary one (Celia Kerslake).

Gamon McLellan concentrates on the last half year and provides incisive and objective analysis of the current situation in Turkey, including mention of Prime Minister Erdoğan's broad-ranging 'Democratisation Package' (p13) which is arousing interest and anticipation in many quarters. McLellan's overall survey is then underpinned by eye witness reports about and reactions to the events of last summer with Natalie Martin covering Istanbul, Steve Bryant on Ankara and Kerem Öktem focusing on the Turkish media.

To give balance to our coverage we have articles on aspects of culture plus an interview. We are most grateful for these to our regular contributors including Arın Baraktaroğlu and Ayşe Furlonger. Of course, we are also deeply indebted to all our occasional contributors; we look forward to their continuing support. We also urge other readers to consider offering an article, a review, or a report for inclusion in a future issue of our *Review*.

Last, but far from least, we can report that the Council of the Turkish Area Study Group recently concluded a long period of discussion aimed at finding a more appropriate name for a society that has come of age. TASG is in the process of becoming the British Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS). The new name will be reflected in our next issue in the spring – though the name of this *Review* will remain as it is.

Brian Beeley
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor

Noteworthy Events

by Ayşe Furlonger

EXHIBITIONS

Turkish Pavilion at The Venice Biennale: Resistance by Ali Kazma



The Encyclopedic Palace, Giardini-Arsenale, Venice, www.labiennale.org/en/art/contact,
1 June - 24 November 2013

The 55th International Art Exhibition will take place in Venice from 1 June to 24 November 2013. The title chosen by curator Massimiliano Gioni for the 55th International Art Exhibition is Il Palazzo Enciclopedico / The Encyclopedic Palace.

Istanbul-born video artist Ali Kazma has been chosen to represent Turkey at the Turkish pavilion at this year's Venice Biennale. 'Resistance' is a multi-channel video installation in which the artist explores the networks that shape the human body within social, cultural, economic, political, scientific, and mental layers. Ali Kazma is a Turkish video artist primarily creating documentary videos. His work documents human activity, labour and explores the meaning of production and social organization through the detailed and meticulously created videos, mainly focusing on routines and cycles in different professions. The themes used in Kazma's works are often seen as highlighting past and present socio-economic and political issues in Turkey and, more specifically, Istanbul.

Ayşe Erkmen: Intervals

The Curve, Barbican Centre, Silk Street London EC2Y 8DS
24 September 2013 - 5 January 2014

This autumn, Turkish artist Ayşe Erkmen produces ambitious new work for the Barbican, highlighting the artistry and craft of scenic painting. From fairy tale landscapes, to atmospheric interiors and abstract designs, a series of scenic backdrops move up and down on an automated fly system. Dividing the gallery the backdrops become performers in their own production. When entering the exhibition, one encounters a large scale, white on black map of Turkey and the Mediterranean. Spanning from wall to wall and blocking the view of what lies behind, this imposing fabric resembles the set backdrops found in the world of theatre, ballet and opera.



Ayşe Erkmen was born in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1949 where she later completed her formal education in sculpture at the Mimar Sinan University of Fine Arts in the 1970s. She has been a professor at the Kunstakademie Münster, Germany, since 2010.

CULTURE

Turkish Day in Trafalgar Square

Trafalgar Square, London
2 November 2013: 8:00am – 9:00pm

Turkish day in London is a unique event inspired by the Turkish community living here in the United Kingdom. This event promises to be a full day packed with activities and features that

deliver the best and most accessible way to enjoy a Turkish cultural experience outside Turkey. Visitors are invited to enjoy live performances by leading Turkish artists and musicians and to view recreations of Turkey's greatest landmarks.

BOOKS

An unpublished novel by internationally acclaimed **Turkish novelist Yaşar Kemal** is set to hit the shelves nearly 40 years after it was written.



Titled *Tek Kanatlı Bir Kuş* (One-winged Bird), the novel was written by the author at the end of the 1960s, but had not been published before. *Tek Kanatlı Bir Kuş* sees the author departing from his trademark naturalism, experimenting with fantastical elements. Once again, Anatolia provides the setting. Yaşar Kemal focuses on the theme of fear, which spreads among society members like a contagious disease, through the stories of a postmaster named Remzi. The 90-year-old author is mostly known for his epic novel tetralogy *İnce Memed* (Memed, My Hawk) and he was the first Turkish author nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature. In his books, he generally explores the life struggles of people from the Çukurova region of southern Turkey in line with the economic developments in the area. His books have been translated into many languages. Yaşar Kemal published his latest novel *Çıplak Deniz*

Çıplak Ada (Naked Sea Naked Island) in October, the last instalment of the 'Island Story' tetralogy. In that series, he told tales of the exile of (Rum) Greeks from Anatolia following the First World War.

LECTURES

A series of lectures at King's College

King's College London Strand Campus, WC2, October – December 2013

For further information contact the convenors, Ioanna Rapti (ioanna.rapti@kcl.ac.uk) and Tassos Papacostas (tassos.papacostas@kcl.ac.uk).

Tuesday 12 November, 5.30pm (K0.31, King's Building)

Dr Yaman Dalanay (Oxford University): Ephesus during the Byzantine and Ottoman periods

Tuesday 26 November, 5.30pm (Council Room, King's Building)

Dr Günder Varınlıoğlu (Koç University): An island settlement in Late Antiquity: Boğsak off the coast of Isauria (Rough Cilicia)

Tuesday 10 December, 5.30pm (Council Room, King's Building)

Dr Koray Durak (Boğaziçi University): Byzantium's relations with the Islamic East: trade and beyond.

The Ottoman Empire and the Politics of Today

Dr Frederick Anscombe

School of Oriental & African Studies, College Buildings Room G3, Russell Square, London
21 October 2013, 5.15pm

Organiser: Professor Ben Fortna

Contact email: bf7@soas.ac.uk

MUSIC & PERFORMING ARTS


Turkish State Opera and Ballet Opens the 2013/2014 Season

www.dobgm.gov.tr

The Istanbul State Opera and Ballet will present the Benjamin Britten opera 'The Turn of the Screw' as its first performance of the 2013-2014 season on Thursday at 20:00 at the historic Süreyya Opera House in Kadıköy.

The Ankara State Opera and Ballet will open the 2013-2014 season with its production of the Verdi opera 'Rigoletto' on Wednesday at the Ankara Opera House. 'Bir Yaz Gecesi Rüyası', a modern dance rendition of Shakespeare's 'A Midsummer Night's Dream', will be staged on Thursday and Georgian composer Vakhtang Kakhidze's ballet 'Amazonlar' (The Amazons) is set for Saturday.

The Antalya State Opera and Ballet will present the Carl Orff cantata 'Carmina Burana' on Thursday at 20:00 at the Haşim İşcan Cultural Center.



Turkey's Politics since March 2013: a Survey

by

Gamon McLellan, SOAS, University of London

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government did not enjoy universally favourable press coverage at home or abroad in the first months of this year. There was less talk of the 'Turkish model' for the Arab world than had been heard earlier. Generally, however, the international verdict was favourable, with reservations. In the aftermath of its third parliamentary election victory in 2011, the AK Party had continued to deliver prosperity and growth (in sharp contrast to the situation in Greece), and its leader still enjoyed popularity in the Arab street. He had been praised for successfully eliminating the military and judiciary as political threats, and discussions aimed at resolving the country's entrenched Kurdish problem¹ looked as if they might prove successful. There were expectations, too, that in 2020 Istanbul might become the first Muslim city to host the Olympics, although in May, when Erdoğan was in Japan to

¹ For details, see *Review*, No 21, pp 11-16

finalise the contract for the Sinop nuclear power station and invited his Japanese opposite number to withdraw Tokyo's bid for the games,² he did not get a positive response.

The international image of the Turkish government and of the Prime Minister in particular was radically altered by the events of a few days at the end of May, when a peaceful demonstration was held against felling trees in the small Gezi park adjoining İstanbul's Taksim Square in preparation for the reconstruction of an Ottoman barracks. Reports suggested the barracks would house yet another shopping mall, to add to the 300+ malls Turkey already has. The demonstration was attacked by the police with clubs and tear gas, causing serious injury. The degree of force used against the demonstrators prompted widespread shock and outrage and led to an escalation of protest meetings both in Taksim but also in other cities across the country. All this prompted further violent dispersal tactics by the police, with tear gas canisters fired directly at close range at demonstrators' heads, water cannon spraying protesters with sewage water and – according to some reports – water laced with harmful chemicals. Savage clubbings and beatings were administered to demonstrators and people who happened to be in the vicinity, and sexual assaults and abuse by police against women caught up in the incidents were reported. Serious injuries resulted: deaths, blindings, genital damage and brain injury were recorded, and tear gas was used indiscriminately. Canisters were lobbed into the windows and doors of private residences in the Taksim area, and on one occasion into the Taksim underground station, with members of the public prevented from leaving.

Some of the worst police violence was seen in central Ankara. Ethem Sarısülük was left brain-dead after being shot by a policeman there on 1 June: he died two weeks later.³ In late June, a video emerged showing three students (one of them a woman) trying to hide in an underground car park in Antalya on 2 June. A group of 17 police officers discovered them and savagely beat them. One of the students was the son of a local policeman, and he decided not to press charges so as not adversely to affect his father's position.⁴ A 22-year old, Abdullah Cömert, died of multiple head injuries during a demonstration in Antakya on 4 June.

The main television news stations did not initially show what was occurring: they broadcast recorded programmes – one channel infuriated viewers by screening a documentary about penguins. Those channels that did carry live pictures of the events were fined by the broadcasting regulatory authority RTÜK for "harming the physical, mental or moral development of children and young people".⁵ Despite the weakness of much of the domestic news broadcasting, the incidents and allegations of excessive and lethal violence were comprehensively reported by western reporters on the scene, and have since been catalogued in detail by international human rights organisations.⁶

² *Cumhuriyet* 4 May 2013

³ *Cumhuriyet* 3 and 15 June 2013

⁴ *Hürriyet* 24 & 26 June 2013 <http://webtv.hurriyet.com.tr/20/51327/0/1/antalya-da-otoparktaki-polis-dayagi-kamerada.aspx> <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23589321.asp>

⁵ The stations fined were Ulusal TV, Halk TV, Cem TV ve EM TV: *Radikal* 12 June 2013

<http://i.radikal.com>

http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/rtukten_halk_tv_ve_ulusal_kanala_ceza-1137251

On 15 June, the BBC pulled out of a long-standing contract to supply a regular news programme for broadcasting by the news channel NTV, when the latter declined to show a particular episode dealing with the dispersal of the demonstrations:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/06/130614_bbc_ntv_peter_horrocks.shtml

⁶ Notably by Amnesty International in a report published on 2 October at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/022/2013/en/0ba8c4cc-b059-4b88-9c52-8fbd652c6766/eur440222013en.pdf>. The report is also available in Turkish at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/022/2013/en/6e4b867c-b4aa-4016-b584-33be46e35ae7/eur440222013tr.pdf>

The Gezi demonstrations produced some powerful visual images: a woman wearing a smart red dress and holding a white handbag being directly targeted in the face with tear gas by a policeman in riot gear standing a couple of yards away from her; and an Australian woman in a black dress who stood defiantly with her arms outstretched in front of an armoured vehicle (TOMA) as it sprayed her with a water cannon. Her courage was underlined by an incident in Ankara, when a demonstrator was crushed under such a vehicle and severely injured. Rather different images emerged in the Gezi Park in early June, when the *Miraç Kandili* (commemoration of the journey undertaken by the Prophet Muhammad in a single night from the Masjid ul-Haram in Mecca to the Masjid ul-Aqsa in Jerusalem) was celebrated by demonstrators: two days later (7 June), Friday prayers were performed on the site.

The determination shown by large numbers of demonstrators of very different ages, classes and lifestyles to persist in their protests in the teeth of the police violence came as a surprise to many observers both in Turkey and abroad. The scenes appalled and disgusted a wide segment of society, including many who had previously supported the AK Party and sympathised with the party's agenda of removing restrictions on religious observance, as well as relatives of the demonstrators who did not necessarily share their views at the start of the process. Amongst the half of the population who did not vote for the party in 2011, anger with the party's manner of taking decisions such as the future of the Gezi Park served to focus anger at a whole series of government actions and attitudes over the previous months.

There had been previous instances of violent police suppression of dissent, particularly when the Prime Minister visited university campuses (see *Review*, No 21, p 15). There had already been anger at police tactics in dispersing demonstrators in Istanbul on 1 May, when three people were seriously injured, including a 17-year old girl hit by a gas canister at close range. But the Gezi violence incensed many people who were already concerned at the government's determination to impose a more conservative, Islamic life-style on society. Attempts by the authorities in Ankara to introduce a ban on couples' kissing in the underground led to a kiss-in demonstration. This spring, there were several blasphemy trials: Sevan Nişanyan⁷ was sentenced to 13.5 months in May, and the pianist Fazıl Say and the lawyer Canan Arın were given suspended sentences – the former for tweeting a poem attributed to Omar Khayyam; the latter for referring to the Prophet Muhammad and President Gül in a discussion about child brides. Western culture was targeted: in May it was announced that the State Theatres, the State Opera and Ballet, the State Symphony Orchestra and the Fine Arts authority would be abolished and replaced by a new board which would determine arts policy and decide which productions/works would receive financial support.⁸ The Atatürk Cultural Centre on Taksim Square has been closed 'for restoration' since 2010, and it came as no surprise in June that the Prime Minister declared it would be demolished.⁹

It seemed there was an acceleration towards a more Islamic society – or as critics maintained – towards an Islamic state. They noted that the initials T. C.¹⁰ were being removed from a number of public buildings. Segregation of the sexes became more common, particularly in educational institutions. At the end of May, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was given new authority to give rulings on topical issues: commentators interpreted this as restoring the function of issuing *fatva* enjoyed by the Şeyhülislam in Ottoman times.¹¹ The government's determination to create a religious generation was revealed most clearly in the early summer as new İmam Hatip (Imam Preacher) schools were opened around the country or converted from previously secular schools in readiness

⁷ Compiler of *Sözlerin Soyağacı: Çağdaş Türkçenin Etimolojik Sözlüğü* (Turkish Etymological Dictionary)

⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 23 May 2013

⁹ <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/olayin-geldigi-nokta-ideolojik/45395>

¹⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic)

¹¹ *Cumhuriyet* 30 May 2013

for the new academic year. Figures which emerged in October showed that since 2002 these schools had increased from 450 to 2,074, with pupil numbers rising from 71,000 to 450,000.¹²

The religiously less observant amongst the population were particularly incensed at the new restrictions on alcohol consumption introduced this year, and the manner in which this was done. On 26 April, the Prime Minister made a speech about the evils of alcohol, declaring that Turkey's national drink was ayran.¹³ Within a matter of days, a bill was brought to Parliament restricting alcohol sales. In its final form it outlaws the sale of alcohol between 10 pm and 6 am, makes it more difficult for restaurants to get drinks licences, requires such establishments to be at least 200 metres from a place of worship or education, and bans most drinks advertising. The bill was promoted on the grounds of protecting youth. On 28 May, the Prime Minister referring to the opposition said "when a couple of drunks make a law you respect it, but when we make a law for something that faith imposes, you reject it. Why?"¹⁴ This reference to faith was taken as confirmation that the motive was religious and that the ultimate aim is eventual prohibition.

Finally, Gezi was primarily about an environmental issue – and reflected widespread dismay at the relentless construction ambitions of the ruling party. There were only a few trees to be cut down in Gezi – but many hundreds of thousands are to be felled to the north of Istanbul for the construction of the new third bridge and for the new cities planned for the surrounding areas on both sides of the Bosphorus. Professor Cemal Saydam of Hacettepe University's environmental engineering department warned that the Government's canal project to connect the Black Sea to the Marmara in Thrace risked upsetting the delicate system of currents through the Bosphorus and turning the Marmara into a dead sea.¹⁵ And there is the environmental damage being perpetrated in river valleys around the country as they are dammed. All this and more fuelled the Gezi protests. In September, a plan to put a motorway through the Middle East Technical University campus in Ankara precipitated further demonstrations, which received the same response from the police. In reality, the protests eventually ended in Taksim, but there have been sporadic demonstrations in different areas of the country ever since, and the anger has not subsided.

The government appeared to have been taken by surprise at the rapid escalation of the demonstrations. On 31 May Kadir Topbaş, the Mayor of Greater Istanbul, said the demonstrators were misinformed: there was no plan for a shopping mall on the site of the park. Confusingly, however, the following day Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç said it would be better to persuade people about the merits of a shopping mall rather than spray them with tear gas. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan adopted a more strident tone, labelling the demonstrators *çapulcu* ("looters" or "marauders"), an epithet enthusiastically adopted as their own by the demonstrators. As the crisis intensified, the Prime Minister left for a pre-arranged visit to Algeria and Tunisia 4 - 6 June, leaving Arınç in charge of the government. With the Prime Minister out of the way, it was hoped the crisis might be defused. Arınç conferred with President Abdullah Gül and on 4 June apologised to the demonstrators for the initial police attack on them.¹⁶ The President had also called for moderation from both sides, saying that the message (from the demonstrators) had been received. Fethullah Gülen said the protestors' demands should not be ignored.

However, Erdoğan returned from Tunisia on 7 June and intensified his strident rhetoric against the demonstrators. Police violence continued, and people caught up in the clashes

¹² <http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gundem/imam-hatip-okullarinin-sayisi-tam-5-kat-artti-385476/> 8 October 2013

¹³ Beverage made from yoghurt mixed with water and salt

¹⁴ <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-28-mayis-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-m/45231>

¹⁵ <http://www.arkitera.com/gorus/index/detay/bakin-rafa-kaldirin-demedim-unutun-dedim/408>, posted 23 July 2013

¹⁶ *Cumhuriyet* 5 June 2013

sought refuge from the beatings and tear gas wherever they could: in private houses, the main hotels around Taksim Square and even mosques. The Bezm-i Alem mosque by the Dolmabahçe Palace became a makeshift hospital and refuge with the consent of the mosque authorities. A story emerged of demonstrators drinking beer and going into the mosque with their shoes on.¹⁷ The Prime Minister incorporated this into his speeches, repeating the charges on numerous occasions, despite vehement denials from numerous eye-witnesses. These included Süleyman Gündüz a columnist from the pro-Government newspaper Yeni Şafak, who visited the mosque and made his own inspection concluding that nothing untoward had occurred,¹⁸ and the müezzin who specifically and repeatedly denied the allegations of drinking and impropriety.

These allegations and the Prime Minister's demands that the demonstrators and their supporters be held accountable¹⁹ were interpreted as an appeal to his core electoral support to take revenge on the government's opponents. The police smashed their way into the Divan Hotel in Istanbul, hurling smoke bombs into the lobby, attacking and detaining demonstrators, hotel clientele and medical personnel who had volunteered to help the injured. The police also attacked the entrance to the Marmara Hotel in Taksim Square. Erdoğan repeated his allegations about the behaviour in the mosque, referring to "my police"²⁰ and promising to give them added powers. AK Party municipalities provided buses to transport supporters to a mass rally in Kazlıçeşme in İstanbul,²¹ and there were reports that police in Ankara provided protection to thugs armed with clubs who were intent on attacking demonstrators.

