

# Turkish Area Studies Review

Bulletin of the British Association for  
Turkish Area Studies



[www.batas.org.uk](http://www.batas.org.uk)

No 31

Spring 2018

ISSN 1474-0125



# **The 2018 John Martin Lecture**

**30 November 2018**

**School of Oriental & African Studies**

**London**

Speaker:

**Richard Moore**

British Ambassador to Turkey: January 2014 to December 2017.  
Now: Director of Political Affairs at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

Further details will be available on the BATAS website nearer the time.



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**Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.**

## Editorial

Friends of Turkey remain concerned that continuing restrictions on freedom of expression cannot be justified by current levels of threat to the elected order in the country. But to this is now added alarm at the Turkish army's involvement in Syria. If such efforts are designed to reduce discord *within* Turkey they will fail. Also alarming is the prospect of Turkish initiatives south of the border clashing with those of other NATO members active in the disaster that is Assad's Syria. In saying this we are aware of the immense effort which Turkey has made in accepting refugees.

The political scene in Turkey is analysed comprehensively for us once again by Professor William Hale to whom we are most grateful for a number of such penetrating accounts in recent issues of this *Review*. In addition we have a contribution from Dr Selin Sayek Böke which looks at some likely future trends from her standpoint as a member of the Turkish Parliament and includes positive and negative predictions for the future. We are also immensely grateful to Professor Clement Dodd for contributing once more an insightful article on Turkish Cyprus despite health concerns. We do need someone who will take on the TRNC slot regularly because it is a part of the Turkish world which needs a voice. Dr Mina Toksöz adds to both these two articles and is concerned that the Ankara government may understand fully neither the scale of the change needed in the current growth model nor the growing challenges of regional and global economic change.

Away from politics and economics we have *inter alia* articles on tourism and on poetry and a report on a celebration in London marking the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the start of Turkish Cypriot migration to the United Kingdom. We again include one or two personal 'reminiscences' in this issue; Michael Berthoud's reflections on teaching in Turkey in the 80s will evoke memories for other readers. We are grateful to all our contributors and we make our customary plea for articles, short or long, on aspects of the Turkish reality. And we thank our proof-readers Stephen Parkin and Jane Beeley.

We need a compiler for our regular 'Noteworthy Events' feature which Ayşe Furlonger has contributed for many years. Offers welcome! We are indeed indebted to Ayşe for 'Events' and for her other contributions to the Association. BATAS is also looking for an Events Coordinator to work on the setting up of the Association's own lectures and other meetings. Please get in touch for more details if you might consider contributing in this role.

From the next issue of this *Review* (No.32) Dr Brian Beeley is to retire as Co-editor and Sigrid-B Martin will be joined by Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu as Co-editor. Arın brings editorial experience from her work on an earlier series of this *Review*; she has been a key member of BATAS and a regular contributor to the *Review* for many years. Brian Beeley will continue as a member of the Editorial Board.

Brian Beeley  
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin  
Co-Editor

**The 2017 John Martin Lecture**  
**SOAS, University of London,**  
**The Khalili Lecture Theatre**  
**24 November 2017**



**Building Turkey's  
 Progressive Future:  
 Democratic Politics and  
 Economic Reform**

by Selin Sayek Böke

Member of Parliament Turkey,  
 Republican People's Party

### Introduction

Turkey, a country with great potential, stands at a juncture; whether to take the path that realizes this potential and builds a progressive future or one that stays on the current path of further authoritarianism. Clearly, realizing its potential of this progressive future is the preferred path; and that preferred path is only possible **if and only if** democratic politics and economic reforms are undertaken.

The world is changing. And, like any change, this bears both its risks and its opportunities. This following discussion is one more about the opportunities, the positives that could come out of the need for change and us taking up that challenge.

Turkey is a country with great potential. It is still young. Up until 2035 its demographic window is open. This creates not only a market potential economically but also a huge supply factor potential if invested in properly. This potential had been built up throughout the Republic's history, though not to its full capacity, but has been experiencing a steep degree of erosion. But despite the brain drain, despite the erosion, the existing level of this young and invested-in human capital bears the potential of building a progressive future. But for this progressive future to materialize we need change in politics – one in the direction of democratizing politics and its institutions – as well as change in economic policymaking.

