

Turkish Area Studies Review

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Turkish Area Studies



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Spring Symposium 2015

and

Annual General Meeting

St Antony's College, Oxford

Saturday 25 April 2015

10.00 am to 4.30 pm

Details enclosed (p 74-76). Please act now!

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**Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken
are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.**

Editorial

In this issue we mark the 100th anniversary of World War 1 with an evocative account of the Gallipoli campaign. We are grateful to Eugene Rogan for this lead article and for his well-received annual BATAS lecture on which it is based. Also in the spirit of anniversary we are very pleased to include notice of a substantial study to be coordinated by the British Institute at Ankara to look at the development of relations between Britain and Turkey from WW I up to the 1950s when both countries were firm allies in NATO.

Today, a century after Gallipoli, Republican Turkey faces challenges within and beyond its borders, as we are reminded daily when IS is in the news. A dip in the exchange value of the Lira is to be welcomed by visitors to the country but it marks a pause in impressive recent economic growth – see Mina Toksöz' assessment. Politically, Turkey adjusts to a new role for its presidency but much depends on the outcome of elections in June. Gamon McLellan once again gives us a comprehensive account of prospects. He goes on to look at the changing nature of the Kurdish factor within Turkey given the upheaval across its southern borders – from which large numbers of refugees have sought sanctuary. This makes Turkey one the world's largest refugee hosts, yet one which cautiously offers access to some temporary benefits.

Energy is another area of inevitable foreign involvement for Turkey – might it become a sort of Eurasian energy hub with *inter alia* a transit route for Caspian resource movements to Europe? Energy also figures in Clement Dodd's regular look at Cyprus where the possibility of new mineral wealth concentrates minds – though without the prospect of significant constitutional change in the short term.

Along with regular items from Arın Bayraktaroğlu, and Ayşe Furlonger and our 'resident' poet Gülay Yurdal-Michaels, we welcome contributions on aspects of Turkish history and contemporary culture, including the story of Turkey's sweets and desserts, an Ottoman Garden in St Louis and personal reflections of time spent on the Lycian coast. We focus on several Ottoman topics – reflecting Turks' renewed interest in their imperial past – and, for good measure, we have two articles on ancient Anatolia.

We have an obituary for the renowned Turkish scholar, Talât Sait Halman, who only last year lectured to an appreciative BATAS audience. And we have a report on a memorial event for Andrew Mango, a major figure in Turkish studies and a loyal supporter of BATAS/TASG.

We thank our contributors for making the *Review* possible. And we are extremely grateful to those who give us editorial help – though any surviving errors must be put to our own account.

Brian Beeley
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor

The 2015 John Martin Lecture
London School of Economics, Wolfson Theatre
30 January 2015



Gallipoli from Both Sides of the Trenches

by Eugene Rogan

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Of all the battlefields of the Ottoman Front, Gallipoli stands out as a classic example of trench warfare fought over nine months between April 1915 and January 1916. Following the blood-soaked landings of 25 April, in which Allied forces secured beach heads in Cape Helles and Anzac Cove, British and French soldiers transformed the rural landscape of Gallipoli into a complex grid of trenches.

In the French sector, soldiers marched towards the front down a broad communications trench optimistically dubbed the 'Avenue de Constantinople', while those returning from the firing line came down a parallel trench known as the 'Avenue de Paris'. The English too gave whimsical names to their trenches. 'Regent Street' ran south from the front line past 'Piccadilly Circus' into 'Oxford Street,' and a particularly complex intersection of trenches was christened 'Clapham Junction' after London's largest rail crossroad. Dozens of smaller trenches were named for the regiments whose men had fought and died there: 'Lancashire Street,' 'Munster Terrace,' 'Essex Knoll,' 'Worcester Flat.' The most ironic names were reserved for the front line itself: 'Hyde Park Corner,' 'Main Street,' and, bleakest of all, 'Hope Street.' The ironic names did little to mask the violence of the trenches. Those who served both on the western front and at Gallipoli found the Turkish front by far the more relentless of the two. "It is much worse here than in France, in the view of all those who have seen the two fronts," French corporal Jean Leymonnerie wrote home in June 1915. Britons were of the same view. "In France, apart from full-dress attacks, an infantryman may live for many months without once firing his rifle, or running the remotest risk of death by a rifle bullet," A. P. Herbert claimed. "But in those hill-trenches of Gallipoli the Turk and the Gentile fought with each other all day with rifle and bomb, and in the evening crept out and stabbed each other in the dark. There was no release from the strain of watching and listening and taking thought."

Life in the trenches assaulted every one of a soldier's senses – sight, sound, taste, smell, and touch. Trench warfare undermined the physical and mental health of those not killed or wounded. Invaders and defenders shared the squalor and horrors of trench

warfare equally. From the moment a soldier arrived in Gallipoli, he lived with the sound of artillery. Sometimes heavy, sometimes light, sometimes near, sometimes far, artillery harried the soldiers day and night, an unpredictable threat that claimed a steady stream of casualties on both sides of the conflict. Then there was the relentless gunfire. In the course of the Gallipoli campaign, the Turks taught the invaders the art of sniping. At first the Allied troops were terrified by these invisible killers. Ottoman marksmen, camouflaged with green face paint and hidden in terrain they knew far better than the invaders, infiltrated behind enemy lines in both Helles and Anzac Cove after the landings, "content to lie there and pick off the infidels till they too died," A P Herbert wrote. "They were very brave men." Snipers had a terrible impact on the invaders' morale. "Nothing in their training had prepared them for it," Herbert continued. "They hated the 'blinded' feeling it produced; it was demoralizing always to be wondering if one's head was low enough, always to walk with a stoop; it was tiring to be always taking care; and it was very dangerous to relax that care for a moment."

One of the most surprising claims made by British and Anzac troops was that women were active in the battlefield as snipers. There is no record of women serving with the Ottoman army in the First World War, and in view of the segregation of the sexes in Ottoman society, it seems incongruous to say the least. Yet given the number of British and Anzac claims of women snipers killed, wounded, or arrested, it is hard to dismiss the phenomenon merely as a soldier's myth. A British medic noted in his diary that a wounded Turkish female sniper had been admitted to the hospital in Cape Helles, "she having been shot in the arm"—though he did not claim to have seen the woman himself. One private from New Zealand gave an eyewitness account: "We got a female sniper, but she was shot before we knew she was a woman. There have been a lot of women snipers about. They are good shots." Private John Frank Gray of the Wiltshire Regiment, who was engaged in operations against snipers around Chocolate Hill, near Anzac Cove, claimed the discovery of women snipers was his unit's "queerest find of all". He wrote that the women were armed and hiding in trees, alongside male colleagues. "Some of the women wore trousers, like the men, and some wore full, grey-coloured skirts. They were as thin as could be, and looked as if they had had nothing to eat for months." There is no telling, on the basis of these accounts, if women actually were involved in the fighting or Allied soldiers were justifying violence against Turkish women by alleging they were combatants.

In addition to the relentless dangers of artillery and snipers, the Allies and the Turks regularly dug mines under each other's trenches to kill from below. Corporal Leymonnerie was awakened around midnight, his ear to hard ground in his dugout, by the distinct sound of digging in the ground beneath him. As he listened, he heard the regular blows of a pick. "It had to be the Turks," he concluded, "digging a sap to blow up our fort." He quickly found a safer spot to sleep. "The one thing I fear is to end my days blown sky high over the trenches." He never rested easy in that section of the trenches, fearing the Turks might detonate a charge beneath him at any moment. Lieutenant Mehmet Fasih was more afraid of being buried alive by an underground explosion than of being blown sky high. The punctilious young officer noted in his daily log that the enemy had detonated a mine so powerful that he had felt the ground heave under his feet. "It occurred where I had heard sounds [of digging] a few days back," he recorded, "seven men are missing." Later that afternoon, one of the missing men managed to extricate himself from the debris, much to the Ottoman lieutenant's relief. "There is no worse death than that," Mehmet Fasih reflected. "To face slow death while fully conscious! My God, spare everyone from such a fate."

The weeks spent in the trenches were periods of waiting, punctuated by major attacks. The Ottomans and the Allies alternated in taking the initiative, leaving soldiers on both

sides of the trenches in a state of perpetual tension. “We were afraid of being attacked,” Jean Leymonnerie wrote after a period of duty in the French front line, “but I admit we were much more afraid of having to make an attack ourselves.” The greatest risks in trench warfare came with the desperate run across no-man’s-land, though it was nonetheless terrifying to hear the enemy swarming your lines. For all soldiers, the experience of “going over the top” proved the ultimate baptism of fire – and a trauma that survivors would never forget. “Life in the trenches would be very agreeable,” French corporal Leymonnerie reflected ironically, “were it not for the bayonet charges, which are terrible. The men are mowed down by the many machine guns and the excellent Turkish marksmen before they even hoist themselves over the parapet.”

Robert Eardley was a Territorial soldier from Manchester who reached Gallipoli in June. His first attack on Turkish lines came on 12 July, and he remembered each passing second before the fatal order with precision: “The moments appeared like hours – the suspense – then the officer, his eyes glued on his watch following that finger (of death) slowly, so slowly, but surely moving to destruction – maybe a second left to live – for this is sacrifice – this is the moment when all hearts are sad and heavy – when you will hear some muttering a prayer – at your side you will notice some poor fellow dreading the approaching time knowing that ‘death’ creeps slowly but surely from ‘over there’.” The anxious soldiers tried to raise one another’s spirits with empty words totally out of measure with the gravity of the moment.

“Cheer up chum!”

“Shake, old mate, good luck, hope for the best,” and with a final shake of the entire frame of body, the order is given.

“Over lads and the best of luck.”

Eardley climbed out of the relative safety of the trenches into the line of fire. He ran across no-man’s-land, bayonet fixed, and marvelled at his own survival (he suffered only a flesh wound to the leg and grazed his nose on a broken bayonet), while his comrades fell dead and wounded around him. To hear the wounded call out for help, to give “a last handshake to a dying chum, as long as I live I shall never forget my first experience – those few moments of hell”.

Each attack littered the battlefield with hundreds and thousands of fallen soldiers. Unburied between enemy lines, in the intense heat of summer, the decomposing bodies infused the Gallipoli Peninsula with an intense stench of death. In the early weeks of the conflict, the Ottomans and the Allies agreed to local ceasefires lasting three or four hours to recover and bury the corpses. On 24 May, the British and Ottomans observed a nine-hour armistice along the Anzac front following a massive Turkish attack that left thousands of dead. Each side agreed the ceasefire was necessary but suspected the other of using the hiatus to advantage, to survey the other’s trenches and move men and materiel into a favourable position before the resumption of hostilities. After the ceasefire of 24 May, no further break in fighting was agreed to, and the dead began to pose a growing threat to the morale – and the health – of the living.

Clouds of flies carried sickness to the living from the dead. Soldiers on both sides of the lines suffered from the whole range of air- and waterborne diseases. The absence of proper latrines left soldiers who feared to expose themselves to sniper fire to relieve themselves in the same trenches where they fought, ate, and slept. Dysentery reached epidemic proportions. Raymond Weil, a French artillery officer, noted with growing concern the spread of disease among his troops. The inoculations given French soldiers against cholera and typhoid gave no protection against fevers and gastric disorders. “In recent days, there has been so much illness that even the officers’ ranks have been reduced to nothing,” Weil noted in his diary. Despite severe restrictions on sick leave,

thousands of soldiers had to be evacuated from the front, dehydrated and too weak to walk, let alone to fight. At the height of summer, hundreds of sick men were evacuated from Gallipoli each day. They were sent to hospital facilities at Mudros until they were well enough to return to battle.



Living and fighting in the confines of the trenches strained the mental health of the soldiers. Unlike at the western front, which provided opportunities for soldiers to take leave in towns and villages removed from the fighting, there was no relief from the violence at Gallipoli. Even when swimming in the sea, the invaders were exposed to random shelling that maimed and killed men desperate for a break from the fighting. Nor could they take refuge in sleep. The continual shriek of artillery, the percussion of impact, and the relentless demands of the front left the men no peace to slumber. Soldiers' journals frequently note how little they slept. "My men are tired," Jean Leymonnerie wrote, "and I am too, though I am holding up." He managed only two hours of sleep that night, between 2:30 and 4:30 a.m. It was the same on the Ottoman side. "Only manage 2 to 3 hours of sleep throughout the night and have awful nightmares," Mehmet Fasih noted. As the weeks wore on, the daily anxiety and sleeplessness took their toll, as a growing number of men succumbed to nervous breakdowns or shell shock. A sergeant with the British field ambulance corps first witnessed a case of "nerves" on 14 June, just seven weeks into the campaign. Henry Corbridge was horrified by the "mental cases, pathetic sights they are, with vacant stare and glassy look, and partial paralysis, some are raving". One case, a giant of a man "who had lost his reason, not a scratch on him", needed eight men to restrain him during evacuation to a hospital ship. Over the course of the summer, Corbridge noted ever more cases of shell shock. By mid-August he was recording five times more mental cases than wounded.

Ottoman soldiers too suffered from shell shock. Ibrahim Arıkan, a volunteer from the Ottoman gendarmerie, was astonished to find his battle-hardened commander sitting in a foxhole with the shakes. "Ibrahim, my son, where are you going?" the captain asked him. Arıkan knew something was wrong when the captain, who normally swore at his soldiers, addressed him as "my son". The captain was disoriented and asked Arıkan to accompany him. "He had lost his reason and willpower," Arıkan recalled. "His hand was shaking so violently that he was unable to hold his rifle." Even the hardest men cracked under the relentless bombardment at Gallipoli.

Yet even in the hell of Gallipoli, Ottoman and Allied soldiers could still exchange humane gestures. The trenches were at some points so close that the two sides could hear each other speak. Living at such close quarters had a humanizing effect on the men, and in periods of calm they would throw treats across to the enemy trenches. A Turkish soldier remembered throwing cigarettes, raisins, hazelnuts, and almonds into the Anzac lines. The invaders reciprocated with cans of fruit and jam by way of thanks. Emin Çöl found it remarkable that no one ever mixed dirt with the gifts or followed a treat with a hand grenade. The exchanges were made with genuine goodwill.

After months of fighting without breaking through Turkish lines, the Allies recognized their position in Gallipoli was untenable and evacuated in two stages between December 1915 and January 1916. As they withdrew from their trenches, the Tommies and Anzacs left notes for the Ottomans, promising to meet again. An Australian war poet captured his countrymen's grudging respect for the Turks who had beaten them back:

I reckon the Turk respects us, as we respect the Turk;
 Abdul's a good, clean fighter, we fought him, and we know.
 And we've left him a letter behind us to tell him we found him so.
 Not to say, precisely, "Goodbye" but "Au revoir!"
 Somewhere or other we'll meet again, before the end of the war!
 But I hope it'll be a wider place, with a lot more room on the map,
 And the airmen over the fight that day'll see a bit of a scrap!

They were as good as their words. Many of the same soldiers on both the British and Ottoman sides who fought in Gallipoli would face each other again in Palestine before the war was over.



Turkey's Politics since October 2014: a Survey¹

by
 Gamon McLellan, SOAS - University of London

On 10 August, the Turkish people elected their new head of state for a five-year term. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, was to spend less time in the Çankaya presidential palace than any of his predecessors. Once elected he ensured that the new Prime Ministry building under construction on land belonging to the Atatürk Forest Farm (founded as a model farm to spearhead agricultural development in Turkey) became the new presidential palace. Construction had continued uninterrupted, despite two separate court orders in spring 2014 requiring work on the site to stop. The then Prime Minister had made it quite clear that nothing and nobody was going to halt the project, which as President he inaugurated on 29 October. The colossal complex, dubbed the AK Saray by the media and the Kaçak ('illegal') Saray by opposition newspapers, drew inevitable comparisons with Nicolae Ceaușescu's palace in Bucharest. Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek revealed to parliament's budget committee that the total cost of the palace would be TL 1.37 billion (\$615 million), massively over the original budget.²

¹ © Gamon McLellan, published *Turkish Area Studies Review* 25, Spring 2015

² *Radikal* 4th November 2014

http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/simsek_ak_sarayin_maliyeti_1_milyar_370_milyon_lira-1223677

Public opinion seemed as divided about the new building as about its occupant. Supporters saw it as only proper that the Turkish President should have a palace which reflects the achievements and aspirations of the New Turkey. Opponents were appalled at the ostentation, extravagance and vulgarity of the building, and saw its *kaçak* status as appropriate in the context of the President's attitude to the law. The first foreign head of state to be received in the new palace was Pope Francis in late November, followed a few days later by Russian President Vladimir Putin. But it was for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in January that the full new palace protocol was revealed: President Erdoğan stood on the grand staircase to greet his guest, and on either side of him were fierce-looking warriors in Selçuk and Janissary costumes. The pictures were spectacular³ – although it was sometimes difficult to distinguish the genuine press photographs from the doctored spoof versions produced on social media.⁴



A presidential palace on this scale requires a grand presidency, and Erdoğan has said he expects to change the Turkish political system to an executive presidency if the AK Party wins sufficient seats in the general election on 7 June. The party would need the support of 330 members in the 550-member chamber to submit a constitutional amendment to referendum. 367 members are required to amend the constitution without a referendum. In 2011, at the zenith of Erdoğan's popularity, the party won 327 seats with nearly 50% of valid votes cast. By 16 March this year they had 312 (owing to deaths and defections). Erdoğan, though no longer formally a party member, has said he wants the AK Party to win 400 seats in June. That does not look feasible: any increase in seats will be hard to achieve. As party leader, Ahmet Davutoğlu is in an unenviable position. If he does not win a sufficiently resounding victory, he risks losing the party leadership and the premiership. If he wins enough seats for the party to introduce an executive presidency, it seems the post of Prime Minister will be redundant. Erdoğan believes Turkey should be run like a company – the ministers would not be in parliament. The President would be accountable to the people every five years.⁵

Some of the executive presidency seems already to be in operation, as Erdoğan appears to be treating the Prime Minister's role rather as he has done that of the Mayor of İstanbul since he lost the job in 1998. His former Culture Minister Ertuğrul Günay said in reality he had never stopped being Mayor of İstanbul⁶ and still took all the major decisions about the City, particularly in construction and other major projects.

For Erdoğan, Davutoğlu had seemed the ideal choice as Prime Minister. Although their personalities are quite different, the two men think alike on many issues, particularly on issues like Palestine, Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey's role in the world – and on the AK Party's 'New Turkey', where pious Muslim women are fully emancipated, in contrast to the 'Old Turkey' of Ecevit before 2002, when headscarved women were excluded from parliament and education.⁷ When the President reiterated that gender equality was against

³ *Cumhuriyet* 12th January 2015

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/foto/foto_galeri/183271/1/ Saltanat_Sarayi_nda_tarihteki_16_Turk_devletini_simge_leyen_16_asker.html

⁴ Compiled in *Cumhuriyet* 12th January 2015

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/foto/foto_galeri/183294/1/ Saltanat_Sarayi_ndaki_karsilama_sosyal_medyanin_dili_nde.html

⁵ Speech in Balıkesir on 15th March 2015 <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/92554/bolgemizde-ve-dunyada-yasanan-donusumun-sancilarini-cekenler-turkiyeyi-takip-ediyo-ve-rehber-olarak.html>. See also *Yeni Şafak* 16th March 2015 <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/kriz-cikmaz-2098045>

⁶ Interviewed by *Cumhuriyet* 31st Dec 2013

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/24393/Gunay_Hepsini_Basbakan_yapti_.html

⁷ Davutoğlu's Speech to the Congress of AK Party women's branches, 15th March 2015 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/kimse-kadnlik-onurunu-cinemeyecek/72375#1>

nature,⁸ the Prime Minister criticised western ideas of gender equality as contributing to high suicide rates in the west and emphasised the importance of motherhood.⁹

Yet some ministers have continued to report directly to Erdoğan rather than to Davutoğlu,¹⁰ and the President has twice exercised his constitutional right to chair cabinet meetings, leaving the Prime Minister sitting uneasily alongside him like any other minister.¹¹ More importantly, he has been publicly exerting pressure on the Governor of the Central Bank Erdem Başçı to make a significant further reduction in interest rates (they were lowered in mid-February, after Erdoğan started his campaign), implicitly criticising ministers. The Bank operates independently of government, but criticism from the President and talk of treason in the context of high interest rates led to speculation that the governor would resign, and that his principal supporter in government Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan would also leave. The President believed that lowering interest rates would bring down inflation and stop the Turkish lira losing value against the dollar – the opposite of the accepted wisdom. Finally, on 11th March Erdoğan, Babacan and Başçı met in the presidential palace, where the Governor explained his monetary policy with the aid of a presentation of some 100 slides.¹² This went some way to reassure the markets, but Davutoğlu was apparently not present.

The Prime Minister's position was not strengthened either by the Hakan Fidan affair. In February, Fidan, head of the intelligence service MİT, announced his resignation in order to stand as an AK Party candidate in the June elections. This seems to have been cleared with Davutoğlu – the party leader is usually the key decision-maker in candidate selection. Erdoğan, though, was unhappy, and expressed his displeasure publicly. A month after resigning, Fidan shelved his political ambitions and was back at his desk at MİT. There was speculation that Abdullah Gül also might stand as a candidate, but in March he made it clear he was not in the running.

Hakan Fidan was seen as a crucial support for Erdoğan, both in the struggle with *Hizmet* (Fethullah Gülen's movement), but particularly for his involvement in attempting to come to some agreement with the PKK and to meet the demands of Turkey's Kurds. There seemed to have been some progress in the first two months of the year, and on 28 February a Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) delegation met Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan in the Dolmabahçe Palace and came up with a ten-point plan for a way forward.¹³ There were reports that Abdullah Öcalan would be sending an important message to his followers for Nevruz (traditional New Year, 21 March).

There are formidable obstacles, however, in the way of any agreement. In the autumn there had been outrage amongst many Kurds and others in Turkey at the government's refusal to take any action or to allow any Turkish citizens to cross the frontier to save the Kurdish

⁸ 24th November 2014 <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/91582/adaletin-devreye-girmedigi-hicbir-mesele-hakkaniyetli-sekilde-cozume-kavusturulamaz.html>

⁹ Speech to one of the party's women's branches 4th December 2014

<http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/anneler-cozum-icin-sesinizi-yukseltin/69303#1>

Also *Hürriyet Daily News* <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gender-equality-triggers-suicides-turkish-pm-infers.aspx?pageID=238&nID=75231&NewsCatID=338>

¹⁰ Notably Interior Minister Efkân Ala, who went to Bingöl in October after the police chief there was wounded and two colleagues killed in clashes with protesters angered over the government's policy on Kobani (see below).

The Minister called Erdoğan to report his findings, not the Prime Minister: *Cumhuriyet* 10th October 2014

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/128773/Efkan_Ala_Davutoglu_yerine_Erdogan_i_aradi.html

¹¹ The pictures and video which were widely circulated are eloquent and can be viewed on the Presidency website at <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/92490/bakanlar-kurulu-cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-baskanliginda-toplandi.html>

¹² Entitled *Main Economic Developments*, the presentation can be viewed in Turkish at

http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/6f8c4952-8336-4f40-af89-f0910f71b32f/ekonomik_geli%C5%9Fme.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=6f8c4952-8336-4f40-af89-f0910f71b32f and in English at

http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/c4a0ce2b-7968-403d-9276-b956de13fffb/economic_developments.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=c4a0ce2b-7968-403d-9276-b956de13fffb

¹³ Anatolian Agency 28th February <http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/471897--cozum-surecinde-onemli-bir-asamaya-gelindi>

population of Kobani a few hundred yards from the border. Islamic State fighters entered the town in early October. Beşir Atalay (AK Party deputy leader) and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç both asserted that there were no civilians left in Kobani.¹⁴ There were widespread protests and clashes with the security forces in the south east of Turkey and elsewhere – some 37 people were killed.¹⁵ Turkey eventually allowed Peshmerga fighters from Iraqî Kurdistan to pass through Turkish territory to join the fight for Kobani.

But many Kurds and others will have noted that despite its reluctance to help the Kurds of Kobani, Ankara did launch an operation in February to retrieve the remains of Süleyman Şah, grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, and to relieve the soldiers guarding his mausoleum (*türbe*). This was situated in a small sovereign Turkish enclave in northern Syria.¹⁶ Süleyman's remains were brought to Turkey for safekeeping until such time as a new mausoleum¹⁷ can be safely built at another location in Syria identified and marked out by the troops who carried out the operation. They demolished the existing building and evacuated the site.