Hannes Swoboda, Head of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, told Erdoğan to behave like a statesman.²² The Head of the German Green party Claudia Roth, who was tear-gassed in the Divan Hotel, described the scene as "like war" and accused Erdoğan of polarising Turkish society into the "AK Party and them".²³ The Istanbul Bar Association said the language of the government constituted a legal threat.²⁴

The perception that the Prime Minister was encouraging a "them and us" polarisation of Turkish society was reinforced by references to "the interest lobby" being behind the Gezi protests,²⁵ and by Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay's suggestion that "foreign forces and the Jewish diaspora" were behind the protests.²⁶ For good measure, Turkey's champion

¹⁷ A sensationalist account by Mustafa Durdu was published on the web on 5 June, alleging that the demonstrations had been ordered by the CIA and Mossad, that the Gezi park camp was a nest of prostitution, that the demonstrators had soiled the Bezm-i Alem mosque "like infidel American soldiers", that they had drunk alcohol and "possibly they even had group sex". <http://www.habervaktim.com/yazar/59624/bunlar-cianin-cocuklari.html>

¹⁸ <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/SuleymanGunduz/hakikatin-bilgisine-ulasmak/38061>, 9 June 2013

¹⁹ In his speech at the Kazlıçeşme rally in İstanbul on 16 June, the day the hotels were attacked, the Prime Minister said "we know very well those people in their hotels who cooperated with terrorism" and said they would be called to account: <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/biz-yuzde-yuzun-hukumetiyiz/46043>

²⁰ <http://www.haberler.com/basbakan-erdogan-2-son-allah-in-izniyle-bu-4758209-haberi/>

²¹ This meeting appears to be the one referred to in an open letter to the Prime Minister which appeared on the advertising pages of *The Times* on 24 July 2013: "...you held a meeting in İstanbul, reminiscent of the Nuremberg Rally, with total disregard for the five dead whose only crime was to oppose your dictatorial rule..." The letter, signed by a number of celebrities including Andrew Mango (biographer of Atatürk), the Turkish pianist and composer Fazıl Say (who held a concert in the Gezi Park during the protests), Sir Tom Stoppard and David Starkey, condemned the police clamp-down on peaceful protestors resulting in "5 people dead, 11 blinded due to indiscriminate use of pepper gas, and over 8,000 injured". The mention of Nuremberg seems to have particularly angered the Turkish government.

²² *Cumhuriyet* 18 June 2013

²³ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23515740.asp>, *Cumhuriyet* 17 June 2013,

<http://sozcu.com.tr/m/mobil/video.php?url=/2013/video/genel/rothdan-sozcuye-ozel-aciklamalar.html>

²⁴ *Cumhuriyet* 19 June 2013

²⁵ The Prime Minister's speech in Samsun on 23 June 2013:

<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25450624/#storyContinued>

²⁶ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23631279.asp>. This not surprisingly provoked strong international reactions, and attempts were made to "unsay" the comments and to suggest they were taken out of context.

wrestler declared that the demonstrators were Armenians, while the *Muhtar* (local administrator) of the smart Bosphorus suburb Yeniköy accused demonstrators there of taking their cue from (local) Greeks.²⁷

More seriously, the “them and us” language offended the large Alevi community, who had already felt insulted by the announcement on 29 May that the third Bosphorus Bridge would be named after Yavuz Sultan Selim (Selim I, “the Grim”). Selim was famous for his victories over the Persians and for reprisals in the name of Sunni Islam against the Kızıldaş Türkmen peoples of eastern and central Anatolia, ancestors of today’s Alevi Turks: one Alevi politician commented that Selim was a butcher, and that naming the bridge after him was an invitation to slaughter Aleviler. On 14 June, referring to a bomb attack in Reyhanlı a month earlier, the Prime Minister reinforced the message of exclusion when he declared: “Regrettably 53 of our Sunni citizens were martyred in Reyhanlı”.²⁸ President Gül suggested that a future project might be named after Hacı Bektaş Veli, the Sufi leader revered by Aleviler. When the Prime Minister announced his much heralded “Democratisation Package” on 30 September (see below), the only gesture to the Alevi community was to rename the university in Nevşehir after Hacı Bektaş. Taking the Prime Minister to task for his “them and us” rhetoric, Orhan Bursalı, *Cumhuriyet* columnist, argued that Erdoğan was provoking a ‘Clash of Civilisations’ within Turkey.²⁹ The same newspaper had reported an attack on an Alevi association building in Ataşehir in Istanbul by thugs armed with clubs and stones shouting “We’ll kill all the Aleviler”.³⁰

There was confusion in command in the authorities’ handling of some of the demonstrations. On 11 June, the police entered Taksim Square to remove banners and other material, but said they would not move against the demonstrators themselves. The governor thanked the demonstrators for their behaviour that day towards the police: a handful of people who threw Molotov cocktails at the police were, he said, members of a marginal group. He stated specifically that there would be no action against the demonstrators that day.³¹ Despite that, the police did intervene violently in Gezi Park later in the afternoon. Any confusion about who was responsible for decisions was laid to rest on 24 June, when Erdoğan spoke in fiery Islamic terms to a predominantly Sunni Muslim audience in Erzurum and stated categorically that it was he who had been issuing the orders.³²

The media were blamed for inflaming the incidents. Social media played a crucial role and were a particular target of government ire. Hüseyin Çelik, deputy chairman of the AK Party, condemned CNN and BBC reporting of the protests, and on 23 June the Mayor of Ankara accused a BBC Turkish Service journalist of being an agent. Egemen Bağış, EU Minister, invited EU ambassadors to a meeting at which he asserted that the Gezi protests had been planned years in advance and showed them a video which he claimed showed demonstrators drinking and misbehaving in the Bezm-i Alem mosque. The ambassadors were apparently unimpressed by this and by Bağış’s attempts to draw a parallel between the

²⁷ Despite the absurdity of this allegation it caused alarm amongst participants in a small demonstration in Yeniköy. Announcements were made through loudspeakers that the demonstrators were led by Greeks (*Rumlar*) and Armenians who had allegedly opposed construction of a mosque in the local park. Demonstrators, who included some Greek and Armenian residents, feared they would be lynched and some were beaten up by a mob some 30 strong which attacked the demonstration (*Radikal* 21 June 2013):

http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/yenikoy_muhtari_konustu-1138630,

http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/yenikoy_parki_forumuna_saldiri-1138514

²⁸ “Reyhanlı’da dikkat edilirse 53 Sünni vatandaşımız ne yazık ki şehit edildi”,

<http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/turkiyeyi-oyunun-icine-sokmayacagiz/45967>

²⁹ *Cumhuriyet* 25 June 2013

³⁰ *Cumhuriyet* 22 June 2013

³¹ <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=422092&kn=7&ka=4&kb=7>

³² <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakaneroganin-milliriadeye-saygi-erzurum-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metn/46327>

Turkish and various European police forces' handling of unrest.³³ And the video apparently did not show anyone drinking alcohol in the mosque.

Then there were the reprisals. Many people involved in the protests found that their careers were affected. The Health Ministry started an enquiry into doctors who had voluntarily treated the victims of violence 'without authorisation'.³⁴ In İzmir and Konya investigations were launched into teachers who took part in the protests focusing on their use of social media.³⁵ The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) has launched an enquiry into use of Twitter and Facebook by some of its employees during the protests.³⁶ Egemen Bağış had warned on 15 June that "from now" the state would be obliged to regard all those who stayed in the vicinity of the demonstrations as members of a terrorist organisation.³⁷ Thousands of individuals were detained officially or unofficially, and prosecutions were initiated for a variety of offences ranging from membership of terrorist organisations to trivial charges. Passive resistance took the form of people standing quite still for many hours in different parts of the country, and some of these were detained. A traditional form of protest in Turkey is the banging of kitchen pots and pans, and this was done extensively on balconies and in houses during the protests. It was declared an offence, and a woman in Ankara was fined 88 lira. The imam of the Bezm-i Alem mosque and the müezzin who declined to confirm the drinking allegation were both transferred to village mosques, and their boss, the Müftü of Beyoğlu, was sent to Karadeniz Ereğlisi. Koç Holdings, who own the Divan Hotel and made little secret of their opposition to the Government's reaction to the protests, found that some of its companies became subject to a detailed tax investigation. Reports emerged that no ground rent had been paid to the state by Koç University for seven years,³⁸ and most damagingly a contract awarded to Koç for the construction of warships was cancelled in September by a committee chaired by the Prime Minister.³⁹

On 5 August, verdicts were announced in the Ergenekon trial, a monumental legal process which started in 2007, involving an alleged conspiracy to bring a military take-over. Over 250 defendants were convicted. Former Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ and other leading generals were sentenced to life imprisonment, along with Doğu Perinçek, leader of the Turkish Labour Party (TİP). Mustafa Balbay, Ankara bureau chief of *Cumhuriyet* and elected MP in 2011, was given 34 years. The evidence presented and the conduct of the trial have been widely criticised, and Ergenekon and the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trial which issued verdicts in September 2012 (they were finally confirmed in October this year) have been likened to Stalin's show trials and are widely seen as politically driven.⁴⁰ The surgeon and academic Mehmet Haberal was released and duly took his seat in the National Assembly.

Turkey's relations with the European Union, already cool (see *Review*, No 21, p 17) were effectively frozen by European reaction to the Turkish police action. Scepticism was voiced about whether the Turkey of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could ever align itself with the values of the EU. Chancellor Merkel expressed her shock, and a vituperative response by Egemen Bağış did not help. Discussions on a new chapter due to start in June were postponed until after the publication on 16 October of the next EU Progress Report – ineptly timed for the middle of the Feast of Sacrifice (*Kurban Bayramı*). That report is expected to be particularly critical even by the standards of recent progress reports. Yiğit Bulut, foreign policy adviser to

³³ http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/egemen_bagis_gezi_olaylari_yillar_once_planlandi-1139094
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/23585144.asp>

³⁴ Vatan 14 June 2013 <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/doktorlara-gezi-soku/545976/1/gundem>

³⁵ *Cumhuriyet* 20 September 2013

³⁶ <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=447064&kn=7&ka=4&kb=7> (14 October 2013)

³⁷ Radikal 16 June: http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/egemen_bagis_taksime_cikan_terorist_muamelesi_gorur-1137822

³⁸ <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2013/09/30/koc-universitesi-7-yildir-devlete-kira-odemiyor#>

³⁹ *Zaman* 27 September 2013: http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_milgem-koctan-alindi_2142897.html

⁴⁰ See for example Rosemary Righter in *The Times* 7 August 2013: "The Spectre of Dictatorship hangs over Turkey"

Erdoğan, argued that Turkey should stop pursuing the EU bid and concentrate on enhancing its standing in the region,⁴¹ and Başış said Turkey might never become an EU member because of prejudice against its EU application.⁴²

The damage to the government's international image done by the police response to Gezi was reduced to some extent when world attention shifted to Egypt, where live ammunition was fired indiscriminately into crowds. However, the fall of President Muhammad Mursi was a blow to the government's regional policy. He had been the principal guest of honour at the AK Party congress in September 2012 (see *Review*, No 20, p 7), and there was close empathy between him and the Turkish Prime Minister: they saw themselves as the principal Sunni Islamist leaders in the region. Not only did the Egyptian coup remove a key friend: Ankara found it now had problems with Riyadh and other Gulf capitals that were keen to support the new Egyptian regime. The emergence of a *de facto* Sunni axis comprising Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, Gaza, Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Sudan and the Maghreb, possibly to be joined by a post-Assad Sunni Syria, seemed to have evaporated. Even more worryingly for Ankara, Bashar al-Assad is still in Damascus, and the earlier concern about the emergence of a radical Kurdish state on Turkey's border has been aggravated by a conflict between two jihadi groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida competing to set up an Islamic state of Syria and Iraq.⁴³ With Washington apparently unhappy about aid to these groups reported to be coming across the frontier from Turkey, the government's regional policy is appearing more questionable, and as the US seems unwilling to get militarily involved in Syria, there seems no end in sight to the volatile instability on Turkey's southern border. Refugees who could be accommodated in the short term are becoming a major problem, with concerns about epidemics spreading and more frequent clashes with Turkish citizens. Alawi refugees from Syria are confronting particular difficulties and dangers in Turkey, particularly in the official refugee camps where they fear attack by dominant Sunni Islamist Syrian groupings.⁴⁴

The optimism earlier this year at the prospect of a settlement of Turkey's Kurdish problem has not been maintained. The government appointed a number of 'wise men' to consider the issues and make recommendations. They duly obliged, but reports of a meeting with the Prime Minister in late June indicated that he was not prepared to accept many of their suggestions. He rejected removing the threshold requiring political parties to win at least 10% of the vote nationally before they can be allocated parliamentary seats in an election: an almost impossible task for a regionally based party like the (Kurdish) Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).⁴⁵ He also dismissed a demand for a halt in the construction of gendarmerie stations in the region, which was causing anger amongst residents. The meeting coincided with clashes between the gendarmerie and villagers in Lice who were protesting about the building of a gendarmerie post there. He apparently did not respond to a number of demands to improve the lot of remand prisoners charged in the KCK cases (see March newsletter for details of these trials). Nor did he agree to discussion of the Gezi protests during the meeting.⁴⁶ The protests seem to have deflected the government's enthusiasm for an immediate Kurdish settlement – perhaps because of the proximity of elections next year and a realisation that it may not be wise to rely on support from the BDP

⁴¹ Star 25 September 2013: <http://m.stargazete.com.tr/mobilyazar.asp?Newsid=792214>

⁴² He claimed this had also been evident in their attitude to Istanbul's Olympic bid <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10325218/Turkey-will-probably-never-be-EU-member.html>

⁴³ See *Washington Post* 13th October 2013: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaeda-linked-groups-taking-root-in-syria/2013/10/13/11d01b12-334c-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html

⁴⁴ The plight of Alawi refugees has been highlighted by *Cumhuriyet* and by Patrick Cockburn in *The Independent*, 6 October 2013: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-shias-in-fear-of-life-on-the-edge-8862645.html#>

⁴⁵ The BDP and its predecessor party acquired parliamentary representation in 2007 and 2011 by its candidates standing as independents who then rejoined their party once elected

⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet* 28 September 2013

to effect the constitutional changes the AK Party is seeking. Meanwhile, the PKK halted its withdrawal from Turkish territory in September. On 14 October, Abdullah Öcalan conferred with visiting BDP leaders. Much had been achieved last year, “but the problems facing us are like a mountain” he said in a published message. He had put his proposals to the government, he declared, and was waiting the State’s response for deep, meaningful discussions.

Work on the drafting of the constitution has continued, with agreement between the parties on some 60 clauses – but major disagreement on others, particularly on the AKP’s wish to move to a presidential system. Meanwhile the ruling party put together what was called the ‘Democratisation Package’, presented by the Prime Minister on 30 September. This brought good news for the AK Party’s core constituency. The ban on the headscarf in official government premises was abolished,⁴⁷ together with clothing restrictions on officials of either sex: only the military, judges and prosecutors will still be restricted in the clothing they can wear. Any kind of intervention in a person’s lifestyle will become an offence. Analysts have pointed out that this will make it a crime for a boss to prevent an employee downing tools to go to Friday prayers, for example. Mehmet Yılmaz in *Hürriyet* commented that “the tram is approaching its final destination”⁴⁸ – a reference to Erdoğan’s much quoted remark that democracy was like a tram: you get off it when you reach your destination.⁴⁹

Others were less pleased with the package. The Kurds have long demanded mother-tongue education in schools. The Prime Minister announced that this would be available – in private schools. This did not satisfy Kurdish leaders who did not see why it could not be made available free in state schools. Syriac community leaders, however, quickly announced they would be setting up private schools to provide mother-tongue education in Syriac. Their community though was not very impressed by the announcement that the land taken from the Mor Gabriel monastery would be returned: this had in any case been ordered by a judgement of the European Court of Human Rights. One proposal was specifically aimed at the Kurds: the end of legal measures prohibiting the use in official documents of such letters as q, w and x, which do not exist in Turkish but are used in Kurdish Latin script. The key Kurdish demands were not met, nor were those of the Aleviler. The government continues to resist demands to recognise the *cemevleri* as places of worship. A project financed by the Gülen movement for a building to house both a mosque and a *cemevi* has been dismissed by the principal Alevi organisations as an attempt at assimilation. The Greek Orthodox were disappointed that the package did not contain a decision to reopen the Patriarchal Theological School on Heybeli Island. The principle of reciprocity has been repeatedly repudiated by both the Turkish and Greek governments, and the government has said there was no impediment to opening the School. However they maintained they were waiting for the Greek government to allow a mosque in Athens and to permit western Thracian Turks to elect their own religious leaders.

Although in the summer he had refused to remove the electoral threshold, the Prime Minister now proposed three options for discussion:

- (a) keeping the 10% threshold but adopting a single member constituency system;
- (b) reducing the threshold to 5% and narrowing the size of the electoral regions; and
- (c) leaving the present 10% threshold in place.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ To the alarm of the government’s secularist critics, on the day the ban ended a television presenter who had appeared in a fashionably revealing dress was sacked after Deputy AK Party Chairman Hüseyin Çelik said he had seen a presenter on TV in a totally unacceptable costume

⁴⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/24882720.asp>, 9 October 2013

⁴⁹ *Milliyet* 14 July 1996

⁵⁰ A consideration of the implications of this can be found at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-328844-governments-proposed-election-systems-favor-ak-party.html>



The March 2013 TASG Review referred to a campaign to reconvert the Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya) in Istanbul into a working mosque, following the opening to Muslim worship of the Hagia Sophia in Iznik and the Hagia Sophia in Trabzon.⁵¹ In May, the Prime Minister declared that this could be put on the agenda once the Sultanahmet mosque was full. Various religious groupings called on Muslims to attend morning prayers in Sultanahmet on the first day of the *Kurban Bayramı*. Consequently large numbers of people made their way to the mosque on the morning of 15 October, and Sultanahmet was filled to capacity – many of the congregation were reported to be foreign Muslims. In his sermon, the preacher in Sultanahmet said: “Many of our brothers have got what they want in (government) packages. But don’t we have any wish from this package? Sultanahmet today is filled with this congregation. But Ayasofya is bereft of a congregation. Ayasofya weeps, it is in mourning. How many more packages do we have to wait for before Ayasofya is opened? Is Ayasofya too big to be included in packages? One day Ayasofya must open as a mosque. I am saying this with your wishes and in your name: ‘God willing we will perform the Bayram prayers together (there).’”⁵²

Attention is now focused on the local government elections in March 2014, the presidential election in August 2014, and the parliamentary general election in June 2015. Despite this summer’s upheavals, the AK Party remains the overwhelming favourite nationwide, although the local government elections will be seen as an indicator of any slippage. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has hopes of capturing the mayoralty of Istanbul – but can only do that with an attractive candidate. Mustafa Sarıgül, now mayor of the Şişli district, is the only one with some chance of doing this, but CHP infighting may rule him out. Kadir Topbaş, the sitting mayor, is the AK Party’s strongest potential candidate – but he may be replaced.

There is no serious CHP potential candidate for president. The issue is about whom the AK Party will select. Erdoğan is the favourite. Abdullah Gül, however, has taken care throughout the summer to use language very different from that of the Prime Minister.⁵³ The Gülen movement would appear to favour a second Gül term. The real result of the presidential election, as the previous one, is likely to be decided behind the closed doors of the AK Party leadership.

⁵¹ The building in Trabzon opened for prayers on 29 June, *Apogevmatini* 2 July 2013

⁵² <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/24920622.asp> 15 October 2013

⁵³ “Therefore, we cannot view every issue and every debate in terms of ‘black or white’, right or wrong’, ‘justified or unjustified, ‘us and them’ or ‘friend or foe’. In fact, viable solutions for social issues can usually be found in the grey areas, on the middle ground and by way of compromise. This is because people are inherently not disposed to being cast in moulds or in camps; be burdened with preconceived notions and prejudice; or be otherized.... we must avoid polarization and stand up for the values and virtues of our democracy as society. Let us all be awake to dangers that threaten democracy.... I viewed the peaceful demonstrations of the young people at Gezi Park, who showed their environmental sensitivity and concerns about the aesthetics of the urban environment, as a new manifestation of our democratic maturity.” <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/speeches-statements/344/87262/he-president-abdullah-gul-addrebes-tbmm-on-the-occasion-of-the-new-legislative-year.html>, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/371/87261/sayin-cumhurbaskanimizin-turkiye-buyuk-millet-meclisi-yeni-yasama-yilinin-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konu.html>

Gezi Park/Taksim June 7th-11th 2013

by Natalie Martin

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I first became aware of the Gezi Park protests on my Facebook account and it wasn't something I paid much attention to. It seemed too small and too far away to be of consequence to me.

However within a few days it was becoming clear that I had seriously misjudged the significance of Gezi Park and within a week I was flying to Istanbul to observe what was going on. Finding a hotel within walking distance of Taksim was easy as bookings had fallen off a cliff with the first whiff of tear gas. What I found in the Square was an astonishing, creative, idealistic and chaotic sea of humanity and colour.

The people there on the evening of Friday June 7th cut across the boundaries of age, class and politics. There were children and elderly people, courting couples, students and middle aged types who looked like they'd really rather be sitting down with their feet up after a long week at work. The only thing there weren't very many of were women wearing headscarves.