The great potential of Turkey lies in its geographic location. This does really go beyond the truism that Turkey stands at a geopolitically advantageous location. It truly does. Within 4 to 5 hours of flying time you are able to reach 1.5 billion people



and 58 countries. If progressive politics believes that Turkey's responsibility is to be a peace-builder, and cares for diplomacy as an instrument for both universal values and free exchange the country can excel by the advantage of looking West but also having strong ties with the East.

Looking into the macroeconomic data, it is once again evident that despite all of these structural advantages, once again the structural imbalances have accumulated and their resolution requires not piecemeal economic reforms but a new progressive agenda. This progressive agenda has to have two pillars: again, not one or the other but both: democracy and economic reform. Rule of law and democratic values are not only critical as an end, but they underlie all the structural issues in economics as well.

So, what does the progressive future of Turkey look like? In no specific order, it is one of a participatory democracy, a constitutional democracy, an inclusive society, an egalitarian society and one on a path of sustainable development. It is worth briefly defining the basics of each pillar. The participatory democracy is not just majoritarian, but is based on active citizenship. In other words, democracy and politics are not merely reduced to just the ballot box but depend on active involvement in decision-making and an active civil society. A constitutional democracy based on a constitution that protects the basic rights and freedom for everybody is an integral part of this progressive future. Most importantly, it relies on a strong provision of checks and balances, with effective constraints on executive power, a proper separation of powers, and a strong rule of law.

The inclusive society goal is one that is based on gender equality, all children starting life with equal opportunity, activation for all citizens. The egalitarian society is one where equality is not limited to equality of opportunity, but is one that focuses also on equal outcomes through a progressive redistribution policy framework. Finally, the progressive future is one that aims and achieves sustainable development; a development perspective that takes into account not only today but also the future. This development path should be one that is both socially and institutionally sustainable; one that is built around an inclusive, democratic and green economy. One should note sustainable development is not only an objective but is also a natural outcome of the combination of all the above principles.

This new progressive future requires a new policy framework and instruments. In the broadest sense such a new policy framework should include, at least, a social investment state, a social market economy, separation of powers/checks and balances being put in place with inclusive institutions. A social investment state that redefines the new progressive welfare state, focusing on activation and a proper definition of labour-focused 'flexicurity', is much needed. A social market economy with free markets in an active state that regulates and supervises with a strong public investment program is an important cornerstone of this progressive future.

## **A Way Out of the Middle Income Trap: Inclusive Development and Progressive Politics**

Although growth figures indicate that Turkey's economic performance remains average among emerging markets, even the most ardent supporters of Turkey's economic trajectory could not deny that the country has failed to translate a favourable global climate into a path-breaking economic development. After 16 years of single-party rule, often portrayed as 'stability', we are still suffering with



middle human capital and middle technology traps, a natural outcome of which is to be stuck in the middle-income trap.

Turkey is neither Russia nor Venezuela; we do not have natural resources. Our main asset is our productive people. Seeing our young demography as a demand factor of 'market potential' limits the extent of investment in our young and leads to us being trapped in a 'middle human capital' level. A perspective change is much needed; where our young demography is seen as the most critical asset that would contribute to our potential GDP.

This requires first of all, a job-creating growth framework: the nature of growth in Turkey is one of jobless growth. Indeed it is one of 'unemployment generating growth'. Unemployment has been steadily increasing since 2012 despite an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent according to the new GDP series. Turkey's jobless, or even unemployment generating growth, seems to be unique as well. We grow as fast as India and China, but have a much higher rate of unemployment. High-rates of unemployment are coupled with labour-market duality, whereby one third of labour is in informal work. Occupational safety and health hazards are high and very costly in human terms. Out of 180 countries, in terms of labour freedom Turkey ranks 147th.

Despite the country's incredible human potential, there is no sign that this could be utilized in the near future as the current government's policies leave the state of education in a dire situation. In reviewing Turkey's performance in education, PISA experts state that children in Turkey are not learning relevant material given the current state of knowledge. The standard deviation of the scores of students is also suggestive of heavy inequalities; it is the highest among OECD countries. In other words, education is not a means to reduce societal inequalities, or does not allow for upward social mobility through equal opportunity provision but rather is an instrument that creates persistence in inequalities.