Davutoğlu said the government had communicated in advance with “groups inside Syria”- understood to mean the Syrian Kurds and the Islamic State. Damascus protested that this was an act of aggression against Syria, regretting that “Turkey did not await the Syrian consent to move the tomb after the Turkish Foreign Ministry informed Syria’s consulate in İstanbul of its intent to carry out the relocation on the eve of the transgression act.”¹⁸ One Turkish soldier was killed in an accident during the operation, but overall it was judged a success. However, Gürsel Tekin, Secretary-General of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), said, “it was the first time in over ninety years that the Turkish Republic had surrendered territory without a fight – this”, he said, “was unacceptable.”¹⁹

In the wake of the Kobani protests, reaching an agreed solution to the (Turkish) Kurdish issue will be hard. In October the Turkish Armed Forces carried out air strikes against PKK positions in Hakkari, “in retaliation”, they said, “for rocket attacks on a military position”.²⁰ Tweets by Melih Gökçek, Mayor of Ankara, that some of those involved in violent protests were “atheist Armenians masquerading as Kurds” were unhelpful.²¹ Talks will not be made easier by the problems of coordinating the Kurdish negotiating position between Abdullah Öcalan in jail on İmralı island in the Sea of Marmara, the PKK commanders in Kandil, and the (mostly HDP) Kurdish politicians operating within the Turkish political system, who both represent their constituents but also have provided communications between İmralı and Kandil. Although some Kurdish complaints have been addressed in recent years, the last six

¹⁴ These assertions turned out to be incorrect after Kobani was eventually relieved. See Quentin Somerville’s BBC report on 2nd February, where he describes the state of the civilians he found in the town <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31088684>

¹⁵ See “Turkey’s Politics since March 2014: a Survey” *Turkish Area Studies Review* 24, Autumn 2014

¹⁶ The enclave was created in 1921 in the Angora Agreement between France and Turkey, signed on 20th October 1921. Clause 9 provides that the tomb “shall remain with its appurtenances the property of Turkey, who may appoint guardians for it and hoist the Turkish flag there.” The mausoleum and enclave had previously been moved further north with the agreement of the Assad regime in 1974, when Lake Assad, formed by damming the Euphrates, started to fill

¹⁷ Plans for the replacement mausoleum can be viewed at

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/foto/foto_galeri/219865/2/iste_yeni_Suleyman_Sah_Turbesi.html

¹⁸ Syrian Arab News Agency 22 February 2015 <http://www.sana.sy/en/?p=29576>. A source in the Syrian Foreign Ministry lamented that Turkey had carried out “the move without Syria’s consent contrary to procedures usually followed according to the 1921 agreement signed between Turkey and the French occupation authorities back then,” which suggests that Syria continues to acknowledge the validity of article 9 of the 1921 agreement <http://www.sana.sy/en/?p=29576>

¹⁹ *Cumhuriyet* 22 February 2015

www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/218947/Tekin_den_Suleyman_Sah_icin_sert_aciklama.html

²⁰ Dombey, Daniel, “Turkish forces strike PKK outposts as Syrian war fuels tensions”, *Financial Times* 14 October 2014

²¹ *Cumhuriyet* 14 October 2014

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/130527/Gokcek_ten_skandal_tweetler_Kurt_gecinen_ateist_Ermeni_ler_var.html

months have seen little further progress: Turkish Radio and TV's Kurdish channel TRT 6 (launched 1 January 2009 and known as TRT Şeş) rebranded itself TRT Kurdî on 11 January.

The 28 February HDP-Akdoğan meeting and Erdoğan's concern that Hakan Fidan should not leave his post did raise hopes of some movement, perhaps an attempt to resolve matters before the 7 June election. But the election is itself a complicating factor. On 13 January, the HDP joint leader Selahattin Demirtaş announced that the party intended to contest the election as a political party, not as individuals standing as independents (as the Kurdish politicians did with some success in 2007 and 2011).²² This is a courageous strategy which has never to date proved successful.²³ It was last attempted by the Democratic People's Party DEHAP in 2002. They won 6.7% of the vote and were consequently unrepresented in parliament between 2002 and 2007, as they did not reach the threshold of 10% of the vote nationwide. Standing as independents has its drawbacks. It is difficult to manage electorally,²⁴ but it avoids the very real danger (for the Kurdish movement, but also for the stability of Turkey) of the party's voters being unrepresented in Ankara for four years. The attraction of standing as a party offers the prospect of doubling its parliamentary representation and making it much more difficult for the AK Party to win more than 300 seats or possibly even the 276 seats needed for an overall majority.²⁵ It is a high risk strategy. Demirtaş and the party were exhilarated by his 9.76% vote at the presidential election in August. Yet this was still below 10%, and it was a percentage of a very low turn-out. It is reasonable to infer that a significant proportion of those who did not vote in August were secularists who were not enthusiastic about the CHP-MHP joint candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. They did not vote for Demirtaş then, and there is little reason to think they have changed their minds. If the HDP does not win 10%, the principal beneficiary will be the AK Party, which will then find it much easier to win 330 seats or more – enough to hold a referendum on an executive presidential system.

Despite its confidence, the HDP may well reverse its decision – the success or otherwise of the negotiations following the 28th February meeting may determine this. But calculations were thrown into disarray following a speech by the President in Balıkesir on 15th March.²⁶ Calling for support for the New Turkey, for the executive presidential system and 400 AK Party MPs, he said there had never been any Kurdish problem in Turkey – “my citizens who are Kurdish may have had problems.” “Don't bring us Kurdist (Kürtçü) politics,” he demanded: 40,000 people had been killed in Turkey for this reason. “We had built roads and airports”, he said, “all over the south east – except in Hakkari where ‘they’ [PKK] had stopped it happening. We will never allow a separatist, terrorist organisation to stand in the way of development” he declared, proclaiming “one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state”..

This speech astonished many observers. Demirtaş asked why there was a peace process if there was no Kurdish problem. The President's strategy is not easy to discern. But Erdoğan made a similar intervention in the run-up to the 2011 election. In a speech in Muş he said: “For me, the Kurdish problem is over and done with in our country. My Kurdish brothers in this country have problems, but there's no Kurdish problem.”²⁷ While he would no doubt like

²² Interview on Habertürk TV 13 January <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1030157-iki-donem-kurali-esner-mi>

²³ In 1991, Halkın Emek Partisi (*The People's Labour Party*) was successful because it was in alliance with the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) and thus not impeded by the 10% threshold

²⁴ For detail on how this was achieved in 2007, see Hale, William (2008) 'The Electoral System and the 2007 Elections: Effects and Debates', *Turkish Studies*, 9: 2, pp. 242 ff.

²⁵ See Yetkin, Murat, “Kurdish votes key to Turkish elections” *Hürriyet Daily News* 14 March 2015

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-votes-key-to-turkish-elections.aspx?pageID=449&nID=79652&NewsCatID=409>

²⁶ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/92554/bolgemizde-ve-dunyada-yasanan-donusumun-sancilarini-cekenler-turkiyeyi-takip-ediyor-ve-rehber-olarak.html> The full speech was available at the time of writing on YouTube

<http://www.youtubehaber.com/haber-7386-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-balikesir-toplu-acilis-toreni-konusmasi>

²⁷ *Zaman* 1st May 2011 <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1128424>

to resolve the Kurdish issue, in the approach to elections he seems acutely nervous of non-Kurdish voters' reactions to a possible deal with the PKK. Whatever the reality, the speech elicited a categorical statement from Selahattin Demirtaş at a meeting of the HDP parliamentary party (*grup*) on 17 March. In the shortest speech he had ever made to this body, Demirtaş said the HDP was not a party to go in for deals and bargaining. Directly addressing Erdoğan he declared, "You will not be able to become President". He then repeated three times "We shall not make you President" and then closed the meeting.

The PKK is affiliated to the leading Syrian Kurdish group the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which together with its armed wing the YPG is engaged in the bitter struggle in northern Syria with both the Islamic State and the Assad regime. Turkey's reluctance in the autumn to move against the Islamic State led to US Vice President Joe Biden expressing frustration with Turkey to Harvard students.²⁸ This was followed by an apology by Biden (and then confusion about whether he had actually apologised), and the US dropping supplies to the PYD.

Since the autumn, Turkey and its ally the United States have had a wholly different understanding of the Syrian situation. With the start of air strikes against the Islamic State, the Obama administration moved its attention away from Damascus. For Ankara, the Assad regime remains the principal threat in Syria. More recently the AK Party government has moved to distance itself from the Islamic State, but in doing so it has stressed repeatedly the need not to ease up on Damascus. On 19 February, Turkey and the US signed an agreement to work together training Syrian rebels to fight the Islamic State, but Ankara insisted this could also be seen as providing training to those fighting Assad. And they have declined to allow the Americans to use the İncirlik air base. This position was reiterated by a Foreign Ministry spokesman on 11 March, when it was stressed that İncirlik could only be used by the coalition as part of a "comprehensive process" – this was understood to mean operations against both the Islamic State and the Assad regime.²⁹ On 26 February, the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was asked at the Senate Armed Services Committee whether he was optimistic that Turkey would be more engaged than they had been in confronting the Islamic State. He replied: "No, I'm not. I think Turkey has other priorities and other interests. They're more focused on what they consider to be a threat, the KCK, the Kurdish resistance, if you will, in Turkey. Public opinion polls show in Turkey they don't see ISIL as a primary threat. They're more focused internally on their economy and this sort of thing. And of course, the consequence of that is a permissive environment because of their laws and the ability of people to travel through Turkey *en route* to Syria. So somewhere in the neighbourhood of 60% of those foreign fighters find their way to Syria through Turkey."

It was not surprising that when US Secretary of State John Kerry said that negotiations would have to be opened with the Assad regime in order to end the fighting in Syria, there was a furious reaction from Ankara. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu flatly rejected the proposal, reiterating that all Syria's problems emanate from the regime and wondered what could be negotiated with a regime that had killed 200,000 people. Ahmet Davutoğlu went further, saying that to shake hands with Assad would be like doing so with Hitler.³⁰ Clarification from the State Department that there would not be negotiations personally with Assad³¹ suggested that Kerry had not been very judicious in his choice of words, but Ankara's position that the regime has to go has not changed.

US-Turkish relations have clearly suffered, and not just because of Syria and the complexities of the region. On 12 February, during a state visit to Mexico, President Erdoğan criticised Obama and his administration for their silence on the killing of three

²⁸ See "Turkey's Politics since March 2014: a Survey" *Turkish Area Studies Review* 24, Autumn 2014

²⁹ *Hürriyet Daily News* 11 March 2015 <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/use-of-incirlik-base-only-possible-with-comprehensive-process.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79537&NewsCatID=510>

³⁰ Meeting of his parliamentary party 17th March 2015 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/halepce-neyse-halep-odur/72419#1>

³¹ Briefing on 16 March 2015 by spokesman Jen Psaki <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/03/239343.htm#SYRIA>

Muslims in North Carolina. The White House had said it would wait for the results of a police investigation before commenting. Speaking to journalists on his way back from his Latin American tour, Erdoğan said he had got on well with Obama when the US President was first elected, but things had changed.³²

There is also the Putin factor. During his December visit to Ankara Vladimir Putin announced he was shelving the South Stream project to carry gas to Europe via a pipeline under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, bypassing Ukraine. He talked about replacing this with a pipeline to southern Europe via Turkey, a proposal he reiterated in Budapest on 17 February. This would seem to move Turkey towards Putin's friends in the EU, notably Hungary and Greece. The European Vice President in charge of the Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič was not impressed: "We don't work like this: the trading system and trading habits - how we do it today -- are different," he declared.³³ He reiterated his criticisms of the Russian move during a visit to Turkey in March. Like other European countries, Turkey is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas imports (Russia is the largest exporter to Turkey), but also has aspirations to become a regional energy hub. On Syria they may have different positions, but when it came to Georgia in 2008 and Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Turkey was at pains to remain detached, applying to the letter the terms of the Montreux Convention on the movement of warships through the Straits. Many Turks are personally anxious for the fate of the Crimean Tartars, but for all the talk of Turkey's duty to speak for defending Muslims in Europe, there has been no indication that concern for Crimea's Muslims will have any impact on Turkey's policies towards Russia.

However, work is starting on a pipeline to bring natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and ultimately to Europe. The project was initiated at a ceremony in Kars on 17 March attended by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The TANAP pipeline is due for completion in 2018.

Putin's pipeline plans provided fresh ammunition for those in the European Union who do not see Turkey as 'one of us'. There had been some initial optimism about Turkey's EU application after the Davutoğlu government took over.³⁴ In September a new five-year European strategy³⁵ was launched, and in January Minister for Europe Volkan Bozkır said Turkey could close all the chapters of the accession negotiations in two years.³⁶ A particular concern for Turkey is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a proposed free trade agreement between the EU and the United States. With the existing customs union but without EU membership, Turkey fears having to accept duty-free US goods without the reciprocal advantage of access to US markets.

A difference of approach between EU capitals and Ankara was revealed in January, when Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu flew to Paris to join President Hollande's march with world leaders to honour those killed at the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine and the kosher supermarket. The prevailing sentiment in France and across the European Union was concern about home-grown terrorism and rights of free expression. Davutoğlu, however, stressed the problem of Islamophobia in Europe. On his return, he explained that in the name of Turkey and the Islamic world he had declared that "we have never remained and never will remain

³² Sabah 15 February 2015

<http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/safak/2015/02/15/asil-olan-halkin-bizi-yalnizliga-itmemesi>

³³ Mazneva, Elena, Bloomberg 14 January 2015 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/russia-to-shift-ukraine-gas-transit-to-turkey-as-eu-cries-foul>

³⁴ Pierini, Marc and Sinan Ülgen, "A Moment of Opportunity in the EU-Turkey Relationship", Carnegie Europe 10th December 2014 <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/12/10/moment-of-opportunity-in-eu-turkey-relationship>.

However, a contrasting view emerged soon afterwards: Alaranta, Toni "Turkey under the AKP: A critical evaluation from the perspective of Turkey's EU negotiations", Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 9th February 2015 http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/480/turkey_under_the_akp/. Alaranta concludes that "the AKP is not – and never has been – a pro-European party. It is a modern Islamist party that has learned how to survive in an international system characterized by economic interdependence"

³⁵ *Turkey's European Union Strategy*, Ankara 2014 http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/foto/eu_strategy.pdf

³⁶ <http://www.tourismlifeinturkey.com/newsdetail/8542-ABveTurizmKonuluTuRSABcalismaToplantisiyapildi.html>

silent in the face of any insult to our blessed Prophet.”³⁷ He argued: “If Europe is one day to obtain peace and tranquillity, this can only be realised when it is accepted that the religion of Islam is a fundamental component of Europe. We had bilateral talks with Mrs Merkel, who confirmed our opinion that Islam is an authentic, fundamental religion of Europe.” For Davutoğlu, Turkey’s European identity is one facet of Turkey’s global and regional identity. The Turkish and Islamic identities are intertwined and essential to Europe: “From Al Andalus to the Ottoman Empire, Islam is the most essential element of the European continent,”³⁸ he declared.

Reporters without Borders deplored³⁹ the presence of “officials from countries that restrict freedom of information in Europe”, naming Davutoğlu amongst others, and his presence in Paris was lampooned in *Cumhuriyet*. Despite threats and a police raid on its İstanbul headquarters, *Cumhuriyet* published a four-page Turkish version of *Charlie Hebdo*’s 14 January issue and reprinted the cartoon of the Prophet alongside columns in the main paper. The gap between the Turkish government and the defenders of free speech in Europe (including Turkey) had earlier been illustrated when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, entertaining Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara, launched a vitriolic attack on Benjamin Netanyahu’s presence at the Paris march.

The Director of Religious Affairs Mehmet Görmez and his predecessor differed in their reactions to the Paris murders. Görmez stressed Islamophobia and contrasted the commemoration of 12 people “killed in a way that no religious person, no one in his right mind, can accept” with what he called silence over the last ten years about 12 million people slaughtered in the Muslim world.⁴⁰ Ali Bardakoğlu, who was replaced by Görmez in 2010, stressed that Muslim leaders bore some responsibility for the rise of Islamophobia; there was a need, he argued, to counter extremist jihadi thinking.⁴¹

The European Commission annual Progress Report⁴² on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership noted concerns about the handling of corruption allegations and the independence of the judiciary. In the same month, the İstanbul prosecutor dropped charges against 53 people detained in December 2013 on suspicion of bribery and illegal currency and gold transactions. They included the sons of four ministers. Four of the prosecutors involved in the case – alleged by the government to have been a coup attempt by the Gülen movement – were suspended on 30 December by the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors. Under the new system elections were held for this body in October, which were won predominantly by candidates favoured by the government. The ministers involved in the corruption allegations were covered by parliamentary immunity, and parliament voted in their cases not to send them to trial.

In February, new heads of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal were appointed. The former body – which almost closed down the AK Party in 2008 – is no longer a threat to the ruling party. Opposition circles have suggested, however, that there may be a move to close the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and/or the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). This seems far-fetched, but prosecutors can be unpredictable.

In February, there was widespread anger across the country at the fate of Özgecan Aslan, a young girl who was travelling in a minibus in Mersin. She was the last passenger left on the vehicle, and the driver then attempted to rape her. He murdered her and burnt her body.

³⁷ Television address 31st January 2015 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/yeni-turkiye-yolunda-konusmasi1/71117#1>

³⁸ 13th January 2015 speech to AK Party MPs <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/avrupa-biziz-biz-avrupayiz/70513#1>

³⁹ <http://en.rsf.org/rwb-condemns-presence-of-predators-11-01-2015.47472.html>

⁴⁰ Milliyet 13th January 2015 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gormez-12-milyon-musulman-gundem-1998085/>

⁴¹ *Radikal* 9th January 2015

http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/diyabet_isleri_eski_baskani_paris_otekinin_provokasyonu_degildir-1268340

⁴² http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf

This infuriated many already angered over the number of brutal attacks on women which the courts are not seen to take sufficiently seriously. There were demonstrations, with male protesters wearing skirts to show solidarity with vulnerable women. President Erdoğan strongly condemned the murder, but he criticised some women who danced in a meeting on 14 February to protest at rape, sexual harassment and violence against women, referring to them disparagingly as ‘feminists’.

Prosecutions of those alleged to have insulted the government and particularly the President are increasing. But on 3 March, Erdoğan was himself ordered by a court to pay TL10,000 to Mehmet Aksoy, whose monumental sculpture depicting two figures representing Armenian-Turkish friendship was removed from its site in Kars after Erdoğan visited in 2011 and described it as a monstrosity. Artists had been outraged. The fate of the sculpture paralleled that of the cause it represented. The protocols signed between the two nations in 2009 which would have normalised relations were never ratified, and on 16 February 2015 President Serzh Sargsyan wrote to the Armenian National Assembly withdrawing them from the ratification process.⁴³



Update on Cyprus 2014/2015

by **Clement Dodd**

The last Update ended with an account of visits to the North by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. They both voiced strong support for the Turkish Cypriots. For his part President Erdoğan called for a bi-communal federation that would emerge from ‘two founding states’, whilst Davutoğlu wanted the immediate ending of the embargoes imposed on the TRNC and roundly declared that Turkey would never abandon the Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile the Greek Cypriot government, utterly opposed to a future formed by two ‘founding states’, was demanding the return of Varosha, the now grievously dilapidated suburb of Gazimağusa (Famagusta), and of Güzelyurt (Morphou), the agriculturally productive area of northwest Cyprus abandoned by the Greek Cypriots in 1974. These demands and counter-demands occurred at a time when the newly appointed UN Special Adviser, Mr Espen Barth Eide, was expressing some confidence in the outcome of the continuing negotiations. It emerged that he was intending to advance ‘bridging proposals’, an approach not at all to the liking of nationalist politicians in the South, who ‘felt that differences could not be bridged over given Turkey’s stance’.

The Negotiations

This ‘stance’ in the dispute suddenly hardened when, on 3 October, Ankara announced its decision, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, to carry out seismic surveys within offshore blocks of the self-declared Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus off the island’s south coast. One of these blocks (No 9) is where an Italian/South Korean consortium is drilling for hydrocarbons. The Greek Cypriot government immediately protested that this was an unacceptable infringement of its sole right, as the recognized Government of Cyprus, to exploit the hydrocarbon deposits around the island. Ankara

⁴³ <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2015/02/16/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-National-Assembly/>

asserted that Turkey was helping the Turkish Cypriots because, under the terms of the 1960 treaties and the Constitution, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities had rights of participation in the exploitation of all mineral and other deposits in and around the island. The Turkish Cypriots pointed out that, as partners in the Republic established in 1960, they had the right to participate in government in all areas other than those relating to religion, education, culture, personal status, family affairs and suchlike matters, which were left to the two Communal Chambers. Later constitutional changes that were made unilaterally by the Greek Cypriots were, of course, illegal. The Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus says that in a political settlement the Turkish Cypriots would profit in part from the proceeds arising from hydrocarbon developments, but denies their *right* to a share of them. As so often, the decision of a UN Security Council in March 1964 to treat the purely Greek Cypriot-manned government then in office as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, in defiance of the 1960 treaties, and of the legal doctrine, *pacta sunt servanda*, continues to bedevil the Cyprus dispute.

President Anastasiades' response to the Turkish intention to conduct surveys in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was to leave the negotiations and to appeal widely to the international community for support, in particular to the UN, the European Council, and also to the United Kingdom and the United States. For his part President Eroğlu said that he had suggested to Anastasiades that they should set up a joint committee to discuss hydrocarbons along with the possibility of providing some water to the South from that soon to be piped to the North from Turkey, but without response. On 20 October Turkey began making seismic surveys in the island's EEZ, a programme designed to last until 30 December.

All this was, of course, a blow to prospects of a settlement of the Cyprus conflict and led to both Russia and Greece saying that they would send warships to the sea area under dispute, a threat that raised tension, but without providing any result. The EU urged Turkey to show restraint and to respect the Republic of Cyprus's sovereignty over its territorial sea including its rights in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Ankara was also reminded that it was obliged to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, but overall, UN and EU response to Turkey's action was rather more restrained than was expected. Nevertheless Ankara continued to assert the rights of the Turkish Cypriots.

Despite this setback to negotiations for a solution, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in a report to the UN General Assembly on 22 October (though dated 4 September) expressed some optimism for the future, noting that 'the objective is expected to be achieved provided that the correct political will of the leaders of their respective communities prevails, and that there is continuing support from the international community'. That there is a 'correct' political will, that it is shared by the two leaders, and that, if it exists, it will be supported by both sides is unfortunately anything but obvious.

During this hiatus in the negotiations Kudret Özersay, the respected Turkish Cypriot official negotiator, resigned from his post on his decision to become a candidate for election to the Turkish Cypriot presidency in the contest to be held in April 2015, when President Derviş Eroğlu would be standing again. However, the post of chief negotiator was soon filled, and its importance stressed, by the appointment to this influential position of Mr Ergün Olgun, who served President Denktaş as Head of the President's Office and his chief official negotiator, and helpmeet, for many years, despite having a large business in Nicosia that he had to leave his family to manage. With this political and business experience, and with an academic background in both economics and government, he will be a major asset to the Turkish Cypriot team.

The Hydrocarbon Deposits

During November 2014 the Turkish Government's operations in Cyprus's EEZ on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots dominated relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots began by insisting that the Turkish Cypriots would have a share of the hydrocarbon proceeds *after* a settlement, but not before. The Turkish Cypriot approach was, and still is, to call for revenues from hydrocarbons to be agreed before negotiations for a settlement. This found favour in some unofficial, but certainly not in official, Greek Cypriot sources on the grounds that it would act as a financial spur, and incline the Turkish Cypriots to an agreement. The American view is that the issue should be discussed during the course of the negotiations.

The Greek Cypriots seek to buttress their approach by claiming that in 2010 presidents Talat and Christofias agreed that 'the country's natural resources would be within the competence of the central federal state, in which the Turkish Cypriots would have an effective participation'. This, it is asserted, was regarded at the time as a 'convergence' between the two sides and was registered as such by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative. However, convergences were not binding agreements, and indeed both sides have subsequently challenged them.

The 10th Economist Nicosia Conference

Greek Cypriot frustration was somewhat mitigated by statements in support of the Greek Cypriot case at the 10th Economist Nicosia Conference held on 4 November. In a significant speech the American Ambassador, Mr John M Koenig, carefully said that "the United States has been clear that we support Cyprus's right to develop resources in its EEZ, and believes that the resources should be equitably shared in the context of an overall settlement" which seemed to suggest during the negotiations, but could be taken to mean after. He spoke warmly of the deepening relationship between Cyprus and the United States, "a relationship that covers a broad range of interests from trade and energy to security co-operation, counter-terrorism and regional collaboration on the biggest transatlantic challenges of the day". He was reaffirming the deepening relationship he perceived between the USA and Cyprus that the American Vice-President, Joe Biden, had certainly highlighted during his visit to the island in May. It is an involvement with the Greek Cypriots that is too pronounced for the Turkish Cypriots and, probably, for Turkey. It is also not much welcomed by those on the left in Cyprus who prefer to look to Russia for help and support.



