

Turkish Area Studies Review

Bulletin of the British Association for

Turkish Area Studies



www.batas.org.uk



Annual Symposium 2017

and

Annual General Meeting

(@ 4.30)

**Wolfson Lecture Theatre, Paul Webley Wing,
Senate House, SOAS, University of London,
Malet Street, WC1E 7HU**

**Saturday 6 May 2017
10.00 am to 4.40 pm**

Programme & abstracts enclosed (pp 69-71); no advance booking needed!

For more information see: www.batas.org.uk

The 2017 John Martin Lecture

24 November at SOAS London

Speaker:

Selin Sayek Böke

Further details will be available on the BATAS website nearer the time.



CONTENTS

B Beeley & S-B Martin 2 Editorial

2016 John Martin Lecture

Margaret MacMillan 3 Winding up the Ottoman Empire:
From Paris to Lausanne

From the BATAS Symposium (April 2016)

Sinan Bayraktaroğlu 6 Turkish versus English as languages of Higher
Education in Turkey **Part 2**

Edward Charlton-Jones 13 White Russian Refugees in Constantinople
1918-1923 (report by Jill Sindall)

Politics, Society & Economics

William Hale 15 Turkey's Politics since October 2016

Clement Dodd 26 Update on Cyprus 2016/17

James Pettifer 32 Gülen's Balkan Schools

Tim Jacoby et alia 34 The Vaiz(e) and Syrian refugees in Bursa

History & Culture

Ayşe Furlonger 39 Noteworthy Events

Malcolm Wagstaff 45 The British Military Mission to Turkey **Part 2**

Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy 48 Attila İlhan, Poet, Novelist, Essayist & Columnist

Orhan Veli Kanık (poet) 50/1 *Anlatamıyorum*

Gülay Yurdal-Michaels (translator) 50/1 *I cannot explain*

Arın Bayraktaroğlu 51 Meeting Şefika Kutluer and Bettany Hughes

Conferences & Organisations

John Moreton 52 Levantine Heritage Foundation conference

Brian Beeley 54 Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey

Book Reviews & Publications

Brian Beeley 55 Feyza Howell, et alia, *Asım Kocabıyık and the
Turkish Republic*

Malcolm Wagstaff 56 George Junne, *The Black Eunuchs of the Ottoman
Empire*

Celia Kerlake 58 Caroline Tee, *The Gülen Movement in Turkey*

Brian Beeley 62 Turkey Book Talk: William Armstrong

Arın Bayraktaroğlu 62 Recent & Forthcoming Publications

Appreciation

S-B Martin 64 Michael Lake

In Memoriam

Christine Woodhead 66 Halil İnalçık (1916-2016)

**Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken
are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.**

Editorial

Turkey's 2017 referendum is a crossroads, with potentially the biggest change of direction for the country since the foundation of the republic nearly a century ago. The vote is close, like that of the UK's EU referendum last year, the USA's more recent national election and the current contest in France. All four cases raise questions about the future balance between two very different sides. Friends of Turkey are concerned about the country's future links with Europe and the Middle East and about the prospects for equality at home. Above all we hope to see a speedy return to the developing freedoms and openness which we have come to admire.

We are most grateful to William Hale for his account of recent developments in Turkey, leading up to the referendum, which he assesses in some detail.

Change in another era – after the 1914-1918 War – was the focus of the annual John Martin Lecture, given by Margaret MacMillan to an appreciative audience at SOAS. We have a report. We are also grateful to Clement Dodd for his update on developments in divided Cyprus and his analysis of the continuing hesitant moves towards some accommodation between the two sides on the island. We have an article from new contributor James Pettifer, who looks at controversial aspects of Gülen activity and influence in the Balkans. This subject is touched upon again by Celia Kerslake in her review of Caroline Tee's latest publication. We welcome Tim Jacoby, Roger Mac Ginty and Bülent Şenay, who report of their study of Syrian refugees in the Bursa area – with findings very relevant to the vast challenge facing Turkey nationally as it hosts some three million Syrians. Although the politics of the day govern our lives, we try not to neglect other aspects such as poetry, Ottoman history and the lives of major figures.

We thank all our contributors, not least those who submit material regularly or assist with the work of our Editorial Board, and we welcome any offers from individuals new to our pages.

The BATAS Symposium for 2017 will take place in London on 6 May. We have a fascinating quartet of presentations, abstracts of which are included in this issue of *TAS Review*, along with details of the event. As a change from practice hitherto, we meet this year in London.

We include a special word of thanks to Michael Lake, who has been our President for many years, and we are grateful to William Hale for agreeing to act in his place *pro tem*. We also acknowledge our debt to Keith and Vanessa Bowtell, both of whom have been stalwart supporters of BATAS – and its predecessor TASG – for decades. Keith has been our treasurer and Vanessa our secretary and they have otherwise contributed much to the running of the Association. So indeed has Rezan Muir who only recently relinquished her role as events coordinator. We offer them all our thanks and hope to see them at future BATAS initiatives.

Brian Beeley
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor

The 2016 John Martin Lecture
The Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS, London
23 November 2016



**Winding up the Ottoman Empire:
From Paris to Lausanne**

by Margaret MacMillan¹

Professor of International History
at the University of Oxford

Professor Margaret MacMillan delivered BATAS' 2016 John Martin Lecture to an appreciative audience at SOAS on 23 November last². Her presentation focused on the four-and-a-half years between the start of the Paris Peace Conference in January, 1919, and the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923, which saw the Ottoman Empire consigned to history and replaced by a compact Turkish state in Anatolia and Thrace. She cited the dictum of French Prime Minister Clemenceau, one of the protagonists of the Paris Conference, that making peace was much more difficult than making war.

As a preface to her account Professor MacMillan reflected on the fact that 2016 was the centenary of the Sykes-Picot agreement – not a treaty but an understanding between Britain and France for the division of the Ottomans' Arab lands between them after the conclusion of the war. She considered the possibility that, had there been no 1914-18 War, the Empire might have survived, but she felt that the balance of probability, given the range of problems facing the Ottomans, including the predatory behaviour of the Great Powers and growing nationalisms (Arab, Turkish, Kurdish) within the remaining territories, was that the collapse was ultimately inevitable. Another unknown was the extent to which the victorious Allies might have been able to achieve their full ambitions for the dismemberment of the imperial lands, had nationalist Turks not succeeded in regaining some control of their destiny. Whatever might have been, Professor MacMillan stressed, it is important to see how the manner of the winding up of the Empire left a legacy which would influence developments in the area in later years.


Professor MacMillan also emphasised what an extraordinary and unprecedented event the Paris Peace Conference was. Thirty-one countries were represented – many more than at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. And the proceedings were followed with great interest by newspaper reporters and their readers all over the world. The first six months (January – June 1919) were the most intense phase,

¹ Margaret MacMillan is Professor of International History and Warden of St. Antony's College, Oxford. She included the subject matter of this lecture in her prize-winning 2001 book *The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War*, ISBN 0-7195-5939-1 and other publications.

² Professor William Hale introduced the speaker and chaired a question-and-answer session. Ayşe Furlonger proposed a vote of thanks.

when the leaders of the great powers were present in person. After that the conference continued at foreign minister level until January 1920.

Britain and France expected the Peace Conference to oversee the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in line with their territorial ambitions. These included a division, partly based on the Sykes-Picot line, between a British zone in Mesopotamia and Palestine and French authority in Syria-Lebanon. The language of control was to be that of (temporary) 'mandate' rather than 'colony', as a gesture to the new League of Nations. In the case of Palestine, however, the deliberations at the Conference took place in the shadow of both Arab anticipation of national independence **and** Zionist ambitions in Palestine – both having been encouraged by conflicting messages from Britain during the War (the MacMahon correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca in 1915 and the Balfour Declaration in 1917). Professor MacMillan stressed the importance of being aware of such expectations brought to the Paris Conference in any assessment of subsequent developments in the lands in question.



The United States had entered the war only in April 1917, as an 'associated power' rather than an ally. It never declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Twelve months before the start of the Peace Conference President Woodrow Wilson had presented the American Congress with his famous 'Fourteen Points', which set out the principles on which a lasting peace might be built, including a "general association of nations" that was to be realised as the League of Nations. A major strand of the US position was emphasis on rights of 'self-determination' extending beyond Europe to territories elsewhere changing hands as a result of the victory of the Allied powers. Whether Wilson's 'self-determination' necessarily meant independence rather than some form of autonomy was never made clear, and the only one of the Fourteen Points that dealt with the Ottoman Empire was opaque. However, the notion of 'mandate' was available to the peacemakers as a solution for those former German or Ottoman territories that were not regarded as ready to assume self-government immediately. The possibility of a US mandate for Armenia was mooted at the Paris Conference, but was decisively rejected by the American Congress in 1920.

Inevitably there was real tension at the Paris conference between old-style imperialism and Wilsonian principles. Britain and France felt it expedient to pay lip-service to the inspirational ideal of self-determination, and in November 1918 had issued a declaration, widely circulated in Arabic, stating that their main aim in fighting the Ottomans had been "the emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks". In reality, however, their concern was with imperial security, now including the protection of air as well as shipping routes. There was also a growing interest in oil supplies in the Middle East, which *inter alia* moved Britain to insist on including the Mosul area in its Iraq mandate, a matter never subsequently forgotten in Ankara. In short, Wilsonian principles notwithstanding, Britain and France saw the ex-Ottoman Arab lands in terms of old-style colonial opportunity. They favoured the (cheap) option of indirect rule through carefully chosen local monarchs, who they were confident would be happy to accept the 'protection' of the mandatory power

against their unruly populations. The key decisions about the division of the Ottomans' Arab territories were taken by Britain and France at a conference in San Remo in April 1920, and the mandates they had awarded themselves were confirmed by the League of Nations (at which Britain and France were also dominant) in 1922.

It was at the San Remo Conference that the terms of the treaty to be presented to the Ottoman government were agreed. Almost a year earlier, in May 1919, the Allies had taken the fateful decision to allow the Greeks to occupy Izmir in pursuance of Venizelos's Anatolian dream (the *megali idea*). This, combined with the Allies' occupation of Istanbul and the evident inability of the sultan's government to offer any resistance to their plans for the partition of Turkey, provoked the Turkish national movement. Mustafa Kemal's move from Istanbul to Anatolia in May 1919, initially on a government mission, marked a key moment in the development of that movement.

When, in August 1920, Sultan Mehmet VI's government signed the Treaty of Sèvres in a porcelain showroom on the outskirts of Paris, Greek troops had just made further advances and were occupying most of western Anatolia. The provisions of the treaty included the cession of Izmir and Thrace to Greece, independence for Armenia and autonomy for Kurdistan, zones of influence for France and Italy and international control of the Straits. All this was in the face of the reality that, in April of the same year, Mustafa Kemal had been elected President of the Turkish 'Grand National Assembly' in Ankara and was progressively consolidating his power. Inevitably the Sèvres proposals remained as such and a new accord between a resurgent Turkey and the imperial powers became necessary. During 1921 Greek forces advanced further into Anatolia but were checked west of Ankara by Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü. France signed a preliminary peace treaty with the Ankara government and withdrew from south-central Turkey, as did Italy from the southwest. In March 1921 the Ankara government even signed a friendship treaty in Moscow with the Russian Bolsheviks.

In the autumn of 1922 Turkish troops, having definitively expelled the invading Greeks, marched north from Izmir to confront the British in the supposedly neutral Straits Zone in what became known as the Çanak crisis. Other powers failed to support the United Kingdom. Mustafa Kemal was firm but conciliatory, and in October came the Armistice of Mudanya, which provided for the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace and the handover of that territory to the Ankara government. Invitations to a new peace conference to be held in Lausanne, Switzerland, were issued on 27 October. The fact that the invitation was sent to both the Istanbul and Ankara governments precipitated the abolition of the sultanate, an action upon which the nationalists were already determined.



The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) established Turkey within its present borders (except for Hatay). Professor MacMillan considered that the new Turkish rulers had shown creditable pragmatism in giving up all claims to the Arab lands and also to the Dodecanese. In return for these concessions they had won the great prize of international recognition of Turkish sovereignty and the abolition of the hated

'capitulations'. By the time the Republic was proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal on 29 October, Allied forces had already left Istanbul.

The extent of change between Ottoman surrender and Republican proclamation justifies Professor MacMillan's focus on a mere half decade. The emergence of a unitary Turkish national state from the ruins of a multi-confessional empire was, to say the least, astonishing. Within it all the impact of one man, Mustafa Kemal – later Atatürk – was crucial. Even more than that, the new country had stopped two leading imperial powers in their tracks. Afterwards Britain and France felt increasing demands for self-determination within their overseas domains.

However, within the Arab lands released from Ottoman rule the unsatisfactory nature of the arrangements imposed upon them were seriously to affect the subsequent progress of the Middle East. Seemingly offered national independence post-1918, Arabs retained a sense of alienation against British and French imperialism much greater than any resentment they might previously have shown towards the sultan. Later, instead of real self-determination, Arabs found themselves subjects of autocratic presidents and monarchs with scant concern for self-determination. Most obvious of all is the case of Palestine, where, within only a quarter century of Lausanne, an intrusive new Israeli state had established itself in most of the territory. Yet the incomers too share with Arabs generally a sense of bitterness and double-cross. Many observers see Palestine as a colonial disaster, made worse by the special religious significance of Jerusalem and other holy places. Today ISIS (Daesh), Al-Qaida, and other extreme agents of Arab reaction talk about redressing the wrongs of Sykes-Picot and other legacies of European imperialism. Kurds in several countries remember that the Treaty of Sèvres raised the hope of a state in their name. An independent Armenia did indeed materialise, but not until the break-up of the Soviet Union. Professor MacMillan stressed that even the Treaty of Lausanne, supposedly a comprehensive settlement, subsumed some of the shortcomings of Sèvres – not least the imposition on the Middle East of a mosaic of national boundaries that had less to do with local self-determination than with the imperial rivalries of Britain and France in the early twentieth century.

**Celia Kerslake
Brian Beeley**

FROM THE 2016 BATAS SYMPOSIUM IN CAMBRIDGE



Turkish versus English as Languages of Higher Education in Turkey³

by Sinan Bayraktaroğlu
University of Ankara, Faculty of Letters

Part 2

³ Part 1: *TAS Review*, 28, pp.24-28

EMI in Turkey: English as a Medium of Instruction is an official policy supported by the Turkish government, i.e. through the Higher Education Council (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK*). Notwithstanding this, there are hardly any comprehensive policy documents or official statements on the use of EMI nor any written guidelines about how to teach EMI, and also, more seriously, an absence of a rigorous specific inspection scheme for ELT, let alone EMI.

EMI in Turkish HE started with the foundation of the Middle East Technical University (Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi) in Ankara in 1956. Today Turkish universities are free to determine the extent of EMI and approximately 110 out of 178 teach through it to some extent in some or all departments. In addition, those universities with Turkish as the medium of instruction emphasise teaching English as a foreign language (EFL).

EMI is generally common in both newly established private and elite state universities. They all run a Preparatory Year English Language Program (PYP) during which all new students, whose English is below the university required language proficiency, undertake an intensive course to bring them to a level at which they can operate through EMI. After passing the end-of-year test students may commence their chosen field of study. However, these tests are often written in-house by individual universities with little standardization, and university teachers are not convinced that the preparatory year adequately prepares students for EMI study. Preparatory year teachers are concerned that students arriving with a low level of English, sometimes CEFR A2, are supposed to reach a B2 level in just eight months, which is a target almost unattainable in 32–34 weeks. Teachers also believe that many preparatory year students are not motivated as they really just want to get on with studying their subject at university rather than learn English. According to the findings of Oxford EMI on Turkey

Turkish university teachers express concerns about EMI. They believe that EMI reduces a student's ability to understand concepts and leads to low levels of knowledge of the subject studied. Teachers believe it takes too much time to teach the curriculum through EMI, that EMI causes feelings of alienation and separation and reduces student participation in class due to students' low level proficiency in English. EMI might be seen as a vehicle for creating an elite class excluding the masses as the majority of students do not have access to English education.⁴

EMI has been severely criticized by some Turkish scholars, educators, and intellectuals on the grounds that it is a threat to Turkish language and culture. It also obstructs the development of students' cognitive and learning skills by delivering the content in English and thereby causing devastating damage to the quality of education received. Such criticisms⁵ have been part of a very heated debate on this ongoing topical issue in Turkish public opinion since 1956 - the year of the foundation of the Middle East Technical University.

Challenges for EMI in Turkey: The following is an authentic answer to an exam question in the media law course of a third-year undergraduate studying at an EMI university:

I think this is defamatory statements. This statements are ağır eleştirii.
Ağır eleştirii accepts only ifade and basın özgürlüğünün sınırları içinde.

⁴ op.cit.D.Vale et al, p 15 (see Review 28, p 27, Footnote 63)

⁵ For a survey of such criticisms from 1975–2010 of EMI in Turkey, cf. S. Bayraktaroğlu, *Yabancı Dil eğitimi Gerçeği: Yabancı Dille Eğitim Yanılgısı*, Ankara: Öğretmen Dünyası (2011); See also, more recently, S. Bayraktaroğlu, *Türkiye'de Yabancı Dil Eğitimi: Beklentiler, Gerçekler, Öneriler*, Ankara: Öğretmen Dünyası (2015).

Because Samantha says: Daily Republic's readers are so idiot! If you show the kişileri suçlayıcı şekilde or write the şeref ve itibarını zedeleyecek şekilde this is ihlal. Bir insanın yazdığı eserin kişinin şeref and itibarını zedeleyecek şekilde yayımlanması, it is defamation hemde from copyright kaynaklanan haklarını zedelemiş olur.⁶

This is only one of many examples showing how unrealistic it is for the Turkish universities to conduct their courses through EMI. Where students are unable to express their views in an intelligible and comprehensive manner they cannot analyse, interpret and develop their critical thinking skills. This undoubtedly leads them to refrain from asking questions and participating in class discussions, preferring to be passive. As a result they resort to rote learning for examinations. Because of this most unfortunate EMI outcome, students use a mixture of Turkish and English and end up with a totally unintelligible discourse in a linguistic system that is neither Turkish nor English. In short, it is quite clear from the data collected from examination papers that EMI does not facilitate or improve students' learning and understanding of their academic subjects; on the contrary, it prevents them from acquiring expected knowledge and skills. Hence the quality of education is severely damaged. Finally, in addition to these issues, perhaps the most serious is that students are deprived of the development of their linguistic and cognitive skills in their own native Turkish.

The fallacy about EMI: Furthermore, the academic and administrative infrastructure of many Turkish universities, except in a very few prestigious ones, is not equipped to implement EMI. Most seriously, there seems to be a widespread fallacy among policy makers (i.e.YÖK) and university administrators that EMI is also a methodology for teaching English as a foreign language. However, 'teaching through English' and 'teaching English' are two totally different educational processes which require different pedagogical approaches. EMI assumes the student's level of English to be at least CEFR B2 before they embark on their study of academic subjects in English. It can only help raise CEFR B2 to C1 or C2 levels if it is implemented properly by adopting CLIL (Content and Language Integrated Learning) methodology. This is an approach to academic teaching (e.g. in Economics, Science, Medicine) in which the teacher takes some responsibility for the language used to deliver the content and tries to accommodate the language problems of his/her students.⁷ In other words, EMI is not to bring students' level of English from CEFR A2 or B1 to the EMI minimum required level of CEFR B2 but is rather to develop CEFR B2 to C1 or C2 only if the CLIL approach is implemented effectively. In short, EMI, as practised today and for many years in Turkey, is based on an unfortunate fallacy amongst policy makers and university rectors that leads to the disastrous outcomes described above.

⁶ Since 2007, we have been taking senior appointments in 10 different state and private Turkish universities either as the Director of School of Foreign Languages or Advisor to Rector responsible for restructuring the ELT and EMI operations within such universities. We were therefore fortunate enough to have access to examination papers in different subject areas when carrying out our duties while at the same time collecting data for our research on the state of ELT and EMI in HE in Turkey. The above text therefore is only one of many authentic samples chosen from our data showing the student's answer to an exam question.

⁷ British Council and TEPAV, *The State of English in Higher Education in Turkey*, Ankara: British Council (2015), p. 7. Available at: http://www.britishcouncil.org.tr/sites/default/files/he_baseline_study_book_web_-_son.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016).

Notwithstanding this common misbelief about EMI, Turkish universities promote themselves by claiming that they offer 'international education' through it. However, according to global university rankings for 2015 by the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, there are over 150 Turkish universities that fall outside the world's top 1,000 – and 100 that fall outside the world's top 2,000 universities according to Turkey's own URAP (University Ranking by Academic Performance). The failure of effective English Language Teaching, and thereby EMI, is a major factor affecting the quality of HE in Turkey, restricting access to academic resources, international research publication and the mobility of staff and students.

Challenges for ELT and EMI: There are so many challenges for EMI in Turkey that we shall limit this study to the most crucial pedagogical problems:

- Unrealistic objectives, such as PYP students arriving with a low level of English – sometimes CEFR A2 – being supposed to reach a B2 level in just eight months.
- Students lacking the English language skills needed to study through EMI.
- Lack of international testing standards for all four skills (reading, listening, writing, speaking) and a centralized standard objective assessment system, rather than in-house testing of students' English proficiency during transition from PYP to EMI.
- The lack of policy documents or official statements on the use of EMI and any written guidelines about how to teach EMI.
- The lack of a special inspection scheme for ELT and EMI at HE.
- The indifference of EMI lecturers to the language issues that their students face. Lecturers are interested in their comprehension of the academic subject area.
- The current English proficiency levels of both EMI lecturers and students restricting effective learning.
- The lack of professional development provision for university lecturers in EMI.
- The limited provision of teacher training programmes for ELT instructors.
- The shortage of linguistically qualified EMI teachers; the lack of EMI content in initial teacher education (teacher preparation) programmes and continuing professional development (in-service) courses.
- The lack of awareness of the CEFR amongst policy makers, education managers and instructors of English for the teaching of EFL with international standards. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and the CEFR levels should be adopted in Turkish universities. Most students currently enter university preparatory school with a CEFR level of A1+ and are expected to reach B2 in a period of eight months.
- The lack of a global understanding of the aims and objectives of EMI.

