

Turkish Area Studies Review

Bulletin of the British Association for
Turkish Area Studies



www.batas.org.uk



The extra 2015 BATAS Lecture

Friday 27 November 2015 at 6.00 pm

Professor William Hale

Emeritus Professor of Turkish Politics at SOAS, London

on

Turkey: Two Elections and their Aftermath

In the

Khalili Lecture Theatre,
School of Oriental & African Studies,
University of London, Russell Square

For further information **and to reserve a seat** sees www.batas.org.uk

Spring Symposium 2016

April/May in Cambridge

Details will follow (see also www.batas.org.uk for more information)



CONTENTS

B Beeley & S-B Martin	2	Editorial
Ayşe Furlonger	3	Noteworthy Events

Politics, Society & Economics

Gamon McLellan	5	Turkey's Politics since March 2015
Clement Dodd	15	Update on Cyprus

From the BATAS Symposium

Pheroze Unwalla	21	Centenary reflections on the transformation of Gallipoli
Sami Zubaida	23	Turkey, alcohol and Islam
Antony Wynn	28	Carpets in peace and war

Art & Culture

Celia Kerlake	33	Aspects of poetry
Hande Eagle (interviewer)	39	Jamal Aliyev, musician
Gülay Yurday Michaels (poet)	43	<i>I Saw Mimosas by Chance in Londinium</i>
Gülay Yurday Michaels (translator)	43	<i>Londra'da Mimosalar gördüm Rasgele</i>

History

Semra Eren-Nijhar	44	Turks in Britain
Edward Flaxman	48	Railway Tragedy in 1871

Conferences, Workshops & Organisations

Christine Woodhead	46	Gibb Memorial Trust
Jane Beeley	48	National Library, Ankara
John Moreton	49	<i>Merhaba to Turkish in Leeds</i>

Book Reviews & Publications (& a small vote of thanks)

Cumhur Bekar	52	Cihan Yüksel Muslu <i>The Ottomans and the Mamluks</i>
William Hale	54	Gail Dallas Hook, <i>Protectorate Cyprus: British Imperial Power before World War I</i>
David Boxen	56	Zülfü Livaneli, <i>Son Ada (The Last Island)</i>
Yannis Moutsis	59	Vally Lytra, <i>When Greeks and Turks Meet</i>
Jill Sindall	61	Alyson Wharton, <i>The Architects of Ottoman Constantinople</i>
Brian Beeley	64	Tim Symonds, <i>Sherlock Holmes and The Sword of Osman</i>
Sigrid-B Martin	65	Vote of thanks to Professor Clement Dodd
Arin Bayraktaroğlu	65	Recent & Forthcoming Publications

Postscriptum

Gamon McLellan	67	Kenan Evren & Süleyman Demirel
----------------	----	--------------------------------

Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.

Editorial

Friends of Turkey have been horrified by the recent bomb outrage at Ankara railway station. Further dismay has followed the renewed violence between Kurds and official forces in several parts of the country. For their part, Turks watch their neighbour, Syria, continue to descend into many-sided conflict which has pushed hundreds of thousands from there and from Iraq to seek refuge in Anatolia or even to face the perilous journey onwards towards the European Union. Signs are that Ankara is willing to play a more pro-active role in the regulation of migrant and refugee movement in addition to the huge burden Turkey is carrying already. Within the country there is political uncertainty with two national elections only months apart and economic changes include some weakening in the value of the Lira.

Given the range and complexity of current challenges, this issue of the *TAS Review* offers a substantial account, by Gamon McLellan, of issues facing Turkey. We also have contributions from speakers at our BATAS Symposium in Oxford earlier this year ranging from reflections on Gallipoli to Islam and alcohol to Carpets in War and Peace. To counterbalance political aspects there is under the heading of 'Art & Culture' a substantial contribution on Turkish poetry by the BATAS Chair Celia Kerslake and an interview with a young Turkish cellist. We are grateful to all the other authors too. The six book reviews will keep the reader up-to-date.

BATAS is pleased to develop links with the British Institute at Ankara; we now exchange Council representatives. On 14 May a BIAA Roundtable Discussion on *Turkish Studies in the UK* was convened and chaired by Professor Deniz Kandiyoti at the British Academy. Some twenty people attended, most of them academics. It was noted that there had been a decline in the number of posts and degree courses dedicated to Turkish studies and that expertise on Turkey is increasingly found outside academe although there is now more world-class scholarly activity on Turkish topics in UK universities, much of it 'hidden' in discipline-based departments. At the meeting BATAS was recognised as the only formal body representing the interests of Turkish studies in this country and the four BATAS members at the Roundtable stressed our potential to play a co-ordinating role. Copies of the *TAS Review* were distributed, along with our list of academics involved in Turkish studies at UK universities which would develop into a database for networking.

A publication such as this *Review* depends on contributions from a number of people. One of these, Clement Dodd, gets a special 'vote of thanks' in this issue. Professor Dodd has been a strenuous supporter of BATAS and its *Review* since we first existed. We hope he will continue to up-date us on Cyprus. As ever we look to new contributors who might offer an article, book review, or an account of some personal experience or interest in matters Turkish. And we would welcome offers from potential proof-readers to join our current – and much appreciated – team.

Noteworthy Events

by Ayşe Furlonger

MUSIC

A Cosmopolitan Journey Around The Mediterranean And Beyond: *Melange* – SOAS Concert Series

Date and Time: 13 November 2015 / 19:00 – 21:00
Venue: Brunei Gallery Lecture Theatre

Melange seamlessly blend music from North Africa, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, and Greece with Central Asian folk melodies, across to the fiery tango of Argentina and the street choro of Brazil. Their fresh approach adds touches of jazz improvisation, dynamic arrangements and on-stage interaction. Formed by cellist Shirley Smart on returning from ten years in Jerusalem playing and studying the musics of the region, *Melange* is now a true reflection of modern cosmopolitanism and comprises musicians from Greece, Spain, Morocco, Iraq, Italy and the UK. They will perform as an acoustic quartet of oud, cello, guitar and percussion, with tracks from their first CD, 'Random Roads' and their second album due for release this autumn.



ART

Afghan girl' photographer opens exhibition in Turkey

Date: 16 September 2015 to 13 December 2015
Venue: CerModern, Altinsoy Cad. No:3, Altındağ/Ankara, Turkey



American photographer Steve McCurry, who took the iconic photo of an Afghan refugee girl, will give a talk in Ankara on 15 September at CerModern and open his exhibition showcasing his most well-known photographs taken in different parts of the world over the last 30 years.

The award-winning photographer became famous after his December 1984 photo depicting Afghan girl Sharbat Gula, who was 12 years old at the time, which was published on the cover of the June 1985 edition of *National Geographic*.

Images of Our Time Works from the Academy of Fine Arts in Sarajevo

Date: 4 September 2015 – 1 November 2015
Venue: Pera Museum Meşrutiyet Caddesi No.65, 34443 Tepebaşı - Beyoğlu - İstanbul

Since its foundation, Pera Museum has supported young artists and contemporary art through collaborations with many universities and art institutions both in Turkey and abroad. Now, in its tenth year, Pera Museum is hosting young artists from Bosnia Herzegovina. With the collaboration of Sarajevo Academy of Fine Arts and the support of IKASD, this exhibition brings together works in various media created

by undergraduate and graduate students, as well as graduates of the six faculties of the academy. It includes paintings, sculptures, prints, and graphic and product design. Curated by Professor Aida Abadžić Hodžić from the Faculty of Philosophy of Sarajevo University, the exhibition surveys contemporary art in Bosnia Herzegovina. Note: IKASD is the Istanbul Kültürler Arası Sanat Diyalogları Derneği (Istanbul Intercultural Art Dialogues Association).

EXHIBITIONS

Woven Luxuries

Indian, Persian and Turkish Velvets from the Indictor Collection

Date: 13 March 2015 – 1 November 2015

Venue: Asian Art Museum, 200 Larkin Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

Adults \$15, concessions \$10, children 12 and under free.

Silk velvets were the pre-eminent luxury textile in many parts of the Islamic world and Europe, especially from the 15th century onwards. They were used for clothing, carpets, spreads, bolsters, hangings, and exchanged as diplomatic gifts. The eleven textiles in this exhibition are selections from a private New York collection, providing a glimpse into the richness and diversity of Iranian, Indian and Turkish silk velvets. Spanning three distinct cultural areas with their own design sensibilities and tastes, this group of textiles showcases the different techniques of velvet production and their varied uses.

34th Istanbul Book Fair

Date: 7 and 15 November 2015

TÜYAP Fair and Convention Center, Büyükçekmece, İstanbul



Organized by TÜYAP Fairs in partnership with the Turkish Publishers Association, the 34th International Istanbul Book Fair will be held at the TÜYAP Fair and Convention Center. The theme this year be 'Humor: Looking at Life with a Smile'.

The Fair is also preparing a program to commemorate the 100th birthday of Aziz Nesin with interviews and panels on his literary significance, life and works. 'A Man Larger than Life: Aziz Nesin 1915-2015', an exhibition prepared by the Nesin Foundation in association with curator Işın Önol, will be open throughout the Fair to educate viewers on the literature, humor, world view, political stance and legacy of Nesin. The Fair will be held concurrently with the 25th Istanbul Art Fair-ARTIST 2015.

TALKS AND LECTURES


Helen of Troy - Goddess, Princess, Seductress

Date and Time: 17 November 2015 / 18:30 - 21:00

Venue: The British Academy 10 Carlton House Terrace London SW1Y 5AH

Pre-booking available. Ticket: £ 10.00 (free for members!); maximum tickets per person: 8

Following a decade of research Bettany Hughes will explore the figure of Helen of Troy in her cultural, literary and historical guises. The 'World's Desire' – as an image of Helen – has been a constant presence in the human imagination for 27 centuries; Hughes will chart those points in the archaeological record where fact and fiction graze. H.Rider Haggard and Andrew Lang in 1890 published *The World's Desire*, a fantasy novel named for Helen and recounting her part in the story of Odysseus.



The Armenian Tragedy A Commemorative Symposium

Date and Time: 29 October 2015 / 13:30 - 20:45

Venue: M2 Boardroom, University of Brighton, Grand Parade Building, Brighton BN2 0JY

No charge for admission but Advance Registration is essential.

To book a place email memorynarrativehistories@brighton.ac.uk

This series of presentations by scholarly researchers will construct a narrative of Armenian experience in the late Ottoman Empire: from the cultural efflorescence before the First World War, as recorded in photographs and memoirs, through the tragic sufferings and deportations of the years 1915-17, to the struggles of survivors after the Armistice.

Speakers include Professor Armen T Marsoobian (Southern Connecticut University), Professor Bob Brecher (University of Brighton), Ara Sarafian (Gomidas Institute, London), Ari Sekeryan (Oxford University), Helin Anahit (Middlesex University) and Vatche Simonian (London)


ARCHEOLOGY

Ancient Urartian storage containers found in Van

Excavation work has been continuing on Van's Çavuştepe Castle, which dates back to the Urartian era and is one of the most popular tourist attractions in the province. Among discoveries in the castle are ancient storage containers, known as 'pithoi', cereals, butter and wine were kept in these containers, which date back 2,800 years. Located in the



Gülpınar district, 20 kilometers from the Van city centre, the castle was built in the heyday of the Urartian Kingdom by the King Sardur II. The walls of the castle have survived, together with its cisterns and pioneer sewer systems, temples and palace structures. Yüzüncü Yıl University Archaeology Department Professor Rafet Çavuşoğlu said that "During this year's work, we unearthed storage buildings made up of two parts reinforced after fires and we have found 120 pithoi containers, where cereals, sesame oil, wine and other food were kept, each with a capacity of 300 kilograms."



Turkey's Politics since March 2015: a Survey¹

by

Gamon McLellan, SOAS - University of London

Over 100 people² were killed and many more seriously injured on 10 October when two bombs exploded outside the main Ankara railway station, in a crowd gathering for a rally calling for an end to fighting between the PKK and the security forces. This happened three weeks before the 1st November parliamentary elections and was the worst such incident in the history of the Turkish Republic. Three days of national mourning were declared. *Cumhuriyet* newspaper reported that 694 people had been killed in political violence since the 7 June election. The rally had been organised by trades unions and professional associations; many of the victims were supporters of the HDP (Peoples' Democracy Party), which had been calling for the violence to end. The same day the KCK³ announced a unilateral ceasefire in the PKK campaign against the Turkish state.⁴ The following day, however, the Turkish military bombed the PKK, and two soldiers died in clashes with the PKK in Erzurum.

The political process throughout 2015 has been dominated by the Kurdish question – both by the ongoing issues of Turkey's own Kurdish population, but also by policy towards the Syrian Kurds and specifically towards the PYD (Democratic Union Party, the principal Syrian Kurdish political grouping) and the armed People's Protection Units (YPG) which have been fighting Islamic State⁵ forces in northern Syria. Since last year, the AK Party, and in particular Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have expressed views about Syria radically different from those of the United States.⁶ Turkey's position has shifted somewhat: Ankara had initially ruled out any dealing with the Syrian leader.⁷ In September, however, on his return from Moscow President Erdoğan joined other western leaders in agreeing that Bashar al Assad could be involved in the transition to a new regime in Syria, although he could not be part of what was to follow.⁸

But on the fighting between Syria's Kurds and the Islamic State, the views of Washington and Ankara still seemed far apart: on 21 September, asked about policy differences with Turkey, the US State Department spokesman stated: "We don't consider the YPG a terrorist organization, and they have proven successful against ISIL inside Syria."⁹ President Erdoğan

¹ © Gamon McLellan, published *Turkish Area Studies Review* 25, Spring 2015, pp.7-15

² The death toll was still rising at the time of writing. On 11th October HDP joint leader Selahattin Demirtaş said 128 of "our comrades" had died. Some 60 injured were said to be intensive care.

³ *Koma Civakên Kurdistan* (Union of Kurdish Communities), umbrella group incorporating the PKK

⁴ Provided, that is, there were no attacks "against the Kurdish movement, people and guerrilla forces."
<http://kurdishdailynews.org/2015/10/10/8896/>

⁵ There has been widespread discussion about how to refer to this organisation. As the acronyms widely in use – ISIS, ISIL, the Turkish İŞİD and the Arabic DA'ISH (DAİŞ/DEAŞ in Turkish spelling: Erdoğan's preferred acronym) - all stand for Islamic State (in Iraq and the Levant/Sham), "Islamic State" is used here, without any judgement implied

⁶ See "Turkey's Politics since October 2014: a Survey" *Turkish Area Studies Review* 25, Spring 2015 and "Turkey's Politics since March 2014: a Survey" *Turkish Area Studies Review* 24, Autumn 2014

⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu had said shaking hands with Assad would be like doing so with Hitler – see "Turkey's Politics since October 2014: a Survey" *Turkish Area Studies Review* 25, Spring 2015

⁸ *Radikal* 24th September 2015

⁹ John Kirby, State Department spokesman

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/09/247117.htm#TURKEY>

responded: “the PYD, YPG – they’re all terrorist organisations”,¹⁰ reiterating what he had said a year earlier when he equated the PYD with the PKK.¹¹ Ankara, which had been pushing for a demilitarised area and/or no-fly zone on the Syrian side of the frontier, has consistently viewed the PKK and its Syrian Kurdish affiliates as the real threat in the region, rather than the jihadist groupings, including the Islamic State. However, in early October Russia started its bombing campaign, ostensibly against the Islamic State, but hitting Assad’s opponents indiscriminately, diminishing the significance of the US-Turkish policy differences. Two violations of Turkish airspace by Russian warplanes, described as “looking non-accidental” by Jens Stoltenberg, Nato Secretary General,¹² illustrated the potential dangers of the Russian involvement. So did Turkish complaints that Russian radar had locked on to Turkish military aircraft. President Erdoğan condemned Russian actions in Syria and warned that Turkey was Russia’s largest natural gas consumer: it could get its gas elsewhere and find another partner to build the Akkuyu nuclear power station in Mersin.¹³ Turkey may have a cold winter: there is no clear alternative gas supplier.

Throughout the summer, refugees have been fleeing the appalling situation in Syria. The official UNHCR figure on 25 August for refugees in Turkey was 1,938,999. Much has happened since that date. In the Aegean coast area, people smugglers have been organising crossings to the islands, and local businesses have been selling life jackets and inflatable dinghies – which are far from sea-worthy – to those desperate to enter the European Union. Too often, the consequences have been tragic. The fate of the young Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi, whose body was found on the beach at Bodrum after an overloaded dinghy capsized minutes into its attempt to reach Kos, demonstrated the awful risks incurred by the refugees. In September, several thousand Syrians were camped on the land frontier in Edirne until the authorities bussed some 1,500 back to areas in Anatolia. The Russian bombing campaign is likely further to swell the numbers of Syrian refugees entering Turkey.

The AK Party government’s response to the plight of Syrian Kurds under Islamic State occupation in Kobani in autumn 2014 had bitterly angered many of Turkey’s Kurds and led to widespread protests and clashes, but there had been optimism at the start of 2015 that there might be some agreement with Turkey’s Kurdish leaders. This had culminated in the 28 February meeting between AK Party and HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) representatives in the Dolmabahçe Palace with its 10-point plan for a way forward.¹⁴ The HDP, however, decided to contest the June 2015 election as a party, thereby risking all if it failed to clear the 10% nationwide threshold. By exceeding the threshold, however, it stood to gain more seats than if its candidates had stood as independents: the principal loser would be the AK Party, whose majority since 2002 has been repeatedly boosted by the elimination of smaller parties. This appears to have alarmed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – as President no longer formally a party member, but in reality still very much its leader. Once again, in the run-up to an election, he opted for a trenchantly nationalist line in his Balıkesir speech of 15 March,¹⁵ which marked the real beginning of the election campaign and set the tone of the AK Party strategy for both the June and November general elections. There had never, he said, been a Kurdish problem in Turkey – Kurdish citizens of Turkey may have had some problems. He called for 400 AK Party MPs to be elected, sufficient to introduce a new constitution with an executive presidency to build the new Turkey. There would be “one nation, one flag, one

¹⁰ *Radikal* 24 September 2015

http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/cumhurbaskani_erdogan_bayram_namazini_emirgan_camiinde_kildi-1439453

¹¹ *Hürriyet* 18 October 2014

¹² 6 October 2015 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_123471.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹³ <http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1829066-erdogan-akkuyuyu-ruslar-yapmazsa-baskasi-yapar>

¹⁴ See “Turkey’s Politics since October 2014: a Survey” *Turkish Area Studies Review* 25, Spring 2015

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

homeland, one state.”¹⁶ words calculated to infuriate and inflame many Kurdish voters and those committed to a political resolution to Kurdish grievances.

Lack of presidential impartiality became a significant issue in both the June and November election campaigns. On 30 March Erdoğan confirmed that Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had consulted him in detail on the contents of the AK Party manifesto for the June election and that he had read the document. A few hours later he denied that he had read it – the AK Party leader had, he said, consulted him on the contents of the manifesto before it was written and he would be happy to confer with other party leaders on their manifestos if they wished to consult him.¹⁷ On 16 May, another round in the public row between Erdoğan and the Doğan Media Group ensued following a headline on the *Hürriyet* website “World in shock! Death sentence for president who got 52% of the vote”. The story was the sentencing of Muhammad al-Morsi in Egypt – Erdoğan took the headline as implying that he could face the same fate and railed against the newspaper. *Hürriyet* addressed an open letter to the President in both its Turkish and English editions, pointing out that Erdoğan himself had used the same words in a strong public criticism of the Egyptian court.¹⁸

The row escalated when *The New York Times* took up the story, describing the President’s accusation as “distorted and absurd” in its editorial ‘Dark Clouds over Turkey’.¹⁹ Erdoğan responded in a speech in İstanbul on 30 May²⁰ to mark the anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of the City, when he lashed out at *The New York Times*, which, he said, had attacked Abdülhamid II as a despot in the 1890s and was now following the same line, hand in glove with the ‘Armenian lobby’ and ‘Pennsylvania’ (i.e. Fethullah Gülen). The other major target of presidential invective was the charismatic HDP joint leader Selahattin Demirtaş, following the latter’s terse speech on 17 March when he told Erdoğan “We shall not make you President”, indicating the HDP would block the plan for an executive presidency.²¹ This became a slogan in the HDP June campaign. In October, Demirtaş’ fellow joint leader Figen Yüksekdağ went further, telling Erdoğan: “Once again, you won’t succeed... We said ‘We’re not going to make you President’. Now we’re saying ‘We’re not going to make you a dictator’.”²²

Observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported that in general the 7 June elections were organized professionally, and that during the campaign fundamental freedoms were generally respected. But they expressed serious concern that media and journalists critical of the ruling party were subject to pressure and intimidation. The President, they pointed out, “played an active role in the election campaign, even though under the Constitution he is obliged to be non-partisan and perform his duties without bias.” He attended, they said, “an extraordinary number of public events as head of state, along with local officials; however, these events were used as opportunities to campaign in favour of the ruling party and to criticize opposition figures.” They noted that there were isolated cases of cancellation or restrictions of rallies of opposition parties in favour of events organized for the President or the Prime Minister, and that “the campaign was tainted by a

¹⁶ Text downloaded from Turkish presidency website on 17 March <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/29721/bolgemizde-ve-dunyada-yasanan-donusumun-sancilarini-cekenler-turkiyeyi-takip-ediyor-ve-rehber-olarak-goruyor.html>

¹⁷ *Cumhuriyet* 30 March 2015

¹⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/29042781.asp>
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hurriyets-address-to-the-turkish-president.aspx?pageID=238&nID=82627&NewsCatID=339>

¹⁹ 22nd May http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/opinion/dark-clouds-over-turkey.html?_r=0

²⁰ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32584/istanbulun-fethinin-562-yil-donumu-kutlamalarinda-yaptiklari-konusma.html>

²¹ See “Turkey’s Politics since October 2014: a Survey” *Turkish Area Studies Review* 25, Spring 2015

²² *Cumhuriyet* 2 October 2015

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/380053/Kandil_e_Gandi_li_mesaj.html

high number of attacks on party offices and serious incidents of physical attacks.”²³ A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reiterated these criticisms in respect of the 1 November election campaign,²⁴ which they said was conducted in a dramatically changed environment amidst clashes and further polarisation.

	<u>2011 election</u>	<u>2011 election</u>	<u>6th June 2015</u>	<u>7th June election</u>	<u>7th June election</u>	<u>3rd Oct 2015</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>MPs elected</u>	<u>MPs in place</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>MPs elected</u>	<u>MPs in place</u>
AKP	49.83	327	311	40.87	258	258
CHP	25.98	135	125	24.95	132	131
MHP	13.01	53	52	16.29	80	79
HDP			29	13.12	80	80
Ind	6.57	35	13	0	0	2
Others			5			
SP	1.27			2.06		
Total MPs		550	535		550	550

The table shows how the main parties performed on 7 June.²⁵ On the eve of the election, the AK Party had had 311 members in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, down from the 327 elected in 2011. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) had similarly lost seats as members had died or resigned the whip: 29 of the successful independent candidates in 2011 had by 2015 become HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party) members. Not shown on the table are 5 parties which on 6 June had 1 member each in the assembly, 4 of them MPs who had resigned from the major parties. The other was Emine Ayna of the Democratic Regions Party.²⁶ Only two of these parties contested the June election.