Turkey is also experiencing a middle-technology trap. During the 1990s and 2000s Turkey was among the top 15 countries in industrial manufacturing production. In the 2010s Turkey is no longer in this league. Turkey has experienced a 'premature deindustrialization'. The share of manufacturing industry in GDP decreased from 21% to 19% since 2000; while the same share is 30% in Korea. Share of hi-tech exports in manufacturing exports is 3.5%; a level that is not only low but also decreasing over time.

Grand National Assembly of Turkey



[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seal\\_of\\_the\\_Turkish\\_Parliament\\_\(Turkey\\_1924-1960\\_Medals\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seal_of_the_Turkish_Parliament_(Turkey_1924-1960_Medals))

Jobless growth and premature de-industrialization lead to deepening inequality and lower income levels. Per capita income has been hovering around 10 thousand dollars for the past decade. Not only is the average income low; the distribution is also becoming more and more unequal over time. The Gini coefficient is on the rise. The top 2 percentiles' income earnings are nearly

8 times those of the lowest 2 percentiles. The wealth distribution is also heavily unequal: the share of wealth owned by the top 1% was 38% in 2002, and has risen to 55% in 2016. This is suggestive of a heavy wealth transfer from the 99% to the 1% over the past decade.

Overall this discussion leads to the same conclusion: the Turkish economy is in urgent need of a comprehensive overhaul that should involve the implementation of a new monetary as well as fiscal policy. Building Turkey's progressive future, therefore, without doubt, calls for a substantive effort to steer economic policy and economic governance into a new direction which prioritizes efficiency over clientalism, equality over patronage and the interests of Turkey's hardworking people over the ruling elite.

After years of political patronage which 'excludes' everybody other than the ruling elite, what Turkey needs is an agenda of 'inclusive development', one that utilizes Turkey's undeniable potential by building a rule-based, labour friendly, meritocratic economic structure.

Steering towards such inclusive development should first and foremost entail an inclusive institutional framework, one that safeguards property rights not only for moguls friendly to the ruling party but for everybody. Transparent, accountable and impartial institutions should be put in place in order to ensure that rules and regulations apply equally to all. Identity-based glass-ceilings should be shattered not only for the sake of 'equality' but also to realize the potential of Turkey's diverse society to its fullest. Once inclusive institutions are built and operated efficiently by a non-partisan bureaucracy, the Turkish economy will improve, as already available potential could then be realized by getting the incentives right.

Efficient fiscal and monetary policy should follow immediately. Fiscal discipline and the principle of an independent Central Bank are being gradually abandoned by the ruling party, leaving the Turkish economy in uncharted waters. Central Bank independence, which has nowadays been degraded to nothing more than rhetoric as technocrats struggle to withstand political pressure, should be ensured. This is of utmost importance considering that an independent Central Bank valuing expertise over loyalty and the state of the economy over the short-term myopic interests of the ruling politicians should be at the heart of the progressive economy.

It is beyond question that the rule-based monetary policy should be coupled with fiscal discipline. Yet fiscal discipline cannot be evaluated solely through debt-ratios or purely by quantitative indicators. Instead, a progressive economy which can lead Turkey out of the middle-income trap, should simultaneously include fair and social progress-driven spending and revenue planning with fiscal discipline. This is noteworthy especially because Turkey's current fiscal problem is not a high-budget deficit that would call for fiscal prudence, but rather, the unpredictable and non-transparent practice of extra-budgetary funds used mostly for partisan and clientalist ends with no proper auditing whatsoever. Given Turkey's ample potential, therefore, going beyond the middle-income trap does not entail miracles but rather the proper implementation of a well-known economic blueprint of inclusive development that is based on the principles of fairness, equality and sustainability.

Yet this is actually where the 'anti-democratic trap' begins: building its authority first and foremost on ideological polarization, political oppression/patronage and economic clientalism, the AKP government is not only incapable but also reluctant to change its current path on science, education as well as the economic model. It is a choice that prompts them to cripple democracy rather than improve it. Thus making Turkey's progressive future possible is not solely a task of economic governance, but is a significant political task as well.



We should begin to take on the task of first eliminating the political oppression by the AKP government, which is getting deeper by the day. The current *extended state of emergency* period has speeded up the erosion of law, providing the government with unlimited discretionary powers through a ruling by decrees. The legislative branch has been drastically weakened vis-à-vis the executive. The judiciary is under the control of the executive. There are no effective limits on the executive. According to the World Justice Project rule of law data, Turkey ranks 99th among 113 countries; similarly, according to the World Bank Governance indicators rule of law measure Turkey ranks 108th among 209 countries.