British Council recommendations: Most recently, the British Council, in collaboration with TEPAV, published a report on *The State of English in Higher Education in Turkey*.⁸ This had quite an impact on YÖK, which initiated a review of ELT and EMI in Turkish universities. The report makes the following recommendations:

- More focus, status, and resources should be given to *Turkish-medium programmes*.

⁸ Ibid.

- New English-medium programmes should not be introduced until secondary schools produce graduates with intermediate (CEFR B1) levels of English proficiency.
- New English-medium programmes should be at the *graduate rather than the undergraduate level*.
 - The Preparatory Year English Language Programme should only be available to EMI students;
 - have an improved intake; the entry level should be at least CEFR A2;
 - assess entry level through university examinations assessing all skills;
 - shift the curriculum away from *English for General Purposes* towards *English for General Academic Purposes*;
 - have instructors trained in *English for Specific Purposes* and *English for Academic Purposes*;
 - have instructors trained in techniques for incorporating student–student interaction, with “speaking” integrated into every activity
 - have an Exit level of CEFR B2 in all skills.
 - assess the exit level through valid preparatory school exit examinations assessing all four skills.
 - redirect those who cannot meet these requirements to Turkish-medium programmes.
- There should be credit-bearing English language courses **throughout** all undergraduate and graduate programmes. These should be compulsory for all English-medium students but elective for Turkish-medium students.
- There should be an elective *English for Occupational Purposes* (EOP).
- EMI teaching should be improved
 - from traditional EMI to CLIL;
 - through training for EMI lecturers.

Challenges for Turkish-medium instruction: Oxford EMI reports that “Interestingly, Turkish-medium instruction is also facing problems; the translation of specific academic or technical terms into Turkish, the lack of resources for teaching in Turkish and the low level of participation of students in class are ... concerns.”⁹ We should however add that problems in Turkish-medium instruction are not limited to the lack of resources or the translation of certain technical terms into Turkish in HE. Indeed this is a problem that relates to a serious national educational issue of the ineffective teaching of the Turkish language throughout primary and secondary education that carries over into HE. This is well-evidenced as shown below.

Firstly, according to the *Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) (2012)*¹⁰, 15-year-old Turkish school students’ performance in reading comprehension and

⁹ Dearden, *English as a Medium of Instruction*, p. 15.

¹⁰ The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a worldwide study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in member and non-member nations of 15-year-old school pupils’ scholastic performance in mathematics, science, and reading. It

problem-solving skills are well below the OECD average, ranking 32nd among 34 OECD countries. Clearly 15-year-old Turkish students have not reached basic competence levels in these areas, which are essential language skills for the effective use of spoken and written Turkish.

Secondly, the recent comments of the former Minister of Education, Nabi Avcı, at the 123rd Bâb-ı Âli meeting in Istanbul on 26 February 2015 show how the learning/teaching of Turkish is conducted through a lack of professional linguistic pedagogy in Turkey today:

We are being criticized for not being able to teach foreign languages. The Turkish educational system is unable to teach foreign languages. That is true. We know this because we can assess English against international testing scales. But are we able to do this for Turkish? No, we are not. Therefore, we are not very aware of the seriousness of this matter.¹¹

Although this comment refers to the assessment of Turkish, its pedagogical implication is a serious concern for the Turkish educational system in general. It is as much a concern for the teaching of Turkish as a native language as for the development of the cognitive and learning skills of students. It is through teaching/learning the mother tongue that we acquire the skills of reasoning, critical thinking, and the interpretation of various texts, which are the essential tools for the effective use of one's language. It is therefore of great concern that no descriptors nor scales of proficiency exist in the teaching, learning and assessment of 'speaking', 'listening', 'reading', and 'writing' in Turkish. The lack of such a system clearly shows that the teaching of Turkish is not based on professional linguistic pedagogy, let alone related to the international principles of the CEFR.

Furthermore, the teaching of Turkish in primary and secondary education is traditionally 'teacher-centred' as opposed to 'learner-centred'. The role of the teacher is authoritative rather than as a facilitator of learning. The teaching style is magisterial rather than motivating. Grammar is dealt with as a systematic body of rules to be learnt and observed rather than as a means for constructing and conveying meaning according to the communicative needs of the student. Such considerations make Turkish language educational reform an urgent imperative.

Effective Turkish language teaching/learning is the prerequisite for English language learning: The following is an excerpt from a recent public lecture delivered by a Turkish Minister of Education:

We are facing difficulties in foreign language education due to the fact that we are unable to teach our students their own native Turkish language at a satisfactory level. This is an issue which we need to look into while searching for an answer to why we are unable to teach and learn foreign languages; a question which we come across everywhere and on every occasion. We desperately need to review our system in Turkish language

was first performed in 2000 and then repeated every three years. It is done with a view to improving education policies and outcomes. It measures problem solving and cognition in daily life (cf. *Wikipedia*). The PISA 2012 survey focused on mathematics, with reading, science and problem-solving minor areas of assessment. All 34 OECD member countries and 31 partner countries and economies participated in PISA 2012, representing more than 80% of the world economy. Around 510,000 students between the ages of 15 years 3 months and 16 years 2 months completed the assessment in 2012, representing about 28 million 15-year-olds in the schools of the 65 participating countries and economies.

¹¹ Speech delivered by Nabi Avcı, Minister of Education, at the 123rd Bâb-ı Âli Conference on 26 February 2015. My translation.

education in our schools, and we are currently doing this. Our students are able to answer correctly most of the 30 questions in a multiple choice test, but if they are unable to write a few sentences which are grammatically acceptable and effective, then we should focus our attention on Turkish language education and review our adopted teaching methodologies.¹²

Considering the state of Turkish language education today in the Turkish educational system, it would be unrealistic to expect success in ELT, let alone in EMI, without an effective Turkish language education policy at primary and secondary levels. This is because effective native language teaching/learning is the most powerful means people bring to the task of foreign language learning and provides *language awareness, knowledge, skills, learning abilities, and autonomy in learning*. It is **the** master key to ELT, the tool providing the student with the most complete means of accessing English language learning. It is through their native language education that students learn **'how to learn'** and be **'good language learners'** which are equally indispensable for foreign language learning - and are easily transferable for that purpose.

On a theoretical level, language education of any kind, native or foreign language, involves competencies which include 'what the learner knows, what the learner can do and what the learner is able to understand, think about and reflect upon'. Native and foreign language learning/teaching have therefore a joint purpose: the development of text competence, language and genre awareness and intercultural competencies, understanding language and communication, and understanding how we use language differently in different situations (Aase, 2006)¹³. Developing competencies in native language education facilitates foreign language learning, or indeed strengthens competences in the foreign language. That is to say that a foreign language learner builds upon his/her existing skills and knowledge acquired in and through native language education. Furthermore, language learning is a 'learner-centred' process in which the learner takes charge of his/her own learning rather than relying on teachers. Successful learners have learned how to learn and have acquired the learning strategies, the knowledge about learning, and the attitudes that enable them to use these skills and knowledge confidently, flexibly, appropriately and independently of a teacher (Wenden 1991: 15)¹⁴. Therefore, they are autonomous. The teacher, on the other hand, is the agent who 'teaches how to learn'.

Conclusion: A serious language problem today pervades all levels of the Turkish educational system due to blind spots in language education policies both for Turkish and English language teaching/learning, as well as EMI. This has a devastating impact on a country whose young population¹⁵ is its most valuable asset. Amidst this plethora of language problems, to adopt EMI in HE at the expense of reforming Turkish-medium education is nothing but an infliction of severe damage on the minds, thoughts and creativity of future generations, while, more seriously, constituting a threat to Turkish

¹² Retrieved from:

http://sonhabergazete.com.tr/haber_detay.asp?haberID=3029&HaberBaslik=bakan-avciturkcenin-onemine-dikkat-cekti

¹³ Aase, L. (2006). *Aims in the Teaching/Learning of Language(s) of Education (LE)*. Strassbourg: Council of Europe, Language Policy Division. Intergovernmental Conference: *Languages of Schooling: towards a Framework for Europe* www.coe.int/lang

¹⁴ Wenden, A. (1991). *Learner Strategies for Learner Autonomy*. London: Prentice Hall.

¹⁵ According to the 2014 Turkish Population Census, out of a total population of 77,695,904 people, 24.28% are aged 0–14, 29.31% are under 18, 40.73% are under 24, and 48.8% are under the age of 30.

language and culture. The Republic of Turkey was founded on sound language education policies, which is evident in the words of Kemal Atatürk: “The Turkish nation, which is able to protect its country and its great independence, must also liberate its language from the yoke of foreign languages”.¹⁶ It is high time that Turkey carried out a deeply rooted reform of both Turkish and English language policies in HE today. Turkish universities should inevitably adopt Turkish as the medium of instruction, but should at the same time seek to provide an effective education in EFL, rather than adopting EMI with detrimental blind spots.



White Russian Refugees in Constantinople 1918-23¹⁷



Report on a talk
by Edward Charlton-Jones¹⁸

The five years 1918-23 covered an episode in Constantinople’s history which was to have a profound effect on the city’s sociological and cultural make-up. The Russian Revolution of 1917 came at a critical moment in the history of World War I. The Imperial Russian onslaught on the Ottomans in Transcaucasia had decimated the latter’s military strength: of their estimated troop level of 800,000 in 1915, 300,000 had been killed fighting the Russians, and the surviving Ottoman troops were living on starvation rations. But the Russians were also suffering severe deprivation since the Entente’s failure to capture the Dardanelles meant that the supply route to Russia had to go through the Arctic, frozen for eight months of the year. This, together with the Central Powers’ blockade across the Baltic and Black Seas and the inoperation of the Trans-Siberian railway due to lack of rolling stock, was disastrous for the under-supplied Russian army.

Following the Tsar’s abdication in March 1917, Kerensky’s Provisional Government assured the Entente that Russia would continue to fight the Central Powers. However, the aftermath of a military uprising in Petrograd in July 1917 resulted in public demands for an end to Russia’s involvement in the war. The Provisional Government’s attempt to suppress the rebellion whilst attempting to maintain momentum in the war offensive resulted in mass mutiny and desertion from the Russian front line on the western border. Lenin seized power for the Bolsheviks in St Petersburg and in December 1927 concluded a unilateral armistice with the Central Powers. However, civil war between the Red Army and the anti-communist militants (the White Army) continued for two years.

¹⁶ Atatürk’s speech on Turkish Language on 2nd September 1930. Retrieved from <http://www.ataturkinkilaplari.com/ao/31/ataturkun-turk-dili-ile-ilgili-sozleri.html>

¹⁷ Talk at BATAS Annual Symposium 9 April, 2016, Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

¹⁸ With Allen & Overy, London & Istanbul

In 1919, the Greek government sent troops to Odessa to assist the French in supporting the White Russian Army under the leadership of General Denikin. As Andrew Mango noted in his biography of Atatürk: 'This placed (the Greeks) in the camp of the enemies of the (Bolshevik) revolution'¹⁹ – one factor the Soviets had in common with Mustafa Kemal and his followers.

At this point, Charlton-Jones's story begins. In November 1920, the rump of the White Army (now commanded by General Wrangel) and White Russian civilians (in all totalling about 150,000) were evacuated from the Crimea in what remained of the Imperial Naval Fleet. Charlton-Jones says that this was the largest seaborne evacuation in history until Dunkirk. The French who, with the British, had occupied Constantinople since March 1920, granted the fleet asylum and permission to moor in the Straits.

Russian refugees grew to comprise the largest community of displaced persons in the city. The Ottomans were unable to cope, and so this task fell to the Allied Commissions of Control and Organization. Severe shortages of coal and wheat were alleviated by shipments from Britain and the US, primarily through relief agencies. Starvation was staved off by soup kitchens serving thousands each day, operating in Gallipoli and Beyoğlu. A housing shortage was exacerbated by the requisitioning of buildings by the Entente to provide housing and administrative buildings for staff of their occupying forces. The Russian refugees were dependent on overseas aid from, for example, the League of Nations, and desperate poverty forced many into prostitution and racketeering involving the sale of jewelry and valuables smuggled out of Russia.



General Wrangel came to represent a pillar of the Russian community and refused safe passage to Malta offered him by the British. He and his fellow military and naval officers went on to develop the concept of "Russia Abroad", determined to keep their compatriots' cultural references, language and Russian identity alive. Officers continued to wear their imperial uniforms and set up workshops to educate members of the former aristocracy in skills such as carpentry so that they could eventually earn a living. Many of them succeeded in establishing social positions in the circles of the Ottoman and European elites; others reinvented themselves as fallen aristocrats. But there were those amongst the refugees who were artists: ballet troupes and musical groups were formed and some even went on tour to Europe. Others performed in night clubs and cabarets. Another significant impact on the local community of this new group was that of Russian women who broke down gender and dress code boundaries; for example, bob haircuts became fashionable among some Ottoman women.

Like Shanghai and Berlin in later years, Constantinople became a city where, in the throes of chaos and trauma, hedonism prevailed. In areas such as Beyoğlu Russians gathered in drinking establishments and cafes chantants. Many in the local community considered this a time of decadence, threatening their traditions and

¹⁹ *Atatürk*, 1999, London; John Murray, p 287

morals. For them, those who partook of these louche activities were agents of debauchery. Their sensitivities were so offended; Charlton-Jones said that, when Atatürk came to power, he felt compelled to 'clean out' the areas which had become notorious red light districts.

Charlton-Jones's talk gave a fascinating insight into the phenomenon of a society which evolved within but remained distinct from another society. The variety of photographs which he had retrieved from archives vividly brought the audience face to face with a group of extraordinary people who succeeded in their determination to survive and to preserve their language and culture in a foreign environment.

A postscript: After what would seem to have been a deliberate act by the Italians in ramming and consequently sinking his yacht, Wrangel and the former imperial fleet left Constantinople, carrying about 4,500 Russian civilian refugees. They then sailed to Tunisia where the ships were interned by the French. In an act of supreme irony, the French – having recognized Soviet Russia in 1924 – gave the ships to the Bolshevik government. However, they were found to be unseaworthy and sold for scrap.

Jill Sindall



Turkey's Politics since October 2016

by
William Hale
Emeritus Professor, SOAS, London

In December 2016 Turkey's rapprochement with Russia seemed to be progressing...

In the last quarter of 2016 Turkey's unexpected rapprochement with Russia seemed to be producing some important results, as the two countries came together with Iran and the rival Syrian parties in securing a ceasefire in the tragic Syrian civil war. Following the capture of Aleppo by Russian-backed Syrian regime forces, the Turkish government backtracked on its previously vehement opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, by accepting the *fait accompli*. On 20 December it was announced that the Russian and Turkish governments had brokered a ceasefire between the regime and the opposition forces. This excluded the Islamic State organisation (IS) and the al-Nusra front, which were classed as terrorist organisations by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Later, both the UNSC and NATO welcomed the agreement, showing that it also had backing from the US.²⁰ Cooperation between Ankara and Moscow had continued even after the murder of

²⁰ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 20, 39, 31 December 2016: Yezid Sayigh, 'Ceasefire in Syria: Turkish Policy Sets Syria on a New Path', BBC News website (www.bbc.co.uk/news) 30 December 2016

the Russian ambassador in Ankara by a lone gunman on 19 December, as the Russian and Turkish leaders simultaneously denounced the attack, and agreed to establish a joint security team to investigate it.²¹ On 23 January 2017, in talks in Astana, capital of Kazakhstan, the Russian and Turkish representatives, plus representatives of Iran and the UN, agreed to set up a mechanism to monitor the ceasefire. Representatives of the Syrian government and the rebels also attended the Astana meeting, but the rebels then backed out of face-to-face talks with the Assad delegation.²² However, the ceasefire generally held.

.....but then ran aground

After this initial success, the talks ran into the sand, as the Turkish-Russian relationship hit serious problems, and the rebel organisations backed away from prospective talks to settle the future of Syria. Two fundamental issues still divided Turkey and Moscow. One was Turkey's continuing refusal to support any settlement which would allow President Assad to retain power. Second, Turkey's policy in Syria was directed not just against IS but also the Syrian Kurdish organisation, the Democratic Unity Party (PYD) and its military arm the People's Protection Units (YPG). These control a long strip of Syrian territory along the border with Turkey. They are aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), responsible for carrying out terrorist attacks in Turkey, but are supported by the US military as the main component in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This is used by the US military as its main local proxy force in the war against IS in Syria. Until February 2017 Russia had avoided getting sucked into Syrian-Kurdish politics but on 15 February Moscow hosted a 'Kurdish National Conference', including the PYD. This suggested that Turkey was being sidelined as both Russia and the US were backing the PYD/YPG, in spite of Turkish opposition. The Syrian peace process was also effectively halted on 15 March as another round of talks in Astana was boycotted by the rebels.²³

The Turkish-Russian entente – such as it was – received another setback in March when the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov cranked up pressure on Turkey to drop its objections to PYD representation in the prospective Geneva peace talks on Syria. The YPG also claimed that Russia was setting up a military base in Afrin, in the north-western Kurdish enclave close to the Turkish province of Hatay, although this was denied by Russia. An SDF commander was quoted as saying that 'the main purpose of our alliance with Russia is to keep Turkey off our backs' – referring to Turkish attacks on SDF forces in the Syrian town Manbij. Turkey had long opposed the SDF occupation of Manbij, since it had hoped to include the town in a prospective Turkish-backed 'security zone' in a stretch of northern Syria which was being carved out by 'Operation Euphrates Shield' (see *TAS Review* 28, p.13).²⁴ Begun in August 2016, and mainly consisting of Arab Syrian militias of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) this operation had captured the important IS stronghold of al-Bab in March 2017, and was officially declared completed on 28 March. Under it, Turkish-

²¹ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 20 December 2016.

²² *Ibid*, 24, 26 January 2017.

²³ *Ibid*, 16 February, 15 March 2017.

²⁴ *Ibid* 22 March 2017: Amberin Zaman, 'Ankara's Syrian plan falters as Moscow sets up in Afrin', *Al Monitor* website (www.al-monitor.com/pulse) 22 March 2017: Fehim Tastekin, 'Is Turkey rattled by Russian-Kurdish deal?', *ibid*, 24 March 2017.

backed forces had captured a zone of 2,015 sq.km. between the towns of Jarablus and Azaz, separating the PYD-controlled cantons of Kobane and Afrin.²⁵

Turkey's relations with the US also remain contested

The long-declared policy of the AKP government was to extend the 'Euphrates Shield' operation to the expected offensive against Raqqa, the main remaining base of the IS in Syria, for which it would need support from US forces. As part of this, the US military would have to drop its alliance with the YPG/SDF. The aim would be to establish a 'no fly zone' in northern Syria, with US support, in which some of the Syrian refugees could be re-settled. However, Washington had been reluctant to commit its forces to an operation which could lead to a direct clash with Syrian regime forces, and hence with Russia. Soon after the installation of the Trump administration in Washington, Ankara was apparently hopeful that it would be more supportive of Turkish policy in Syria than its predecessor, since President Trump had said before entering office that he would support the 'safe zones' idea. Nonetheless, later indications were that the US military's Central Command (Centcom) would continue its campaign against IS in collaboration with the YPG, not the FSA/Turkish combination.²⁶ This combined with persistent Turkish demands for the extradition of the Islamist ideologue Fethullah Gülen, who was accused of being the master-mind behind the botched coup attempt of 15-16 July 2016 (see *TAS Review* 28, pp.4-7). Expectations that these issues might be resolved by the first ministerial visit to Ankara by the new Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, on 30 March, were left unrealised, as Tillerson gave evasive answers to these questions. In response, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu blamed the Obama administration, rather than its successor, for the problems in Turkey-US relations – suggesting that the government still hoped that the Trump administration might change tack, although there was no clear sign of this.²⁷

Mass arrests of state employees, academics, journalists and judiciary have continued

In October 2016 and February 2017 parliament renewed the three-months State of Emergency originally declared in July 2016 following the failed coup attempt of 15-16 July (see *TAS Review* 28, p.7-8). This gives the authorities wide powers to dismiss public servants, and arrest and imprison its critics without trial and in some cases without even a formal indictment being submitted, and had been used to enforce mass arrests and expulsions. In February 2017 another 330 academics were expelled from the universities, apparently for signing an 'Academics for Peace' petition criticising government policies in the south-east, which was treated by the courts as 'support for terrorism'. Under the same decree, 2,585 Education Ministry staff, 893 members of the Gendarmerie, 417 members of the General Security Directorate, 49 from the Interior Ministry and 520 civil servants from other ministries were also sacked. In mid-March, according to the Turkish Journalists Association 143 journalists were in gaol, accused of collaboration with either the Gülenists or the PKK (bizarrely, in some cases, both). Prominent journalists such as Nazlı Ilıcak, Şahin Alpay, Ali Bulaç and Ahmet Altan had been held without indictment for 226, 225, 225 and 170 days respectively. The government maintained that they were

²⁵ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 29 March 2017.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 16 December 2016, 21 March 2017; Amberin Zaman, 'Should Ankara be optimistic about relations with Trump?', *Al Monitor*, 5 December 2016.

²⁷ Serkan Demirtaş, 'So, Obama is still poisoning Turkey-US ties?', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 1 April 2017.

being held not for what they wrote, but for ‘supporting terrorism’, but it was hard to see this as anything other than a severe restriction of free speech. In March 2017 the Constitutional Court gave a judgement in the case of an imprisoned journalist, Orhan Pala, in which it decreed that ‘giving a gaol sentence for a press offence is openly contradictory to the journalists freedom of expression’, although it remained doubtful that the lower court would re-hear the case. It was thought that the journalists held without charge would eventually be released without trial, but that the period of detention would itself act as a ‘punishment’ or deterrent. Against this, the government came in for severe criticism from U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein and the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.²⁸

Among opposition politicians, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, the two co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP), which is accused of having links with the PKK, were arrested in November 2016 with another nine of the HDP’s 59 Deputies. This provoked another terrorist bomb attack by the PKK in the Kurdish-inhabited city of Diyarbakır which killed eight people and injured more than 100, and followed the arrest of the two co-mayors of the city in the previous month.²⁹ The fate of the judiciary was also a serious cause of concern. In March 2017 the International Association of Judges (AIJ), which is part of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, reported that since July 2016, 2,538 out of Turkey’s 10,382 judges, and 1,121 out of 4,622 public prosecutors had been dismissed without giving reasons for the individual cases and without proper procedures. It could be assumed they would be replaced by judges and prosecutors who supported the government line.