Although the AK Party had enjoyed an overall majority between 2011 and 2015, they had been short of the 330 members needed to submit a constitutional change to referendum (367 are required to amend the constitution without a referendum). Now, however, they had only 258 members in the 550-member assembly. The loss of the party’s overall majority was followed by a prolonged and uncharacteristic period of silence from the presidential palace. The result was also disappointing for the CHP, while the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) scored a significant increase. The HDP’s risky strategy of standing as a party (rather than as individual independent candidates) had proved successful, more than doubling its representation in the assembly. Some 16 other parties contested the election – none won anything approaching half a percent of the vote, with the exception of the Saadet Partisi.²⁷ The SP won 2.06% of the vote – an improvement on the party’s 1.27% achievement in 2011. Some 18% of the newly elected MPs are women.²⁸ 16% of both AK Party and CHP representatives are women. The MHP has only 4 women deputies (5% of its 80 MPs). It may have an even smaller representation of women after the 1 November election, as Meral Akşener, deputy Speaker of the Assembly in two parliamentary sessions²⁹ and a former

²³ OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw 18th August 2015. *Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections 7 June 2015 OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report* <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/177926>

²⁴ Report 7th October <HTTP://ASSEMBLY.COE.INT/NW/XML/NEWS/NEWS-VIEW-EN.ASP?NEWSID=5820&LANG=2&CAT=31>

²⁵ All these election figures are the final official results from the Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (Supreme Electoral Authority Board). The state of the parties in the assembly on the eve of the election was taken from the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) website, downloaded on 6th June.

²⁶ Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi. The Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) was renamed in July 2014. Most members then joined HDP, but one MP, Emine Ayna, did not.

²⁷ Felicity Party – the Islamist party founded by Necmettin Erbakan loyalists in 2001, the same year as the AK Party was established

²⁸ These figures from the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) website, downloaded on 28th September 2015

²⁹ The 23 (2007-2011) and 24 (2011-2015)

Interior Minister,³⁰ was not selected as a MHP candidate for November. The party with the highest proportion of women in the current parliament is the HDP, with 32 members (40%).

Neither the CHP nor the MHP appeared to have had a strategy or plan in place for a hung parliament. Immediately after the election, speculation was intense. One possible outcome was an AKP-MHP coalition bringing together Turkey's two conservative parties. Opponents of AK Party rule saw the opportunity for an opposition alliance of the CHP, MHP and HDP. Both scenarios would have produced a majority government. The latter would have enabled the opposition parties to force the President out of his controversial new palace with a presidency conducted along traditional lines. These scenarios proved short-lived. Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, argued that the most logical alliance would be between the AK Party and the HDP, given their joint involvement in the process which had produced February's Dolmabahçe meeting. In such a scenario, Bahçeli declared, the MHP would be the main opposition.³¹ In the ensuing weeks, he set out conditions for entering a coalition with the AK Party, including an end to the so-called Kurdish peace process, vigorous prosecution of ex-ministers and others (including Erdoğan's son Bilal) involved in the corruption probe which started on 17 December 2013, and a return to a non-political presidency operating within constitutional guidelines.³² He explicitly ruled out any deal between the MHP and the HDP, which his party regarded as apologists for the PKK.

Meanwhile, the AK Party government remained in office. The President did not commission Davutoğlu, as leader of the largest party, to form a new government until 9 July, 32 days after the election.³³ A long process of negotiation ensued between the AK Party and the CHP, but by mid-August, when Davutoğlu had still had no success in forming a coalition with anyone, Erdoğan made it clear that he would not have the time to commission those who "did not know the Beştepe address" a reference to the refusal of the opposition leaders to enter his new presidential palace, built without planning permission on the land of the Atatürk Forest Farm at Beştepe.³⁴ He then invoked article 116 of the Constitution which provides for fresh elections if no government is formed within 45 days, thus avoiding having to ask the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to form a government after Davutoğlu returned his commission.

Under article 114 of the Constitution, a provisional government then had to be formed of MPs from the different parties in Parliament under a Prime Minister appointed by the President. Davutoğlu was reappointed, the CHP and the MHP refused to take part, and the new government duly took over on 29 August. As required by the Constitution, the three ministries of Justice, Transport and the Interior are held by non-party figures. Other ministers are also from a non-party background, notably the new Foreign Minister Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu (promoted from Permanent Under Secretary) and Ayşen Gürcan, Minister of the Family and Social Affairs, who is Turkey's first headscarved minister. Two ministers were appointed from the HDP: Ali Haydar Konca who became Minister for the European Union and Müslüm Doğan, Development Minister

Essentially, though, it has been an AK Party dominated government, with Mehmet Şimşek remaining Finance Minister and Vecdi Gönül Defence Minister (he held the job from 2002-2011, returning to it in July when his successor İsmet Yılmaz was elected Speaker of Parliament). Tuğrul Türkeş defied his party to accept the job of Deputy Prime Minister and was promptly expelled from the MHP.³⁵ His colleague Meral Akşener was also offered a job

³⁰ 1996-97

³¹ *Bugün* 17 June 2015

³² *Cumhuriyet* 17 August 2015

³³ *Cumhuriyet* 9 July 2015

³⁴ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/34128/biz-emri-dagdan-almadik-biz-emri-haktan-ve-halktan-aldik.html>

³⁵ He was subsequently adopted as an AK Party candidate for the November elections, but on 6 October he was listed as an independent on the Turkish Grand National Assembly website, suggesting he had not by then formally joined the AK Party

but turned it down.³⁶ Thus Ahmet Davutoğlu had remained at the head of a predominantly AK Party government continuously since the 7 June election without ever receiving a vote of confidence and may carry on as such well after 1 November.

All these party political manoeuvres, however, were totally overshadowed by events on either side of Turkey's south-east frontier. Four days after the election, the KCK announced in Qandil, the PKK stronghold in northern Iraq, that because of "Turkey's never ending attacks against the Kurds" and the government's "intention to wage a war against the Kurdish people", it was abandoning the cease-fire announced in 2013 by the imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan.³⁷ In May, HDP offices in Adana and Mersin had been bombed, and there had been explosions at an HDP rally in Diyarbakır two days before the election.³⁸ In July, events escalated with a suicide bombing, blamed on the Islamic State, at a municipal cultural centre in Suruç (Urfa province): 33 people died. Rumours spread that Turkey's national intelligence agency MİT had been involved in that incident.³⁹ These came in the wake of photographs in *Cumhuriyet* apparently showing that the TIR trucks belonging to MİT which were intercepted in January 2014 on their way to Syria had indeed been carrying arms and ammunition hidden under medical supplies.⁴⁰ A few days later came a story alleging that MİT had organised a bus convoy to transport Islamic State fighters and munitions from one location in northern Syria through Turkish territory and back across the frontier into Syria, bypassing PYD-YPG territory.⁴¹ This story was denied by the government. Meanwhile on 22 July an apparent reprisal for the Suruç attack killed two policemen in their homes in Ceylanpınar (Urfa province).

Against this background, Washington and Ankara reached an understanding. On 23 July, Turkey agreed to cooperate with the United States in launching air strikes against the Islamic State, allowing US warplanes to fly from İncirlik airbase near Adana.⁴² At the same time, Ankara started a major operation against the PKK both in northern Iraq and in Turkey – which caused concern in Washington, which saw the Syrian Kurdish PYD-YPG – affiliates of the PKK – as valuable assets against Islamic State. Air strikes and cross-border artillery bombardments against the PKK in northern Iraq were accompanied by police operations inside Turkey, rounding up suspected supporters of the PKK, the Islamic State and the DHKP-C.⁴³ This provoked retaliation. In İstanbul on 10 August, a suicide bomber drove a vehicle loaded with explosives into a police station, and shots were fired at the US Consulate General. The DHKP-C said a woman detained for this belonged to their organisation.⁴⁴ Nine people were killed in separate incidents across the country that day.⁴⁵ The violence intensified in September, with 16 Turkish soldiers killed and 6 wounded in a PKK attack in

³⁶ *Milliyet* 26 August 2015 quoted her as saying "How could they dare offer me a ministry? They know very well I can't be bought." <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/meral-aksener-kimdir--gundem-2108112/>

³⁷ <http://kurdishdailynews.org/2015/07/11/pkk-declares-the-death-of-turkish-kurdish-peace-process/>

³⁸ *Financial Times* 18th May and 5th June 2015

³⁹ *Taraf* 25 July 2015 <http://www.taraf.com.tr/politika/chpden-suruc-katliami-icin-sok-iddia-mit-biliyordu/>
Cumhuriyet 3 August 2015

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/336043/Suruc_bombacisi_MiT_kontrolunde_Suriye_ye_gidip_gelmis.html A detailed account and analysis of the violent events in the south east is to be found in Jenkins, Gareth, 2015.

"Erdoğan's War: The Causes and Consequences of the Upsurge in Kurdish Violence" *Turkey Analyst* vol. 8, no. 15, 20 August 2015 <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/427-erdogans-war-causes-and-consequences-of-the-upsurge-in-kurdish-violence.html>

⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet* 29 May 2015

⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet* 11 June 2015 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/296432/Devlet_isi_yapiyorduk.html

⁴² *Washington Post* 23rd July 2015 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-agrees-to-allow-us-military-to-use-its-base-to-attack-islamic-state/2015/07/23/317f23aa-3164-11e5-a879-213078d03dd3_story.html

⁴³ Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front, a far-left militant organisation dating back to the late 70s, when it was known as Dev-Sol:

⁴⁴ *The Times* 11th August 2015

⁴⁵ *The Independent* 11th August 2015

Dağlıca in Hakkâri on 6 September. Two days later 13 police officers were killed in Iğdır when their minibus was bombed.⁴⁶

All this provoked widespread public anger against the PKK, and also against the HDP, despite condemnation of the violence from that party's leaders. Fury was also directed against Kurds generally. On 8 September, the slogan "We don't want a (security) operation: we want a massacre!" was recorded at a demonstration in Beşiktaş (Istanbul),⁴⁷ and in Antalya an angry mob was about to lynch a man they thought was Kurdish, until they discovered he was from Amasya.⁴⁸ Buses travelling to and from the Kurdish regions were stoned in Kayseri.⁴⁹

But anger was also expressed at the government. In August, a distraught lieutenant-colonel lashed out at the funeral of his brother, an army captain killed when Turkish forces were attacked by PKK fighters. "Those people who say 'I want to become a martyr' move around in palaces with 30 bodyguards and armoured cars... You should just go there and do it," he said.⁵⁰ This was aimed at the then Energy Minister Taner Yıldız who had appeared on television answering awkward questions about whether his sons had paid money to avoid military service. Yıldız had declared "It's my ambition, if God so decrees, to become a martyr to my faith, my nation, my country."⁵¹ Emine Güzel, mother of a gendarmerie major killed in a skirmish with PKK forces in Tunceli, was more explicit. At her son's funeral in Ankara she shouted: "Where are you, Tayyip? Their soldiers shot my son. If he wants, he can throw me in a cell. His PKK soldiers shot my son."⁵²

It became apparent to many observers that the PKK was working to a quite different agenda from the HDP, whose joint leader Selahattin Demirtaş came out strongly against what the PKK has been doing. On 24 September, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said he believed the PKK did not want the HDP to reach the 10% electoral threshold needed for parliamentary representation and was pursuing a 'parallel policy' to that of the President in the run-up to the 1 November election.⁵³

On 28 July, President Erdoğan called for the parliamentary immunity of leading HDP politicians to be lifted on the grounds that the party was involved with PKK terror,⁵⁴ a message he has repeated since in increasingly strident terms. On 20 September a large rally 'One Voice against Terror' assembled in İstanbul, with free public transport provided from all over the city. Erdoğan told the audience to vote on 1 November for 550 MPs who would – no matter which party they belonged to – be "local, national and who will work body and soul for this country".⁵⁵ The message was clear: vote for anyone but the HDP.

⁴⁶ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/30013893.asp>

⁴⁷ "Operasyon değil, katliam istiyoruz" *Cumhuriyet* 8th September 2015

[http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/364193/Besiktas ta fasist yuruyus...](http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/364193/Besiktas%20ta%20fasist%20yuruyus...) Operasyon degil katliam istiyoruz .html

⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 9th September 2015

⁴⁹ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dogu-dan-gelen-otobuslere-tasli-gundem-2114774/>

⁵⁰ *Milliyet* 23rd August 2015 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yarbay-agabeyin-isyani-gundem-2106521/>

⁵¹ *Radikal* 19th August 2015

⁵² *Cumhuriyet* 28th September 2015

[http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/377127/ O nun PKK li askerleri vurdu oglumu...](http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/377127/O_nun_PKK_li_askerleri_vurdu_oglumunu...) .html and *Sözcü* <http://www.sozcü.com.tr/2015/gundem/binbasi-yavuz-sonat-guzelin-annesinin-feryadi-944560/>

⁵³ Interviewed by Yusuf Özkan Lahey of the BBC Turkish Service

http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/09/150924_kilicdaroglu_bbc_mulakat

⁵⁴ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/33986/mill-birligimize-ve-kardesligimize-kastedenlerle-bir-cozum-sureci-mumkun-degil.html>

⁵⁵ "1 Kasım seçimlerinde Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne hangi partiden olursa olsun fark etmez 550 tane yerli, millî, bedeni ve kalbiyle bu ülke için çalışacak milletvekili göndermenizi istiyorum."

<http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/35408/bu-milleti-bin-yillik-yuruyusunden-kimse-alikoyamaz.html>

Meanwhile the situation in the Kurdish south east became increasingly grim, with the security forces imposing long curfew periods and the PKK and their associates controlling no-go areas. Reports from the region described towns and villages where roof-top snipers took over houses to target suspected PKK elements. In September, the mayor of Cizre, on the Syrian frontier in Şırnak province, was removed from office, and the town was placed under curfew for 9 days with limited food and water supplies and no access to medical services. The curfew was briefly lifted and then re-imposed as the security forces conducted a full-scale operation in the town against the PKK youth group YDG-H (Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi – Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement) – local teenagers wearing civilian clothes to emphasise that their fight was waged “by the people not by an army”.⁵⁶ The authorities have continued to employ trusted locals as “village guards”. These first appeared in the mid-80s, as martial law was gradually replaced in the south east by a tightly controlled regime under a special governor – in effect martial law under civilian control. On 20 September, the Interior Minister announced the recruitment of 5,000 new village guards. This was seen as a symptom of a return to the conditions of the 80s and 90s, as was a decree issued by the government on 10 September authorising provincial governors throughout Turkey to call out the army to deal with terrorism and public disorder in circumstances where the police and gendarmerie are insufficient.⁵⁷ During the curfew, HDP MPs attempted to lead a group into Cizre but were refused access. On 22 September, the party had had enough. Its two ministers in the provisional government resigned, ending a period of notional power-sharing in which it was clear the HDP ministers had no influence.⁵⁸

Journalists also have had a tough time in the south east. The Dicle News Agency offices in Diyarbakir were raided in late September and over 30 journalists briefly detained. Access to its website from Turkey was already blocked by court order. Three foreign journalists from the VICE news agency were detained in late August while reporting in the region and were charged with terrorism offences. Two who were British nationals were released and deported in early September. The third, an Iraqi, was still in jail at the time of writing.⁵⁹

Elsewhere in Turkey, journalists were prominent amongst the mushrooming body of defendants in cases brought for alleged defamation of the President. The Adana journalist Aytekin Gezici was sentenced to over 5 years in jail for twitter comments about Erdoğan and ministers. An investigation has been launched into *Nokta* magazine for a photomontage cover depicting a grinning Erdoğan taking a selfie in front of a coffin draped in the Turkish flag. Can Dündar, editor of *Cumhuriyet* is facing terrorism and espionage charges for the story of the MİT trucks headed for Syria (see above). Two prominent journalists from *Sözcü* received 11-month sentences on 9 October: Necati Doğru for insulting the President and Uğur Dündar (whose sentence was suspended) for insulting former Transport Minister Binali Yıldırım. Journalistic organisations linked to Fethullah Gülen have been targeted by prosecutors.⁶⁰ On 1 September, the Ankara offices of Koza İpek Holdings which owns *Bugün* newspaper were raided, along with the residence of its Chief Executive. Koza İpek was accused of financing the Gülen movement and peddling its propaganda. Ekrem Dumanlı, editor of *Zaman* newspaper resigned, complaining of “unlawful pressure” on 5 October. Four days later his colleague Bülent Keneş, editor of the English-language *Today's Zaman* was remanded in custody on charges of insulting the President. Hidayet Karaca, Chief Executive

⁵⁶ Letsch, Constanze *Guardian*, 8 September 2015. On the YDG-H, see also Mahmut Bozarslan “Young guns rule their turf in Turkey” *Al-Monitor* 7 October 2015 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-kurdish-rebels-new-youth-wing-or-deep-pkk.html>

⁵⁷ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/30032142.asp>

⁵⁸ http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_hdpli-iki-bakan-istifa-etti_2317914.html

⁵⁹ <https://news.vice.com/article/free-rasool-vice-news-staff-on-the-journalist-now-imprisoned-for-a-month-in-turkey>

⁶⁰ *The Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights in Turkey since December 2013* appeared in September, although it is dated July 2015. It is a report by four British lawyers led by Lord Woolf (former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales) and was commissioned by the Journalist and Writers’ Foundation, the Honorary Chairman of which is Fethullah Gülen. Despite its comprehensive title, it concentrates on moves against *Hizmet*, the Gülen Movement http://www.onebrickcourt.com/files/REPORT_ON_THE_RULE_OF_LAW_FINAL_FINAL_240815_27622.pdf

of Samanyolu Television, has been on remand in Silivri jail since last year on charges of belonging to an armed organisation. Samanyolu was one of 7 channels associated with the Gülen movement which were dropped on 8 October by the television distributor Digiturk – purchased in July by the Qatari Bein Media Group, the sports division of Al Jazeera.

But once again it was Aydın Doğan, his Doğan Media Group and *Hürriyet* newspaper which attracted the greatest reaction from the President and the AK Party. On 4 September, a prosecutor started proceedings against *Hürriyet* columnist Ertuğrul Özkök for an article⁶¹ passionately condemning the President for policies that had culminated in the body of the 3-year old Syrian Aylan Kurdi, washed up on the beach at Bodrum. Two days later, the President was interviewed on television⁶² in the immediate aftermath of the deaths of 16 Turkish soldiers in Dağlıca attack. He paid tribute to those who had died. The interviewer then moved on to talk about terrorism more generally and put to Erdoğan opposition charges that his demands for 400 AK Party MPs before the June elections had raised the temperature. Erdoğan's lengthy answer ended with the words "If a party had won 400 MPs sufficient to change the Constitution, these things would not be happening today".⁶³ *Hürriyet* then published a tweet: "Dağlıca comment from President Erdoğan: 'If we'd had 400 MPs these things would not be happening'".⁶⁴

This produced a furious reaction. An angry crowd of some 200 people attacked the *Hürriyet* offices in İstanbul, egged on by the rhetoric of Abdürrahim Boynukalın, AK Party MP and head of the party's youth organisation, who promised to make Erdoğan executive President whatever the results of the 1 November election.⁶⁵ Boynukalın made specific threats (caught on video) against the newspaper's columnist Ahmet Hakan, and *Hürriyet* offices were again attacked. Hakan was also threatened by Cem Küçük a pro-Government columnist writing in *Star* newspaper with the headline "Portrait of a Schizophrenic and PKK thief: Ahmet Hakan".⁶⁶ On 1 October, after presenting his television programme, Hakan was beaten up by a group of thugs outside his home, suffering a broken nose and cracked ribs.

It was in this atmosphere of prosecutions, threats and intimidation of critics of the President and the government, and passions stirred by the ongoing conflict between the state and the PKK, that the bomb attacks in the Ankara peace rally took place. At the time of writing, the perpetrators of the Ankara bombings had not been identified. Ahmet Davutoğlu said it was most likely the work of two suicide bombers and mentioned four organisations the Government believed capable of executing the attacks: DEAŞ (the Islamic State), PKK, DHKP-C and the MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party).⁶⁷ He said he wanted to consult with the leaders of the CHP and MHP, but not with the HDP. Bahçeli declined to meet Davutoğlu. Kılıçdaroğlu did call on the Prime Minister and afterwards called for the Interior and Justice Ministers to resign. But it was Selahattin Demirtaş who articulated the widespread outrage and anger against Erdoğan and the government. More than 150 of his party members had been killed in the attacks on the party in the south east in only a few months, yet not a single person, he claimed, had been apprehended. 100,000 people had come to Ankara for the rally, he argued, yet there had been no security. But after the bombs exploded, when the injured were struggling for breath, the police threw gas canisters. Demirtaş said if he had been Prime Minister he would have apologised a thousand times and resigned: "No, as a matter of honour I wouldn't have resigned, I'd have killed myself." He went on: "Every utterance you make, it reeks of provocation... Every speech from the

⁶¹ "Utan ey büyük adam" ("Be ashamed, Big Man") http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/ertugrul-ozkok_10/utan-ey-buyuk-adam_29974660

⁶² <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/30002984.asp> (video of interview was available 9th October)

⁶³ "Eğer 400 milletvekilini alacak ve Anayasa'yı değiştirecek bir sayıyı bir parti almış olsaydı, bugün bunlar olmazdı"

⁶⁴ "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Dağlıca açıklaması: '400 vekil alınsaydı bunlar olmazdı'"

⁶⁵ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=428&VideoID=762> (video) Abdürrahim Boynukalın was not selected by the party as a candidate for 1st November election.

⁶⁶ <http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/sizofrenik-ve-pkkli-bir-hirsiz-portresi-ahmet-hakan/yazi-1055333>

⁶⁷ <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/halka-tahriklere-kapilmayin-cagrisi/78892#1>

President and the Prime Minister only serves to make our people enemies of each other.”⁶⁸ HDP supporters and others assembled at the site of the Ankara bombing the next day. The party then complained of police harassment as they tried to leave flowers. Incensed by this and by Davutoğlu’s comments criticising the HDP, furious crowds then came out on to the streets of towns and cities around Turkey to protest. In scenes reminiscent of the 2013 protests, they were dispersed with tear-gas and water cannon. Turkey approaches the 1 November elections as polarised as ever.