The Cairo Declaration

On 11 November the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, the Greek Prime Minister, Antonios Samaras, and President Anastasiades met in Cairo. They saw the need for a concerted and collective response to tackle 'the immense challenges to the stability, security and prosperity of the Eastern Mediterranean'. They looked, *inter alia*, 'for respect of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus over its Exclusive Economic Zone', and called on Turkey to cease seismic survey operations under way within the maritime zones of Cyprus, and to refrain from similar activity in the future. They also looked for 'a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem that would reunify the island in accordance with international law including the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions'. This impressive show of unity suffered

somewhat when a few days later it was learned that the Turkish Prime Minister was to visit Athens in early December, though the visit had been planned some time earlier.

The European Union

On 10 November the European Parliament held a debate on Turkish activities in Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone. Johannes Hahn, Vice-President of the Commission, said: 'We expect Turkey to respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus over its Exclusive Economic Zone.' He added that 'Turkey, with a stated European perspective, must respect the standards of that perspective'. One Greek MEP declared that it was a disgrace that the EU was turning a blind eye, and was ignoring the interests of a country that was under occupation. The only MEP to show sympathy for Turkish Cypriot concerns was Geoffrey Van Orden. He reminded parliament that in 2004 the Commission pledged to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, and claimed that this promise had not been kept. The Resolution adopted by the parliament deplored 'the escalation of threats and unilateral action by Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus in relation to the Exclusive Economic Zone'. Turkey was also reminded at this meeting that the recognition of all member states was a necessary component of its EU accession process. Ankara reacted strongly to the European Parliament's Resolution asserting that it had no force, and that should it be sent to Turkey it would not be received since it was of no importance.

In Washington the Greek and Greek Cypriot lobbyists thought differently. Nine organizations chose to vent their ire on the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, asserting that his statements on the EEZ issue 'came close to sanctioning Turkey's continued blackmail of Cyprus'.⁴⁴ Eide was proposing that negotiations on hydrocarbons should take place neither before nor after, but alongside, negotiations on a settlement, a procedure that seemed very little different from the American proposal that the issue should be discussed 'in the context of the negotiations'.

Eide's proposal for twin-track negotiations (one track devoted to the hydrocarbons' issue, the other to the creation of a federation) was not greatly welcomed by either side, though it matched the American view that the hydrocarbons' issue should be discussed 'within the context of the negotiations'. Whilst not enthusiastic about this approach the Turkish Cypriot side intimated that it could accept it. At first Anastasiades rejected the idea, but agreed that the hydrocarbon issue could be discussed towards the end of the negotiations on the proposed federation – when it was expected that the major issues of territory and property (particularly the large amount of Greek Cypriot property abandoned in 1974) would be discussed. However, the Turkish Cypriot side saw this as a trap, as a way that could well tempt the Greek Cypriots to try to barter these important issues against that of the hydrocarbons without specific recognition of the Turkish Cypriots' *rights* in the hydrocarbons' issue.

It was hoped that Anastasiades would return to the negotiating table after 30 December, the date the Turkish research vessel, *Barbaros*, was due to leave the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone. However, in early January 2015 the Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that the ship would continue prospecting in the Cypriot EEZ, and that operations could even include drilling. For the Greek Cypriots this meant that the negotiations would remain stalled.

⁴⁴ *Cyprus Mail*, 14 November 2014

The Report of the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus, 16 January 2015.

During this impasse the UN Secretary-General's Report appeared on Operations in Cyprus from 21 June to 15 December 2014. It pleased neither side. Anastasiades described the Report as an attempt to oblige them to return to the negotiation table and did not adequately condemn the 'Turkish' actions in their EEZ, a clear violation of the rights of the Republic of Cyprus. Also they resented that in the Report there was marked reference to the need to remove restrictions and barriers that impeded the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community, the first time it has been highlighted in a UN Secretary-General Report. The Greek Cypriots believe that because the Republic of Cyprus is acknowledged as having sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus the issue of restrictions on the North is solely a matter for the Republic of Cyprus. In their view the Report encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to further their aim to achieve a permanent division of the island.

The Turkish Cypriots welcomed the new concern with their economic plight, but deplored the omission in the Report of any reference to Turkish Cypriot 'equal land inherent' rights to the proceeds arising from the discovery of the hydrocarbon deposits. Also the Turkish Cypriots resented the emphasis on Turkey in the Report when, they claimed, it was at the initiative of the Turkish Cypriot government, and on its behalf, that Turkey began to look for hydrocarbon deposits in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone.

Turkish Cypriot Proposals and Relations with the United Kingdom

The newly appointed and experienced Turkish Cypriot official negotiator, Mr Ergün Olgun, soon got off the mark by deploring the statement made by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for Europe, David Lidington, on 27 November on his visit to Cyprus. In his statement in Cyprus Mr Lidington said that the British Government 'recognises the right of the Republic of Cyprus to develop potential hydrocarbon reserves in its Exclusive Economic Zone', and he noted that 'relations between the United Kingdom and Cyprus have never been stronger'. However, he also welcomed the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 'Joint Declaration' that enabled the present round of talks to begin, an agreement that President Anastasiades had only accepted in February 2014 under much pressure.⁴⁵

Writing in the Turkish daily, *Kıbrıs*, Ergün Olgun has called for a new dynamic in negotiations, making the point that, in certain important ways, including having all the proceeds from the hydrocarbon deposits, the status quo worked greatly to the benefit of the Greek Cypriots. For this and other reasons, for them recognition of the Turkish Cypriots as equal partners in a federal government was a very hard pill to swallow. He believed that the future would unfold in one of three ways:

- (1) the present impasse could just continue, or
- (2) both sides could agree simultaneously to stop the search for hydrocarbons in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone, or
- (3) they could set up a joint committee to discuss the hydrocarbons' issue and, presumably, proceed from there, with recognition of the Turkish Cypriots' right to share in these resources.

Turkish Cypriot Visits to London

Ergün Olgun doubtless made this and other points to David Lidington on a visit to London in late November when he had to have a private, not an official, meeting with him, and on parliamentary, not on government, premises. This occurred at a time when

⁴⁵ It essentially recognised the sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots in any new federal agreement. (For the controversy around the making of the Joint Declaration See 'Update on Cyprus 2013/14', *Turkish Area Studies Review*, Spring 2014, No.23).

in the House of Commons there was a debate on Cyprus occasioned by Jack Straw, a former Foreign Minister, who urged, as he has before, that the right way forward for Cyprus was a two-state solution, a debate that produced the usual very pronounced support in Parliament for the Greek Cypriots.

The Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister, Mr Özdil Nami, also paid a visit to London in November, but his meetings were similarly private, not official. The Greek Cypriot government protested vehemently against these meetings with members of the 'pseudo-government', unofficial though they were deemed to be. In response a British Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesman very correctly said 'Mr Nami, who was in London on his own initiative, asked to see Mr Lidington – who was pleased to have a private meeting with Mr Nami, who is a leading member of the Turkish Cypriot *community*' (my emphasis). In fact, the TRNC is in reality not a community but a state, since it has the attributes of a state, even if it is unrecognised by all states save Turkey. Even the Greek Cypriots sometimes refer to the TRNC as 'a breakaway **state**'. The spokesman duly continued, "Our position is not changed. We do not recognise the title of 'minister' other than for members of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus". For the TRNC, and for Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus is just 'the Greek Cypriot administration'.

A newcomer to the intricacies of the Cyprus problem trying to understand the positions of all those involved in the Cypriot wonderland could do well to remember Humpty Dumpty's interpretation of the complexities of Wonderland "When I use a word", he told Alice, "it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less".

The Forthcoming Presidential Election in the TRNC

In the TRNC interest is fast building up in the forthcoming (April) presidential election. Regarded as the main competitor to the incumbent, President Eroğlu, is Sibel Siber. She is the 'Speaker' of the National Assembly, and was for a while prime minister of the coalition government now in power, which is composed of the centre-left Republican Turkish Party, led by Özkan Yorgancıoğlu, and the centre-right Democratic and National Strength Party under Serdar Denktaş, the son of the late President Rauf Denktaş. The third major candidate is Professor Kudret Özersay, the former Turkish Cypriot official negotiator, a well-known independent and a popular speaker on political issues, but without party support. Another candidate, who could gather substantial support from the left, is Mustafa Akıncı.⁴⁶ He was at one time a very effective mayor of Turkish Cypriot Nicosia, and head of the Communal Liberation Party, which has now much declined under its new name of the Socialist Democracy Party. A second run-off election is expected between Derviş Eroğlu and Sibel Siber, whom the Greek Cypriots would prefer to see in office. She is quite pro-Turkish, whilst more inclined, like all those on the liberal left, to seek compromises with the Greek Cypriots, particularly if the left were in power in the South.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot Attitudes to the Cyprus Problem Compared

Voting in the forthcoming election for a president will no doubt be influenced by general Turkish Cypriot attitudes to the Cyprus problem. They are included in a recent study of attitudes and opinions on both sides carried out from the South by the University of Nicosia in conjunction with Insights Market Research. Some quite interesting conclusions emerge.

Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, this study showed that 80 per cent of Turkish Cypriots believe that there is a common Cypriot identity, as compared with 67 per cent of Greek

⁴⁶ As intimated by Yusuf Kanlı, a Turkish Cypriot journalist who writes in *Hürriyet Daily News* and is very well informed on the Cyprus problem in general, and on Turkish Cypriot politics in particular.

Cypriots. On both sides those younger were more positive than those older. On the issue of a solution of the Cyprus problem the majority of Greek Cypriots predictably said that they wanted a unitary state, with only 24 per cent favouring a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. Similarly, less than a third of the Turkish Cypriots interviewed favoured a federation, with 29 per cent saying that they wanted a two-state solution. Since federations are difficult, and two-state federations particularly so, peacemakers need to take these general attitudes into account, let alone those of the politicians needed to make such a federation work.

Cyprus and the World

Cyprus has in the past often been a troubled island. There seems to be more trouble in the offing. This is because Russia, which has always had a considerable interest in Cyprus, and is a major investor in the shaky Greek Cypriot economy, has now been allowed to have its warships in the Mediterranean use Cypriot ports. This has occurred before, but now, after an agreement recently made by Anastasiades in Moscow with President Putin, it seems to be more serious. It is reaffirmed that Russian ships may use ports and, apparently, that its planes may use airports in Cyprus 'in cases of humanitarian crisis, international terrorism and piracy'. There has also been talk in recent months in Cyprus of allowing Russia to have an air base on the island. The American and British governments are clearly worried by what looks like another Russian challenge to Western influence in the world in general, and a direct danger or threat, in particular, to the militarily important British Base Areas in Cyprus. Russia is also helping the Greek Cypriots by lowering interest on an existing large loan and by extending the period for repayment. The Greek Cypriots could be seen to be playing one power off against another in order to achieve their undying aim to control the whole of Cyprus, since this is what really matters to them, but obsessed with the Cyprus problem they could be playing with fire. Is Cyprus to live up to its reputation as a *place d'armes*?



The Turkish economy in 2015:

Lower Oil Prices, Tightening Monetary Policy, and G20 Opportunities

by Mina Toksöz,
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The oil price decline came at a fortuitous time for the Turkish economy as it braces for higher international interest rates and capital flow volatility associated with the expected tightening of monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve. Assuming oil prices remain below \$100/barrel for a few years, it not only eases foreign payments pressures, but also provides a disinflationary impetus, easing pressures on the Turkish Central Bank (CBT). The Turkish presidency of the G20 in 2015 also provides the opportunity to seek international cooperation to try to manage the policy spill-overs and risks from this process of international monetary tightening.

Public sector debt down; private sector debt up

Turkey has grown at around 4.5% per year in the past decade doubling Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to an estimated US\$813bn in 2014. Helped by some US\$35bn of privatisation revenues, the public debt burden has been halved to 34% of GDP. But, while the public sector balance sheet improved, foreign payments balances weakened with a chronic current account deficit. Structurally, this reflects the decline in the national savings ratio to a low of 13.3% in 2013 (cf over 30% in most Asian economies). With investment to GDP at around 20%, the domestic savings gap has had to be funded by external savings (capital inflows). The widening current account deficit also reflected the deterioration of the terms of trade as prices of commodities – that Turkey mostly imports – rose, while the price of manufactures – that make up the bulk of its exports – fell. However, the fall in oil prices since mid-2014 has improved this picture. Even taking into account a higher debt interest payments bill as international interest rates rise, the current account deficit could decline to around 4% of GDP in 2015-16, reducing the external financing gap to more manageable levels.

The past decade has also seen a rise in private sector indebtedness. Capital inflows have fuelled a credit bonanza in Turkey with the level of debt of every entity – households, corporates, and recently, SMEs – rising rapidly. Fortunately, starting from a low base, debt levels are not yet high by international standards. Household debt currently stands at about 50% of disposable income (cf. 150% in South Korea). But there are concentrations of debt with banks and corporates accounting for three-quarters of external debt. Banks, which have funded the credit growth by borrowing in international markets, hold the bulk of short-term debt. Thus, although the Turkish banking system remains well capitalised and regulated, the rapid credit growth of the past few years creates increased risks compared with the mid-2000s.

Global policy spill-overs and many elections have complicated macro-policy

Policy weaknesses have contributed to vulnerabilities that placed Turkey among the Fragile-5 during the ‘tapering tantrum’ in 2013. One problem has been the difficulty of managing monetary policy in an economy with a relatively deep and open capital market in the context of the spill-over effects of the ultra-loose monetary stance by the major reserve currency central banks. The high levels of capital inflows to emerging markets in 2009-12 had kept monetary policy loose as emerging market policy makers tried to dampen currency appreciation. The CBT was forced to reverse this stance raising interest rates in early 2014 in response to the sharp reversal of capital flows in the wake of US Federal Reserve ‘tapering’ its asset purchases. But, the CBT reverted to cutting rates from April onwards arguing the tightening effects of the macro-prudential measures and the downward trend in inflation generated by the decline in energy prices was sufficient. Yet, with inflation repeatedly missing its targets in recent years and politicians making pronouncements about their personal views on interest rates, central bank credibility has suffered and the currency has been one of the most volatile among major emerging markets (EM).

The second problem has been the proclivity for policy to be driven by electoral concerns. Six electoral contests (local authority, parliamentary, presidential, constitutional referendum) over 2009-2014 have delayed the withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus of 2009. In 2015, a general election is due, possibly followed by another

constitutional referendum. Even though the fiscal stance has been relatively prudent generating a primary surplus every year, a stronger countercyclical stance was required in the high growth years to contain the current account deficit and avoid the stop-go pattern of growth since 2009. This had been the aim of the fiscal rule that was about to be adopted in 2010, but which was abruptly dropped at the last minute.

A new growth driver is needed

The deep structural reforms of the Turkish economy and the restructuring of the banking sector following the 2001 crisis laid the basis for growth in the past decade and provided resilience against external shocks including the 2008-09 global financial crisis and regional conflicts. But the impact of these reforms has now waned, global conditions have changed, and the economy needs another series of productivity raising measures. Does the AK Party have the focus to carry these out?

The AKP seems to be in flux, distracted by the conflict with its former Gülenist allies; negotiating a complex peace process with the Kurdish minority; and like many other countries in Europe, obsessed with tightening security. Given the ongoing regional conflicts, the domestic political pressures, the upcoming general election, and the reliable old guard on the economy possibly retiring, the government is likely to struggle to initiate difficult transformative economic reforms. Instead growth is likely to be driven mostly on the same credit driven basis as before, although higher international interest rates will somewhat brake its foreign borrowing component. Large infrastructure projects will also support growth with the 2014-2018 Five Year Plan targeting \$250bn of infrastructure investments. Yet, a tighter domestic policy stance would be required for building policy buffers against the more difficult global environment of the coming decade.

Turkey's G20 presidency in 2015

Turkey's holding of the presidency of the G20 in 2015 provides an opportunity to seek more international cooperation to help manage the more difficult international environment. The G20 – the main international forum for global economic policy cooperation between advanced economies and developing countries – is almost tailored for Turkey to facilitate the forming of alliances with other like-minded mid-level powers (such as MIKTA, consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) interested in pursuing global reform and cooperation.⁴⁷

Given that Turkey's vulnerability to capital flow volatility remains a major concern, G20 cooperation to help manage the spill-over risks from international monetary policy tightening would be a major gain. Turkish presidency provides the opportunity to make these issues a main focus of the G20. Specific policies to mitigate the impact of capital flow volatility could include the implementation of defensive structural measures to strengthen international financial safety nets, such as currency swaps with major international reserve currency central banks. Turkey must also remind G20 leaders of the important achievement of the G20 in forging a pluralistic new consensus on growth and development and ensure that the G20 reconfirms its early mission of a 'new era of international cooperation' that was

⁴⁷ See Mina Toksöz, 'Policy cooperation in the G20: the role of Middle Powers and Proposals for the Turkish Presidency in 2015', Chatham House, International Economics Department Briefing paper, forthcoming March 2015.

declared at the 2009 London summit. This would involve those economies at the receiving end of capital flows to pursue structural reforms and policies such as flexible exchange rates and high foreign currency reserves that can cushion external shocks. But it also requires major advanced economies to take more responsibility for the spill-over effects of their policies. This could include adopting counter-cyclical micro-prudential policies (such as those proposed by Basel III accords) and macro-economic policies (such as incorporating financial stability as part of central bank objectives) that “lean against” asset bubbles and reduce pro-cyclicality of capital flows.



THE SEARCH FOR CISSIDES

by Peter Rogers⁴⁸



Charles Fellows visited Levissi on 15 May 1840. Fellows, the thieving vandal whose name is inscribed next to Elgin in the annals of infamy, or the saviour of the Xanthian stones, depending on your point of view, was on his second visit to Lycia. He had ‘discovered’ Xanthus on his previous visit and was to return two more times to assist in the removal of the relics which now grace the Lycian Gallery in the British Museum.

Levissi was a densely packed village of some 500 buildings (not all dwellings) built and occupied by Greeks relocated from the Dodecanese by the Ottomans, probably in the seventeenth century. It occupied the south-east corner of the valley identified by Strabo, the ancient Greek geographer, as Carmylessus. It is now known as the Kaya Valley.


On 15 May Fellows had returned from a visit to Rhodes and, to escape what he described as the “insufferably oppressive and stagnant air of the bay of Macry” (now Fethiye), he and a companion rode for two hours up the steep mountainside behind Makri and then descended into “a highly-cultivated plain wherein lay Levissi. From its commanding position and the remains of a few tombs”, he wrote, “I judge that it may probably be the site of a small ancient town, perhaps *Cissidae*” (sic). Later that day, “we passed through Lavisse (sic), and over the hill to the sea-coast, in order to examine the ruins of an ancient city, supposed to be Carmylessus, situated principally upon an island and partly along the coast”⁴⁹.

Fellows was mistaken – he was looking at the ruins of an early Byzantine settlement on Gemiler Adası, not the valley of Carmylessus as defined by Strabo. He was wrong about Carmylessus; was he also wrong about Cissides? If he was, what was the true location of Cissides? Did it even exist? I had to know. It became an obsession. For months, years, I searched countless indexes and every conceivable work of reference – in vain. I gave up and put it out of my mind. Years later I

⁴⁸ An RAF pilot and staff officer for thirty-five years, Peter Rogers now divides his time between philately and the history and archaeology of Lycia which he visits regularly.

⁴⁹ Charles Fellows *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor*, 1852, London (facsimile, 1975, Olms)

acquired a facsimile copy of Leake's *Journal of a Tour in Asia Minor* originally published in 1824⁵⁰. Lt Colonel W M Leake set out from Constantinople on 19 January 1800 in the company of Brigadier General Koehler, Sir Richard Fletcher, Archdeacon Carlyle and Mr Pink; they were well-armed and dressed as Tatar couriers. The general aim of this bizarre group of worthies was, as Leake put it, "to trace vestiges of Grecian art and civilisation amidst modern barbarism and desolation". The group travelled southeastward and reached the Mediterranean coast at Gülnar, ancient Celenderis, on 9 February suffering relatively few mishaps on the way. From here they sailed to Cyprus, returning to the mainland a month later. Leake fell ill and left the group which returned much the way it had come. When fit again, Leake returned to Constantinople by boat. In his journal he quoted extensively from Strabo's account of the Anatolian coast although, of course, he was travelling in the opposite direction. Abeam Lycia he referred to an "anonymous Periplus, entitled the Stadiasmus of the Sea, a fragment of which is preserved in the Madrid Library". These ancient sailing instructions quoted distances from significant points on the Lycian coast among which were 140 stades from the Xanthus River to Cape Hieria, 130 stades from Cape Hieria to CISSIDES, and 85 stades to Telmessus (now Fethiye). Great joy! Here was the reference I had been seeking for years. Leake added that Cissides was the name of the promontory, on the south side of which was the island of St Nicholas. I didn't need to use chart and dividers to verify these distances. The island of St Nicholas (Gemiler Adası) was the one that Fellows had mistaken for Carmylessus. During the early Byzantine years it had been a place of pilgrimage with four churches and a small township all of which were destroyed during the Arab raids of the late seventh century.



A glance at the map⁵¹ shows that the only promontory which could be said to be north of the island was the relatively insignificant projection, labelled Beştaş Burun on the map, and which formed the left hand entrance to Beştaş Limanı, the bay. There is now no evidence to show that there had ever been a settlement on the promontory. Sometime after the seventh century there had been seismic activity in the area. The small township on the north shore of the island had slumped by eight

⁵⁰ William M. Leake *Journal of a Tour in Asia Minor* 1824, London (facsimile, 2005, Eilbron Classics)

⁵¹ Adapted from Rod Heikell *Turkish Waters and Cyprus Pilot*, 1993, St.Ives, by kind permission of the publishers Imray Laurie Norie and Wilson

metres, according to the Osaka University team which had surveyed the island and, not too far east, the old village of Symbolon now lies beneath the waters of Ölüdeniz Lagoon. In former times, therefore, Beştaş Burun might have been much more prominent.

No sooner had I come across Leake's journal but, rather like London buses, three more references turned up: Hazlitt's *Classical Gazetteer* said "a pr. of Lycia, 10 miles from Lagusa"⁵². Lagusa is a former name of Şövalye Island lying offshore from Fethiye; 10 miles south of it, as the crow flies, brings you in the general area of Beştaş Burun. Ernst Kalinka, who published the huge *Tituli Asiae Minoris: Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti* in 1901, included in it a small scale map of Lycia inscribed in Greek. One does not need to be fluent in ancient Greek to be able to read the caption ΚΙΣΣΙΔΑΙ curving out of Beştaş Bay. The third reference, the vast three volume work *Lykien und Pamphylien*⁵³ published in 2004 by the Germans Hellenkemper & Hild, mentions the distances quoted in the ancient Stadiasmus and concludes that Cissides was, probably, Beştaş Limanı. These three references do not, materially, contradict Leake – although we have to remember that they all postdate the one who might have been their primary, and only, source.

Why was this relatively insignificant headland (or the bay it protects) deemed important enough to warrant an entry in the ancient sailing instructions? Perhaps it served as a marker for the safe anchorage between the island and the mainland coast, usually inhabited by a 'gulet' or two nowadays. However, the authoritative *Turkish Waters & Cyprus Pilot* states that "there can be an appreciable west-going current in the channel. There is moderate shelter from the Meltem but at night there may be a katabatic wind off the mountains from the north-east which makes it uncomfortable; some care is needed in this anchorage"⁵⁴. If it is sometimes uncomfortable for modern well-built gulets, it must have been very much more so for smaller ancient vessels which might have preferred Beştaş Limanı for safe anchorage.

On the left hand side of Beştaş Limanı is a small cove, Soğuksu Koyu – Cold Water Bay. This is a very popular anchorage for the yachting fraternity who only have to paddle ashore, and undertake a short climb, to be able to dine at Ali Tuna's restaurant where 'Turkish Lamb' on the menu looks and tastes remarkably like wild boar. Cold Water Bay takes its name from the perennial springs which well-up from beneath the surface of the bay. As these plumes of ice-cold water break the surface they are perfectly potable. I know because I have drunk from them. Here then, I believe we have the answer. For small ancient vessels sailing along a notoriously dry coast, fresh water would have been a rare and vital commodity, well worth an entry in anybody's sailing instructions. And, come to think about it, the Xanthus (i.e. the fresh water of the Xanthus River) and Cissides were the only two fresh water sources along this entire stretch of coast. Cissides means water to the thirsty mariner. I rest my case.