Inside Gezi Park things were different again. These were the original protesters who were in it for the long haul. They were younger and reminded me of the students from my own university days in England thirty years ago. It was like the Glastonbury music festival but with better weather. There was an idealistic atmosphere and Gezi had been transformed into a colourful campsite turned commune with a real sense of optimism and purpose. They knew it wouldn't last forever but were prepared to give it a go.

Over the next few days the Square was a street party for most of the time and political rally for some of the time. The grungy, hippy students with their rows of tents



in Gezi Park were being joined by their extended families who'd been profoundly shocked by the vehemence of the government's reaction to what was really a little local dispute over a few trees.

It had served to unite not only the generations but all the disparate political groups which were finding themselves increasingly swimming against the AKP tide. These included far left and Kurdish groups, trade unions, gay and lesbian campaigners as well as the environmentally minded groups who had initiated opposition to the bulldozing of a precious green space.

As an outsider looking in I have to say that of course there were a few radical elements amongst the occupants of Gezi. It was clear that the worldwide publicity was starting to draw in more extreme participants as the days passed. However I can also say that at no time did I feel unsafe – even after dark. People were polite



and welcoming without exception. I saw no violence on the part of the vast majority of protesters nor felt any menace.

The caveat to that of course is that the only time I was unsafe was when the police appeared backed up by their TOMA water cannon. They looked so youthful – younger than the Gezi students – and possibly slightly scared behind their uniforms and riot equipment. Nevertheless it was still a surprise when the crackdown started because there really was nothing to crack down on. The police reaction on the evening of June 11th was unjustified in terms of public disorder and clearly disproportionate. Tear gas appeared in front of me and behind me in a pincer movement trapping people within its grasp and making a quick getaway difficult.



I left Istanbul with a heavy heart early the next morning and followed the events of the next few days closely on Twitter. I missed the piano playing and the 'standing man' but would hope that they – not the TOMA and teargas – encapsulate the true creative spirit of Gezi as I experienced it during those few days in early June and a real hope for Turkey's future.



Ankara's Atomised Protest

by Steve Bryant

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The worst gassing I got this summer in Ankara was at a birthday party. My friend probably shouldn't have chosen a bar on Bülten Sokak, halfway between the flashpoint on Kennedy Caddesi and the regular protests at Kuğulu Park. We'd been chatting for an hour or two when a wave of young men and women came running past. They wore the outfit: light back-packs, swimming goggles, carpenters' dust-masks. One or two had plastic hard hats. Shortly after the crowd of twenty or thirty ran by, a blue Akrep, the Land Rover-based armoured vehicle made by Koç Holding's Otokar, swept into the street, flinging gas cannisters after the protesters. The demonstrators were long gone but the birthday party was soon coughing and crying. A few customers jeered the police and were shushed by others. Ten minutes later another group of protesters ran past, the same Akrep in pursuit, and the bar got a second dose.

Such surging movements characterized the unrest in the capital throughout June. For a few heady days at the very start of the month demonstrators could gather at Kızılay in the heart of the city. Within days they'd been broken up. In Istanbul protesters held Taksim and Gezi Park for many days but, in Ankara, Kızılay proved

impossible to hold. The police dispersed large groups that formed and drove them into separate areas that rapidly took on a character of their own, reflecting particular social classes or political concerns. Mayor Melih Gökçek speaks of the damage to municipal vehicles and property, as well as the city's economy. He has opened a 'Museum of Vandalism' to display burnt-out buses. Damage was certainly done, and I saw at least one car destroyed. But my abiding impression is of restraint. I saw no looting and very little wanton damage.

As the gas cleared on Bülten Sokak, I asked the bar owner: "Is this bad for business?" He gave me the look the question deserved and pointed out that some of those who fled the gas had done so without paying. Still, this was Turkey, and standards of service were maintained. Within moments of the first acrid whiff of gas, the bar staff had material out: lemons, antacid and tissues. Customers were invited to shelter in the back of the bar. The same adaptability was in evidence in Kızılay on the very first nights of the protests. On the evening of June 1, I got my first gas of the summer and found myself stumbling down the steps of the steel footbridge where Meşrutiyet Caddesi meets Atatürk Boulevard. Barely able to see, and with the bridge ringing like a bell around me as scores of protesters hammered it with sticks, I was met by two young men in hoodies and white face masks, carrying plant sprayers. Politely, they offered to spray my eyes. The atomisers were filled with a solution of the heartburn remedy Talcid – it brings rapid relief to the effects of tear gas too.


At night, from ground level with tear gas cannisters and stones flying, any estimate of crowd size should be treated with scepticism. Still, I think there were tens of thousands out that night in Kızılay. The crowd stretched down the main Atatürk Boulevard to Kızılay Square and on into the side-streets of Sakarya. From the footbridge I'd seen a crowd filling Meşrutiyet, a wide boulevard, for hundreds of metres. They shouted and sang. Some set fire to rubbish. A few threw stones at the police. Youngsters wanting to smash advertising hoardings were stopped by older men. Then the gas landed and the crowd was gone, dispersed to regroup elsewhere. There were families out on those first nights. A girl of perhaps seven wore swimming goggles as she sat on her father's shoulders. There were a few ladies in shawls and one or two head-scarved women. The leftists were out in force, flying banners, and were in some ways the bravest. They would rush forward to meet the volleys of gas cannisters, hurling them back at the police who were protecting the Prime Minister's offices behind the Court of Appeals. Sometimes a call would go up for fresh gloves to deal with the hot cannisters. Meanwhile, the crowd chanted "Tayyip Resign!" and jumped and sang. Regularly they broke out into the Tenth Year National Anthem. At some point that night we retreated toward Kavaklıdere, past the Parliament junction, where the entrance to a pedestrian underpass had been renamed 'Taksim' in huge spray-painted letters. Within minutes we were overtaken by fleeing people. The police had moved into action and driven the crowd away.

The police in Ankara did fire tear gas with great abandon. The cannisters were the size of small hand torches: heavy, hot, and hard. From short range and at very flat trajectories, injuries were inevitable. The police also sometimes seemed cruel. It's one thing to force protesters down a street with gas but, when the half-blind crowd finds a second cloud of gas awaiting them at the other end of the street, a special kind of impotent rage is born. Those who wanted to avoid such treatment generally gathered around Kuğulu Park, the tiny maze of paths surrounding a pond at the top of Tunalı Hilmi Caddesi. The Çankaya Municipality removed the swans from the park in early June, so one night I was able to see protesters on the shallow waters in a

blow-up dinghy. In the Park environmentalists pitched tents in an Ankara echo of the occupation of Gezi Park in Istanbul. But it never achieved the same continuity. At Kuğulu police cleared the park most nights, and the tents returned the next day. In the evenings though, thousands assembled around the Park, spilling onto the street, re-named TOMAlı Hilmi by the protesters after the bulky white-and-blue water cannon TOMA trucks that they seemed to love and fear at the same time. Any toy company making a model TOMA will clean up, in my opinion. Kuğulu quickly took on a festive atmosphere. And quickly too did the beer-sellers arrive. One evening I saw a long row of empty beer cans and bottles placed on the edge of the pavement. Less than a month earlier the government had tightened the law on alcohol so this was a political protest. It was also very likely to give ammunition to opponents of the protesters and soon groups were calling on Twitter to rein in the party atmosphere at Kuğulu.

The crowd loved to leap and shout “Jump! Jump! Whoever doesn't jump is Tayyip.” In Kızılay in the early days this chant was “whoever doesn't jump is a fascist” but by mid-June it was only Tayyip. Some said they really did want the Prime Minister to step down. Others thought that was impossible – and possibly counter-productive. “It really doesn't matter who we vote for” a businessman told me one evening as, on the dot of 9 p.m., the sound of banging pots and pans struck up from balconies across Ayrancı. “Whatever government we elect, Cemil Çiçek always seems to be in it.”

At the Park the demographic was clearly upper middle-class: young professionals, many of them with Kemalist leanings. Some protected their heads with snowboarding equipment. I met one young man who helped design tanks for Ankara's growing defence industry and had some very detailed plans for disabling a TOMA. The irony was not lost on him. Through Twitter these people learned of, and cheered on, their fellow protesters. There was the group from southwestern suburb Dikmen who every night tried to march down the hill only to be blocked by police. Like Godot, every night they would declare “Dikmen is coming!” The leftists and students would be battling police in the center around Kızılay or west toward Kurtuluş. There were protests in the mainly Alevi suburb of Tuzluçayır on the eastern outskirts. Protest flared in other suburban hotspots such as Batıkent. These groups seldom met. Only on Kennedy Caddesi was there overlap. On this tree-lined road leading down to the US embassy leftists fleeing south from Kızılay would encounter people from Kuğulu drifting north. Most nights these unlikely partners would make their last stand at Kennedy, with communists shoulder-to-shoulder with wealthy sons of moneyed Gaziosmanpaşa residents on the makeshift barricades. There was a whiff of marijuana in the air there sometimes. Near the foot of Kennedy is an underpass for cars on Atatürk Boulevard. It is lined with sky-blue ceramic tiles depicting swans and the municipal logo. Many of these were smashed. Every morning municipal workers swept away the detritus from a night of protests. So the city now shows few physical signs the protests ever happened –and the swans are back in Kuğulu Park.



Dark Clouds over Turkey

by Kerem Öktem⁵⁴

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In late May and throughout June, protests over a construction project for a shopping mall on Taksim Square in Istanbul escalated into nation-wide protests against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in particular and Turkey's political class in general. And nothing has been quite the same again since, particularly in the realm of politics and the country's media. Faced with social phenomena they could not understand – grass roots mobilization, non-hierarchical organizations, irreverence and anti-authoritarianism – Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government have chosen to react with a strategy mix of the construction of a counter-narrative based on conspiracy theories and polarization of society, a witch-hunt against oppositional figures, and an unprecedented media crackdown exposing immoral relations between the government and big business.

Conspiracy theories

The protests against the shopping mall on Taksim Square and the imminent destruction of adjacent parts of the Gezi Park came as a complete shock to Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government which, after more than ten years in power, seems to have lost touch with developments on the ground. Instead of taking the protests for what they were – an outburst of frustration over a developmental model based on profit maximization and social conservatism by different sectors of society led by students and new social movements – Erdoğan and his advisers decided to spin a narrative of internal and external conspiracies. Turkey's recent history is of course full of manipulations by the military, the deep state and also external actors; so the Prime Minister's reaction may not be as devious as one might think. Yet this time he got it wrong. Instead of acknowledging that certain excesses in urban development policy might need to be curbed and that criticism of too authoritarian a leadership style might be a welcome corrective, he blamed a conspiracy made up of an illustrious band of actors – the 'Interest lobby' (i.e. Jews), Iran, western liberals, the opposition Republican People's Party, George Soros, Open Society and the online magazine *Jadaliyya* – for interfering with Turkey's economic and foreign policy achievements. His spin doctors, from EU Minister Egemen Bağış to the newly appointed adviser to the PM Yiğit Bulut – an uncompromising secularist, nationalist and fierce opponent of the AKP until only a few years ago – began feeding the public made-up stories aiming to bring the Gezi protesters into disrepute. Twisting and turning the truth, they talked about group sex and drunkards in a mosque where demonstrators had fled to escape the extreme use of tear gas and water cannons, and about attacks on a woman in *hijab*. None of these happened, of course. Bulut went even further to suggest that the 'powers that be' might be trying to kill the Prime Minister by way of 'telekinesis', a sort of mental manipulation by ill-meaning third parties. And members of the government tried to fabricate evidence for a nationalist secularist conspiracy aiming to bring down the government, much as the Egyptian military ousted President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood with a military coup.

⁵⁴ Mercator Fellow for 2013-14, Istanbul Policy Centre

Things which the conspiracy view could not explain away – for instance that five demonstrators had been killed by brutal police violence – were simply ignored. Soon these narratives went viral in the pro-government media, on state TV and on radio, complementing the witch-hunt that built up throughout July.

The witch-hunt

It started with more than fifty protestors being taken to court and held in police custody for several weeks without trial, even though there was no danger of their absconding. Among them was an elderly lady, Mücella Yapıcı, the secretary of the Taksim Platform – one of the civil society initiatives which had been fighting against the destruction of Gezi Park well before the protests – and Chair of the Istanbul Chamber of Architects. Several academics who had taken sides with the protestors faced investigations by their departments. And a government campaign against doctors and nurses who came out to help those wounded during the protests was averted only after the Chamber of Doctors refused cooperation with state agencies to identify the medical personnel who had rushed to the scene. A smear campaign was unleashed against actors and public personae who had made supportive statements on the Gezi protests. Among those targeted for public humiliation was Mehmet Ali Alabora, a leading film and theatre actor with a principled left-wing stance. Pro-government newspapers began a veritable hate campaign against him, making his friends fear for his life, but also sparking an online petition in his favour which has collected more than 100,000 signatures.

Media crackdown

In order for such spin doctoring to succeed, the government needs the media to cooperate. Turkey's media had already been one of the least free in Europe before the protests, with dozens of journalists in prison, incestuous relations between the government and big business and direct censorship from the government on security-related issues. Yet what has happened since the initial protests in June has been without precedent in Turkey's recent history. Some of the country's most influential liberal columnists such as Hasan Cemal and Can Dündar, many of whom have supported at least some of the AKP's policies in the last few years, lost their jobs in the mainstream media due to government intervention or proprietors' responses. The most illuminating example of the conflicts of interest that media bosses have been facing is that of Doğuş Publishing. Owing what was once one of the country's most respectable news channels, NTV and the best-selling popular history journal *NTV Tarih*, Doğuş group has a large construction company which had just won the contract for a major urban development project including a marina in Istanbul. Deciding for the marina and against its media responsibilities, it pushed its leading TV journalists into resignation and closed down the history journal after it transpired that its upcoming issue was presenting a history of public protest in Istanbul from a vantage point sympathetic to the Gezi Park protestors.

But the new restrictive media regime is not limited to pressure brought to bear upon media companies. The government has used loopholes in the regulatory framework to take under its control major TV stations and two newspapers, one of them a flagship title. How? Ten TV and print media outlets belonging to the indebted Çukurova conglomerate had previously been put under the control of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), a government body collecting debts on behalf of

creditors. After the Gezi protests it chose to re-staff all outlets and forced critical journalists out of the formerly Çukurova-owned newspapers.

The result of these interventions is a heavily compromised media landscape. Almost all major outlets have either been reined in through direct or indirect pressure, are owned by pro-government businessmen or have simply switched from journalism to entertainment. The Doğan media group's flagship *Hürriyet* and *Radikal* are the only openly critical mainstream titles left on the shelves. The *Zaman* group of the influential Hizmet network continues to allow for a measure of criticism of the government, and Cengiz Çandar is still writing in *Radikal*. Yet their editors-in-chief too feel the Damocles sword of the government very closely. Nevertheless some smaller newspapers have earned a new lease of life. For example, the Socialist *Birgün* (One Day) has as its new editor Ece Temelkuran, an experienced journalist who lost her column in a major newspaper some time ago. And a number of online news websites such as *T24* and *Bianet* have been able to attract many of the seasoned writers who have lost their columns and their sympathy for the Prime Minister.

So it's not yet a complete media blackout. What we see, however, is the encroachment of authoritarian politics by a larger-than-life leader who fears the removal from power of his party and is ready to go to great lengths to avoid this. The convictions in the Ergenekon court case against a deep-state network led by the military but also involving scores of journalists only strengthen the impression that Erdoğan is ready to go beyond the manipulative techniques of government which Turkey experienced during the deep-state years of the 1990s. With the media largely muffled, the build-up to the local and presidential elections next year will be a new experience for Turkey. With the military guardians removed from the political scene, it is now an overbearing government that will use all the possibilities of the state, the intelligence services and the media to ensure an election victory. That victory, however, is not yet a foregone conclusion.



Update on Cyprus 2013

by **Clement Dodd**

It will be recalled that in the last 'Update on Cyprus' (*Review* No 21, p.21) it was reported that Nicos Anastasiades had been elected President in South Cyprus, replacing Demetris Christofias. In 2004 Anastasiades had favoured the Annan Plan for a federation that was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. He could, therefore, be expected to play a positive role in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem, though he was criticized for saying that he would always consult the multi-party advisory National Council as negotiations proceeded: they would not necessarily always be supportive. He might not then be as conciliatory as expected in the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots expected to begin in October.

Recently some Greek Cypriot leaders have been calling for the surrender to the Greek Cypriots as a 'gesture', before negotiations begin, of the Turkish Cypriot occupied area of Varosha (Maraş), south of Famagusta. In the past there have often been claims for its surrender, accompanied with the proposal that Famagusta itself should be returned to Greek Cypriot rule, and that its port should be administered by the European Union for both sides to use. It has also been proposed, and repeated now, that Ercan Airport in the North might then be opened to international traffic, though with the proviso that such a concession would definitely not mean recognition of the 'breakaway' state! The Turkish Cypriots are, as ever, unimpressed by these suggestions, insisting that such matters have to form part of a general settlement of the problem. It is nevertheless interesting that the American Ambassador to Cyprus, Mr John Koenig, has allegedly said that the United States understood the potential value of the prior cession of Varosha, "that it could change the dynamics of the Cyprus issue in a positive way".⁵⁵

Political Change in the TRNC

In the forthcoming negotiations expected to start in October the Turkish Cypriot negotiator will again be the President, Derviş Eroğlu. However the National Unity Party (UBP), of which he was long a leading member, is no longer in power in the North. As a result of a division in the party, mentioned in the last 'Update', eight UBP deputies recently left the party, thus weakening the UBP government in the National Assembly and, with other parties, successfully called for new elections. A temporary coalition governed the country until elections were held on 28 July. The results were as follows:

	% of votes	seats
Republican Turkish Party – United Front (CTP – BG)	38.37	21
National Unity Party (UBP)	27.3	14
Democratic Party/National Powers (DP/UG)	23.11	12
Communal Democratic Party (TDP)	7.41	3

The turnout was 69.6%



A coalition government was formed composed of the moderate left CTP-BG and the moderate right (DP/UG) parties with the leader of the RTP-BG Party, Özkan Yorgancıoğlu, as Prime Minister. The former UBP Leader, and Prime Minister, İrsen Küçük, was not re-elected. President Eroğlu probably welcomed the change of government, likely to be rather less



pro-Turkish. However, the Turkish influence cannot easily be sidestepped by the new coalition now in power. The Turkey/TRNC protocol in force gives Turkey control of the economy. Moreover, the TRNC is estimated to owe Turkey some \$2 billion, with a further \$1.5 billion owed to local banks. Turkey will doubtless continue to insist on economies, and on the privatization of state utilities despite protests from the left. Without Turkish aid civil service, and other public sector salaries, simply could not be paid. So it is not expected that in this regard a great deal will change.

⁵⁵ As reported by Maria Myles in the *Cyprus Mail*, 27 June 2013

New Negotiations

A new round of negotiations between the two sides is expected to start in October assisted, as before, by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Alexander Downer. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, believes that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots should first form a joint committee to exploit and market the proceeds from the hydrocarbon deposits now being developed to the south of the island. The most economic way to market the gas is probably to export it to Europe through pipelines in Turkey. However, the Greek Cypriot government, in conjunction with the American companies involved in offshore Block 12, have agreed to build a liquefaction plant near Limassol. It is claimed that there is enough Cypriot gas to make it commercially viable, but that it could be expanded to process gas from neighbouring countries, with, it is understood, Israel particularly in mind.

The Turkish Government asserts, along with the Turkish Cypriots, that all hydrocarbon resources claimed by Cyprus have to be shared proportionately between the two communities, on the grounds that the 1960 Treaties, to which the Greek Cypriots have not since adhered, are still in force. Davutoğlu implies in his statement that if a united state cannot be reinstated, then there will have to be a two-state solution.

A two-state solution is probably still the option favoured by most Turkish Cypriots in preference to a federation, which they see as second best. A federation can be justified as a belated, if considerable, revision, of the 1960 Constitution, but a two-state solution raises difficult issues. With a two-state solution the Greek Cypriots could argue that the 1960 Treaties had thus been overthrown. They might well then claim that all hydrocarbon deposits south of the new proposed Greek Cypriot state would belong solely to them. They could also point out that the sovereign British Base Areas, authorized under the 1960 Treaties, had no longer any legal right to exist. If they did not want them abolished (and many Greek Cypriots, it should be said, want Cyprus to belong to NATO) they would, at least, probably want rent for them.