Gamon McLellan



Update on Cyprus September 2015

by Clement Dodd

Quite a lot has been happening in Cyprus during the past six months. This is because both sides have been showing more determination to solve the Cyprus problem. It will be recalled that in February 2014, under some pressure, both sides agreed in a Joint Declaration to establish a federal state whose citizens would also be citizens of either the Greek Cypriot, or Turkish Cypriot, state, with both states being established at the same time as the federal state.⁶⁹

Negotiations got under way between the two sides without showing much promise of agreement, though the prospect of progress improved considerably with the appointment in October 2014 of Mr Espen Barth Eide as the UN Special Adviser. However, the talks collapsed when in that month, the Greek Cypriot President, Anastasiades, protested against Turkish seismic surveys then being made in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, and left the talks. These were not resumed until April 2015, when the Turkish Government decided not to persist in prospecting for hydrocarbons in the Cyprus EEZ, allegedly because the companies being used by the Republic of Cyprus were, for technical reasons, no longer drilling in there.⁷⁰ Anastasiades then returned to the negotiations. At this juncture the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Philip Hammond, saw fit, when addressing a Greek Cypriot audience in his parliamentary constituency, to declare that ‘the United Kingdom will continue to champion Cyprus’ right to exploit its economic zone without interference from others’. He also ‘wanted the Turkish Cypriot community to be clear that it wanted to engage in a settlement process’. The Turkish Cypriot response was that it was Anastasiades who had walked out of the negotiations, and that the TRNC also had a right to exploit the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone.

Presidential Election in the TRNC

During the resumed negotiations the Turkish Cypriot President, Derviş Eroğlu, stoutly defended Turkish Cypriot interests, but his reign as Turkish Cypriot president ended when he was defeated in the Turkish Cypriot presidential election. It was not going to be

⁶⁸ http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/385453/Demirtas_tan_Davutoglu_na_cok_sert_yanit.html

⁶⁹ See ‘Update on Cyprus 2013/14’, *TAS Review*, Spring 2015, No. 25, p.15 for the text of the Declaration.

⁷⁰ It is widely believed that it was external diplomatic pressure that persuaded both sides to find reasons for not persisting in the dispute.

easy for him to succeed; in office in the TRNC was a mainly socialist government that was supporting the former lady Speaker of the National Assembly, Sibel Siber. Another potentially powerful contender, however, was Mustafa Akıncı, aged 67, head of a tiny left-wing party, but experienced, and respected as a former Mayor of Turkish Nicosia who had got along well with his Greek Cypriot counterpart. A fourth candidate was Kudret Özersay, an academic by profession, but serving under Eroğlu as the official negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot side. He had previously campaigned a good deal in the country calling for efficient, less corrupt, and public spirited, government, but he did not belong to any political party.

Polls suggested that the contest would essentially be between Eroğlu and Sibel Siber, but the results of the elections held on 19 April, on a low 62 per cent turnout, defied the polls. Eroğlu won most votes (28.2%) followed closely by Mustafa Akıncı (26.9%). Sibel Siber won 22.54 per cent, and Özersay just over 21 per cent. Since no candidate had a majority of the total vote, a second ballot was held a week later between Eroğlu and Akıncı. This resulted in a victory for Akıncı, who won 62 per cent of the vote. He had campaigned on the urgent need for a solution and was expected to show more flexibility in negotiations than Eroğlu, who mainly represented the nationalist/conservative right. It is arguable that Eroğlu might have won but for the intrusion of Özersay, but it is thought that the latter attracted mixed votes of the young, rather than the nationalist and conservative vote. In the second round Akıncı, promising a solution of the Cyprus problem, had solid support from the socialists to secure him the victory. Eroğlu retired from politics, bringing to a close a long and distinguished career fighting valiantly for Turkish Cypriot independence together with, if somewhat overshadowed by, the late President Rauf Denktaş.

Akıncı was, and is, more inclined to a federation with the Greek Cypriots than Eroğlu, and represents the feeling of many Turkish Cypriots that they are increasingly being dominated by Turkey – without whose financial support, however, they could not survive. With Turkish influence comes also more emphasis on religion, which is not much to the liking of many Turkish Cypriots, who often consider themselves quite different from the Turks. In his campaign Akıncı had made something of the disquiet caused by the degree of Turkish influence in government and society. After his victory he felt bold enough to declare on television that the relationship with Turkey should change. “It should be one of brothers, not that of a mother and her child”. President Erdoğan was furious. “Do his ears not hear what he is saying?” he thundered. “Even working as brothers has its conditions. We gave martyrs for the sake of Cyprus, and we continue to pay the price.” Unrepentant, Akıncı responded, “Does Turkey not want to see its baby grow up?” His words, he said, “were not only heard by his ears, but came from his conscience, heart and brain”.⁷¹ For the Greek Cypriots this tiff was seen to provide evidence for their belief that Turkey is simply a dominant colonial power in Cyprus. Part of the problem is that the Turkish mission in the TRNC is seen by some to be overbearing. It certainly needs to ensure that Turkish aid is well spent, so a degree of Turkish control is unavoidable, if not always, it seems, tactfully managed. It is also said that when Turkish Cypriot ministers or civil servants want funding for particular projects they tend to go direct to the Turkish mission rather than through normal ministerial channels.

Renewal of Negotiations

The election of Akıncı was welcomed in the South, particularly by the left, but also by parties that support President Anastasiades in looking for a solution. Anastasiades has a good deal of opposition, however, especially from elements in DIKO (Democratic Party)

⁷¹ Akıncı later visited Ankara, when, it seems, good relations between the two leaders were restored.

and EDEK (Movement of Social Democrats), neither of which parties really wants a federation unless it allows for the major influence of the Greek Cypriot side. He is supported by his own party (DISY, a liberal democratic party) and by the socialist party, AKEL.



A marked, and welcome, feature of the negotiations is that Anastasiades and Akıncı get along very well together, frequently participating in joint social events. On 20 July Akıncı played down the celebrations to mark Turkey's military intervention in 1974. He also declared that the military intervention in 1974 was not just a 'Peace Operation', but also a war, a view that

found some favour with the Greek Cypriots.

Very little detail is made available on the progress of the negotiations, this in order, it seems, not to raise hopes and fears on both sides. It seems that the hydrocarbons' issue is to be settled quietly during the negotiations on the basis of 'convergences' on the issue that emerged during earlier series of negotiations. On governance, Eide has said that the issue of governance, the structure of the proposed federation, has largely been settled. Very recently, however, President Akıncı has surprisingly declared that the presidency of the new federal state would have to rotate between the two sides. So it seems that not all has been settled on that score. More important, the determination to establish a federation as a solution for Cyprus shows little realisation that two-state federations are notoriously unstable. To many observers a two-state solution has always seemed by far the best way to reunite Cyprus.⁷²

The Property Issue

The problem of the property abandoned in 1974 in the North by Greek Cypriots seems on the way to being resolved by the appointment of a new Commission, equally staffed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to decide on the right of former owners to reoccupy their properties, accept compensation, or exchange them with Turkish Cypriot properties. (These are properties in the South abandoned by Turkish Cypriots in 1963 and 1964, when they were under attack by the Greek Cypriots, and in 1974, when so many fled to the safety of the North after it came under Turkish control.)

A commission like the new one now being established has, in fact, been in operation in the North for some time, and has paid substantial compensation (out of Turkish funds) to Greek Cypriot owners of abandoned property. Little is apparently being said about the property abandoned by the Turkish Cypriots in the South, though it may be available for exchange deals.

The re-occupation of property in the North by Greek Cypriots after a solution presents worries for the Turkish Cypriot side. The federation in prospect has to recognise bizonality and bicommunality, but it is feared that the return of large numbers of Greek Cypriots to live in Turkish Cypriot territory could undermine these principles. However, it has been claimed that very few Greek Cypriots will want to live in the Turkish Cypriot state that is to be formed. It has been pointed out that a very large majority of those who fled in 1974 will no longer be alive, and that their heirs will by now have long established themselves and their families in the South. What would they do, it is asked, in the new

⁷² For a lucid account of the fate of two-state federations see Tozun Bahçeli and Sid Noel, 'A Bizonal Federation is not Viable' in *Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution*, ed. James Ker-Lindsay (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015).

Turkish Cypriot state?⁷³ Also it is by no means axiomatic that owners of, or heirs to, abandoned property in the North have the right to return to it. It is now generally accepted that the Turkish Cypriot 'users' also have a right to the property. Nevertheless some present Turkish Cypriot occupants of Greek Cypriot property have been embarrassed, and sometimes harassed, by some Greek Cypriots who, with deeds in their hands, have visited their properties to assert their ownership. On balance, it seems likely that the property problem will be largely solved by compensation. Presumably, unless external financing is obtained to meet the bill, compensation will continue to be provided by Turkey, but other sources of funding will need to be found to meet the large costs that may be incurred. It is a great credit to Turkey that it has so far taken on the financial burden of compensation. Arguably it is not obliged to do so: Turkey claims that its military intervention in 1974 was vindicated under its rights as a guarantor power of the 1960 Constitution, which, after 1964, had been unilaterally amended in its own interest by the Greek Cypriot government.

Other Problems

There are, of course, other major problems to be resolved in the negotiations – the extremely difficult issue of the apportionment of territory between the two constituent states is one. Another is the question of guarantees of any settlement by the Guarantee Powers of the 1960 treaties. The Greek Cypriots do not want any, but the TRNC, and Turkey, are adamant that they are necessary for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. Russia has joined in this topic by declaring that guarantees by NATO would not be acceptable! Then there is the issue of settlers. The Turkish Cypriot side is adamant that Turks who have settled in the TRNC will not be obliged to return to Turkey. As for *freedom* of residence and employment anywhere in a new federal Cyprus the Turkish Cypriots are deeply worried that, through the application of the *acquis communautaire*, they could be reduced to a minority in their own country. In this and other respects they are eager to have their independence guaranteed in EU primary law, which would be very difficult to obtain. Incidentally, it seems, oddly, that it could be possible for a federal state itself to decide on these issues without offending against the *acquis*. It was argued, with regard to the situation in 2004, that there would have been no need for derogations provided the Cypriot federal state then being established agreed to the freedoms sought. The EU is more prone, it is suggested, to guarantee freedoms *between* member states rather than *within* a member state.⁷⁴ This rather problematic approach would have to be brought up in the negotiations to see if it would be possible to proceed in this way, but it is very difficult indeed to envisage Greek Cypriot participation in this sort of solution. The issue of derogations is a thorny one not easily to be settled.

A New Turkish Cypriot Government

This and other problems arising unsettled the coalition government in the North. The Democratic Party-National Forces led by Serdar Denktaş (son of the late President Denktaş) in the legislative election in 2013 won over 23 per cent of the vote, and took 12 of the 50 seats in the National Assembly. The party then became a junior partner in an unlikely coalition with the socialist Republican Turkish Party, whose chairman is former President Mehmet Ali Talat. In 2014 four deputies resigned from Serdar Denktaş's party, three joining the National Unity Party. In early July this year, the Prime Minister, Özkan

⁷³ As argued by a balanced and informed commentator on the Cyprus problem, Loucas Charalambous in the *Cyprus Mail*, 9 August 2015. He estimates that there are only some 25,000 Greek Cypriots now with claims to property in the North.

⁷⁴ These points are made by Nathalie Tocci, *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution* (Ashgate, Aldershot UK and Burlington USA, 2004), p. 162.

Yorgancıoğlu, resigned in order to provide an opportunity for a new and more settled government. The leftist RTP and the conservative/nationalist NUP then established an unlikely coalition led by Ömer Kalyoncu of the Republican Turkish Party. Critics on the right regret that the National Unity Party did not insist that in the coalition they secure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There will shortly be a new leadership election.

Preparing for EU Membership

The derogations' problem was highlighted when, at the beginning of August, Eide declared that the aim of the negotiations was to create a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the principles and values of the European Union. To provide guidance on EU matters an adviser, Mr Pieter Van Nuffel, was also to be appointed to help with the negotiations, though not take part in them. He has also to provide advice to the Turkish Cypriots on how to prepare for their participation in EU membership. To underline the importance of EU membership the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, visiting the South, declared that undoubtedly the EU constituted the best safeguard and guarantee of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots. He said that he was watching the situation closely and would have Van Nuffel report to him personally. This participation in the process by the European Union is very much to the liking of the Greek Cypriots. Eide has reasserted that there is no move away from a bizonal, bicomunal federation, but with full respect also for the values and principles on which the EU was based – a difficult reconciliation of principles.

On the Turkish Cypriot side Akıncı seems to be accepting the EU approach without much demur. Critics on the right in the North say that he is inclined to give too much away.⁷⁵ As some Turkish Cypriots are apt to point out, the EU was not mentioned in the Declaration of 11 February 2014 as the basis of negotiations. Former President Eroğlu has said that for him an EU adviser's presence would not have been acceptable. Some Turkish Cypriots take the view that there should really be a new application by the new federal state for EU membership! They do not want to be seen to be condoning the actions of the 'illegal Greek Cypriot administration'.

Greek Cypriot Reactions to Federation

In the South not all is sweetness. Nationalists have given Anastasiades a hard time. For instance, Nikolas Papadopoulos (son of President Papadopoulos, who argued forcibly against the 2004 federal solution rejected by the Greek Cypriots) asked how it was possible to be optimistic about a solution when the Turkish Cypriots are insisting on guarantees, derogations from EU law, and the right of intervention by outside powers, particularly Turkey. "It is a bad climate", he said. The prevalence of these attitudes in some parties brought a response from Loucas Charalambous, writing in the *Cyprus Mail*.⁷⁶ He believes that the Greek Cypriot nationalist parties could influence the Greek Cypriot electorate, as in 2004, not to vote for a solution in a referendum. In particular the small farmers, he suggests, could be persuaded to vote against a settlement: they are afraid that the proposed property solution will open up the door to Turkish Cypriot claims to the land that was taken over by the Greek Cypriots, when in 1963/64 the Turkish fled to towns for their safety, and when in 1974 many thousands fled to the North. Charalambous believes that many in the South do not really want a solution, and could be persuaded against it. Much better and safer, he believes, than a referendum, would be for the parliaments of both sides to take the decision about reunification. He makes a

⁷⁵ The decision not to require Greek Cypriots to present any documents at the border when travelling to the North was widely criticised as virtually admitting that there was only one state in Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus.

⁷⁶ *Cyprus Mail*, 26 July 2015.

point that applies to democracy generally. Why ask the least knowledgeable to make the most important decisions?

Conclusion

Considerable progress towards creating a federation has clearly been made. It is a great boon that the two presidents get along together so very well. The progress made clearly also owes a great deal to the untiring efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Eide, and his staff. It is significant that he clearly understands that there are two sides in the dispute. In April he went so far as to say on one occasion that he was aware that, in the Turkish Cypriot view, the Cypriot state was hijacked by one side and 'turned into more of a Hellenic state'. He understood that there were different understandings of why the Cyprus problem existed. This was not much appreciated by many in the South. Nor was the point made by the American Ambassador, when in May, during a talk in Nicosia University, he told the audience that the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974. He was due to be leaving Cyprus soon, but there were calls, nevertheless, for his immediate recall.

As to progress in the negotiations Eide is clearly looking forward to a referendum. He has been very active in bringing the two leaders together and has welcomed important initiatives by non-governmental organisations from both sides, particularly business organisations, to come together and speak out loudly for a solution, and the economic benefits that would ensue. He has to be congratulated for his pronounced belief in a solution and his untiring efforts to help bring it about. By September 2015 the two presidents had met together in negotiations nine times, and the official representatives forty times. As mentioned earlier, little detail is being revealed about the details of the discussions or the results so far obtained, which in the overheated Cyprus atmosphere is undoubtedly wise. Eide is very confident that all will turn out well. He is looking forward to even more frequent meetings this autumn, with his mind clearly set on a referendum before parliamentary elections in the South due in May 2016. Yet while the property problem may be on the way to a solution, there is still the very difficult territorial issue to be resolved, along with that of immigrants, and the Turkish Cypriots' deep concern that the Greek Cypriots will dominate them through application of the *acquis*. It surely was a great mistake that the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus was admitted to EU membership before a Cyprus solution was successfully negotiated.



Finally, with the two sides, the UN and the EU all putting a great effort into creating a federation, and with business groups from the two sides coming together, it seems to be assumed that a solution of the Cyprus problem is in sight. But will a federation work? History shows that two-state federations 'have often proved to be fragile, dysfunctional in operation, and often short-lived'.⁷⁷ Moreover, 'a bizonal, bicomunal federation is arguably the most failure-prone' it has been persuasively asserted.⁷⁸

These are important points to make, and to be considered. Is it too late to think afresh about the Cyprus problem, and about other ways towards its resolution?

⁷⁷ Bahceli and Noel, 'A Bizonal Federation is not Viable', in *Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution*, p.39.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.45. This is an important study. The authors suggest that if a Cyprus federation is established, it may well not be successful and, one may conclude, even worsen relationships between the two sides.

FROM THE 2015 BATAS SYMPOSIUM



From battlefield to ‘theme park’: Centenary reflections on the transformation of Gallipoli

by **Pheroze Unwalla**
Modern Middle East History
York University, Toronto

The Great War came to the Gallipoli Peninsula in February 1915 with the Allied Powers seeking to force their way through the Dardanelles and on to Istanbul in order to knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The story of the costly and brutal Battle of Gallipoli is by now a rather well-known tale. I did not seek to rehearse it at the 2015 BATAS Spring Symposium. Rather, my talk was more concerned with the lesser known but no less intriguing story of the peninsula in the hundred years since the battle’s end.

In December 1915 and January 1916, after repeated failed attacks on Ottoman positions, the Allied forces gave up their dream of reaching Istanbul via Gallipoli and evacuated. They left a ravaged space in their wake. Villages were deserted. The land was scarred with trenches and craters and the peninsula was littered with armaments and decayed corpses, both Ottoman and Allied. Look hard enough at Gallipoli today and you can still see a few elements of the battlefield that once was, but such glimpses into the past are growing rarer by the day. Commemorative fervour has altered the face of the peninsula, polishing away many of its more gruesome features and burying 1915 amidst a throng of structures ironically built to keep its ostensible memory alive. A century of uneven development has engendered Gallipoli’s metamorphosis from First World War battlefield to sombre pilgrimage site to what one recent observer provocatively termed a ‘theme park’. The amalgam of stimuli underlying this dramatic and controversial transformation was the subject of my BATAS talk and sits at the core of my larger research project.

The story is a lengthy one, spanning one hundred years and involving a large number of Turkish and foreign actors but I only sketch its outline here and broadly identify some of the more prevalent factors in Gallipoli’s renovation. To begin, we must hark back to the immediate aftermath of the battle. With the peninsula in ruins and guarded by only a small Ottoman force, it was foreigners who showed the most interest in the treatment and commemoration of the dead, sending contingents to perform burials and mark graves. From the death knell of the Ottoman Empire into the early decades of the Republic of Turkey, that trend would continue. In the 1920s and 1930s, with the Treaty of Lausanne granting them legal control over certain

tracts on the peninsula, foreigners became the pre-eminent transformative force there, infusing the space with grandiose memorials and numerous striking cemeteries to honour their fallen.

Ottoman and Turkish efforts in this period were paltry in comparison. I argue that this disparity between Turkish and foreign memorialisation helped give birth to one of the primary drivers of future development. As with the construction of memorials and cemeteries, pilgrimages to Gallipoli during the early republic were dominated by foreigners. Their travel accounts are fascinating but no more so than the few available Turkish equivalents whose authors often decried the aforementioned discrepancy and occasionally called on Turks to raze foreign edifices, build comparably grander Turkish ones, and then visit them in greater numbers. Although these early calls for action fell largely on deaf ears, they would be repeated over subsequent decades and into the present, even as Turkish memorials came eventually to far outnumber the foreign. From the very beginning then, a deep-seated Turkish nationalism and a sense of commemorative territoriality fuelled a competitive developmental ethos at Gallipoli. I believe it continues to do so.

In the 1950s we can observe another fateful occurrence: the establishment and thereafter slow, erratic growth of a Turkish tourism industry. An interesting story in its own right, the industry arose due to a number of internal and external dynamics. More importantly for present purposes, it resulted in the development of critical infrastructure (i.e., roads and highways) and the targeting of specific Turkish locales for touristification. Gallipoli was one such region. By itself, the mixture of tourism with commemoration proved potent in spurring the construction of many Turkish memorials and cemeteries on the peninsula. Combined, however, with the intense Turkish insecurity over national sovereignty at Gallipoli, it would also influence the size and architectural style of new memorials as well as their location. Many such choices would upset and alienate foreign governments for a time, but they were concurrent with significant efforts by both Turkish and foreign governments and select private citizens to create a Gallipoli-based Turkish-foreign friendship that would aid in improving diplomatic relations and courting foreign tourists. In time, this friendship too would be exalted on the peninsula in further memorials, statues and plaques.

The strange brew of tourism and commemoration, xenophobic nationalism and Turkish-foreign communality on the peninsula is central to its extraordinary history in the hundred years since the Battle of Gallipoli. The concoction has served to intensify and steer memorialisation and touristification efforts, particularly in the run-up to the centennial commemorations. The peninsula is now filled with Turkish memorials, statues, museums, information centres, plaques and interactive audio-visual recreations which for the most part purvey a highly circumscribed Turkish nationalist narrative of the Battle of Gallipoli. Paved roads, hotels, restaurants, shops, parking lots, public toilets, bleachers and other amenities have also been built to facilitate the intake of as many tourists as possible. Often to the detriment of the site's historical integrity, such alterations were particularly noticeable in the run-up to the heavily publicized centenary ceremonies when, for a brief moment in April, Gallipoli once again drew international media attention.

What will happen to the peninsula now that the centennial has come and gone? Will development continue in an attempt to attract ever more tourists? Or will the fervour for expansion and augmentation diminish? Although we will have to wait some time for definitive answers, my sense is that a temporary denouement is possible and perhaps even probable given that a degree of Gallipoli fatigue was already evident in Turkey and elsewhere prior to the ceremonies. For many, however, the damage has been done. The transformation of the Gallipoli Peninsula from battlefield to 'theme park' has been so extensive as perhaps to be considered irrevocable.



Turkish tourists gather and take photographs in front of one of the many edifices on the Gallipoli Peninsula at which tour buses pause. This particular statue is of the legendary Ottoman soldier, Corporal Seyit.

Image provided by Pheroze Unwalla



Turkey, Alcohol and Islam

by **Sami Zubaida**

Politics & Sociology, Birkbeck
& Food Studies Centre, SOAS



A current of social and religious conservatism is fostered by the AKP leadership, as part of a cultural contest against the previously dominant Kemalist elites. Public pronouncements by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other leaders favour piety, traditional values of family, gender and sexuality, education and life styles. The denunciation of alcohol and drinking cultures is part of this campaign. While alcohol is not prohibited, which would be a step too far, there are many regulations and

informal restrictions on its availability. Popular sentiment enters this culture war: opinion surveys show a sharp rejection of drink and drinkers by many Turks. Alcohol, then, has come to prominence again as a symbolic marker in a culture war. Let us look at some background factors in this iconic symbolism around alcohol in Islam and Turkey.