Gender inequality and violation of women's rights is pervasive. Turkey ranked 131st out of 144 countries in gender equality according to the World Economic Forum's 2017 Global Gender Gap report. Minority groups are largely excluded from the bureaucracy. Identity-based politics and a polarizing political discourse is the main culprit in creating this exclusive environment, expressing itself as pervasive partisanship throughout all institutions. And this polarization is feeding into the social domain where political affiliation has become a very critical identity, creating huge social risks. People don't want to live as neighbours, work together, or have their kids play with kids of families who have voted for different political parties than they themselves voted for.

If Turkey could get out of the middle-income trap, therefore, getting the economics right is not the toughest challenge in hand. Our new economic story should start with a political struggle since for a progressive future we need policy change and for policy change we need to change politics. The main principle that is going to shape our progressive politics is freedom and equality for all. This by definition begins with constraining the power of the ruler, through the instruments of modern constitutional democracy: putting checks and balances in place, institutionalizing a true separation of power and immediate normalization by ending the saga of the state of emergency. I use the adjective "true" with "separation of power" deliberately, because in Turkey, separation of power is already enshrined in the constitution yet, notwithstanding the principle, the judiciary is under the total control of the government whereas the legislative branch is dissolving into the executive. The legislative branch, i.e. parliament is currently reestablished as a medium of approval not debate. We should initiate the change first by ensuring the separation of power and rule of law by returning to an improved parliamentary democracy and judicial reform.


The second component of progressive politics should without doubt be secularism. As part of its efforts to cling on to power in the face of mounting economic and social pressures, the AKP government has purposely and significantly undermined secularism, another main constitutional principle that lies at the heart of Turkish democracy. We should restore secularism not only as a main tenet of the state and the bureaucracy but also as a mindset that encourages rational, critical thought and gender equality.

All these points boil down to one main assertion, which shapes our politics as the progressives of Turkey: the future of Turkey's economy cannot be seen as detached from the prospects of its democracy. Turkey is now at the crossroads: either, we, as progressives will succeed in building a bottom-up mobilization around the principle

of active citizenship and restore our democracy or the Turkish economy will have to settle for the mediocrity which is evident in the above-depicted traps. Progressive politics in Turkey, therefore, means more than it means in many other parts of the world: our way of life, our civil and political liberties and the prospects of our economy hinge on the successful political struggle of Turkish progressives.



Selim Böke, BATAS President & Chairperson



## Turkey's Politics since October 2017

by

William Hale

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### **The government has continued to suppress dissent...**

On 19 January 2016, eighteen months after it was introduced following the botched coup attempt of 15-16 July 2016, the government used its large majority in parliament to extend the State of Emergency for another three months.<sup>1</sup> This allows it to rule by decree, effectively without judicial oversight. It gives the authorities powers to suppress the opposition media, and arrest anyone accused of supporting the coup attempt, of allegedly supporting the Kurdish militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its associated organisations, or 'insulting the President', among other supposed crimes. On 1 January the Minister of Justice, Abdülhamit Gül, announced that the cases against members or alleged supporters of the Gülenist organisation which was behind the attempted coup would 'no longer be on Turkey's agenda in 2018',<sup>2</sup> but there was no sign of this happening, as draconian action against the opposition media continued.

### **....with 'aggravated' lifetime sentences inflicted on pro-opposition journalists**

Following an appeal by the accused, on 11 January the Constitutional Court ordered the release of veteran journalists Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay, who had been in prison on remand for over a year. After the Court's verdict, Alpay's counsel, Veysel Ok, said he hoped that it would 'set a precedent for all trials'. Sadly, this optimism proved mis-placed, as local courts rejected the top court's ruling, and ordered the re-

<sup>1</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 19 January 2018.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 1 January 2018.

arrest of the journalists.<sup>3</sup> On 16 February, six of Turkey's best known opposition writers, including the brothers Mehmet and Ahmet Altan, together with the former newspaper editor Nazlı Ilıcak, were given aggravated life sentences by the lower court, meaning that they would be held in solitary confinement for up to 23 hours a day, without parole, and with limited visits from outside, for the rest of their lives. Thanks to these and similar decisions, Turkey was ranked as the world's biggest gaoler of journalists by the international press organisation 'Reporters Without Borders'.<sup>4</sup> The victims of this campaign also included leading opposition politicians, such as Enis Berberoğlu, a deputy of the Republican People's Party (CHP), whose continued detention was ordered on 16 January, and Selahattin Demirtaş, former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP), whose trial began on 7 December 2017, facing him with a potential sentence of 142 years in prison (*Review 30, p.3*).<sup>5</sup> Later, on 29 January 2018, there was a wave of arrests of more than 311 citizens who were accused of 'terror propaganda' for posting on-line messages critical of the Turkish offensive in the Syrian-Kurdish enclave of Afrin (see below).<sup>6</sup>