The economy was also showing worrying signs

Although the government’s severe restrictions of civil rights, together with its policy on Syria, received the lion’s share of media attention, the economic indicators were also important and worrying. Potentially, this could be of profound political importance, since a major source of public support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was its success in running the economy – in particular, by increasing real per capita income by 50 percent since 2002, halving the poverty rate, and improving health and other public services, besides increasing employment and maintaining relative price stability. On past form, a downturn in the economy could be expected to undermine the AKP’s electoral strength. In 2016 GNP growth faltered, with the third quarter showing the first fall since the world crisis of 2009, of -1.8 percent. This reduced GNP growth from 5.9 percent in 2015 to an estimated 2.1 percent for 2016, and an expected 2.7 percent in 2017, according to World Bank estimates. However, even this depended on increasing exports in an uncertain market.³⁰ In foreign trade and payments, the current account balance for January

²⁸ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 8 February, 11 March 2017: Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, ‘Constitutional Court’s decision on jailed journalists’, *ibid*, 1 April 2017.

²⁹ ‘Turkey HDP: Blast after pro-Kurdish leaders Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ detained’, BBC News website, 4 November 2016.

³⁰ Data from ‘Growth in Turkey to recover in 2017 thanks to improving Exports, Says World Bank’, from World Bank website, 2 February 2017 (www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/02/02). Other data from Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkstat), National Income data (www.turkstat.gov.tr) and *Hürriyet Daily News*, 12 December 2016. IMF estimates were slightly above this, with an estimate of 2.7 percent growth in 2016 and an expected 2.9 percent for 2017: *Hürriyet Daily News*, 6 February 2017.

2017 showed a deficit of \$2.8 billion, compared with \$2.2 billion in January 2016.³¹ A primary worry on this front was caused by the decline in tourism income, with a 30 percent drop in 2016 compared with 2015. This was caused mainly by the slump in tourist entries from Russia, as the result of the diplomatic stand-off between the two countries in 2015-6. This figure was expected to recover in 2017, but with a fall in tourist entries from Germany and other EU countries as a result of security worries and the fiercely critical rhetoric between Turkey and some of its European trading partners (see below).³²

Uncertainty, and domestic political upsets, also accounted for a dramatic drop in the international value of the Lira, which fell from TL 2.91 against the US dollar in December 2015 to TL 3.50 one year later: in March 2017 it was trading at around TL 3.60 to the dollar. This was bound to work its way into the domestic inflation rate, as increased Lira prices for imported goods, with the rise in the consumer price index running at 10.3 percent in February and 11.2 percent in March 2017 compared with 8.5 percent for the whole of 2016. The devaluation of the Lira had serious implications for firms with borrowings in dollars, particularly since, according to the Central Bank, the net foreign exchange deficit of non-financial companies (in manufacturing and services) rose from \$65 billion in September 2009 to \$213 billion in September 2016.³³ Of more immediate concern to the AKP's electoral base was a rise in unemployment in November 2016 to 12.1 percent, with youth unemployment at 22.6 percent.³⁴ Early in 2017 the government had hopes of improving Turkey's international trading position through a revision of the customs union agreement with the EU, dating back to 1996, but these were dashed by the continuing war of words between President Erdoğan and the EU countries – an apt illustration of the interplay between politics and economics.³⁵ Addressing this issue was of primary importance to both sides, since Turkey was the EU's fifth largest outside trade partner in 2016, and the fourth largest export destination of the EU.³⁶

Turkey-EU relations hit a low point...

Even before the row between the AKP government and leading EU nations over the party's attempt to take its referendum campaign into western Europe (see below) relations had seriously deteriorated. In the run-up to the referendum, the AKP was evidently trying to win over hard-line nationalists in the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), as well as radical Islamists, by suggesting that Turkey did not really 'belong' in Europe – a line mirroring that of the ultra-nationalist right in western Europe. In November 2016 President Erdoğan suggested that Turkey should not remain 'fixated' on the idea of EU membership, but should instead consider joining the 'Shanghai Five' of Russia, China and three central Asian nations – though whether this was more than a vague threat remained doubtful.³⁷ On 24 November the European Parliament voted to freeze temporarily the EU's accession talks with Turkey, although in fact these have made little progress in recent years and the

³¹ Focus Economics, 'Turkey Current Account January 2017', (www.focus-economics.com/countries/turkey/news) 13 March 2017.

³² *Hürriyet Daily News*, 31 January 2017,

³³ Data from *ibid*, 3 April 2017, Türkstat (see note 10), Consumer Price Index, and Mustafa Sönmez, 'Why 2017 doesn't bode well for Turkey's economy', *AI Monitor*, 4 January 2017.

³⁴ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 15 February 2017.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 15 January 2017, 28 March 2017.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 30 March 2017.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 20 November 2016,

Parliament only has advisory powers on this issue anyway.³⁸ Within the EU, it was clear that member states were still divided on this question, with Austria calling for a formal halt to accession talks, the Netherlands and Bulgaria being said to share this position, and other states (notably Germany) opposing a halt, or remaining neutral. The furthest the foreign ministers of all member states, meeting as the European Council, were prepared to go, was to say that no new Chapters in the negotiations should be opened.³⁹

When German Chancellor Angela Merkel met President Erdoğan in Ankara in February 2017, there was agreement on the need to strengthen the ‘fight against terrorism’, but no progress on thorny issues like liberalising the Schengen visa regime for Turkish citizens, or the extradition of suspected Gülenists from Germany to Turkey.⁴⁰ President Erdoğan’s threat to reinstate the death penalty, and the government’s harsh reaction to a critical ‘Progress Report’ by the European Commission in November 2016, were further causes of hostile rhetoric. The difficulty for the EU decision makers was that while they were entitled to wave a stick at the government for its failure to apply democratic standards, unless they could also offer the carrot of eventual accession (almost impossible, due to the objections of some member states) then the EU was bound to lose leverage over Turkey.⁴¹

The row escalates as Turkish ministers are prevented from attending rallies in Germany and the Netherlands

Under recent legislative changes, Turkish citizens living abroad have the right to vote in Turkish elections and referendums at pre-arranged polling stations. There are reported to be 1.42 million Turkish voters in Germany, plus another 880,000 in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and France, making a total of 2.3 million, equivalent to around four percent of the total number of voters in Turkey (58.2 million).⁴² The AKP evidently hoped that these votes would help it to win the forthcoming referendum on constitutional changes, since its share of the vote in the general elections of November 2015 was about ten percent higher among expatriate citizens than its share in Turkey itself. Hence a serious row erupted on 8 March 2017 after Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu was prevented from addressing a pro-government rally at the planned venue in Hamburg. Later, ministerial visits to planned rallies in Germany were banned, the Minister for Family and Social Policies, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya was deported from the Netherlands, and minister Çavuşoğlu denied permission to enter the country. Similar bans on an official Turkish presence at referendum rallies were enforced by Austria, Denmark and Switzerland. In retaliation, President Erdoğan accused Chancellor Merkel of ‘supporting terrorism’, and made repeated accusations of ‘Nazi-ism’ against both Germany and the Netherlands. Predictably, this provoked an angry response from both countries. In Ankara, Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş threatened that Turkey would ‘re-evaluate’ the agreement signed with the EU in April 2016 which had successfully curbed refugee migration from Turkey to Greece (see *TAS Review* 28, p.9-10). It was generally surmised that this rhetoric was intended to increase ultra-nationalist support at home for a ‘yes’

³⁸ Ibid, 24 November 2016.

³⁹ Ibid, 13, 14 December, 25 November 2016.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 2 February 2017. On the visa issue see also *ibid*, 19 December 2016.

⁴¹ Murat Yetkin, ‘Europe losing leverage on Turkey’, *ibid*, 15 November 2016.

⁴² Data from Middle East Eye website, 28 March 2017, ‘Germany accuses Turkey of “intolerable” spying as diaspora heads to polls’, (www.middleeasteye.net/news/germany-accuses-turkey-intolerable-spying..) and *Hürriyet*, 11 February 2017.

vote in the forthcoming referendum, by creating the image of a 'foreign enemy' against which the government was supposedly taking an heroic stand.⁴³ Whether the row could be easily smoothed over after the referendum remained uncertain, however.

The proposed constitutional changes were far-reaching and highly controversial

Under the original text of the Turkish constitution, the President has only limited powers, with leadership of the government vested in the Prime Minister, who in turn needs a parliamentary majority to govern. However, the President has been directly elected by the voters since 2014, and President Erdoğan has long pressed for amendments which would give him increased powers. Constitutional amendments in Turkey can be enacted by either (a) a two-thirds majority in the unicameral Grand National Assembly (i.e., 367 votes out of 550) or (b) a three-fifths majority (331 votes) plus approval in a national referendum. Since the ruling AKP has 317 seats, and the two main opposition parties - that is the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP) – resolutely opposed the idea, President Erdoğan needed the support of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), with its 39 seats, to reach the minimum threshold of 331 votes. In a surprise move in October 2016, the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli agreed to back the idea, albeit at the cost of serious dissent within his own party. This has led to the expulsion of seven of the party's Deputies, led by a former Minister of the Interior, Meral Akşener.⁴⁴

The draft amendment package was submitted to parliament on 10 December 2016, and the whole package finally passed on 20 January 2017.⁴⁵ Since the proposal received between 330 and 367 votes, a referendum was necessary, and the date for this was fixed as 16 April. Voting figures for successive ballots on individual clauses suggested that on the most crucial issues, regarding the powers of the President and parliament, and those affecting the judiciary, around 5-6 Deputies from either the MHP or (possibly) the AKP either voted against the amendments or absented themselves. There was sharp criticism of the fact that many AKP deputies cast open rather than secret ballots, as required by the constitution, and that Tayyip Erdoğan failed to adhere to his presidential oath of neutrality by strongly advocating the amendments.⁴⁶

Some of the proposed changes were relatively uncontroversial, such as the increase in the number of parliamentary seats from 550 to 600 (Article 75), the reduction of the minimum age for election as a Deputy from 25 to 18 (Article 76) and the increase in parliamentary terms from four to five years, with simultaneous election of the President (Article 77). The most controversial changes can be summarised as:

⁴³ 'Germany warns Turkey over Nazi jibes amid referendum row', BBC News website, 8 March 2017: Jon Henley, 'Turkey threatens to pull out of migrant deal as Dutch row intensifies', *The Guardian*, 13 March 2017: Philip Oltermann, 'Erdoğan ratchets up anti-Dutch rhetoric despite German verbal ceasefire plan', *ibid*, 15 March 2017: Pinar Tremblay, 'What's behind Erdoğan's recent angry outburst?', *Al Monitor*, 24 March 2017.

⁴⁴ See *Hürriyet Daily News*, 10 March 2017 and Alex MacDonald, 'Split within far-right party could hold key to future of Turkish politics', *Middle East Eye* website, 12 July 2016 (www.middleeasteye.net/split-within-far-right-party.)

⁴⁵ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 10 December 2016, 20 January 2017.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 16 January 2017: Ali Bayramoğlu, 'Will Turks give blessing to Erdoğan's autocratic course?' *Al Monitor*, 27 March 2017.

- The requirement that the President should not be a member of a political party to be removed (Article 101). In effect, the President could also be the Chairman of the ruling party, and the requirement that he/she should be a neutral head of state is annulled.
- The President to act as the head of the government as well as the head of state, with the power to appoint and sack ministers independently (Article 104) and to appoint or dismiss one or more Vice-Presidents (Article 106). Hence, the office of Prime Minister is abolished.
- The President could independently order new elections, although this would otherwise require a three-fifths majority in parliament, in place of the previous simple majority (Article 116).
- The number of judges in the Constitutional Court to be reduced from 17 to 15, of which the President would appoint 12 (Article 146). In the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (now renamed as the 'Board of Judges and Prosecutors') which makes all senior appointments to the judiciary, the number of members is reduced to 13 from 22, of which the President would appoint four and the parliament seven (Article 159).
- The President to propose the budget to parliament 75 days before the start of the fiscal year. Members of parliament could not make proposals to change public expenditures. If the budget is not approved, then a temporary budget would be proposed. If the temporary budget is not approved, the previous year's budget would apply (Article 161). In effect, the legislature would not have the power to withhold money from the executive.⁴⁷

Presidential republics are not *ipso facto* undemocratic, as several democracies, notably the USA, apply this system. The problem in the Turkish case is that Turkish government is highly centralised and majoritarian, and that Turkish parties (unlike those in the US) are monolithic and leader-dominated, with a top-down authority pattern. There is no division of power between the central government and the states, as there is in the US. Unlike their equivalents in most continental European countries, Turkish parties are highly polarised. Hence, provided his party retains its parliamentary majority, under the amendments the President would wield virtually unchallenged power. If it lost its majority in parliament, the opposition parties would be most unlikely to cooperate with the President, who would be unable to conduct 'log-rolling' and similar operations to bring opposition Deputies into line (as the US President can do with opposition members of Congress). Thus, the disadvantages of the system would be that either (a) the President would wield too much power or (b) if he did not have majority support in parliament there would be deadlock between the different branches of government, with 'cohabitation' hard to achieve. In the US and other democracies, an important brake on executive power is the independent judiciary, which can annul executive acts and laws as unconstitutional. In Turkey, the Constitutional Court is supposed to carry out this function, and has sometimes done so, but it tends to be highly politicised, and the judiciary as a whole tends to act as the servant of the government rather than the protector of the rights of the citizen. Hence, the constitutional amendments which enhance the power of the President to appoint the senior members of the judiciary are open to grave criticism. Quoting the report of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the International Association of Judges concluded that the amendments 'would place the independence of the judiciary at serious jeopardy' due to 'the determining influence of the President on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.'⁴⁸

⁴⁷ For the full text of the amendments, see the website of the Turkish Union of Bar Associations (*Barobirlik*), <http://anayasadegisikligi.barobirlik.org.tr/pdf/anayasadegisikligi>.

⁴⁸ Quoted, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 28 March 2017.

The referendum campaign was one-sided

In campaigning for a 'yes' vote in the referendum, the government made full use of its control of the state broadcaster TRT and heavy influence over most of the private broadcasters and newspapers, with *Hürriyet*, owned by the Doğan group, being the only mass-circulation daily to adopt an even-handed approach. There were frequent complaints that the authorities had interfered to prevent 'no' campaign rallies and restrict the movements of opposition leaders, including rebel ex-members of the MHP.⁴⁹ President Erdoğan made no pretence of being neutral, as the constitution requires, and spoke at 'yes' campaign rallies, as well as having his portrait on posters urging a 'yes' vote. By contrast, the CHP held off from over-identification with the 'no' campaign: its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, spoke at 'yes' campaign meetings, but his portrait, or the party's emblem, did not appear on 'no' campaign posters: instead, a smiling photogenic schoolgirl urged a 'no' vote 'for my future' or 'against a one-man regime'. A significant feature of the campaign was that it was fought almost exclusively on the far right of the political spectrum. The CHP could assume that virtually all its supporters would vote 'no', while the AKP could count on a 'yes' vote from its own partisans. The MHP's grass-roots were thus the battle-ground, since their votes could go either way. This almost certainly explained Erdoğan's harsh anti-EU and generally xenophobic rhetoric, reflecting the hard-line nationalist stance of most MHP supporters. On the other side of the argument, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu adopted an unusually harsh nationalist position – urging, for instance, that the government should break off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands for refusing entry to the Foreign Minister.⁵⁰ The votes of Kurdish citizens were also uncertain. The pro-Kurdish HDP strongly supported the 'no' campaign, but many Kurdish voters were alienated from the party by its links to the PKK, and had supported the AKP in the November 2015 elections. Hence, in the latter stages of the campaign, the AKP started to campaign for a 'yes' vote in the Kurdish-inhabited south-east. The problem it faced was that support from both the MHP and Kurdish voters was hard to combine, given the MHP's harsh anti-Kurdish stance. Hence, the more it won over the Kurds, the more it alienated MHP supporters, and vice-versa.⁵¹ The AKP was also evidently disturbed by the expectation that a referendum which it had originally expected to win easily had turned out to be a neck-and-neck race, with the opinion polls in early April predicting a 50-50 result, within the margin of error of 2-4 percentage points.⁵²

The result was close.....

As the initial results of the voting came in during the evening of 16 April, it appeared that the 'yes' camp was well ahead, but its lead then steadily narrowed to finish at 51.4 percent for 'yes' against 49.6 percent for 'no', according to unofficial preliminary returns.⁵³ The turnout rate was reported as 85.3 percent – much higher than could be expected in most European elections. Regional voting patterns were fairly predictable, with the 'no' votes predominating in areas where the opposition CHP and HDP had their main strength – that is, the Thrace, Marmara, Aegean and

⁴⁹ Ibid, 6 April 2017: Ali Bayramoğlu, 'Will Turks give blessing to Erdogan's autocratic course?', *AI Monitor*, 27 March 2017

⁵⁰ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 13 March 2017.

⁵¹ Ibid, 25 March 2017.

⁵² Murat Yetkin, 'The outlook 10 days ahead of Turkey's referendum', *ibid*, 6 April 2017.

⁵³ Detailed preliminary results from *Hürriyet* website, 17 April 2017 (www.hurriyet.com.tr/referandum-2017-sonuclari).

Mediterranean coastal regions, in the case of the CHP and the Kurdish-inhabited south-east in that of the HDP. However, there were some important surprises. In particular, the ‘no’ votes were in the majority in nearly all the big cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Antalya and Adana, although in the previous general elections, held in November 2015, the AKP had been the leading party in all of them but for İzmir. Among cities with a population of over two million, only Bursa and Konya, which are both traditional strongholds of the centre-right, supported the amendments.⁵⁴ It was also noticeable that a number of western and coastal provinces also reported a majority of ‘no’ votes, although the AKP had been the leading party in the same provinces in November 2015.⁵⁵ While the AKP had been the dominant party throughout the Black Sea coast and central Anatolia in 2015, ‘no’ voters were in the lead in the provinces of Zonguldak, Artvin, Ardahan, Bilecik and Eskişehir. An exception to this trend occurred in the Kurdish-inhabited south-east, with ‘yes’ votes in the lead in two provinces which had opted for the HDP in 2015⁵⁶ and the ‘yes’ camp generally reported as being stronger in the region than the AKP’s level of support in 2015. This counter-trend remains to be explained convincingly.

Overall, and outside the south-east, it is fairly clear that the most economically developed and urbanised provinces in the west and coastal districts, with generally higher educational levels, were opposed to the constitutional changes, whereas rural and generally less developed regions stayed loyal to the AKP. This striking cultural-



cum-geographical divide is illustrated in the map, in which provinces where the majority voted ‘no’ are shown in darker shading.

....but was seriously disputed by the opposition

⁵⁴ These calculations are for whole provinces, which in the last two cases include a substantial proportion of voters in country districts, but within the provincial boundaries: it is thus possible that in both cases a majority of urban voters opted for ‘no’.

⁵⁵ That is Yalova, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, Manisa, Uşak, Aydın, Denizli, Muğla, Mersin and Hatay. That is, Muş and Bitlis. See also Rifat Başaran ‘Ruling AKP sees gains over HDP in southeastern provinces’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 April 2017.

⁵⁶ That is, Muş and Bitlis. See also Rifat Başaran ‘Ruling AKP sees gains over HDP in southeastern provinces’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 April 2017. Ibid, 18, 19 April 2017.

The legitimacy of this close result was immediately challenged by the opposition parties on the grounds that the High Election Board (YSK), the supposedly independent judicial body which supervises all elections, had broken its own rules by allowing invalid votes to be counted. Under the electoral law, ballot papers are sealed in envelopes which have to have an official seal to be counted. However, in the course of the count the YSK announced that unsealed ballots could be counted provided they had not been 'brought in from outside' (how this could be established after the event was quite unclear). The complaint against the YSK was that it had broken a clearly stated law, which it had actually applied in a previously contested case in 2014. Accordingly, the CHP applied to the YSK for an annulment of the results. In a decision issued on 19 April the Board refused to do so. In response, the CHP announced that it would appeal against this decision to the Constitutional Court. However, the latter has previously rejected appeals against the YSK on the grounds that it has no jurisdiction on this issue and that the Board's decisions are 'definitive'.⁵⁷ In principle, it is possible that the case could be submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), provided all domestic judicial channels have been exhausted. However, it is not clear whether the ECHR could or would annul the referendum results, and it would almost certainly take a long time before this issue could be decided.

Given this outcome, Selin Sayek Böke, a Deputy Chair of the CHP, announced that the party would 'not recognise' the result of the referendum, and would use 'all democratic means' to oppose it. She implied that this could include boycotting parliament, but the party later announced that it had not adopted this idea.⁵⁸ Large public meetings to mobilise opposition to the constitutional changes could be organised, but the government would probably then organise counter-demonstrations, and would be most unlikely to give in. The risk of public disorder would also arise, although it is doubtful that the CHP would benefit from this.

Preliminary European reactions have been critical, but an effective response is uncertain

International reactions to the referendum have been mixed, with Presidents Trump and Putin both congratulating Tayyip Erdoğan on the result, suggesting that they rate *Realpolitik* above moral or legal issues in this case.⁵⁹ Reactions in Europe outside Russia were more critical or, at best, uncertain. On 17 April observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) who had been sent to Turkey to monitor the referendum reported that it did not meet high democratic standards for two reasons – firstly, that the pre-referendum campaign had not been fought on a level playing field, and second, that the YSK had changed its own rules at the last minute.⁶⁰ On the following day the European Commission called on the Turkish government to investigate the 'alleged irregularities' in the vote count and to seek 'the broadest possible national consensus in the follow up to the referendum', although it seemed unlikely to do either.