The mention of wine, *khamr*, in the Qur'an is various. It is clear that wine, made from fermented dates or grapes, was commonly known and drunk in the Arabian milieu of early Islam. Earlier verses in the Qur'an praise the benefits of wine, and wine is promised to the pious in paradise. But the consensus of opinion considers later verses which were against wine to have overruled the earlier ones. The decisive verse:

O believers, wine and gambling, idols and divining arrows are an abhorrence, the work of Satan. So keep away from it, that you may prevail. Satan only desires to arouse discord and hatred among you with wine and gambling, and to deter you from the mention of God and from prayer. (5.90)⁷⁹

It is interesting to note that the context of this prohibition is one of social order, as distinct from the verses elsewhere which prohibit pork, blood and carrion in the context of purity and pollution. This social order focus has a significance for later permissive interpretations which considered that it only applies to 'rough' common people who are out of control and cause trouble, and not for refined elites.

This explicit prohibition of alcohol in Islam as well as the common breach of this prohibition in so many social contexts, historically and at present, has made for a potent theme in moral and cultural discourse. Many Muslims flouted the prohibition, some with a trust in God's mercy towards faithful sinners, others with explicit rationalisations, commonly the view, as stated, that the prohibition is a matter of social order against the drunkenness of common and ignorant people, and should not apply to the refined elite. The tension between commandment and practice, however, offered a fertile theme for poetry, narrative, mysticism and humour. Alcohol and the imagery of intoxication are common elements in the lore of Sufi mysticism. While some apologists have argued that this is a purely literary device or a spiritual analogy, not referring to real practice, we do know that many of the mystics and some *tariqas* (Sufi orders), notably the Bektāṣi order in Turkey and the Balkans, used alcohol as part of their ceremony. The majority of Sufis, however, frowned on the practice and denounced it. Much of popular as well as literary humour revolves around tales of the hypocrisy of pious people, including clerics, with regard to drink and intoxication. In short, the lore of alcohol is a potent element in diverse cultural fields in Middle Eastern history and society. At the present time it has also become an important identity marker, emphasising the difference from the decadent West.

Drinking, however, always proceeded in the shadow of official censure if not prohibition. Authorities would occasionally crack down on drinking and taverns with arbitrary punishments. These were often gestures in periods of political contests over piety, or measures to ensure control over social spaces. One such period was the reign of the stern Ottoman Sultan Murat IV (r.1623-40) who prohibited alcohol, coffee

⁷⁹ Quote from Tarif Khalidi, *The Qur'an: A New Translation*, London: Penguin 2008, p 94

and tobacco, sanctioned by severe penalties, including death. He was also known to be a heavy drinker, and his early death is attributed by some historians to liver disease. It is related that this ruler wandered the streets of Constantinople in disguise to check for himself that his edicts were obeyed. On one such expedition, it is told, he took a boat ride across the Bosphorus, and noticed that the boatman was drinking from a bottle. Suspicious, he asks to taste the liquid: finding it was wine he admonishes the man for disobeying the edicts, at which the boatman demands: who do you think you are? At the Sultan's reply, the man mockingly retorts: "one draught and you think you are the sultan!"

The story of Murat IV illustrates an important general point, still relevant today: prohibitions of alcohol are as much to do with social control as piety and observance. Murat, we note, also banned coffee and tobacco: this was part of a general religious and political campaign against the then emergent coffee house in which these items were enjoyed. In the early days of the coffee house many scholars ruled that coffee was an intoxicant akin to wine. These venues



constituted spaces of sociability, mixing and entertainment outside the control of authority, much like taverns. We have a literary portrayal of this phenomenon in Orhan Pamuk's *My Name is Red*, of the coffee house harbouring poets, entertainers and story tellers, considered subversive by a local fundamentalist imam, who ultimately leads his flock on an attack to destroy the café. Cafés continued to be venues of free sociability and, later, political discourse, distrusted by the authorities: Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (r. 1876-1909), the last authoritarian Ottoman ruler, was famous for his network of spies, many of them reporting from cafés.

Soldiers and urban toughs featured prominently in the lore of drink and taverns. In Ottoman lands, especially Turkish cities, the Janissary military corps were notable drinkers, with their own dedicated taverns, featuring entertainments such as dancing boys. The Janissaries were also devotees of the Bektāşi Sufi order, considered heretical by Orthodox Muslims, and which featured drink as part of its rituals. In their



period of decadence in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century their acts of violence and extortion, as well as riots and rebellions, were fuelled by drink. They were instrumental in overthrowing Sultan Selim III (in 1808), who had tried to control them, but were outmanoeuvred by his successor Mahmud II who succeeded in abolishing the Janissaries in a famous massacre in 1826, in favour of a modern army. The abolition

of the Janissaries dissociated the image of alcohol from the rough and violent soldiery and facilitated its emerging function as an element of secular modernity.

The Ottoman reforms over the nineteenth century transformed government, law, education and the economy, modernising these institutions along European lines, partly in response to the contingencies of incorporation of the region into world capitalism. New classes developed: the personnel of state institutions, modern education, the professions, the media, the arts and the new military, as well as new working classes in railways, ports and other urban sectors. These were the bearers

of socio-cultural transformations and an outlook and desire for being modern and 'civilised', *medeniyet*. Drink and drinking cultures became part of this modernity and civilisation. This culture was at odds with the deep layers of conservative Turkey and other Muslim parts of the Empire, the start of the cultural conflict that was to mutate and transform till recent times. The new middle classes and elites, including the Court and the state class, drank, not just for the love of alcohol but as a life style statement.

François Georgeon, a French historian of the period, wrote a fascinating account of the symbolic significance of alcohol for notions of modernity and civilisation in Turkey from the nineteenth century⁸⁰. Sultan Mahmud II (r.1808–39) was the first reforming ruler who made a serious impact. He modelled himself on other European rulers, and included alcohol as a feature of public occasions such as official dinners and receptions. Champagne, which was not new to the Ottoman court, then appeared in public. Later in the century, the state class of the expanded reform bureaucracy became the vanguard of the drinking classes. To cater for them, a new type of refined and opulent tavern or *meyhane* came into existence, with a professional guild of tavern keepers and their assistants trained in the arts of serving drink and its accompaniment of *meze*, and in the skills of nursing a *nargile* (water pipe). Among the consumers, a new *adab* – etiquette and lore of drink – determined a kind of *savoir boire*.

Alcohol became an issue during the rule of the authoritarian Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1909), who propagated Sunni Islam as an ideological buffer of the dwindling Empire. But the propaganda against drink remained just that, moral and medical, but did not impose prohibitions and the culture of drink persisted. The Young Turks who deposed the Sultan in 1909 were socially liberal and largely secular.

The Turkish Republic established by Atatürk in 1923 abolished the Caliphate in 1924, a deeply symbolic measure, involving the secularisation of the state and the law, and the abolition of Shari`a courts. Henceforth the separation of religion from politics and the secularity of the state was to be a pillar of the Republican constitution. Drink was an important component of the secular culture of the Republic and the modern elites and bourgeoisie associated with it. Atatürk and his theorists were emphatic in separating Turkey from the Ottoman past and the Perso-Arab 'Oriental' associations. They recovered a supposed pre-Islamic Turkic culture (much like some Iranian and Egyptian counterparts) which was more akin to modern European tropes: not only liberated women in public affairs, but also music, art and life styles. Atatürk and his associates held state balls, with the men dressed in tuxedos and tails and the women in ball gowns, and danced tangos and waltzes: it was compulsory to bring wives. Drink was part of these cultural styles, in continuity with earlier Ottoman modernity. Atatürk was a notable drinker, fond of his *raki*. Devotees of the great man were seen until recent times at the bar of Sirkeci rail station saluting his memory with the national drink accompanied by his favourite simple (white) *meze* of white cheese, melon and *cacik* (yoghurt/cucumber).



⁸⁰ Francois Georgeon, 'Ottoman Drinkers: The Consumption of Alcohol in Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century', in Rogan, Eugene, ed., *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, London: I B Tauris 2002 (7-30)

Defending his government's strictures on alcohol, Erdoğan has denounced a law 'made by two drunkards' as opposed to his stance which supposedly follows basic national values.

The Beyoğlu district of Istanbul is the centre of arts, entertainment, bars, clubs and restaurants. It comprises the historical European and cosmopolitan parts of the city, Galata and Pera. It also contains Taksim Square and Gezi Park. Drink and music are essential items in its mix. For many *Istanbullus* the area has a symbolic and historical significance of continuity with the city's cosmopolitan past and the diversity of its cultures. Over the course of the twentieth century many conservative and even religious Turks accepted these aspects of Istanbul as part of their history and diversity. Indeed many such Muslims saw no contradiction between their religion and a nationalist pride in the Republic, sharing in the adulation of Atatürk, including the secular constitution. The resentment against this urban culture came with political Islam and its parties, starting in the 1980s, carried, in part, by the swelling of Istanbul's population by migrations from rural and provincial Anatolia, altering the character of the city. The Istanbul bourgeoisie saw this as an invasion and a threat, the barbarians at the gate. This demographic transformation was translated into Islamic success in the municipal elections of 1994 when Erdoğan was elected mayor of the city, and the mayor of Beyoğlu was also from the then pro-Islamic Welfare Party. Beyoğlu had its own shantytown area, and many of those who enjoyed its facilities did not live there. Sure enough, the first target of the new mayor was alcohol: he demanded that drinking should not be visible in public, that bars should not have outside tables and should install curtains to hide their interiors. Outrage on the part of *Istanbullus* brought protest and defiance with demonstrations of public drinking. The orders were soon withdrawn. At that point the secular citizens were ascendant, with backing from the media and the public, and the Islamists had to watch their back with fear of military intervention. Now, after a decade of electoral success and economic growth, governing without a coalition, the army neutralised, in control of the media, the judiciary and the police, Erdoğan feels free to move on this crucial symbolic issue of alcohol and its venues.

The social and electoral base of the AKP comprises the new provincial bourgeoisie from the Anatolian cities, whose businesses have thrived since the 1980s but more so under AKP rule and the economic renaissance accompanying neo-liberal regimes. The AKP also has much support among sectors of the working class and the poor who benefit from its social assistance policies and the rise in employment and wages. Erdoğan's conservative and moralistic edicts and proclamations echo the cultural aspirations and resentments of these constituencies, especially the Anatolian bourgeoisie. Moral disciplines, 'family values', religious education and cultural conformity go down well with this constituency, and Erdoğan is delivering. Control of alcohol and banishing drink from public space is emblematic within this outlook.

A central issue for the Gezi Park and Taksim protesters is that of the unrestrained building and development boom in Istanbul, razing old neighbourhoods for gated housing and shopping malls. The beneficiaries are cronies of the AKP, given access to public land and development permits. Private developments and shopping malls privatise public space and public assets. Like restricting and hiding alcohol and its

associated sociability it is part of the process of controlling, restricting and moralising public space. Erdoğan responded to protesters by telling them to drink at home.



Carpets in Peace and War: The Oriental Carpet Manufacturers of Smyrna from 1907 to 1929

by **Antony Wynn**
Freelance Historian,
Author of *Three Camels to Smyrna*

With its large natural harbour and fertile hinterland, Smyrna had long been a prosperous centre of export trade in dried fruit, tobacco, cotton, olives, liquorice and, much later, carpets. The trade was dominated by Levantine families of Italian, French and British extraction benefiting from the generous terms of the various concessions held under the capitular treaties with the Ottomans, some of which had been originally negotiated with the Byzantines. The principal benefit was almost total freedom from taxation, which gave them a huge advantage over the Ottoman traders.

The best known of the British Levantine families were the Girauds, the Whittalls, the Lafontaines and the Bakers. There was so much intermarriage amongst them that they can almost be considered as one family. The first Giraud came to Smyrna some time before the French Revolution and his daughter married a Whittall. The Whittalls came to Smyrna in about 1800 and prospered to such an extent that in 1863 Sultan Abdul Aziz came to visit them and awarded Charlton Whittall with the Mejdidiye order, together with sets of diamonds and pearls for his ladies. The first Lafontaine in Turkey was a watchmaker to the Ottomans and came out in 1786. They later became British subjects, as did the Girauds. They were involved in mining, in the Ottoman debt and in 1880 started carpet production in Uşak. Their expertise lay in design and dyeing. They became the principal supplier of carpets to George Baker. The first Baker in Turkey had come to Constantinople in 1847 to work in the gardens of the British summer embassy at Therapia, where his work was admired by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who got him to design his garden at the Dolmabahçe palace. An enterprising man, Baker sold cuttings from the gardens and bought ladies' knickknacks to sell. It was in the palace that he came to see the great wealth and variety of Ottoman carpets and, having bought a quantity of them, sent one of his sons back to England to sell them. The enterprise was a success and, when Queen Victoria saw one, she decided that she wanted to have some herself. Thereafter, a 'Turkey carpet' was a 'must have' in every English household aspiring to respectability. Abandoning gardening, the Bakers set themselves up as carpet traders and textile merchants. The famous firm of GP & J Baker still makes upmarket fabrics to this day.

Before the Lafontaines became involved in the carpet business the principal exporters at the beginning of the twentieth century from Smyrna had been the Spartali company, which employed thousands of weavers all over central and eastern Anatolia. They were Armenians, originally Spartalian, but the firm had been taken over by the Aliotti family, who had married into them. The Genoese Aliottis had been trading in Smyrna for centuries and there is still a *han* in the Izmir bazaar named after them. Another family in the trade was that of De Andria, also Genoese, who had also been in Turkey for centuries. There were Turkish carpet exporters, of course, particularly the famous Çolakzadeh family, but they worked on a much smaller scale, and they had to pay Ottoman tax.

By the beginning of the 20th century the competition between these carpet traders had become so fierce that their efforts to undercut each other threatened to bankrupt them all. In 1907 they decided to amalgamate and form themselves into a cartel, The Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, known as the OCM (*Şark Halı Kumpanyası*).



It was registered in Smyrna as an English company, under English law. To assure themselves of supplies of yarn they brought in the English Sykes company, which owned a wool mill at Bandırma producing yarn and cloth. The organisation was thus vertically integrated from yarn supply to manufacture and export. The missing element was the supply of raw wool.

Next to be recruited to the company was the American adventurer Charles B Fritz. He was quite a character and, as it turned out, the key to the business. His father had sent him out as a young man to London to work for a Philadelphia firm importing prunes, which went bankrupt. He then became an umbrella salesman, before moving on to importing kid skins for gloves. While still in London he came across some Turkey carpets and fell in with the Baker family, who supplied him with carpets for the American market, where he established a flourishing business. A flavour of the man comes out in his obituary:

Fritz was by chance in Constantinople in the final years of Sultan Abdul Hamid, when the lives of high government officials were often in danger. One of the vezirs had fallen foul of the revolutionaries, and was trying to escape to Italy and had taken refuge with the Whittalls in their house at Moda. Fritz was also about to sail for Italy, on a passport which included his wife, although she was not travelling with him. When an attaché at the British embassy heard of this vacancy, he persuaded Fritz to let the vezir, disguised in a Muslim woman's veil, board the ship to Naples as his wife, and the man was saved. Some years later the minister regained his position. Fritz, remembering that the man might consider himself to be in his debt,

approached him and the grateful minister arranged for the Sultan to grant Fritz the monopoly for purchase of the entire Anatolian wool clip.

The cartel now had the wool, the spinning mills, dye works and weavers, together with the sales outlets it needed all over Europe and the United States. They were in a very strong position, not least because they also had access to European financial backing. As well as their own modern carpet factories on the coast the company also employed village women who worked in their own homes all over western and central Anatolia. Most of them were Greek or Armenian. Some years ago some students in Izmir asked me whether this was because the Frankish owners of the company were prejudiced against Muslims. "Far from it;" I replied, "on the contrary, they considered Turkish weavers to be better. The problem was that the Muslims would not allow the company inspectors to enter their houses to check the work on the looms." Since the OCM had given the weavers the wool and had paid them an advance to start work, they had to insist on inspecting the quality of the work in progress. There was no solution other than to employ Christian weavers, who had no such objections. One of the students then asked why the OCM could not use female inspectors. My response was to ask him if he thought that any family in those days, Muslim or Christian, would have allowed their women to travel, alone, for days on end, to remote villages in central Anatolia to visit the houses of strangers to look at carpets.

By the end of 1910, only two years after its foundation, the company was employing some 100,000 weavers working on 20,000 looms in 27 towns and cities all over western and central Turkey, with some 90% of all Turkish production in its hands. As the cost of labour rose in the west, so the work was shifted further east.⁸¹ A constant stream of camel trains brought the carpets from all over Anatolia in to Smyrna for washing and then export to Europe and the USA. In 1914 some 600 camels a week were leaving Uşak for Smyrna, each carrying two bales of carpets.

After the state railway, the OCM was the biggest employer in Turkey. Its profits were phenomenal, it paid dividends of between 11% and 12% and international bankers were falling over each other in order to lend money to them. However, it had not been an easy start. In January 1908 a number of banks in the United States collapsed and the American stock market lost half of its value. This crisis paralyzed trade over much of the world for four months and had a particularly bad effect on the demand for luxury goods such as carpets. For most of the first half of the first year of the cartel's operation there was almost no business. It was as a result of this banking crisis a hundred years ago that the Federal Reserve Bank was established, to ensure that such a thing should never happen again.

1908, the year of the establishment of the company, also saw the beginning of the constitutional revolution in Turkey and the rise of the Young Turks. The new constitution, quite apart from political reforms, led to a period of both social and economic liberalism, and educated women began to appear unveiled in public. All was not springtime, however. In the same year the Ottomans suffered the losses of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Crete. Also in the same year there were the first-ever strikes among workers in the coal mines, the railways and in the new factories. These humiliations and upheavals led many Turks to think that perhaps all this new liberalism had been a mistake, and there was a call for the abandonment of the new

⁸¹ This process continues today. 'Persian' carpets are now being woven in Vietnam.

ideas and a return to the old certainties of firm government, Islamic law and a reversion to the *hijab*. A particularly famous incident was the rioting by the women of Uşak, the principal carpet weaving town of Turkey, who smashed the new industrial wool spinning mills. These had been introduced because the annual production of carpets in Uşak had more than tripled in the previous ten years from 75,000 square metres to 250,000 square metres and the hand carders and spinners could not possibly keep up with the increased demand for yarn. The new mills, of course, took work away from these poor women, who depended for their livelihoods on spinning yarn at home for the carpet trade.

From now on the story is dominated by wars. In 1911 Italy occupied Tripolitania, which was then Ottoman territory, and also the island of Rhodes. The Italian fleet blockaded the Dardanelles, which cut Constantinople off from European trade. The banks, fearing the worst, closed their doors, cutting off credit. Without the finance to buy wool and pay advances to the weavers, the carpet exporters cancelled orders and the poor weavers in deepest Anatolia, who had never heard of Italy or Rhodes, found themselves out of work. More war followed in 1912 and 1913, this time in the Balkans. Turkey lost Salonika to Greece and Bulgaria occupied Edirne.

Constantinople was filled with thousands of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and northern Greece, who brought with them typhus and cholera, which began to spread in the city. People were afraid to leave their houses. The normally busy shopping streets of Constantinople were deserted. Tourists stopped coming and this lucrative market for the OCM's carpets dried up. One hundred thousand refugees came down from Constantinople to Smyrna, bringing their diseases with them. The markets in Europe, nervous at the possible outcome of these wars to the east, slowed down, but the American market, where the OCM had had the foresight to establish itself, held up well and went on to grow fast.

We now move on to 1914. The usual picture of the First World War is one of slaughter in the mud and trenches of France and Belgium. For the Levantines in Turkey things went rather differently. (See recent article by the author on the treatment of the Levantines by Rahmi Bey, the governor of Izmir and Aydin.) After the war the OCM found itself with huge stocks of carpets on its hands which, for lack of shipping, they had been unable to deliver. This was not such a bad thing, as they were then able to profit from the huge backlog of demand both in the USA and in the victorious countries of Europe, which had been starved of imports all this time. The economies of defeated Germany and Austro-Hungary, however, which had previously been very good markets, had been destroyed and did not recover for many years.

Although there was now a huge demand for carpets, the company now had a problem meeting it, since it had lost most of its Armenian weavers during the events of 1915. Letters in the OCM archive show that the Armenians sent west to Nevşehir survived, whereas those sent south to Syria did not. The end of war did not bring much peace to Turkey. In 1919 the advance of the Greek army was accompanied by much destruction, particularly of the carpet weaving town of Ghiordes, which was destroyed in 1921. Anatolian carpet production, which had made a brief recovery, practically came to a halt.



1922 saw the defeat of the Greeks and the re-occupation of Smyrna and, with it, the great fire. To this day nobody is sure who started it. There were dreadful scenes at the harbour. Allied naval vessels in the bay, under orders to take on only their own nationals, looked on as Greeks and Armenians, pushed by the crowds behind, plunged into the sea to escape the flames. The OCM head office

on the quay was burned and its entire stock of carpets was lost. The American Tobacco Company also lost its entire stock of tobacco. These colossal losses following the fire became the subject of insurance claims into which politics entered in a big way. In brief, the goods had not been insured against war risk, since the owners had seen no risk of war. The Americans therefore were anxious not to blame the Turkish army for the fire. The British, for their part, were interested in the oilfields of Mosul and also had no wish to antagonise the new Turkish government. The record is therefore murky.

The companies made claims against the insurance companies for accidental damage, which the insurance companies refused to meet. A test court case held in London in 1923 found in favour of the insurance companies: in other words, that the fire had been an act of war and not an accident. This wiped £100,000 sterling off the OCM books. This decision did, however, later enable the companies to enter a claim for damages for their losses from the Turkish government by way of war reparations. What was the effect on the carpet company of the exchange of populations in 1923? In the post-war years the OCM found that it had now lost all its weavers in Anatolia. The Armenians had gone in 1915, and now they had lost the Greek weavers, who had been forcibly moved to Greece. The only way they could carry on weaving was to establish looms in Athens and on Rhodes. Rhodes, being still under Italian occupation, supplied the Italian market free of customs duty and did well for a while. In Turkey the taxes on trade imposed by the new republic, as well as the threat of trouble coming from Bolshevik Russia, drove most of the traders of Persian and Caucasian carpets in Constantinople to the safety of London, where their businesses thrived in the bonded warehouses that were granted to them beside the docks. Until this period Istanbul had been the world centre of the whole oriental carpet trade, and this shift is a perfect illustration of the effect of politics on commerce. London was now where people felt safe to do business.

The European governments were just as bad. When they imposed protective trade tariffs, by way of imperial preference, Indian carpets began flooding into England and Algerian carpets came in to France, practically duty free, to the great detriment of the remains of the Turkish trade, which was obstructed by heavy import duties in Europe. The new Turkish government also imposed all manner of restrictions on the export trade through taxes and foreign exchange regulations. The once thriving Turkish carpet industry, employing many tens of thousands of spinners, dyers and weavers, was destroyed by war, politics, taxes and political instability.