⁵² William Hazlitt *The Classical Gazetteer* 1851, Guernsey (facsimile, 1995)

⁵³ Hansgard Hellenkemper & Friedrich Hild *Lykien und Pamphylien: Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 8, 2004, Vienna

⁵⁴ *Turkish Waters & Cyprus Pilot*

The origins of ancient Greek settlement in western Anatolia

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In antiquity, several Greek city-states were located on the Aegean coast of Turkey, in a region generally known as Ionia. These cities played a crucial role in ancient Greek history, in particular in the archaic period (c.800-470 BCE). During this time, the Homeric epics emerged from this region, as well as the earliest known Greek philosophy, natural science, cartography, geography, and historiography. As well as being cultural powerhouses, these cities were also thriving economic centres. They played a vital role in long-distance networks of trade and exchange, and also provided many of the migrants who settled in Greek communities as far afield as Marseille and the Black Sea. Prosperous, cultured, and cosmopolitan, these cities were major players in the ancient world – both individually as independent communities, and collectively in an alliance known as the Ionian League⁵⁵.



The wealth and prominence of these cities was such that they attracted the attention of many imperial powers over the centuries. They were first incorporated into the Lydian empire based at Sardis, and subsequently into the Achaemenid Persian Empire when it annexed Lydia in 547 BCE. During the fifth century BCE, the region oscillated between Athenian and Persian control, and individual cities often positioned themselves strategically to gain greater autonomy. The area was once again under dispute in the Hellenistic period, as both the Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires staked their claims to it; and it was on this western seaboard that the Romans first gained a foothold in Anatolia in 133 BCE. These political disputes over the territory of Ionia were accompanied by ideological wrangling over its identity. Who did the region rightfully belong to, and what was its proper place in the world order? Did it belong to the Greek sphere, or to the Near East? Was it an outpost of Europe, or simply the westernmost edge of Asia? And crucially, how did these Greek cities come to be established in Anatolia in the first place? Debates about who the Ionians were, and who they *should be*, were an essential part of the political discourse. In this context, in antiquity the history and origins of the Ionian cities were discussed not just by scholars and academics but also by politicians, generals, and demagogues. History, then as now, was inherently political.

⁵⁵ For a general overview of the Ionian cities during the archaic period, see Greaves, A.M. 2010, *The Land of Ionia*, Wiley-Blackwell. For a discussion of Ionian identity, the Ionian League, and the Ionian migration, see Mac Sweeney, N. 2013, *Foundation Myths and Politics in Ancient Ionia*, Cambridge University Press.

Amongst commentators ancient and modern, the foundation of the Ionian cities is often explained with reference to the myth known as the Ionian Migration. This story appears in several ancient texts, and tells of how the Ionian cities were founded by the sons of the Athenian king Codrus.⁵⁶ Several of these princes, it was said, fought with one another over who would succeed their father, and the disillusioned losers left Athens with their followers to found new communities in Anatolia. This migration was thought to have happened sometime in the 'Dark Age', a few generations after the end of the Trojan War. Modern scholars have assumed that the myth contains a good deal of historical truth. Although it was generally accepted that the stories acquired mythic additions and elaborations over the centuries (such as the dramatic motif of the quarrelling princes), it was suggested that at their core was an oral history based on actual events. The essential basis of the myth – a migration from Athens to Ionia – was therefore largely upheld. It was posited that this migration was likely to have occurred during what is now known as the Early Iron Age (c.1150-800 BCE), and most probably in the eleventh century as this was a particularly unstable



time following the collapse of the Mycenaean palatial system in the Aegean.⁵⁷ For many decades, archaeological evidence was cited in support of the idea of the Ionian Migration. For example, protogeometric pottery, a form of pottery thought to have originated in Athens in the Early Iron Age, has been discovered at many sites in western Anatolia. This has led scholars to suggest that the Athenian migrants must have brought this ceramic style with them when they came to settle in Anatolia.

More recent archaeological investigations, however, have called the historicity of the Ionian Migration into question. It now seems that most of the Ionian cities were inhabited long before the supposed advent of the Athenians – often as far back as the Early Bronze or even the Neolithic periods. Any new arrivals in the Early Iron Age, therefore, would have found themselves settling into long-established towns, rather than founding new communities *ex nihilo*. Furthermore, these places had a long prehistory of interaction and mutual migration with the rest of the Aegean. It seems that during the Bronze Age, Mycenaean and Minoan immigrants came to settle in Ionia while at the same time Anatolian emigrants moved to Greece. Given this background of interaction around the Aegean basin, it would be unsurprising if new migrants did come to Ionia in the Early Iron Age, and new styles and practices do indeed appear in the archaeological record at this time. It is significant, however, that these novelties seem to co-exist comfortably with older local traditions, suggesting some continuity in population and culture. One of the most notable new styles of the time was the protogeometric pottery mentioned above, and its appearance may suggest that Athenians were amongst the people who made their way to Ionia. This movement may be better characterised by trade and general mobility, however, rather than the colonial settlement described in the myths. After all, protogeometric pottery also appears at indigenous sites that were unquestionably Anatolian in nature, such as the Lydian capital Sardis, or the Phrygian capital Gordion. In addition, the archaeological record also demonstrates close connections between Early Iron Age Ionia and several other regions of the Aegean, including

⁵⁶ Versions of the story can be found in Pausanias 7.2.1-4 and Strabo 14.1.3, amongst others.

⁵⁷ For the collapses at the end of the Bronze Age and the transition into the Early Iron Age, see Bachhuber, C. and Roberts, R.G. 2009, *Forces of Transformation: The End of the Bronze Age in the Mediterranean*, Oxbow.

Euboea and the Peloponnese, as well as with areas even further afield. Any Athenians arriving in Ionia, therefore, most likely found themselves in the company of a motley group of polyethnic Greeks and indigenous Anatolians. Overall, the picture gained from the archaeological record about the origins of Greek settlement in Anatolia is complex. It suggests that different groups of immigrants arrived in Ionia from different starting points and at different times, and that this was all part of more general Aegean-wide mobility. Rather than having any single moment of foundation, the Ionian cities seem to have evolved gradually over time.

The apparent disjoint between the stories told in the literary texts and the evidence preserved in the archaeological record appears to be problematic. Why does the clarity of the foundation myths contrast so dramatically with the complexity and messiness implied by the archaeology? A re-evaluation of the myths suggests that the stories are actually far more nuanced than scholars have often thought. While some ancient authors do write about a migration from Athens, others offer alternative accounts of the cities' foundations. The lyric poet



Mimnermus, himself from the Ionian city of Colophon, wrote in the seventh century BCE that migrants had come to his city from Pylos in the Peloponnese.⁵⁸ The mythographer Conon, writing in the first century BCE, mentioned that the eponymous founder of Miletus was an indigenous Carian. In contrast, Pherecydes said that the city of Teos was first established by ethnic Minyans from Boeotia; Hellanicus claimed that Priene was founded by Thebans; and Asius wrote about an autochthonous founder of Samos. The variety of stories told is far greater than is often acknowledged.

Furthermore, there were often several different stories in contemporary circulation about each city. The founder of Chios, for example, was said by some to have been the hero Oinopion, by others to have been a local nymph, and by yet others to have been the hero Egertius. The bulk of the settlers are said to have been variously from Lesbos, from Erythrae, and from Thessaly. There is even disagreement over the origins of Oinopion himself. While some say he was Cretan, others suggest he was Athenian (according to Plutarch, *Life of Theseus*). In addition to all this, Chios was an Ionian city and some therefore claimed that it had been founded by the sons of Codrus from Athens. It seems that there was no single agreed myth of the origins of Chios. Rather, there were many myths and many stories. The ambiguity of Chian

⁵⁸ Dr MacSweeney can provide further details of sources.

origins is further complicated by the fact that some authors chose to offer several different versions of the city's foundation within the same text. Diodorus Siculus, for example, claims both that Chios was founded from Lesbos and that it was founded by the Cretan Oinopion. Hecataeus suggested both that the island was founded by an eponymous nymph representing indigenous groups, and that it was colonised by Erythraeans. Ion, a versatile poet from Chios itself, made the claim that while Chios was founded by the eponymous son of Poseidon and a local nymph, it was also continually re-founded by successive waves of new arrivals from many different regions, including Anatolian Carians as well as diverse Greek groups. According to Ion, it was only when one Chian king decided to join the Ionians that Chios itself 'became' Ionian.

Perhaps this is the key to understanding the true origins of Greek settlement in western Anatolia. Paraphrasing the words of the eminent classicist John Myres, it is perhaps less a case of the 'coming of the Greeks' to Anatolia, and more a case of the '*becoming* of the Greeks' in Anatolia.⁵⁹ From both the literary texts and the archaeological record, it appears that there was no simple start-point at which the Ionian cities came into being. The moments of their first occupation usually lie far back in prehistory, in a period long before our myths and even our archaeological evidence can satisfactorily illuminate. But the cities were formed less by these single moments of beginning, than by the course of their early histories. These early histories were characterised both by regular and ongoing movements of people around the wider Aegean and Anatolian region, and also by stability and continuity of a significant portion of the indigenous Anatolian population. It may never be possible to reconstruct the exact nature of the various population changes, constant and complex as they were. It may be possible, however, to learn something of the flexible identities of these communities. At one level, it seems that these identities were formed and re-formed over time – as Ephorus tells us of the city of Miletus, it was once a place inhabited by indigenous Leleges, and later a town founded by Cretans, and finally a fully-fledged city fortified by the Athenian prince Neileus. At another level, it seems that these multiple identities could also co-exist alongside each other at the same time. According to Pausanias, some of the Milesians themselves honoured Neileus as their founder, while others seem to have honoured an autochthonous hero, Asterius. For us modern students of antiquity, perhaps the most sensible approach to follow is that advocated by the 'Father of History' Herodotus, himself a native of one of western Anatolia's Greek cities. Herodotus, after explicitly highlighting the cultural and ethnic hybridity of the Ionian cities, acknowledged that the claims people chose to make about their identity were also of significance (and indeed perhaps even of greater significance). With a wry smile, he tells us: "since they cling to the name more than other Ionians, let it be, then, that they are indeed trueborn Ionians" (Herodotus).



⁵⁹ Myres, J.L. 1930, *Who Were the Greeks?*, University of California Press.



Some British Travellers to Ottoman Kurdistan, 1580-1921

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Part 2

2. Early British Reports of Encounters with Kurds, 1591-1700

The earliest first-hand published references to Kurds by British writers begin to appear at the end of the sixteenth century. From the 1580s, following the establishment of direct trading agreements between London and the Sublime Porte, a number of accounts began appearing from the London press recounting travels within the Ottoman Empire by merchants, diplomats and chaplains. Their occasional references to Kurds were generalizing, often misinformed, and commonly confused.

In 1591, the merchant Ralph Fitch concluded an eight-year journey that had taken him up the Tigris from Basra to Mosul and from here to “Merdin, which,” he says “is in the countrey of the Armenians; but now, there dwell in that place a people which they call Cordies, or Curdi. From Merdin I went to Orfa.”⁶⁰ Passing on to Urfa without further comment, Fitch evidently lacked interest in these ‘Curdi’ of Merdin; he was primarily seeking global markets and trade routes and had little concern for local communities that were not introduced to him for being involved directly in the circuitry of trade.



Later that decade, William Parry reported encountering those he called Kurds further south and east while travelling in 1598 from Baghdad to Qasvin. Along the way he observes that the Kurds are “a pilfering people” who were “altogether addicted to theiving, not much unlike the wilde Irish, so that as we passed through them, everynight wee didde encampe, they slily stole more or lesse from us, watcht we never so warily: else would they do little hurte.”⁶¹ Parry was accompanying Anthony Sherley, the self-appointed ambassador between the English and Safavid courts. Sherley himself, in his own *Relation* of his embassy, which was eventually published in 1613, mentions the Kurds only in passing for being among those nations brought in to re-populate Persia after the ‘inundation of Tamberlaine.’ Parry records how Shah Isma’il, “afterwards making himself the

⁶⁰ Ralph Fitch in Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations: Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1589; rpt. 8 vols. London: Dent, 1910), 5: 315.

⁶¹ William Parry, *A New and Large Discourse of the Travels of Sir Anthony Sherley* (London: Valentine Simmes for Felix Norton, 1601), 18, 17.

head of a faction against the Ottomans,” was “forced to re-people his country to give himself strength against so potent an adversary, calling in Tartars, Turcomans, Courdines [Kurds], and of all scum of nations, which though they now live in a better country, yet have not changed their bad natures.”⁶² As for Kurdistan, Parry catalogues “the parts of Persia, that in times past were distinct kingdomes,” naming an undefined region ‘Curdistan’ without further comment about its territorial reach and borders.⁶³ George Manwaring, another member of Sherley’s embassy, whose travel diary of this journey would not be published until the nineteenth century, reports arriving in a region he calls “Curdia,” calling it “a very thievish and brutish country.” Of the Kurdish people he writes:

They have no houses, but live in tents and caves; they till their corn twice a year, and remove from place to place with their tents; they ride commonly upon cows and bulls, and keep their abiding, for the most part, by a little river called Hadro;⁶⁴ their apparel is very coarse, for they wear only a shirt, and over that a rough felt coat, and on their heads a clout tied: they would come into our company sometimes forty, sometimes more or less; and, except we did look well unto them, they would filch and steal anything they could lay their hands upon.⁶⁵

In these first encounters during the final years of the sixteenth century, the Kurds are occasional and minor figures, an unspecified tribe, or, at best, nomadic herdsmen living in tents among their animals, serving as background figures, shapes in the landscape. The accusation of being a people inclined to thievery would reappear.

One of the earliest uses of the term ‘Kurdistan’ in English was not by a British traveller but by Abraham Hartwell in his 1603 translation of an influential Italian history, *The Ottoman of Lazaro Soranzo*. Here we find the following:

The Turke is also wont sometimes to invite the *Curdians* or *Gurdians* to his warres: who are *Mahometanes*, and live like Freeman, and are verie couragious. They dwell in the region of *Bagadat*, and in that part thereof, which now is called *Curdistan*, that is to say, *Chaldea*, named by the Arabians *Keldan*. Some are of opinion, that they may one day do great hurt to the Turkish Empire. Some thinke the same also of the *Drusians*, who are souldiours by profession, and dwell in the Mountayne *Libanus*: as also of the *Arabian Bandoliers*, who are Lordes and Masisters of the Champeine, as sometimes our *Fuorusciti* or outlawes are wont to be among us. But in trueth I do doubt, that the Majestie and State of that Empire shall have small cause to feare either the first, who do inhabite but a small countrey, or the second, who are but some few Mountaine people.⁶⁶

⁶² Anthony Sherley, *His Relation of his Travels into Persia* (1613) in E. Denison Ross, ed., *Sir Anthony Sherley and His Persian Adventure* (1933; rpt. London: Routledge, 2005), Appendix I, 229-236; this passage 231.

⁶³ Parry, *New and Large Discourse*, 26.

⁶⁴ William Ainsworth later describes travelling along the Euphrates from ‘the village of Masro, tenanted by a small congregation of Syrians’ and then: ‘Passing Hadro, with groves and gardens, we came after three hours from Masro, to the river of Zengibar, or of Negroes, in a limestone ravine.’ See *Travels and Researchs in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia*, 2 vols. (London: John Parker, 1842), 1: 282.

⁶⁵ George Manwaring, *A True Discourse of Sir Anthony Sherley’s Travel into Persia*, in Ross, ed., *Sir Anthony Sherley*, 175-226; this passage, 196.

⁶⁶ Lazaro Soranzo, *The Ottoman of Lazaro Soranzo*, trans. Abraham Hartwell the Younger (London: John Windet, 1603), 25-6. An earlier but unpublished translation by Hugh Conisby reads: ‘Sometimes the Turke hath entertained the Curdi, a stoute people; which live freely; & are Mahometanes. Their dwelling is neere Babilon in Caldea, now Curdistan. Some are of Opinion, that these may hereafter do great damage to the Turkish

Here, Kurdistan is a 'small countrey' restricted to the upper Tigris, 'in the region of *Bagadat*,' an area south of that described by those who travelled with Sherley. In this account, though, it is the Arabs who are branded as thieves, while the Kurds are recognised to be a people offering little threat to the powerful Ottoman state. British travellers were, however, starting to record encounters with Kurds that were taking place much further west.

Although not published until 1611, John Cartwright's *The Preacher's Travels* recounts journeys in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire made between 1600 and 1601. Cartwright was not, in fact, any kind of preacher, but he does provide what is perhaps the earliest account of personally and directly encountering those he calls Kurds. After three days travelling south-east from Diyarbekir (which he calls 'Cara-emit'), Cartwright reports crossing the Tigris (which he calls the Euphrates):

We were no sooner over, but forthwith wee were incountred with a certaine troupe of people called the *Curdies*, which some thinke to be a remnant of the ancient *Parthians*, who so much annoied the *Romans* with their bowes and arrowes... This rude people are of a goodly stature, and well proportioned, and doe never go abroad without their armes, as bowes and arrowes, Scimitarre and buckler, yea and at such time, when a man for age is ready to goe down to his grave.⁶⁷

No longer simply nomadic figures adding human interest to a landscape, the Kurds in Cartwright's report physically occupy the immediate foreground as they rise up before the reader, an armed 'troop' of ancient pedigree currently commanding the eastern shores of the Tigris. For him they represent at once a body type and a model of manliness in its most virile form, a martial pride that endures into old age. This sounds like genuine, personal observation. But for all his eye-witnessing, Cartwright may have been prone to believing everything he was told, and continues:

They doe adore and worship the Divell, to the end he may not hurt them or their cattell, and very cruell are they to all sorts of Christians; in which regard, the Country which they inhabite is, at this day termed *Terra Diaboli*, the land of the Divell.

Here, east of the Tigris, Cartwright appears to have met up with some Yezidis, and for some reason believed them to represent Kurds in general. We will never know how Cartwright came by his information and this misunderstanding: did those men he met by the river somehow tell him they were Yezidi Kurds? Or was he relying on other local informants? What led him to believe that they 'worship the Divell?' At the same time, Cartwright was clearly given some reliable understanding of the general situation of the Kurds under the Ottomans, since he notes that:

Empire: The like do they hould of the Druses, which are soldiers & inhabitantes of the mounte Libanus. & of the cutthroate Arabians. But sure the greatnes of that State, hath small cause to stande in feare, of the first, which are Inhabitantes of a small region: Nor of the seconde, which are but a few Mountaynes; nor of the thirde, which are a sorte of confused Theeves.' British Library MS Cotton Nero B.xi. ff.1-16 f. 10a-b.

⁶⁷ John Cartwright, *The Preacher's Travels* (London: Thomas Thorppe, 1611), 20-21.

They live under the commandement of the great Turke, but with much freedome and liberty; For *Solymus* the second having a great multitude of them in his army against the Persians, they did him little service, performing no more than what well pleased themselves.⁶⁸

Cartwright was somehow made aware of the Kurds' historical and traditional independence, but he would not be alone in his notion that Kurds were all Yezidis, and that Yezidis worship the devil. These confusions would persist for centuries.⁶⁹

Two years after Cartwright's journey, the Protestant chaplain in Aleppo, William Biddulph also reports encountering some he believed to be Yezidis and, like Cartwright, assumed they worshipped the devil and represented Kurds at large. Travelling east from Diyarbekir, Cartwright was very likely to have come upon Yezidis, but Biddulph reports encountering those he calls 'Coords' much further south and west:

In the Mountaines betwixt *Scanderone* and *Aleppo*, there are dwelling a certaine kind of people called at this day *Coords*, comming of the race of the ancient *Parthians*, who worship the Devill, and allege for their reason in so doing, that God is a good man, and will doe no man harme, but that the Devill is bad, and must be pleased lest he hurt them.

He further noted that 'there was one of our Carriers ... named *Abdell Phat*, who was said to be of that Race and Religion.'⁷⁰ Employed as a carrier, Abdell Phat, the first 'Coord' to be mentioned by name by a British writer, was clearly not considered a thief, suggesting how Kurdish thievery was often no more than a citational accusation, a rumour repeated by travellers and writers and applied with little discrimination. And there is reason to wonder just how accurate and reliable Biddulph's local informants really were: how did he know that Abdell Phat was a Yezidi? And what inclined him to believe that all Kurds were Yezidis and that they worshipped the 'Devill'? Cartwright and Biddulph were not alone in being confused over these matters.

In 1632, twenty-three years after Biddulph's *Travels* first appeared in print, the Scottish traveller William Lithgow reissued his account of travelling in Ottoman lands – first published in 1614 – with supplemental sections, including an additional report of his journey between Iskenderun and Aleppo. It reinforces this sense of confusion, of faulty information and memory, of strange beliefs passed on among British travellers about the peoples they were meeting, and suggests incomplete understanding and unreliable local informants:

In all this way ... I saw nothing worthy remarking; save onely a few scattered Villages, and poore miserable people called Turcomani, living in Tents, and following their flockes to whom I payed sundry Caffars... They differ also in Religion from all the other Mahometans in two damnable points: The one is, they acknowledge, that there is a God, and that he of him selfe is so gracious, that he neither can, being essentially good doe harme, nor yet will authorize any ill to be done, and therefore more to be loved than feared: The other is, they confesse there is a Divell, and that he is a tormentor of all evill doers: and of himselfe so terrible and wicked, that they are contented even

⁶⁸ Cartwright, *Preacher's Travels*, 21.

⁶⁹ See Christine Allison, "Unbelievable Slowness of Mind," *Yezidi Studies*, from Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, *Journal of Kurdish Studies*, 6 (2008), 1-23.

⁷⁰ William Biddulph, *The Travels of certaine Englishmen into Africa, Asia, Troy, Bithnia, Thracia, and to the Blacke Sea* (London: Thomas Haveland for William Aspley, 1609), 41.

for acquisting his favour and kindnesse, to sacrifice in fire their first borne child to him: soliciting his divellishnes, not to torment them too sore.⁷¹

Travelling east to Aleppo, where Biddulph claims to have encountered devil-worshipping 'Coords,' Lithgow recalls encountering devil-worshipping Turcoman nomads who practise human sacrifice.

Clearly early British travellers were reporting unreliable memories of things they were told, probably by unreliable informants, and perhaps in some cases with a tendency to sensationalize. None of the travellers I have mentioned indicates sources for this kind of local information about people and places they visit; nor do they indicate what languages were used when learning about 'Coords.' But devil-worship makes a good and memorable story of just the sort that local informants employed by foreign travellers might well have enjoyed mis-communicating to astonish and entertain their guests. And it is just the sort of anecdotal report that could be embellished by travel writers in order to entertain readers.

Anyone in mid-seventeenth century Britain seeking information about the Kurds from published accounts by travel writers would have a difficult time making reliable sense of the various and conflicting reports and would come away with very little by way of reliable information. The Kurds were evidently not Turks, Arabs, or Greeks but a martial people who, though subject to the Ottoman sultan, ranged with considerable autonomy throughout the empire from the eastern Mediterranean to the upper Tigris valley and east into the Safavid Empire. In the mountains between the upper Tigris and the Caspian Sea, Kurds appeared in the form of nomadic herdsman with an inclination to pilfer from travellers. From Iskenderun to the Tigris, Kurds were confused with Yezidis, but deemed employable and not accounted thievish. Clearly, these earlier travellers had only the vaguest understanding of who the Kurds were, and where Kurdistan could be found.

Books published in English about Kurds and Kurdistan during the second half of the seventeenth century did little to dispel the geographical uncertainty or to displace the figure of the devil-worshipping Yezidi – itself a confusion as even Biddulph recognized – from haunting the representation of the Kurds. These decades were, however, marked by two developments in writing about the Kurds: the appearance of Paul Rycaut's *Present State of the Ottoman Empire* in 1667, and the translation of works by French travellers whose journeys to Persia took them through Kurdistan: the translations deserve separate study in this context.⁷²

Paul Rycaut's *Present State of the Ottoman Empire* was the first comprehensive account of the Ottoman polity written by an Englishman with experience and access to reasonably reliable sources, and would become the standard European

⁷¹ William Lithgow, *The Totall Discourse of The Rare Adventures* (1632; rpt. Glasgow: MacLehose, 1906), 176.