With regard to the 1960 treaties, it is surprising that, to my knowledge, the Turkish Government has never properly addressed the world, (or taken legal action, if that is possible) to show how the United Nations and its member states unwarrantedly interpreted the 'Government of Cyprus' in UN Security Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) to mean the solely Greek Cypriot-manned government then in power. The only legal Government of Cyprus, it has been cogently argued, was the shared government established under the 1960 Constitution accepted by both communities, not that taken over in 1963 solely by the Greek Cypriots.⁵⁶ Many Turkish Cypriots believe that they have always had the right to enter into negotiations as a recognized state: they insist that negotiations between 'two communities' is a fiction that does

⁵⁶ For a brief account of these extraordinary events see 'Update on Cyprus', *Review* No 20. Autumn 2012. A legal rebuttal of the alleged 'Doctrine of Necessity, claimed for the rump Greek Cypriot government in power in 1964, is given by Zaim M. Necatigil, in his masterly work, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law* (revised 2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 1998), pp. 56-65.

not accord them the equal status to which they are entitled, and leads to bias against them.

Conclusion

On the road to a solution of whatever kind there are still obstacles to overcome. Should a federation be the preferred solution there are serious problems relating to the balance of federal and constituent state functions still to be solved. Also, whatever the sort of agreement reached, federal or two-state, the very difficult issues of property abandoned in 1974, and the territorial division that affects them, have not been removed through the passage of time, despite the achievement of the Immovable Property Commission in Northern Cyprus, which has awarded compensation, (mainly) to 471 Greek Cypriots applicants seeking redress for properties lost in 1974 at a reported total cost of £105,268,533, paid by Turkey.⁵⁷

The outcome of the forthcoming new round of negotiations is difficult to foretell, but there is clearly more interest by Turkey now in a two-state solution than hitherto. In this regard Ankara cannot help but be aware that Russian interests in Cyprus have grown, and that the possibility of a Russian air base in Paphos has been mooted in the South. With a two-state solution Turkey would doubtless be able to maintain a footing in a new Turkish Cypriot state that for long would probably still have to rely greatly on Turkish financial aid. Is Cyprus going to live up, one wonders, to its historic reputation as a *'place d'armes'* in the now rather troubled eastern Mediterranean?

ERRATUM

In No 21 of the *Review* we omitted the caption to the photograph on page 10. We reproduce the picture with its caption and with apologies to Dr Alon Liel who included the picture in his 2013 John Martin Lecture to TASG on 22 February last.



Ben Gurion (1st Prime Minister of Israel) & Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (2nd President) at Istanbul University's Law School in 1912

⁵⁷ As reported in *Kıbrıs*, 5 April 2013.

FROM THE 2013 TASG SYMPOSIUM



From Atatürk to Erdoğan: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Evolution

by Clement Dodd



The Atatürk Revolution

The object of this paper is to determine how far the achievements of the Kemalist revolution remain, or have been eclipsed by subsequent developments, one of major importance being the revival of religion in Turkish politics and society in recent years. Whilst this revival may be in part be a case of evolution from Ottoman times, new approaches to the understanding of Islam in Turkey in recent decades suggest a counter-revolution has occurred, and is still occurring, that is not consonant with Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary vision of a future Turkey.

The first question it seems important to ask, however, is whether the Kemalist revolution really was a revolution. It was certainly not a violent social and political upheaval of the sort exemplified by the French Revolution and others that followed its pattern.⁵⁸ It was in part a continuation of the Ottoman modernization movement and, like that movement it was led from the top, though it reflected and developed the ideas of the more radical wing of the Young Turk movement, to which Mustafa Kemal belonged.

The Kemalist revolution may be said to have been revolutionary in three respects at least. First, the Ottoman structure of political authority was completely destroyed by the abolition of the caliphate and sultanate, and the assumption of sovereignty by the newly elected Grand National Assembly. Secondly, the influence of religion, whose practices Mustafa Kemal despised, was drastically controlled, especially in education, but also by the closing down of the influential dervish orders, by the abolition of religious apparel outside religious premises and by the immediate introduction of European codes of civil and criminal law to replace the corpus of Islamic law, the *mecelle* as reorganized in Abdul Hamid's reign.⁵⁹ Thirdly, by rigorously asserting both the important role of Turks in world history and the historic

⁵⁸ For an interesting discussion of the Kemalist revolution see Şerif Mardin, 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution' in his *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), pp. 192-204.

⁵⁹ It did contain some modifications in commercial and criminal law along European lines introduced earlier, in the 19th century. For a graphic account of the legal reform see Count Léon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* (London: London University Press, 1927), reprinted (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1927).

importance and uniqueness of the Turkish language, Mustafa Kemal created, with some signal success, a new national Turkish identity that has remained a force in Turkish politics and society that stresses Turkish separateness from the Islamic world. Turkey was to be part of Europe.

The first of these revolutionary reforms, the declaration of a republic, warrants further consideration, especially Mustafa Kemal's vision of the new state he wanted to create and the extent to which he was successful. For him the way towards the creation of a modern western type of state primarily meant stressing republicanism, nationalism, and secularism. Populism was also important, officially defined as meaning 'order and solidarity without class conflict...with no privileges for any individual'. He read some history and political theory, was very interested in the French Revolution, and particularly admired the Third French Republic, which he considered 'the most successful regime in the history of humankind'.⁶⁰ With Rousseau he believed that the basic aim of a republic was to give expression to the general (i.e. moral) will rather than to individual liberty. As for the citizens their duty was to serve the Republic. Probably he would typically have asserted that the national will represented, or created, by the national assembly was also the general will, or could become so through the enlightened leadership of the revolutionary elite. It is important to note, however, that Mustafa Kemal, a practical leader, was not at all inclined to work with a clear-cut ideology: he rejected those on the left and right who sought to create a rigid ideology for the Republican People's Party, and he made sure that the state dominated the party.

Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary movement had a significant influence in the large cities where it created a new nationalist and secularist elite, particularly among the young, but there was little impact on the countryside, though the government did establish People's Houses in some villages, 500 in all, where practical skills were developed and attempts were made to acquaint the villagers with European culture. The Kemalist regime, though open to private enterprise, followed the Soviet example of state-directed development. This prompted Mustafa Kemal to encourage his friend, Fethi Okyar, to establish an opposition party that would counter İsmet İnönü's penchant for state-led economic development. The new party established in 1930, the Free Republican Party, attracted thousands of would-be members. In İzmir a very large demonstration in support of the new party got out of hand, with police actually firing on the crowd. The new party's supporters were not opposed to Mustafa Kemal, but they were clearly not pleased with the new regime. A few months later in Menemen this dissatisfaction was underlined when an officer of the gendarmerie, haranguing a crowd being addressed by a dervish demanding restoration of the Caliphate and Islamic law, was shot down, and then decapitated. It was deemed politic to close down the new party.

The Kemalist regime was clearly unpopular in areas where traditional beliefs were still paramount and where little could immediately be done to improve matters by economic development. Yet in the larger towns statist economic development was producing some commercial and industrial expertise that was encouraging a degree of skilled entrepreneurship. Also education was improving among the town

⁶⁰ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, (p 134).

populations with the development of radio and the press, even though these were controlled.

Democratic Breakthrough

The next, and major, test of Kemalism occurred after the end of the Second World War. Influenced by the victory of the Western liberal and democratic powers, and fearful of the ambitions of the Soviet Union, four members of the Grand National Assembly, including a large land owner, Adnan Menderes, threatened by a proposed land redistribution law, were determined to establish a new democratic party. İsmet İnönü and the RPP gave way and in 1950 the new Democratic Party won power. It was widely supported by landowners, by new rising businessmen and by the traditionalist periphery (to whom more, if still modest, religious freedom had been granted). The DP held power in two consecutive elections in 1954 and 1957. Buoyed up with the heady revolutionary idea that the will of the people was all important in democracy, they proceeded to oppress the opposition, not heeding sufficiently the outright hostility of the Atatürkist student population, and the rumblings in the military and the Kemalist elite generally, whose standard of living, through inflation, was declining significantly. As is well known, the DP government was overthrown and death sentences were handed down to three of its leaders, including Menderes.

A new constitution clearly being needed, academics were brought in to advise. In an era of enthusiasm for democracy, if properly instituted, the framers of the 1961 Constitution, with the democratic 'majoritarianism' of the former DP in mind, determined on a festival of freedom, provided it was properly controlled, primarily by a second chamber in parliament, and by powerful constitutional and administrative courts. With some prescience the military insisted on a new National Security Committee with direct access to government, a committee they headed and largely controlled. It was all a bold experiment, but the two rival left of centre and moderate parties could not cope with the problems that arose from significant economic development, the influx of workers and their families, into the towns. In the universities there was much political agitation, which led to violence there, and in the streets, between rival groups advocating solutions far left and far right. The military intervened in 1971 to restrain the violence, but when democratic politics resumed in 1973 matters became worse as minor parties of extreme views, including a new religious party, had to be taken into coalitions. With whole ministries sometimes taken over by minor political parties government was dramatically politicized, while violence in the streets escalated, with assassinations and a vicious attack on the Alevi Muslim minority. Deeply alarmed, the military intervened in 1980.

Whereas in 1960 the military had intervened, it might be said, to save the people from the government, the military's task now seemed to be to save the government from the people. The military soon stopped the violence with draconian military measures, much to the general relief of the populace. Banning former politicians from politics (though they later returned, authorized by a narrowly won referendum) and closing down the parties, the military had nevertheless somehow to return to democratic politics. They first established a new constitution that, while seeking to stop political parties having close relations with outside bodies (like labour unions), also provided for a strong presidency, which they clearly hoped, though in vain, would be filled by an independent, preferably military, personage. They did, however, require election of the president by a very large majority of the Grand National Assembly, in an attempt not to have him or her appointed by any one party.

A major problem for the military was how to exit politics. They helped establish two 'safe' political parties, but in new elections they failed and the military had to accept, with some reluctance, a new Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal, who had worked for the junta as a successful free market *supremo*. Under his free market policies something new and unexpected was now gathering momentum, namely the rise of a new business *bourgeoisie*, Muslim in belief and life style. These new entrepreneurs came from the periphery that Atatürk's revolution could not really penetrate. These newcomers on the economic and social scene were the so-called 'Anatolian Tigers'. They were in competition with the large association of Istanbul-based businessmen which has been described as 'a handful of wealthy tycoons who enjoy special privileges and a cosy relationship with the state... Social trust, solidarity and loyalty are at the centre of the [new] regional economic development successes. The shared culture produced by communal ties, Sufi networks and village connections ease conflict and facilitate economic activity'.⁶¹ Mustafa Kemal would never have believed it possible!

The military was faced with a difficult problem. They were predominantly opposed to the extreme left, especially, that is, to communism. They were consequently particularly concerned about the education of the youth, the section of the population that had really inflamed opposition in the previous decade. So they had to have resort, quite incredibly, to the promotion the teaching of religion and morals of religion in schools. They believed that these students would be a bulwark against the communism that the military principally feared. Short of an ideology the military took to a new doctrine, the 'Turkish Islamic Synthesis', a theory promoted in 1970 by the Hearths of the Enlightened (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) a group of academics, businessmen and politicians led by the historian İbrahim Kafesoğlu. This questionable theory stressed similarities between historic Turkish culture and Islam, though the shared qualities were very general (e.g. a shared belief in justice, morality and family). In this synthesis the Turks had a special place as the soldiers of Islam. The synthesis clearly served to persuade the military to promote education in religion in the general schools.

The military were perhaps also influenced in their now more lenient approach to religion by the fact that in Turkey the understanding of Islam had been changing for some time.⁶² The increasingly popular followers of Said Nursi (1877-1960), the *Nurcular*, and the religiously educational Gülen movement, were becoming very influential. Nursi, in addition to claiming that science was perfectly acceptable to Islam, also drew attention to Muhammad's career as a merchant, thus showing that Islam and business were compatible. More importantly, perhaps, he sought to replace slavish and imitative repetition of belief, seeing the Koran as a guide to personal moral behaviour. He had been close to the Sufi *Nakşibendis* who had always *inter alia* preached on the need for 'being inwardly focused on God, whilst also taking an active part in the life of the community'.⁶³ Turgut Özal had as a spiritual adviser the leader of the Gümüşhanevi Nakşibendi order, which particularly stressed involvement in politics and society.

As politics developed afresh during the 1990s the military seemingly came to realize that religious education under a coalition government headed by Necmettin Erbakan

⁶¹ M.Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, (Oxford: OUP, 2003), p. 88.

⁶² Given the lack of concrete evidence the impact of the military is simply surmise.

⁶³ As quoted by M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p.135.

of the religious Welfare Party was going too far. So they called for the establishment of a general school system that would effectively undermine the influential preacher and prayer leader schools, from which graduates were proceeding to the universities in a variety of subjects and could from there infiltrate the state bureaucracy, it was thought. The military was also deeply disturbed at the time by other manifestations of support for religion, notably when in Sincan, close to Ankara, an Islamic mayor hosted an anti-Western speech by the Persian ambassador.

Erbakan resigned rather than follow the military's advice on education. He was later banned from politics for life and the party was closed down. This has been dubbed a 'post-modern' intervention. A new Virtue Party was also closed down before the present and more moderate and 'conservative' Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded whose principal members were Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdoğan. The military intervention of 1997 was not, however, to be forgotten, or forgiven.

The Justice and Development Party in Power

After coming to power in 2002 with a large majority, the Justice and Development Party laid one of the foundations for its continuing success in subsequent general elections by taking steps, with the help of the IMF, to stabilize the economy. The government had also to take care to satisfy the European Union that Turkey met the conditions of the Copenhagen Criteria, which was necessary before EU accession negotiations could begin.⁶⁴ Progress was made on a number of issues: the death penalty was abolished, there was agreement on the need to appoint an Ombudsman, progress was made on police torture, on honour killings, polygamous marriages and equal rights for women. Under Article 301 of the Penal Code prosecution was allowed only for insults against the narrower concept, 'the Turkish nation', not against 'Turkishness', and the maximum prison sentence was reduced to two, from three, years. Also remarks made in criticism were no longer deemed punishable. Critics deemed it not enough. Accession negotiations began in October 2005, but only one chapter out of 35 has so far been provisionally closed.⁶⁵



AK PARTİ

A major issue for the EU was that the military should not be involved in politics, and that therefore the influence of the National Security Council should be restricted, and the legal powers of military courts curtailed. The government was in complete agreement. In 2003 the NSC was made advisory, and only on national security issues. Later it was made obligatory for the chairman to be a civilian.

Despite this reform the military continued to criticize the government, openly declaring in 2007, when a new president had to be elected, that they had the right to an opinion on the issue as 'the staunch defenders of secularism'. Only after new elections in 2007 that increased the parliamentary strength of the government could one of its two founders, Abdullah Gül, be elected. Later a constitutional amendment that in future required popular election of the president was successfully agreed by referendum. The military feared that this would ensure the election of an Islamic president.

⁶⁴ They began in October, 2005..

⁶⁵ Of the total of 35 chapters 12 are opened, one has been provisionally closed, and 22 have been suspended or blocked.

The increasing estrangement of the Kemalist military from the government was dramatically underlined when in the press two alleged plots by military officers, some of very high rank, to overthrow the government, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer conspiracies, were revealed. That one of the bastions of Kemalism might be brought to the ground was, and is, deeply disturbing for many Turks. In the upshot over 300 military officers, and some civilians, convicted in the Ergenekon case have been given long prison sentences. In 2010 '356 serving and retired military officers of high rank were arrested, accused of planning Sledgehammer'.⁶⁶ Legal proceedings are also underway in the cases of the 1997 military 'post-modern coup', and even the 1980 military intervention, this with the demand that General Evren (94) and the Air Force Commander, Tahsin Şahinkaya, should be present in court to answer charges.

The next bastion of Kemalism to be reformed, with EU support, was the judiciary. In 2007 the Constitutional Court annulled a law allowing female students and others to wear headscarves. This very long-standing and controversial issue seems to have prompted the Chief State Prosecutor to file a suit at the Constitutional Court to close down the Justice and Development Party, claiming it was anti-secularist. The initiative failed, the party, instead, being fined. The European Union registered its satisfaction that the party was not closed down, regarding this as always a very serious matter in a democracy.

Government circles now began to criticize the Council of State and the Court of Appeals for seeking to influence the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the body that controls judicial appointments and promotions. In 2010 the government decided to reform the Constitutional Court and the High Council by expanding their membership in order – critics maintained – to influence them in its favour. The constitutional changes were successfully put to a, deeply contested, referendum on 12 September 2012 with 58 percent voting for, and 42 per cent against.

The alleged increasing authoritarianism of the present regime is under much criticism, and has been heightened by the government's heavy-handed treatment of recent large demonstrations in Istanbul and other cities in Turkey, the reasons for which are at present not altogether clear, but growing religiosity and authoritarianism are probably major factors.

Conclusion

The Atatürk revolution was not a violent social and political upheaval, but it made changes surely significant enough to merit its being called a revolution. Politically Mustafa Kemal wanted a secular republic peopled by patriotic citizens loyal to the democratic state he seems to have envisaged. However his aims were only in part achieved, mainly through their adoption by some members of the Kemalist elite, whose influence via the Republican People's Party was not great in the country at large: there traditional Islamic life was too well established. Yet the major legal changes brought about by Atatürk, as in family and criminal law, were important in the long run and have remained to this day. The specifically Turkish identity that was

⁶⁶ As reported by Daniel Rodrik, 'Turkey's Miscarriage of Justice', *The Washington Post*, 23 September, 2012

fostered is also still important, if modified for some by the claim that the Turks always were, and still are, an essential part of early Islam.

A factor working against the achievement of real republicanism was, oddly, the victory of the liberal and democratic western powers in the Second World War. Their liberal and democratic formulae did not embrace the essentially French republicanism Atatürk had had in mind: Liberal democracy naturally respected religious freedom. Also the popular modernization theorists of the time, especially if aware of the new modernizing interpretations of Islam provided by the Nursi and other Islamic scholars, could believe that traditional Islam would lose political significance.

Intervening in 1980 the military had to compromise with religion, but in 1997, with support from the judiciary, and some pronounced general civilian sympathy, they realized that they had gone too far. They warned the Muslim politicians to tread carefully. This probably had some effect, helping to induce the new government formed by the Justice and Development Party to insist that it was conservative not Islamic. With the recent demise of the military, and the reform of the judiciary, it is argued that a more religious state may now begin to emerge. Ironically Erdoğan often rejects criticism by claiming that his government overwhelmingly represents the 'will of the people' – the revolutionary majoritarian doctrine employed by Menderes.

Many in Turkey are clearly worried about the religious background they see behind the new 'conservatism'. For atheists, agnostics, and for those for whom religion is a matter of strictly personal belief, there has surely to be some way for humankind to create a political system that can combine a wide range of political and social freedoms with concern for morality and the public interest. This could be the public-spirited democratic republicanism Atatürk seems to have had in mind but which, after his time, tended to turn into a rather negative state elitism. If the Republican People's Party tried successfully to create, along democratic lines, the republicanism Atatürk had in mind, it would be an evolution from Kemalism that might match and challenge the part-evolution, and part-revolution, in recent times of Turkish Islamic thought and practice. A new constitution is in the making, which the Republican People's Party might well treat as an opportunity to begin a revival of Atatürk's political ideals that would make Turkey's claim still to be a republic look more convincing.



Turkish prose fiction in the early decades of the Republic

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This article offers a glimpse into the main developments in Turkish prose fiction during the first four decades of the Republic, which celebrates

its 90th anniversary this year.⁶⁷ Most serious Turkish writers of the period down to the 1960s saw themselves as having an educative role in society. The 'enlightenment' mission inherited from the late Ottoman period, which had already become subsumed into a search for national identity in the Young Turk period, received further impetus from the Kemalist regime's nation-building project, which most intellectuals of the time strongly supported. From the mid-30s, however, we see the emergence of an equally committed literature with a subversive, leftist thrust. These socialist writers shared the anti-clericalism of the Kemalists but were also sharply critical of the established socio-economic order. Two significant writers of the 1940s-50s who did not belong to either of these politically engaged movements are discussed by way of contrast at the end of the article.