In 1928, however, the Turkish government changed its restrictive attitude towards commerce and relaxed its tax regime. This led to a brief and spectacular boom in business which, but for the Wall Street crash of 1929, might have continued. Çolakzadeh, the only Turkish carpet exporter who had survived independently of the

OCM, was clever enough to see the crash coming and was able to sell his carpet stocks in New York just in time, before their value evaporated. Once again, the poor and illiterate weavers in the villages of Turkey, and also of Persia, found themselves out of work as a consequence of follies committed by supposedly educated people in far away countries, of which they knew very little.

This has been a patchwork of a story. What is it all about, in the end? It demonstrates that trade, investment and industry can only flourish when conditions are favourable. It shows the need at the same time for proper control of banks and commercial institutions, and the need for economic and political stability, without sclerosis. What was true a hundred years ago is just as true today.



Poetry in the first two decades of the Turkish Republic

by Celia Kerslake
Oriental Studies, University of Oxford
Chairperson BATAS

At the time of the foundation of the Republic, Turkish literature had already undergone about fifty years of adaptation to the modern world. In the course of this process the highly conventionalised forms, themes and imagery of classical Ottoman poetry, for centuries the only prestigious literary genre, had been almost completely abandoned, although the music of its metrical system retained a strong emotional resonance in some quarters. For the majority of poets, beauty of sound was no longer the predominant concern. The 'National Literature' movement, launched by a group of young poets and writers in 1911 as the Ottoman Empire teetered towards its final collapse, had swept all before it, with its programme for building national consciousness through a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the role of literature in society. The decade of almost uninterrupted warfare and socio-political upheaval between 1911 and 1922 had made the ideals of 'National Literature' seem imperative for national survival.

One of the key principles was that the language of literature was to be brought as close as possible to the language of 'the people' (generally understood to mean the spoken idiom of Istanbul). It was to be stylistically simple (free of literary artifices and ornamentation) and grammatically Turkish (free from the Persian constructions and Arabic inflections that had been for centuries integrated into the formal written language of the elite). Its vocabulary was to be drawn only from words in general use; thus Arabic and Persian synonyms for everyday concepts such as 'water' and 'night', which were much favoured in traditional poetic diction but unknown to the general populace, were to be dropped. Finally, the subject matter of literary works was to be drawn from the real life of the people and/or to reflect issues of national concern.

As far as poetry was concerned, the National Literature movement demanded the abandonment of the Arabo-Persian metrical system known as *aruz*, based on patterns of long and short syllables, and the adoption instead of the indigenous rhythms of Turkish folk poetry, which relied simply on numbers of syllables (*hece*), regardless of their length. The absence of long vowels in native Turkish words did indeed mean that *aruz* would be difficult to sustain with a poetic vocabulary that was to be much more Turkish. But ideological considerations weighed much more heavily than this technical incompatibility. While *aruz* represented the 'old' literature that was seen as elitist, inward-looking and detached from reality, *hece* led (or so it seemed) directly to the pastures and mountains of Anatolia, to the 'authentic' voice of 'the people', now seen as the means of national survival. As a result, the folk metres so long despised by the literary elite became the new poetic orthodoxy in the period that witnessed the birth pangs and the early development of the Turkish nation state. Most of the poetry produced between 1923 and 1940 was cast in rhymed stanzaic forms taken directly from the folk tradition, with lines of 7, 8 or 11 syllables. A body of poetry on patriotic themes (sometimes referred to as *memleket şiiiri*) was produced, extolling the beauties of Anatolia and the virtues of its people in what one commentator has called "the voluntary reflection on the literary plane" of the orientation of the new regime.⁸² This poetry found pride of place in school textbooks, but was of very low literary value, not least because its Istanbul-based practitioners had, for the most part, no direct knowledge either of Anatolia or of its living poetic tradition.⁸³ However, although there is not space to do justice to them here, mention must also be made of three poets who, in their different ways, created works of originality and artistic merit within the *hece* system: Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901-1962), whose poems explore the mysteries of time and eternity in a dream-like atmosphere; Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983), whose poems of this period are powerful evocations of fear aroused by dark, lonely streets and rooms; and Fazıl Hüsni Dağlarca (1914-2008), who began a remarkably long and productive poetic career with work focusing on the relationship of the human being with nature and the universe, and his loneliness in the face of death.

Two major poets who had come to prominence before the Republic, Yahya Kemal (Beyatlı, 1884-1958) and Ahmet Haşım (1887-1933) remained aloof from the National Literature movement and continued to write in *aruz*. What these two poets had in common was their overriding concern with the aesthetic aspect of poetry, particularly its musicality. Although differing markedly from each other in terms of the poetic worlds that they created, Yahya Kemal and Ahmet Haşım shared a commitment to what they called 'pure poetry' (*saf şiiir*). For them it was not enough that poetry be unencumbered by what were seen as the 'artifices' of traditional Ottoman poetic diction; it must also be untarnished by subordination to any non-artistic (social/political/religious) ideals. Yahya Kemal, who had been born and brought up in Ottoman Macedonia and had spent his twenties leading a bohemian life in Paris, succeeded in harmonising the *aruz* metres with a language remarkably close to the educated spoken Turkish of his day. He produced sonorous poetry that celebrated the glories of the Ottoman past and articulated a deep love of Istanbul, the city whose conquest represented, for him, the pinnacle of his nation's historic achievement. This vision of Turkishness, which included Islamic culture as a key ingredient, was clearly incongruent with the ideology of the new Republic, but this did

⁸² Hakan Sazyek in Talât S. Halman, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, iv (Ankara, 2006), p 29.

⁸³ Mehmet H. Doğan, *Yüzyılın Türk Şiiiri (1900-2000)*, i (Istanbul, 2001), p 24.

not prevent Yahya Kemal from attracting a strong following among conservative circles. Insisting that poetry was to be listened to rather than read, he refrained from collecting his poems into books during his lifetime, but delighted his admirers with his own recitations.

The poetry of Ahmet Haşim, by contrast, is not concerned with external 'realities' of any kind. Influenced on the one hand by the Symbolists and Impressionists in northern Europe, and on the other by Şeyh Galib's great eighteenth-century Ottoman mystic poem *Hüsn ü Aşk*, Haşim produced a body of poems that evoke an obscure and melancholy world, largely empty of human life but full of striking images of flames and radiance, dawn and sunset, lakes and swans. Criticism of the opacity of one of his poems led him to preface the second of his collections (1926) with an important essay in which he set out his conception of poetry. In a modernist vein very different from the prevailing view of literature in Turkey, he insisted that the language of poetry was closer to music than to the language of prose; it was designed to be heard rather than understood. He also saw it as a virtue for a poem, like a prophetic utterance, to be open to multiple interpretations, giving the reader, as well as the poet, a role in the creative process.

While the early Republican poetic scene was thus dominated by poets who, in different ways, were disengaged from the material conditions of the society in which they lived, a radically new voice was also beginning to make itself heard, that of Nazım Hikmet (1902-63). Nazım, as he is known to his admirers, has a unique place in the history of modern Turkish poetry. On the one hand, his undisguised commitment to communism (after several years spent in Moscow in the 1920s) made him ideologically repugnant to a large section of the Turkish public, and persona non grata to the regime. On the other hand, the audacious novelty and directness of his poetic idiom was applauded by all the leading poets and critics when his first collection was published in 1929. However, a long series of prosecutions in the 1920s and 1930s eventually led in 1938 to a prison sentence of 28 years on trumped-up charges of inciting army and navy cadets to rebellion. Although released under a general amnesty in 1950, Nazım feared for his life and fled the country in 1951. The Turkish parliament deprived him of his citizenship, and he spent the rest of his life in exile, mainly in Moscow. He is still by far the best known Turkish poet internationally, and the campaign for his release from prison in 1950 had world-wide support.

As early as 1922 Nazım was writing poetry that was revolutionary in form as well as content, beginning with descriptions in free verse of the scenes of extreme poverty and hunger that he had observed while crossing parts of northern Anatolia on foot in 1921 and travelling by train from Batum to Moscow in 1922. Finding the *hece* verse forms inadequate to express the enormity of this mass suffering, Nazım abandoned all formal conventions and created a poetry that relied on vigorous patterns of sound in lines of different length. Moreover, in what was to remain a favourite component of his stylistic toolbox, the auditory/semantic patterning was visually reinforced by a 'stepped' arrangement of lines on the page. Nazım believed that a poet should be constantly searching for the most appropriate form for any specific subject matter. He was against rigid divisions between different kinds of poetry, and between poetry and prose. The only rule a poet must observe was to reflect reality from a socialist viewpoint. Nazım's output includes a number of book-length narrative poems that incorporate collage of various text types (e.g. newspaper reports, telegrams).

Colloquialisms and slang featured naturally in his representation of characters' speech.

Some of Nazım's early poetry (e.g. *Becoming a machine*) displays a naive Futuristic belief in industrialisation as the panacea for social injustice. But although dismayed by the way the Soviet Union developed under Stalin, he remained committed to the Marxist revolutionary cause throughout his life, and virtually every one of his poems reflects this in some way. Moreover, the universality of the Marxist vision made him identify with revolutionary struggles in countries as widely dispersed as China, India and Ethiopia. He was the first Turkish poet whose works not only take the reader to distant countries but present fully empathetic portraits of individuals from societies very different from his own. Although Nazım loved his own country and longed for it in exile, his poetry shows a truly global conception of humanity, without a trace of national particularism. Even his narrative of the Turkish war of independence, *The National Forces*, through which left-leaning Kemalists sought to rehabilitate him posthumously as a 'patriotic poet' (*vatan şairi*), had always been intended by Nazım to form an integral part of his most ambitious work, *Human Landscapes from my Country*. Both of these were composed during his long prison term and published after his death. While the liberation of Turkey from the imperialists in 1919-22 was obviously important to Nazım, the resulting establishment of a 'bourgeois' nation state that did nothing to overthrow the capitalistic socio-economic order was not something he could celebrate. Through the loosely interlinked depictions of about 180 Turkish citizens in *Human Landscapes*, he delineates a society corrupted from top to bottom, in which the poor are just as narrowly focused on their individual interests as the members of the affluent elite. The only positive characters are the convicted communists, imprisoned for their beliefs but never abandoning their hope, their solidarity or their determination to bring change to their country.⁸⁴

For all the excitement that it had aroused in the late 1920s, Nazım Hikmet's radically innovative verse had surprisingly little impact on the general development of Turkish poetry at that period, and his confinement to prison in 1938, accompanied by the banning of his works, effectively removed him from the literary scene until his posthumous rediscovery by the Turkish Left in the 1960s. As he embarked on his long sentence, a group of three young poets in Ankara were starting a movement that was to have a much more radical effect on how poetry was conceived and produced in Turkey. Orhan Veli (1914-1950), Oktay Rifat (1914-1988) and Melih Cevdet Anday (1915-2002) became known for a brief period as the *Garip* ('Strange') poets, after the title of a poetry collection that they published jointly in 1941. But the movement is identified predominantly with Orhan Veli. It was he who authored the preface to *Garip* (headed 'Thoughts about poetry'), which is regarded as the manifesto of the movement, and the second edition of the book (1945) contained only poems by him. The *Garip* message was iconoclastic in the extreme. It demanded no less than the complete abandonment of the established aesthetics of poetry – its formal structures of metre and rhyme and the notion that only certain kinds of language were 'poetic'. There should, it was maintained, be absolutely no distinction between the language of speech and that of poetry, because the consequence of such a division had been to make poetry the preserve of a small elite. The masses who struggled to make a living had just as much right as the

⁸⁴ The genesis of *The National Forces* and the changes it underwent in the process of incorporation into *Human Landscapes* have been brilliantly examined in Erkan Irmak, *Kayıp Destan'in İzinde* (Istanbul, 2011).

affluent to have access to poetry and to enjoy it. The practical result of these ideas was a collection of short poems that present simple, brief reflections on some of the daily pleasures and frustrations of life for the ordinary citizen, often with a touch of humour and sometimes an element of surrealism. In complete contrast to Nazım Hikmet's work, the poems of *Garip* are non-political and do not suggest that life can get any better; it is just there to be got through as best one can. Probably the single most famous *Garip* poem is Orhan Veli's epitaph to a certain Süleyman Efendi, recording that he suffered from nothing in life as much as the corns on his feet. The devotion of a poem to such a 'trivial' topic was unprecedented in the history of Turkish poetry.

Although predictably condemned at first by most established poets, the highly accessible *Garip* style was taken up enthusiastically by press and public alike, and proved to be a point of no return for modern Turkish poetry. The notion of obligatory adherence to a predetermined system of metre and rhyme was gone for ever. So was the idea that Turkish poetry should conform to a 'national' ideal articulated in the traditional rhythms of the Anatolian minstrels. In the words of a leading poet of the following generation, Cemal Süreya, poetry had been "brought into the street and dressed in a cloth cap".⁸⁵ Democracy had come to poetry before it came to politics in Turkey. These gains had been won, however, at a considerable cost in artistic terms. The *Garip* poets themselves soon recognised the severe limitations of a poetry that was required to be as transparent as prose. Each of them began to explore new avenues, and the paths they took are representative of the more general course of Turkish poetry in the next two decades – on the one hand the expanding 'socialist realism' of the 1940s, and on the other, the intellectually challenging modernism of the 'Second New' movement of the 1950s. I propose to discuss these in a later article.

Samples of the poetry discussed in the article

Excerpt from **AÇIK DENİZ** by Yahya Kemal

Balkan şehirlerinde geçerken
çocukluğum
Her lâhza bir alev gibi hasretti
duyduğum.
Kalbimde vardı Byron'u bedbaht eden
melâl
Gezdim o yaşta dağları, hulyâm içinde
lâl,
Aldım Rakofça kırlarının hür havasını,
Duydum akıncı cedlerimin ihtirâsını,
Her yaz şimale doğru asırlarca bir koşu,
Bağrımda bir akis gibi kalmış uğultulu...
Mağlûpken ordu, yaşlı dururken bütün
vatan,
Rü'yâma girdi her gece bir fâtihâne zan.

THE OPEN SEA

My childhood was spent in Balkan towns,
Feeling every moment a burning sense of loss.
In my heart was the melancholy that oppressed
Byron.
I wandered the mountains at that age, silent in
my reveries,
Breathing the air of freedom in the Rakofça
countryside.
I felt the passion of my raiding ancestors,
Whose rush to the north, every summer for
centuries,
Was always there inside me like a resounding
echo...
While the army stood defeated and the whole
country was in mourning,
Every night into my dreams would come
thoughts of conquest.

⁸⁵ Quoted in Mehmet H. Doğan, *Yüzyılın Türk Şiiri (1900-2000)*, i (Istanbul, 2001), p 31.

Source: Mehmet H. Doğan (ed.), *Yüzyılın Türk Şiiri (1900-2000)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001, vol i, p. 105.

Translation [of the Yahya Kemal excerpt] by Celia Kerslake

Excerpt from **SALKIMSÖĞÜT** by Nazım Hikmet (1928)

Akıyordu su
gösterip aynasında söğüt ağaçlarını.
Salkımsöğütler yıkıyordu suda saçlarını!
Yanan yalın kılıçları çarparak söğütlere
koşuyordu kızıl atlılar güneşin battığı
yere!
Birden
bire kuş gibi
 vurulmuş gibi
 kanadından
yaralı bir atlı yuvarlandı atından!
Bağırmadı,
gidenleri geri çağırmadı,
baktı yalnız dolu gözlerle
 uzaklaşan atlıların parıldayan
nallarına!

Ah ne yazık!
 Ne yazık ki ona
dört yıl giden atların köpüklü boynuna
bir daha yatmayacak,
beyaz orduların ardında kılıç
oynatmayacak!

Source: Nazım Hikmet, *835 Satır*. İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1988, p. 14

KİTABE-İ SENG-İ MEZAR by Orhan Veli

Hiç bir şeyden çekmedi dünyada
Nasırdan çektiği kadar.
Hattâ çirkin yaratıldığından bile
O kadar müteessir değildi.
Ayakkabısı vurmadığı zamanlarda
Anmazdı ama Allahın adını
Günahkâr da sayılmazdı.

WEeping Willow

The water flowed,
it showed
willow trees in its mirror,
weeping willows washing their hair in the
stream.
Red riders raced towards the sinking sun,
their burning drawn swords hitting against the
willows.
Suddenly
like a bird
 shot
 in the wing
a wounded horseman tumbled from his
horse.
He did not shout,
or call after those who had gone,
he just looked with brimming eyes
 at the flashing hooves of the riders
receding.
Alas!
 alas that he
will never again lie on the foaming necks of
the galloping horses,
or brandish his sword in pursuit of the white
armies!

Source: Nâzım Hikmet, *Beyond the Walls: Selected poems* translated by Ruth Christie, Richard McKane & Talât Sait Halman, London: Anvil Press Poetry in association with Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002, p. 27. The translation has been slightly modified by Celia Kerslake.

EPITAPH

He suffered from nothing in the world
The way he suffered from corns;
He didn't even feel so bad
About being created ugly.
Though he wouldn't utter the Lord's name
Unless his shoe pinched,
He couldn't be considered a sinner, either.

Yazık oldu Süleyman efendiye.

Poor Süleyman Efendi.

Source: Orhan Veli, *Garip*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2014, p. 63

Source: Talat Sait Halman, (transl.), *I am listening to Istanbul: Selected poems of Orhan Veli Kanık*, New York: Corinth Books, 1971, p. 88. The translation has been slightly modified by Celia Kerslake



JAMAL ALIYEV

Cellist

Interviewed by Hande Eagle

Born in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1993, Jamal Aliyev is a rising star in today's classical music scene. World-renowned cellist Steven Isserlis, says: "He is eager to learn, pleasure to teach and already a highly accomplished cellist..." Since February, Aliyev has won four prestigious awards – the Royal College of Music Concerto Competition (February), the Bromsgrove International Young Musicians' Competition (April), the Royal College of Music Violoncello Competition (May), and the Croydon Concerto Competition (June). His debut album "Russian Theme" is due in November.

Hande Eagle:

Can you tell us about how your relationship with the cello started? Perhaps a little about your grandfather Kara Aliyev and your family background.

Jamal Aliyev:

First of all, my whole family are musicians. My mother is also a cellist and my father is a violinist. When I was three or four years old they both practised their instruments at home and I thought "I want to do this as well". I told them about my interest. I don't think they wanted me to be a musician until I was five when I heard my grandfather play, I was so impressed. He was a very famous cellist in Azerbaijan. I told my parents that I really like the cello. I used to play with sticks and imitate playing the cello. They decided to give me a cello and I started playing. Soon I began proper lessons with my grandfather and continued with him for nine years before moving to the Yehudi Menuhin School in London.

H E: *You said your parents didn't want you to be a musician in the beginning. Why?*

J A: They were musicians as well and they tried very hard to become successful. But, after much effort, they ended up in orchestras where musicians don't earn much so they didn't want me to choose music as a career but they realised that I really love music and the cello and so they risked it for me.

H E: *But it was also a risk **you** were taking.*

J A: But I was five, I didn't know about life or risks, or anything.

H E: *Do you ever have moments when you doubt yourself and say, "Hmmm, maybe I should have studied banking?"*

J A: No. I don't, I had regrets of being a musician from the ages of 10 to 16 when I had to practise all day while my friends were playing outside and I couldn't join them because I had musician parents who – I now appreciate – made me practise every day, all day. They controlled every hour I practised. That's the only time I wished I had been like my friends. Otherwise, no, I wouldn't want to be anything else.

H E: *Your debut with the BBC Concert Orchestra was broadcast live on Radio 3 at the Yehudi Menuhin Hall in 2012. How was that?*

J A: It was my first time playing live on the radio. I think I had to begin preparing mentally for it three months in advance just by imagining that moment of going on stage and having to play in front of a BBC microphone. The whole world could have been listening. I still remember that day very vividly when I had to wake up and perform. I was playing in London and my parents were listening from Turkey!

H E: *How did you deal with the stress? A debut concert can be life-changing.*

J A: It's the same with every performance really. I knew I had to practise technically and mentally. When the day came, I knew I had to trust myself. I had that confidence and arrogance to be able just to go and play.

H E: *Confidence or arrogance?*

J A: Both, I think, to a certain extent – giggles innocently – otherwise, if you go on stage and you don't have the confidence and think, "Oh! What will happen if I make a mistake? Everybody will think I am not a good cellist!" The moment you think that and everything goes wrong. You have always to believe you can do it and do it well.

H E: *How would you describe your relationship with your instrument?*

J A: The Royal College of Music have generously loaned me a John Betts cello but it's not a wonderful instrument. I am very lucky to have found good friends who will invest in a wonderful Gabrielli cello for me from the 1750s. It's a million times better than my current instrument. I really hope they will be able to buy it; it's very expensive, it costs over half a million! For the moment the John Betts is great and I have been playing on it for two years. It's a really good cello compared to the other instruments I previously had. It's by an English luthier.

H E: *Would you say that practising and playing on an inferior instrument has made you a stronger player because you are capable of understanding your instrument?*

J A: Yes, of course. You can make music on any cello, but when you practise on one of inferior make and then are given a superior one, you play twice as well.

H E: *It's like the difference between playing an electric keyboard and a bespoke piano.*

J A: Yes, of course. In the past, all great musicians like David Oistrakh, the great violinist, and Mstislav Rostropovich, initially played on less than superior instruments but managed to attain incredible sound. But when they took on instruments such as Stradivarius, Storioni and Guarneri we can see what a big difference the quality of the instrument made. But it's also about ability and talent.

H E: *What makes you such a talented, sought-after, multi-award winning young cellist? What sets you apart?*

J A: Thank you for your kind comments... – giggles with a glint in his eyes – When you come from a background where your family couldn't achieve what they wanted, and were orchestra musicians with their limited income, the life they live, and everything they have given me, I want success so much just to make them proud of me. – gazes into the distance with tearful eyes, and his voice trills – This doesn't just come with practise, it's everything else combined and of course, 60-70% luck.

H E: *What inspires you?*

J A: Great musicians don't inspire me as much as pop artists such as Freddie Mercury and Michael Jackson. I think I like the idea of being on stage in front of 70-80,000 people, communicating with them, entertaining them and controlling the audience. But of course, they perform in stadiums and I perform only in halls. Maybe I always wanted to be a pop star...

H E: *When we talk about Freddie Mercury I suppose we have to mention what a showman and icon he was.*

J A: He was also a very talented singer. I could even say that he was the best male singer of his time. Yes, he was very arrogant, he was a showman. He loved living life, he didn't play by the rules, he smoked (**H E:** *And he drank a lot*) when he shouldn't but he still sang wonderfully. He was always in tune. The audience loved him so much. Jackson's and Mercury's stage presence is what surprises me the most. I try to take that and adapt it into my performance of classical music.