Under the 'Negotiating Framework for Turkey' accepted by the European Council and Turkey in 2005 it was agreed that '[I]n the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy and human rights and

⁵⁷ Ibid, 18, 19 April 2017.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 19 April 2017.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 18, 19 April 2017

⁶⁰ Ibid. 18 April 2017

fundamental freedoms and the rule of law', the Commission could, independently or at the request of one third of member states recommend the suspension of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The heads of state and government of the member states, meeting as the European Council, would then decide, by a qualified majority, whether to suspend negotiations.⁶¹ It can be argued that in practice such negotiations are suspended anyway, due to other longstanding issues, but such a decision should have important symbolic value. If the Turkish parliament decided to reintroduce the death penalty, as Tayyip Erdoğan has several times suggested that it should, then it is thought that this formal step could well become inevitable. At the time of writing, however, it was unclear what steps, if any, the Council or individual EU member states, would take.



Update on Cyprus 2016/2017

by Clement Dodd

The period under review began with expressions of hope about the meetings to be held in New York in September 2016 by the two Cypriot leaders with the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, always anxious to see progress in the negotiations going on in Cyprus where they are under the guidance of his Special Representative there, Mr Espen Barth Eide. He was also to be present in New York. These meetings on the Cyprus issue would coincide with a meeting in New York of the UN General Assembly. It was envisaged that later in the year there could be a meeting of the two sides with representatives of the three Guarantor Powers of the 1960 treaties that established the Republic of Cyprus, namely the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece. The primary purpose of this projected five-power meeting would mainly be to address the difficult issue of the need for any international guarantees of a settlement.

In New York President Anastasiades had the opportunity to address the UN General Assembly on the Cyprus issue. He expressed his hope for a speedy solution addressing the Cyprus problem in a statesmanlike way that clearly impressed the UN General Assembly. However, he lunged into a very sensitive issue when he declared that the Greek Cypriot side 'accepted the evolution of the present unitary Cyprus state into a federal one'. For the Turkish Cypriots this is entirely unacceptable, since for them it is a new state that is to be created – and this equally by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Unfortunately President Akinci had no chance to express his views to the UN General Assembly, the TRNC not being a recognised state. Anastasiades also repeated the frequent Greek Cypriot assertion

⁶¹'Negotiating Framework for Turkey' (2005) para.3: text from website of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (www.washingtoninstitute.org/documents).

that the new state would have a single sovereignty, which as a federation it cannot have.

President Akinci was not allowed to address the UN, but he was ably backed by members of the Turkish Cypriot Government in making his views as widely known as he could. He made it abundantly clear that if there should be no solution the Greek Cypriots would have to accept a large Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus for years to come. Eide believed that the negotiations were at a strategic stage, and that the following few months would be extremely important. On the issue of an international guarantee for a settlement the Russian Ambassador accepted that the 1960 guarantor powers had a role but Russia, he said, would never accept a NATO guarantee. In August the Greek Foreign Minister, Nicos Kotzias, had stated that Athens wanted the abolition of the ‘anachronistic system of guarantees, and was not changing his mind’.

Whilst the meetings in New York did not make a great contribution to a settlement of the Cyprus problem, it seems that the ground was prepared, with American and other interlocutors, for finding the finance needed – said to be billions of euros – to compensate Greek Cypriot owners of properties in the TRNC abandoned in 1974. In fact, many Greek Cypriots have already been compensated by the Immovable Property Commission established in the TRNC in 2006. By the end of December 2015 Turkey provided compensation to a total of some £200 millions to those Greek Cypriots who had applied for redress to the Commission. Nothing has been done, however, to recompense the Turkish Cypriots for their loss of property in 1963-64 when, under violent attack by Greek Cypriot forces, many abandoned their homes and land to find shelter in defensible enclaves.⁶² They also abandoned property in 1974 after the Turkish military intervention, when they fled to the newly Turkish occupied North. Greek Cypriot legislation in force prevents Turkish Cypriot owners of property from claiming for the return of their properties, and/or compensation, until after a comprehensive settlement. Much of this property has been greatly modified both for public and private purposes.⁶³

The Mont Pèlerin Meetings



⁶² This violence was intended to oblige the Turkish Cypriots to accept that they were a minority in Cyprus not a junior partner in government as required in the 1960 Constitution. Beginning in 1964, the then wholly Greek Cypriot government unilaterally made laws that greatly refashioned the 1960 Constitution in Greek Cypriot interests, but nevertheless came to be universally recognised, save by Turkey, as the Government of all of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots were treated as a minority, and in consequence began to develop their own governmental institutions.

⁶³ See Ayla Gürel, *Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife*, Report 4, Turkish Cypriot Legal Framework (Nicosia, PRIO, Peace Research Institute, 2012).

Returning from New York Akıncı was anxious to get the negotiations started again and complained that Anastasiades was delaying progress, he allegedly being more satisfied than Akıncı with the status quo. Believing that it was better to negotiate somewhere removed from local Cypriot pressures, the two sides now agreed that the negotiations should take place elsewhere than in Cyprus. They chose Mont Pelèrin in Switzerland, where they then duly met on 7 November 2016 in a meeting opened by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, and then later chaired by his Special Representative, Espeth Barth Eide. The meetings were interrupted for a short period to allow President Anastasiades to return to Cyprus to consult with his supporters and listen to his numerous critics. The meetings in Switzerland resumed on 20 November when, for his part, Akıncı was pressed by the Turkish Cypriot government to secure an agreed date for a projected five-party conference of the two sides with representatives of the 1960 Guarantor Powers, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. It was not until that meeting that the Turkish Cypriot government wanted to have territorial issues discussed and decided. More particularly the Turkish Cypriots wanted *international* guarantees of any settlement, guarantees of the sort that authorised Turkish military intervention in 1974 to prevent the declaration of *enosis* by the leaders of the coup against Makarios. Before guarantees were agreed Akıncı was not to make concessions on territorial and other important issues. Members of the Turkish Cypriot government often accuse him of showing too much 'empathy' in his negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. In his clear desire for a solution Akıncı does, however, have strong support from the socialist political parties, from trade unions, and from many non-governmental organisations. There is indeed a strong wish for a settlement among many Turkish Cypriots, who just want to live in peace with their neighbours, and to be able to enjoy unfettered economic and relations with the rest of the world, relations that are prevented by the international embargoes that they believe are so unfairly placed upon them.

The meetings at Mont Pelèrin made no real progress, though there seemed to be some agreement during the discussions that a division of territory in a solution would probably be in the region of 29 per cent for the proposed Turkish Cypriot federal state, from the present 36 per cent.

The Geneva Conference

The projected Geneva international conference referred to above duly convened on 9 January 2017 and lasted until 12 January. Anastasiades and Akıncı were accompanied by ministers and officials from their governments. The foreign ministers of the Guarantor Powers attended. Meetings between them and the two presidents were chaired by the new UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. During the discussions each side presented a map showing its desired territorial division of the island under a federal solution, but these maps were not made public in order to avoid inevitable, and damaging, discord in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side declared that it could not support any settlement that did not include either an international, or a Turkish, guarantee. The Greek Cypriot side, supported by Greece, utterly opposed such a guarantee, believing, with Eide, that it was unnecessary, and knowing that it would mean having Turkish troops in Cyprus. To this many Greek Cypriots are utterly opposed, though there is a substantial Greek military presence and influence in the South.




There was no really positive outcome of the Geneva Conference. All that was achieved was the appointment of a Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot Working Group of Deputies on Security and Guarantees that was to be composed of ‘technocrats’ from both sides. Their official task was to identify specific questions, and what was needed to address them. According to Anastasiades, however, they were expected to develop new forms of guarantees acceptable to both sides, and radically different from the guarantee system of 1960. Setting up this committee served to show that the conference had achieved something, but it was little more than to kick the Cyprus problem into the long grass. Commenting later on the ‘technocrats’ meeting Akinci stated that the views and positions of the two sides were very different, and that they could not be reconciled at a ‘technocratic’ level since they were essentially political issues.

The Main Issues at Stake

Governance: What then are the main issues at stake in addition to the seemingly incorrigible one of guarantees of any solution? There seems to be broad agreement that the federation to be formed should more or less follow the lines of the 2004 Annan Plan of 2004, a plan the Greek Cypriots rejected in the referendum in 2004. The major problem with two-state federations is whether the two partners should have equal powers in all the federal institutions, or whether, if one state is much larger, it should therefore have some preponderance, as was allowed for in the proposed constitution under the Annan Plan. This is an issue that needs to be considered very carefully with the help of persons really knowledgeable about, and ideally with experience of, federal systems including, for this case, the two-state, or near two-state, constitutions of, say, Belgium and Canada.

This is a problem for the future. For the present an important, indeed crucial, problem is the Turkish Cypriot insistence that in the proposed federation there must be an alternating presidency. Akinci has seemingly indicated that the period of office of a Turkish Cypriot president could be for one year with a Greek Cypriot president serving for two. Not even this satisfies many Greek Cypriots, or so it appears. The Head of the Church in Cyprus, Archbishop Chrysostomos, has declared that a president from the Turkish Cypriot ‘minority’ simply would not be approved by the people. He was reminded by the Turkish Cypriot spokesman that the Joint Declaration of 11 February, 2014, emphasised the political equality of the two sides.



Territory: Another major problem is that of how much territory each federal state would control. There seems to be general agreement that the Turkish Cypriot share of the island could be reduced from 36 per cent to some 29 per cent. However, the Greek Cypriots also want 28 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot coastline, currently 57 per cent of the whole island. They also lay claim to Morphou (Güzelyurt),

the centre of the agriculturally productive north west of Cyprus, and now under Turkish Cypriot control. They also want to have Varosha as part of the Greek Cypriot federal state, as well as all, or some part of, the Karpasian peninsula, a development that Turkey would regard as something of a threat to its southern coast.

Greek Cypriot Refugees: Another serious issue at stake is the possible return to the North of Greek Cypriot owners of property lost in 1974. The Greek Cypriot president has proposed that 100,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from 1974 should be allowed to

return to the North, and that they should be administered there by the Greek Cypriot federal state! Akıncı has suggested that much lower figures of refugees would be more realistic, while the prospect of having many Greek Cypriots among them greatly disturbs the Turkish Cypriots. It is a reminder to them that under a solution within the EU the Greek Cypriots will have as many rights to live and work in the North as they have in the South. The treasured Turkish Cypriot ideals of bi-communality and bi-zonality are not likely to survive. In this regard the wisdom of the Turkish Cypriot government's decision in 2014 to agree to try to establish a federation in Cyprus that would inevitably operate by reference to EU rules is open to question. It is interesting that a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, Yiğit Bulut, has allegedly said, 'The accession of the TRNC to the European Union as part of the solution of the Cyprus problem is tantamount to killing the Turkish Islamic presence in the TRNC, which will be a crime. To avoid this fate the TRNC could become a Turkish province and continue on its way as normal.'⁶⁴

Guarantees of a Settlement: However, most important among the issues at stake is that of an international guarantee of any settlement or, failing that, of a Turkish guarantee. However, neither the Greek Cypriots, nor Greece, want any Turkish troops in Cyprus. Akıncı has warned them in response that if there is no agreement on a federation, there will necessarily continue to be substantial Turkish forces in the North.

In the South Anastasiades is pressed by the small but influential nationalist parties to have Russia engaged in the negotiations. They invited the Russian Ambassador to a conference in Cyprus where the impossibility of a union under the federal framework was under discussion. It has been suggested in the North that Russia does not really want a solution of the Cyprus problem since it would mean the consolidation of the Western defence system in the eastern Mediterranean, and the entry of eastern Mediterranean gas into Europe, which relies largely on Russian sources.

In the TRNC government, whose members form no part of the President's negotiating team despite their protests, there is some feeling that best for the TRNC would be a Taiwan/China sort of arrangement with Turkey – not a solution without its problems. This is the sort of solution perhaps that they have in mind in their frequent references to the possibility of the Plan B should the negotiations fail.

Breakdown of the Negotiations

After the Geneva negotiations the Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister, Tahsin Ertugruloğlu, declared that Geneva had been a fiasco. Nevertheless negotiations continued between the two sides, with Eide envisaging another session of the Geneva process in early March, 2017, claiming that he had recently had a very constructive meeting in Greece with the Greek Foreign Minister, Nicos Kotzias, a result few were expecting. Perhaps there would be a positive outcome, but then suddenly there was a bombshell. On 13 February the Greek Cypriot Representative Assembly voted to have public schools commemorate the day in 1950 (*Enosis* Day) when 96 per cent of the Greek Cypriots voted to join Greece. A nationalist minority party proposed this motion, which the Socialist Party (AKEL) rejected, but on which Anastasiades' party, the Democratic Rally (DISY), abstained, thus allowing the proposal to be accepted. The result was uproar in the TRNC since *enosis* was expressly forbidden in the 1960 treaties. For the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister,

⁶⁴ As reported in the daily newspaper in the TRNC, *Afrika*, 22 November, 2016

Hüseyin Özgürkün, it was a severe blow to the negotiations, highlighting as it did Greek Cypriot determination to make Cyprus a Greek island. To continue the negotiations, he said 'would be a waste of time'. Akıncı called on Anastasiades to have the measure rescinded, and asked Eide to exert pressure on the Greek Cypriot side. Akıncı also demanded a strong reaction to this development from the United Nations. In his view it was not a small matter, as Anastasiades tried to make out. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported Akıncı's demand that the law must be rescinded. Anastasiades claimed that the decision was no more than a reference to historical fact. Its commemoration was essentially not different, he maintained, from the annual Turkish Cypriot celebrations of the anniversary of the 1974 Turkish military intervention, and of the founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Negotiations ended abruptly. When Eide did manage to get the two leaders together one left the room, furiously banging the door, but there is some dispute as to which president it was. For Anastasiades the negotiations were unnecessarily being jeopardised by 'a minor insignificant issue'. He responded to Turkish Cypriot and Turkish outrage by a legislative amendment that passed the power to decide on commemoration in the schools to the Ministry of Education. This did not appease the Turkish Cypriots. They wanted it rejected in the Representative Assembly.

In Turkey the Greek Cypriot decision particularly alarmed and offended the opposition Republican People's Party, the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, always a staunch supporter of the Turkish Cypriots. With the referendum forthcoming in Turkey on the controversial constitutional proposals now made by the government, and opposed by the RPP, the government did not seem less eager than its rivals in its support for the Turkish Cypriots. In the TRNC there were many who attributed Anastasiades' willingness to let the *enosis* measure be agreed to his desire to attract the nationalist vote to himself in the 2018 presidential elections, in which he would be a candidate.

The Future

At the time of writing the negotiations are stalled. The 'guarantees' issue is clearly a major problem. It has been claimed that 85 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots consider that a continued Turkish guarantee, and military presence, in the North are vital if there is to be a settlement of the Cyprus issue.⁶⁵ As this seems to be completely unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots there is a clear danger the negotiations for a federal state could fail on this issue alone.

Should this be the case, the Turkish Government claims that it has a Plan B, but does not say what it is. It is difficult to imagine what sort of plan might be acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. As for the Turkish Cypriots, many really want a Turkish Cypriot state recognised internationally. Could this be achieved against the desire of the nationalists in the South for a Greek Cypriot island in which the Turkish Cypriots would be a minority? Perhaps the Turkish Cypriots could voluntarily offer to reduce their share of Cyprus to some 29 per cent in return for Greek Cypriot recognition of their state, which would entail international recognition for the Turkish Cypriots. This may not seem much, if anything, for the Greek Cypriots, but what is the alternative if the present negotiations fail? They will have to put up for ever with the present division of the island, and will almost certainly find that the TRNC will move ever

⁶⁵ According to Yusuf Kanlı, 'Psychological Disorders', *Turkish Daily News*, 3 February, 2017. No source is given, but Kanlı is a reliable and well-informed Turkish Cypriot commentator on Cypriot affairs.

closer to Turkey, becoming more like a Turkish province (as Akıncı has warned) and that there will be Turkish troops in northern Cyprus permanently. On either side of an intentionally guaranteed border, manned perhaps for some time by UN forces, the two Cypriot states would probably get along quite well, and without the Turkish Cypriots having to expose themselves to the requirements of the EU *acquis*, which they see as threat to the bi-communality and bi-zonality they greatly wish to preserve. It may be time for new solutions for the Cyprus conflict.



Gülen's Balkan Schools – Dilemmas for Balkan governments

by James Pettifer

St Cross College, University of Oxford

Like many other readers of *TAS Review*, I expect, I remember exactly where I was when I first heard news of the coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016. In my case, it was sitting on a beach with my grandchildren on the Ionian island of Levkas, about as far away within Greece from Turkey as it is possible to be. Greeks sitting nearby were very agitated and, as news began to seep through on the television, mostly were firmly hoping the coup would succeed.

It did not and political life gradually 'normalised' but what was certain was that although a Greek island was perhaps as good a place as any to watch events unfold, no one I met there, Greek or foreign tourist, had ever heard of Fetullah Gülen. Yet only a few weeks before I had been standing outside the large Gülen-sponsored school in Ohrid in Macedonia (FYROM/RM)⁶⁶ and watching lines of orderly school-uniformed pupils troop out to go home while I waited for my coach. Over time, travelling in the region, they had become a common sight, with about seven schools operating on Gülenist principles under the 'Yahya Kemal' name there and with real or alleged Gülen societies in a variety of businesses and charitable foundations. In Albania and Bosnia it is the same, with particular influence in education in three secondary schools in Tirana, the capital, and primary schools, a presence in publishing, a newspaper and so on. There are some thirteen Gülen-originated schools in Bosnia, although some claim to be no longer interested in their founding father, and one in Serbia. Similar institutional penetration has occurred in parts of Kosovo. This has been regarded by the government in Ankara as a secret society in action, designed to supplant normal Turkish cultural influences in the western Balkans where Turkish influence has been strong.



The exact nature of education varies from place to place, and some schools seem to be much more directly structured under Gülen's US-based central organisation than others, but they share a commitment to high educational standards, discipline, uniforms and an emphasis on science, computing and technology. As such they appeal to many middle class and ambitious parents who may not, to any significant

⁶⁶ Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/Republic of Macedonia

extent, be interested in Islam or indeed religiously observant. The alumni do naturally form strong networks, targeting influence in the political and social élite and it is impossible, talking to alumni of the Tirana school I know, at least, not to observe a marked resemblance to the modus operandi of the Roman Catholic organisation Opus Dei, where a highly organised minority seeks influence for particular social and cultural objectives.

Following the coup attempt, the Erdoğan government in Ankara has called for the closure of these educational institutions saying – at least via the Anadolu Agency and other mainstream news outlets – that they are ultimately involved in training and sponsoring terrorists or terrorist sympathisers. What has the reaction of governments been?



Different governments have reacted in different ways, significantly affected by their general relationship with Turkey. In Serbia it appears the single Gülenist school is in process of being closed down, a sign perhaps that the Serbian government never really much wanted it in the first place. In Albania, the Rama government has resisted Ankara's call and, although the schools are ostensibly operating normally, there are reports of material directly linked to Gülen, even small pictures of him, being removed from public display, and a kind of 'de-Gülenisation' in progress.. There are solid reports of parents removing pupils in small numbers, reputedly often involving more Islamic families who wonder whether associating their children with a very controversial figure might not be a good long term idea.

In the important 'test case' country of Macedonia all Gülen schools are still operating at a formal level, but it seems that the Gruevski government, with its very close diplomatic relationship with Ankara, was initially willing to close them but was not supported in this by the ethnic Albanian party of Ali Ahmeti, the DUI, in the coalition. The recent bitterly contested elections in Skopje have left the country without a functioning coalition, at the time of writing, and it is uncertain what decision will be taken when a new government is formed. Political analysts see the hand of Washington behind the pressure from Ahmeti's party on this issue, but how far this influence will be decisive in the future is open to doubt. The support both in trade, food supplies and diplomacy that Skopje receives from Ankara has always been central to its survival since independence in 1991 and, if push comes to shove, Ankara has numerous pressure points in Macedonia to use if it wishes. Albanians there are still suffering major political disunity after the debacle of the recent elections.

It is a very difficult issue for western Balkan governments. There are very many people in most of the countries, even Montenegro, who have Turkish elements in their descent and initially the arrival of the Gülen schools on the educational scene was seen as a useful 'moderate' way to encourage a Turkish, or quasi-Turkish, education without allowing potential Islamic extremism, or external Middle East-originated ideologies, into the educational system. Whatever view is taken of the role or non-role of Gülen in the attempted coup, this perspective must be functionally dead. Gülen has brought intense controversy with him and, with the stabilisation of the Erdoğan government and the new Trump administration in the US, many difficult days lie ahead. Balkan governments face many complex issues in working out a

stable relationship with the Trump administration without having the additional factor of Gülenism in the mix. The most hopeful development would perhaps be on the Albanian model – de-Gülenisation at an open level but where schools rebrand themselves more as conventional ‘academies’ – but whether this will happen is impossible to predict. If Gülen himself is extradited from the US at some point to face trial, it is very hard to see many, indeed any, of his educational and business apparatus surviving.

The role of the Vaiz(e) in the management of Syrian refugees in Bursa, north-west Turkey



Tim Jacoby

Global Development Institute,
University of Manchester

Roger Mac Ginty

Humanitarian and Conflict
Response Institute,
University of Manchester



Bülent Şenay

Associate Professor of History
of Religion and Culture at the
Uludağ University, Bursa

Our study intersects the fields of migration studies, identity politics and humanitarianism. By looking at the role of the Turkish state’s Vaiz(e) network, it seeks to get beyond a number of limitations that dominate these literatures. The first is the often-noted emphasis on empirical and positivist analytical approaches which tend to overlook the role of religion in the management of social problems. The second is the propensity to restrict analyses of faith-based organisations to agencies working in the NGO sector. The third is a tendency to deal with faith, the divine or belief in a non-earthly supreme being by shoe-horning it into ready-made categories such as ‘social capital’, ‘fundamentalism’ or the ‘sociology of religion’ which then employs a social scientific vernacular based on terms like ‘faith-based organisations’, ‘belief systems’ and ‘indigenous knowledge’ to explain religious faith and practice.