The only apparent relaxation of this campaign came on 16 February, on the same day as the sentencing of the Altan brothers and Ms Ilıcak, when the journalist Deniz Yücel, who has German nationality, was released after a year in gaol (*Review 30, p.6*). However, as the German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel effectively admitted, this was secured through political channels, and had nothing to do with the Turkish judiciary: according to the German daily *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, it was agreed at clandestine meetings between Gabriel and President Erdoğan during the latter's visit to the Vatican on 5 February (incidentally, the first such visit by any Turkish President since 1959). Not surprisingly, this was criticised by opposition politicians for being purely due to German diplomatic pressure.<sup>7</sup>

### **The electoral alliance between the AKP & MHP is being formalised under new legislation –**

The parliamentary cooperation between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was further advanced on 19 February when the two parties agreed on a pre-election legal package. This was motivated partly by President Erdoğan's concern that, without outside support, he might not win the 50-percent-plus-one of the popular vote needed to secure his re-election as President. On the other side, the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli justifiably expected that, if it ran independently, his party would fail to pass the ten percent minimum required to win any seats in parliament. As it currently stands, the election law prevents electoral alliances between parties. Hence, on 21 February the two parties submitted a joint draft of amendments to parliament which would allow inter-party alliances (with, presumably, MHP candidates running on AKP lists in Turkey's multi-member constituencies). As part of the deal, the MHP would support Erdoğan

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 11, 12 January 2018: *Hürriyet*, 11 January 2018.

<sup>4</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 16 February 2018: Ayla Jean Yackley, 'Life sentences for Turkish journalists chill others awaiting verdicts', *Turkey Pulse* ([www.al-monitor.com/pulse](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse)) 22 February 2018.

<sup>5</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 16 January 2016: Dorian Jones 'Kurdish leader goes on trial in Turkey facing 142 years in jail', *VOA News* website ([www.voanews.com](http://www.voanews.com)) 7 December 2017.

<sup>6</sup> 'Syria war: Turkey arrests hundreds for criticising Afrin offensive', BBC news website ([www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk)) 29 January 2018.

<sup>7</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 5 February 2018: Cengiz Çandar, "'Black Friday' of Turkish democracy", *Turkey Pulse*, 20 February 2018.

in the presidential election. More dubiously, under the new rules government officials would be able to monitor voting processes 'due to security concerns', prompting fears that this would result in rigged results.<sup>8</sup>

### – but a win for the government cannot be guaranteed

Under the constitution, municipal elections are due to be held in March 2019, with presidential and parliamentary elections in the following November. Unless the voting is flagrantly rigged, it cannot be assumed that the AKP will definitely retain its parliamentary majority, or that Tayyip Erdoğan will easily win the presidential race. Opinion polls in Turkey are unreliable, if not outrightly partisan, but a poll conducted in mid-February by the reasonably impartial PİAR organisation, after deducting the 30 percent of 'don't knows' and non-respondents, put the combined AKP-MHP vote share at 45 percent, or well below the figure needed to win either the parliamentary or presidential elections, with the CHP's share stuck at 25.5 percent. The HDP and the 'Good Party' (İP – a breakaway from the MHP) scored 13-14 percent each (*Review 30, pp.4-5*).<sup>9</sup> Other polls have suggested similar results.