At the time of the foundation of the Republic Turkish literature had already undergone about fifty years of adaptation to the modern world. The highly conventionalised forms and themes of classical Ottoman poetry, for centuries the only prestigious literary genre, had been completely abandoned. Alongside new forms of poetry, writers had been developing new genres such as drama, the novel and the short story, which were essentially of European inspiration although initially incorporating some elements from the indigenous literary tradition.

Literary activity in the early years of the Republic shows a great deal of continuity, in terms both of its actors and its motivating concerns, with that of the preceding fifteen years, an extraordinarily turbulent period that witnessed the Balkan Wars, the First World War, the final collapse of the Empire and the ensuing 'National Struggle' (or War of Independence). The cultural impact of these traumatic years upon the Turcophone sections of the Ottoman elite had been to engender an urgent awareness of the need for national unity, however ill-defined the concept of that 'nation' might yet be. A 'national literature' campaign had been launched by a group of young writers as early as 1911. Its main messages were that literature should be accessible to as wide a readership as possible and should address itself to issues of public concern. This meant the definite rejection of the ideal of art for art's sake, which had been fashionable since the 1890s. It also meant the abandonment of the abstruse language that was considered appropriate for 'high' literature, full of unfamiliar Arabic and Persian words and alien grammatical constructions. In order to become a vehicle for the self-identification and survival of the nation, literature had to be written in a language as close as possible to everyday speech. At a time of existential crisis for the state and society with which they identified, the great majority of Turkish writers and poets eagerly adopted this new mission.

The 'National Struggle' that followed the Armistice of 1918, the occupation of the Ottoman capital by Britain, France and Italy and the Greek invasion of western Anatolia from 1919-22 inspired a number of literary works. The most famous were written by two of the leading novelists of this period, Halide Edip (Adivar, 1882-1964) and Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu, 1889-1974), who had both taken an active part in the resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal from his base in Ankara.

⁶⁷ The development of the Turkish novel in more recent decades is discussed in my chapter 'New directions in the Turkish novel' in Brian W Beeley (ed), *Turkish Transformation: New Century - New Challenges* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 2002), 99-122.

Halide Edip wrote two novels about the National Struggle. The first, *Ateşten Gömlek* (Shirt of Fire), appeared in serialised form in a newspaper in the summer months of 1922, before the final victory had been achieved. It was subsequently published in book form in 1923, and became immensely popular. The patriotic heroism and self-sacrifice of its protagonists are thematically intertwined with the rivalry in love of the two soldier friends for an upper-class young woman who, having lost her husband and child in the Greek occupation of Izmir, had joined the resistance as a military nurse. The novel ends tragically with the deaths of all three protagonists in or as a direct result of the conflict.



Halide Edip had to spend most of the period of Mustafa Kemal's presidency of the Republic in exile, because of her involvement in the establishment of a democratic opposition party in 1925. This did not prevent her from continuing her literary activities, and in 1926 her novel *Vurun Kahpeye* (Strike the Whore) appeared. The main focus of this story is not the National Struggle itself but the impact of the conflict on an idealistic young woman who is working as a teacher in a western Anatolian town that comes under Greek occupation. The heroine, Aliye, is strongly committed to the nationalist cause, whereas many of the leading figures in the town are staunchly opposed to it, regarding the nationalists as Bolsheviks who threaten the moral values of the community and the property rights of landowners. As in the case of *Ateşten Gömlek*, personal human attachments and patriotic commitment are given equal weight in the narrative, and Aliye finds herself in the agonizing dilemma of having to agree to marry the commander of the Greek occupying force in order to relieve pressure on the local nationalist militia and save the life of its leader, who is her lover. This extreme self-sacrifice, however, turns into a different kind of tragic end when the town is liberated by Turkish troops at the critical moment, and Aliye, along with other women who are suspected of having had relations with the enemy, is savagely hacked to death by the religious fanatics who have been hounding her from the moment of her arrival in the town. Thus *Vurun Kahpeye* gives strong literary voice to the Enlightenment-inspired drive for female emancipation in Turkey. It is interesting to note that in the case of Halide Edip this commitment to women's freedom and hatred of religious bigotry went hand in hand with a deep emotional attachment to the spiritualism of Islam, a quality that set her apart from Kemalist orthodoxy.



Yakup Kadri's *Yaban* (Stranger), published in 1932, views the National Struggle from a completely different perspective, which aroused great controversy at the time. This was the first novel in which the rural sector of Turkish society, which comprised at least 80% of the population at this period, had come under the literary spotlight since the foundation of the Republic. The novel is set in a village in western Anatolia that came under Greek occupation at a relatively late stage of the invasion. Instead of presenting a story of heroic resistance and self-sacrifice in the national cause, it depicts the villagers as initially indifferent to the struggle and then even opposed to it when they are seduced by Greek propaganda into believing that the invaders have come in the name of the Caliph to save them from the godless Mustafa Kemal. Yakup Kadri's first-person narrator, who clearly represents the author's own viewpoint, is a former army officer who has lost his right arm in the

Great War. In a state of despondency caused both by the post-Armistice plight of the country and the loneliness of his personal disability he accepts the invitation of his former batman to take refuge in his village. But from the moment of his arrival there he is appalled by the wretchedness and physical squalor of the village environment, and even more by the ignorance and superstition of the villagers and what strikes him as the primitive, almost bestial nature of their social behaviour. What is particularly striking about the attitude of the narrator is his sense of the collective responsibility of the educated elite (*aydınlılar*) for the deplorable state of the rural population. *Yaban* is an appeal to that elite to take note of the enormity of the task that awaits them in terms of creating a modern Turkish nation.

The establishment of the Republic in 1923 represented, at least from a Kemalist viewpoint, the symbolic realisation of the political ideal that had given birth to the 'national literature' movement in 1911. It is a remarkable fact, therefore, that very few novels were written in Turkey, at the time or later, that celebrate the foundation of the Republic or the series of radical reforms that ensued.⁶⁸ The only writer of any stature to have taken up the task of giving literary expression to the Kemalist revolution is Yakup Kadri, who not only served as a member of parliament from 1923-34 but was also involved in a short-lived journal called *Kadro* (1932-4) that formulated radical proposals for state control of all aspects of the nation's life. His novel *Ankara*, published in 1934 just after the passage of most of the reform measures, is divided into three sections, each focusing on a different period in the revolutionary life of that city. The first is 1921, at a critical stage of the War of Independence, the second is 1925, and the third is an imagined future, culminating in the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Republic in 1943. There is a striking contrast between the second and third parts of the novel. The second part, set only two years after the declaration of the Republic, presents the picture of a comfortable elite that has already set aside the ideals of the revolution and given itself over to moneymaking and acquiring all the attributes of an elegant Western lifestyle. The third part conjures up a utopian vision of a modern, prosperous and orderly Turkey with well-developed, state-organised agriculture and industry, thriving modern cultural activities and a growing, contented population. The male protagonist, a writer, has risen from penury to fame in the service of his country, and his devoted wife has also found social fulfilment as a teacher. This narratorial lurch from cynicism to wild flights of ideological fantasy undermines any credibility that the novel could have had as a literary analysis of the revolution. Nevertheless, coming from the pen of the most distinguished Kemalist novelist, *Ankara* remains a uniquely interesting historical document.

One prominent writer of the early republican period who openly challenged the Western cultural values that Kemalism espoused was Peyami Safa (1899-1961). Five of his novels that appeared in the 1920s and 1930s are all structured on a single model: an educated young girl finds herself torn between two very different young men, one of them representing modern 'Western' values and the other traditional 'Eastern' ones. The Westernised young man is ambitious, determined and successful but self-interested and dishonest; the traditionally minded one, by contrast, is idealistic, patriotic and trustworthy but indecisive and passive. Despite his shortcomings, it is the 'Eastern' suitor that the author expects the girl to choose in the end. Although in his non-fiction writings Peyami Safa called for a synthesis of

⁶⁸ See Ömer Türkeş in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*, ii, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul 2001), 427.

Western and Eastern values and argued that Turkey must adopt the rationalism and positive work ethic of the West, in these novels the focus is almost exclusively on those aspects of Western culture that he sees as morally and socially destructive. Thus the West symbolises materialism and the pursuit of pleasure, while the East represents spiritual understanding and moral virtue. In each novel the Westernised suitor, who approaches love as a source of physical enjoyment, is superficially more attractive to the heroine, but she values the sincerity and moral depth of his 'Eastern' rival. Only where the girl eventually makes the 'right' choice does the novel have a happy end. And it is clear that the ensuing marriage will be one in which the woman's place is in the home. Despite their high level of education none of the heroines of these novels are earning their own living. Economic independence may be one of the aspects of a Western lifestyle that is highly tempting to them, but those that eventually decide in favour of their 'Eastern' suitor are also, by doing so, accepting the superiority of the traditional view of marriage.⁶⁹

If Peyami Safa's novels challenged Kemalism at the cultural level, socialist writers began to draw attention to its failure to address structural problems of inequality and oppression. Kemalist writers like Yakup Kadri saw the problem of underdevelopment as one that could be solved by an 'enlightened' elite imposing modernising reforms. Already in the 1920s the Marxist poet Nazım Hikmet (1901-63) had begun to hint at a very different solution, nothing less than a radical restructuring of the social order. Sabahattin Ali (1907- 48) emerged in the 1930s as the first prominent Turkish fiction writer to be inspired by socialist thought. He is particularly noted for his finely observed and skilfully constructed short stories, which provide memorable images of the predicaments of individual members of the struggling lower classes. In *Kağrı* (The Ox Cart), for example, the protagonist is an elderly village woman, a widow whose only son has been shot by the son of the local landowner. She is first advised to keep quiet about it and accept some symbolic help from the landowner. Then, when the gendarmes eventually arrive and order an exhumation of the body for examination, she is forced to transport the decomposing corpse on an ox cart to the town miles away, accompanying it on foot, and she collapses on the way from grief and exhaustion, alone in the world, a person of no consequence to the authorities.

Sabahattin Ali, like all the writers we have considered so far, was of urban origin, and his knowledge of the conditions of life of villagers and artisans was derived mainly from the contacts that he made in prison while serving time for political offences (an experience common to virtually all left-wing writers in Turkey at one time or another). The period of İsmet İnönü's presidency in the 1940s witnessed a remarkable educational experiment in the form of the Village Institutes. These were simultaneously boarding schools and farms, and gave selected village children a remarkably broad, modern education, with a special focus on rural skills. Although the experiment did not long survive the introduction of multi-party politics in the post-war period, it did produce a generation of highly committed young teachers of village origin, who were usually both Kemalist and socialist by conviction – an ideological combination that was to become dominant among Turkish intellectuals in the 1960s and 70s. Not surprisingly a number of the Village Institute graduates were eager to give their own accounts of what rural life in Turkey was really like. The first example

⁶⁹ For details of the particular novels in question see Berna Moran, *Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış: Ahmet Mithat'tan A.H. Tanpınar'a* (Istanbul 1983), 185-99, on which the analysis given here is based.

was Mahmut Makal's famous *Bizim Köy* (Our Village), a modest little volume that caused a sensation both in Turkey and abroad when it came out in 1950. *Bizim Köy* is not itself a work of literature but a set of brief sketches of aspects of life in two villages in central Anatolia, based on the author's personal experiences.



Not many of the novels and short stories of the 'village literature' genre have outlived the period in which they were written. In most cases the writers' concern to convey a political message tended to make characterisations one-sided and plots too predictable. The work of Yaşar Kemal (born 1923), whose first novels appeared in the 1950s, is a notable exception to this generalisation. Although not a Village Institute graduate, Yaşar Kemal is of village



origin, and is a native of the Çukurova area in southern Turkey, where most of his novels are set. He is steeped in the folklore of the area, which he studied as a journalist, and also has a particular genius for describing the natural environment, with its specific flora and fauna, mountains, forests and marshes, and the impact of different light and weather conditions. His writing style has a poetic and semi-mythical quality, exemplified in the almost super-human, beneficent attributes of İnce Memed, the eponymous bandit hero of 'Memed My Hawk'.⁷⁰

Finally mention should be made of two major writers of the middle decades of the twentieth century who were not motivated by socio-political engagement and whose more individualistic approach to fiction writing was a harbinger of things to come. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901- 62), the first professor of modern Turkish literature at Istanbul University, was a man for whom aesthetic values, musical and visual as well as literary, were all-important. He felt a profound sense of continuity with the past, and while convinced of the need for Turkish society to adapt to the modern world he was equally convinced that no society could be healthy if it tried to reject its cultural heritage in toto. His classic novel *Huzur* ('Peace of Mind') (1949)⁷¹ has as its main character a young man named Mümtaz, who shares the refined sensibilities of Tanpınar himself. The love affair at the centre of the story, between Mümtaz and an equally refined young woman called Nuran, is inseparably intertwined with their shared love of the beauties of Istanbul – the haunting modalities of classical Ottoman music, the architectural harmony of the city's historic mosques and the atmospheric enchantments of fishing trips on a moonlit Bosphorus. Tanpınar's fiction was regarded by the literary establishment of his time as self-indulgent in its focus on the inner worlds of socially privileged individuals and regressive in its validation of the past. It was not until the 1970s, a decade after his death, that the critical climate in the country had changed sufficiently for Tanpınar to be 'discovered' and given the recognition he deserved.



Sait Faik (1906-54), on the other hand, an eccentric and lonely figure and prolific writer of short stories, enjoyed considerable recognition in his own time despite his

⁷⁰ The novel *İnce Memed* was published in 1955, and the English version by Edouard Roditi in London in 1961.

⁷¹ Erdağ Göknar has published a translation of this novel under the title *A Mind at Peace* (Brooklyn, NY, 2008).



failure to address social issues as such. The reason for this was probably that his concern for the underprivileged members of society was vividly reflected in the way he described them - and his own interaction with them – in his highly unusual and personal stories. Sait Faik did not have to work for his living, and spent much of his time wandering about Istanbul and its islands, engaging with ordinary members of the public that he encountered some of them from the Greek or other non-Muslim minorities, and virtually none of them from the educated classes. The stories he produced are often carelessly written and lack a clear structure, but their unpretentious sincerity and human warmth, their imaginative power and occasional touches of surrealism have given Sait Faik a unique and undisputed place in the history of narrative fiction in Turkish.⁷²

Poetry

Gülag Yurdal Michaçlıs

Poet and Translator

Başlıksız Şükürler

Olsaydı varsayımla
Olmasaydı yok yokken yine
Yaşanmaya değer miydi bir hayat
İncelenip araştırılmamışsa
İster yatağında güller açsın
Kuşlar uçsun her gece
İsterse kavrulsun kimlik tutkusuyla

Kısa ayaklarıyla koşuyor kıyıdaki
Deniz kaplumbağası
Onun kadar gayretli herkes
Bir ben miyim yaşamdan korkan
Harpten kıtlıktan
Sosyal adaletsizlikten?

26/04/2013

Untitled Gratitude

Assuming she was here
When nothing was not nothing again
Was life worth living
If not searched for and researched
Whether roses bloomed in her bed
Or birds took flight each night
Was she fried up with the passion of
identity or not

The turtle on the shore is
Running with its short legs
Everyone is struggling likewise
Am I the only one afraid of life
War famine
And social injustice?

15/05/2013

⁷² Two collections of Sait Faik stories are available in English translation: *A Dot on the Map*, ed. Talat Sait Halman (Bloomington, Indiana, 1983); *Sleeping in the Forest*, eds. Talat S. Halman and Jayne L. Warner (Syracuse, NY, 2004).

1218 – WHEN MY FAMILY RODE INTO TURKEY...

by Osman Streater
Writer and PR Consultant

Part II

Continued from *Review No.21*.



Back to the chronicle. So far, it may seem to be one long history of blood and guts. But it isn't. Here is part of Ahmed Bey's story of the wedding celebrations of one of his sons, at the Kızıldağ *yayla*, with a long guest list of what he calls 'suitable people' – some two or three thousand of them: "Everybody was amazed at the variety of fireworks and magicians and musicians and wrestling displays. Nobody in these parts had ever seen such a wedding, and it was only with God's help that there was no accident amongst the crowds and nobody was hurt. A great deal of happiness and jollity resulted. All during the wedding festivities tradesmen came up from the towns and did a roaring trade. The variety of things available made the place look like a city."

I should also mention that the Menemencis were religious, with virtually everyone who comes up in the chronicle having made the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. Ahmed Bey describes his own pilgrimage: "In 1851 we went on the Hajj by sea. Around twenty neighbours and friends became *Hacı*, together with some of our womenfolk and servants. On the return journey by land we rented carriages and camels and horses for our people. Although the holy pilgrimage cost a great deal of money, the expenditure added to our fame and standing, as well as ensuring that we got back in safety and comfort." The 'twenty neighbours and friends' mentioned were of course all men and one can but hope that the 'womenfolk' were at least allowed into the carriages.

I mentioned the Menemencis' ups and downs in matters financial. This was well illustrated at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1800, the then Derebey had been shot dead by a man to whom he had given refuge with the tribe, even though all his advisers warned him, correctly as it turned out, that he was an agent for an enemy tribe. That Derebey, the father of our author Ahmed Bey, had accepted an honorific title from the Sultan without realising that, under Ottoman rules, this would mean that all his property would be forfeit upon his death. They didn't in fact lose everything, because friends at court took pity, but his widow Ümmügülsüm Hatun, known in tribal legend as Ekber Kızı or Akbar's Daughter, who was pregnant with our author Ahmed Bey at the time, was to tell him later on that, as all the animals had been sold, the tribe made the journey to the *yayla* on foot, and that she had only one *kilim* left to cover six children at night.

Yet within ten years the situation was reversed. In 1810 Ahmed Bey's elder brother Hacı Habib Bey was made *Mütesellim* or District Governor of Tarsus. With the food shortage in Europe during the Napoleonic War, and with what Ahmed Bey calls Frankish cargo ships queuing up in the port of Tarsus to buy grain, this gave him enormous power, which I am sorry to say he had no hesitation in using. In other words, the ships' captains had to pay him for permission to enter port and buy their grain. Ahmed Bey records in the chronicle that his brother made one thousand purses of Maria Theresa Thalers from this trade. Part of this vast fortune was shared round to build large konaks or mansions for all the brothers, each of course with a Selamlık or male section and then a separate Harem. From the chronicle we learn that each Selamlık had about thirty or forty rooms, while each Harem had fifteen or twenty. Generous as Habib Bey was to his family, he did not stint himself. Here is Ahmed Bey's description of



his visit to the *yayla* from Tarsus: “When we went to greet him we were astonished to see his wealth in the style and showiness of the period. There were three to five hundred retainers, most of them almost drowning in silver and gold, wearing Lahore shawls and red headgear. At the time I was a boy of ten and showed it by my behaviour when he was distributing gifts to relatives and retainers, and discovered that he hadn’t brought anything for me. Even though he immediately sent someone back to Tarsus for a good robe (*entari*) for me, I was very offended by his having forgotten me. I cried a great deal and refused to wear it. The *Rahmetli* (Deceased) then persuaded me to wear it by displaying winning ways.”



In 1815 came the first real challenge from Istanbul. Sultan Mahmud II, the reforming Sultan, was anxious to reestablish the authority of the state. In 1826, he was to do so by destroying the Janissaries, but in 1815 he made what he considered an even more urgent move against the Derebeys. In many cases, he was successful. For example, he overthrew the Çapanoğlu of Yozgat, to whom the Menemencis owed allegiance, and who at their height had been capable of fielding a private army of 40,000. It is sometimes assumed that the Istanbul government did not move against the more remote Derebeys of Cilicia until fifty years later in 1865. This is not true. An army was sent against the Menemencioğlu in 1815. That it failed in its mission is largely due to Ekber Kızı, Akbar’s Daughter, the clearly very remarkable widow of the Derebey who had been shot dead in 1800.

When I first read about Ekber Kızı, I was tempted to categorise her leadership and sheer determination as an early example of modern Turkish feminism. But having gone into it more, I am now more inclined to see it as a surviving example of the independence Turcoman women used to display in the heroic age of the Oğuz Turks. Examples can be found in Geoffrey Lewis’s translation of *The Book of Dede Korkut*. More specifically, when the French traveller Bertrandon de la Brocquière travelled through Cilicia on his way to Jerusalem in the 15th century, he was astonished by the independence of Turcoman women: not only did they shoot arrows and fight in battle alongside their men, but Turcoman wives would even tell their husbands in front of guests that they were talking nonsense and should shut up.