We aim to go beyond the limitations in the literature and attendant epistemology by:

1. recognising the role of religion in the management of social problems;
2. examining a state-sponsored faith-based organisation rather than an NGO; and
3. emphasising the role of faith and religious belief in responses to social problems.

While our paper contains a specific case study, it connects with a series of wider academic and policy concerns, especially in relation to the interplay between the

secular and the religious. It is worth noting that we do not see these two positions as binaries – strictly separated and always incompatible. Instead, and depending on context, they can be seen as often occupying overlapping political, social and cultural hinterlands. Identifying and separating threads of religiosity and secularism is difficult, with both involved in the co-production of the polity and society. Contemporary Turkey is no exception to this, and these dynamics are often best seen in the *longue durée* whereby different ideas, and societal and state forces, conflict, cooperate, coalesce and hybridise over the longer term.

Context

Funded by the British Academy, our project looks at the changing way that the Vaiz(e) network has responded to the growing presence of Syrian refugees in Bursa, a city of 1.8 million in the north-west of Turkey. Using workshops with key informants, it maps the extent and nature of Vaiz(e) support and addresses wider questions of the interface between faith and state in response to changing social circumstances. Our argument is that in order to understand much religious activity, scholars need to take seriously the ideational content of belief and practice. Our research suggests that the faith aspects of the activities of the Vaiz(e) are crucial in understanding their motivations and practices in dealing with Syrian refugees. A recurring trope in the fieldwork was how faith – a belief in Islam and the worldviews associated with it – shaped structures and activities on the ground. To overlook faith and the divine is thus to miss out an important part of the evidential trail.

Bursa is located in Turkey's wealthy Marmara region. Ottoman capital from 1335 to 1363, it has long been a centre of migration. Although far from the border, it is believed to have received over 50,000 refugees from the civil war in Syria since 2011. Most appear to come from the Aleppo region, with which Bursa has a long history of trade links. A significant minority are said to originate in the Damascus area too. It is difficult to be certain about this and the overall numbers, though, as many remain unregistered with the authorities. The actual total number of Syrians in the city may therefore be much higher than official figures. Those only in receipt of informal assistance and/or working in the grey economy are especially difficult to access. As a result, little is known about their lives. Many only come to the attention of statutory bodies when they approach neighbourhood mosques for help. Since all places of worship are managed by the Turkish state, they are typically passed onto officials employed by Directorate for Religious Affairs (the Diyanet).



At the city level, this means the Muftiate and its team of Vaiz/Vaize (male/female). Derived from the Arabic term, واعظ, typically translated as “preacher”, their social role is actually much wider and more difficult to define. They have their roots in the creation of the Diyanet in 1924 following the abolition of both the Ottoman Ministry of Religious Affairs and the pious foundations. Staffed with clerics who had backed the war of independence (many had sided with the incumbent Ottoman government functioning under occupation), it contained large numbers of voluntary positions encompassing a broad range of social roles. These gradually became professionalised and then, more recently, closely associated with



university training through the parallel development of divinity faculties as the key replacement to Ottoman religious training systems.

The Vaiz(e) is one such position, amounting to about 4,000 of the 120,000 staff currently employed by the Diyanet. Frequently holding graduate degrees and enjoying high levels of social authority, their role is fourfold: (1) presenting talks on various aspect of Islam within mosques and the community (2) leading educational events and cultural activities associated with Islam – festivals, summer camps, conferences etc (3) offering legal opinions (*fatawa*) as the Mufti's representative (the most senior Vaize increasingly serves as his deputy) and (4) working with individuals, families and organisations to resolve local conflicts and promote Islamic values. Since the election of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 2002, and especially during the 2003-2010 period when Ali Bardakoğlu led the Diyanet, these endeavours have both developed considerably and begun to include greater numbers of women – to a point where Vaize almost equal the number of Vaiz nationwide.

While this administrative layer of the Turkish state is commonly referred to, there are very few studies of how it operates in practice.⁶⁷ There are no English language studies of Bursa's Vaiz(e) and no studies at all of how it relates to the city's burgeoning Syrian minority. Our project is thus important in both extending our understanding of urban support networks in Turkey and as a case study of the role of religious agents in social tasks more broadly. We worked with Professor Mehmet Emin Ay, Mufti of Bursa, his Vice-Mufti, Sedanur Sezen, and their team of approximately 100 Vaiz(e) from Spring 2015 onwards. We focussed on accessing the six head-Vaiz(e) and 20 senior-Vaiz(e) who play the largest role in developing the Muftiate's social policy, as well as those officials working in the city's Yavuz Selim, Görsü and Çarşamba neighbourhoods, where the numbers of Syrians are believed to be greatest. Through interviews and workshops, we heard how the presence of the Syrian refugees both affected their work and, inversely, how they were able to have an impact of the newcomers' lives.

Our initial findings suggest that, first and foremost, faith matters. Islamic notions of assistance appear to prefigure all other initiatives. Scholars have put forward multiple ethical reasons for extending assistance to refugees: from security oriented self-interest, to social contract theory, utilitarianism and liberal universalism.⁶⁸ In the case of our research in Bursa, interviewees stressed a religious motivation. The Vaiz(e) were unanimous in emphasising the ethical obligations that all Muslims have in assisting refugees, especially one's neighbours.⁶⁹ The Prophet, himself, was a refugee – forced to flee persecution in Mecca for the sanctuary of Yathrib (later renamed Medina) in 622. Those that helped him, known as the Ansar, are especially blessed. Then as now, religious orientation is unimportant. The Vaiz(e) pointed out that, since Yathrib was a largely Jewish town, there should be no differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslim Syrians.

To keep this in the mind, the Vaiz(e) we spoke to most preferred the term *muhacir* to the contemporary Turkish word, *mülteci*; the former having both religious resonance

⁶⁷ Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (2016) Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663.

⁶⁸ Christina Boswell, *The ethics of refugee policy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

⁶⁹ "None of you [truly] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself." Number 13 of Imam Al-Nawawi's *Forty Hadiths*.

and, in emphasising migration over refuge, fewer connotations of need. Referring to Bursa's Syrians as *émigrés* also better captures the socio-economic spread of recent arrivals – some, particularly those that left nearer to the start of the civil war, are very wealthy and have made substantial investments in Bursa's economy. Here, the Vaiz(e) have attempted to play down the widespread idea that Turks are alleviating a temporary problem that will soon go away. Many – perhaps most – they point out, probably will never return to Syria. Both the Mufti and the Vaiz(e) have repeatedly emphasised that they would like the Syrians to stay in Turkey as long as they wish. Turkey therefore needs to get used to the idea that there will be a large, and rapidly growing, Syrian minority within the country in perpetuity.

As such, the Vaiz(e) have concentrated on combining basic assistance initiatives with longer-term efforts aimed at integration. Deploying a religious discourse to encourage local companies to distribute free bread or worshippers to donate money (single Friday collections at the larger mosques regularly raise in excess of 300,000 Turkish lira they report)⁷⁰ has thus operated alongside a successful campaign to pressure the statutory authorities into issuing foreign guest identification cards that allow Syrians to access community health centres, schools, social services and so on. This has helped both to bring working Syrians into the formal sector (perhaps most notably by registering the small businesses that a great many had established on arrival) and to find employment for out-of-work Syrians. Here, a widespread reputation for excellence in joinery has assisted many in accessing Bursa's furniture factories. The Mufti's office has also helped to deal with the significant problem of Syrians seeking to get married, but unable to provide the appropriate paperwork, by circumventing the normal procedures over certificates of no impediment, birth certificates and so on. To these ends, the Vaiz(e) have joined a city-wide association of around 60 local NGOs operating together – despite widely differing approaches to the public place of religion, local issues and party politics – to assist Syrian refugees. Supervised jointly by the Mufti, the regional governor and the city council, the aim is to offer a more joined up approach to the practical difficulties of immigrant life.

Indeed, for the Vaiz(e), the large number of Syrian-Turkish relationships that have developed in recent years are, while to be welcomed as the basis of long-term integration, not unproblematic. Although the Vaiz were agreed that marriage could help the large numbers of young (and sometimes traumatised) Syrian men arriving in the city to take a fuller part in Turkish society, some of the Vaize pointed out that Syrian women's reputation for beauty and domestic management have prompted issues of jealousy amongst local women. This has added to anti-Syrian prejudice, especially where some Turkish men have taken Syrian women as second wives without the permission of the first wife, occasionally seeking to justify this on the grounds of Islam or humanitarianism. The Vaiz(e) reported that they have tried to challenge such practices and spend much of their time emphasising the Islamic values of tolerance, open debate and legal process.

They also reflected on the tension between integrating Syrians into Turkish life while also seeking to preserve their own cultural orientation. The Muftiate's consistent promotion of the Turkish language (especially to older arrivals who are struggling to pick this up) is thus placed alongside the obligation for all believers to learn Arabic in order to access key religious texts. In this view, Turks' inability to communicate with Syrians is thus their own shortcoming. This encouragement of Arabic is seen as a

⁷⁰ Equivalent to €76,000 or \$81,000 on 7 February 2017.

way of alleviating the problem of Syrians not being able to understand much of what takes place within Diyanet mosques. As such, the Mufti reported that he had rejected Syrian requests to hold separate prayers on the grounds of divisiveness, but had donated a building to the Syrians for their informal use. A similar balance is apparent in the sponsorship of youth events. Joint activities for Turkish and Syrian children and young people remain the preferred policy, but are organised together with an annual nationwide summer camp specifically for young Syrians. Hosted collaboratively by the Youth and Sports Ministries in the town of Kırşehir, it attracted over 400 attendees and included Vaiz(e) from Bursa who assisted with lessons, prayer leadership and so on.

In many cases across Turkey, permission has been granted for Syrians to establish their own schools and to teach in Arabic – thereby taking advantage of EU harmonisation legislation principally directed at the country's Kurdish-speaking community which permits education in minority languages. According to our research (facilitated by Arabic literate, local teacher Gülsen Sufracı), there are around 30 of these currently operating in Bursa. Most are small and informal, but three – *Risalet*, *Fecr Ikra* and *Mühabbet* – are relatively large with several hundred pupils in each. A full curriculum is taught with a particular emphasis on Turkish language. The objective is to gain entry into the mainstream education system, with many students going on to Imam-Hatip schools. Mainly serving the estimated 4,000 or so Syrian children not enrolled at one of Bursa's state schools, they are registered as NGOs and co-operate closely with similar establishments in Reyhanlı, Antep, Kilis, Mersin and Istanbul. Unlike in these other cities, though, Bursa's provincial governor has refused to grant official status to Syrian schools, preferring instead to promote the merits of combined education. As a result, these schools cannot host public exams, are forced to seek funding from overseas (notably the Bahraini humanitarian organisation, *Jasad Wahed*) and must send their students to be assessed in Istanbul.



Bursa Merkez Anadolu İmam Hatip Lisesi

Opinion within Bursa's Vaiz(e) appears to be divided on the issue of separate or combined schools, with some worrying about the social effects of offering official recognition to separate schools and others pointing out the practical difficulty of including (especially older) Syrian children in mainstream classes that they cannot understand and may not be able to learn in time to graduate and get good jobs. There was, however, a general acknowledgement of the fact that many Syrians fear registration as they think this could lead to them being sent back or as a means for one of the conflict protagonists to find them. Some Vaiz(e) spoke of a greater need to recognise the broader political context to their presence in Bursa, as well as perhaps a degree of political organisation – both in terms of Assad's agents and Syrian opposition – operating within the city.

The key response to these difficulties from the Muftiate has been the establishment of Arabic medium courses. Using their Arabic language skills (a common – but not entirely universal – aspect of university divinity programmes), the Vaiz(e) have interviewed voluntary teachers and supported them with training. This allows Syrians

to teach themselves in the Arabic language – while of course concentrating on Turkish language training too. The content of these interviews and assessments focus on fairly standard aspects of religious knowledge, but include subtle questions designed to uncover what they described as “salafi” tendencies. None has been found thus far, but if discovered, it would, the Vaiz(e) reported, be a criterion for rejection.

In conclusion, the Vaiz(e) acknowledge that they have been accused of not doing enough for the Syrians. It is certainly true that their capacity to help has been limited by a lack of budgetary allocation to support them. In other words, any specific support has been in addition to their existing duties and responsibilities, without additional central funding. They are also limited by the fact that they do not all have sufficient training in Arabic. Despite these institutional constraints, though, they were keen to stress that, personally, every Vaiz(e) is doing their utmost to help. They see this as part of their responsibility as Muslim leaders in the tradition of the Medinan Ansar. For the future, they understand that the vast majority of Bursa’s Syrians are not going home, at least in the short to medium term. They accept that Turkey has to adapt to accommodate this reality and that that change is slow and difficult. While generally proud of Turkish people’s response to the crisis, they continue to worry about anti-Syrian sentiment and are concerned that a change in government might result in a less brotherly (and perhaps less Islamic) approach from the state authorities.

The key points of this paper have been to sketch the work of a religious organisation in dealing with refugees and migrants, and to underscore the religious motivation in this work. This last point, we would argue, is often overlooked in many analyses of the work of religious organisations in relation to social problems. Our research suggests that faith matters in eliciting a response, and in shaping the nature and extent of that response. This challenges many other analyses that tend to overlook or minimise the role of religious belief, and stay in a social science comfort zone in order to seek to rationalise beliefs that rely on notions of the divine.

Noteworthy Events

by Ayşe Furlonger

LECTURES

Oliver Gurney Memorial Lecture - Sacred Landscapes and Alalakh

‘Sacred Landscapes and Alalakh as Hittite Cult Center: Tell Atchana Excavations’

Date and time: 18 May 2017 18:30 to 20:30

Venue: British Academy Lecture Hall 10 Carlton House Terrace London SW1Y 5AH

More information: £10 (Free to BIAA members)

To book visit: www.biaa.ac.uk/events or call 020 7969 5204



Speaker: Professor Dr. K. Aslihan Yener (University of Chicago & Koç University)

Tell Atchana, (ancient Alalakh), is well placed to contribute to the topic of ritual landscapes, notably new cults and their associated rituals in the international Late Bronze Age, when many foreign contacts and foreign overlords such as the Hittites affected local society. This lecture will focus on newly excavated contexts and dating, sacred architecture, new seals, and burial practices.

LSE Public Lecture Series 2016-17: 'Anthropology of Turkey and Beyond'

This interdisciplinary lecture series hosts academics invested in anthropological debates and/or ethnographic fieldwork on Turkey and connected geographies. The goal is critical analysis of culture, religion, and politics in Turkey, among Turkey's diasporic populations and across other relevant regions. Speakers are expected to address aspects of past, present and future complexities of contemporary Turkey, revealing connections between different life practices and processes in different spaces and times-

For more information: www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/ContemporaryTurkishStudies/Public-lecture-series-2016-17

Lecture title: 'The Sultan is Back: The Politics of Sacred Places and Remaking Muslim Lives in Post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina'

Date and time: 17 May 2017 - 6.30-8pm

Venue: LSE, Room 1.11, Cowdray House, 6 Portugal Street, London, WC2A 2HT
Admission is free, open to all, and on a first-come-first-served basis.

Speaker: Dr David Henig (University of Kent)

Chair: Professor Esra Özyürek, (LSE Chair for Contemporary Turkish Studies)

Dr David Henig is a social anthropologist trained at Durham University before joining the University at Kent as Lecturer in Social Anthropology. He also taught at SOAS. His interests include the dynamics of global political economy, transnational religious movements, the social life of imperial formations, and religious, political and economic cosmologies. He has carried out extensive fieldwork in the post-Ottoman frontier regions of the Muslim Balkans and the Caucasus and also along the Sino-Persian frontiers around the Pamirian knot. Dr Henig's most recent interest centres on linking anthropology with global transnational history and diplomacy, comparative imperialism, international relations, and geopolitics.

SOAS History Department

Lecture title: 'An Unexceptional Governmental Tool: The State of Emergency in the Late Ottoman Cities'

Date and time: 22 May 2017 – 5.10-6.30 pm

Venue: SOAS, Brunei Gallery (B104)

Speaker: Dr Noémi Levy-Aksu (Birkbeck, University of London)

Introduced into the Ottoman system by the 1878 constitution, the state of emergency (*idare-i örfiyye*) was applied in various localities for different lengths of time under the rule of Abdülhamid II, most often in the absence of war or major disorders. This

paper explores the political and social consequences of the measure in Ottoman cities, with a special focus on the Balkan provinces.

LSE

Lecture title: TBC

Date and time: Wednesday, 31 May 2017 - 6.30-8pm

Venue: LSE, Room 1.11, Cowdray House, 6 Portugal Street, LSE.

Admission is free, open to all, and on a first-come-first-served basis.

Speaker: Dr Başak Ertür (Birkbeck, University of London)

Chair: Professor Esra Özyürek (LSE Chair for Contemporary Turkish Studies)

Dr Başak Ertür is Lecturer at the School of Law at Birkbeck. She has a Birkbeck Ph.D. (2015) and an MA from Durham University and is currently a fellow at the Center for the Study of Social Difference at Columbia University. Başak has previously worked as an editor, translator and interpreter and on several projects for Amnesty International and International PEN as campaigner and consultant.

CONFERENCES

Travellers in Ottoman Lands: The Botanical Legacy

Date: 13-14 May 2017

Venue: Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh

For more information: www.cmep.org.uk/call-for-papers-travellers-in-ottoman-lands-the-botanical-legacy/

Enquiries should be addressed to ottomanlandsastene@gmail.com

This two-day seminar will be presented by the Association for the Study of Travel in Egypt and the Near East (ASTENE) in conjunction with the Centre for Middle Eastern Plants, part of the Royal Botanic Garden. Among the themes to be covered will be

- Travellers' accounts of the botanical legacy of the former Ottoman Empire (e.g. present-day Turkey, the Levant, Egypt, the Balkans, Arabian Peninsula, etc.)
- The flora of the region, including their heritage, preservation and medicinal uses
- Bulbs of the region, especially tulips, and their cultural significance; Tulipomania
- Ottoman garden design and architecture
- Floral and related motifs in Ottoman art, including textiles, ceramics, etc.
- Culinary aspects of the botanical legacy of the region
- Literary, pictorial and photographic depictions of the botanical and horticultural legacy of the region.

BRISMES Conference 2017

Movement and Migration in the Middle East: People and Ideas in Flux

Date: 5-7 July 2017

Venue: The University of Edinburgh, IMES 19 George Square, Edinburgh

For more information: www.brismes.ac.uk/conference

In collaboration with Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Edinburgh, the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies' 2017 Annual Conference will be on the theme of 'Movement and Migration in the Middle East: People and Ideas in Flux'. This conference will provide a forum for informed discussion, including insights into the historical background, current context, as well as the challenges posed by the present situation and possible future directions. BRISMES 2017 will feature plenary sessions with Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, Iraq Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Edinburgh, and Laurie A. Brand, Robert Grandford Wright Professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at the University of Southern California. Turkey has been well represented in BRISMES since the Society was established in the early 1970s.

SUMMER SCHOOL

The Middle East in Global Politics

Date: 3 - 21 July 2017

Venue: SOAS, University of London

Application Deadline: 24 May 2017

Further information on Course Structure, Content and Learning Outcomes, entry requirements and how to apply can be found: www.soas.ac.uk/summerschool/subjects/politics/the-middle-east-in-global-politics/

Co-convenors: Reem Abou-El-Fadl & David Wearing: SOAS, University of London

This course aims to place the modern Middle East in its international context, exploring histories of empire and decolonisation, hegemony and resistance, conflict and cooperation, as well as identity and foreign policy. The programme begins with an exploration of the historical phases of interaction between Middle East states and the international system, divided into the colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War periods. International relations theory is introduced at intervals in the first two weeks with key themes, such as transnationalism, political economy, globalisation, conflict and cooperation, foreign policy and identity, including analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arabism and Islamism.

MUSIC

Talent Unlimited Recitals:

Dates and time: monthly July to November 2017 at 1.00 pm and on 30 November at 7 pm.

Venue: St James's Church, Piccadilly, London.

Free recitals:

17 July 2017: Francina Moll Salord and Margalida Moll Salord, violin and piano

14 August 2017: Alexi Musnitsky & AyşeDeniz Gökçin, piano

22 September 2017: Asagi_Nakata, piano

30 November 2017: Erzhan Kulibaev, violin (In memory of Aidan Woodcock)

45th Istanbul Music Festival

Date: 29 May – 21 June 2017

For more information: www.muzik.iksv.org



This year's Festival, organised by the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (IKSV), is taking the idea of the 'unusual' (Sıradışı) as its theme. While classical music is still the focus, the programme will also feature interdisciplinary and multimedia works, and performances that reconnect different periods and genres. In order to provide a broader audience with new insights into Istanbul, the festival will also offer free concerts. The event will host over 600 local and international artists, including the Russian Chamber Philharmonic St. Petersburg, Vienna Chamber Orchestra, London Chamber Orchestra and Ebene Quartet, remarkable soloists such as Hüseyin Sermet, Fazıl Say, Alina Pogostkina and Mathias Goerne, as well as young generation artists. The event will take the audience on a musical journey through fifteen locations in Istanbul including historic Yeniköy where the Küd Dipo Surp Asdvadzadzin Armenian Church, built in 1760, is still active; the Sait Halim Pasha Mansion with its elegant 19th century architecture; the Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church, which was reopened in 2010 after many years; and the Yeniköy Panayia Greek Orthodox Church, as well as the Austrian Culture Forum.

BOOK LAUNCHES

Venue: Asia House, 63 New Cavendish Street, London, W1G 7LP, 0207 307 5454

Further information: enquiries@asiahouse.co.uk

Date: 11 May, 2017; 18.45-20.00

Elif Shafak: *The Forty Rules of Love: A Novel of Rumi*

Details: <http://asiahouse.org/events/a-room-for-rumi>

Date: 17 May, 2017; 18.45-20.00

Ece Temelkuran: *Women Who Blow on Knots*

Details: <http://asiahouse.org/events/odyssey-across-middle-east>

POETRY

Cypriot Poets: Transcending Conflict

Date: 3 May 2017

Venue: National Poetry Library, Level 5, Blue side, Royal Festival Hall

For more information: www.southbankcentre.co.uk/whats-on/121732-cypriot-poets-transcending-conflict-2017

This event is free however please e-mail specialedition@poetrylibrary.org.uk to reserve your place.