Although Tayyip Erdoğan frequently denied that the elections would be brought forward, there was speculation that he well might do so, worried that if he left it until too late he might lose.<sup>10</sup> Apart from a possible loss of conservative votes to the İP, the President was also presented with a potential challenge from the revived pro-Islamist Felicity Party (SP) which refused to join the AKP-MHP alliance when the President invited it in in February.<sup>11</sup>

Under the constitutional changes enacted in 2007 which introduced direct elections to the presidency, if no candidate wins an outright majority in the first round, the two front-runners compete in a second round one week later, following the French model. For the opposition parties, it would be essential to unite behind a single candidate in the second ballot, and to carry their grass-roots supporters with them. Hence, both Meral Akşener, the leader of İP, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, chairman of the CHP, have accepted the principle of jointly supporting whichever opposition candidate competes in the second round; (Ms Akşener has said she would herself run as a candidate for the presidency).<sup>12</sup> The Felicity Party, with whom Akşener has also suggested an alliance, has proposed running its own candidate, with ex-President Abdullah Gül being suggested as a possible nominee. This currently seems unlikely, however: the former President has had open arguments with Tayyip Erdoğan, but seems very reluctant to issue an open electoral challenge.<sup>13</sup>



<sup>8</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 February 2018.

<sup>9</sup> As reported on *Mynet* website ([www.mynet.com/haber](http://www.mynet.com/haber)) 21 February 2018.

<sup>10</sup> Ayla Jean Yackley, 'Signs point to early Turkish elections', *Turkey Pulse*, 26 February 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Ahmet Hakan, 'Erdoğan oyun planını bozan parti; Saadet Partisi', *Hürriyet*, 24 February 2018.

<sup>12</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 25 October, 16 December 2017, 28 February 2018.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, 13 January, 1 March 2018: Murat Yetkin, 'Will Gül challenge Erdoğan for the presidency?', *ibid*, 4 January 2018: Mustafa Akyol, 'Could little-known Turkish party offer Islamist alternative to Erdogan?', *Turkey Pulse*, 23 February 2018



There was also the possibility that the new legislation allowing inter-party electoral alliances would also benefit the opposition parties – a paradoxical effect that the AKP and MHP had evidently failed to take account of. Reversing the CHP’s tradition of strict opposition to political Islamism, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu met the SP leader Temel Karamollaoğlu, and later proposed an ‘alliance of principles’ between opposition parties to defend ‘democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and conscience, and freedom of judicial independence’ – all principles which the AKP-MHP alliance had failed to protect. Whether this would include an opposition electoral alliance, with joint lists, was unclear, but in the meantime, the opposition parties were evidently worried that ‘security concerns’ would allow the government to rig the elections. Accordingly, on 2 March the CHP, İP and HDP established a joint commission, with a view to preventing this.<sup>14</sup>

Against this, Tayyip Erdoğan’s main advantage might be that even if the opposition parties do agree to support whichever candidate comes second in the first round of the presidential election, it cannot be assumed that they would carry their supporters with them. Thus, those who voted for Meral Akşener in the first round, might opt for Tayyip Erdoğan in the second round, rather than a CHP candidate; equally, pro-HDP voters might boycott the second round rather than supporting any of the ‘establishment’ candidates, allowing the President to win by default.

### Turkey’s offensive in Afrin has deepened its involvement in Syria

Since October 2017, militia forces of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which are trained and apparently financed by Turkey, supported by Turkish army units, have been stationed in Idlib province, in north-west Syria, with the aim of monitoring the ‘de-escalation zone’ initiated by the ‘Astana peace process’, led jointly by Russia, Iran and Turkey (*Review 30, p.10*). During December, the process seemed to be in tatters as land and air forces of the Syrian regime, Russia’s client, bombarded areas held by Islamist rebels of the Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Further fierce attacks followed in early February, when Russian warplanes, backed by Syrian regime ground forces, carried out fierce attacks on the HTS after it had downed a Russian Sukhoi-25 ground attack aircraft. By the end of the month, however, the situation appeared to have calmed down, so that by late February Turkish forces had established six of the twelve observation outposts they were due to set up under the de-escalation plan. Turkish troops in the Afrin enclave also took over territory connecting Idlib with Azaz, part of the zone cleared by Turkish and FSA forces as part of ‘Operation Euphrates Shield’ (*Review 28, pp.12-13, Review 29, p.16, Review 30, p.10*). Nevertheless, the danger that Turkey might get dragged into a direct confrontation with Syrian government forces in Idlib remained.<sup>15</sup>



<sup>14</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 3 March 2018.