At any rate, it was Ekber Kızı who noticed Ottoman forces being assembled, as they thought discreetly, at Tarsus and Adana. She reacted by stocking up Milvan Castle with huge quantities of arms, ammunition and food of every kind, including some 800 sheep, as well as supplies of *rakı* to which only she had the key – she planned to use it as a reward for deeds of courage. She also secretly informed the tribe’s soldiers of what the signal would be to retreat up to the castle. When a Menemenci horseman rode silently through their villages with a knotted cloth hanging from the back of his saddle, they were to move to Milvan Castle without further ado. It worked exactly as she had planned. When the Ottoman army of Mustafa Paşa made its move against them, the Menemencioğlu family and private army disappeared into their castle redoubt.

The siege lasted some six to seven months. At first, the Ottoman commander thought they would soon surrender out of hunger and thirst. When he realised that they were not going to do so, he had relatives of the defenders in the castle rounded up in chains and marched to the castle walls, where they were made to shout “Save us” to those inside. The defenders shouted back that they did not recognise their relatives and then opened fire. Then the Paşa sent for siege artillery. When this arrived, a party of Menemenci soldiers sneaked out of the castle at night, surprised the sleeping gunners and cut off their noses and ears, sparing just one gunner whom they took back to the castle with a gun and a supply of shells, which they forced him the next morning to fire upon the Ottoman troops. In the end, the Ottoman commander gave up and withdrew. Ekber Kızı published a list of all the most valiant of her soldiers. This appears in the chronicle, and includes two Armenians. Doubtless, they were all rewarded in *rakı* as well as words.

Why did it take another fifty years from this failed attempt of 1815 before the Menemencis and the other Cilician Derebeys could be successfully overthrown? There were many reasons. Ottoman armies were chronically short of manpower and were engaged elsewhere, in fighting against Russia and Iran. And there was also the extraordinary episode of the Egyptian occupation.

This is not the place to go into the remarkable story of Mohammad Ali or Mehmed Ali Paşa of Kavalla and his rise to power in Egypt. However, in 1832 he sent his European trained troops under his son Ibrahim Paşa into Asia Minor. The new model Ottoman army, now without any Janissaries but also as yet without modern German discipline and training, proved no match, and in two battles lost over 30,000 men – and with all due respect to them, when Arabs start defeating Turks, things must have come to a pretty pass in any Turkish army. Furthermore, the Egyptians were welcomed wherever they went by the population. Mahmud II's reforms had not been popular, tax collectors had been even greedier than usual, and suddenly they had in their midst these European-trained Egyptians who seemed determined to behave with fairness and decency.

The Kurdish tribes of the Taurus Mountains were not, however, having any of it. They had been in constant rebellion against the Ottomans, and before them the Byzantines, and they saw no reason not to be in rebellion against the Egyptians. Mountain warfare proved to be the weak point of the Egyptian army: they had never seen any mountains, let alone fought in them. This was where our chronicle author Ahmed Bey came into his own. By then he had emerged from a period of family in-fighting as Derebey. Already an experienced mountain warrior, he went over to the Egyptians and became their enforcer. In typical Menemencioğlu fashion, the tribe covered itself both ways, with another brother staying loyal to the Ottomans (as part of the preparations for the siege of Milvan Castle in 1815, it had been arranged that one brother would go into hiding away from the castle, so that he could emerge and take over if the castle were to fall). Ahmed Bey's success was such that he was given the nickname, not very politically correct these days I am afraid, of *Kürtkiran* – Breaker of Kurds.

The Egyptians were only removed from Anatolia by the Treaty of London in 1840, a humiliating treaty from the Ottoman point of view. But Ahmed Bey had parted company from them before. Although he approved of much of the civilian reforms the Egyptians brought with them – for example, he joined in their efforts to grow cotton in the Cilician plain, the start of what is today such a major industry – they were in other ways too modern for him. In particular, he didn't like their deliberate offensiveness towards Islam. The turning point for him came one day when Ibrahim Paşa was describing what he planned to achieve next, and Ahmed Bey said "Inşallah". He was very offended by Ibrahim Paşa's reply of "Why are you bringing God into it? I've said I will do it and I will, without God's help or anyone else's."

It used to be thought that the reason for the suppression of the Derebeys of Cilicia in 1865 was obvious enough. They had defied the authority of the Sultans; the Sultans had to bring them under control. Moreover, the Cilician Derebeys controlled the vital route south from Asia Minor, whose importance Frederick Burnaby described in his 1898 classic *On Horseback through Asia Minor*: "It is the route from Smyrna and Constantinople to Aleppo and Baghdad. It is the route of Antioch, Palmyra, and Babylon. It is the route of all the conquerors". But in fact there were other reasons, some rather surprising. It was, for example, no accident that their suppression happened in 1865. The Crimean War had a part to play in it: the shortage of men in the Ottoman army showed up the fact that they were unable to recruit from Cilicia because of defiance by the Derebeys, and the British even humiliatingly offered to go into Cilicia and suppress the Derebeys for the Ottoman government. Moreover, after the Crimean War the Russians began forcing Turks and Moslems out of their territories in large numbers, and the Ottoman government saw the under-populated Cilicia of the time as ideal resettlement territory. Almost incredibly, but in fact quite logically, the American Civil War also provided an incentive, interrupting as it did supplies of cotton, and focusing attention on the cotton-growing potential of Cilicia, already proven by the Egyptians. And of course the greatest incentive was the desire of the new,

reformist Ottoman authorities of the *Tanzimat* or Reform movement to impose what they called *medeniyet* – ‘civilisation’, doing away in the process with the nomadic existence which they contemptuously called *bedeviyet* – ‘Bedouin-ness’. That ‘civilisation’ was to cost many members of the tribe their lives in the years after the exile of their patriarch.

The creation of the Reform Division sent to suppress the Derebeys and settle the tribes in 1865 was quite an achievement. Not only were sufficient numbers of troops found, but its military commander Derviş Paşa and his civilian assistant the historian Cevdet Paşa were given large funds and almost total discretion. Furthermore, supplies of the brand new rifle, never before used in Anatolia, were shipped in and issued to the Reform Division, thus enabling them to shoot their opponents while remaining out of their old muskets’ range. But in addition to force, persuasion was to be used, again a very rare phenomenon. Tax arrears were to be forgiven. All supplies were to be paid for instead of simply being taken in the usual fashion. On approaching a tribal village, the Reform Division was to set up an open air mosque and say its prayers: they had discovered that Cilicia was so remote from Istanbul that many people there thought that the Sultan and his representatives were not Moslem. Derebeys were to be won over by the offer of generous pensions. And on the whole it worked – except that it had some disastrous consequences.

In a region where life was only made liveable by people escaping the stifling heat and malarial perils of the Cilician Plain by migrating up into the Taurus mountains during not just the summer but much of the year, the ‘civilisation’ that was imposed forbade them to move from the plain and exposed them to heat and disease. This was doubly extraordinary, because in Istanbul one of the earliest and most popular achievements of the reformers of the *Tanzimat* had been the abolition of the need to wait for the Sultan’s express permission before people could leave the city and move to the coolness of their Bosphorus and island summer homes as the heat closed in. Sultans, obsessed with the need to know exactly who lived in what summer home, had tended to hold up permission until all their records were up to date, so the removal of the need to wait for his go-ahead had been much appreciated by the sweating population. Yet Istanbul, even at the height of summer, is open to sea breezes from three sides and does not contain malarial swamps. In Cilicia, the swamps were very real. So was the heat. The Cilician swamps were not drained until the 1950s, nearly a century later. Meanwhile, the story of the deaths caused by the action of 1865 was for a long time hidden, for the simple reason that the main historian of the events, Cevdet Paşa, was himself the senior government official who accompanied the Ottoman army that carried them out. Yet the suffering was all too real, and affected many innocent parties, amongst them the descendants of Kara or Black Tatars who had accompanied Timur the Lame or Tamerlane in his invasion of Asia Minor in 1402. Unlike Timur, who wanted to get back to Central Asia after his killing spree, they had taken to the grassy and watery areas of Cilicia. Timur wanted to force them back with him, but many fled into the valleys and mountains of the Taurus mountains, managed to evade his patrols and stayed, becoming part of the permanent population of the high regions and never, for atavistic reasons of inherited terror, daring to venture down to the Cilician plain for the mild winter. So in their fear of Timur they had stayed up in the mountains for centuries. In 1865 their mountain homes were torched by the Reform Division and they were forcibly settled in the plain in straw huts. But the Tatars could not adapt to the heat of the Çukurova or Cilician plain. Their population declined from 11,000 in 1868 to 4426 in 1890. This was but one unexpected and at the time unreported result of the imposition of ‘civilisation’. By virtue of their exile, the Menemencioğlus took no part in the transformation of Cilicia from tribal winter pastureland into what it is now, the bread basket of Turkey, and of Adana from a small town of some 25,000 to Turkey’s fourth largest city. Unlike the Kozanoğlus, who tried to take back their Cilician domains during the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, the Menemencioğlus never looked back, either literally or metaphorically.

On arrival in Istanbul, Ahmed Bey bought a large house in Beyoğlu or Pera as it was called, as he informs us for 625 purses of *akçes*, and lived there with his family for another eight

years until his death. Many of the exiled Derebey families rapidly disappeared from sight, as if their reason for existence had been taken from them and they couldn't adapt to their new circumstances. By contrast, the Menemencioğlus became rapidly integrated in urban society. Even the district of Istanbul Ahmed Bey chose for his house – Beyoğlu, the sophisticated embassy and European quarter – seems to show a desire to embrace the family's new life rather than long for the old one. As sophistication in the Ottoman Empire was often supposed to be indicated by use and knowledge of Arabic and Persian words, for a while they used the Turco-Persian Menemenlizâde as the family name rather than the pure Turkish Menemencioğlu. What is perhaps most remarkable is the speed with which the Menemencioğlus became integrated into the mainstream Ottoman establishment and beyond that into the international framework. In fact, it is very much as if they were welcomed back, so perhaps the word should be reintegrated.

My great-grandfather Rifat Bey, who was a little boy when he left Cilicia with his father Ahmed Bey, was three times Ottoman Minister of Finance and then Speaker of the Ottoman parliament. He married the daughter of the great Ottoman patriot poet Namık Kemal, whose opposition to central authority flummoxed the government because he was descended from Sultan Ahmed III. My grandfather, his son Muvaffak Bey, broke further with Turcoman tradition by marrying a Greek girl. Sultan Abdül Hamid had wanted to 'favour' Rifat Bey by marrying Muvaffak to one of his granddaughters, but Muvaffak had fallen hopelessly in love with the beautiful Katerina, and Rifat Bey risked the Sultan's wrath by allowing them to get married. The family story is that, at the first dinner she attended at the family mansion, Rifat Bey sat Katerina on his right and then told the assembled family that he had something to say to them: "I have heard," he told them, "that some of you have been trying to convert my new daughter to Islam. I want you to understand that one does not change one's religion like one changes one's shirt. I never want to have to speak to you about this again." And he never did.



As for his younger son, Numan Menemencioğlu, born less than thirty years after the suppression of the tribe in Cilicia, he was the Foreign Minister who kept Turkey neutral during the Second World War. He paid his own first visit to Cilicia in early 1943 to meet Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden at the Adana Conference. He also saved some 100,000 Jews from the Nazis, working not only with the Jewish Agency for Palestine – he is named on the Simon Wiesenthal Centre website – but also with his friend Angelo Monsignor Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII and Apostolic Delegate in Turkey during the war.

The friendship seems to be symbolic of the remarkable and ever changeful life of the Menemencioğlus who first entered the domains of the Christians at the beginning of the 13th century.

Interview with Fuad Kavur

Film maker talking about his 'Atatürk' Film

Interviewed by Arın Bayraktaroğlu
in April 2013

Fuad Kavur is a Turkish film maker who lives in London. He arrived in England in 1963, when his paternal uncle, Kemal N Kavur was serving as the Turkish ambassador to the Court of St James. "I was sent here to learn English at a summer school; however, something must have gone



wrong, as, half a century later, I am still here", quips Kavur. He continued his secondary schooling at the French Lycée, "a good place to learn English", Kavur muses, and later studied International Relations at University College London. "At the time, the idea was for me to go into family business". "The "family business" Kavur refers to is diplomacy, given his two paternal uncles, Kemal and Sadi Kavur served as ambassadors, respectively, at Helsinki, Sofia, Moscow, Tokyo, London, Bern; and Belgrade, Stockholm and Lisbon. However, diplomacy was not to be as, during his third year at University, Kavur directed, at the Bloomsbury Theatre London, the British premiere of Gottfried von Einem's opera, *Der Prozess* (The Trial), based on the Kafka novel of the same title. The production was such a success, with great reviews in the national press, that it pretty much put the lid on a career at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead, Kavur got a job as an assistant director at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. There, he worked with John Copley on numerous productions, including *Così fan tutte*, *The Marriage of Figaro*, *Don Giovanni* and *La Bohème*. However, a chance meeting in 1975 with Sir Peter Ustinov led to an exclusive long term collaboration – first on opera stage in Edinburgh, Paris, La Scala in Milan, Salzburg and Berlin, then on television with various documentaries, finally culminating in the feature film *Memed my Hawk*, based on the Nobel Prize nominated Turkish novel by Yaşar Kemal, which Kavur produced. *Memed my Hawk* received a royal premiere in London, attended by Prince and Princess Michael of Kent.

Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu met Kavur for tea at his Belgravia flat in London, to talk about his film *Atatürk*, to shoot in September 2013 in Hungary.

Interview

Q- Why an Atatürk film?

A- Oddly, the idea was not mine but came to me from an old friend, Branko Lustig (prominent Croatian film producer), who was my first assistant director on *Memed my Hawk*. Branko later went on to produce *Schindler's List* and *Gladiator*, for which films he got two Oscars. He was instrumental in getting me the commission to write this screenplay. First I was reticent. However, by the time I had researched the subject, I was totally hooked, as I realised this was a fascinating story about a most extraordinary man – a Nietzschean 'Übermensch'.

Q- Could you expand on this?

A- I could, but if we are not careful, we would be here all day! However, in a nutshell, if it was not for Atatürk, today Turkey too would be going through what is euphemistically called the 'Arab Spring', which, in reality, is nothing but revolutions for people fighting to gain their freedom. Yet, what Kemal Atatürk managed to do for Turkey, creating a truly modern state out of the ashes of the Sick Man of Europe, is nothing short of a miracle: Turks did not have to

fight for their freedom, they were given it. That is a story which the world should know about.

Q- What is the main message of your film?

A- Sam Goldwyn, one of the founders of MGM, used to say, "Messages, I leave them to Western Union". I am a film maker and I too feel films are made to entertain. That said, if there is, let's say, a 'central theme' to my film, it is Freedom. That is a universal theme, given all human history, social and individual, is the story of mankind's quest for Freedom. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau said, "Man is born free, but is in chains everywhere" – and is constantly trying to free himself.

Q- What is the relevance of an Atatürk film to the present day Turkey?

A- 2013 is the 90th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. However, as H G Wells dreamt, if 'time travel' were possible and we could go back to the Turkey of October 1923, what would we find? A country with 95% illiteracy! In such an environment, the easiest course of action for a politician who sought popularity would have been to embrace religion and spoon-feed the public with that magic potion of comfort. However, Kemal Atatürk chose the difficult path and embarked upon a programme of education. His message to Turks was "wake up and smell the coffee". In practise this meant there was only one way to achieve Freedom and that was by knowledge; and there was only one way to acquire knowledge, and that was by education – both for men as well as women. Of course, such a policy ruffled reactionary feathers and made enemies for Atatürk. Just as well, for without that there would be no screenplay: the essence of all drama is conflict!

Q- What about your actors?

A- Our cast is composed of English actors, with one exception of an exceptional Canadian actress, Sarah Gadon, a discovery of David Cronenberg, who is playing a young and attractive American journalist who happens to be in Anatolia in the early 1920s. Other members of our cast include Jack Fox, a most talented and a handsome English actor – blond with piercing blue eyes; and Edmund Kingsley, son of Ben Kingsley. We also have a number of names playing cameo parts – Terence Stamp, Ralph Fiennes and Julian Fellowes, the Oscar winning writer of *Gosford Park* and *Downton Abbey*. Finally, there is Una Chaplin, Charlie Chaplin's granddaughter, who is playing Latife, Atatürk's wife. This is a curious turn of fate, given Kemal Atatürk absolutely loved watching Charlie Chaplin movies. Indeed, one night, after a



screening of the *Gold Rush* he said, "I don't think I have ever laughed so much in my entire life..." Now, with Charlie Chaplin's granddaughter portraying Kemal Atatürk's wife, one could almost argue, the wheel has come full circle.

Q- Why are you not making the film in Turkey?

A- The decision to shoot in Hungary was taken by Jonathan Sanger, our American producer and Anthony Waye, our Executive Producer. Although Anthony shot parts of *The World is not Enough* and, last spring, *Skyfall*, in Turkey, he felt the studio facilities in Hungary were much more suitable for this particular film. These days, Budapest is the centre of film making in Europe. Last month, the studio had difficulty in finding me a hotel room due to the presence of foreign film crews in Budapest!

Q- When will we see the film?

A- The principal photography is planned for early September 2013. We have a 12 week shoot plus one week in Istanbul for the exteriors. That means we will wrap up early December. However, as the old Hollywood saying goes, "movies are made in the cutting room", so to have a finished product, we are looking to mid-2014. If people only knew what goes into making a film...


Q- What is the audience for your film?

A- I have lived in England for half a century, consequently it is natural that I think and write in terms of Anglo-Saxon audiences. Luckily, thanks to Hollywood, the world audiences, by now, are used to seeing English speaking movies, even if they do not necessarily take place in America or England. After all, with one exception of a then totally unknown Omar Sharif, the entire cast of *Doctor Zhivago* was composed of Anglo-Saxon actors – all playing Russians. Therefore, I can confidently say, for *Atatürk*, the world is our audience – I hope, that will include Turkey.

Subscription Reminder
from the
TASG Membership Secretary

Subscriptions for 2014 are due on 1 January 2014 – the rates can be found on p 63 in the *Review*. Members who pay by standing order are requested to ensure, if necessary, that their payments are at the appropriate levels of £18 for single or £30 for joint membership, please.

Book Reviews & Publications



The Young Atatürk: From Ottoman Soldier to Statesman of Turkey

by George W Gawrych

I.B.Tauris, London & New York, 2013, 267pp,
xiv pp. Biographical Notes, Bibliography, Index
ISBN 978 1 78076 322 4, Hardback

Anyone producing a new biography of Atatürk is entering a crowded market. A quick internet check reveals no less than thirteen published biographies in English – to say nothing of the many accounts in Turkish and other languages – of which seven are currently in print or easily available. To stand out from the crowd, a new biography must either produce substantial new material, or a novel and convincing analysis of an oft-told story.

George W Gawrych's main claim to originality is that, as a former teacher at the US Army Command and General Staff College, he approaches the narrative from the military viewpoint and that, unlike his predecessors, he has conducted extensive research in the archives of the Turkish General Staff. His account is also thoroughly documented – an important advantage over some of the competition, such as the much better known biography by Lord Kinross.⁷³ The story is not limited to the battlefield, since Gawrych uses Atatürk's own military publications, notebooks, reports and correspondence to explore his intellect and character – in particular, the role in his thinking of the nineteenth century military classics by Colmar von der Goltz and Carl von Clausewitz. As Gawrych admits, success in the war of national resistance of 1920-22 'required more political than military acumen' (p.35) but he leaves many of the crucial political questions unanswered. For this, readers will still need to turn to the far longer and more detailed study by Andrew Mango.⁷⁴

In his first two chapters, Gawrych re-tells the story of Kemal's early life, his evolving political and military ideas, his career as a commander during the first world war, and the organisation of the national resistance movement after 1918. This includes a reference to his address to the second congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1909, in which he urged the army to stay out of politics (a principle which he later conspicuously failed to adhere to in his own case) as well as a


⁷³ Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: the Rebirth of a Nation* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964)

⁷⁴ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London, John Murray, 1999)

detailed account of his role in the defence of the Dardanelles in 1915. In the following three chapters, most of the narrative covers familiar ground, with the formation of the nationalist government, the Sèvres Treaty and its rejection, and the brief war with Armenia which ended in December 1920. There are detailed accounts of the two battles of İnönü and the Greek offensive during the summer of 1921. The turn of the tide, with the epic battle of the Sakarya in August-September 1921, followed by the Turkish breakthrough at Afyon and Dumlupınar just one year later, and the ultimate Greek defeat, take up the following two chapters. These include blow-by-blow accounts and useful illustrative maps of all these encounters. In a valuable table, Gawrych details the statistical strength of the two sides, making the important point that they were pretty evenly matched in terms of military manpower, but with the Greeks having a distinct advantage when it came to machine guns and artillery. The only clear advantage on the Turkish side was the possession of a substantial cavalry force – provoking the speculation (although Gawrych does not suggest this) that this may have been the last occasion in which cavalry made a crucial contribution to victory in a major war.