⁷² Judging from their reprint history, the following proved notably popular: Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *The Six Voyages of John Baptista Tavernier* (London: Godbid, 1677; 2nd ed. 1678), and *A Collection of Several Relations...* (London: Godbid and Playford, 1684); John Chardin, *The Travels of Sir John Chardin ...* (London: Moss Pitt, 1686); Jean de Thevenot, *The Travels of Monsieur de Thevenot ...* (London: John Taylor, 1687).

history of the Ottomans for generations.⁷³ Rycaut's account added some factual and presumably accurate details concerning Ottoman relations with the Kurdish tribes in the administrative region of Diyarbekir, emphasizing their relative autonomy within the Ottoman domains:

Diarbekir, otherwise Mesopotamia, have a Revenue of a Million two hundred thousand and 660 Aspers, and hath under its jurisdiction 19 Sangiacks, with five other Governments called Hukinmet in Turkish, eleven of which Sangiacks are properly belonging to the Ottoman Royalties, and eight are Curdian Counties, or of the people called Kurts; for when Curdia was conquered, the country was divided, and distinguished into the nature of Sangiacks, but with this difference of right inheritance and succession to the Goods and Possessions of their Parents, and succeed as Lords of Mannors, or to other petty Governments by Blood and Kindred. And as other Lords of Sangiacks, Timariots, or Barons pay the Grand Signiors duties, and hold their Land in Knights service, or other tenure whereby they are obliged to attend and follow their Commanders to the Wars, whensoever they are called thereunto by the Grand Signiors summons: these that are registred for Hukinmet have no Timariots or Lords to command them, but are free from all Duties and Impositions, and are absolute Masters of their own Lands and Estates ... Those Sangiacks which are entailed upon Families are Sagman, Kulab, Mechrani, Tergil, Atak, Pertek, Tchisakichur, Tchirmek.⁷⁴

For Rycaut, the Kurds appear as an intriguing administrative anomaly in the imperial political order. They were all subjects of the sultan – who was still regularly portrayed as an absolute monarch – but many of the great Kurdish families enjoyed degrees of relative autonomy. Rycaut emphasized how the Kurds were unlike other Ottoman subjects, enjoying ‘right inheritance and succession ... by Blood and Kindred,’ and that some were not only free from taxation but also held ‘absolute’ dynastic mastery over ‘their own Lands and Estates.’ Although he notes here that some Kurdish families are bound to provide military service to the sultan, when later tabulating the strength of the Ottoman army from figures that he claims were ‘extracted out of the Imperial Rolls, and Registers of the Grand Signior,’ he announces he has omitted ‘*Kiurdistan*,’ [sic] from his tally of ‘1800 men’ from ‘the Government of Diarbekir,’ but provides no reason.⁷⁵ Unlike earlier writers, he offers no comments on the fighting abilities of Kurdish men.

Rycaut returned to the anomalous status of the Kurds, emphasizing their general exceptionality within the Ottoman polity which, he explained, aspired to be based on meritocratic rather than hereditary principles: ‘There are notwithstanding some *Pashaws* of petty Governments, who have obtained to themselves, through some ancient grace and priviledge from the *Sultan*, an hereditary succession in the Government, and as I can learn, those are only the *Pashaws* of *Gaza*, *Cordistan*, and three *Sangiacks* formerly mentioned under the *Pashaw* of *Damascus* and *Matic*, and *Turcman* under the *Pashaw* of *Aleppo*.⁷⁶ Although I am not sure where those ‘Sangiacks’ would be in today’s Syria, it seems to me that Rycaut’s

⁷³ See Sonia Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) remains the best introduction to this important figure.

⁷⁴ Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, 3rd edition (London: John Starkey, 1670), 52.

⁷⁵ Rycaut, *Present State*, 176.

⁷⁶ Rycaut, *Present State*, 70.

mapping of Ottoman exceptionality has unmistakable resonance with contemporary and distinctly post-Ottoman crises.

One final English source from the seventeenth-century worth noticing is an unpublished manuscript in the British Library reporting a visit to the Yezidis in the winter of 1679-80 by one 'Mr Edward Dunch.' Here the Yezidi are called a 'sect' and are not associated with Kurds. Dunch does not record where the meeting took place, but does report a remarkable conversation with the 'Izedee' priests that is of interest here:

They told us, that they were Christians, and detested Mahomet, but the Turks were strong and they durst not declare themselves ... Mr. Frampton, once minister to the English in Aleppo, had been among these people formerly and christened four of their children, as I have been told; though little religion is to be found with them. They esteeme any creature, that is blacke; and worship the devill, that he may doe them no hurt.⁷⁷

Frampton served between 1655 and 1666, so evidently there were British expatriates who already understood very clearly that Yezidis were not necessarily the same as Kurds, while the notion that they were actually Christians is one that will continue to resurface centuries later in writers who confuse Kurds and Nestorians.⁷⁸ Certainly by the nineteenth century the notion that all Kurds were Yezidis had been fully unravelled by the time of Layard's *Nineveh and its Remains* (1849) and his account of the Yezidis; thereafter British interest in this and other exotic religious cults that were surviving among the ancient monuments largely eclipsed interest in the question of Kurds as a people even as more travellers acknowledged they were journeying in a land called Kurdistan.⁷⁹

So by the end of the seventeenth century, early published accounts of the Kurds by British visitors were few, short, often confused and confusing, liable to repeat hearsay, and sometimes rather uncertain about where Kurdistan was. In some ways, this condition would change but little over the next two centuries. More accounts by British travellers recording encounters with Kurds appeared, many of them notable, but Rupert Hay was surely typical of the educated middle-class Englishmen and women of his generation in having only vague and unclear notions about these 'wildest of brigands.' So it may not be so very surprising that, in 1921, when Rupert Hay set out to establish his credentials for writing about

⁷⁷ See Gerald MacLean, *The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580-1720* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 233.

⁷⁸ Professor Christine Allison observes: 'I don't know what we mean by 'Kurd' at this time; Yezidis speak Kurdish and lead a very similar life to their Kurdish Muslim neighbours; I think it is very likely that all these Anatolian Kurdish speakers would refer to themselves as 'Kurmanj' – this is certainly what we see in the nineteenth century, before the idea of 'the Kurdish nation' took hold. I also think that they sometimes claimed to be Christians, but would not necessarily see baptism and conversion as a reason to stop being Yezidis, if there was something to be gained from it...'; personal communication 29 July 2014.

⁷⁹ Following Layard's account, the Yezidis came to be of considerable interest to generations of subsequent English travellers. For reports of visits to the Yezidi temple near Mosul, see Wigram and Wigram, *Cradle of Mankind*, Lady Drower (Ethel Stefana Stevens), *By Tigris and Euphrates* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1923), *Peacock Angel* (London: Murray, 1941), and the scholarly account by C. J. Edmonds, *A Pilgrimage to Lalish* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1967), who comments on how 'the Yazidis and the problems of their origins and their beliefs have given rise to a considerable literature,' 3. See also Frederick Forbes, 'A Visit to the Sinjar Hills in 1838, with some account of the Sect of Yezidis and of various places in the Mesopotamian Desert, between the Rivers Tigris and Khabur,' *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 9 (1839): 409-30.

'remote parts' of unknown lands, he uncannily identifies himself with these earliest British travellers to Ottoman Kurdistan. 'During recent generations,' he laments:

to comparatively few has come the chance of exploring unmapped wilds and living on terms of close intimacy with strange and unrecorded tribes. Despite the attractions and influence of modern life many of us in England still feel the promptings of the Elizabethan spirit – the call of the uncharted sea, the fascination of what is new and mysterious.⁸⁰

Hay did not need to have read Parry, Cartwright, Biddulph, Lithgow or Rycout to see himself in their place, setting off far from home to chart the 'new and mysterious' regions of the world while living among 'strange and unrecorded tribes.' His education in being English had produced this almost instinctive sense of feeling that he was returning to the former golden times of Elizabeth when England opened out to the world, and the markets and culture of the Ottoman world were opening up to England.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II:



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a case of changing historical perception in Turkey⁸¹

Irrespective of how people describe their interests in the study of history, it matters. Constant debates surrounding historical issues and years-old controversies still resonate with people today. This is true in the case of Turkey's view of its Ottoman past where no historical figure is more controversial or generates more debate than the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II.

⁸⁰ William Rupert Hay, *Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer, 1918-1920* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1921), 1.

⁸¹ An earlier version of this paper featured in the 'Seminars on Turkey' series at SOAS (Modern Turkish Studies Programme) in 2013.

Ottoman history is still the main stage on which rhetorical devices of a past are used by thinkers, activists and politicians when depicting matters to do with faith, identity and political activity. As Turkish society has become more polarized, opinions of the Ottoman Empire – especially of Sultan Abdul Hamid II – have also become victims of the greater political narrative where one side sees the Sultan as an enduring icon of a great Ottoman and Islamic past, while the other continues to present him as an authoritarian despot. The question to be asked is whether these perceptions have changed in current academic endeavours to place Sultan Abdul Hamid within academic discourse rather than falling victim to current social and political trends. The aim of this paper is to argue how historiography has impacted the perception of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and how the sources, which serve as a basis for a subconscious opinion, have been used to depict him.

In the West the description of Abdul Hamid as ‘Red Sultan’ emerged in response to Britain’s relations with the Ottoman Empire. Internal British politics created a discourse where a struggle between Benjamin Disraeli and W E Gladstone regarding Britain’s hardening attitude to the Ottoman Empire took centre stage within the British Parliament⁸². However, the consolidation of the expression the ‘Red Sultan’ in Western minds was mostly in reaction to the atrocities faced by the Armenian subjects in eastern Anatolia in 1894-1896. The Sultan had been accused of delaying the reform project for the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, a commitment agreed upon in Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty of 1878. During the Hamidian era the sensitive subject regarding the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire led to much debate within the European corridors of power as international pressure intensified on the Sultan. In order to bring their plight to the attention of the Western world, the Armenians within the Ottoman domains created associations and then began to organize demonstrations, attacks and then revolts. The reaction of the state was swift and forceful, particularly in relation to the revolts. The response to the events in the European press was dramatic. Ottoman measures against the Armenians, boosted by the fervour provoked by the British press, created a public opinion in Britain strongly critical of the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone, in his challenge to the leader of the opposition, Robert Cecil, cited Abdul Hamid as an issue worthy of concern in relation to British policy. Continuously in his address to parliament in both 1896 and 1897 he referred to the Sultan as a “great assassin”⁸³.

During the 1890s when opposition rhetoric against Abdul Hamid reached its zenith a clandestine umbrella oppositional movement under the name the ‘Young Turks’ began to oppose the Sultan and to adopt derogatory terms from the West such as *müstebit* (tyrant)⁸⁴. The Young Turk opposition further developed its ideas in Europe, and outside the Ottoman domains projected rhetoric similar to that in the Western press. The antipathy against the Sultan and his policies among the imperial powers of the West provided an opening for the Young Turks who succeeded in launching a hostile propaganda campaign against the Sultan and his agents.

Journals and newspapers published within the Ottoman domains were under extensive official scrutiny and pressure. State censors continuously investigated newspaper publishing houses and eliminated any news perceived to be critical of the

⁸² Michael Partridge, *Gladstone*, Routledge, London 2003, p 235.

⁸³ *The New York Times*, ‘Gladstone on the Great Assassin’, 7 January 1897, p 3.

⁸⁴ Ahmed Emin, *Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1914, p 60.

Sultan or the ideology of the regime – though the portrayal of Abdul Hamid in the mainstream Ottoman press was of a “great sultan”⁸⁵. In order to achieve their objective the Young Turks continued to publish images, caricatures and articles in newspapers such as *Le Yıldız* attacking the Sultan and his policies⁸⁶.

The Sultan was now prone to intellectual attack by the Western powers, the Western press and the organs of the Young Turks in Europe – and Armenian opposition also continued to gain further traction. The Armenian journal *Pro Armenia*, published in Paris at the beginning of the twentieth century, went on to use the common derogatory descriptions of the Sultan from Gladstone’s “great assassin” to Sir William Watson’s “Abdul the Damned”⁸⁷. Along with increasing Armenian hostility towards the Sultan, Young Turk publications (mainly published in Geneva) used terms such as *uğursuz* (The Ominous), *pinti Hamid* (Miser Hamid), *katil-i ekber* (Great Assassin) and *cani-i azam* (Great Homicide)⁸⁸.

In view of the evident restrictions, it would be easy to assume that objective representation was absent in the non-official press. However, it was possible to find articles on occasion with a more balanced disposition such as the New Zealand newspaper *Otago Witness* which, in 1907, depicted the Sultan as a ‘many sided monarch’⁸⁹. Thus was the Sultan presented as more complicated and multi-layered than he appeared from the simplistic paradigms often presented by the opposition. Similar views of objectivity can also be found in books on the Sultan. The book *Sa Majesté Imperiale Abd-ul-Hamid Khan II Sultan, Reformateur et Reorganisateur de l'Empire Ottoman* by N Nicolaidis, is positive about the Sultan’s reign, reforms and rule⁹⁰. It gives sufficient data on Ottoman institutions to support the claim that Abdul Hamid was a dedicated Sultan. Meanwhile Paul De Regla’s earlier *Les Secrets d’Yildiz* exemplified the negative perceptions of the Ottoman Sultan appearing in Western fiction⁹¹.

After his dethronement in 1909, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was presented as the reason for all the evils within the Empire, although pressure on both the oppositional press and Western media to be negative declined. In 1908 the Sultan was forced to re-institute the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and to change from authoritarian to constitutional rule. From that moment onwards for some nine months both in the Turkish and foreign press there was little opposition towards the Sultan⁹². However this amnesty wasn’t to last long as events leading to the 31st March incident⁹³ brought outwardly Islamic pressure for return to the *status quo ante*. Members of the clandestine Committee of Union and Progress were hounded by masses gathered in the imperial capital. But such ‘counter revolution’ attempts were swiftly crushed with much blame aimed at Abdul Hamid who nevertheless was removed from power as a

⁸⁵ *Servet*, 1 September 1902, *İkdam*, 31 August, 1897.

⁸⁶ *Le Yıldız*, 1 January, 1892.

⁸⁷ William Watson, ‘*To the Sultan*’, *The Poems of William Watson, Part Two*, Cambridge 1905, p 59.

⁸⁸ Muammer Göçmen, *İsviçre’de Jön Türk Basını ve Türk Siyasal Hayatına Etkileri*, Kitabevi, Istanbul 1995, pp 171-173.

⁸⁹ *OtagoWitness*, ‘Abdul the Versatile’, 27 July 1907, p 80.

⁹⁰ N. Nicolaidis, *Sa Majesté Imperiale Abd-ul-Hamid Khan II Sultan, Reformateur et Reorganisateur de l'Empire Ottoman*, Imprimerie Th Dewarichet, Brussels 1907.

⁹¹ Paul De Regla, *Les Secrets d’Yildiz*, Pierre A Desjardin, Paris 1897.

⁹² Nevertheless in some newspapers (e.g. *Serbesti*) the reign of Abdul Hamid II before the second constitution period is depicted as ‘tyranny’.

⁹³ The events took place on April 13 1909 but, due to the use of the Rumi calendar in the Ottoman Empire at the time, it is also known as the 31st March incident.

'tyrant, despot and red sultan'. The Sultan's rapid fall from grace found almost no faction willing to defend him, as only rare accounts of 'objectivity' can be found such as Edward Knight's reference to the Sultan as an "excellent monarch of the despotic Oriental type"⁹⁴. By 1914 anti-Hamidian literature such as Ahmed Emin (Yalman) Bey's Ph.D thesis attempted to search for a scapegoat for the ills of the Ottoman Empire and pointed to the Sultan. "When the veil, imposed by a despotic government was removed", he observed, "a sad picture revealed itself. It was a picture of chaos, of degeneracy, of disintegration"⁹⁵.

During the first decades after the removal of Abdul Hamid II an increasing number of memoirs were published. Some were by Young Turks and others were by Ottoman statesmen close to the Sultan – such as the Sheik-ul-Islam under Abdul Hamid – Cemaleddin Efendi – who published his account in 1920⁹⁶. Senior Ottoman military officer Tahsin Pasha's memoirs (1934) attempted to dispel the host of rumours and urban legends concerning the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II – especially regarding news on the spy network and denunciation.⁹⁷ However, as so often is the case, most memoirs of this period were written to absolve the writer from any accountability.

The period of opposition during the latter part of Hamidian rule was also a time when the use of print media was high, thus facilitating propaganda about the ills of Hamidian rule. But the information is neither reflective of the whole period nor without bias regarding the Sultan. Whereas anti-Hamidian propaganda was decreasing during the Second Constitutional period, Abdul Hamid was once again chastised as a negative figure but this time by new writers and thinkers who supported either the new Turkish Republican regime or the popular 'modernization theory'.

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey a new historical approach appeared which attempted to view Turkish history as part of a greater Turkic narrative. The first books prepared by a committee, under the supervision of the first Turkish President Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), attempted to pay equal importance to the Ottoman Empire and the old Turkish Empires. Some publications omitted Sultan Abdul Hamid II or his reign, almost in an attempt to ignore his contribution. Others chose to continue to see his time as a reign of tyranny⁹⁸. Even after the 1940s in some books, the Tanzimat period is seen as the basis of Turkish modernity, but Abdul Hamid's reign was presented as an exception – a departure – and often totally ignored. The official historiography regarding the Sultan continued to be viewed as a one-sided affair, as an image of despotism, which went virtually unchallenged. In general there was no separate treatment of the Hamidian era in Turkish textbooks even though the Sultan's reign was longer than that of his Tanzimat predecessors.

In 1962 Robert Devereux wrote an extensively researched book on the First Ottoman Constitution. The Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha was presented as the driving factor regarding the promulgation of the First Ottoman constitution, and Abdul Hamid continued to be viewed as an obstacle to Ottoman political reform and revival. The

⁹⁴ Edward F. Knight, *The Awakening of Turkey, A History of the Turkish Revolution*, J B Lippincott, London 1909, p 39.

⁹⁵ Ahmed Emin, *Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*, Columbia University Press, New York 1914, p 15.

⁹⁶ Cemaleddin Efendi, *Siyasi Hatıralarım*, (Çeviren: Selim Kutsan), Nehir Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005.

⁹⁷ *Tahsin Paşanın Yıldız Hatıraları*, Boğaziçi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996.

⁹⁸ Mustafa Demir, Serkan Yazıcı, 'Atatürk ve Türk Tarihçiliği', *Cumhuriyetimizin 81. Yılına Armağan*, Sakarya Üniversitesi Yayınları, Sakarya 2004, pp 217-225.

book for the first time provided details of the Ottoman parliament and constitutional processes. It should have provided clues to the Hamidian governmental mechanisms but it focused on Hamidian despotism instead.⁹⁹ This was during the same time in which Bernard Lewis had published *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* in which he saw the creation of the Turkish Republic as a natural conclusion to the failed and declining Ottoman Empire and the Hamidian period as one of 'Despotism and Enlightenment'.¹⁰⁰



In Turkey in 1962, however, Enver Ziya Karal, a prominent professor of Turkish history, pointed to the error in laying all blame for the problems in the Hamidian era on the personality of the Sultan and instead suggested that this period was one of 'istibdat devri' (era of pressure)¹⁰¹. Meanwhile Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, in his book titled *Ulu Hakan*, chose to select the positive qualities of the Sultan and to counter negative perceptions of him in order to reclaim the Sultan from the common methodology and narrative of study at the time. Popular works by Fazıl made Sultan Abdul Hamid II into a spiritual hero among conservative circles especially due to the Sultan's Caliphate policies¹⁰²!

By the 1970s Orhan Koloğlu, using the social sciences, also attempted to expel the urban legends surrounding the studies of the Sultan that indicated that there was a "prohibition of using specific words". Earlier historians and writers had suggested that the use of words such as "nose, Yıldız, Mithat, Murad" was forbidden but Koloğlu showed that they could be found in journals such as *Takvim-i Vakayi* and the state annuals¹⁰³.

It was not until the seminal Ph.D thesis of Engin Deniz Akarlı that a brighter approach took into consideration 'the problems of external pressures, power struggles, and budgetary deficits' during the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. This was the first work of its kind to contain a lot of referenced material from the Yıldız archives revealing the complexities of the Hamidian reign that had so often been explained in simplistic terms¹⁰⁴. The new perspective provided by Akarlı also included his introduction of other actors, thus presenting a governmental narrative not simply restricted to the person of Sultan Abdul Hamid II but also providing a narrative that showed many continuities from the Tanzimat period. Mustafa Armağan's books between 1996 and 1999 also addressed the alternative viewpoint of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Although his works were less academic in nature, Armağan managed to popularize Sultan Abdul Hamid II as a pious and worthy sultan¹⁰⁵. Indeed, by the 2000s, scholars felt obliged to reassess the Hamidian period and to compensate for the often one-sided narrative about the Sultan. The increase in Muslim sentiment in

⁹⁹ Devereux, Robert, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962

¹⁰⁰ Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford UP, 1961

¹⁰¹ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Cilt: IV*, Ankara 1962, pp 562, 576-577.

¹⁰² Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Ulu Hakan II. Abdülhamit Han*, İstanbul 1965, pp 6-8.

¹⁰³ Koloğlu, Orhan, 2007, pp 441-444. The total prohibition of these words and the attempt to delete them from dictionaries also doesn't seem to have been possible.

¹⁰⁴ Bkz. Akarlı, *The Problems of External Pressures*, 1976, p 67

¹⁰⁵ Mustafa Armağan, *Abdulhamit'in Kurtlarla Dansı, Abdülhamit'in Derin Devleti, Abdülhamit ve Afrodit Kızıl Sultan'ın Aşkı*, 2011-2012.

Turkey brought a new and more positive discourse on Sultan Abdul Hamid II. A different take on the Hamidian rule was the contribution of Selim Deringil who attempted to portray the Sultan's policies within the prism of Islamic 'symbolism' in which the extensive use of Islamic 'symbols' during the Hamidian era was suggested to be based on pragmatic policies.¹⁰⁶ Kemal Karpat presented the policies of the Hamidian period based on global Islamic political solidarity in reaction to Western intellectual and political superiority.¹⁰⁷

Contemporary Ottoman historians such as Ismail Kara¹⁰⁸ and Şükrü Haniöğlu¹⁰⁹ have attempted to recognize the Islamic nature of the Hamidian reign but have stopped short of praising the Islamic policies of the Hamidian period as a progressive moment in the late Ottoman period. Both Kara and Haniöğlu provide extensive empirical evidence on the character of the Hamidian period, placing special emphasis on the Young Turks and intellectuals at the time. Meanwhile works by Benjamin Fortna¹¹⁰ and Selçuk Akşin Somel¹¹¹ have offered in-depth study of the educational system of the Hamidian period. These more recent contributions have presented new scholarly opinion on Sultan Abdul Hamid and the merits of his rule, state, religious policy – and his personality. Gökhan Çetinsaya's contribution to Hamidian Iraq¹¹² and Azmi Özcan's¹¹³ study of Indian and Hamidian relations have also shown the Hamidian state to be far more progressive than often presented. Both in its internal and external policies the Hamidian regime was in many ways a continuation of the Tanzimat period. Scholars such as Abdülhamit Kırmızı have now started to explore the provincial systems of Anatolia and the Balkans, providing in-depth information on Ottoman political thought about authoritarianism and constitutionalism during the Hamidian regime from the perspective of Ottoman governors.¹¹⁴

The perception of Sultan Abdul Hamid II has only gradually started to change in the last 20 years or so for two main reasons. The first has been an increase in Islamic sentiment within Turkey and the Muslim world. The second has been an academic review of old assumptions about the character of Abdul Hamid and his reign. Historians have attempted to provide a more reflective framework by studying a host of aspects of Abdul Hamid's reign – his educational policies, budget deficits, pressure by Western powers, minority groups and the function of the provincial administration, to name a few. Such historians have found that there is indeed a need to revise the manner in which the Hamidian period is portrayed.

¹⁰⁶ Deringil, Selim, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London, I B Tauris, 1998

¹⁰⁷ Karpat, Kemal, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002

¹⁰⁸ Kara, Ismail, *Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler*, İstanbul, Kitabevi, 1997

¹⁰⁹ Haniöğlu, M. Şükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008

¹¹⁰ Fortna, Benjamin C. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002

¹¹¹ Somel, Selçuk Akşin, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline*, Leiden; Boston, Brill, 2001

¹¹² Çetinsaya, Gökhan, *Ottoman administration of Iraq, 1890-1908*, New York, NY, Routledge, 2005

¹¹³ Özcan, Azmi, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*, Leiden; New York, Brill, 1997

¹¹⁴ Kırmızı, Abdülhamit, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet idaresi: 1895-1908*, İstanbul, Klasik, 2007

Poetry

Gülay Yurdal Michaçlıs

Poet and Translator

Pronectus-Karamürsel'de Yaşayan Kardeşim için

Bir kent eski isimlerini unutmamalı
Yenisi doğsa da tümüyle
Yoksa doğuşturduğu kimlikler
Yaşamaz evlerinde açıkça konuşa
konuşa.

Orası giderdiğin yalnızlık
Çoğalttığımız acılarla kalmazdık başbaşa
Uzgöreçle uzduyaçla Morfeus'a
Yakardık dursun diye güneş yerinde
Kuş besleseydik hiç olmazsa
Gri göklere yaslanarak
Yaşlanarak ağlaya ağlaya duyulmadan.

For My Brother Whose Grave is in Pronectus-

A city should not forget its old names
Even if a new one is wholly born
If not the identities it bears
Won't live in its houses by talking openly.

That's where you removed loneliness
We would not have been left alone with
aches we multiplied
To Morpheus by telephone or television
We prayed that the sun would stay
We could have at least kept a bird-
Leaning against grey skies
Leaning, our crying, unheard.