In this poetry talk and reading, five Cypriot poets explore the power of words in bridging the divides of Cyprus. Since the border opening of 2003, Cypriot poets have been reaching across and writing about the divisions. This has brought new possibilities for collaboration and understanding between writers who share a common history. Five Cypriot poets present the stories of these divided communities, reading their poetry and answering questions in a Q&A session.

EXHIBITION

Feyhaman Duran: Between Two Worlds

Date: 12 January – 30 July 2017

Venue: Sakıp Sabancı Museum, Sakıp Sabancı Cad 42, Emirgan 34467 Istanbul



The Sabancı University Sakıp Sabancı Museum's latest exhibition *Feyhaman Duran – Between Two Worlds* presents the artist's technique reflecting the country's transformation from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic. The exhibition shows the influences that shaped the art of Duran, who left an empire on the brink of collapse to arrive at the home of art in Paris and returned to a country in revolutionary transformation. Duran, greatly influenced by impressionist movement during his Parisian education, carried his canvas to various spots across the city just to sit back and paint. His landscapes of Süleymaniye, Bosphorus and Istanbul's islands provide a comprehensive glimpse of the city's history. His work in the province of Gaziantep, as part of the Republican People's Party's (CHP) Nationwide Journeys, documents the ideological structure of the era. Throughout his artistic life, Duran articulated his inner experience of amalgamating the East and the West through his paintings. Due to the demand for portraits in the early Republican years, he has been mostly known for his work in this style but he was equally proficient in other styles such as still-lives and landscapes. In addition to his portraits, the nudes he painted in Paris, landscapes in various regions and still-lives where he used Ottoman calligraphy as objects are included in the exhibition. Also on show are the samples of 19th century Ottoman calligraphy understood to have been left to his wife Güzin Duran by her grandfather, the famous calligrapher Yahya Hilmi Efendi. The portraits, which form a substantial part of the exhibition, are presented with short biographies of the subjects. Some parts of the Beyazıt home the artist shared with his wife Güzin figure in the museum showing the daily life and the studio of the artist. It is the first time Feyhaman Duran, whose work and life show how deeply he was attached to tradition, is the subject of such a comprehensive exhibition.

ARCHAEOLOGY

Rock tombs of Turkey's Şanlıurfa to open to tourism

Rock tombs nearly 2,000 years old, which have been unearthed in caves in the south eastern province of Şanlıurfa, are to be opened to tourists after excavations are completed. The caves were unearthed during restoration and environmental arrangement works in the city's Kale Eteği and Kızılkoyun districts, where shanty houses had been previously built. Inside the uncovered caves a total of 133 rock tombs were found; 72 caves in the Kale Eteği district and 61 in Kızılkoyun. These rock tombs date back to the 1st century AD, from the era of Edessa King Abgar. Four floor mosaics and a number of figures were also found.





THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO TURKEY 1798-1802⁷¹

by Malcolm Wagstaff,
Emeritus Professor of the
University of Southampton

Part 2⁷²

After two days' rest, partly forced by a lack of horses and camels, the travellers rode to Nicosia. Here a letter from Lacy, now at Larnaca, told Koehler that Spencer Smith was at the port and that a convention had been concluded with the French allowing them to leave Egypt. Letters from Smith confirmed the news next day. Koehler took his men down to Larnaca where they went aboard Smith's 80-gun ship, HMS *Tigre*. There they found Buonaparte's aide-de-camp, with his wife and other French officers. They had been captured escaping from Egypt. Smith explained how he had mediated between the French and the Turks to bring about the peace. Koehler was in a quandary. Should he go to Alexandria with the *Tigre* and link up with the Grand Vizier from there or should he go direct to Palestine? In the end he decided to send a *Tatar* and seek the Grand Vizier's views. As there was no reply after several weeks of waiting, Koehler decided to return to Istanbul.

Koehler took the party back to Kyrenia where they found the port crowded with Ottoman troops returning from the war. They were able to find a ship to take them across to the mainland. It was a stormy passage – everybody was desperately seasick. Eventually, the vessel got to Alaya (Alanya). Leake was ill with jaundice. He was left behind with a servant while Koehler and two of his party rode back to Istanbul. Leake was fit enough to travel towards the end of April or the beginning of May and he started to make his way back to the Ottoman capital. It seems to have been a leisurely journey, largely by sea but with stops at various places on the way and even excursions inland. Leake was back in Istanbul by the end of June/beginning of July only to find that the Military Mission was no longer there. He met William Richard Hamilton, another of Elgin's secretaries, who had recently arrived from Italy where he had recruited artists and musicians for the ambassador. The two men almost certainly knew each other already. Hamilton told Leake that Smith's convention had been repudiated by both the British and Ottoman

⁷¹ **Principal Sources:**

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⁷² Part 1 in *TAS Review* 28, pp. 41-45



The view from the seaward of Alaya/ Alanya where Leake convalesced after the Mission had been in Cyprus and he was suffering from jaundice.

Drawing is by W.H. Bartlett

governments. The war was on again and the Mission had transferred to Palestine where the Ottoman army was reassembling for an attack on Egypt. In fact, the *New Adventure* had sailed from Istanbul on 13 June and had anchored off Jaffa on 2 July.

The British troops set up camp amidst orchards to the east of the town. Its orderly disposition contrasted with the sprawling dispositions of the Turkish troops and the filth around their tents, though the foreigners were impressed not only by the number of tented cook shops and cafes, but also by the flaming cressets which illuminated the camp at night. Koehler was not impressed by the quality of

most of the troops – ‘a complete mob’ – and feared they would be no match for the seasoned French army. The Ottoman artillery though was ‘really good and regular’. Koehler persuaded the Grand Vizier to hold field days in the hope of melding the Turkish troops into an effective fighting force and insisted on twice daily drill for his own troops. In July and August most of the Mission were ‘generally sickly’. Plague took one of the artificers at the beginning of December. Within the month, Mrs Koehler and then her husband died from ‘a malignant fever’. Major Holloway took command. Reports and rumours of French military activity kept arriving in the camp but they were often discounted. One report in November, though, seemed particularly alarming. The French appeared to be in motion and advancing northwards along the Mediterranean coast road. Leake was sent off with a group mounted on *hedgins* (racing camels) to reconnoiter on 20 November. He reached El-Arish on the Egyptian frontier, but was back in four days. The French had simply been probing north and had then withdrawn, taking stolen camels with them.

For its part, the Ottoman army appeared reluctant to advance against the enemy. The Grand Vizier seemed to be dragging his feet, not even planning a future campaign or defining an objective. The British were slow to realize that, in reality, he was playing a delicate game of political survival. Rivals in Istanbul were intriguing against him. Locally some of the mamluks who had survived the French onslaught in Egypt pursued their own petty agendas. The janissaries in his army could not bear association with the gunners of the *Nizam-i Cedid*. Most serious of all, the local governor, Cezzar Ahmet Paşa, was openly hostile to the Vizier. He had been appointed military commander of Egypt in 1798, presumably in the hope that he would recover the lost province. Cezzar had trained as a mamluk and had an unrivalled knowledge of the country. Moreover, he had stopped the Buonaparte’s advance into Palestine, with some assistance at the siege of Acre from Sidney Smith’s squadron. The paşa was piqued that the Grand Vizier had taken command of the Ottoman Army. In the end, Kör Yusuf Ziyauddin Paşa, ’s hand was forced.

The Advance into Egypt and the End of the Military Mission

The British cabinet reviewed the geopolitical situation in Europe and the Mediterranean during September. It concluded that the only way to strike against France was to drive its army out of Egypt. Henry Dundas, Secretary for War, set a plan for a tripartite attack before his colleagues. An Indian Army would seize the Red Sea ports, while a British expeditionary force would attack through the Delta and the Turkish army would strike through the Sinai Peninsula. The Grand Vizier was

persuaded to cooperate when he learned that the British force had arrived at Marmaris, on the south-west corner of Anatolia. But he had to wait until the end of Ramadan to advance. The first detachments moved off on 21 February 1801. More troops followed on 23rd and then the mass of the army, including the British contingent, two days later. They paused at Gaza. News came on 21 March that the British army had landed at Aboukir. This was the sign the Grand Vizier required. His advance guard of 3,000 mounted Albanians and 60 Turkish gunners moved off on the following day, accompanied by a British detachment commanded by Leake. Tahir Paşa was in command. Tremendous sand storms hit them. Water ran low. The guns kept getting stuck. Men dropped out. But the French had abandoned the frontier posts and fallen back. The Ottoman advance guard reached the north-eastern branch of the Nile and by the beginning of May it had arrived at Belbeis, described as largely ruined. Here they were joined by the second division of the army under the command of Kavaklı Ali Bey, the future Muhammad Ali Paşa and viceroy of Egypt. Lacy accompanied him and immediately set about entrenching the camp. The rest of the army arrived on 11 May. Four days later the Grand Vizier received reports that a considerable French force had marched from Cairo towards them. As the light faded on 15 May 1801, Tahir Paşa's division, accompanied by Leake and British guns, was ordered to locate the enemy and attack in the dark, if possible. Although contact was made, battle did not ensue until the morning. The resulting 'prolonged and desultory skirmish' of El-Hanka resulted in the French withdrawing to Cairo. Leake's guns had been in action against the French squares.

Within a few days, the Ottoman and British armies joined up. By 21 June 1801 Cairo was completely invested by allied forces. The following day a French officer came out with flag of truce. Negotiations began and on 27 June a capitulation was agreed, its terms not very different from those negotiated by Sidney Smith. On 11 July, the Military Mission marched through the quiet streets of the city to the premises recently occupied by the *Institut d'Egypte*. It was a semi-rural area where the substantial houses of leading mamluks mixed with the humble dwellings of peasants, workmen and the *demi-monde*. The Military Mission's work was now over. Its members were withdrawn with the majority of the British expeditionary force as they escorted the remnant of the French army to Alexandria for repatriation. Here Leake may have assisted his friend, Hamilton, in securing the Rosetta stone. The two of them were sent subsequently on special missions. The first was to Upper Egypt to negotiate with mamluks who had escaped the French. On the way there and back Leake collected information which formed the basis of his later map of Egypt, much used by archaeologists and others as an alternative to the French map. The friends' second special mission was to Syria. Ostensibly, they were there to buy horses, but the real purpose is obscure. Leake and Hamilton returned to Britain via Athens. They escaped shipwreck on Kythera when the ship carrying some of Elgin's marbles foundered. Hamilton remained to rescue the sculptures using Greek sponge divers. Leake travelled home through northern Italy and France. His arrival back in London late in 1802 marked the final end of the British Military Mission to Turkey.



ATTILĀ İLHAN

(1925-2005)



Turkish poet, Novelist, Essayist and Newspaper Columnist

Attilâ İlhan can be described as a true son of the modern Turkish republic with a deeply inquiring mind that made him both an admirer and a critic of the new society.

He was born in Menemen where his father was a district official. Menemen was near the beautiful, cultural Aegean city of Izmir with a past going back to ancient times. İlhan attended the public schools in the Izmir area. At age sixteen he had the unfortunate experience of being arrested for leftist activities as a communist and the three months in jail which he spent with hardened criminals affected him deeply. He was also taken to Manisa mental hospital for examination. These experiences were painful but his ability to write poems was not diminished and he was already a published poet at the age of sixteen. Moving to Istanbul gave him a wider milieu of literary experiences and opportunity to meet many writers and poets in the cafés they frequented. In the 1950s and 1960s he went to Paris and stayed there for some periods of time, gaining a new perspective in relation to attitudes about political and sexual behaviour, as well as a deeper knowledge of French literature. He was fascinated by the different types of men and women he encountered in the night life of Paris. They became the subjects of many of the poems he wrote in this period. He also wrote poems about his travels, giving vivid impressions of places and people he met abroad.

A prolific writer, İlhan published several volumes of poetry⁷³, plus novels and essays. His deep involvement in the transformation of Turkey into a modern republic after the national struggle (1919-1922) was the main theme of many of his books of essays. He was deeply concerned about the changes of values in a new society. Some of his books of essays are titled *Which Sex*, *Which West*, and *Which Literature*, giving an idea of his concerns about accepting some Western values without critical evaluation. He had a very strong patriotic side and was a great admirer of “Gazi Mustafa Kemal” (Atatürk) and wrote a poem with the title ‘mustafa kemal’. (*sisler bulvarı* (foggy boulevard), 1970, pp. 138-139).

İlhan explained his philosophy and ideas about art and literature in his essays and in many interviews, including one to *Cumhuriyet Kitap* (‘Book Review’, October 28, 2000) which sums up his ideas and beliefs. In that interview he defined himself as a Marxist but he was a libertarian socialist. He had well defined ideas about the development of the new Turkish literature and was critical of some modernistic movements such as the Garip poetry group founded by Orhan Veli, Cevdet Anday

⁷³ Two of Attilâ İlhan’s poems are reproduced here in translations by Nilüfer Mezanoğlu Reddy: ‘time for work’ is from *duvar*, 1948, Bilgi Yayınları, pp.78-79 and ‘teatime in emirgân’ is from *belâ çiçeği*, 1962, pp.65-66. **NB: From about 1948 Attilâ İlhan chose generally not to use upper case letters.**


and Oktay Rifat. His main criticism against Garip was their exclusion of lyricism and images in their poetry. İlhan was also interested in a new synthesis that did not exclude the literature of the Ottoman past and gave a feeling of classical poetry in a new social context.

An outstanding contributor to modern Turkish literature in the twentieth century, Attila İlhan was also an innovator in the use of Turkish language, with an impressively deep and wide vocabulary including Ottoman Turkish as well as folkloric elements. He was a poet following the tradition of poets deeply involved in the search for freedom and fighting tyranny like Namık Kemal (1840-1888), Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915) and Nazim Hikmet (1902-1963). Nazim Hikmet commented on Attila İlhan's poetry by saying that "*duvar* made me feel very happy. İlhan is a very noble and sincere poet."

Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy

time for work

my sibling we have a song we sing together
 it is sparkling like happiness deep like hope
 in the evenings when we get together at the same table
 it is remembered right away with no trouble
 "you're like the rising sun in the dark seas"
 on our table wine cheese bread and grapes
 dead in their graves god in the sky all forgotten
 the place becomes alive like in a dream
 why should my poems sing of sorrows
 I too know how to write a love poem
 my heart is all eager my hair is blown by the wind
 it can be excused after all it is the riddle of love
 I have a sweetheart with twinkling blue eyes
 she works at the factory from sunrise until the stars come out
 she weaves both her life and the wool cloth
 when she gets home her eyes close from tiredness
 on our table wine cheese bread grapes
 the world is all sunshine people quite happy
 I too know how to write a love poem
 my heart is full of love when it is drunk
 I have a sweetheart with twinkling blue eyes
 every night she goes to sleep early like birds
 she weaves wool cloth in her dream she weaves her life



1948, pp 78-79

teatime in emirgân

from the palace of çırağan to büyükdere
 shivering in the autumn of old plane trees
 reaching to where the secret evenings linger
 almost at once listening to themselves
 behind the lattices a woman with big eyes
 wearing a hastily put on silk ferajeh
 the loneliness of teatime beyond emirgân
 the gilded tea glass warming up with a touch
 nedim's hicazkâr song echoes in totyos efendi

through the solitary voice of a young girl
 the ramshackle wooden sea mansions in forsaken places
 hanging down into the garden with worn out creepers
 like the freezing birds dispersed over the bosphorus
 the wind hauls a foggy rain
 ships in istinye harbor in a dark slumber
 with their broken masts lost and rickety
 suddenly the fear of death comes over me
 in an obscure namaz when selam is given
 if it is a hint of gazali also a bit of mevlâna too
 under the dome the hummings of a divan
 inside the dirtiest white coloured ship şeref
 hundreds of military students are going to exile
 in the air a whiff of a hanged man
 istanbul jöntürks are mourning with death chants

echoes of worrisome nights of trouble from bebek
 carried by ferries sailing nonstop
 the most terror-struck autumn is in my eyes
 from the more obscure armistice days
 at what allaturca hour is the time for the second serving of fine tobacco
 for colonel sadik bey's hookah
 cooing like doves filling the fountains with joy
 in the shadow of ottoman gallows
 to be filled with bitter feelings in emirgân
 like the long steeped tea in a dark samovar
 with the melancholy of a hexagon-shaped old poem
 written in the long forgotten diaries with keys



1962, pp 65-66

Gülay Yurdal Michaels

Poet and Translator

Anlatamıyorum

(by Orhan Veli Kanık)

Ağlasam sesimi duyar mısınız,
 Mısrararımda;
 Dokunabilir misiniz,
 Gözyaşlarıma, ellerinizle?

Bilmezdim şarkıların bu kadar güzel,
 Kelimelerinse kifayetsiz olduğunu
 Bu derde düşmeden önce.

Bir yer var, biliyorum;
 Her şeyi söylemek mümkün;

I cannot explain

(translation by Gülay Yurdal Michaels)

If I were to cry would you hear my
 voice
 In my verse
 Would you be able to touch
 My tears with your hands?
 I didn't know how songs could be so
 beautiful
 And words so inexpressive
 Before I suffered this trouble.

I know there is a place

Epeyce yaklaşmışım, duyuyorum.
Anlatamıyorum

It's possible to say everything there
I've come so close to it, I feel
I cannot explain.



Orhan Veli Kanık or **Orhan Veli** (1914–1950), based in Istanbul was one of the founders of the Garip Movement together with Oktay Rıfat and Melih Cevdet. Aiming to transform fundamentally traditional form in Turkish poetry, he introduced colloquialisms into the poetic language.



Two February Visitors in Cambridgeshire


Arın Bayraktaroğlu meets Şefika Kutluer and Bettany Hughes



Once described by *The New York Times* as “The magic flutist”, Şefika Kutluer, who played mainly from J.S. Bach in her concert at Gonville & Caius College Cambridge on 4 February 2017, started playing the piano at the age of eight. However, when Ulvi Cemal Erkin, one of the most famous composers in the new Republic, who also happened to be a family friend, advised her that her facial bone structure was ideal for the flute, she switched instruments. Graduated from Ankara Conservatoire, she later continued her studies first at *Conservatorio Santa Cecilia* in Rome for three years, and then worked with

Professor Werner Tripp, principal flautist of the Vienna Philharmonic for many years, in Vienna. During her career as an international flautist she gave concerts in most European cities, China, USA, and South America including Brazil and Chile and produced 17 CDs. She plays silver and golden flutes produced by famous German flute manufacturer Johannes Hammig and a golden mouth-piece produced by Albert Cooper (British). The only country she has not been to but would like to play in is Poland. She has a rich repertoire including Western classical and Eastern sufi music, as well as Latin romance and jazz. She organises an annual music festival in Ankara, called East Meets West. After her fourth concert in the UK on 4 February, she said “The audience in the UK is exceptional and inspirational. They are highly educated and appreciate good music. This is what a player needs so as to produce outstanding performance.” Being in love with nature, she also feels very much at ease in England where, she says, “The environment is protected and the parks are not destroyed. The urban and the rural qualities are combined so much so that the cities can breathe easily. I admire this.”

Arin Bayraktaroğlu and Bettany Hughes



Bettany Hughes talked about her new book: *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities* (2017, The Orion Publishing Group Ltd) to a packed house in St Peter's Church, Ely (Cambridgeshire) on 7 February this year. With 800 pages, this monumental book, which took ten years to write, seems to be the most comprehensive work to date on this subject. Bettany Hughes believes that Ottoman Constantinople and Turkish Istanbul cannot be understood well if no consideration is paid to the city's past as the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium. It is a place where Romans, Jews, and much later the Ottomans left their marks, all of which was inherited by the new Republic of Turkey. Hughes' enthusiasm for the project, diligent research and great love for the transnational character of the city is apparent in the way she uncovers for the reader a multitude of little-known events that happened during the lifetime of this metropolis. One such episode is that Leonardo da Vinci, an applicant to fulfil Sultan Beyazid II's dream of having a bridge built over the Golden Horn, wrote to the Sublime Porte: "I, your servant, heard that you intended to construct a bridge from Istanbul to Galata, but you could not because no expert could be found.... I could construct it in such a way that even a sailing-ship could pass under it" (page 416). Why he was not granted permission to build the bridge, however, is not clear. On the topic of female power during the Ottoman period, among other fascinating details, we learn that Nurbanu Sultan (1525-1583), formerly a concubine and later becoming the wife of Sultan Selim II, "installed the first library established by a woman in a splendid mosque in Istanbul" (page 463). Such fascinating details make this a captivating book to read.


Conferences, Workshops & Organisations



**The Levantine Heritage Foundation's
2nd International Conference, London,
2-4 November 2016**

The Levant and Europe: Shipping and Trade – Networks of People and Knowledge

“We are all Levantines now...” declared Dr Philip Mansel as he opened the Levantine Heritage Foundation’s second major interdisciplinary conference, held at two fine venues in London, Europe House and the Hellenic Centre, last November. As previewed in *TAS Review* No.27 (pp.40-41), this major conference aimed to build on the success of the LHF’s first international conference held in Istanbul in 2014 by emphasizing the theme of trade ‘as the central dynamic in the creation of a Levantine world, with complex economic networks giving rise to equally complex social, cultural, political and material interactions’ (to quote from LHF Chairman Quentin Compton-Bishop’s Welcome Note to the conference). By the time the conference closed all the participants (including a few of us from BATAS) must have grasped the historical point of Philip Mansel’s words; for we had by then been treated to an amazing range of information and insights into the activities and movements of people within, into and out of a region that we should think of as extending from the Ionian islands of Greece to the borders of Syria and Iraq: a region much larger and more diverse than that suggested by the ‘L’ of that recent – and to many, surely, mystifying – acronym ‘ISIL’⁷⁴. Nearly forty presentations were given by scholars from Britain, the USA, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Italy and elsewhere. Some were livelier and better delivered than others, as in every such conference; but the wealth of topics certainly justified the claim by LHF Trustee Axel Çorlu in his closing remarks that both presenters and other participants at this gathering had helped to stimulate a whole new inter-disciplinary field of ‘Levantine Studies’.