H E: *Is that possible? Doing what they did in the classical music scene?*

J A: You can but if you overdo it you will be called a showman. People will criticise you for not making the music as you should. I think performing is acting. If you just sit there and play without any facial expressions or movements, it won't captivate the audience – except in the case of Horowitz, the great pianist, who didn't move at all. He played incredibly but I am not Horowitz and will never be. So I have to have some stage presence. Expressing your emotions to the audience is really important and that's why I have been so inspired by Mercury and Jackson. I also met Rostropovich,



a wonderful man, very intelligent. I have also been spending time with Steven Isserlis lately. He is my hero; I learn so much from him.

H E: *Do you think we can talk about the death of classical music in the 21st century?*

J A: In countries such as Austria, the UK and the USA; classical music education is really good. However, where I come from classical music education is really poor. They don't really pay attention to it. Classical music is not important in Turkey. Turkish arabesque is considered to be important, it is popular. Fazil Say recently got into big trouble because he questioned why they teach arabesque rather than classical music. Of course, many people enjoy arabesque music but there should be a better balance between the teaching of it and of classical music.

H E: *Many artists are finding it hard to secure a living with their music. What are the financial realities you're living with and how could they be improved? London is a very expensive city and artists are fleeing. Do you plan on moving?*

J A: I am not thinking of leaving London at the moment. I am very lucky, I have upcoming concerts and a scholarship covering my tuition fees. Several charities/foundations generously aid me. I am very grateful for that. I really want to become a British citizen. I love London. It's full of opportunities. I love the culture and the people.

H E: *Mstislav Rostropovich said, "The cello is a hero because of its register – its tenor voice. It is a masculine instrument, whereas the violin is feminine because of its soprano pitch. When the cello enters in the Dvorak concerto, it is like a great orator." Would you agree?*

J A: Yes. I love the cello and 99% of people I know prefer the cello to the violin. I know violinists would hate me for saying that but I think the cello is so in the middle, and it's, as Rostropovich said, wonderful. There are so many more compositions for the violin than the cello. Rostropovich actually made it a solo instrument in a Dvorak concerto. It's the most wonderful, heroic sound. I would never change my instrument.

H E: *Do you think the music industry is subject to sexism? Would you say men have a better chance at fame and fortune?*

J A: I think men have a better chance at everything, not just music, because they can concentrate on what they're doing. In many countries women get married, have children and become mothers. They don't continue practising their instruments. Like my mother... She was a great cellist when she was under 20. Then she married, had me, and stopped practising. If she hadn't, she would have had a bigger career. Men do have a better chance. On the other hand, producers actively look for pretty women with beautiful dresses to draw the audiences in.

H E: *What was the best advice you were ever given about life and music?*

J A: In 2005, when I went to Paris to play to Rostropovich, he told me "you have the talent, you have every possibility to become a great cellist, my advice to you is go to the end, and never look back, never doubt yourself, never regret anything, practise as much as you can. I am 90% sure you will get there." That was a boost for me. I knew he was sick then, but he was really nice to me and made me so comfortable.

H E: *Last but not least, what are your goals for the next 5-10 years?*

J A: This March I recorded a debut album with pianist Anna Fedorova. It will be out in November. I'm about to sign a new contract with Ellison & Strømsholm International Artists' Management in the UK and Scandinavian countries for concerts in Europe, Asia and the USA. I'm really looking forward to it going smoothly.

For more information on Jamal Aliyev visit: www.jamalaliyev.com or contact hande@handeeagle.com

Poetry

Gülay Yurdal Michaels

Poet and Translator

A poem is never finished - just abandoned (Paul Valery)

I Saw Mimosas by Chance in Londinium

Sometimes I can catch the sun too
without running
I hold myself back
When a lame pigeon alights on the
edge of a sidewalk
Its feathers frayed obviously - how
much
And its life never finished but only
abandoned.
Mimosas cost five pounds exactly
Those of my distant grade-school
were free
I can hold unto them - how nice
I salute freedom's twists and turns
While being consumed piece by
piece
Dying quite abashed slowly
The days of the universe aft and
fore
I also salute.
by Gülay Yurdal-Michaels

*Bir şiir hiç bir zaman bitirilmez,
sadece bırakılır... (Paul Valery)*

Londra'da Mimosalar gördüm Rasgele

Güneşi de yakalıyorum bazen
koşmadan
Tutuyorum kendimi
Topal bir güvercin kaldırım
kenarına konarken
Tüyleri eprimiş belli ki - ne kadar
Yaşamı bitmiyor hiç bir zaman
sadece bırakılıyor.
Tam beş sterlin mimozalar
Ta ilkokulum bahçesinde beleştiler
Tutunabiliyorum onlara, ne güzel
Selam duruyorum özgürlüğün
büklerine
Tükenirken parça parça
Süklüm püklüm ölürken yavaş
yavaş
Evren öncesi ve sonrası
Günlere de olsun selam.
Gülay Yurdal Michaels



Turks in Britain

by Semra Eren-Nijhar

Sociologist, Author and Documentary Maker

The history of Turkish people in Britain is not as short as many might presume but was quite under researched. Many people do not know that 'Güvercinlik' (pigeon-loft) is the term given to Trafalgar Square, London, by the first Turkish arrivals. It is where the first Turks (mainly Turkish Cypriots) used to meet. It was their only meeting point as they did not have any associations, cafés or restaurants of their own in which to gather and socialise. Although some Turkish Cypriots arrived in London in the 1920s and 1930s, Turkish Cypriots started coming in bigger numbers in the 1940s and 'Güvercinlik' is the place where their journey in Britain started.

Now, in the twenty-first century, Turkish people are an integral part of Western Europe and nearly five million of them constitute one of the largest immigrant populations. Some have been living in Europe for centuries but it is within the last sixty years that their numbers have grown – with fourth and fifth generations – forming one of the most productive and enriching communities.

Today there are estimated to be 500.000 Turkish people living in Britain, although the community is not evenly distributed across the country because Turks prefer to live close to other members of their own community. These demographics have, however, started to change gradually. Smaller Turkish communities are to be found in parts of Scotland and in Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield and the English Midlands. There are Turks across London's thirty-two boroughs but there are concentrations in Enfield, Hackney, Lewisham, Islington and Haringey. The history of Turkish migration to the UK is very different from that of such movements to other European countries. It does not only differ in terms of the pattern of movement but there are also socio-economic and cultural differences as compared with migrants living in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.



The first Turkish Cypriots who came to London at the beginning of 1920's were students or tourists. Later, when the Great Depression of 1929 hit the then British Colony of Cyprus, the number of Turkish Cypriots in London increased. Between 1945 and 1955 – after World War Two – Turkish Cypriots migrated to Britain for employment. Many who arrived in those years experienced London with its war ravaged ruins and they were subject to food rationing along with all other Londoners. They contributed to the rebuilding and growth of London in those post-war years. The new arrivals from Cyprus were among the first generations of migrants who took part in the formation of the early multicultural society of London and the UK – along with other incomers from the Asian subcontinent, Africa and the Caribbean.

The number of new arrivals from Cyprus increased in the early 1960s on account of worsening economic conditions within the island. The new arrivals peaked in this period as it coincided with the withdrawal of British troops from Cyprus and the loss of well-paid jobs tied to British colonial rule there. In 1962 came the UK Immigration



Act along with state-controlled 'Surplus Labour Export' based on bilateral agreements between countries to facilitate the flow of migrants to European countries. These groups of migrants arrived first and eventually were joined by their wives and children.

In the 1960s Turkey started sending migrant workers to Europe – mainly to Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium but also to Britain. The number of Turkish Cypriots further increased in London during the political turmoil in Cyprus of the 1970s.

In the 1980s many political intellectuals from Turkey became exiles in Britain after the Turkish Military Coup in 1980. These highly educated people came to Britain as students or as professionals. Soon after their arrival in London, they participated in political activities as intellectuals and trade unionists within the British setting and continued to play an active role in Turkish politics. The 1980s was also a time when multiculturalism was showing its strength through its activities, with Turkish people taking an active part in the debate about multiculturalism in Britain. For political intellectuals and trade unionists from Turkey the defence of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom was also a defence of the labour movement itself.

Turks constitute one of the most active political ethnic communities in London and have made their mark in the political development of Britain. We now see a good number of elected politicians from the Turkish community taking part in political discourse in Britain. Results indicate strongly that Turks in constituencies where they live in large numbers can influence election results if they fully engage with local and national debate.


A small number of political refugees with Kurdish backgrounds arrived from Turkey in the 1980s but during the 1990s they arrived in larger numbers. Also during this period a substantial number of Kurdish economic refugees from Turkey came to Britain. This group of new arrivals became part of the ethnically rich tapestry of London, by building on the existing networks of support to find employment within their communities, thereby enriching already established business.

Within the last ten years there has been a growth in the number of Turkish people living in Britain from countries other than Cyprus and Turkey. The third and fourth generation of Turkish people from Germany equipped with their language and professional skills are now settling not only in Turkey but also in Britain. Among this group are also people with Turkish backgrounds originating from Macedonia, Greece, Romania and – particularly – Bulgaria. The Turkish community nowadays contributes not only as workers in the restaurant and the hospitality sector as before. Today in their distinctive way they can be found as traders, politicians, doctors, artists, teachers, academics, film makers, entrepreneurs, actors, civil servants and bankers and indeed in all levels of British society.

Railway Tragedy in 1871

Many Britons were involved in the development of the Ottoman railway system in the later decades of the nineteenth century. One of these was a 26-year old engine driver, William Laughton, who died when his train crashed into a stream in 1871 near Izmir on the Aydın line. Work on building this line had started in 1857 and it reached Aydın in 1866. Its main purpose was to move raw materials and agricultural products to the coast and to deliver imported manufactured goods to the hinterland. The line, which reached Eğirdir in 1912, was placed under military control during the 1914-18 War and was again disrupted following the Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919. It was ultimately bought by the Turkish State Railways (TCDD) in 1935.

Note: We are indebted to Edward Flaxman who saw the memorial to William Laughton in St. John's Anglican Church in Alsancak, Izmir. Mr Flaxman was for many years involved with major sewerage works in Istanbul and has taken several holidays in Turkey. His photograph of the memorial has also appeared in *Genealogists' Magazine*, 31(10), 2015, p.368.



Brian Beeley



Gibb Memorial Trust

In 1889 Elias John Wilkinson Gibb, the only son of a wealthy Glasgow wine merchant, established himself as a gentleman scholar in London and devoted the rest of his short life to the study of Ottoman literature. His *A History of Ottoman Poetry (HOP)*, published in six volumes from 1900 to 1909 was a truly monumental achievement, which provided the first extended account in English of Ottoman poetry. The first four volumes cover four developmental phases, largely under the

influence of Persian literature, from around 1300 to the middle of the nineteenth century, preceded in the first volume by a lengthy introduction on prosody, metaphor and mysticism. The fifth volume introduces the 'New School' of Ottoman poetry produced in Gibb's own era and inspired by French models. The sixth contains in Ottoman printed script the texts of all works quoted in English translation in the previous volumes. *HOP* quickly became a classic and no comparable study has yet appeared in English to rival it. More than a century and several reprints later, it remains a major work of reference and a rich source of quotations for English-speaking students of Ottoman literature and culture. Gibb's work has also been appreciated in Turkey. A partial translation into modern Turkish appeared in 1943, and another in 2000.

When Gibb died unexpectedly in 1901, aged 44, only the first volume of *HOP* had appeared in print and its future might have seemed uncertain. However, two developments occurred which ensured that his scholarly legacy would endure. First, the remaining five volumes of *HOP*, which were almost complete, were seen through the press by Gibb's friend and literary executor, the Persian scholar E G Browne. Second, in 1902 Gibb's mother established the Gibb Memorial Trust to commemorate her son's achievement and to help promote the continuing study of the history, literature, philosophy and religion of the Turks, Persians and Arabs. The Trust is an endowed charity which continues to support the preparation and publishing of books arising from academic research in these fields.

Since its first publication appeared in 1905, the Gibb Memorial Trust has published well over 100 titles, primarily scholarly editions and/or English translations of major Arabic and Persian literary and historical texts. Many of these are major texts which the Trust has kept available in new printings throughout the twentieth century. Appropriately enough, the first volume published under the Trust's auspices in 1905 was a facsimile edition of a Çağatay Turkish text, the memoirs of Babür, the first Moghul emperor in India. However, not until 1971 – over sixty years later – was a second Turkish text published, a facsimile edition of the biographical dictionary of poets compiled by the sixteenth-century Ottoman scholar Âşık Çelebi. Since then only two more 'Turkish' items have been added to the list. In 1980 the Trust published a new edition of the memoirs of Osman Ağa, an Ottoman military officer held captive in Habsburg Austria in the late seventeenth century. In 2001 Geoffrey Lewis, himself one of the Trustees, oversaw the publication of an account of Istanbul in the 1580s, translated into English by Michael Austin from the original Italian text written by a former physician to Murad III (1574-95).

At their annual meeting in May 2015, the Trustees considered ways in which the Ottoman and Turkish list could be expanded. It is hoped that in future more scholars will come forward with proposals for editions and particularly – given the current dearth of Ottoman sources available in English – for translations of significant texts. Meanwhile, a proposal is being prepared for a volume of essays on Ottoman poetry as a genre and on how study of this has developed in the century since Gibb published his *magnum opus*.



Paperback Edition (2013) of *HOP*, v. 1



M J L Austin (ed.),
Domenico's Istanbul (2001)

Christine Woodhead
Chairman, Gibb Memorial Trust, 2015-16
c.m.woodhead@durham.ac.uk

Further information on these and on other publications and activities of the Gibb Memorial Trust are available on the Trust's website (www.gibbtrust.org) or by contacting the Secretary, E J W Gibb Memorial Trust, 2 Penarth Place, Cambridge, CB3 9LU. Purchase inquiries may also be made to the Trust's distributors, Oxbow Books, 10 Hythe Bridge Street, Oxford OX1 2EW (www.oxbowbooks.com). All six volumes of Gibb's *History of Ottoman poetry* are newly available in paperback from Oxbow, either separately or as a set.

The National Library of Turkey



The National Library of Turkey is undertaking a major project to restore and bring back into use thousands of hitherto unseen rare and unique items which have been languishing in storage. Some of the rescued books and papers go back a thousand years. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism in Ankara, which is directing the project, reports that some 220,000 of these neglected books and documents are now catalogued and can be viewed by readers and there are another 130,000 items awaiting attention. Among works now available are 40,000 books from the Türkocağı

Collection of Ottoman history and art. There is also material in a number of languages other than Turkish.

Jane Beeley

NB: See *CILIP Update*, London, June 2015, p.10 and *Daily Sabah*, Ankara, April 17, 2015.



John Moreton

***MERHABA* to Turkish at Leeds**

In recent times some British citizens have been in the news for flying off to Turkey though actually bound for a certain destination further to the south and east. Did those people have any Turkish language under their belts (or even just a phrasebook) before setting off on such an enterprise? Did they feel a need – or were there middlemen or couriers on hand to deal with any linguistic obstacles en route? A much greater number of British visitors, of course, have been to Turkey for more conventional reasons, mostly flying into Istanbul, Izmir, Bodrum, Dalaman or Antalya and, no doubt, some of them at least, have felt the urge to grapple with the fascinating but challenging language of their hosts.

I first had a go at grappling with it in the summer of 1971 when, having earlier met my first ever Turk at a railway station in Slovenia, I arrived wide-eyed and by courtesy of the *Istanbul Express* from Munich at Istanbul's not-so-exotic Sirkeci terminus. That was the start of a (roughly) three-month adventure in Turkey that particular summer and of an enduring interest in the country, its language, its peoples and its history. As an undergraduate classicist and archaeology enthusiast I had won a travel and study scholarship from the then British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara to study Hittite and Neo-Hittite sites (and museums) and to write it all up. I first had to spend about six weeks working on the Institute's current excavations in eastern Turkey – essentially 'rescue archaeology' prompted by the construction of the Keban Dam on the upper Euphrates in the region of Elazığ. After initial weeks living in a village called Aşvan (which was due to disappear under the waters of the new dam) I took the opportunity to extend my investigations to include ancient Urartu, and consequently roamed as far east as Van (and even beyond). To prepare myself for all this I had begun earlier that year to learn some Turkish, using the late Geoffrey Lewis's original *Teach Yourself Turkish* and, on arrival in Turkey, was

armed with its first few chapters and also an American phrasebook called *Say It In Turkish*. The Fodor Guide to Turkey also helped to provide instruction and often amusement as I travelled around the country on seemingly endless bus journeys, regularly being summoned to chat to the driver (a practice now banned).

Naturally my weeks at Aşvan and subsequent travels gave me a lot of experience as a budding Turkish linguist and were an enviably time-rich introduction to large parts of the country and its culture. In the following years I made further visits, mainly to Istanbul and the Marmara and Aegean regions, and indeed spent an academic year at Istanbul University's Faculty of Arts doing further archaeological research as holder of a Turkish Government bursary. My attempts to break into Near Eastern archaeology as a career in the mid-1970s came to nought, despite my having some background in the field. So some years later I found myself teaching English in the Arab world and through all those years had the chance at least to maintain my Turkish, whether by chatting to Turkish speakers in Abu Dhabi or by stopping off in Istanbul during trips home.

Over the past four years my fascination with Turkey and Turkish has been re-activated through that most demanding of situations: teaching the language to complete beginners. In September 2011, forty years after I had myself started to study it, I was asked by the Department of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Leeds University to teach an 'elective' course to be called *Turkish for Beginners*. I had come home from working in the UAE and had gained a PhD in Arabic/English translation at Leeds before the Department took me on part-time to help teach both Arabic to beginners and Arabic/English translation to postgraduates. At that point it and the parent School were keen to broaden their profile in language provision. Persian was already being taught as a one-year elective but Turkish was new at Leeds, which was now about to join the very small number of UK universities offering some sort of course in the language. I was rumoured to know Turkish as well as Arabic, so gladly agreed (though at short notice) to introduce that language to whoever might be interested.

Before 2011 I had gained some experience in teaching Turkish, but only in private one-to-one or small group situations. These included teaching many years ago a young lady who was engaged to marry a Turk and also a couple of Burmah Castrol executives in Swindon. I had also acquired a professional qualification in the language from the (now Chartered) Institute of Linguists. At Leeds my first challenge was to select a suitable coursebook that could serve as the main vehicle for teaching, and I opted (rightly, I think) for *Complete Turkish*, the new-style Teach Yourself course by Asuman Celen Pollard and David Pollard. This course aims to take students from complete beginner to intermediate level, using a carefully organized functional approach that provides a solid grammar foundation and useful vocabulary as well as illustrating and explaining language and cultural points that a teacher can expand on. There is also a CD audio support pack with a pair of authentic-sounding dialogues to frame each unit of the book.



Unfortunately I have never managed to get beyond the midway point in the book, given only two contact hours with students each week over a twenty-one-week academic year. So far I have had up to seven or eight students each year, but this is a good number – possibly limited by the fact that some would-be participants cannot attend on the allotted day. Most of the students are already linguists, some also starting Arabic, others starting or continuing with a range of European languages. A few others have come from disciplines such as Politics, International Relations, Islamic Studies and even Fashion Design. Some have had family connections with Turkey, while others have simply been there on holiday. All seem to have enjoyed the challenge of grappling from week to week with a new language with many alien features in its structures, vocabulary and word order. I have tried to facilitate that task and to make it more enjoyable by introducing a number of ‘extras’ to supplement the coursebook. These have included: role-play exercises to encourage confidence in speaking in pairs; handouts to explain points of grammar or word order; the use of websites such as that of the airline *Pegasus* to give simple reading practice in ‘real-life’ contemporary Turkish; watching on DVD a romantic film, *Evim Sensin*, to absorb known and unknown vocabulary and get a feel for Turkish intonation; and occasionally bringing into the class a native speaker at the University who plays the lute, sings simple songs and provides songsheets for the students. At the end of the year the students (who gain 20 credits by passing the course) have a written exam (50% of their total assessment) on the key language and cultural points covered during the year through grammar, reading, writing and translation exercises. There is also a short Oral Exam for 10% of the total marks, while the remaining 40% are gained through continuous assessment of coursework.

Some past students have asked me whether there would be a ‘Turkish 2’ on offer the following year. Regrettably, I had to inform them that there would not, since there was no degree course in (or including) Turkish and the Department and School had no plans to introduce anything beyond the existing ‘elective’ course. I have, however, always offered students advice on how to pursue their study of Turkish (including the advice to work their way through the rest of the coursebook!) and many have given me news of how they have done so. If their knowledge of Turkish empowers them in future to – as Geoffrey Lewis memorably put it – “agglutinate freely in conversation”, then my efforts will not have been in vain. As for myself, I plan to teach the course once again and then try to hand it over to a suitable native speaker.

Whether Turkish studies will ever have any bigger future at Leeds is hard to predict. There are, however, full-time colleagues who have an interest, either in modern Turkish or Ottoman or in broader Turkish area studies. Indeed, since the start of this calendar year I have been a member of a new ‘Laz Study Group’ initiated by a fellow Turkish enthusiast, Professor (of Arabic) James Dickins. This comes under the umbrella of a School-wide research group in Language, Linguistics and Translation, and so far a small group of us has attempted to learn some of the basics of the Laz language with the aid of a locally-based Laz speaker, a Georgian postgraduate student and a Turkish coursebook in Laz. The idea is that in due course both staff members and students in linguistics or other disciplines will be able to contribute useful original research into Laz and, amongst other things, its relationship with the dominant Turkish language.


Back in the mists of 1971 I had no idea where my interesting new acquaintance, Turkish, might be leading me. Now I can say that it has been a fascinating journey, and as I embark upon the humbling adventure of studying and doing homework in Laz – probably an even harder language to grapple with – I have that teacher's salutary experience of appreciating much more of what my own Turkish students must have gone through!

Book Reviews & Publications

The Ottomans and the Mamluks: Imperial Diplomacy and Warfare in the Islamic World

by Cihan Yüksel Muslu

London: I B Tauris, 2014, 376 pp
£56.00 cloth



Ottoman diplomatic history as a sub-branch of the Empire's historiography is still inchoate. It has also generally been studied from one-sided and limited perspectives. Scholars have mostly employed one kind of source and focused on one aspect of the mutual relations. In this regard, Cihan Yüksel Muslu's study on Ottoman-Mamluk diplomatic relations is groundbreaking as she masterfully and extensively employs documents and narratives from both sides. Her use of a wide range of both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish sources in diplomatic chancelleries, archival documents and chronicles makes this an invaluable study on the subject. It consists of an introduction followed by six chapters, a brief conclusion, three annexes – one of which, on the inventory of diplomatic missions, takes up a quarter of the book. There is a twenty-three page bibliography and a composite index of names of people and places as well as a glossary. However, given the subject, the lack of any maps constitutes the major shortcoming of the book.