The Philately of Post-Ottoman 'Arabia'

by **Abed Najjar**
Philatelic Specialist¹¹⁵

The study of stamps, which can be looked upon as the preservation of historical events, has provided philatelic researchers and collectors not only with a means to portray the history of a region but is also an illustrative tool to help clarify those events. This article aims to provide a brief overview of how the philately of 'Turkish Arabia' has recorded the important historical developments in the years after the end of Ottoman rule. 'Arabia' for the purposes of this article consisted of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

¹¹⁵ Author of *The Postal History of Jordan 1400-1959*, Sahara Publications Limited, 2006, 240 pages, ISBN 19030220906 and a number of other publications on specialist philately.

The Ottoman Empire divided 'Arabia' into the different *Vilayets* or *Mutasarrifates* which were essentially administrative divisions or provinces. The first of these provinces to see the end of Ottoman rule was the *Mutasarrifate (Sanjak)* of Jerusalem in December 1917. In Iraq, Ottoman control in Baghdad lasted until March 1917 and in Mosul until November 1918. Ottoman rule over *Vilayet* Syria, *Vilayet* Beirut and *Vilayet* Yemen ended in October 1918, although control of Medina endured until January 1919.

The end of Ottoman rule in Arabia was a political change marking an immediate and major milestone in the philately of the region. Previously the Empire had run an efficient and extensive postal system with a very large number of post offices throughout the region including offices on the Hejaz railway, which connected Medina, now in Saudi Arabia, with Damascus. Ottoman Turkish stamp issues and postal stationery, including a very large range and variety of attractive values and designs, were extensively used throughout the area:



Following the end of Ottoman rule in the new Arab states it was of course inappropriate for the administrative authorities to continue to use Turkish stamps without an indication that the area in which they were used now fell under new control. Measures were taken in some areas to overprint or handstamp the Turkish issues with wording showing that the area was now under new 'occupation' or 'administration'. Other authorities produced completely new stamp issues. The following are the various issues that were produced by the new Arab authorities in each *Mutassarifate* or *Vilayet* after the end of Ottoman rule.

Mutassarifate of Jerusalem (Palestine)¹¹⁶

Between December 1917 and February 1918 the British Military Administration for this region sent out all mail franked with current British stamps depicting the portrait of King George V. These were cancelled with FPO (Foreign Post Office) or APO (Army Post Office)



¹¹⁶ Modern names identified in brackets.

cancels. Little civilian mail, if any, is recorded during these three months. In fact it took less than three months to design and produce the first issue of stamps for this area. The 1 piaster stamp which was first to be produced was also overprinted 5 milliemes. It was designed and printed in Egypt and reads: 'E.E.F. (Egyptian Expeditionary Forces)/ POSTAGE PAID'. It was issued in February 1918 and was followed in the July by a colourful set of a similar design with eleven values from 1 millieme to 20 piasters which were widely used in Palestine, Syria/Transjordan and Lebanon, all of them under British Military Administration.

Vilayet Beirut (Lebanon)

After the end of Ottoman rule in *Vilayet* Beirut in October 1918 there was no need to overprint any Turkish stamps as the already existing EEF stamps of Palestine were put into use in this region. Illustrated is a 1 piaster value from the July 1918 EEF issue for Palestine with the BEYROUTH date cancel of 29 July 1919.



Vilayet Syria (Syrian Arab Republic)

On 1 October 1918 Ottoman rule in the *Vilayet* ended. Emir Faisal announced the establishment of an independent Arab Constitutional Government in Syria on the 5th of that month. The area now known as The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan formed a part of this Government using stamps of Palestine. On 8 March 1920 the Syrian National Congress declared independence and on the 11th Emir Faisal was declared King.



The existing Turkish stamps were overprinted using two different handstamps. The first had the words 'Arab Government' and this formed the first provisional issue. The second was a triangular handstamp which read 'Syrian Arab Government'. It was used to overprint fiscal stamps of Turkey when no more postage stamps were available. All these issues are generally scarce with some values being very rare indeed. Unfortunately, both handstamps were forged and to the untrained eye forged stamps handstamped with these dyes are almost impossible to differentiate from the genuine. Covers from this period are scarce – with some very rare indeed.




Jordan are very rare as little mail was sent.

The cover to Cairo (shown right), which carries a handstamped Turkish one piaster stamp cancelled with the Karak negative seal in violet is one of only two such covers recorded. It is a

The illustrated 25pi value is a great 'Arab Government' rarity with only six genuine stamps known to exist.

Unfortunately, forgeries of this stamp also exist. Stamps from this issue used in



great philatelic rarity. Karak is a town 90 miles south of Amman, Jordan.

Baghdad

After the fall of Baghdad on 11 March 1917, stocks of Turkish stamps found in Post Offices were insufficient for overprinting – those remaining had probably been looted. The chief political officer offered to pay for any remaining stamps. By August, limited quantities were available of different Turkish stamps; these were overprinted 'Baghdad in British Occupation' and the value altered to annas. These overprints are very scarce with some values exceptionally rare. Such stamps used on cover are highly desirable and this issue was extensively forged.



Illustrated is the 1 piaster Turkish stamp with a red star, overprinted 'Baghdad in British Occupation'. Only 59 examples of this value were produced making this a Baghdad philatelic rarity. Also illustrated are five values from this issue similarly overprinted with with an Iraq 4 annas on an exceptional cover to Basra dated January 1919¹¹⁷.



Vilayet Mosul (City of Mosul)

After the end of Ottoman rule in Mosul in 1918, Indian stamps depicting King George V overprinted IEF (Indian Expeditionary Forces) and issued in September 1914 were put to use. The September 1918 overprinted issue for Iraq was also used in Mosul but was withdrawn as the status of the Vilayet was in dispute between Turkey and the UK.

This issue was replaced on 1 February



¹¹⁷ Images of the 1 piaster 'Baghdad' overprint **and** the cover provided by Prof Akthem Al-Manaseer (USA)

1919 with a new issue produced by overprinting existing stocks of Turkish fiscal stamps with the words 'POSTAGE' I.E.F. 'D' and the value altered to annas. These stamps were used until invalidated in 1921 when the dispute between the two nations was resolved, whereupon the previously used September 1918 overprinted issue for Iraq was put back into use.


Iraq

On 1 September 1918, a set of Turkish stamps with values from 5 paras to 20 piasters was overprinted 'Iraq in British Occupation' and the value altered to annas and rupees. This issue replaced the stamps issued for Baghdad and Mosul.



Vilayet Al Hejaz (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

The region known as Al Hejaz included the important cities of Jeddah, Mecca and Medina. In June 1916, Emir of Mecca Sherif Hussein Bin Ali proclaimed himself as King of the Hejaz. The first issue of stamps for the Kingdom was designed and printed in Egypt in October 1916. Illustrated is the ¼ piaster value from this issue. Previously un-overprinted stamps of Turkey had been used.



Vilayet Yemen (Republic of Yemen)

Ottoman rule in Yemen ended in October 1918. Imam Yahya Mohammed Al Qasimi declared Northern Yemen as an independent sovereign state. No postal system as such replaced that used during Ottoman rule and few records exist of the mail sent between 1918 and 1926, much of which was sent stampless. The first issue of stamps for the Kingdom of Yemen was produced in 1926.

The provisional issues for all the above regions – produced because of necessity – constitute a fascinating philatelic field of study, providing collectors with much scope for research. Regrettably, space here precludes further elaboration on the important historic and philatelic aspects behind the issue of these stamps. The frankings and postal markings, the censorship of mail, the scarcity of some post office uses, the very limited printings of some stamps and the study of the cancellations, errors, varieties and forgeries, have kept serious philatelists (such as I myself) interested and occupied for decades.



The Story of Turkey's Sweets and Desserts

by Mary Işın
Historian of Turkish cuisine



“The sea of sugar knows no shore, no boundary”

Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rûmî (1207–73)

Associating sweetness with joy, good fortune and well-being can be traced far back in Near Eastern history, to the honey-filled groves of the Sumerian creation myth, the biblical land of milk and honey, and the rivers of honey in the Koran. The Ottomans carried the spiritual significance of sugar and sweets in Islamic culture to new heights, dubbing the three-day festival following Ramazan the Şeker Bayram or Sugar Feast. They also appear to have invented two apocryphal oral traditions of the Prophet Muhammed – ‘The love of sweets springs from faith’ and ‘True believers are sweet’ – which were quoted by Turkish writers and written on the walls of confectionery shops. Sweet foods were prepared for all special occasions, including religious festivals, rites of passage and palace ceremonies. Boiled sweets called *akide* were presented by the janissaries to the grand vizier and other state officials as a symbol of loyalty, while the palace reciprocated with trays of baklava for the janissaries; and *gaziler helvası* (warriors' helva) was made for the souls of dead soldiers killed in battle.

Some of these customs survive today, such as serving *zerde* (rice pudding with saffron) at wedding and circumcision meals, serving *lokma* or *irmik helvası* (semolina helva) to mourners after funerals, distributing *akide* at *mevlits* (memorial ceremonies) and *aşure* on the tenth day of the month of Muharrem, and making *güllaç* (a milk pudding using starch wafers) during Ramazan.

Turkish confectionery is exceptionally diverse, due both to the varied cultures that contributed to Ottoman cuisine and to innovations during the Ottoman period such as baklava, string *kadayıf*, and *lohuk* (fondant) in the 15th century, *akide* and a whole new range of fruit preserves in the 16th century, *lokum* (Turkish delight) in the 18th century and *ekmek kadayıf* (a pudding reminiscent of English treacle sponge) in the 19th century. Helva made with sesame paste was similarly unknown in pre-Ottoman times, yet is so ubiquitous in the region today that its absence can hardly be imagined.

Customs involving sweets similarly proliferated. Offering fruit preserves or *lohuk* to guests before serving coffee became an established part of Ottoman hospitality rituals in the 17th century and it was in the same period that traditional winter gatherings of friends known as *sohbet*, began to be called *helva sohbeti* in reference to the sweetmeat, usually the thistledown textured *pişmaniye* or *gaziler helvası*, that was served to guests.

In the kitchens of the palace and the wealthy elite new variations on old dishes were constantly being thought up by cooks eager to please their gourmand employers. In this way many sweet dishes changed beyond recognition. A typical example of this process is *kadayıf*, which originated as a griddle cake in medieval Arab cuisine, but in early Ottoman times took on a new form called *tel kadayıf*, consisting of fine pastry threads. This version became so popular that it spread throughout the Near East, virtually replacing the original form of *kadayıf*. Another example of Ottoman culinary transformation is *aşure*, which derives from a dish of boiled wheat grains associated with ancient Neolithic fertility rites. In Islamic belief wheat was the forbidden plant in the Garden of Eden and wheat soup was the first food eaten by Adam and Eve after the Fall, which symbolises the revolution in human life brought about by farming. In its Ottoman version this wheat soup became a sweet pudding of wheat berries, dried fruits, pulses and rosewater. An *haute cuisine* version of *aşure* made at the palace in Muharrem 1870 for distribution by Sultan Abdülaziz's mother Pertevniyal Sultan consisted of one and a half tons of dry ingredients that included wheat, rice flour, broad beans, black-eye beans, kidney beans, chickpeas, clarified butter, raisins, dates, hazelnuts, almonds, pine nuts, sugar, musk and rosewater.

Meanwhile fruit preserves of Persian and Arab origin made from rose petals, quinces and bitter orange, multiplied in the Ottoman period with scores of new varieties including green almond, cornelian cherry, aubergine, green walnut, peach, mulberry, watermelon, barberry, jujube, stonecrop, sour grape, sage gall, persimmon, wild apricot, quince blossom and judas tree flower.

A rare example of a pudding that has gone unchanged for centuries is *tavukgöğüsü* (milk pudding thickened with shredded chicken breast), which originated in medieval Arab cuisine but today is still made only in Turkey, although it was once widespread in European as well as eastern cuisines.¹¹⁸


Ottoman influence on European cuisine, mainly via Italy and Hungary, began in the early 16th century. Rice pudding was one of the earliest, served as 'Turkish-style rice' at an Italian wedding banquet in 1529. This was soon followed by Ottoman fruit preserves and sweetened drinks known as sherbet. Francesco I de' Medici wrote to Maffeo Veniero of Venice in 1577, asking for recipes for preparing 'Turkish *sorbette*' and the new fashion for sherbet later spread to France and then England in the seventeenth century. Crunchy slabs of flavoured sugar called *sert şerbet* or *şerbetlik şeker* used for making sherbet were imported from Turkey to England, eventually giving rise to the fizzy sherbet sweets that are still popular with English children today. *Koz helvası* (nougat), a sweet of Arab origin, introduced to Hungary from Turkey, became known as *törökmez* ('Turkish honey') and afterwards spread to southern Germany and Austria, where nougat on sticks sold at fairs is still called *Türkischer honig*. Baklava was another introduction to Hungary, from where it spread under the name 'Hungarian tarts' to Austria and developed into the famous *apfelstrudel*. Towards the middle of the 19th century the soft confection *lohuk* was introduced to France, where it was named *fondant*. Around the same time *lokum* was attracting the attention of foreign visitors to Istanbul and exports to England began in the early 1860s under the name 'lumps of delight'.

¹¹⁸ This is the original form of the pudding known as blancmange in English, *blanc-manger* in French, *bianco mangiare* in Italian and *manjar blanco* in Spanish.

The 19th century saw the tide of influence turn as westernization gathered momentum. French confectioners discovered the Istanbul market and opened shops in Beyoğlu, the hilltop district above Galata where diplomats, foreign merchants and other foreign residents congregated. French puddings and pastries began to appear in Turkish cookery books, a trend that became even more marked after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. A book on confectionery entitled *The Turkish Woman's Book of Confectionery* published in 1939 is filled with recipes for crèmes, gateaux, biscuits, tartelettes, mille-feuilles, savarins and petits fours. The author claimed to have written the book 'to meet the needs of modern Turkey,' and those needs were apparently French food.

Turkish confectionery has not survived those decades of neglect unscathed. Chocolate has undermined demand for traditional sweets like *akide*, and more recently the fad for cheesecake has obliterated memories of traditional Turkish desserts made with cheese, such as cheese-filled baklava and cheese helva. On the positive side, however, the *muhallebici* or 'milk pudding shop', which was on the brink of extinction in the 1980s, has staged a spectacular comeback.

ILLUSTRATIONS



A 16th-century Turkish confectionery shop with sugar loaves and lidded sweet jars on the shelves. The parrot in the cage at lower right was probably a symbol of the confectioners guild, since parrots were supposed to enjoy eating sugar and be 'sweet tongued'. The 15th century Turkish poet Ahmed Paşa wrote, 'He is a parrot desirous to reach the place where sugar is found.'


Sugar gardens being paraded at the circumcision festivities for the sons of Ahmed III in 1720. The pools were filled with sherbet, the soil was made of sugar mixed with musk, and the pebbles were sugared almonds. This tradition can be traced back to 1457, when sugar mosques, castles, pavilions and meadows of flowers were made for the circumcision of Mehmed the Conqueror's sons Bâyezid and Mustafa.





Two janissary soldiers carrying one of the hundreds of trays of baklava distributed to the janissaries on the 15th day of Ramazan each year. One tray was given to each squad of ten soldiers and they then marched out of the palace in what was known as the Baklava Procession.

A cartoon from the comic newspaper *Karagöz* (issue 225, dated 5 September 1910) showing the shadow puppet character Karagöz carrying provisions purchased for Ramazan: Güllaç wafers, macaroni, a jar of clarified butter from Aleppo, garlic sausages, *pastırma* (cured beef), and a basket filled with jars of jam.



— وای شاه فرم کردم... بیله شکر بشدونه... نوره اوله مبارک آی بیله برکتیه کلیر...
 — مریزورسلک برادر... برکنده سوزنی اید... بقیض آ... دوت حال کانتک سورمایدی بوکلدم... ادر بومله عمر برکلی ورسون...



Turkey from the shore: reflections

by Chris Ponsford,
 First Mate on a small yacht

We first visited Turkey in August 1988 on a family flotilla holiday along the Lycian coast. Provisioning in Fethiye market was magic with traditional cups of apple tea over each transaction, one of which was a huge bag of saffron which lasted me for years. Once afloat we mainly stopped at rocky bays, with no buildings or other boats,

where enterprising Turks camped out for the season to feed us on makeshift tables, cooking in the open with just a generator to run lights and fridge. The lamb was very tasty even if the yoghurt was sometimes rancid. It was very hot and we loved to swim. We visited Dalyan on a large *gulet* which got stuck on the sand bar so we all had to lean over one side to get back afloat. The amphitheatre and rock tombs were very impressive but when we asked to go to the promised mud baths our Turkish guide said it was too late as they would be full of 'dirty peasants'!

We were excited to find ancient ruins along the shore nearly everywhere we went and we walked inland to explore whenever we could. Peter went up to the deserted former Greek village of Kaya Köyü and another time I went on my own up a steep wooded path to some ancient pillars and was alarmed by a man raucously calling his goats. Luckily my husband appeared and then the man tried to buy me in return for some goats.

One night we sailed off by ourselves to the lovely bay of Gerbetse, the only building being the ruins of an early Christian church. In the corner was a fishing boat and, on our other side, a yacht full of nude Austrians. Their lilo blew away and when one of them dived in after it the fisherman let out a bloodcurdling shriek, brandished his heavy wooden tiller and ran along the rocks protesting. The Austrian retreated and we gave the fisherman the thumbs up. He dived in and came aboard our boat. All went well and soon Farouk fetched his wife to join us. Together we enjoyed coffee, cake and chocolate and then they cooked a fish for us on their boat. At our final port of Marmaris, in its huge unspoilt inlet of many bays, we were thrilled by the noise and colour of the main street with shady awnings strung above and were hounded by carpet sellers.

When we retired we bought our own yacht, *Curlew*. In 2012 we cruised the Greek islands from Thassos to Rhodes and were tantalizingly close to all the wonderful Turkish sites we longed to visit, but we avoided the delays involved in the mass of paper-work in taking a boat from Greek to Turkish waters. After crossing the mouth of the Dardanelles near Samothraki, we heard Turks and Greeks trying to communicate in English on their ships' radios: "This is Turkish warship. You must leave these waters immediately." – "But I have long fishing net. I need one hour to collect." – "You must leave immediately."

Then last summer we finally sailed *Curlew* into Turkish waters, going east to Antalya and then back to Marmaris where we left her over winter. We plan our timing carefully to comply with the Turkish reciprocal regulation which only allows EU citizens to spend a maximum of 90 days within any 180 in the country. Our last Greek port was at Simi where we met for a drink by the harbour with a young marine engineer who had done some repairs to our boat. We were next to a very merry party with dancing and celebrations. On enquiry we learned that every month the mayors of Turkish Datça and Greek Simi take it in turns to go across the water to meet together.

After five years sailing around Greece, with its ubiquitous blue and white churches and seeming lack of entrepreneurship we arrived at Bozburun to the sound of the *müezzin* and the next day in a quiet bay were hailed by locals selling bread and fruit from their boats. On another occasion we were even able to buy hot pancakes from a couple who made and cooked them freshly on their little boat.

We only had a week to make our way to Yat Marine, just beyond Marmaris, to leave the boat whilst returning home to avoid the heat of the summer. We were disappointed to find many of the bays in the inlet very built up and the main street changed into a modern shopping mall, but luckily the carpet sellers and restaurant owners are no longer allowed to hound us.

On return in September we hired a car to buy supplies for our voyage and to explore the Bozburun peninsula by land. We passed through mountain villages with honey stalls and silver domed mosques glinting like panels of foil in the sun, each beside a slim rocket minaret pointing to the sky. The scenery is very green compared with Greece as there are many more springs in this area and lots of feathery pea green pines. Eventually we came down to Turunç Bay in a spectacular position at the foot of towering cliffs and then in the evening we stopped for oranges, lemons and huge tomatoes at a lamplit stall. I stroked one of the pots of basil and the storekeeper came running after us and presented me with a stem of the pungent herb: a charming welcome to this friendly country.

Back at the boatyard it was still pretty hot but now only one pair of swallows swooped over the swimming pool without bothering to dip into the water. At night the bar was garish with its bright red lighting, as was the path, lit by silver-painted robed statues holding bright lamps. The garden and the pool lights changed continuously from red to green to blue.

Once at sea we revisited many of the places we had sailed into in 1988 with our teenage boys. The main resorts have grown beyond all recognition but many of the bays, still hard to reach by land, were unspoilt, just full of boats of all shapes and sizes. Gemiler Adası, where we anchored between the ruin-covered island and the mainland, was particularly sad with noisy *gulets*, speed boats, and yachts, all crammed in. A giant turtle came swimming past and we feared for its life amongst the waterski engines.

Further East we made a few forays inland to see the Chimaera where flames burn out of the rocks, fantastic sites in the Xanthos valley and dramatic Arycanda in the hills. At Patara we saw cows being milked by hand amongst the ruins. We were unable to hire a car in Finike as all, except the barbers, were shut in preparation for Kurban Bayramı and we saw a sheep bleating on a balcony above us. However we did not need wheels to get to our favourite site, Phaselis, as we could anchor right beside its well preserved amphitheatre and aqueduct.




At Kalkan we squeezed into the harbour between a *gulet* and a fishing boat under the shadow of the soaring Taurus Mountains. Suddenly there was a downpour and we saw a little toddler trying to dance and jump with excitement on the steep slippery wet cobbles in the first rain he could remember.

Sailing back beyond Fethiye we walked up a remote hillside and found a small community which had built their own mosque. We were greeted by a young man whose father was the Imam. He showed us the mosque, trying to keep out the chickens as we entered the gate. Then we were given sage tea by his wife on their balcony and bought some trinkets they had made. After

our feeble attempts at bargaining they took pity on us and gave us a bag full of fruit as well.

We sailed on past Marmaris back to Gerbetse where we had met Farouk the fisherman twenty-six years previously. This time we anchored with two lines ashore but huge gusts dragged the anchor at dusk. Peter swam ashore and released the first line but I had to let the second one go to get away from the rocks. Then from the same corner a little fishing boat came to help us. After collecting Peter the young sailor helped us to anchor in a safer place. We gave him some money but by dawn he had gone. Could he have been the son of Farouk? The next day we sailed under the walls of ancient Loryma to the eerie inlet where the Athenian fleet took shelter during the Peloponnesian war. We showed the café owner our photo of Farouk and he told us this was his uncle who lives further north at Söğüt. This is the direction we plan to take next spring up the Aegean coast...



An Ottoman Garden in St. Louis

by **Philippa Scott**
Journalist and Writer

All gardens are reminders that time does not stand still; change is normal, an inevitable part of life, and season follows season. When the sponsors of an Ottoman garden which had been created in St Louis asked me to write the explanatory publication to tell the general public how and why the garden had been created, I was surprised and immediately intrigued. I flew to St. Louis.

The Missouri Botanical Garden (MoBot) was created by Henry Shaw, whose family fortune was made in Sheffield steel. Inspired by Kew Gardens, and a beautiful prairie outside St Louis, Shaw resolved to create a garden there. He toured Europe and the Mediterranean in 1821, and spent two months in Turkey. His diaries include descriptions of gardens, plants and flowers, palaces, kiosks and summer houses. Today MoBot is in the heart of St Louis. The city has grown around what was once open prairie and, within its confines, are many different examples of gardens. The most recent of these is the Bakewell Ottoman Garden.



A romantic family legend inspired the creation of an Ottoman garden within the grounds of the MoBot. This was the story of Aimée Dubucq de Rivery, cousin of Napoleon's Josephine. Her story has been told in several books, of which Lesley Blanch's *The Wilder Shores of Love* is probably the best known.


Martinique was a French territory. Traditionally wealthy planters there sent their daughters to France to complete their education and, it was hoped, to make a successful marriage. In 1788 Aimée's ship encountered a storm. The story says the ship, blown off course, was boarded by pirates. Aimée was taken to Algiers and then, because she was young and beautiful, despatched to Istanbul, a gift from the Bey of Algiers to Sultan Abdulhamid. Was she Nakshidil, the mother of Mahmut II, as is claimed in so many romantic stories? Turkish historians dispute this. If she entered the seraglio, she may have influenced Mahmut as a young boy, and perhaps even the dispatch of the first Ottoman embassy to France. The Bakewell family of St. Louis share ancestry with Aimée and, because of this connection, his sons created the Bakewell Ottoman Garden, dedicated to the memory of their father, Edward L Bakewell.