The fascinating topics in this conference ranged from the activities of the Levant Company to historical trade links between the Sicilian port of Messina and the Levant, and to the establishment of the Zantiot Greek community in 18th century Ottoman Cyprus. Mention should, however, be made of some of the presentations relating specifically to Turkey. The first Keynote Speech was given by Sibel Zandi-Sayek and was about the International College of Smyrna which, as the speaker amply illustrated, was in fact not just an American Protestant missionary institution but acted as a ‘unique enclave’ that came to be embedded in the diverse, pluralistic ethnic and religious make-up of a highly entrepreneurial late Ottoman Smyrna. That was until government restrictions on foreign schools in the early Republican period forced it to relocate to Beirut – a victim, perhaps, of that historical tension earlier referred to by Philip Mansel between cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the old Levantine cities such as Smyrna, Beirut, Alexandria and Salonica. There were two other papers on Smyrna /Izmir and its hinterland which I also found very interesting. One, by Turkish researcher Onur Inal, described in fascinating detail how the developing trade in figs and raisins from around Aydin and Nazilli in the late 19th century promoted western Anatolia’s integration into the market economy and made Izmir a ‘gateway city’ through which the natural wealth of its hinterland reached European markets. Another, by an Italian researcher, focused on the related topic of the Ottoman railway linking Smyrna with Aydin, whose construction (1856-66) was promoted by British capital. This project connected the port city with its fertile valleys inland, and of course brought various changes to both urban and rural landscapes. The many

⁷⁴ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

other papers with a specifically Turkish focus included such topics as the Italian trade network in the new Turkey during the interwar years and the interesting case of one William Nosworthy Churchill, a Levantine merchant who founded the first Turkish private newspaper, the *Ceride-i Havadis*, in Istanbul during the 1840's.

These were just a few of the many really enlightening talks on the wider Levant (including Philip Mansel's on the fascinating history and wretched current circumstances of Aleppo). Now those of us who enjoyed this conference can look forward to the third LHF international conference planned to be held in Athens in 2018, when the emphasis will naturally be upon the Greek connection with the Levant.

For information about the Foundation and its meetings and activities in London, visit www.levantineheritage.com

John Moreton
University of Leeds



RESEARCHTURKEY
CENTRE FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH ON TURKEY

The Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey) is a UK-based, independent, non-partisan, non-governmental, non-profit think-tank devoted to policy analysis and research on contemporary Turkey. **Research Turkey** was established in London in 2012 to make available to a wider readership articles and reports about the Turkish reality today. It has been publishing in both English and Turkish on the researchturkey.org website and electronic journal (*Research Turkey*). It aims to share a wide range of reviews, interventions, political, economic and social analyses, working papers, interviews and commentaries, by examining Turkey in the world from different points of view. It welcomes theoretical and political pluralism.

Research Turkey also provides a platform for academic and public debate in the fields of economics, politics, society and culture as they relate to Turkey and the broader world through public events and lectures in notable institutions such as the LSE, King's College London, SOAS, Oxford University, the Westminster Parliament, the British Academy, the New School in New York and the Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara.



Additionally, **Research Turkey** has a double blind peer-reviewed academic journal, called *Research & Policy on Turkey*, published in association with Taylor & Francis. **Research Turkey** launched a news-based online platform *Independent Turkey*, for journalists, activists, and practitioners in various fields, in

November 2015. All of Research Turkey's publications, articles, and material (except the contents of its academic journal, *Research and Policy on Turkey*) can be accessed freely from <http://www.researchturkey.org>. All Research Turkey's events are free and open to the public. Research Turkey's founder and Director in London, **Ümit Sönmez**, says that the emphasis is on providing a platform for a range of topics and views, free from interest-group bias. The readership numbers several thousands, with costs met by donations rather than subscriptions.

Brian Beeley

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Book Reviews & Publications



Asım Kocabıyık and the Turkish Republic: partners in success – 1924-2012

by Feyza Howell,
Esra Üstündağ Selamoğlu,
and Zafer Toprak


Borusan Holding AŞ, Istanbul, 2015, 400 pp
ISBN 978-605-64590-1-6

This volume is remarkable in a number of ways. It is splendidly produced in hard covers and comes in a sturdy box. A first impression is of the dozens of evocative photographs. Most of these trace the long life of Asım Kocabıyık, a village boy from Afyon who rose to become head of the powerful Borusan Holding organisation which has made its mark on the Turkish steel pipe and related industries. There are also pictures of Turkey's political and wider social progress from the start of the Republic. Indeed this volume is a homage both to its founding president **and** to the humble Anatolian lad who was able to succeed within the new order. This is neither dispassionate history nor critical biography but it is a compelling account of boy-makes-good.




Kocabıyık's origins in Tazlar village are made clear. His father Ahmet was headman (*muhtar*) at one point and became a shop-keeper and local trader. He later took his family into Afyon city to improve their material prospects, thereby setting young Asım on his route to opportunity. Much of his progress is revealed in short statements by the man himself, some about his own business achievements and others reflecting on his country's life and times.

The text of the volume is not continuous. Apart from the comments by Kocabıyık himself, there are brief pieces of Turkish historical commentary and linking passages

with which the three compilers develop a sequential account though, inevitably, this produces a compendium-style work. In one sense it is a magnificent coffee-table volume to be dipped into but it can be more, given the range of contacts which Asım Kocabıyık made during his long career as a business magnate. The five-page index reveals links with big names in Turkey's economic development – Eczacıbaşı, Koç,  Sabancı and others – and there are the political contacts as well – Özal, Demirel, Ecevit. Appendix 1 (of six) details the component enterprises, dealerships, etc in the Borusan Holding group, showing a geographic spread of operations from the United States to Central Asia, via a number of locations in Turkey and Europe. In the text of the volume are several informative accounts of Borusan's part in the Turkish economy, with an indication of Asım Kocabıyık's role in it. In contrast to such technical detail, the book also reports on cultural activities promoted by Borusan Arts, founded in 1997 and including the acclaimed Borusan Istanbul Philharmonic Orchestra.

Brian Beeley

☆☆☆☆☆



The Black Eunuchs of the Ottoman Empire:

Networks of Power in the Court of the Sultan

by George Junne

I B Tauris, London & New York, 2016, 336 p
ISBN: 978 1 78453 154 6

The words *black eunuchs* are surrounded by sexual fantasy because of the eunuchs' position in the courts and great houses of the Middle East, a position which they enjoyed until early in the last century. Their associations with the *harem* and the care of its women were particularly potent. George Junne sets out to get behind the myths and to examine the actual lived experience of the black eunuchs, their histories, accomplishments, social and political success and the friction which their position created in the Ottoman imperial household. Four of his nine chapters, however, are devoted to the background – the history of enslaved African eunuchs in Africa and Europe; the position of eunuchs in the Byzantine Empire; eunuchs in Islamic trade; and slavery under Ottoman rule. In these chapters Junne sets out the principal sources of black slaves and eunuchs, as well as how they were 'manufactured' (his word). This was either by crushing the testicles (not always effective) or by removal of the genitalia (often fatal). We are told how black eunuchs were acquired and traded. Estimates of their numbers are hazarded. Junne then begins his study of the black eunuchs in the Ottoman Empire (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Relevant material is limited. Descriptions were often based on gossip and speculation but were frequently

copied from generation to generation. Although first mentioned at the Ottoman court in the fifteenth century, black eunuchs came to prominence in the sixteenth century when, under Sultan Murad III (1574-95), the Chief Black Eunuch took over the position and power previously enjoyed by the Chief White Eunuch. The reasons are not clear, but seem to be related to the diminishing supply of white eunuchs, the rising number of black slaves in the imperial household and the schemes of the valide sultan and other powerful, favourite women in the imperial harem. Black eunuchs were educated at court and then became stewards with various roles about the harem – tutors, porters, escorts and guardians – and with the sultan himself. The more skilled, forceful and obsequious rose through a hierarchy of official positions until one of them became the Kislır Ağa (otherwise known as the Chief Black Eunuch), controller of the household and particularly of the women. The harem complex in the Topkapı Sarayı is described along with the black eunuchs' quarters, but no plan is provided. Daily contact with the sultan brought influence, power and wealth to the Chief Black Eunuch, creating an alternative centre of power to that of the Grand Vizir. The Chief Black Eunuchs, who are really the focus of Junne's study, acquired the right to supervise and then to administer the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as the majority of the imperial *awqaf*. They were able to build and endow not just simple mosques but also complexes of mosques, medresses, libraries, kitchens and hospitals (the *küllieys*). Bashir Ağa I (Kislır Ağa 1717- 46) built up a considerable personal library. Around 1610 they became responsible for administering Athens and its district. Chapter 8 quotes various descriptions of the appearance, anatomy, skeleton and personality of black eunuchs culled from various sources, including medical examinations, though not all of them were reliable. Pictures exist and a few of them could have usefully supplemented the text. The final chapter (Chapter 9) outlines the personal lives of a number of Chief Black Eunuchs, in particular a few from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One or two eunuchs gave interviews to journalists after they retired and we learn how they coped after the post was abolished in 1909. Some married and others formed a mutual support association. Others became destitute.

While there is much of interest in the book, the text would have benefitted from more thorough sub-editing. Some slips in chronology have not been corrected. There is a lot of repetition. For example, we are treated to several graphic descriptions of how eunuchs were 'manufactured'. Information, on the roles, power and influence of the Chief Black Eunuch and other eunuchs, is repeated. Numerous direct quotations, often from secondary sources, do not always advance the author's argument and seem unnecessary. A tighter text would have produced a better book.

Malcolm Wagstaff
Southampton University



The Gülen movement in Turkey: The politics of Islam and modernity.

by Caroline Tee

London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016. x + 227 pp. ISBN 978-1-78453-588-9; eISBN 978-1-78672-027-6; ePDF 978-1-78673-027-5



The coup attempt that took place in Turkey on the night of 15 July 2016 and claimed the lives of some 250 people, most of them civilians, was immediately attributed by President Erdoğan to the shadowy organisation headed by the self-exiled Turkish religious leader Fethullah Gülen (born 1938), who since 1999 has been living in seclusion on a ranch in Pennsylvania, issuing weekly sermons remotely to his (overwhelmingly Turkish) followers around the world. Although there are continuing claims in some quarters that Erdoğan was forewarned of the coup attempt and in some sense complicit in it, the event (incomparably more violent than military interventions have usually been in that country) came as a massive shock to the people of Turkey and temporarily united a sharply divided society against the organisation now re-named by the government FETÖ (Fethullah Terror Organisation), which is generally believed to have been responsible for it.

Over the last forty years this mysterious organisation, which had no publicly visible power structure or official spokespersons, had established itself in about 120 countries, primarily through schools and intercultural 'dialogue' activities. These were funded by a network of businesses and benefactors who supported the movement's ostensible aim of promoting global peace and mutual understanding within a vision inspired by Muslim piety and the Sufi ideal of love. In Turkey, however, it had long been evident that the movement aimed at the progressive infiltration of key state institutions (e.g. the judiciary and police), and from 2011 onwards it had been in an increasingly conflictual relationship with its former allies, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The book under review here was on the verge of publication at the time when the failed coup occurred. Its author, Caroline Tee, was able to add a six-page 'Afterword' covering the event itself and its "fatal" impact on the movement in Turkey, with the expected closure of all its schools, media outlets and other establishments and the dismissal of thousands of teachers and other employees. Naturally she was not able to pronounce on the degree of involvement of Gülen-affiliated officers, as opposed to others who might have had different motivations, in the failed military uprising. This will only come out (if at all) after the judicial process that is now in its very early stages has run its course. Nevertheless, the very clear account given in Chapter 8 of the initial symbiosis and subsequent hostility between the Gülen movement and the AKP provides an excellent background for anyone trying to understand why Gülenist involvement in the traumatic events of 15 July seems plausible.

The main focus of this book, however, lies elsewhere, and in this sense the subtitle "The politics of Islam and modernity" is rather misleading. Dr Tee is primarily

interested in “the movement’s engagement as a pious Muslim group with the field of modern science and science education” (p. 5). Her analysis of this issue, which constitutes the first half of the book, is based on anthropological research carried out in a number of Gülen-run schools and universities in four cities in the western part of Turkey between early 2013 and early 2015. It is also informed by a study of Gülen’s own writings, in which the relationship between religion and modern science figures prominently (pp. 3-4). Tee devotes a whole chapter (Chapter 2) to the thought of an earlier Turkish (in this case ethnically Kurdish) spiritual leader, Said Nursi (1877-1960), whose writings had been a major source of inspiration for Gülen. Gülen inherited from Nursi not only a determination to demonstrate the compatibility of modern science with belief in a transcendent God but also the idea of ‘positive action’ (*müspet hareket*), meaning the active contribution of pious Muslims to the well-being of society. While Nursi’s ultimate goal was the reinvigoration both of Muslim society and of the role of religion within it, he rejected political activism and focused mainly on reviving religious faith among his followers. Gülen, helped by much more propitious circumstances in the Turkey of the late twentieth century, was able to develop what Tee calls (p. 49) “a much more aggressive vision for the successful integration of pious believers into modern life”. She states: “His intention is that his followers actively shape modern society, and that they also prosper and benefit from the opportunities it offers”. This observation perfectly explains the supreme importance attached by Gülen to science-based modern education, and the fact that he accords the “holy vocation” of teaching a special prominence within the concept of *Hizmet* (‘service’), the name by which the movement itself is known to insiders.

Excerpts from Tee’s fieldwork interviews with teaching staff, students and administrators in the various educational establishments she studied form an important part of Chapters 3 and 5, and provide an invaluable direct insight into the educational experience offered, the motivation of the teachers and the top-down way in which this national and international project was organised. She estimates that there were in total more than 500 Gülen-run schools in Turkey, plus a dozen or so universities and a great many exam-coaching establishments (*dershane*). These were all fee-paying establishments (with scholarships available for needy students), part of the private sector in education in Turkey that has grown dramatically in the last two or three decades. Exact numbers, she tells us, are impossible to come by because the affiliation of these institutions to the Gülen organisation was not officially acknowledged. However, they clearly acquired a reputation for their combination of academic success (especially in maths and science) with strict adherence to Muslim behavioural norms, thus attracting students from upwardly mobile families in the socially conservative sector of society.

The two aspects of the Gülen schools that Tee regards as particularly significant are their strong emphasis on maths and science teaching and the extreme dedication of their teachers. On the first of these topics her findings may be summarised as follows. The indisputably high motivation of both teachers and students in the high schools (*lise*) towards science subjects, which is reflected in the large numbers of Gülen-school students selected each year for the Turkish national team to compete in the international “Science Olympiads” (p. 72) did not seem to make students eager to study natural science at university or to engage in scientific research. At the schools she studied, the “overwhelming preference” of those students who excelled in science was to study some branch of engineering at university. A much smaller

number were aiming to study medicine (p. 113). Tee also notes (p. 112) that the Gülen universities founded after 2008 (when the law regarding subject coverage was relaxed) followed the trend observable in other non-state universities of concentrating their science provision on the applied sciences (engineering and medicine), for which there is high popular demand. Tee's conclusion (p. 115) is worth quoting in full:

It would therefore be mistaken, or at least premature at this stage, to assume that the Gülen Movement's commitment to science education is connected to a serious interest in invigorating the relationship between modern science and Islam. Rather, science education provides a valuable milieu through which the movement recruits, influences and equips the next generation of pious Muslims for successful engagement in a rationalist and technological world order.

Significantly, Tee links these findings to the observation that her research revealed "little evidence to suggest that the schools trained their students to think critically or philosophically about modern science in a way that might herald a new development in the field of science and Islam" (p. 187). Rather, the manner of teaching differed little from the rote learning methods traditional throughout the Turkish education system (p. 114). Tee also notes that the one exception to the Gülenists' embrace of modern science was the theory of evolution, which they not only rejected but even ridiculed. In the schools studied by Tee, evolution was taken seriously only in classes preparing the scientific high-flyers for the Science Olympiads (p. 96).

The majority of teachers and administrators in the Gülen schools were, according to Tee, members of an ill-defined body that she refers to as "core affiliates" of the movement. I am using 'ill-defined' here in two senses. Firstly, the Gülen movement has no membership structure and claims to be simply a "loose network of altruistic volunteers who are united only by their commitment to universal principles of civic and humanitarian service" and draw their inspiration from Fethullah Gülen (p. 24). Secondly, Tee herself is unclear as to whether what she calls the "core affiliates" are the all-male innermost group who may spend some or all of their time in the company of Gülen himself in Pennsylvania, receiving religious instruction from him, or a much larger category of "committed disciples" of both genders who work in Gülen institutions throughout the world, are moved from one job to another according to instructions coming down through a more or less invisible hierarchy, and are "fully dedicated in every aspect of their lives to the movement's vision" (p. 25). Tee's participant observation of the schoolteachers in her study does indeed reveal a truly remarkable attitude of willing self-sacrifice (*fedakârlık*) on the part of these individuals. Apart from their regular teaching duties (in which they kept strictly within the boundaries of the state-prescribed curriculum) they would devote large parts of their free time to giving students extra help with their lessons, socialising with them and their families, and trying at the same time to be a role model of modest, pious living. In the case of those students who showed interest in Gülen's message they would also join with them in religious activities such as *sohbet* (reading groups for studying the Qur'an and the works of Nursi and Gülen). These teachers would typically give up part of their salary to the movement, and showed no interest in career progression or financial reward. Some of Tee's interlocutors, when asked what motivated them, spoke of their belief that one had to do good in this world in order to be rewarded in the next (pp. 56; 62-65).

The other major ‘public’ aspect of the Gülen movement, apart from education, is ‘dialogue’, specifically intercultural dialogue, to which Tee devotes Chapter 6 of her book. She notes that the desirability of Muslims reaching out to Jews and Christians to strengthen the bonds of human friendship is another theme that Gülen inherited from Nursi. For obvious reasons this aspect of Gülenist activity has been much more evident at the international level than within Turkey. Institutions such as the Rumi Forum in Washington, D.C., the Dialogue Society in the UK and a number of chairs at universities around the world won the Gülen organisation many admirers among Western academics, politicians, journalists and public figures of all kinds. A great many conferences and publications have been generated on issues of general human concern and the role of religious faith in the modern world. Tee’s analysis of this aspect of the movement’s activity emphasises the following points (pp. 138-9):

- (1) It is characterised by conflict avoidance, i.e. focusing only on areas of common interest and concern and resolutely not engaging with theological or other differences. For this reason the term ‘intercultural dialogue’ is preferred to ‘interfaith dialogue’.
- (2) It is concerned to present a positive, peaceable image of Islam in a world that has come to equate Islam with terrorism.
- (3) It promotes Turkey and Turkish culture through organising visits to Turkey for foreigners who take part in the dialogue.
- (4) It is largely designed for a non-Muslim audience and has had only limited success within the Muslim world. (Apart from a limited outreach to Alevi in Turkey, it largely ignores sectarian differences within Islam.)

The only thing I found disappointing about this book is that while it recognises in general terms the “indirect” political agenda of the Gülen movement, there seems to have been no attempt to find reflections of this agenda in the movement’s educational activities. If, as we are told on p. 2, the establishment of an “Islamised national order... lies at the very core of the Gülenist project”, and “Gülen encourages his followers to attain leverage in areas of civil society and to exert their influence on the political process in indirect ways”, why do none of the dedicated teachers interviewed by Tee talk about their educational mission in these terms? Why do none of the students interviewed explain their aspirations in terms of service to society, let alone the moral/spiritual transformation of that society? I would have expected these questions to be at least raised in the book, if only to eliminate the sense of disjuncture that the reader experiences between Tee’s anthropological research on Gülenist education and the highly charged political story that was gathering momentum at the same time. Obviously one could not have expected loyal Gülen followers to talk openly about a long-term goal to infiltrate state institutions in preparation for an eventual political takeover. (Such had been the message of a notorious (but disputed) sermon by Gülen to his followers that was exposed on a national television channel in 1999 (p. 171). The horrified public reaction to this revelation was undoubtedly a major factor contributing to Gülen’s decision to relocate to the USA later that same year.) But a general desire to contribute through education to the improvement of society – moral/spiritual as well as social/economic – can surely be expressed with impunity (even) in the Turkey of the AKP, and I would have expected Dr Tee both to have looked out for such answers from her interlocutors and/or to comment on their absence.

With this one reservation, Caroline Tee is to be congratulated on a book that is highly informative, elegantly written and meticulously documented. While making an

important contribution to the still meagre body of academic literature on the Gülen movement it is also a book that the general reader can enjoy and learn from.

Celia Kerlake



William Armstrong

Copy Editor / Writer at *Hürriyet Daily News*;
Freelance Writer

William Armstrong, who is based in Istanbul and has contributed to this *Review*, runs a well-received podcast called Turkey Book Talk (<http://turkeybooktalk.podbean.com>). The podcast features conversations with the authors of newly released titles on Turkey and its neighbourhood, with a new episode posted every two weeks. Most of the guests are scholars, writers and journalists. The podcast provides a platform for their important but sometimes technical work to reach a wider audience. The goal is to present complex subjects in an accessible and enjoyable form. Turkey Book Talk can be accessed via the podcast apps Podbean, iTunes, Stitcher or Acast (via Google search).

Or Facebook https://www.facebook.com/TurkeyBookTalk/?ref=aymt_homepage_panel

Or Twitter page <https://twitter.com/TurkeyBookTalk>

Access to **Turkey Book Talk** is free but William Armstrong also runs a subscription system and welcomes per episode donations from those who appreciate the service he offers. Details at <https://www.patreon.com/user?u=2998854>

NB: See also 'Recent and Forthcoming Publications' in this *Review*.

Brian Beeley



RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

ARTS AND ARCHAEOLOGY

Blessing, Patricia and Rachel Goshgarian (Eds). *Architecture and Landscape in Medieval Anatolia, 1100-1500*. (Edinburgh University Press, 2017). ISBN:

10: 1474411290.