In the first chapter, Muslu provides a painstaking explanation of the preparations of diplomatic texts, the choice of gifts and the selection of envoys as well as the treatment and behaviour of the ambassadors on both sides. She shows that the early Ottomans imitated the Mamluks in their literary composition (*inşa*). In particular, Mamluk-trained scholars heavily influenced the fledgling Ottoman chancery – which is overlooked in early Ottoman diplomatic studies. Chapter Two focuses on the inception of diplomatic relations between the two empires. Muslu demonstrates how the Ottomans were perceived by the Mamluks during the earliest phase of their relationship, making what is, given the paucity of contemporary Ottoman sources a significant contribution to early Ottoman studies. For instance, the earliest ambassadorial reports of the Mamluks about the Ottoman court provide

fresh insights and valuable information on the history of the Ottoman dynasty along with the manners, rituals and ceremonies at the court.

In the next chapter, Muslu explores Ottoman-Mamluk relations from the aftermath of the Timurid invasions to the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The most interesting aspect of the chapter is the Mamluk perception of Ottoman succession practices, in particular fratricide. It might be surprising that the Mamluks were so well-informed about the Ottoman practice of fratricide and disapprovingly noted “how the Ottoman ruler rose to power after killing his brother”. (p 92) Chapter Four discusses the effects of the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed II on relations with the Mamluk sovereigns. With growing self-confidence, the Ottomans started to demand a different type of recognition from the Mamluk court. In response, the Mamluk sultans did not accept this demand. There were intense diplomatic manoeuvres as each side tried to demonstrate its superiority over the other as the sole leader of the Islamic world. Muslu adduces Mehmet II in his title as an example of his wish to express his superiority over his powerful rival. Chapter Five explains the changes in relations between 1481 and 1491. Heightened tension culminated in a long war between 1485 and 1491. Muslu makes it clear that there were powerful intermediaries on both sides trying to reach a peace agreement. The fact that these intermediaries played an important role in ending the war and regulating the peace process, shows how the Ottoman and Mamluk sultans were constrained by strong oppositions within their own administrations and that foreign policy was not shaped only by their own personal desires.

In the final chapter, Muslu deals with the last twenty years of Ottoman-Mamluk relationships until the death of Bayezid II in 1512. She shows that the appearance of Portuguese power in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and the rise of the Safavids in the east compelled the empires to compromise. Although the major problems continued to affect their relationships seriously, they easily and swiftly changed their policies when faced with threats from the Safavids and the Portuguese – showing the flexible and pragmatic aspects of their diplomatic initiatives. Unfortunately, Muslu finishes her narrative with the death of Bayezid II. She excludes the final five years preceding the demise of the Mamluk Empire in 1517 because she thinks that the narrative of an account of this period would require a second volume.

Cihan Yüksel Muslu presents a vivid and intense picture of diplomatic relations between the two most prominent powers in the medieval and early modern Sunni Muslim world. She provides a colourful account of diplomatic preparations, a survey of ambassadors and of the change in titles, and reflections on the political agendas of the rival chancelleries that have long been underestimated in Ottoman historiography. This important book will be of interest to all those concerned with the study of both Ottoman and Mamluk diplomatic history as well as those with a broad interest in Islamic history.

Cumhur Bekar,
Researcher at the Eurasian Empires Project,
Leiden University, The Netherlands



Protectorate Cyprus: British Imperial Power Before WWI

by Gail Ruth Hook

I B Tauris, 2015, 304 pp
ISBN: 978 1 78076 114 5



Over the years, there has been a steady flow of books on the modern history of Cyprus, but most of them concentrate on the period since 1914, or more particularly the years of turmoil since the 1950s. Gail Douglas Hook, who specialises in British imperial history, switches the focus by exploring the period beginning with the British takeover of the island in 1878, when it nominally remained part of the Ottoman Empire, until the start of the First World War, when it was officially annexed by Britain. The result is an engaging and detailed account of a seldom-told story, even if it leaves several important aspects unexplored.

Under the Cyprus Convention of 4 June 1878, which was incorporated into the Treaty of Berlin of that year, the British occupation was supposed to be temporary. Officially, it was accepted by the Sultan until such time as the provinces of Batumi, Ardahan and Kars were returned by Russia to the Ottoman Empire. As in the case of Egypt, and as a token of continuing nominal Ottoman suzerainty, the island was required to pay a tribute of £5,000 per year to the Porte (in practice, it appears that the actual sum came to much more than this). Nevertheless, British officials, treated the island as though it were a permanent and regular part of the British Empire, justifying the occupation by claiming to bring 'good government' to a previously neglected part of the Ottoman dominions, rather than by relying on the complications of the Convention.

This story of imperial endeavour brings in some colourful characters, such as Sir Garnet Wolsey, the first British High Commissioner (in effect, Governor) in Cyprus, and the inspiration for the 'very model of a modern Major-General' in Gilbert and Sullivan's *Pirates of Penzance*. Never one to hide his light under a barrel, Wolsey was a strong supporter of army reform, and hence vehemently opposed by the army commander, Prince George, Duke of Cambridge and his cousin, Queen Victoria. Wolsey started his task in Cyprus energetically, but within a year was chafing at his isolation in Nicosia: in June 1879 he eagerly leapt at the chance of a transfer to South Africa, where he assumed military and civilian command. Meanwhile, the first accurate survey of Cyprus was conducted by the young Captain Herbert Kitchener, Royal Engineers – later 'Kitchener of Khartoum', and the iconic face in the world's most famous recruiting poster.

As previous consular reports made clear, the *Tanzimat* reforms of the mid-nineteenth century had failed to make much impact on outlying parts of the Ottoman Empire like Cyprus. The British may have exaggerated the view that the Ottomans had left Cyprus a 'woeful wreck' (p.51) but there was certainly plenty to be done if the commitment to 'good government' was to become more than a slogan. In the administrative field, a Legislative Council was established in 1878, headed by the High Commissioner, with four to eight nominated members, half of them officials, and the other half 'inhabitants not holding office' (p.94). A new constitution, implemented in 1882, increased this to four officials, plus 12 elected members, 'nine Christian and three Mahometan', although final decisions were made by the Colonial Office in London. In this way, limited open government was established, backed up by municipal councils, and a reformed system of courts and police.

Initially, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots welcomed Wolsey on his arrival, in the hope of better administration. Before long, however, the two communities developed different aspirations, as the Greek Cypriots assumed that the end of Ottoman rule would mean union with Greece – an aim which the Turkish Cypriots naturally opposed. In this way, the basic dilemma of twentieth century Cypriot politics was already emerging. The British assumed that conditions would not arise under which they would be required to return Cyprus to the Ottoman empire, under the Convention, but they were opposed to *Enosis*, and thus justified the idea of prolonging their own rule indefinitely. 'Divide and rule' was not an official part of British policy, but unofficially it appears that it favoured the Turkish Cypriots, as the natural opponents of Hellenism. Hence, in the Legislative Council the British officials were usually supported by the Turkish Cypriots against the Greeks. Nor did the British encourage cross-cultural collaboration, 'if anything, the uniqueness of British, Greeks and Turks became more pronounced' (p.232).

On the positive side, Cyprus and its inhabitants derived some tangible benefits from British rule. The installation of a reasonably efficient and honest public administration, ending the oppressive exploitation of its own flock by the Greek Orthodox Church, was a clear gain, and one which still distinguishes government in Cyprus from that of most of its neighbours. The British also tackled some of the island's most pressing physical problems – in particular, the prevalence of malaria in the coastal regions, deforestation, and the lack of roads. Although the causes of malaria were not properly understood until 1898, British officials noticed that it was associated with stagnant water, and thus promoted the drainage of marshes and better urban sanitation. This turned out to be the right answer, as drainage removed the habitat of the anopheles mosquito. Similar campaigns were launched to end the scourge of locusts, and to replant forests with pines and eucalyptus. Roads were also constructed, albeit using forced labour from surrounding villages.

Critical problems in Cypriot government, which the British failed to solve, arose from the ambiguous relationship with the Ottoman Empire. The most vexatious of these was the continuation of the tribute – in effect a tax from which the people of Cyprus derived no benefit, and which was anyway diverted by the British to pay off the British and French holders of Ottoman bonds. The financial burden this created limited the resources available for beneficial physical improvements, and penny-pinching by the Treasury prevented a solution. Meanwhile, the British developed a separate social world similar to that in other colonial societies with hunting, cricket,

croquet and race meetings. Gail Hook relates all this in engaging detail, enlivened with period photographs.

Effectively, what the book gives us is a detailed and critical picture of a colonial administration at the height of British imperial power. This leaves it with two crucial defects. The first is that since it is based almost entirely on British primary and secondary sources, it tells us little about the Cypriots, either Greek or Turkish, and how their lives and culture were affected by colonial rule. The second is that it fails to fit the account into the broader picture of British policy and interests in the Near East at the time, and the role (if any) that Cyprus played in them. In 1878 the *Daily News* criticised the occupation on the grounds that Britain had accepted a responsibility, 'without adequate means of fulfilling it, on quite insufficient grounds of policy, and under no urgency of duty'. Gail Hook gives us the quotation (p.28), but fails to discuss whether the *Daily News* was right. Originally, the occupation was supposed to have the purpose of giving Britain a secure naval and military base in the eastern Mediterranean, protecting the approaches to Egypt. In fact, it failed to develop into anything of the kind for many years. By 1882 it had already become unnecessary, since the British had taken over Egypt itself. Cyprus was left as a backwater, until the development of air power, the Cold War, and rising Greek nationalism brought it back onto the international agenda in the 1950s. A broader critical analysis, with some discussion of these crucial issues, would have enhanced the value of this book for a wide circle of readers.

William Hale

Son Ada The Last Island

by Zülfü Livaneli

Doğan Kitap Book, 2014, 180pp, Foreword by Yaşar Kemal,
Q&A section with Livaneli, ISBN 978 605 09 1636 2



In his foreword, the late Yaşar Kemal describes Zülfü Livaneli's short story as a work of great literature. This is praise indeed from a writer universally acclaimed as one of Turkey's most accomplished modern authors. The story is an allegory describing an island community whose utopian life-style is fundamentally changed and ultimately destroyed by the actions of a former President who retires to the island with his wife and grandchildren. The work is a study of dictatorship and authoritarian rule, but the story touches on several other themes as well: the nature of good and evil, the corrupting effects of war, environmentalism and man's interaction with the natural world, to mention but a few. There is even a discussion on literary technique between two of the principal characters, the narrator and his writer friend. The

narrator is urged by his friend: to focus on events because *they* tell the story; to avoid fancy 'literary' description; above all to avoid imitating others and develop his own voice and style. For the most part the narrator follows the advice, relating the events of the story with a sobriety and spareness of style which leaves a powerful impression, heightening their universal relevance.

Zülfü Livaneli, born 1946, is one of Turkey's most talented and colourful sons, a prolific novelist, poet, composer, film-director, singer, former MP, and Goodwill Ambassador to UNESCO. His popular novels deal with many themes and have been translated into nearly forty languages. Sadly, *Son Ada* has not been so translated and, as Yaşar Kemal comments in his foreword, the novel received little or no attention from critics when it was first published. Like Kemal, I consider that silence to be undeserved, if perhaps understandable in the current political climate in Turkey, and should like to see it take its proper place in Livaneli's opus.

The story-line is as follows: Forty families have each escaped both personal problems and the political upheavals and violence of their mother country – one inevitably reads this as Turkey. They have sought refuge on a beautiful imaginary island where they live in complete harmony with each other and with their environment. The former President of their country, who has been forced into retirement by his revolutionary council, takes up residence on the island with his family and bodyguards, and sets in train a series of events which inexorably lead to the destruction of both himself and of the islanders. The 'war' which he instigates against the other inhabitants of the island, the sea-gulls, is eventually won by the birds, albeit at the cost of a drastic reduction in their numbers. Unlike their fellow human residents, whose naivety and complacency result in the loss of all they have, the gulls resist the depredations of the ex-President and end up reclaiming their habitat.

The allegorical nature of the story is reinforced not only by the austere style, but also by the odd impersonal form of address adopted by the islanders. Thus we never learn the name of the narrator. He refers to his friend, the writer, simply as 'Yazar' (the Writer) and calls his much loved partner 'Lara'. This is not her own name, but that of a nearby island. The forty families refer to each other by the number of the houses in which they live (1-40).

The key characters in the story are the Narrator, his partner, Lara, his friend the Writer, the ex-President, and the mute, disabled son of the grocery-man, who plays a symbolic and pivotal role towards the end of the story. In addition to these individuals there are the two communities who share the island, the sea-gulls and the humans.

By far the most successful and interesting feature of the novel is the portrayal of the ex-President and his interaction with the island's human community. The ex-President is the archetypal dictator. He is a master of oratory. Supremely sensitive to the mood of his audience, he constantly re-calibrates the tone and content of his addresses, transitioning from conciliatoriness to outright threat and back again with consummate ease. Whilst he professes free speech and democracy, he demeans and threatens all those who disagree with him, constantly addressing Lara as "küçük hanım" (little/young lady) and the Writer as a rebel ("bozguncu") or as an anarchist. Those who resist him and do not toe the 'party line' are demonised as being enemies of the community intent on destroying their unity and breaking their morale. The threats are reinforced by the use of actual violence meted out by his thuggish, robot-like armed body-guards.

As a highly experienced ex-political leader, he researches his opponents and ruthlessly exploits their weaknesses. Thus his discovery of a flaw in the title deeds of 'No 1', the legal owner of the island, enables the ex-President to blackmail him into recommending his (the ex-Presidents's) election and that of his wife to the new island management committee which he initiates. So the ex-President's claim that all the disastrous decisions of that committee are taken democratically is clearly disingenuous and false: the very process by which the committee was installed was 'fixed'. The committee of five has a permanent majority of three – the ex-President, his wife and No1 – which the ex-President effectively controls.

In its responses to the ex-President's proposals the island's human community bears resemblance to the chorus in a Greek tragedy. The narrator describes with heavy irony how initially they regard the public meetings called by the ex-President as a pleasant distraction, bringing novelty to the routine of their lives. Gradually we witness the islanders coming under his thrall, some of them even abandoning their shorts and swimwear and aping the dress of their 'leader' with his long trousers, immaculately ironed white shirt and tie. Eventually the community abandons all common sense, despite repeated appeals from the Writer to remember the chain of events initiated by the ex-President leading to each disaster in turn. In the interaction between the leader and the led we gain an insight into the manipulation of public opinion by politicians and the media which they control. We also learn how hatred can be whipped up in societies under stress.

The sea-gull community is another key player in the story and the birds are invested by Livaneli both with superior intelligence and with human-like feelings which inspire profound sympathy in the reader. Most poignantly, it is suggested that the suicidal dive-bombing raids carried out by some of the birds on the human community are allocated to those who lost their young when the President's shooting party trampled their eggs underfoot. These are desperate acts of self-destruction by parents unable to bear the pain of their loss.

Whilst the ex-President and two communities are depicted in stylised terms representing them as 'types', the characters of the Writer friend, the narrator and his partner, Lara, are fleshed out and given more individual treatment. By doing this Livaneli presumably intended to prevent his novel from becoming too formulaic and didactic. I find their characterisation the least satisfying aspect of the novel. Compared with the great themes outlined above the vacillations and avowals of cowardice by the narrator, the comparisons he draws between his own pusillanimity and the steadfastness of his partner, Lara, together with the detail of their intimate relations, are the only *longeurs* in the novel. The repeated reminders by the Writer of the sequence of events resulting in the islanders' ultimate disaster is also overdone and unnecessary. The reader is well aware of the link of cause and effect even if the islanders appear blind to it.

The novel paints a pessimistic picture of human nature but is not unremittingly gloomy. There are moments of humour, as when the narrator first meets his fellow islander, the Lawyer, while they are both swimming in the sea. The lawyer introduces himself with old-fashioned courtesy and formality just at the moment when a pile of fruit and vegetables discarded by a passing ship washes up on shore and covers them both in orange peel and cucumber. The ex-President is made to look ridiculous when he brands Lara as a communist after she quotes a poem by Pushkin. She points out that Pushkin pre-dated the rise of communism in Russia by nearly a hundred years.

Premonition is skilfully used as a device to prepare the reader for unexpected events and make them more credible. Thus the narrator's dream of sea-gulls dive-bombing into a sea of blood presages the actual suicidal attacks by the birds which take place later. The scene for the final demise of the ex-President at the top of a cliff is set earlier in a visit there made by the disabled boy and the narrator.

The introduction of the disabled mute boy is another highly successful creative device. Though he only plays an active role towards the end of the story, he is present throughout the narrative as an invisible silent witness to events and in particular to the injustices suffered by the sea-gull population. His final act of self-immolation is accompanied by an inarticulate scream which is all the more shocking for his silence up to that point. The scream seems to encapsulate all the helpless rage and despair felt by his fellow islanders.

In a question and answer section printed at the end of the Doğan Kitap edition of the work *Livaneli* confirms that this is the most overtly political of his novels. There is an obvious connection with the increasingly authoritarian behaviour of the AKP government to June 2015 and its leadership in the person of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The story also appears to convey the spirit of resistance to that authoritarianism which found expression in the Gezi Park demonstrations of May/June 2013, though the actual writing of the book preceded those events by at least four years.

Is this a 'classic' as Yaşar Kemal suggests? It shares themes with George Orwell's *1984* and even contains echoes of William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, set as it is on a remote island. On the whole, however, it is an imperfect work which does not, in my view, live up to Yaşar Kemal's flattering claim.

Would I recommend it to a friend? Unhesitatingly my answer is **yes**. There is an elegiac beauty in the austere description of this *Paradise Lost*. Livaneli's masterly exploration of dictatorship also serves as a cautionary tale to us all to remain forever vigilant and resist it in all its forms before it is too late.

David Boxen



When Greeks and Turks Meet: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Relationship Since 1923

Vally Lytra (ed.)
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2014, 342 pp
ISBN: 978 1 47240 618 7

The book *When Greeks and Turks meet* edited by Vally Lytra, comes, as we read in the foreword, ten years after the launch of the joint BA degree on Turkish and Modern Greek Studies by the Department of Languages and Cultures of the Near and Middle East of the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Centre for Hellenic Studies of King's College in London. Having witnessed the initial steps of the *Greek Turkish Encounters*, as the series of events were called, I believe that the

book was published just at the right time. Sixteen years after the Turkish-Greek rapprochement that came after the earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999 this edited volume serves as a summary of what has been achieved in the field of Turkish-Greek relations until now.

The complex and often problematic relations between Greeks and Turks began way before 1923 but the book, quite right, focuses on the relationship since 1923. The exchange of populations ended a common life of more than five hundred years in Anatolia and the Balkans and limited the areas of coexistence in Istanbul, Western Thrace and of course in Cyprus. The first part of the volume, *Rethinking Remembrance and Representation* covers the part of Greek-Turkish relations that is dominated by memory and nostalgia for an (often) idealized past. Renée Hirschon's contribution covers the significance of the exchange of populations and Olga Demetriou's article on the notion among the Greek Cypriot refugees after 1974 offers invaluable insight on the psychological aspect of the partition of the island and its consequences. Hercules Millas discusses the issue of identities among Greek and Turkish students of Turkish and Greek language respectively, as they are formed by history books and literature. Finally Panagiotis Poulos discusses the revisiting of Ottoman Istanbul through the music of its Greek (*Rum*) composers.

The second part of the volume, *The Politics of Identity, Language and Culture*, is quite useful for the understanding of the dimensions of 'relearning' the other. This is achieved through looking at the issue of identities being reshaped after encountering the other following a long period of separation. The opening of the borders that separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots for 29 years in 2003 came as a result of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement on the way towards the Annan Plan referenda that took place the following year. The importance of a solution of the Cyprus issue for the Greek-Turkish relations is discussed by James Ker-Lindsay. The experiences of Greek Cypriot students when learning the Turkish language are presented by Constadina Charalambous while Yiannis Papadakis addresses the portrayal of the 'other' in history textbooks, focusing on the attempt of the Turkish Cypriot Ministry of Education to write a series of quite modern history textbooks that endeavor to teach the history of Cyprus freed from the burden of nationalism. Peter Mackridge examines the Greek attitude towards the Turkish elements in the Greek language, an issue that returned to the agenda in a vivid way, given the abundance of Turkish soap operas in Greek television in the past ten years and the everyday access of the Greek public to the Turkish language. Finally, Natasha Lemos discusses an encounter that is yet to be done, that of the separate readings of the Turkish War of Independence (or Asia Minor Catastrophe in the Greek historiography). The existing literature in Greek and Turkish presents a different account of the events and its translation into both languages would create a better level of understanding.

The last part of the book, *Discourses of Inclusion and Exclusion Revisited*, is quite valuable in the sense that it presents the reader the difficult aspects of the Greek-Turkish relations; those that affect the Turkish minority of Western Thrace and the Greek minority of Istanbul. Konstantinos Tsitselikis discusses the Lausanne Treaty that has been dominating the status and the rights of both minorities since 1923 while Dimitris Kamouzis addresses the issue of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Eylem Yanardağoğlu discusses the fragile issue of the Istanbulite Greek media and their role in the life of a community in quest for survival. Ayşe Ozil examines minority education and the administration of Greek schools in Istanbul in the light of a diminishing number of students. Finally Thaleia Dragonas and Anna Frangoudaki

present the ambitious program of the Greek Ministry of Education to teach the Western Thrace minority children the Greek language while respecting their identity and without succumbing to nationalism.

The Greek and Turkish readers will remember by going through the pages of this book stories that have occurred to them, in a personal, communal or transnational level. Therein lies the value of this book: Turkish-Greek relations have gone through repeated faces of tension and reconciliation since 1923. The current status of this relationship has allowed many more encounters that could provide material for many more books. The complexity of bilateral relations has not dissuaded individuals or groups of people to meet and interact. There hides the danger of underestimating or trivializing these encounters or taking them for granted. The issues facing the two minorities and of course the Cyprus issue are there to remind us that the further improvement of the Turkish-Greek relations can only contribute to the enlargement of democratic rule and the respect for minority rights. Moreover, the solution to the Cyprus issue can only benefit the Turkish-Greek relations by working as a model for coexistence after years of separation. In this way this first attempt to record the challenges and opportunities of Greek-Turkish encounters can lead to similar endeavors that will include other aspects of this relationship as it evolves. These can include a more detailed account of the Turkish experience of the Turkish-Greek relations or issues that have been under-researched, such as sports encounters and cooperation in the cultural world, including cinema and music.

In all, researchers of Turkish and Greek foreign policy, Turkish-Greek relations and minority issues can benefit from this well-structured volume while those interested in anthropology or linguistics on both sides of the Aegean can find a comprehensive analysis.