The creation of an Ottoman garden in Missouri is possible because of the general similarity of St Louis' climate to that of north-western Anatolia, especially the Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne regions. Each of these cities was at one time the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and each originally had extensive imperial gardens as well as other, personal gardens. Many of the flower species commonly known to Ottomans are recognized today in subspecies and hybridized forms, and many plants familiar in Western gardens originated in Ottoman lands. Paintings, manuscripts, palace records, travellers' descriptions and merchants' account books all provide information about plants and gardens. Marvellous candlelit evenings took place in palace gardens along the banks of the Bosphorus, visitors marvelled at the abundance of flowers in the Ottoman market gardens, and one source warned that



selling tulip bulbs anywhere but in the capital, or exporting too many, were offences punishable by exile. Ah! Tulips! Europeans were fascinated by this new flower from the East – a sort of red lily – and Tulipmania became a European obsession in which fortunes were made and lost

The Bakewell Ottoman Garden is an enclosed, intimate space, a secret garden, inward looking, which lends itself to poetic imagery and metaphors for the spiritual world. The approaching visitor enters beneath an inscription on specially made Iznik tiles, with Ottoman script proclaiming



'Praise to the Benefactor, Praise'. Leaving the garden, the visitor passes below a verse by a contemporary Turkish musician and poet, Kudsi Erguner, which translates as 'The Benefactor awaits the reach of your memory within the garden'. A sundial



faces the entrance, calibrated to indicate Islamic prayer times. Beyond this, the central pool has a fountain and small jets of water along its edge, the tinkling sound of which creates a soothing effect. To the right, a pedestal fountain invites visitors to rinse their hands in its cool water and, along the back wall of the raised patio; a wall fountain adds further soft tinkling sounds as water drops from its tiers. All the architectural and decorative elements for the garden

were commissioned from Turkish craftsmen using Turkish marble. The painted panels along the wall of the raised, covered patio were copied from Ottoman illustrated manuscripts, while the roof of the patio is surmounted by a brass finial shaped like a stylized tulip. Several stone bird houses are attached to the garden's interior walls.



Scent is one of the pleasures of wandering and sitting in a garden, and it is an important element here, with herbs planted among the flowering plants and shrubs. Remember the lovely portrait of Sultan Mehmed II, 'the Conqueror', who chose to be depicted inhaling the perfume of the roses he holds. The rose was the sacred flower of the Byzantines; perhaps the portrait holds a deeper meaning.



When walls fall – is it really always a blessing?



Heidemarie Blankenstein

On 9 November 2014 it was the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. One year later (1990) divided Germany was re-united. Heidemarie Blankenstein, a well-established journalist, who for years travelled the world and particularly the Middle East, poses the question: is a reunification always the right answer to divided nations? In the case of Cyprus she comes to the conclusion: occasionally walls acting as borders are also a good protection.

She recalls her feelings on 3 October 2014 when she was in her Cyprus home: "The call of the *muezzin* wakes me at precisely 5.45 – just before sunrise – reiterating: 'Allah is the Greatest'. He is oblivious to the importance of the day for Germans; it is 3 October, the Day of German Unity".



Instead the people in the Turkish part of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus prepare themselves for Kurban Bayramı, (Sacrifice Feast), comparable to Western Christmas festivities. They are looking forward to four days of holiday, many visits to their families, many delicious treats, many picnics in the countryside. No cause for a celebration is left out in the Turkish part of the island. There are a variety of village festivals: the Olive Festival in Zeytinlik, the Lapta Festival, the Wine Festival in Akdeniz, the Girne Tourism Festival, and the Ecological Festival in Büyükkonuk.

Throughout the year there are reasons for celebrations. It is therefore hardly surprising that there are two celebrated ‘National Days’: 15 November, the emergence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, while 20 July 1974 is celebrated on account of the military intervention by the Turks from across the sea as the saviour of the Turkish Cypriot community. This was in reaction to the *coup d’état* five days previously by Greek nationalists against Archbishop Makarios, the then President, who **then** threw off his cassock and was able to escape to the British military bases.

The island was under British rule until 1960. Then Greek nationalists chased the Brits off the island – only two military bases are still in British hands. From 1960 a probably well-intentioned constitution was agreed on, one that was supposed to be fair to all ethnic groups. But only three years later the Greek Cypriots, who thought they had – as the majority – the say in all matters, simply dissolved the Constitutional Court. The Turkish Cypriots, now under constant threat, retreated into enclaves. So in reality the island has been divided since 1963 and *de jure* has ceased to exist as a state from that point on. Despite this, Greek Cyprus, as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’, became an EU member in 2004 without clarification as to precisely what territory this ‘republic’ referred to.



A border as protection: The island is indeed divided since 1974 by a proper border. Despite suffering heavy sanctions the Turkish Cypriots can live with this reasonably well, because for them this border is a protection against Greek extremists, while Greek Cypriots regard it as a threat. They desire a reunification according to the German mode. However, they don’t want to do it following the German motto: “We are one people”. Under no circumstances would the Turkish Cypriot community be accepted or even respected by them, as happened with the Germans of the former GDR (eastern Germany) when the country was reunited.

Above all, the Greek Cypriots would love the island to be free of Turks. Decades of peace talks have failed again and again. Recently, the Greek Cypriots have once more left the negotiation table, because they are simply not prepared to compromise.

So Heidi B sits on her balcony this 3 October enjoying the view of the Taurus Mountains in Turkey, merely 60 miles away, absorbing the atmosphere of the peaceful Mediterranean domicile, even though it is surrounded by current trouble spots such as Syria, Iraq, Israel and Palestine. She muses: “It may sound totally paradoxical to German ears, but I enjoy this island’s peace which was created by its division through a border in 1974”.

Northern Cyprus – a new West Bank? However much people might wish to overcome the division of Cyprus, time is working towards its cementation. No one should forget that change in the *status quo* would bring fresh injustice and probably more suffering and new atrocities. A democratically constituted Northern Cyprus could turn into a new ‘West Bank’.

HB (heidiblackenstein.blogspot.com)
Translation: Sigrid-B Martin

Noteworthy Events

by Ayşe Furlonger

LECTURES AND TALKS

The Dardanelles Campaign Viewed From Both Sides of the Trenches

Venue: Royal Asiatic Society, 14 Stephenson Way, London NW1 2HD
Date: 14 May 2015 ...18:00

A lecture by Dr Eugene Rogan, Associate Professor of the Modern History of the Middle East; Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford.

25 Years of Research Among the Alevis

Venue: The Royal Anthropological Institute, 50 Fitzroy Street, London W1
More information: Naciye O'Reilly: ndoreilly@btinternet.com
Date: 22 April 2015 ...17.30

Dr David Shankland, Reader in Anthropology, Department of Archaeology & Anthropology at Bristol University will talk on: *25 Years of Research among the Alevis*

BIAA Oliver Gurney Memorial Lecture : Exploring the early history of British archaeology in Turkey and Syria

Venue: KWolfson Auditorium, British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London
More information: **To book a visit:** www.biaa.ac.uk/events or call +44 (0)20 7969 5204
£10 (Free to BIAA members)

Date: 16 April 2015 ... 18.30

Join renowned archaeologist Nicolò Marchetti, as he showcases new evidence from British archaeologists between 1876 and 1920 from the excavation site at Karkemish between Turkey and Syria. In this lecture, Professor Marchetti will also present the archival research which has helped frame archaeological activities within the wider policies of their time. Nicolò Marchetti is Alma Mater Studiorum and Associate Professor of Near Eastern Archaeology at the University of Bologna. He is Director of the Turco-Italian Archaeological Expedition at Karkemish and Director of the School of Specialization on Archaeological Heritage.



Turkish Migration Conference 2015

Venue: Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic; www.regents.ac.uk; Email: rcts@regents.ac.uk
Date: 25 – 27 June 2015

This meeting on Economics, Identities, and Geographies, is the third in the series on the impact of migration on receiving, sending and transit societies, on individuals, families, households, groups, and communities, law, geography, psychology, economics, development, politics, arts, culture and media.

Research papers from all disciplines are invited. In the past two conferences, alongside academics and graduate students, practitioners, policy makers, artists, and entrepreneurs have participated.

Social Change in Turkey since the Year 2000

Venue & further information: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/>

Date: 30 April – 1 May 2015

Panellists: Dr Utku Balaban, Prof Dr Ayşe Buğra, Prof Dr Mine Eder, Dr Sinan T. Gülhan, Prof Dr Çağlar Keyder, Dr Başak Kuş, Dr Esra Sarioğlu, Dr Cihan Z. Tugal, Dr Funda Üstek, Dr Dilek Yankaya.

Encountering the Past in Turkey

Venue & further information: www.lse.ac.uk

Date: Monday, Tuesday & Wednesday, 11-12-13 May 2015

Panellists and Moderators: Dr Ayşe Gül Altınay, Dr Bilgin Ayata, Dr Alice von Bieberstein, Dr Zerrin Özlem Biner, Mr Murat Çelikkan, Ms Ayda Erbal, Prof Fatma Müge Göçek, Dr Corry Guttstadt, Dr Aslı Iğsız, Dr Sossie Kasbarian, Dr Joanne Laycock, Prof Leyla Neyzi, Mr Marc Nichanian, Dr Ceren Özgül, Dr Esra Özyürek, Dr Murat Paker, Dr Ayşe Parla, Prof Max Silverman, Dr Seap Ruken Şengül, Dr Yael Navaro-Yashin.

EXHIBITIONS

Jean-Etienne Liotard

Venue I: Scottish National Gallery, Edinburgh

Date: 6 June – 13 September 2015

Venue II : Royal Academy of Arts, Burlington House, Piccadilly, London W1J 0BD

Date: 24 October 2015 – 31 January 2016



Jean-Etienne Liotard was an artist in great demand at noble courts across Enlightenment Europe. An eccentric and distinctive portraitist, he also made carefully observed scenes of contemporary life in far-flung locales. Born at the dawning of the 18th century, this idiosyncratic Swiss artist was one of the most accomplished portraitists of his age. He travelled widely, from London to the Orient, applying his unflinching powers of observation to create beautifully crafted portraits, the majority in pastel chalks on parchment. At the peak of his powers, Liotard was commissioned to paint portraits of members of the British, French and Austrian royal families. A master of self-publicity, he was known as ‘the Turk’ in London, for his adoption of Oriental costume and a long beard, relics of his sojourn in the Near East where he painted British and European residents as well as indigenous Turkish peoples. One of the exhibition’s highlights will be a wonderful group of drawings in red and black chalk that depict scenes of contemporary Turkish life. This is the first retrospective exhibition in the UK to be devoted to the artist. It covers Liotard’s time in Paris, Vienna, Geneva and Constantinople, as well as his two

voyages to London, the latter of which included the exhibition of work at the Royal Academy. The world that his art shows us is a fascinating one: highly cosmopolitan and increasingly engaged in the cultural interchange between the Near East and Western Europe.

Life Is Short, Art Long The Art of Healing in Byzantium

Venue: The Pera Museum, Meşrutiyet Cad 65, Tepebaşı, Beyoğlu, Istanbul

Date: 11 February 2015 – 26 April 2016

Curated by Dr Brigitte Pitarakis, this exhibition examines faith, magic and medicine as methods of healing during Byzantine times. It traces the 'art of healing' from the foundations laid by the healers of antiquity Apollo and Asklepios, through to Hippocrates and Dioscorides, the founders of rational medicine. It also examines the roles of the physician saints. On display are icons, reliquaries, amulets, marble carvings, medical equipment, plants and herbs, medical and botanical manuscripts, and documents and photographs pertaining to centres of healing in Istanbul. Works are on loan from the Istanbul Archaeological Museums, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, the library of the Holy Trinity Monastery of Halki (Heybeliada), the Foundation of the Yeniköy Greek Orthodox Church of Panayia, the Rezan Has Museum, the Bibliothèque nationale de France, the Bodleian Library of the University of Oxford, Oxford University Herbaria, the Benaki Museum in Athens, the Kastoria Byzantine Museum, as well as private collections.

The Silk Road: Sublime Spaces Photographs by Lynn Gilbert

Venue: The Roosevelt Library, ICAA San Antonio, 311 Roosevelt Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78210

Further information: The exhibition is free of charge to attend.

Date: 30 January – 30 April 2015 ... Mon-Fri: 9.00-17.00

An exhibition of beautiful photographs featuring the traditional homes of Turkish people living along the Silk Road. These unstaged and intimate portraits – selected from a large body of Lynn Gilbert's work – capture the beauty of design in homes both luxurious and simple. They provide a glimpse into the past and document for the first time the irreplaceable traditional homes that are an important part of Turkey's cultural heritage. On Friday January 30th, there will be a gallery opening and book launch. On Saturday January 31st, there will be a special symposium, entitled *Sublime Spaces: A Decade Long Journey on The Silk Road*. It starts with a talk at 3.00pm and continues into an afternoon tea.

Shoes



Venue: Sadberk Hanım Museum, Büyükdere Piyasa Cad. No: 27- 29

Sarıyer/Istanbul, Turkey

Further information: www.sadberkhanimmuzesi.org.tr

Date: 27 November 2014 – 31 May 2015

The Sadberk Hanım Museum contains a magnificent collection of Ottoman women's garments dating from the 19th and early 20th

centuries. As the collection has grown, so has the number of shoes. The collection consists mainly of late Ottoman shoes and slippers, and also footwear from Central Asia, Iran, North Africa, India and Europe. It also includes some examples dating from the early years of the Turkish Republic. The exhibition presents 127 examples of footwear, including boots, shoes, slippers and clogs, some of which represent traditional styles while others illustrate the influence of European trends. Most of the shoes are made from leather or fabric and embroidered with metal wire and metal wrapped thread, and additionally with silk thread, sequins, beads and other decorative materials. Clogs carved from wood and decorated with mother-of-pearl, ivory, silver and other materials were widely used in Ottoman daily life and form an eye-catching section of the exhibition.

Turkish Paintings from the Ottoman Reformation to the Republic

Venue: Sakıp Sabancı Museum, Sakıp Sabancı Cad. No:42, Emirgan 34467, Istanbul

Further information: www.sakipsabancimuzesi.org

Date: 31 July 2014 – 31 July 2015

This collection exhibition at Sakıp Sabancı Museum gives visitors the chance to see the historical journey of Turkish paintings from the 19th century to the beginning of the Republic. The exhibition displays the works of some of the most important Turkish painters such as Osman Hamdi Bey, Halil Paşa, Abdülmecid Efendi, İzzet Ziya and Fikret Muallâ Saygı. The paintings give visitors hints about the initial phase of the development process, and trace the transition, of painting in Turkey.

Arranged chronologically as well as thematically, the exhibition is divided into sections that allow visitors to see the styles of paintings, as well as what was happening in the Turkish art world on a wider scale, at that particular time. It starts with the paintings that were commissioned by the Ottoman Palaces between 1839 and 1876 and extends to the formation of the Independents in 1929, a group of artists who studied under some of the aforementioned masters and formed the first society for painters and sculptors after the foundation of the new Republic. Some of the must-see works include the magnificent painting of the Hagia Sophia by Şevket Dağ, as well as Halil Paşa's 'Madam X', which was exhibited at the 1889 Paris Exposition and awarded a Bronze Medal. There's also a portrait of Naile Hanım by Osman Hamdi Bey, which, with its gold ornate background inspired by Byzantine icons, hints at the social structure of its era.

Urartian Jewellery

Venue: Rezan Has Museum, Kadir Has Üniversitesi, Kadir Has Caddesi, Cibali, 34083 İstanbul

Further information: www.rhm.org.tr

Date: 24 May 2014 – 31 July 2015



More than a thousand pieces of Urartian jewellery discovered around Lake Van, including this stunning fibula circa 8th century BC. The exhibition is curated by Zeynep Çulha and jewellery has been restored with a grant from the Bank of America Merrill Lynch as part of its global Art Conservation Project.

Kadınlar – Goddesses – Harem – Power

Venue: TwentseWelle, Het Rozendaal 11, 7523 XG Enschede, Netherlands

Further information: www.twentsewelle.nl

Date: 16 March 2015 – 16 August 2015 ... 11.00-17.00

This exhibition takes audiences on a fascinating journey through the Turkish region, inspired by the lives of ten women who have helped shape history. *Kadınlar* (Turkish for 'women') shows pieces that have never been seen before in the Netherlands. These include utensils, musical instruments, icons, paintings, miniatures, textiles and jewellery. The exhibition comprises 130 pieces on loan from 11 Turkish museums, including the Topkapı Palace Museum, Museum of Turkish and Islamic Art, Pera Museum and Museum of Anatolian Civilisations. There are also 50 objects on loan from other European museums. The exhibition is organised by the Dutch journalist and author Henk Boom and his wife, Lotje de Lussanet, who is an artist and curator at the museum. Boom charts the turbulent times of Baron van Dedem, Dutch ambassador to Constantinople from 1785 to 1810, in *Cornucopia* 48.

Intersecting Worlds: Ambassadors and Painters

Venue: The Pera Museum, Meşrutiyet Cad 65, Tepebaşı, Beyoğlu, Istanbul

Further information: www.peramuzesi.org.tr

Date: 3 November 2011 – 31 December 2015

This is a fascinating look into the relationship which existed between the Ottoman Empire and Europe for over three centuries through the eyes of court painters. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire welcomed more ambassadors than it sent to other countries. It was important for these visiting ambassadors to document the Turkish cities, particularly Istanbul, and the social structure, customs and military organisation of the Ottoman Empire. One way to do this was to write reports upon return to their homelands, but they also took away gifts from the Sultanate and paintings, which they themselves commissioned, as evidence of life in the Empire.

The paintings were produced by Orientalist artists, and became expressions of respectability and social status. The selection displayed at Pera Museum comes from the Suna and Inan Kıraç Foundation, and features stand-outs such as the portraits of Charles Gravier, the Count of Vergennes and the French Ambassador, as well as of the Countess, both in Turkish attire and painted by Antoine de Favray in 1768. There are works by Jean-Baptiste Vanmour, who went to Istanbul in 1699 in the suite of the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Ferriol, and left perhaps the most comprehensive visual record of Istanbul. Fausto Zonaro's 1896 painting showing the daughter of the English Ambassador being carried across an Istanbul park is another highlight.

FILM

19th London Turkish Film Festival

Venue: O2 Cineworld, Rio Dalston, Ciné Lumière, Ray Dolby Theatre

Further information: www.ltff.co.uk

Date: 7 – 17 May 2015

The London Turkish Film Festival (LTFF) was inaugurated by Vedide Kaymak in 1993, and since then it has been a vital event in the London cultural scene. Her

project has been facilitated by the energetic support of the Rio Cinema in Dalston and by the encouragement of its general manager, Charles Rubinstein. The supportive role of Film London has also been a crucial factor in the development of the Festival. Now in its 19th year, the festival has grown from a small three-day event to a full-scale two week Festival. Over the years, the LTFF has screened nearly 300 features and 350 short and documentary films. The festival has also invited nearly 250 guests, including directors, producers, actors, and short film-makers. Panels and discussions have also featured as another key activity of the festival. The 19th LTFF promises to be an exciting and ground-breaking event, opening up the new trans-cultural Turkish cinema to new audiences in venues across London.



Turkey and Britain 1914-1952: From Enemies to Allies

A new project for the BIAA (British Institute at Ankara)

This year marks the 100th anniversary of one of the most consequential battles in British and Turkish History, Gallipoli. While this battle represents the height of the antagonism between the Ottoman and British Empires, its anniversary affords us an opportunity to reflect on the nature of the relationship between Britain and Turkey. Winston Churchill characterized the diplomacy between the two nations in a letter to Turkish president, İsmet İnönü on 30 January 1943. In this letter Churchill highlighted the need to examine, promote, and understand the evolution of that relationship

'There is a long story of the friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey. Across it is a terrible slash of the last war, when German intrigues and British and Turkish mistakes led to our being on opposite sides. We fought as brave and honourable opponents. But those days are done, and we...are prepared to make vigorous exertions in order that we shall all be together...to move forward into a world arrangement in which peaceful peoples will have a right to be let alone and in which all peoples will have a chance to help one another.'

To explore this relationship between Britain and Turkey the BATAS partner organisation, the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA)¹¹⁹, one of the British Academy's six overseas Schools and Institutes, will help host a project to create a scholarly network and establish a robust basis for collaboration among historians and political scientists in the UK and Turkey. The project has the support of the Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi (SAM), a leading think-tank attached to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and of the diplomatic communities of both countries. Through shared discussion and analysis of Anglo-Turkish relations this project aims to examine the period between the First World War, when the strategic alignments of the two nations placed them on opposing sides, and Turkey's entry into NATO in 1952, in the context of the Cold War.

The time-frame of the study is important because it covers the period in which the Middle East emerged from Ottoman and British imperialism to become the problematic region we know today. As a result of the current acute and intractable problems of the Middle East the relationship between Turkey and Britain is now arguably more critical than at any previous period. As well as involving academic historians and political scientists, this project will seek to engage a variety of non-academic partners directly concerned with

¹¹⁹ Keith Nuttall represents BIAA on BATAS' Council; Jill Sindall is BATAS' representative to BIAA

regional policy so that understanding of contemporary challenges can be informed by historical awareness.

By providing a collaborative context for exploring historiographical ideas and research frameworks, the project seeks to provide a deeper and more historically grounded understanding of Anglo-Turkish relations. By engaging with the themes of modernisation, nationalism and internationalism, colonial and post-colonial discourse, and diplomatic relations, scholars engaged in the planned workshops will amalgamate cultural, political and diplomatic perspectives to build a much needed bridge between British and Turkish historiographical traditions. This alliance of perspectives will also provide insight into influential ideas such as the 'separate path for Turkey', as it explored and defined its own way to statehood in the context of European colonisation of the Middle East.

The research network created by this project will meet at four workshops, two to be held in Turkey and two in the UK, between 2015 and 2017, each lasting three days and each complemented by other events aimed at a wider audience. The workshops will cover Anglo-Turkish relations chronologically, focussing on topics and events relevant to particular periods. At the same time they will be informed by a range of questions, issues, and over-arching themes designed to link the workshops together. This will establish the parameters and conceptual framework for interpreting Anglo-Turkish relations and also demonstrate the dynamic nature of the relationship between the two nations.

The first workshop, to be held in Çanakkale in July 2015, will deal with Anglo-Turkish relations in the late Ottoman period, the political transformation of Turkish society resulting from the Young Turk movement and militarization, and the ethnic, religious and cultural politics of the WW I period. The second workshop, at Cumberland Lodge in spring 2016, will cover the Treaty of Lausanne and the Çanak crisis, the birth of the Turkish republic and its implications for Anglo-Turkish relations, and Turkish reactions to the creation of the modern Middle East, especially Mesopotamia/Iraq. The third workshop, in Churchill College Cambridge in autumn 2016, will examine the nature and intensity of Anglo-Turkish relations during the early Republic, the international context of Atatürk's revolution, Turkish alliance building in the 1930s, the neutrality option and Churchill's policy towards Turkey, and the choices facing it during WW II. The final workshop, in Istanbul at Bahçeşehir University in spring 2017, will trace the processes which brought Turkey into the NATO alliance in 1951 and its relevance for Turkish domestic politics and Britain's role in NATO policies for the Middle East. Throughout his political career, Winston Churchill was involved in Anglo-Turkish relations, and his personality provides a connecting thread across the entire period.

The study of Turkey's early republican history would have previously fallen outside the scope of the British Institute at Ankara, but BIAA has changed over the last five years, from an academic base almost exclusively concerned with archaeology, to one dealing with a much wider range of social science and humanities disciplines and issues related to Turkey and the Black Sea region. In fact, the majority of projects initiated in this period have been about contemporary Turkey, a clear reflection of the country's growing world importance now the BIAA has now initiated its first project dealing with the early republican period.

Enquiries and proposals for papers from BATAS members and any scholars with interests in Anglo-Turkish relations in this period are warmly encouraged. For further information and details of the project please look at the Project web-site, <http://fromenemiestoallies.com>.


Warren Dockter & Stephen Mitchell (BIAA representatives)

Book Reviews & Publications

The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising Janissaries, Modernisation and Rebellion in the Nineteenth Century

by Fatma Sel Turhan

I B Tauris, 2014, 410 p., ISBN: 978 1 78076 111 4



This is a meticulously researched case-study of reaction to the elimination of the janissaries. More than two-fifths of the volume are accounted for by appendices, notes, bibliography, and an index. Meanwhile the comprehensive introduction reveals that this work is the outgrowth of the author's earlier postgraduate focus on the abolition of the janissary corps in 1826.

Turhan presents the end of the janissaries as part of Ottoman moves to modernise the Empire and indeed to halt its decline. Such measures were received with particular dismay in Bosnia where many janissaries had been recruited and where it was felt that Bosnia's influence at the centre of Imperial government would be much reduced. The author divides the decade after 1826 into two parts, with regard to Bosnia. She sees the main thrust of unrest up to 1831 as directly related to the loss of the janissaries. However, from then up to 1836 the revolt was primarily about opposition to the wider programmes of modernizing changes themselves (*nizâmât*). Inevitably, given the crucial border location of Bosnia, it was likely that the Imperial reaction to unrest would be harsh.