Özgüleş, Muzaffer. *The Women who Built the Ottoman World: Female Patronage and the Architectural Legacy of Gulnus Sultan*. (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN:

10: 1784539260.

Niewohner, Philipp. *The Archaeology of Byzantine Anatolia: From the End of Late Antiquity until the Coming of the Turks*. (Oxford University Press, 2017). ISBN:

10: 0190610468.

HISTORY

Burak, Guy. *The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization). (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 10: 110746207X.

Firges, Pascal. *French Revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire: Political Culture, Diplomacy, and the Limits of Universal Revolution, 1792-1798*. (Oxford University Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0198759967.

Hughes, Bettany. *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*. (Da Capo Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0306825848.

Peirce, Leslie. *Empress of the East: How a European Slave Girl Became Queen of the Ottoman Empire*. (Basic Books, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0465032516.

Thys-Şenocak, Lucienne. *Divided Spaces, Contested Pasts: The Heritage of the Gallipoli Peninsula*. (Routledge, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1472414462.

Wirtz, Philipp. *Depicting the Late Ottoman Empire in Turkish Autobiographies: Images of a Past World* (Life Narratives of the Ottoman Realm: Individual and Empire in the Near East). (Routledge: 2017). ISBN: 10: 1472479327.

Yıldız, Aysel. *Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution* (Library of Ottoman Studies). (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1784535109.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Batuman, Elif. *The Idiot*. (Penguin Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1594205612.

Göknaş, Erdağ. *Nomadologies*. (Turtle Point Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1933527870.

Warner, Jayne. *Turkish Nomad: The Intellectual Journey of Talat S Halman*. (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1784536431.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Adamides, Marios. *The New Turkey of Erdoğan that Replaced the Old Kemalist Turkey 2002-2017*. (Independently published, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1520728875.

Altstadt, Audrey L. *Frustrated Democracy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan*. (Columbia University Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0231704569.

Çağaptay, Soner. *The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey*. (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1784538264.

Çalış, Şaban. *Turkey's Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the Modern Republic* (Contemporary Turkey). (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1784531898.

Demirsu, İpek. *Counter-terrorism and the Prospects of Human Rights: Securitizing Difference and Dissent*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). ISBN: 10: 3319508016.

Göl, Ayla. *Turkey Facing East: Islam, Modernity and Foreign Policy*. (Manchester University Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1526107481.

Kaliber, Alper and Senem Aydın-Düzgit. *Is Turkey De-Europeanising?: Encounters with Europe in a Candidate Country* (South European Society and Politics). (Routledge, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1138286524.

Karakatsanis, Leonidas, and Nikolaos Papaogiannis (Eds.). *The Politics of Culture in Turkey, Greece & Cyprus: Performing the left Since the Sixties* (Routledge Advances in Mediterranean Studies). (Routledge, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1138914452.

Kurban, Vefa. *Russian-Turkish Relations from the First World War to the Present*. (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1443817775.

Nas, Çiğdem and Yonca Özer. *Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles*. (Routledge: 2017). ISBN: 10: 1472473558.

Temelkuran, Ece. *Turkey: The Insane and Melancholy*. (Translated: Zeynep Beler). (Zed Books, 2016). 10: 1783608897.

Tüfekçi, Özgür. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism*. (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 178453742X.

Waldman, Simon and Emre Çalışkan. *The 'New Turkey' and its Discontents*. (Oxford University Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0190668377.

SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION

Gürçan, Efe Can and Mete Berk. *Neoliberalism and the Changing Face of Unionism: The Combined and Uneven Development of Class Capacities in Turkey*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). ISBN: 10: 3319482831.

Kaya, Emir. *Secularism and State Religion in Modern Turkey: Law, Policy-Making and the Diyanet* (Library of Modern Turkey). (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 178076622X.

Miller, Brian. *A War Within A War: Turkey's Stuggle With the PKK since 1984 (Asia @War)*. (Helion and Company, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1910294098.

Yıldırım, Mine. *The Collective Dimension of Freedom of Religion: A Case Study on Turkey* (Law and Religion). (Routledge, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1138691224.

Yılmaz, Volkan. *The Politics of Health Care Reform in Turkey*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). ISBN: 10: 3319536664.

MISCELLANEOUS

Russell, Francis. *123 Places in Turkey: A Private Grand Tour*. (Bitter Lemon Press, 2017). 10: 1908524871.

Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

Michael Lake



On Saturday, 4 February 2017, the decision was carried out to thank Michael Lake officially for all his support and personal commitment as the first President of the Turkish Area Study Group, renamed now British Association for Turkish Area Studies. A lunch in his honour was organised in the 'Mon Plaisir' restaurant in London, and the Group's Chair Dr Celia Kerslake took the opportunity to go through his life's achievements. A major part of her speech now follows.

Born and educated in New Zealand, he began his first career, in journalism, as a cadet reporter on the NZ Herald at age 18. By the age of 24 he had been promoted to the 'super-senior' grade of reporter and was told he was the youngest to do so in the history of NZ journalism. At this point (1961) he married Robin, the woman with whom he was to spend his life, and they set sail for the UK to begin a new life in this country. Michael's journalistic career (1961-73) in the UK involved posts with *The Scotsman* (Economics Correspondent, 1961-63), *The Daily Herald/Sun* (Diplomatic Correspondent, 1963-69), and finally *The Guardian* (Chief Reporter, 1970-73) which, he says, actually meant 'chief fireman', being prepared to switch fields of activity at short notice as the need arose. For ten years (1963-73) he also did a weekly commentary on foreign affairs for the BBC World Service. After a total of over 20 years in journalism, during which he had travelled widely and visited almost every country in Europe, Michael made a career switch to the European Commission.



From 1985 onwards he held a series of three diplomatic postings, in Tokyo, Ankara and Budapest. Michael's period as EU Ambassador to Turkey (1991-8) began during a particularly sensitive moment in Turkey's relations with the EEC. Four years earlier (1987) Ankara had put in its formal application for membership, but the answer that came back in 1993 – from a European body that was preoccupied on the one hand with transforming itself into a tighter EU and on the other with considering its position vis-à-vis the newly liberated countries of eastern Europe – was in the form of the offer of a Customs Union. This was agreed in 1995 and came into effect in 1996. No doubt this must have been the high point of Michael's time in Ankara. However, contrary to Turkish expectations, the Customs Union did not open the path to full EU accession and, at the Luxemburg summit in 1997, the EU decided to open negotiations with ten East European countries and with Cyprus, but not with Turkey...

One of the countries thus favoured was, of course, Hungary, and that is where Michael's EU career took him next (1998), in what was to be his last posting before retirement. In marked contrast to his seven years in Ankara, his three years in Budapest witnessed the steady progress of accession negotiations that had begun in the same year that he took up his post. He was actively involved in helping to manage the Accession Partnership arrangements, and apparently signed off half a billion Euros in that connection. A year after he left Budapest in 2001, Hungary, along with the other 11 candidate countries, were offered full membership of the EU to take effect in 2004.

In retirement Michael remained a staunch advocate of Turkey's accession to the EU, which he firmly believed would be in the interests of both Europe and Turkey. In January 2005, just a month after the EU had finally given the green light for accession negotiations with Turkey to begin, Michael gave the TASG Annual Lecture, on the theme of 'Where does Turkey go from here?' On this occasion the then Chairman of TASG, John Martin, invited him to become the first president of the Group. In November 2009 Michael chaired a TASG conference on Turkey and the EU, entitled 'The Great Challenge'. This was held at St Antony's College, Oxford and included among its speakers two leading Turkish professors: Şevket Pamuk, the first

holder of the Chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies at the LSE and Süha Bölükbaşı of METÜ.

We shall remember the warmth and gentle humour with which he welcomed the audiences at BATAS events and his tendency to get just a little carried away by his own anecdotes while preparing to introduce a speaker. We shall remember the irrepressible bonhomie that came particularly into its own during the congenial meals that are an indispensable part of BATAS events. And we shall remember the unfailing generosity that manifested itself in his insistence that he regarded the provision of wine as one of the essential duties of the presidency.



This vote of thanks should also be extended to Professor William Hale who has been prepared to step into Michael's shoes in the role of Acting President. BATAS is most grateful for this support in uncertain times. We can be sure that the two presidents will cooperate and make for a smooth transition.

Sigrid-B Martin



In Memoriam



HALİL İNALCIK

1916-2016

Halil İnalcık, the most prolific, widely read and influential Ottomanist historian of the twentieth century, died in Ankara on 25 July 2016 at the age of 100. Born an Ottoman citizen in Istanbul in 1916, he enjoyed a 70-year academic career, published over 500 items⁷⁵ and can be said to have 'transformed the field of Ottoman

⁷⁵ <http://bilnews.bilkent.edu.tr/bilkent-community-mourns-the-loss-of-halil-inalcik/>

studies from an obscure and exotic sub-field into one of the leading historical disciplines'.⁷⁶ His formal academic career falls into three main phases, at the universities of Ankara (1940s to 1972), Chicago (1972-86), and Bilkent (1993 onwards).

İnalçık was one of the first 40 undergraduate students enrolled in 1935 in Atatürk's newly founded Dil-Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi at the University of Ankara. He continued as a research student under the influence of Fuad Köprülü, rising rapidly to the position of *doçent* in 1943. From Köprülü he determined the need to take Turkish history and particularly cultural history seriously – in contrast to the existing emphases on military and political history – and to counter the negative prejudices obvious in writings about the Ottoman past from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly in successor states in the Balkans and the Arab world, and among many westerners. In 1949-51, seconded from Ankara to study abroad at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, İnalçık met two other scholars who each had a profound effect on the direction and style of his future research. Paul Wittek's legendary seminars impressed upon him the necessity of an ultra-critical approach to document study and the essential principle of allowing the sources to speak for themselves, especially if they appeared to contradict 'what everyone knew'. Meeting Fernand Braudel at a conference in Paris in 1950 inspired him to take up the challenge of researching the Ottoman side of Mediterranean socio-economic history, which was inaccessible to Braudel.⁷⁷

İnalçık's career therefore developed with a determination to bring Ottoman history into world view, by publishing in English as much as in Turkish, by editorship of journals and of large documentary collections, and above all by his teaching both in Ankara and at the University of Chicago. His post-retirement appointment at Bilkent University, as head of a new graduate history department, brought no decrease in his own research output and an increase in awards and honorary doctorates. His extensive collection of research materials was deposited for the use of students and scholars in the Halil İnalçık Centre for Ottoman Studies, founded at Bilkent in 2003.⁷⁸

He published on virtually all eras of Ottoman history, but especially on the period 1300 to 1600, and on a very wide range of types of history. Socio-economic history became his principal field,⁷⁹ but was followed closely by legal history,⁸⁰ political ideology and 'patrimonialism',⁸¹ historiography and aspects of cultural history,

⁷⁶ Fariba Zarinebaf, former PhD student, in University of Chicago Newsletter, 1 August 2016: <https://news.uchicago.edu/article/2016/08/01/halil-inalcik-historian-ottoman-empire-and-university-professor-1916-2016>

⁷⁷ See İnalçık's article 'Impact of the *Annales* school on Ottoman studies and new findings', *Review* 1/3-4 (1978), 69-96.

⁷⁸ For a much fuller assessment of his career, see the section 'Öz geçmişi' on his personal website: www.inalcik.com. Many of İnalçık's articles and essays are also available here as free downloads. These include an autobiographical discussion, 'The shaykh's story told by himself', first published in Thomas Naff (ed.), *Paths to the Middle East: ten scholars look back* (New York 1993), 105-41. This covers his academic career and influences before Bilkent.



⁷⁹ Notable early publications include 'Osmanlılarda raiyyet rûsûmu', *Bellekten* 23 (1959), 576-610, and 'The Ottoman economic mind and aspects of the Ottoman economy', in Michael Cook (ed.), *Studies in the economic history of the Middle East* (London 1970); 207-18.

⁸⁰ E.g.: 'Adaletnameler', *Belgeler* 2 (1965), 49-145; 'Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman law', *Archivum Ottomanicum* 1 (1969), 105-38.

⁸¹ E.g.: 'Comments on "sultanism": Max Weber's typification of the Ottoman polity', *Princeton papers in Near Eastern studies* 1 (1992), 49-73.

including most recently literary patronage.⁸² Particularly worthy of note are his publications on the reign of Mehmed II and the development of Istanbul as the Ottoman imperial city,⁸³ and on the Crimea, the latter an interest acquired partly due to the fact that his father migrated from there to Istanbul in the early 1900s.⁸⁴

While it is impossible here to assess İnalcık's output as a whole – especially the lasting value of close documentary studies and textual editions – two books deserve particular mention as fulfilling his early desire to combat negative 'Orientalist' views of the Ottomans and to get more people to take Ottoman history seriously. *The Ottoman Empire: the classical age* (London 1973) was designed as an introductory book for the general reader. It became almost immediately the standard introduction to Ottoman history in English, has been re-issued several times and translated into many languages, including in 2003 into Turkish. Appearing the year after his move to Chicago, this is the most widely read book on Ottoman history throughout the world and marks one of the principal milestones in his publishing career. *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, co-edited with Donald Quataert (Cambridge 1994), was a second milestone, though rather more specialist. The first 400 sole-authored pages of this large volume represented a culmination of much of İnalcık's existing work on land-holding, finance and trade. This section appeared as a separate first volume in subsequent paperback editions.



That most of İnalcık's publications still retain scholarly relevance even decades after their original publication is exemplified by the early but still much-cited article 'Ottoman methods of conquest'.⁸⁵ This discusses how fifteenth-century Ottoman conquests in the Balkans generally proceeded gradually in two stages – of vassalage and then of direct rule – and provides documentary statistics showing that a significant proportion of the Ottoman provincial cavalry in these areas were of local Christian noble descent. Evidence such as this clearly undermined previous assumptions about the rapacious, ideologically-driven nature of Ottoman conquest as 'holy war' and of oppressive relations between conquerors and subject peoples. By overturning such stereotypical preconceptions, it remains an excellent starting point for students and scholars new to the subject.

Christine Woodhead
University of Durham

⁸² E.g.: 'The rise of Ottoman historiography', in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds), *Historians of the Middle East* (London 1962), 152-67; *Şair ve patron: patrimonial devlet ve sanat üzerinde sosyolojik bir inceleme* (Ankara 2003).

⁸³ E.g.: *Fatih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar* (Ankara 1954); 'Istanbul: an Islamic city', *Journal of Islamic studies* 1 (1990), 1-23.

⁸⁴ E.g.: *The customs register of Caffa, 1487-90* (Cambridge Mass. 1996).

⁸⁵ *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954), 103-29.

BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR TURKISH AREA STUDIES

The 28th Spring Symposium

in association with the London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI)

Saturday, 6 May 2017

Wolfson Lecture Theatre, Paul Webley Wing, Senate House,
SOAS University of London, Malet Street, WC1E 7HU

PROGRAMME

- 10.00 – 10.40** Registration and Coffee/Tea*
- 10.50** Opening remarks: **Professor William Hale**, Acting President of BATAS
- 11.00** **Uluç Gürkan**, Former Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and Vice Chairman of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe (PACE) and OSCE
Legal light on the 'Malta Tribunals' of 1919-1921: The British Government's unsuccessful attempt to bring Turks to trial after WW1
- 11.50** **Professor Scott Redford**, History of Art & Archaeology, SOAS, University of London
An A-Z of medieval Anatolian travel
- 12.45** Break for lunch (list of local eating places available at registration desk)
- 14.15** **Dr Ziya Meral**, Resident Fellow, British Army's Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research
Turkey's Security Dilemma: What drives Turkish security and defence policies? And why is the country facing more insecurity as their outcome?
- 15.05** **Dr Rachel Harris**, Reader in Ethnomusicology, SOAS, University of London
Text, performance, and the transnational circulation of the Hikmet poetry of 12th-century Sufi Ahmet Yesevi
- 16.00-16.30** Coffee/Tea*
- 16.40** BATAS Annual General Meeting

Symposium admission charges: Full-time students (whether BATAS members or not) free, other BATAS members £3, non-members £10.

* Payment for coffee/tea (with biscuits) will be *by ticket only*, obtainable at registration for £2 per person per session.

Abstracts of presentations

Uluç Gürkan, ulucgurkan@gmail.com

Former Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and Vice Chairman of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Legal light on the ‘Malta Tribunals’ of 1919-1921: The British Government’s unsuccessful attempt to bring Turks to trial after WW1

After WW I, the Ottoman Government organized a series of **courts-martial** in 1919-1920 to prosecute war criminals, but the Allies considered Ottoman trials as a travesty of justice. So Ottoman justice had been replaced with Western justice by moving the trials to Malta as "International" prosecution... 144 Ottoman officials were arrested and deported to Malta as prisoners of war. The aim was “*to trial and sentence the Turks*” on the grounds that they had “*perpetrated mass killings against Armenians*”.

A judicial prosecution was conducted by Britain’s highest legal prosecution authority, Her Majesty’s Attorney General for England and Wales in London. The Attorney General’s prosecution was based on Articles 230 and 231 of the Treaty of Sèvres on ‘Armenian massacre’ allegations. Despite the British government’s every effort to try and sentence the Turks detained in Malta, no evidence that a British court of law would consider sufficient proof against them was found. Consequently, the Attorney General, in a document dated July 29, 1921, informed the British government that with the “*evidence in hand*” none of the Turks in Malta could be prosecuted on the grounds of the Armenian massacre.

The prosecutor inquiry constituted a legal procedure antecedent to the Nurnberg Trials. Accordingly, the Malta Tribunal is a judicial decision consistent with the relevant 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention declaring that the ‘Armenian massacre’, or currently termed ‘genocide’ allegations do not exist.. The Attorney General’s decision to dismiss the Armenian massacre accusations for “lack of evidence” corresponds in modern law to a “judgement/verdict of non-prosecution/non suite.”

This is the reason why no trials were held in Malta.

Professor Scott Redford, sr63@soas.ac.uk

Department of the History of Art and Archaeology, SOAS University of London

An A-Z of medieval Anatolian Travel

Caravanserais are not peculiar to the Islamic world: there are remains of roadside inns from the Iron and even Bronze ages. Indeed, caravanserais are not found at all epochs of Islamic history, nor in all parts of the Islamic world. Be that as it may, the central and eastern Islamic lands, in the medieval period, witnessed an interest in building caravanserais. Because many of the caravanserais of Iran and Central Asia were built of more perishable materials, they are less well known than those of the Seljuks of Rum, or Anatolia, which were built of stone. True palaces of commerce, caravanserais are in many ways more impressive than the actual palaces of this dynasty, and have been studied and analysed since the great publications of Kurt and Hanna Erdmann in the early 1960s. This talk will examine recent work on Rum Seljuk caravanserais, and try to understand the reasons for their construction, and how they connected to land and sea routes in all directions. What was travel like in

medieval Anatolia, what did caravans carry, and how did caravanserais work, both as roadside inns and as part of the patronage of the Rum Seljuk state?

Dr Ziya Meral, ziyameral@gmail.com

Resident Fellow, British Army's Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research

Turkey's Security Dilemma: What drives Turkish security and defence policies? And why is the country facing more insecurity as their outcome?

Dr Meral will explore the complex security and defence challenges facing Turkey, and the factors that are shaping the Turkish government's responses to them. This will be followed by a forecast of the short- and medium-term outcomes of current policies, and a discussion of possible ways Turkey can meet increasing insecurity and instability. The presentation will focus on the impact of the Arab Spring, and particularly developments in Syria, on Turkey, and how the Turkish government's space for manoeuvre is limited. It will also discuss issues surrounding security structures in the aftermath of the coup attempt and the central problem with Turkey's counter-insurgency approach to addressing the PKK terror threat.

Dr Rachel Harris, rh@soas.ac.uk

Reader in Ethnomusicology, SOAS University of London

Text, performance, and the transnational circulation of the *Hikmet* poetry of 12th-century Sufi Ahmet Yesevi

In Uyghur villages in Xinjiang (East Turkestan) *hikmet* are sung poems, performed to provoke weeping. They remind pious listeners to meditate on the certain approach of the grave, and to fear the Day of Judgement. Their melodies are handed down within religious lineages from teacher to apprentice, and their texts are carefully recorded in handwritten notebooks.

Hikmet are known in Turkey as a body of medieval Turkic poetry written by the twelfth century Central Asian Sufi saint Ahmet Yesavi, and collected in the *Diwan-i Hikmet*. Manuscript versions of the *Diwan-i Hikmet* have circulated across Central Asia for centuries, and in modern times published versions have circulated from Istanbul to Urumchi to Kazan. What relationship, if any, does the living ritual tradition of East Turkestan have with this transnational circulation of printed *hikmet*?

To join the
***British Association for
Turkish Area Studies***

email the Membership Secretary, Ayşe Furlonger (ayfurlonger@yahoo.co.uk).
She will send you an application form that allows you to choose between different
categories of membership and payment types.

Full-time students can get free membership; for others the annual subscription is
£12 per annum or £22 including a hard copy of each issue of the *Review*.

We need a new Events Coordinator

If you are a BATAS member (or willing to become one) and you enjoy organising social events, you could be just the person we are looking for to become our new Events Coordinator. This officer is responsible for all the practical arrangements relating to BATAS's two annual public events – the Spring Symposium and the John Martin Lecture. Specific tasks include booking venues, making catering arrangements, liaising with speakers, arranging seating plans and organising registration and ticketing. The Events Coordinator works under the general guidance of the BATAS Chairperson.

Don't hesitate to contact: celia.kerslake@orinst.ox.ac.uk
if you are interested
or would like more information

Request for contributions

TAS *Review* welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at bw.beeley@gmail.com and/or sigimartin3@gmail.com. Submissions for the Autumn issue would be particularly welcomed by 31 July 2017.

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Co-Editors:

Dr Brian Beeley, 31 Albany Hill, Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN2 3RX, ☎ 01892-533566, email: bw.beeley@gmail.com

Sigrid-B Martin, The Red House, 49 Hackington Road, Tyler Hill, Canterbury, Kent CT2 9NE, ☎ 01227-471222, email: sigimartin3@gmail.com

Editorial Team:

Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu; Prof Clement Dodd; Dr Celia Kerslake; Stephen Parkin; Jill Sindall

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