These battlefield narratives will probably be the main reason for choosing this account over its many competitors. Against this, important parts of the story are missing. Gawrych gives us detailed accounts of Atatürk's victories, but virtually nothing about his defeats. Thus, the crushing defeat of the Ottoman forces by Allenby in the battle of Megiddo in August 1918, in which Atatürk commanded the Ottoman Seventh Army and then blamed everyone else for the disaster, is dismissed in a few lines, with no details given. More crucially, the later narrative breaks off with the capture of İzmir in September 1922. The vital diplomatic follow-up, ending with the Treaty of Lausanne of July 1923, is summarised in a scant five pages, with another five on the 'Kemalist Revolution' which followed. Like a musical composition which abruptly breaks off in the middle of a final crescendo, this is likely to leave the reader with a strong sense of unsatisfied anticipation. After 1923, as Gawrych remarks, Atatürk 'abandoned his war strategy with its broad appeal to a pluralist Anatolian society for a narrowly based secular Turkish nation state' (p.215) but he gives us no clues as to how or why this came about. Admittedly, he can point out that he did not aim to give us more than a study of the 'young Atatürk', but by ignoring his career post-1923 he leaves out what is still a crucial topic of Turkish political debate and conflict.

William Hale



Mein Zypern

by Joachim Sartorius

mareverlag, Hamburg, 2013, 192 pp
ISBN 978-3-86648-174-9

“My most cherished house is in Cyprus.....”

This is what Joachim Sartorius writes in his book *Mein Zypern* (My Cyprus), published in 2013. It is a compact little book providing a high degree of personal recognition and identification for all lovers of Cyprus and all those who live on the island.

The author spent three summers in Lapta (1984 to 1986) in the former Austen Harrison, now Asil Nadir house, and in Bellapais (Walnut Cottage). In 2012 he returned as a tourist for three weeks and completed his notes from so long ago. "What I am basically trying to do is create a concoction of two eras. "

Joachim Sartorius had just joined the Foreign Office as a young diplomat, 28, when his father, the then German Ambassador in Nicosia, experienced the Greek right extremist Sampson coup d'état in 1974 which led to the Turkish intervention. For the next twenty or so years Joachim fulfilled various tasks in the Bonn Foreign Office and had diplomatic posts in New York, Istanbul and Nicosia until 1986. After that he left the Foreign Office and took on leading roles in the DAAD (The German Academic Exchange Service), the Goethe Institute, and, up to 2011, was manager of the Berlin Festival.

Although he had lived on the divided island for several years, his vision and opinion appear to have been quite clearly influenced by having his work based in the Greek-Cypriot part of Nicosia, and by his artist friends there. Personally he regards himself as a cultured aesthete on the fringe rather than belonging to the 'Turkish Soldatestka' (ruthless band of soldiers). It is perhaps surprising what little impact his diplomatic past and experiences seem to have had on his analytical appreciation of the Cypriot situation and how there is an apparent lack of willpower on his part in at least trying to find relatively balanced conflict solutions.

His descriptions of a summery Cyprus, its historic and cultural sites are sensitive, intuitive and deeply poetic. One can still feel Sartorius' emotional energy and engagement in his choice of language, even though some thirty years have passed since his time and experiences in Paphos, Lapithos, Koiklia and Bellapais.

However, as a travel guide for both parts of the island the publication is quite unusable, since Sartorius insists on using only the now obsolete Greek names for Turkish-Cypriot towns and villages. Their Turkish names have, after all, been in official use for almost forty years. He also refers constantly to the 'Turkish occupied North', which unequivocally leans emphatically in favour of the Greek side. There is no mention at all of the fact that, in the meantime, a well-functioning, democratic governmental system has been in place in the North and that the Turkish army stationed there – possibly seen as a threat by the Greek Cypriots – acts as a reassuring protector of the Turkish Cypriots.

Only once is there any evidence of a refreshing insight, when he says: "I didn't dare to actually tell my friends that their fierce panhellenism had driven the Turkish minority into a corner. Neither did I dare ask the question, whether this revolt against Great Britain, led by a gangster and a dignitary of the church, might not already have carried the seeds for the poisoned relations to follow in later years".



So, one asks oneself: Why didn't Sartorius voice these niggling questions? Was his Greek obsession so strong that he just didn't dare open his mouth? Or was it a misinterpretation of the concept of 'diplomacy'?


His one-sided, almost slavish, obsession and ambivalent attitude is particularly apparent when he very innocently, and without any sense of wrong-doing, describes

his visit to the ancient sites of Turkish-Cypriot Salamis and Vouni and how he stuffed his pockets with antique sherds, most probably according to the motto: everything here is Greek after all, so I can help myself.

All in all Sartorius creates a colourful picture from his own vision of the island for the reader, and his prose and poems are always best, when they are about his own profound experience of a foreign land. In doing this – being a veritable aesthete – he tries hard to avoid any political issues, something that is quite impossible in the case of this island, as world history is synonymous with island history, and the daily lives of the people on both parts of the divided island are shaped by this.

Heidemarie Blankenstein
Berlin/Lapta, July 2013

Translated from the German
by Sigrid Martin-Wünscher



Evliyâ Çelebi. Studies and Essays

Commemorating the 400th Anniversary of
his Birth

by Nuran Tezcan, Semih Tezcan,
Robert Dankoff (eds)

Istanbul. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism
Publications and The Banks Association of Turkey, 2012, 461,
numerous Illustrations, 1 CD. ISBN: 978-975-17-3617-8

Evliyâ Çelebi who, among many other characterisations has been termed the Turkish Ibn Battuta, was celebrated with a UNESCO year in 2011, his 100th anniversary. The attention he received worldwide on this occasion generated a great push for research into this extraordinary – and one might even say out of time – person's life, his travels and his oeuvre. This, in turn, added in manifold ways to our general knowledge about the seventeenth century Ottoman, Arab and Eastern European lands. This year, Evliyâ Çelebi's magnum opus *Seyahatnâme* was added by UNESCO to the 'Memory of the World Register', thereby acknowledging the importance of Çelebi's work for the heritage of mankind.

The book reviewed here is a collection of essays, articles and miscellanea and was originally triggered by an international conference held in 2008 in Bilkent University, Ankara, organised by Nuran Tezcan, one of the editors. Together with 'Evliyâlogists' Robert Dankoff and Semih Tezcan, she contributed to and edited the Turkish version of the present book, which was published in 2011, unfortunately in a comparatively drab version suffering from poor quality paper, feeble overall presentation and a

scarcity of illustrations. The English edition however, is an impressive and magnificently designed volume which offers studies and essays reflecting the fact that Çelebi's *Seyahatnâme* can be read and understood from many perspectives.

The research results cover the life and history of the author and his travel book which deals with geography, cultural anthropology, art history, linguistics, and literature. The book under review furthermore presents a 'Map of the Nile' that only recently has been shown to be by the hand of Çelebi, as well as new insight into the length of his life. Already in the last 150 years or so the *Seyahatnâme* has been used as a mine in many ways, but mostly in separate parts and as a mere travel account. Nowadays, much of this earlier research has been critically reviewed, revised and enlarged.

I would like to draw attention to just a few selected highlights from the book:

The life of Evliyâ Çelebi itself is a marvel. Born in Istanbul in 1611 into the family of a goldsmith connected to the Imperial palace, he was educated at the school of the Inner Palace in the knowledge and fine arts of his time and then he graduated into the cavalry corps and became a master archer. As a young man he started his travels within Istanbul but, at the age of thirty decided to break out of the 'narrow' confines of his home city and undertook his first journey to Bursa. The same year he started on his famous travels proper that took him to almost all corners of the Ottoman Empire and to many countries surrounding it. Çelebi was special in that he kept a journal throughout the over thirty years of his travel life.

At the age of well over sixty, after having travelled to Mekka and down the Nile Valley as far as Sudan, he settled in Cairo and started to write up his notes in a ten-volume 'Travel Book', the *Seyahatnâme*. It was written between 1673 and 1683 and comprises, just to give an idea, about 6000 pages of text when printed. The manuscript had its own astonishing history: it remained unknown and unread in Cairo and was only brought to Istanbul as late as the mid-eighteenth century when it was shelved in the imperial palace library, read by very few and only a small number of copies were made of it.


The *Seyahatnâme* can be looked at from a variety of angles. At first glance, it is a travel log cum autobiography, but more thorough scrutiny reveals it is a historical and geographical account as well as an ethnographic mine: it comprises most exhaustive descriptions of the variety of people in the Ottoman Empire and the countries surrounding it; it is a source of knowledge for the manners and customs, the food and drinks, the housing and tents, the languages and culture of seventeenth-century Ottoman, Eastern European and Iranian regions. One amusing detail is the fact that during his travels, Çelebi not only recorded his whereabouts in his notebooks but also left written traces in several of the places he visited – he wrote and carved graffiti on mosque walls and on trees (the horror of every conservationist!), some of which can actually still be seen today.

Evliyâ Çelebi was, as Nuran Tezcan and Robert Dankoff show, a literary writer, even a creator of language. He was well versed in all three of the languages that comprise Ottoman. He used this mastery to create his own prose style, to coin new words and expressions as well as linguistic forms. The construction of the ten volumes of the *Seyahatnâme* was minutely designed and constitutes a whole in terms of literary conception. We are presented with a literary composition, inventive especially in terms of the use and creation of language and impressive in its narrative power – a

masterpiece that deserves a special place in Ottoman literature. The ‘Map of the Nile’ in the *Seyahatnâme* ended up as a separate piece and is kept in the Vatican Library. The Map was drawn by Çelebi’s own hand as Nuran Tezcan has shown only recently. It is five and a half metres long, beautifully drawn and annotated with many comments on the Nile valley from its source to the Delta as well as on the Egyptian shores of the Red Sea (as a result of the journey down the Nile and along the Red Sea coast that this extraordinary man undertook when he was already over 60 years old!).

The life and work of this “eccentric writer” or even “eccentric genius”, as Semih Tezcan calls him, surely deserve all our attention. In reading this volume I could not help thinking that more research results of an interesting nature are to be looked forward to and that possibly another astonishing discovery, like the Map of the Nile, might be expected. This book is a wonderful edition, erudite and a mine for the lay person as well as for the researcher, not least because of the comprehensive bibliography at the end. It is designed with special care, from the numerous illustrations of brilliant quality to the lovely detail of an Ottoman imperial tent that covers the page numbers at the bottom of each page.

Camilla Dawletschin-Linder



Turkey – what everyone needs to know

by Andrew Finkel

Oxford University Press, 2012.
ISBN 978-0-19-973304-0
pb £10.99. Kindle £4.70.

Andrew Finkel is widely regarded as one of the most experienced insiders reporting from Turkey for nearly a quarter of a century. Indeed his experience of the country goes back to his schooldays at Robert College in Istanbul. He is truly what in the trade is referred to as a ‘Turkey head’ and a consummate one at that, having enjoyed a grandstand view of Turkish society and politics since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and so witnessing a ‘society in the throes of enormous change’ (page 1). This text fully lives up to its title!

The book’s seven thematic chapters are structured around 49 questions which act as chapter subheadings. These range from the descriptive (*‘What are the regions of Turkey?’*) to the analytical (*‘What is the role of the military in Turkey?’*) and the risqué (*‘Are there any Atatürk jokes and, if so, does anyone laugh at them?’*) as well as the specific (*‘What status do lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender [LGBT] people enjoy in Turkey?’*) to the controversial (*‘Why doesn’t Turkey concede there was an Armenian genocide in 1915?’*, *‘What is the Ergenekon Conspiracy?’* and *‘What lies at the heart of Turkey’s Kurdish problem?’*). In all, the questions posed are pertinent

and interesting with something for both newcomers to topics as well as those with more familiarity – and Finkel doesn't flinch from confronting hard challenges.

At one level, this approach ably and amply covers what must have been the publisher's fairly instrumental commission, targeting the booming market of business people and tourists interested in Turkey. But at another level I think that this reads like a first draft of a love letter to an infuriating, unpredictable and sometimes cruel Muse. Being a journalist in Turkey remains a hazardous vocation. Turkey is the world's leading jailer of journalists. Finkel won his spurs in 1999 by being charged with bringing an institution of the state – in his case, the military – 'to be held in disrepute' (page 126).

The author begins with a reflection on the need for such a book and a general introduction to Turkish identity and geography through such questions as *What is a Turk?* and *What sort of language is Turkish?* Chapter 2 tackles the historical background which, in the case of the Finkels, is a family enterprise, given the acknowledged support of the accomplished Ottoman historian Dr Caroline Finkel.

Chapter 3 offers useful history of economic growth and can also be read as a kind of extended SWOT analysis for businessmen trying to acquaint themselves with what is now the world's sixteenth largest economy – not quite a BRIC but a 'N 11', the next eleven, following the continent-sized Brazil, Russia, India and China, with Istanbul aspiring to become the financial growth pole of a future Eurasian zone. Chapter 4, *Turkey in the world*, explains why the Cold War may have ended a decade later in Turkey than in the rest of Europe and draws attention to the changes in Ankara's foreign policy under the AK Party governments towards a 'soft power approach'. However, WikiLeaks is sourced to quote a former American ambassador's swipe about Turkey's regional ambitions being 'Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover resources' (page 77). This and Chapter 6 are the longest in the book which, I think, correctly second guesses the concerns on which the book's target audience may focus.

Chapter 5 is revealingly titled *Politics... and the military*. Through a series of incisive questions, Finkel sides with the mainly renegade leftists now in the liberal camp who have argued for the past decade or more that the Turkish political system has been one of 'administrative tutelage' until the AK Party's third and decisive electoral victory in 2011 in a system whereby elected authority had been circumscribed by a bureaucratic and military elite (page 109). In a nuanced analysis he adds that political parties could make 'a better case against state authoritarianism were they not so hierarchical...[and where party leaders]...enjoy what is popularly called a 'sultanic reign' over their party' (page 112). The constitutional system put in place by the military at the height of the Second Cold War in the early 1980s was designed 'to protect the state from the citizen rather than the other way around' (page 135). Consequently, the secular Establishment and the so-called 'deep state' saw 'the state apparatus slip into the hands of those whom they regarded as their ideological foes – the AK Party...[experiencing] that sinking feeling Dr Frankenstein did when he realised that the creature he created had been given the wrong brain!' (ibid).

Some of these themes are further developed in a long Chapter 6 which deals with society and religion, and much else. These are Andrew Finkel's insightful despatches from Turkey's various *Kulturkämpfen* including Islam, Kurds, Armenians, and gender politics. His account of the Kurdish conflict which has claimed 40,000 lives over three decades and of Kurdish identity is balanced and informative. (By the

way, the depiction – on page 153 – of Kurds as ‘mountain Turks’ is not an ‘urban myth’. Some years ago Murat Belge unearthed a military training manual from the 1930s which bluntly asserted it.) The same applies to the sensible – because he is well informed – summary of the headscarf issue which he regards as being more of a symbolic part of culture wars than a mass phenomenon (page 170).

So does this book survive the aftermath of the Kurdish peace process and the Gezi Park earthquake? I believe it passes with flying colours. Near the end of Chapter 5 we read:

‘The AK Party government is often accused of consolidating its own rule and becoming more authoritarian. Evidence includes the strong arm tactics with which police often quell student demonstrations, or the pressure exerted on an opposition media.’(page 136)

The same applies to his section on solutions to the Kurdish issue which predicts more demands for fuller political and cultural rights.

In short, for whatever purpose this book may be read, it is packed – in ascending order – with information, multidisciplinary knowledge and understanding covering the history, culture, economy and society of this complex and complicated country, communicated with a real affection tinged with sardonic wit and humour. Now that we have the Mills and Boon formulaic version we await the real love story.

Mehmet Ali Dikerdem



TURKEY AT THE 2013 LONDON BOOK FAIR

The London Book Fair 2013
was held 15 - 17 April in Earls Court

Over recent years the annual London Book Fair has become an increasingly important appointment for publishers and booksellers all over the world, not just for the United Kingdom trade. A great deal of insider business gets done – it remains primarily a trade fair – but, like the far older Frankfurt book fair, it has also recently started to open up to an interested general public. As in Frankfurt, each year a country is invited as the guest of honour or, as the LBF calls it, ‘market focus’, a valuable opportunity both for a country to ‘showcase’ its writers and publishers and booksellers as well as for those elsewhere to find out more about the history and current situation of the book trade. The ‘market focus’ of this year’s London Book Fair, held in April, was Turkey. ‘Turkey in all its colours’ was the umbrella title for the

dozens of events which took place during the three days of the Fair in the exhibition halls at Earls Court and all over London in the days before and after the fair itself. It was obvious that both the Turkish government and the country's various professional and trade associations had pulled out all the stops to organise a fascinating and diverse panorama of the remarkable changes taking place in what is very much a key industry for the country's cultural industry and its overall economic growth.

The figures speak for themselves: over the past ten years there has been a 300% increase in the publishers' output amounting to an economic value in the current year of nearly one billion pounds sterling. A further 3% growth is predicted for 2013. In 2012 480 million copies of 42,000 titles were published covering most standard subject areas. Education (especially the production of textbooks for the state school system) is, as it always has been since the earliest days of the Republic, a highly significant proportion of output (over half); another large and perhaps unsurprisingly growing sector is religious publishing. Ottoman history and books on diet and health are also especially popular genres at present. The national bestseller lists though have a weary globalised air about them: Harry Potter, John Grisham and – Turkey is a country of contrasts – the ubiquitous *Fifty Shades of Grey*. There are 1,800 publishers (unlike in the west, still mostly small to medium-sized independent firms rather than conglomerates – although they collaborate when it comes to tackling the thornier problems of distribution) and 6,000 bookstores. While the literacy rate is now over 90% the average number of books read annually per head of the population – between four and six – remains lower than in many other advanced countries. Traditionally the network of public library provision throughout Turkey has never been strong but this too is changing: there are increasing numbers of libraries in every major Turkish town (some established and run by private companies) and their budgets have seen a steep increase over the last decade. Given some of the logistical problems in distribution across the country, sales on the internet, as elsewhere, are rising. And, again as elsewhere, electronic publishing and distribution – the rise of the e-book – is playing an increasingly significant role in publishing and bookselling (see, for example, the interesting e-zine *Sabitfikir* and the cluster of related websites at: www.sabitfikir.com). Internet distribution and e-publishing can only continue to grow: a very high proportion of the Turkish population is young and just like their generational counterparts in other countries tend to be much more digitally aware than their elders (the current government seems to be intent on encouraging this trend – the Ministry of Education's ongoing 'FATİH' project, which plans to distribute tablet pcs to 14.5 million schoolchildren and eventually digitise all the textbooks they use in class, often got mentioned during the book fair).

Alongside all this analysis of a burgeoning sector – all the more fascinating because, in a more unmediated way than most other industries, publishing reflects the inner character and ongoing developments of a country and its culture. Dozens of writers – novelists, poets, dramatists – had been invited over to London (and elsewhere in the UK), in collaboration with the British Council, to read and talk about their work, in what amounted to a full immersion course in contemporary Turkish writing. They included well-established and bestselling novelists such as Elif Shafak, Mario Levi, Ayşe Kulin, and Murathan Mungan but also younger writers, born in the 1970s and 1980s, like Esmahan Aykol, Murat Gülsoy, Bejan Matur and Salih Zengin, working across a wide variety of genres, from biographies to thrillers to children's books.