Ioannis Moutsis

The Architects of Ottoman Constantinople:

The Balyan Family
and the History of Ottoman Architecture

by Alyson Wharton

I.B.Tauris, 2015, 272 pp
ISBN: 978 1 78076 852 6



One of Dr Wharton's objectives in writing this book is to give body and voice to the 'ghosts' who were the artists and architects of most of late 18th/19th century imperial buildings in Constantinople (not a history of all Ottoman architecture as the title suggests) and who, she says, have been excluded from European and Turkish art historiography. These men were not ghosts in their time, but were Ottoman-Armenians among whom the Balyan family formed a dynasty lasting over a century:

famous, wealthy, powerful and privileged *amiras*⁸⁶ holding the office of Imperial Ottoman Architect under the patronage of four successive sultans. Wharton counters the narrative in some Turkish scholarly publications which diminish their artistic importance as well as their status in the Ottoman hierarchy. Many contemporary conservatives viewed the work of these Armenian architects as degenerate and believed them to be corrupt; this view persists to date.⁸⁷ To provide a corrective, the author has consulted the work of Armenian authors extensively, but finds that this canon is sometimes unreferenced, dependent on unofficial documentation, does not correspond with official Ottoman archives, is often hagiographic and is therefore not always reliable.

A further objective is to illustrate that the much-derided architecture of this period was not pastiche and *alafranga*⁸⁸, but – although deriving much from European ideas – was unique to an empire evolving almost out of recognition as a result of the *Nezîm-i Cedîd*⁸⁹ and *Tanzimat*⁹⁰ reforms. Ottoman emblems such as the sultanic *tuğra* (seal) and an Ottoman coat of arms (designed by an Italian artist and commissioned by Mahmud II) were incorporated into decorative features. The writer gives detailed descriptions of various 19th century buildings in Constantinople, cogently illustrating how the architect in question combined European technique and style with motifs not only symbolizing the achievements of individual sultans, but also the increasingly cosmopolitan scene in the capital. Importantly, the Balyans' designs were not proto-nationalist reflections of Armenian separatist aspirations as some suggested but, on the contrary, were important in image-making as they aimed to herald an Ottoman renaissance and emphasised sultanic sovereignty and legitimacy as Caliph. This became more pronounced as western parts of the empire seceded. Although nurturing their cultural and religious identity, the Balyans were loyal Ottomans.

The Imperial Architects Office was established by Mehmet I when, having conquered Constantinople and found it in ruins, he set about rebuilding the city. The *mimarbaşı* (controller) supervised a team of craftsmen. Salaried *kalfas* were in charge of design, and there is some controversy amongst historians as to whether the term translates as master-builder or architect. Dr Wharton goes to some lengths to support the latter interpretation. *Kalfas* were invariably non-Muslim – initially Greek, and later Armenian⁹¹ – holding high status as *amiras* in their communities, and supporting philanthropic causes such as the building of schools and orphanages.

The Balyan family of builders came from Anatolia, and Krikor Amira (1764-1831) was the first in the family to be appointed Imperial Architect, first to Selim III and then to Mahmud II. His son, Karapet Amira (1800-66) worked with and succeeded him as Imperial Architect. In addition to extensive work on imperial projects, Karapet was granted authority to embark on a lavish restoration of Armenian churches in Constantinople, illustrating both his status and the extent to which he was trusted

⁸⁶ Armenian community leaders whose self-appointed duty was to reinforce the role of the Armenian Orthodox Church and that of the Patriarch (spiritual leader of this stateless “nation”), and to combat the incursion of foreign missionaries

⁸⁷ Dr Wharton quotes an article in the newspaper *Zamtan* printed in 2007 repeating these views

⁸⁸ Imitating European style

⁸⁹ The New Order initiated by Selim III (r. 1789-1807) and continued by Mahmud II (r. 1808-39)

⁹⁰ Period of reform under Abdulmecid (r.1839-61) and Abdulaziz (r.1861-76)

⁹¹ The great Sinan- himself an Imperial Architect - is said to have been Armenian in origin, a product of the *devşirme* system

since hitherto it had been almost impossible to obtain permission to rebuild churches. He was supported by the local Armenian network of *esnaf*⁹² and *Miakham Ingerutyun*⁹³, the latter comprising 300 artisans and merchants. He was one of the founders of the Cemaran High School in 1838 which played an important role in the development of Ottoman Armenians, teaching modern and traditional methods in the fields of art, craft and intellectual development.

Wharton's meticulous research into the details of the Balyans' support network reveals how the family relied on local (Armenian) suppliers, tradesmen and craftsmen. However, the scale of the operations became huge, and the author records the evolution of industrial practices over the century from records extracted from Ottoman archives. Originally, the Balyans applied the principle of 'division of labour', and towns and even villages were divided according to specific industrial activities. However, small-scale production moved from workshops to mass production in proto-factories employing new technologies. Eventually, European craftsmen and artists from further afield were employed, using new techniques and materials. The spectacle of new palaces and government buildings in the foreign press served to project a new image of the Empire and of the Sultan, whilst the Dolmabahçe Palace provided an important diplomatic setting for international negotiations announcing, according to Dr Wharton, that the Empire had "arrived at the Concert of Europe" (p 8).⁹⁴ Mosques were built in new fashionable areas along the Bosphorus stimulating new urban development and, in the reign of Abdulaziz, barracks, apartment buildings, police stations, ministry headquarters were also constructed.

The rise of the Balyans corresponded with that of a new elite of Armenian bankers, merchants and industrialists who were prominent in their community and in Ottoman society and who collaborated with the Balyan family on imperial projects. The Balyans themselves expanded their business into capitalistic enterprises. The sons of the elite studied in Europe, predominantly in Venice and Paris, as did Karapet's sons, Nigogos, Serkis and Agop in the 1840s-60s. Serkis was a contemporary of Gustav Eiffel et Saint-Barbe College, Paris, where many sons of Ottoman government officials were also educated. He went on to study at the École Centrale des Arts at Manufactures and then the École des Beaux Arts. In addition to his passionate interest in the arts, Serkis brushed with the intellectual milieu whose main influences were writers such as Victor Hugo. Above all the educational reformer and politically-engaged Director of Saint Barbe (1838-66), Alexandre Labrouste, must have been hugely influential.

On his return to Constantinople and the family business, Serkis was keen to stimulate Ottoman design, manufacture and production of resources (including mineral extraction), minimising the need for foreign imports. By then the position of a salaried Imperial Architect no longer existed and – although occupying a monopolistic role with regard to imperial construction works – the Balyan *amira* of the day was now self-employed and responsible for the finances of projects, rather than the Imperial treasury. Sultan Abdulaziz, Serkis's patron, was irresponsibly profligate and ran up huge debts. There was a transformation in imperial policy after the accession of Abdulhamid and when the empire defaulted on its loans in 1878. The

⁹² Guilds

⁹³ One-Willed Association

⁹⁴ Wharton, p. 115

Porte was then under huge pressure to find capital to repay its debts. The Balyan family were associated with and considered financially responsible for the lavish expenditure of previous sultans and, in 1884, Serkis was accused of embezzlement and his property and building materials were confiscated. Further investigations and accusations followed. Then, in 1895, Serkis was arrested while travelling with a known Armenian separatist revolutionary and, after his death in 1899, the Porte seized more of his property. Wharton believes that such was the pressure to secure money for the state, some of the claims against Serkis may have been fabricated. Nevertheless, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Serkis who had handled huge sums of imperial money (often unrecorded in official documents) over decades would undoubtedly have given rise to suspicion of malpractice in the Hamidian era of austerity.


Dr Wharton's book is complex and requires close reading. On one level, her descriptions of Balyan works are enlightening reading when examining the 19th century architecture of Constantinople and its socio-political context. But her overarching objective is to encourage future generations of scholars to research Ottoman, Armenian and European sources to illuminate more fully the realities of how negative Turkish-Armenian sentiments have affected the historiography of Armenian artistic contributions to the 19th century Ottoman Empire.

Jill Sindall

Sherlock Holmes and The Sword of Osman

by **Tim Symonds**

MX Publishing, London, 2015, 229 pp
ISBN 978-1-78092-755-8



This appealing detective novel finds Sherlock Holmes and Dr Watson in 'Stamboul' on an important mission for the British Government. The author presents the lead characters as close to the Conan Doyle originals as he can and indeed gives Dr Watson responsibility for writing the text! We learn that the whereabouts of an ancient 'Sword of Osman' is politically crucial and we get a carefully crafted picture of Constantinople in the first decade of the twentieth century.




Against this background Holmes and Watson develop a close rapport with the Sultan who takes them into his confidence, though relations with the sleuths' dragoman are more contentious. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mycroft Holmes figures in the unfolding account and even Moriarty gets a mention. As in his previous Sherlock Holmes adventure books, Symonds strives for contextual accuracy and atmosphere.

In this book he identifies his (real) *dramatis personae* and acknowledges the specialists and sources which have helped him to build up his fast-moving story of international intrigue in the late Ottoman capital. There's even a glossary of terms. This is a good read!

Brian Beeley

Thank-you Clem



On Saturday, 16 May, the decision was made to thank Professor Clement Dodd officially for all his support, dedication, and for the actual creation of the Turkish Area Study Group (TASG), recently renamed British Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS). The 'creation' happened nearly 30 years ago, when he recommended John Martin as Chair, who filled the role with great energy and commitment up to his death. Clem Dodd became Vice-President of TASG/BATAS and lent his considerable influence to raising supporting funds from the Turkish Embassy and to inviting renowned speakers for the Annual Lectures and Symposia. To mark the special lunch on 16 May he himself chose the

venue 'Truckles', a winebar in Bury Street just opposite the British Museum, and fourteen members, including our President Michael Lake, attended this very special occasion. We had Truckles practically to ourselves, which gave the BATAS Chairperson Dr Celia Kerslake the ideal opportunity to speak about Professor Dodd's long academic life, his writings and roles at six British and three Turkish universities. She presented him with a *sürahi*/decanter, a traditional type of Istanbul glassware, on behalf of BATAS.

To be so successful, one invariably needs a strong, understanding partner and that he has in his wife Nesta. She has always supported Clem's various endeavours and is an equally loyal member of BATAS. She also very much shared his interest in the Cyprus issue, and they bought a house there and spent long periods on the Turkish part of the island. He is our expert and contributes regularly articles on Turkish Cyprus for the *TAS Review*.



A lasting, positive note is that Clem – although resigning from membership of BATAS Council – will remain a member of the Association, a very much respected one, for hopefully many years.

Sigrid-B Martin

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

ARTS AND ARCHAEOLOGY

Cardullo, Robert (Ed). *Nuri Bilge Ceylan: Essays and Interviews*. (Logos Verlag: 2015). ISBN-10: 3832540156

Erol, Merih. *Greek Orthodox Music in Ottoman Istanbul: Nation and Community in the Era of Reform*. (Indiana University Press: 2016) ISBN-10: 0253018331

Harvey, Tamsin. *Constantinople Quilts: 8 Stunning Appliqué Projects Inspired by Turkish Iznik Tiles*. (C&T Publishing: 2015) ISBN-10: 1617450111

Jackson, Maureen. *Mixing Musics: Turkish Jewry and the Urban Landscape of a Sacred Song*. (Stanford University Press: 2015). ISBN-10: 0804797269

Savino, Melania. *Creating Images of a Turkish Past: Identity and the Representation of Archaeology in Modern Turkey*. (I.B. Tauris: 2016) ISBN-10: 1784532525

EDUCATION

Bridges, David. *Education Reform and Internationalisation: The Case of School Reform in Kazakhstan*. (Cambridge University Press: 2015) ISBN-10: 1107452880

HISTORY

Broadbent, Harvey. *Defending Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*. (Melbourne University Publishing: 2015) ASIN: B00TE1QNN4

Davies, Brian L. *The Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire*. (Bloomsbury Academic: 2016) ISBN-10: 1472508017

Fortna, Benjamin. *The Circassian: The Life of Esref Bey, Late Ottoman Insurgent and Special Agent*. (Oxford University Press: 2016) ISBN-10: 0190492449

Harvey, Annie Jane. *Turkish Harems and Circassian Homes*. (Echo Library: 2015). ISBN-10: 1406859109

Ingram, Anders. *Writing the Ottomans: Turkish History in Early Modern England*. (Palgrave Macmillan: 2015). ISBN-10: 1137401524

Jowett, Philip. *Armies of the Greek-Turkish War 1919-22 (Men-at-Arms)*. (Osprey Publishing: 2015). ISBN-10: 1472806840

Rogan, Eugene. *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East*. (Basic Books: 2016) ISBN-10: 0465097421

Şişman, Cengiz. *The Burden of Silence: Sabbatai Sevi and the Evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish Dönmes*. (Oxford University Press: 2015). ISBN-10: 0190244054

Taki, Victor. *Tsar and Sultan: Russian Encounters with the Ottoman Empire*. (I.B. Tauris: 2016) ISBN-10: 1784531847

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Boyd, Charles. *The Turkish Interpreter: Or, a New Grammar of the Turkish Language*. (Sagwan Press: 2015). ISBN-10: 1296908488

Çelebi, Hatice. *Impoliteness in Corpora: A Comparative Analysis of British English and Spoken Turkish (Pragmatic Interfaces)*. (Equinox Publishing: 2015). ISBN-10: 1781790701

Koziara, Thomas B. *Turkish Vocabulary*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2015). ISBN-10: 1515209997

Pamuk, Orhan. *A Strangeness in My Mind*. Trans. Ekin Oklap. (Faber & Faber: 2015). ISBN-10: 0571275974

Shafak, Elif. *The Architect's Apprentice*. (Penguin Books: 2016) ISBN-10: 0143108301

POLITICS

Assenova, Margarita and Zaur Shiryev (Eds). *Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe*. (The Jamestown Foundation: 2015) ISBN-10: 0985504528

Czasjka, Agnes. *Democracy and Justice: Reading Derrida in Istanbul*. (Routledge: 2016) ISBN-10: 1138910643

- Güney, Aylin and Ali Tekin. *The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Scorecard*. (Routledge: 2015). ISBN-10: 1138840092
- Işıkşal, Hüseyin and Ozan Örmeci (Eds.) *Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium*. (Peter Lang GmbH: 2015). ISBN-10: 3631664028
- Kangas, Roger D. *Uzbekistan in the Twentieth Century: Political Development and the Evolution of Power*. (Palgrave Macmillan: 2015) ISBN-10: 0312096798
- Öktem, Onur. *Water Politics and Political Culture: Turkey's compatibility with the European Union*. (Springer: 2015). ISBN-10: 3319214780
- Peyrouse, Sebastien. *Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development*. (Routledge: 2015) ASIN: B00TK6YETI
- Tugal, Cihan. *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism*. (Verso: 2016) ISBN-10: 1784783323

SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION

- Benbow, Heather Merle. *Marriage in Turkish German Popular Culture: States of Matrimony in the New Millennium*. (Lexington Books: 2015). ISBN-10: 1498522629
- Eissenstat, Howard. *Creating a Turkish Identity*. (I.B. Tauris: 2016) ISBN-10: 1784531146
- Girdner, Eddie James. *Mersin-10, Turkey: Six Years in Northern Cyprus*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: 2016) ISBN-10: 1514701413
- Sürig, Inken and Maren Wilmes. *The Integration of the Second Generation in Germany: Results of the TIES Survey on the Descendants of Turkish and Yugoslavian Migrants*. (Amsterdam University Press: 2015). ISBN-10: 9089648429
- Sirkeci, Ibrahim. *Turkish Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceedings*. (Transnational Press London: 2015). ISBN-10: 1910781010

Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

POSTSCRIPTUM

This summer, Turkey lost two of its former Presidents. On 9 May, Kenan Evren died (1917-2015). He first came to prominence in September 1977, after a row between Fahri Korutürk (then President) and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel over who should be the next Commander of Land Forces (Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı). The dispute was not resolved, and two contenders for the job passed into retirement, leaving Evren next in line. The following year, when Bülent Ecevit was Prime Minister, Evren became Chief of Staff (Genel Kurmay Başkanı) and led the coup of 12 September 1980, when both Ecevit and Demirel were briefly detained and, together with all senior party officials, banned from politics for ten years.⁹⁵ Evren was declared Head of State, and in 1981 all political parties were closed. The intervention was initially welcomed, as it ended the appalling political violence, but its methods were brutal, with thousands detained, widespread torture and the purging of large numbers of talented young people from universities and other areas of public life. Soviet inspired communism was then seen as the principal international threat, and the generals believed encouraging traditional Islam in Turkey would discourage marxist tendencies amongst the youth. Today the 1980-83 period is seen as critical for the subsequent success of political Islam



⁹⁵ The prohibitions were lifted after a referendum in 1987

in Turkey. The other long-term effects were an increase in disaffection amongst the Kurdish population (martial law implementation was particularly brutal in the south east) as well as distortion of the political processes. The controversial 10% electoral threshold was introduced, and the 1982 constitution – the ratification of which by referendum made Evren President until 1989 – is widely regarded as unsuitable today, although there is no agreement about what should replace it. The banning of various new political parties in the run-up to the 1983 election led to several competing parties dividing both the left and right wing vote until 2002. The day of reckoning eventually came for Evren on 18 June last year, when he and Tahsin Şahinkaya⁹⁶ were convicted of crimes against the state, reduced to the ranks and sentenced to life imprisonment.



Süleyman Demirel, seven times Prime Minister and ninth President of the Republic (1993-2000)⁹⁷ died on 17 June (1924-2015), in the midst of the prolonged political hiatus following the 7 June elections. Demirel was bitterly criticised by the left for bringing the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) into government⁹⁸ – yet he could argue with justification that on three occasions (1975, 1977 and 1979) he was able to form a government when no one else could. In 1965 and 1969 he had won large majorities in the Assembly, but he was twice forced from office by the military (in 1971 and 1980). More pertinently for today's politics, as President he chaired the National Security Council (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu) meeting of 28 February 1997 which presented Necmettin Erbakan's coalition government with a list of demands to reinforce secularism, precipitating the process which led to the collapse of the government the following June. Erbakan's Refah (Welfare) Party was closed by the Constitutional Court, and the Mayor of İstanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was removed from office and jailed. The 28 February process – dubbed the post-modern coup – initiated a thorough purging of Islamists and has become something of a foundation legend of the AK Party. In 2012, Demirel claimed he had prevented a coup,⁹⁹ but Hüseyin Çelik, then a Deputy AK Party Chairman, described it as a “Gestapo period, a time of mental torture” when, although weapons were not pointed directly at anyone, “the tanks driven through Sincan were in reality driven over the national will.”¹⁰⁰ Beşir Atalay (then Deputy Prime Minister) called for Demirel to be put on trial as the real leader of the “coup”.¹⁰¹

Gamon McLellan

⁹⁶ Head of the Air Force and as such one of the coup leaders and member of the National Security Council (Millî Güvenlik Konseyi) which ruled Turkey until December 1983. Until Şahinkaya died on 9th July this year he was the last surviving member of the Konsey

⁹⁷ See in particular obituary in *The Guardian* by David Barchard <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/suleyman-demirel>

⁹⁸ In the 1975 and 1977 Milliyetçi Cephe (Nationalist Front) coalitions

⁹⁹ Birand, Mehmet-Ali 19th April 2012: see <http://www.mehmetlibirand.com.tr/yazidetay.asp?id=781> and *Hürriyet Daily News* <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/officers-are-trained-to-stage-coups-when-necessary--.aspx?pageID=449&nID=18768&NewsCatID=405>

¹⁰⁰ 12th January 2012 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/pdf/darbecilere-ve-tesebbuse-edenler-yargilanmali/18753>. Sincan was the Ankara suburb where the local Refah Party mayor had organised a “Solidarity with Al Quds (Jerusalem) Night” and invited the Iranian ambassador. This was followed by tanks moving through Sincan and led to the National Security Council demands on 27th February. General İsmail Karadayı, Chief of Staff in 1997, said in 2012 that the tanks had been in Sincan as part of a routine exercise.

¹⁰¹ Kanal 7 Başkent Kulisi programme, quoted in *Milliyet* 22nd April 2012 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/besir-atalay-28-subat-in-lideri-demirel-dir/siyaset/siyasetdetay/22.04.2012/1531420/default.htm>, also in English <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-wants-expanded-probe-into-97-coup-plot.aspx?pageID=238&nID=19039&NewsCatID=338>

To join the
***British Association for
Turkish Area Studies***

Either Go to the Website www.batas.org.uk
Or email the Membership Secretary
Ayşe Furlonger – ayfurlonger@yahoo.co.uk
and ask for an application form

ELECTRONIC REVIEW.. .

BATAS Council is proposing an electronic version of this *Review* and would like to hear from anyone who is able to offer relevant technical advice.

Please contact

Keith Nuttall (nuttallkr@gmail.com) OR
Brian Beeley (bw.beeley@gmail.com) OR
Sigi Martin (sigimartin3@gmail.com) OR

Request for contributions

TAS *Review* welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at bw.beeley@gmail.com and/or sigimartin3@gmail.com. Submissions for the Sping issue would be particularly welcomed by 15 February 2016.

BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR TURKISH AREA STUDIES

Members of Council 2015 – 2016

Officers:

Michael Lake (President): email: michaelj.lake@virgin.net

Dr Celia Kerlake (Chairperson): 4 Nineacres Lane, Charlbury, Chipping Norton, OX7 3QZ,
☎ 01608 819170, email: celia.kerlake@orinst.ox.ac.uk

Stephen Parkin (Administrative Secretary): The British Library, 96 Euston Rd, London NW1
2DB, ☎ 020-7412-7696, email: snjp@btinternet.com

Ayşe Furlonger (Membership Secretary): email: ayfurlonger@yahoo.co.uk

Keith Bowtell (Treasurer): Stanton Lodge, Shelveys Way, Tadworth, Surrey KT20 5QJ, email:
keithbowtell@hotmail.com

Dr Brian Beeley (Co-Editor of *TAS Review*)

Sigrid-B Martin (Co-Editor of *TAS Review*)

Rezan Muir (Events Coordinator): email: rezan.muir@gmail.com

Dr Natalie Martin (Public Relations Officer)

Keith Nuttall (BIAA Representative)

Co-opted members:

Dr Vanessa Bowtell; David Boxen; Angela Gillon; Ceren Lord (student member); Jill Sindall

Elected members:

Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu; Dr Hifziye Dodd; Dr Hilary Dodd; Prof William Hale; Dr Zeynep Kezer;
Prof Richard Tapper

Turkish Area Studies Review

Co-Editors:

Dr Brian Beeley, 31 Albany Hill, Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN2 3RX, ☎ 01892-533566, email:
bw.beeley@gmail.com

Sigrid-B Martin, The Red House, 49 Hackington Road, Tyler Hill, Canterbury, Kent CT2 9NE,
☎ 01227-471222, email: sigimartin3@gmail.com

Editorial Team:

Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu; Prof Clement Dodd; Stephen Parkin; Jill Sindall

Editorial Advisory Panel:

Dr Sinan Bayraktaroğlu; Prof William Hale; Prof Malcolm Wagstaff