Chapter 2 deals with the first half of the decade in question when Bosnia erupted into rebellion after publication of the *ferman* of 15 June, 1826, which abolished the janissaries in the province. Indeed, that abolition quickly became a cause to unite previously separate groups and areas of disaffection in Bosnia, despite Imperial efforts to explain why the corps should be disbanded. Unrest was not evenly spread and some areas were pacified more quickly than others. Carrot and stick measures were employed by the state, including the frequent replacement of senior officials on the ground. The basis of unrest, meanwhile, was further complicated by the involvement of Serbia, Russia and other outsiders.

In Chapter 3 Turhan shows how the janissary question became – perhaps inevitably – part of a much wider basis of unhappiness with the changes demanded by the government. The opposition became increasingly coordinated and, in 1831, many local people themselves appointed as their *vizier*, one Hüseyin Kapudan, who had been prominent in the disruption in the previous half of the decade. Soon, however, the authorities tried to put in their own appointees in the *valilik* administration. Conflict spread and became even more complex but, nevertheless, in September

1834, the Porte appointed one Akif Efendi to prepare the way for the introduction of the new *nizâmât* procedures despite the continuing disorder.

Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 provide a clear and detailed account of the changing nature of unrest in Bosnia between 1826 and 1836, Chapter 4 offers reflective assessment of the nature of the conflict there. Who were the rebels? What sort of rebels were they? What did they really want? What did the *ulema*, the scholarly class, think about the rebellion – and what part did they play in it? What, in general, was the Porte's attitude to the unrest? Clearly it took account of Bosnia's front-line place in the cross-cutting uncertainties of Balkan politics. Chapter 5 is about the people who led, or were led, during the decade of revolt. Two levels of leadership were recognized. Most revolutionary leaders were 'bandits' but two were 'traitors to the religion and the state'. One of the latter was Ruscuklu Ali Ağa who figured prominently in the first half of the decade in focus while Hüseyin Kapudan emerged as the main rebel leader in the second.

Fatma Sel Turhan sees her Bosnian case-study as an instructive example of local reaction to profound change in the central direction of the Empire in the early nineteenth century. Abolition of the janissary corps produced a reaction which soon expanded into opposition to a number of developments and ultimately saw Bosnia change for ever. The thoroughness of this study is impressive. On average each of the ten years in the decade in question gets more than forty pages of text and supporting evidence. This detailed study is not an easy read but it is an important and revealing one.


Brian Beeley

ARMING THE SULTAN:

**German Arms Trade and Personal Diplomacy in
the Ottoman Empire Before World War I**

by Naci Yorulmaz

I B Tauris, 2014, 349 pp
ISBN 978 1 78076 633 1



In Naci Yorulmaz's first book, he describes how, by cultivating the Ottomans, German exports to the Empire increased by 350 per cent between 1888 and 1893. The author's research is impressive: he scoured archives in Berlin, Orbendorf, Istanbul and London, sourcing valuable material previously unresearched. His particular attention to handwritten documents gave him new insights and new information. His graphs are informative and helpful, and his style highly readable. Quotations are apposite and often amusing, adding flesh to the personalities and shedding light on their viewpoints. Yorulmaz makes a good case for his hypothesis that the key to Germany's success was to establish strong personal relationships,

and that the supply of armaments were as important economically and politically, if not more so, than the legendary Berlin-Baghdad railway. However, the text would have benefitted from judicial editing to eliminate some of the repetition of facts, while the Conclusion adds nothing to the excellent Introduction.

In 1878, the end of the fourth Russo-Ottoman war of the century left the Ottoman army decimated, and set the Empire on the road to bankruptcy. In the same year, Britain occupied Cyprus and Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1882 Britain occupied Egypt. Hence Sultan Abdulhamid's priority was to defend his Empire by rebuilding his military capability. Although the Ottomans had been self-sufficient in arms production at the beginning of the 19th century, half a century later – unable to keep up with technical innovation – they became dependent on foreign arms and naval suppliers, predominantly French, British and American. However, British and American pressure on the Ottomans as a result of the Armenian question, and European attempts to foreclose on the Porte's debts through the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, alienated the Sultan from these countries.

In 1871 came the unification of Germany and the formation of the German Empire at the end of the Franco-Prussian war. The new Empire emerged with an international reputation for military excellence, including its superior manufacturing of armaments. A burgeoning population, a flourishing iron and steel industry combined with technological innovation resulting in a production surplus created a need for the importation of raw materials and increased exports. Germany saw the Ottoman Empire as a potentially lucrative market, a source of minerals for its iron and steel industries and as an ally in areas of strategic importance, particularly the routes to India which the Germans eyed as another export market in waiting, the only obstacle being the British.

Dr Yorulmaz relates how the Germans captured the Ottoman military market deploying the 'German Style of War Business', a strategy crafted by Bismarck who considered that penetration of overseas markets and gaining influence were more effectively achieved by cultivating relationships with Ottoman decision-makers, rather than by 'direct colonization by imperial military power'. This strategy was conducted as a joint enterprise with German manufacturers and financiers, notably Krupps, Mauser and the Deutsche Bank, and was continued (and far more aggressively) by Kaiser Wilhelm II. Its resounding success left the Ottomans deeply indebted to German financiers, heavily compromising their negotiating position.

In 1881 a delegation was sent to Berlin by Sultan Abdulhamid II to negotiate a political alliance with the German Empire and to request civil and military assistance. The envoys were given warm hospitality not only by Bismarck, but by the Kaiser himself. As a result of this meeting, four German military advisers were sent to Istanbul, the most outstanding officer being Major Goltz 'Pasha', a brilliant military strategist who eventually became known as Father of the Turkish Army. He successfully lobbied on behalf of Mauser and Krupp in military circles, which in turn stimulated the interest of German financial institutions in the Ottoman market. He also established an efficient espionage network and consequently was able, for example, to scupper an Ottoman-French arms contract. He persuaded the Sultan to increase the size of the army and helped create a new elite officer corps educated in a military academy run according to his military and political doctrines. Krupp and Mauser gave training courses to army officers and fact-finding trips to decision-

makers in Germany, and the Ottomans were treated as honoured guests. Cultivating these men forged lasting bonds and mutual respect, the legacy of which was the continued alliance between the CUP¹²⁰ and Germany after the Young Turk Revolution in 1909.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this book is the account of the relationship between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Sultan Abdulhamid II. The Kaiser emerges as a leader whose ambitions for Germany and its entrepreneurs were pursued with focus and determination. His support for Krupp and Mauser, in particular, led to these companies holding a monopolistic position in Ottoman arms purchases.¹²¹ He visited the Sultan twice in 1889 and in 1898 and he and the Kaiserin were treated lavishly. On his second visit he was given a 'most noteworthy gift': Abdulhamid's permission to acquire a plot of land on Mount Zion in Jerusalem 'as an expression of intimate friendship'. Wilhelm donated this to German Catholics, losing France (who had been trying for years to gain possession of this land) her prestige as sole protector of Catholic subjects in the Ottoman Empire. This visit secured Germany not only a concession to construct the Baghdad railway, but gave it a monopoly on all orders for military munitions for the Turkish army. The Sultan contemplated the railway concession with glee: "the competition for the Baghdad rail-line (amongst Europeans) has become absolutely **grotesque**...I can wish nothing more favourable than to witness all four of them devour one another."

This book is an important addition to the body of knowledge relating to the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire in the years leading up to World War I, and is to be recommended.

Jill Sindall

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

ARTS AND ARCHAEOLOGY

Bross, Fabian. *Street Art Istanbul*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2015) ISBN-10: 1508512523, ISBN-13: 978-1508512523

Roberts, Mary. *Istanbul Exchanges: Ottomans, Orientalists, and Nineteenth-Century Visual Culture*. (University of California Press: 2015) ISBN-10: 0520280539, ISBN-13: 978-0520280533

Savino, Melania. *Creating Images of a Turkish Past: Volume 18: Identity and the Representation of Archaeology in Modern Turkey* (Library of Modern Turkey). (I.B. Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1784532525, ISBN-13: 978-1784532529

¹²⁰ Committee of Union and Progress, the group of senior Ottoman army officers whose objective was to precipitate a change of regime thus facilitating the reintroduction of the 1876 Constitution, suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II on his accession in 1878

¹²¹ Ironically, the Sultan brought few of these weapons into service, fearing his troops might turn them against him. His main objective seems to have been to persuade the Western powers he was more powerful than he was.

HISTORY

Eissenstat, Howard. *Creating a Turkish Identity: The Struggle for Nationalist Ideology After the Ottoman Empire* (Library of Modern Turkey) (I.B. Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1784531146, ISBN-13: 978-1784531140

Erickson, Edward J. *Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign*. (Pen and Sword: 2015) ISBN-10: 1783461667, ISBN-13: 978-1783461660

Keiser, Hans-Lukas. *World War I and the End of the Ottoman Empire: From the Balkan Wars to the Turkish Republic*. (I.B. Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1784532460, ISBN-13: 978-1784532468

Longino, Michele. *French Travel Writing in the Ottoman Empire: Marseilles to Constantinople, 1650-1700* (Routledge Research in Travel Writing). (Routledge: 2015) ISBN-10: 1138822655, ISBN-13: 978-1138822658

McMeekin, Sean. *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908 – 1923*. (Penguin Press: 2015) ISBN-10: 1594205329, ISBN-13: 978-1594205323

Noppen, Ryan. *Ottoman Navy Warships 1914-18 (New Vanguard)* (Osprey Publishing: 2015) ISBN-10: 1472806190, ISBN-13: 978-1472806192

Özyüksel, Murat. *The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East* (Library of Ottoman Studies). (I.B. Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1780768826, ISBN-13: 978-1780768823

Rogan, Eugene. *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East*. (Basic Books: 2015) ISBN-10: 046502307X, ISBN-13: 978-0465023073

Sommer, Dorothe. *Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Fraternity and its Influence in Syria and the Levant* (Library of Ottoman Studies). (I.B. Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1780763131, ISBN-13: 978-1780763132

Stanley, David. *Die in Battle, Do not Despair: The Indians on Gallipoli, 1915 (War and Military Culture in South Asia, 1757-1947)*. (Helion and Company: 2015) ISBN-10: 1910294675, ISBN-13: 978-1910294673

Yıldız, Sara Nur. *Mongol Rule in Seljuk Anatolia: The Politics of Conquest and History-writing 1243-1282* (Ottoman Empire and its Heritage). (Brill Academic Publishing: 2015) ISBN-10: 9004174338, ISBN-13: 978-9004174337

Zachs, Fruma and Halevi, Sharon. *Gendering Culture in Greater Syria: Intellectuals and Ideology in the Late Ottoman Period* (Library of Middle East History). (I.B. Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1780769369, ISBN-13: 978-1780769363

LITERATURE

Akhavan, Sara. *Poems Before Love: and translations from Persian and Azeri Turkish*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2015) ISBN-10: 1505497272, ISBN-13: 978-1505497274

Hickman, Bill and Leiser, Gary (Eds.). *Turkish Language, Literature and History: Travellers' Tales, Sultans and Scholars since the Eighth Century* (Routledge Studies in the History of Iran and Turkey) (Routledge: 2015) ISBN-10: 1138808180, ISBN-13: 978-1138808188

POLITICS

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives (Author). *The Future of Turkish Democracy*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2015) ISBN-10: 1508402000, ISBN-13: 978-1508402008

Güney, Aylin and Tekin, Ali (eds.). *The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Scorecard* (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). (Routledge: 2015) ISBN-10: 1138840092, ISBN-13: 978-1138840096

MacLean, Gerald. *Abdullah Gül and the Making of the New Turkey*. (Oneworld Publications: 2014) ISBN-10: 1780745621, ISBN-13: 978-1780745626

Murinson, Alexander. *Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Volume 16: Neo-Ottomanism and the Strategic Depth Doctrine* (Library of Modern Turkey). (IB Tauris: 2015) ISBN-10: 1784532401, ISBN-13: 978-1784532406

Söyler, Mehtap. *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). (Routledge: 2015) ISBN-10: 1138782335, ISBN-13: 978-1138782334

Yılmaz, Şahnaz. *Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent* (Studies in International Relations). (Routledge: 2015) ISBN-10: 0415963532, ISBN-13: 978-0415963534

SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION

Aščerić-Todd, Ines. *Dervishes and Islam in Bosnia: Sufi Dimensions to the Formation of Bosnian Muslim Society (Ottoman Empire and its Heritage)*. (Brill Academic Publishing: 2015) ISBN-10: 9004278214, ISBN-13: 978-9004278219

David, Isabel. *Everywhere Taksim. The New Dynamics in Turkish Politics (Protest and Social Movements)*. (Amsterdam University Press: 2015) ISBN-10: 9089648070, ISBN-13: 978-9089648075

Dressler, Markus. *Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (AAR Reflection and Theory in the Study of Religion Series)*. (OUP: 2015) ISBN-10: 0190234091, ISBN-13: 978-0190234096

McGrew, William. *Educating across Cultures: Anatolia College in Turkey and Greece*. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 2015) ISBN-10: 1442243465, ISBN-13: 978-1442243460

Rozen, Minna. *Studies in the History of the Istanbul Jewry, 1453-1923: A Journey Through Civilizations (Diaspora)*. (Brepols Publishing: 2015) ISBN-10: 2503541763, ISBN-13: 978-2503541761

Scott, Alev. *Turkish Awakening: Behind the Scenes of Modern Turkey*. (Faber and Faber: 2015) ISBN-10: 0571296580, ISBN-13: 978-0571296583

MISCELLANEOUS

Özen, Saadet. *Cukulata – A Turkish History of Chocolate*. (YKY Publishing: 2015) ISBN-10: 9750831012, ISBN-13: 978-9750831010

Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

In Memoriam



AN EVENING IN REMEMBRANCE OF ANDREW MANGO 1926- 2014

A meeting to remember Andrew Mango, BBC journalist and writer on Turkey, was held at the Yunus Emre Institute (Turkish Cultural Centre) in London on Wednesday, 12 November 2014. It was jointly organised by the Yunus Emre Institute and the Anglo-Turkish Society, and chaired by David Barchard. The contributors presented their personal recollections of Andrew rather than attempting to evaluate his achievements, as this had already been done in several obituaries.

One of the speakers was Gamon McLellan, who had worked with Andrew at the BBC from 1979 until Andrew's retirement in 1986. He said he had never had a better boss, and owed Andrew a great deal in terms of his own career development. Andrew never interfered in the work of his staff, and if he ever felt the need to criticise he always did it gently. Commenting on the high reputation for independent reporting on Turkish affairs that the BBC Turkish Service had built up under Andrew's leadership, Gamon noted the extraordinarily wide circle of personal contacts that Andrew had had in Turkey, and drew attention to the many endnotes in *The Turks Today* (2002) that cite a "private conversation with the author". He also remarked that Andrew was friends with both Ecevit and Demirel, but this did not prevent him criticising either of them.

Nevsal Hughes and Bengisu Rona had also worked with Andrew at the BBC. Nevsal said that Andrew's knowledge of Turkish and Ottoman was better than that of most Turks. Bengisu referred to his love of poetry and of Istanbul, and recited sections of Yahya Kemal's '*Bir Başka Tepeden*' ('From Another Hilltop') in his memory.

David Barchard commented that Andrew was not overly critical of Turkish politicians, because he understood the complexities of the challenges they had to face. He was always detached in his judgements.

David Shankland spoke about Andrew Mango's "multi-faceted interaction with academia", especially in his retirement. He mentioned particularly the annual review articles that Andrew had produced with Sylvia Kedourie, each one covering a number of recent publications on Turkey, and his much-valued contributions to the SOAS seminars on Modern Turkey started by Clement Dodd. David paid tribute to Andrew's intellectual courage, remarking that he was never afraid to say what he thought about an issue, even when he knew it would not be well received in some quarters, and that he always remained calm under attack.

A theme common to all the contributions was Andrew's generosity and hospitality. Several speakers spoke of the warm welcome they always received in Andrew and Mary's home in Barnes. Andrew's daughter Daphne, for her part, expressed her

appreciation of the great support that the family had received from so many Turkish friends.

Celia Kerslake

TALÂT SAIT HALMAN

1932-2014



It came as a great shock to learn that Professor Talât Sait Halman, who had given the BATAS John Martin Lecture as recently as January 2014, had passed away on 5 December, at the age of 82. It would be difficult to think of any other person who has done so much to promote Turkish culture internationally. His 70 published books include many translations, anthologies and surveys of Turkish literature down the centuries, and he never tired of giving lectures to audiences all over the world, making Turkish literature accessible with a unique combination of affection and humour, and always emphasising the aspects of his subject that appealed to universal human values. Professor Halman had been named Turkey's Ambassador for Cultural Affairs in 1980-82. He effectively continued in this role in an honorary capacity for the rest of his life, including the years when he was fully entitled to a quiet retirement.

Educated at Robert College (Istanbul) and Columbia University, Talât Halman combined an academic career with various official positions. He taught at Columbia, Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania and New York University and, from 1998 until his death, at Bilkent University, Ankara, where he headed the Department of Turkish Literature, which he himself had founded. The department, with its exclusive focus on postgraduate studies, soon established itself as one of the most innovative centres of research on Turkish literature, with its *Journal of Turkish Literature* being the only English-language scholarly journal in this field.

Talât Halman was Turkey's first Minister of Culture for five months in 1971. From 1991 to 1995 he served as an elected member of the UNESCO Executive Board in Paris. At the time of his death he was President of the Turkish National Committee of UNICEF.

Another great interest throughout his life was Shakespeare and his reception in Turkey. Professor Halman's publications include a book on Shakespeare's heroes and clowns, as well as Turkish translations of his complete sonnets and (as recently as May 2014) of his narrative poems. BATAS was greatly honoured by Professor Halman's agreeing to travel to London, with the sponsorship of the Turkish Embassy, to give the 2014 John Martin Lecture, on *Shakespearean Art in the Turkish Heart: The Bard in Ottoman Times and in the Turkish Republic*. This was delivered with characteristic wit and charm, and was very well received by an audience that included a large number of Turkish students.

Talât Bey was a most urbane and courteous individual, a great humanist with an extraordinarily broad knowledge of the world's cultures. Both as a scholar and a gentleman he will be sadly missed by lovers of Turkey and Turkish culture throughout the world.

Celia Kerslake



BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR TURKISH AREA STUDIES

Twenty-sixth Spring Symposium

St Antony's College, Oxford

Nissan Lecture Theatre, St Antony's College, 62 Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6JF

Saturday, 25 April 2015

Programme

- 10.00-10.40** Coffee, registration (in the Hilda Besse Building)
- 10.50** Opening remarks (Michael Lake, President of BATAS)
- 11.00** **Dr Zeynep Kezer** (University of Newcastle)
State penetration in eastern Turkey: Landscape, memory and identity in the early Republican years
- 11.50** **Dr Pheroze Unwalla** (York University, Toronto)
From battlefield to 'theme park': Centenary reflections on the transformation of Gallipoli
- 12.45-14.00** Break for lunch
- 14.10** **Professor Sami Zubaida** (Birkbeck, University of London)
Turkey, alcohol and Islam
- 15.00** **Antony Wynn** (Freelance historian; author of *Three Camels to Smyrna*)
Carpets in peace and war: The Oriental Carpet Manufacturers of Smyrna from 1908 to the early Republic
- 16.00-16.30** Tea
- 16.40** **Annual General Meeting**

Abstracts of Symposium Contributions 2015

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School of Architecture Planning and Landscape, University of Newcastle

State Penetration in Eastern Turkey: Landscape, Memory and Identity in the Early Republican Years

In the early years of the republic, Turkey's leaders were adamant about expanding the physical apparatus of the state ostensibly to modernize the country and achieve national prosperity through market consolidation. Less publicized were their goals of bolstering the state's authority and assimilating – often by force – recalcitrant populations whose communal allegiances they regarded as anathema to the unitary principles of nationalism they espoused. This was especially true of the mountainous region along the banks of the Euphrates River, just on the margins of the state's reach, which who eluded central authority for a long time and was home to a variegated population of Turks plus a mix of Armenians, Kurds and Syriacs. In this presentation, I examine, through a spatial lens, how new infrastructural projects, educational institutions, administrative offices, and military installations were deployed to advance state-penetration and expedite national integration in this historically impregnable region. These interventions forever transformed the region's physical geography and its relationship to the rest of the country. Moreover, despite formal similarities with their counterparts elsewhere in Turkey, these facilities engendered distinctive practices of implicit and explicit violence intended to subdue indigenous populations and erase the cultural landscapes they animated. I argue that a close scrutiny of these new state-spaces and how they mediated state-citizen encounters not only reveals the limits of central authority and the brittleness of official ideology, but also helps us understand the unforeseen and unintended consequences borne out of violent assimilationist policies.

Dr Pheroze Unwalla, pu1@soas.ac.uk

Modern Middle East History, Department of History, York University, Toronto

From Battlefield to 'Theme Park': Centenary Reflections on the Transformation of Gallipoli

In 1915, the First World War came to the Gallipoli Peninsula in the form of a long and brutal conflict between the Ottoman military and the combined forces of the British and French empires. The Ottomans would win that Battle of Gallipoli, but the peninsula itself was ravaged, marked by shrapnel and trenches, unburied bodies and half-destroyed abandoned villages. Fast forward one hundred years and the Gallipoli Peninsula is a changed space, replete with touristic amenities and Turkish and foreign commemorative structures attracting each year thousands of domestic and foreign travelers whose presence stirs controversy.

Speaking on ANZAC Day, Dr Unwalla will relay the story of Gallipoli's metamorphosis from war-torn battlefield to solemn memorial and pilgrimage site to, finally, what one recent observer disapprovingly termed a 'theme park'. This will reveal the processes that catalyzed this profound and fateful transformation with a focus on two underlying factors: (1) A deep and abiding sense of Turkish shame and territoriality formed in reaction to the peninsula's immense foreign commemorative presence established in

the 1920s; and (2) a more recent Turkish quest for tourism dollars which seeks *inter alia* to enhance that same foreign presence.

What this course of development from 1915 to 2015 has physically wrought at Gallipoli is a contentious matter. What it reveals is dramatic, calling into question Turkish national sovereignty over the peninsula, the depth of Turkish-foreign friendship at Gallipoli, and the treatment of one of Turkey's most significant and treasured sites.

Professor Sami Zubaida, s.zubaida@bbk.ac.uk

Politics & Sociology, Birkbeck & Food Studies Centre, SOAS

Turkey, alcohol & Islam

Alcohol and the venues of its consumption constitute potent symbols in Muslim contexts, historically and to the present. They define social boundaries, not only between Muslims and others, but between Muslims. Wine, *boza* and then *raki* feature as such symbols at various points in Ottoman and Turkish history, with the diverse populations of the region. It comes into public prominence in modern times, from the 19th century age of reform, then in the secular Republic, becoming a marker in the contests over religion and cultural identity. Drink came to symbolise modernity and civilization (*mediniyat*), and in the secularity of the Republic. Alcohol, then, assumes particular significance in the contests over the pro-religious policies of the current government. The lecture will also take up questions on the relation between food and drink and the mezze culture, and the particular significance of fish and seafood in that repertoire.

Antony Wynn, wynn@wynndom.demon.co.uk

Free-lance writer & lecturer, retrd from Oriental Carpet Manufacturers. London

Carpet Manufacturers in Smyrna 1908

The Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Company was formed in Smyrna by an amalgamation of a number of Levantine companies engaged in carpet weaving, yarn spinning and dye works. They formed a cartel which, by 1911, controlled about 90% of Turkish carpet exports. In the same year they expanded into Iran and later acquired a string of carpet weaving concerns along the Ganges. After 1922 they moved their operating base from Smyrna to London. Their sales branches extended over the American continent and Europe. Their archives reported on the historical and social factors which affected their business: the Turkish Constitution, the Balkan Wars, the Young Turks, the Great War, the Armenian affair, the Greek-Turkish war and the new Republic. The talk gives a brief overview of these events and will show, for example, how an Armenian village in Anatolia which had been busy weaving carpets for export suddenly finds its women out of work as a result of the banking crisis in New York of 1908. Also discussed will be the delicate situation of the Levantine families who stayed on during the Great War, and how they were protected by the Vali of Aydin and Smyrna. The talk will be illustrated.

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ELECTRONIC REVIEW.. .

BATAS Council is proposing an electronic version of this *Review* and would like to hear from anyone who is able to offer relevant technical advice.

Please contact

Keith Nuttall (nuttallkr@gmail.com) OR
Brian Beeley (bw.beeley@gmail.com) OR
Sigi Martin (sigimartin3@gmail.com) OR
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Request for contributions

TAS *Review* welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at bw.beeley@gmail.com and/or sigimartin3@gmail.com. Submissions for the Autumn issue would be particularly welcomed by 31 July 2015.

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