Although fiction (and poetry even less of course) are very far from being among the bestselling genres in Turkey itself (with some notable exceptions such as the ebullient Ayşe Kulin's books and, interestingly, the occasional revival of writers from the (not so distant) past – the popularity of a new edition of Sabahattin Ali's forgotten classic *Kürk Mantolu Madonna* ['Madonna in a Fur Coat'] is a recent example), the literary scene in modern Turkey is – on the evidence of the writers over for the London Book Fair and its related events – clearly thriving. But how many of these names are known to readers in the United Kingdom or outside Turkey generally? Along with the sense of Turkey's increasing interest and appeal for the global publishing market, the translation of Turkish-language literature was the other main issue of the events and discussions during the fair, also in the broader historical context of relations between East and West and British perceptions of Turkey. It was generally agreed that in this respect the United Kingdom was especially poorly served, as British publishing, unlike its continental counterparts, seems endemically averse to books in translation (as an interesting publication distributed during the Fair⁷⁵ bluntly put it: "...translation does not form a natural part of literary life in the UK and Ireland."). But here too changes are afoot and the prospects look brighter. This is partly thanks to Orhan Pamuk's high profile as a Nobel Prize-winning author, greater public awareness of Turkey's importance and complexity through increased travel and recent political developments which have moved the country onto the world stage, and a new generation of entrepreneurially minded young people like the American Amy Spangler, for example, who has set up a literary agency in Istanbul called Anatolialit (www.anatolialit.com) with the aim of getting translations of Turkish and, especially contemporary writers published outside Turkey. But this individual effort and enthusiasm is underpinned by a crucial – and highly enlightened – government project known as TEDA ('Translation and Publication Grant Programme of Turkey': www.tedaproject.gov.tr) which, as its title suggests, coordinates initiatives across the publishing field by giving grants for translations and publications which might otherwise, if purely commercial considerations were only taken into account, never see the light of day. Since it began in 2005, TEDA has not been aimed solely at the English-speaking world; on the contrary out of the 1,352 titles published in fifty-four languages which it has supported over the last nine years, English translations represent only a very small proportion, 84 (and of those the smaller proportion in the United Kingdom, 34, as opposed to the United States). Nevertheless, there was an enlivening sense – with news of this project and throughout all the events and displays which marked Turkey's presence at the London Book Fair – that a permanent breach in the wall has finally been made and a new perception of the dynamic richness of Turkish writing (and publishing) will continue to grow.

Stephen Parkin

⁷⁵ *Literary Translation from Turkish into English in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 1990-2012*, a report prepared by Duygu Tekgül and updated by Arzu Akbatur, April 2013 (Aberystwyth: Mercator Institute for Media, Languages and Culture, 2013).

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

ARTS AND ARCHITECTURE

Contadini, Anna & Claire Norton (eds.). *The Renaissance and the Ottoman World*. (New edition) (Ashgate Publishing Company: 2013). ISBN-10: 1472409914

Cross, Mary (author), Peter Brown (foreword). *Sacred Spaces: Turkish Mosques and Tombs*. (Quantuck Lane Press: 2013). ISBN-10: 1593720556

Özyıldırım, Gülay. *Disasters and Buildings: The Effects of Turkish Disaster Regulations on Architectural Design*. (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing: 2013). ISBN-10: 3659400319

ECONOMICS

Arcuri, Angelo. *The Rise of a New Superpower: Turkey's Key Role in the World Economy and Energy Market (SpringerBriefs in Economics)*. (Springer: 2013). ISBN-10: 3319004301

Scott, Alev. *Turkish Awakening*. (Faber and Faber: 2014). ISBN-10: 0571296572

HISTORY

Dusinberre, Elspeth R.M.. *Empire, Authority and Autonomy in Achaemenid Anatolia*. (CUP: 2013). ISBN-10: 1107018269

Gürpınar, Doğan. *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation*. (Palgrave Macmillan: 2013). ISBN-10: 1137334207

Hasanlı, Jamil. *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953*. (Lexington Books: 2013). ISBN-10: 0739184601

Masters, Bruce. *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History*. (CUP: 2013). ISBN-10: 1107619033

Saidi, Dana. *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century*. (I.B. Tauris: 2013). ISBN-10: 1780766556

Turhan, Fatma Sel. *The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising: Janissaries, Modernisation and Rebellion in the Nineteenth Century (Library of Ottoman Studies)*. (I.B. Tauris: 2014). ISBN-10: 1780761112

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Başar, Kürşat (author), Çiğdem Aksoy Fromm (translator). *Music by My Bedside*. (Dalkey Archive Press: 2013). ISBN-10: 1564788156

Blasing, Mutlu Konuk. *Nâzım Hikmet: The Life and Times of Turkey's World Poet (Karen & Michael Braziller Books)*. (Persea: 2013). ISBN-10: 0892554177

Ertürk, Nergis. *Grammatology and Literary Modernity in Turkey*. (OUP: 2013). ISBN-10: 0199349770

Göknar, Erdal. *Orhan Pamuk, Secularism and Blasphemy: the Politics of the Turkish Novel*. (Routledge: 2013). ISBN-10: 0415505380

Messo, George. *Turkish Poetry Today*. (Red Hand Books: 2013). ISBN-10: 0957597703

Smith, Paul. *Four More Great Classic Sufi Master Poets: Selected Poems: Sadi, 'Iraqi', Yunus Emre, Shabistari*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2013). ISBN-10: 1492910619

POLITICS AND SOCIOLOGY

Akgönül, Samim. *The Minority Concept in the Turkish Context: Practices and Perceptions in Turkey, Greece and France (Muslim Minorities)*. (BRILL: 2013). ISBN-10: 9004222111

Bali, Rifat. *The Silent Minority in Turkey: Turkish Jews*. (Libra Kitap: 2013). ISBN-10: 6054326708

Bayır, Derya. *Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish Law (Cultural Diversity and Law)*. (Ashgate Publishing Company: 2013). ISBN-10: 1409420078

Christensen, Christian & Miyase Christensen (eds.). *Understanding Media and Culture in Turkey: Structures, Spaces, Voices* (Routledge Advances in Internationalizing Media Studies). (Routledge: 2014). ISBN-10: 0415875927

Döşemeci, Mehmet. *Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*. (CUP: 2013). ISBN-10: 110704491X

Hinze, Annika Marlen. *Turkish Berlin: Integration Policy and Urban Space (Globalization and Community)*. (University of Minnesota Press: 2013). ISBN-10: 0816678154

Kumbaracıbaşı, Arda Can. *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics: 2013). ISBN-10: 0415851777

Larrabee, F. Stephen & Alireza Nader. *Turkish Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*. (RAND Corporation: 2013). ISBN-10: 0833080113

Macmillan, Catherine. *Discourse, Identity and the Question of Turkish Accession to the EU: Through the Looking Glass*. (New edition) (Ashgate Publishing Company: 2013). ISBN-10: 1409455599

Saygın, Hasan & Murat Çimen. *Turkish Economic Policies and External Dependency*. (Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 2013). ISBN-10: 1443844691

Yılmaz, Hale. *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey (1923-1945)*. (Syracuse University Press: 2013). ISBN-10: 0815633173

MISCELLANEOUS

Adams, Geo F., Maggie Mack. *Turkish Bath Handbook*. (A reproduction of the original book by Geo F. Adams, first published in 1881). (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2013). ISBN-10: 1490591907

Seal, Jeremy. *Meander: East to West, Indirectly, Along a Turkish River*. (Bloomsbury USA: 2013). ISBN-10: 1608194353

Heikell, Rod and Lucinda. *Turkish Waters and Cyprus Pilot*. (Imray, Laurie, Norie & Wilson Ltd; 9th Revised edition: 2013). ISBN-10: 1846234131

Petrie, Kristin. *Turkish Angora Cats*. (Checkerboard Books: 2013). ISBN-10: 1617838683

Yüce, Sevtap. *Turkish Meze: Simple, Delicious Recipes for Sharing*. (Hardie Grant Books: 2013). ISBN-10: 1742706657

Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

In Memoriam



MEMORIES OF *LEYLA ERBİL*

1931- 2013

Leyla Erbil, Turkish writer, founding member of the Turkish Writers' Syndicate, a Nobel Prize nominee (in 2002 and 2004) by the Turkish section of PEN, the International Writers' Union, passed away Friday 19th of July. The news was immediately tweeted and appeared in on-line news sites – still a mystery to the family how it moved so fast (someone in the hospital tweeted a friend?). She had been in and out of hospital since the New Year, the last few weeks in intensive care. Under heavy sedation, she mostly slept, her eyes closed – those big, deep green eyes that so many had fallen for.

We in the family also knew the flashing, sharp, cutting looks that could come our way if we fell foul of her. But it is the empathy of my aunt that I remember, as when I was young and asked big questions like “What’s the meaning of life anyway?” Others in the family rolled their eyes upwards and left the room, but she would stay and chat. I remember our summer visits to her house in Istanbul: wonderful aromas wafting from the kitchen where Grandma and the three sisters – Leyla, Mürvet, and Sema, were busy cooking; peals of laughter from Fatoş and my sister playing; me lost in a book in Leyla’s library; the long discussions over dinners with literary and family friends in the warm summer nights.

She was generous with all her friends. I practically lived in her spare room in the Şişli flat during my first year at university, although it was not an easy time for the Erbil family and she had not published for a long time. Then she wrote *Tuhaf Bir Kadın* (A Strange Woman) which spoke to me and many other young women in Turkey of the

1970s. My aunt found it difficult to cope with my grandmother's struggle with dementia and she wrote *Karanlığın Günü* (Day of Darkness) – her most gloomy novel. This was followed by *Mektup Aşkları* (Love by Letters), that begins with a quote from Hegel and dissects 1980s Turkey.⁷⁶ Adding to pressures in her life was the oppressive context of the 1980 military coup. All this had a personal emotional toll with her marriage faltering; she fell out with friends and family. But she kept writing and her writing became better the more she wrote.



Some writers write one good book and then it is downhill. But not Leyla. As she gained in confidence her writing style became more experimental and the content more daring, as evident in her last two books, *Kalan* (What Remains) and *Tuhaf Bir Erkek* (A Strange Man). Nor did she move with fashionable trends; she had her own direction. The 1980s saw the Turkish literary oeuvre follow the global trend into post-modernism. It became fashionable to be a 'woman' writer, or some other 'victimhood' label. But not Leyla, she maintained her belief in humanity and kept true to her tradition – enlightenment updated, not hollowed out.



My contact with my aunt became sporadic once I left Turkey and carved out a career as an international economist. Leyla would quiz me about the global economy when I stopped in Istanbul on my way back from Beijing, Almaty, Ulan Baatar or some other far-flung place, with a quizzical look. She didn't really care much for globalisation; and here I was – the product of globalisation. Why do you go to these places, she asked, after a trip to Karachi where a car-bomb exploded outside my hotel? Is this good for you? Where is all this heading, she seemed to be asking, with the 2008 global economic crisis being no surprise to her.

I, too, wondered and felt a bit lost at times, and it was Leyla's writing – the sharpness, the honesty, the humanity, the humour that would remind me who I was. I remember a dreary night flight back from Buenos Aires in 2002. Argentina had just defaulted; the Turkish economy was still in the throes of its banking crisis; Brazil was on the verge of default as investors pulled out worried about the left-wing Lula victory in the presidential election (I had concluded Brazil would be OK which turned out to be right!). Leyla's latest book, *Cüce* (The Dwarf), was in my suitcase, but I had not yet opened it. It is a story about an alienated, lonely woman – one of many in her books... this one, waiting for a visitor (the dwarf). I was feeling a bit low and tired and thought, "oh dear, a bit odd". But into this seemingly unpromising subject she wove deeper themes with a light touch: religion, women's oppression, critique of Turkish democracy, limits of human communication, and the search for love and meaning. Combined with laugh out-loud funny passages, it became an inspirational story. I read it cover to cover and wrote her a letter to thank and congratulate her as I watched the sun rise over the Atlantic.

¹ *Mektup Aşkları* is currently being translated by Anatolia Lit to be published by Feminist Press, New York.

She has been called the Turkish Faulkner. *Tuhaf Bir Kadın* brought comparisons with Virginia Woolf. But her inspirations were Joyce, Freud, and Marx, as she had told us when we were updating her Wikipedia page a few months ago. But she cast her net wide, drawing from layers of history and world literature including Scripture, Shakespeare, and medieval Japanese *haiku* poetry. I still have the little book of poetry by Matsuo Baso that she had given me.⁷⁷



Two generations in Turkish literature:
Leyla Erbil with Sait Faik Abasıyanık

Literary obituaries in Turkey have placed her as a leading member of the 1950s generation of Turkish writers.⁷⁸ The eminent Turkish literary figure of the 1950s and path breaking short story writer, Sait Faik – the Turkish Chekhov – was a friend, and encouraged her to write. She in turn inspired others, such as Ahmet Arif, the brilliant radical Kurdish poet, with whom she had long correspondence during his bout in prison and exile.⁷⁹

But while her career as a writer began in the 1950s, her writing evolved over time, remaining contemporary and fresh. It has developed into a rich tapestry, unique in its inventive style, a *mélange* of prose and poetry, language at its cutting edge, honest to the bone, pared down. Her writing style fits the content-full of expectations for humanity and our potential to transform the world, and an expression of ‘başkaldırı’ or defiance, as her old friend, İlhan Berk had once said.⁸⁰ She makes her readers sit up and think. Her recent work was sprayed with references to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, returning to the more explicit existentialist tone of her earlier work. But in the later work, especially *Kalan*, her outlook is more mature and much more universal in its appeal, dealing with philosophical and historical questions.

In *Tuhaf Bir Erkek* which, with hindsight, can be seen as a farewell note, she was clearly thinking about death; she plays with combinations and permutations of two lines:

“ey mezar, nerde senin zaferin
ey ölüm, hani senin zehirin”

This is a version of a quote from the Book of Corinthians which variously reads as “O death, where is thy sting; O grave, where is thy victory”. The meaning is that when the bee, scorpion, snake (or some such creature) has lost its sting, it can do no harm and that is what happens in the morning of the resurrection when death’s sting and grave’s victory are gone. Biblical experts trace this to an earlier Abrahamic book of Hosea 13:14, where it appears as “where is thy revenge, O death; where is thy sting, O grave”.⁸¹ Leyla picks this up as:

”o grave, where is thy victory; o death, what about thy sting?”

⁷⁷ Matsuo Baso, *Kuzeye Giden İnce Yol, ve diğer gezi notları* (The narrow road heading north and other travel notes), translated into Turkish by Coşkun Yerli and published by Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994.

⁷⁸ See Semih Gümüş, ‘Leyla Erbil and the 1950s Wave’, *Radikal Kitap*, 26 July, 2013.

⁷⁹ The letters from Ahmet Arif are to be published by İş Bankası Yayınları.

⁸⁰ P.257, İlhan Berk, *Başkaldıran Yazarın Dili* (The Language of a Defiant Writer), *Ethics and Aesthetics in Leyla Erbil*, ed., Suha Oğuzertem, İstanbul, 2007).

⁸¹ There are also references in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* and in his sonnet VI ‘thou art much too fair to be death’s conquest’. I am grateful to my friend Xander for help with the translation of this.

...which becomes:

"o death, where is thy victory; o grave, where is thy sting."

Next, it morphs Mayakovski-like, into:

'o man, here is your victory; o victory, where is your sting.'

And by the end of the book, changes into a defiant:

'o victory, here is your death; o sting, here is your grave.'

Pure *Leyla Erbil*...but her defiance seems to wilt in the face of time:

*gaze at the sea
the world
we were changing the world
us
I forgot
my friends have died
or grown old
or changed
we must start from the beginning
pull the curtain
bullet grey with dirt...*

...I pulled the curtain...on the one side I saw the ferries, like in my youth, as if made of white cardboard, ...ferrying people whose lives consist of one long struggle against the gorgos...and on the other side, crippled by enormity, I saw the immortal god of time, watching the pathetic parade of our lives; the hysterical carnival of our souls; pitying no one, conscious that nothing is important, marching on without looking back, relentlessly (p.135).

We could say that Leyla even managed to defy and trick time with her miraculous recovery from Langerhans, a rare disease that was diagnosed in London in 2006. We couldn't believe our luck that she was up and about, and we even met in Bodrum where she stayed in her customary hotel in Bitez. She was showered with accolades and invited around the country for literary prizes.⁸² Her latest prize in February 2013 was one which she valued very much: the PEN Short Story Writer award.

A new young generation of readers discovered her. She has been adopted by the Gezi Park protesters who identified with her dictum 'Gorgolaşmamışlar'— those who have not become Gorgoised – or muzzled. She had prophetically written in *Tuhaf Bir Erkek* about the May 1st demonstrations in Taksim Square in defiance of Gorgo-repressive political machinery in Turkey. It is deeply sad but somehow apt that as Leyla Erbil was dying in hospital, millions of people were on the streets in Turkey protesting. This was captured with a fabulous headline "Sokaklar size benzerken, nereye Leyla hanım?" (Where are you off to Leyla, when the streets are coming your way?) by Asaf Güven Aksal a few days after she died.⁸³ She managed to follow the Gezi protests only sporadically, but in one rare interview said she saw the movement as a possible "dress-rehearsal" for a popular uprising.

⁸² I tried to capture this in my story 'Trip to Mersin', awarded the City of Mersin 5th Year Literature Award. See <http://researchturkey.org/wp/wordpress/?p=1269>

⁸³ Asaf Güven Aksal, *Sol Gazete*, 21 July, 2013.

At the funeral on 22 July, her readers were handing out paper boats in reference to one of her early stories, *Vapur* (The Ferry) which is a fantastic story about a Bosphorus ferry that breaks free of its repetitive daily routine.⁸⁴ At her graveside in Zincirlikuyu, I noticed a group who remained behind and read their favourite pieces from her books. The paper boats were made from a page photocopied from *Üç Başlı Ejderha* (Three Headed Dragon). The page reproduced a news report of the evidence given to court in the Kahramanmaraş trials by Leyla Ünver who survived a raid that killed six of her family.⁸⁵ These remembrances of the terrible price paid by people fighting for democracy and freedom of speech have become a staple of her writing... starting from the drowning of Mustafa Suphi in the early years of the Turkish Republic, to the execution of Deniz Gezmiş and his friends in the 1970s, to the violence of the 1980 coup, to the Alevi, Kurdish struggles, to daily violence against women, the assassination of Hrant Dink and others, to the recent interminable Ergenekon detentions without trial – she wanted to make sure they are not forgotten.

Over the past year, family setbacks and her old illness reappeared, sapping her strength. Every time I saw her, she seemed weaker; I wondered if I would see her again. It seemed like the whole of Istanbul too felt the same as troops of people came visiting her in Teşvikiye. On my recent visits, she would open her wardrobe wanting to give me things. There was Grandmother's fur coat, with Huriye Bilgin embroidered in the thinning silk lining, to wear on a January trip to Moscow (she was right, I didn't have a warm enough coat for the Moscow winter). We exchanged shoes, she gave me ones that pinched her, and took mine which were a better fit. The last time I was in Teşvikiye, I mentioned that I had re-read her article *Sait Faik'te göz* (Sait Faik Watching) on his sharp observational skills.⁸⁶ There she recounts the true story of how, Sait Faik had come under criticism in the 1950s from doctrinaire lefties – as she too had been for being an independent thinker. She tells of how Sait Faik had put these people in their place when he had whipped out the lighter that was a present to him from Nazım Hikmet – Turkey's first truly modern poet whose life and powerful poems were legendary. She laughed when I reminded her of this and said: "I have that lighter; it's here somewhere. You take it". I didn't take it. Now I am worried this rusty old lighter, tucked away somewhere in a drawer, could be lost. But even if it is, the story will remain, as will the writings of *Leyla Erbil*, which are destined to become classics that even time cannot kill.

Mina Toksöz

⁸⁴ *Vapur* (The Ferry) was one of the collections of short-stories *Gecede* (In the Night,) first published in 1968. Also from *Gezede* is the 'Ayna' story which was translated into English by Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy in a collection of *Short Stories by Turkish Women Writers* and published by Indiana University Turkish Studies Department.

⁸⁵ The Kahramanmaraş case was a long running trial of an Alevi-Sunni, left-right, clash in 1978 in Kahramanmaraş. The late 1970s was a tumultuous time in Turkey which saw economic decline into crisis and escalating social tensions culminating in the 1980 military coup.

⁸⁶ 'Sait Faik'te Göz', from *Zihin Kuşları* (Flights of the Imagination), collection of essays by Leyla Erbil, p.51, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul,1998.

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