<sup>15</sup> Zena Tahhan, ‘Air raids on rebel-held Idlib province intensified’ *Aljazeera News* website, ([www.aljazeera.com](http://www.aljazeera.com)) 5 February 2018: : ‘Turkey reconnects FSA—held Idlib with Azaz’, *ibid*, 27 February 2018: International Crisis Group, ‘Averting Disaster in Syria’s Idlib Province’, *ICG Briefing*



Meanwhile, on 20 January attentions slipped away from the Idlib operation as Turkish and FSA forces widened the war by attacking the Syrian enclave of Afrin, which borders the eastern side of Turkey's Hatay province. The objective was to clear the canton of Kurdish forces of the People's Protection Force (YPG). This is linked to the Democratic Unity Party (PYD). It is widely accepted as being the Syrian branch of the PKK, and thus regarded as a serious security threat by Turkey. Turkish and FSA forces pressed ahead with the operation during

the following weeks, so that by the end of February it was reported that they had cleared the YPG fighters from around 500 square km. This left the town of Afrin, home to over 100,000 civilians, as the main remaining objective. Against this, the Turkish army was reported to have lost 41 soldiers killed in the action, with another 116 casualties in the FSA ranks.<sup>16</sup>

Tayyip Erdoğan's government probably had two objectives in launching the Afrin operation. Apart from removing a YPG enclave which was seen as a security threat, it would strengthen his domestic political credentials by winning the support of nationalist opinion, in the MHP and elsewhere. If there is ever an end-game in Syria's brutal civil war, then Turkey might use the territory it and its Syrian allies controlled as a bargaining chip. On the other hand, it carried some serious political risks and costs. A little-reported aspect was that representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, with which Turkey had hitherto had good relations, visited Afrin in February to show solidarity with their fellow Kurds, thus potentially depriving Turkey of its sole ally within a hitherto-divided Kurdish community.<sup>17</sup>

### **Turkey's relations with Russia remained a crucial issue**

A second, and more serious, risk was that the Turkish and pro-Turkish Syrian forces might run into a head-on collision with Syrian government troops, or pro-government militias, and hence potentially with Russia. Until late February, this danger seemed to have been averted, as Russia was evidently prepared to turn a blind eye to 'Operation Olive Branch', as the Turkish army called it – and even implied support for it, thanks to the link between the US and the YPG (which it naturally opposed – see below). Russia was also prepared to allow the Turkish air force free rein in Afrin, although it could easily have prevented it if it had chosen to do so. Thus when pro-Syrian government militias attempted to enter Afrin on 20 February they were repelled by Turkish artillery – according to Erdoğan, in agreement with President Putin and President Rouhani of Iran.<sup>18</sup> In a visit to Jordan on 19 February, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu had suggested that if the Syrian army were to clear the YPG from the border with Turkey, Turkey would have no objection, but would strongly oppose any attempt by Syria to prevent the defeat of the YPG in

No.56, (www.crisisgroup.org) 9 February 2018: Metin Gurcan, 'Turkey works to secure its future relevance in Syria', *Turkey Pulse*, 23 February 2018

<sup>16</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 20 January, 26 February, 3 March 2018.

<sup>17</sup> Amberin Zaman, 'KRG delegation arrives in Afrin as Turkey offensive softens Kurdish spit', *Turkey Pulse*, 13 February 2018

<sup>18</sup> Murat Yetkin, 'Russia backs Turkey in Syria against US', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 2 March 2018: Ayla Jean Yackley, 'Turkey shells pro-Assad militias entering Afrin to aid Kurdish rebels', *Turkey Pulse*, 20 February 2018.



Afrin. Following this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested publicly that Turkey should conduct a direct dialogue with Damascus to solve their differences over Afrin. This provoked anger in Ankara, where the government had long opposed any direct talks with Assad. Later, in a visit to West Africa, President Erdoğan brushed off the idea, claiming that “we have no trouble with Russia on Afrin”.<sup>19</sup> The Afrin operation came back into the headlines on 3 March, as it was reported that 36 pro-Assad militiamen established in a camp at Kafr Jirin, in the Afrin canton, had been killed in Turkish air attacks: (unreported in the Turkish press, they were said to have been there for the previous two weeks).<sup>20</sup> There was no immediate reaction from Russia, suggesting that Moscow had continued its policy of not physically opposing the Turkish operation. Without military support from Russia, especially in the air, Assad was not able to stop the Turkish action in Afrin.

Besides the important effects of the Afrin attack, Turkey was heavily involved with Russia on the diplomatic front, as attempts were made to push forward with the multilateral peace process initiated in Astana, capital of Kazakhstan, in 2017



(*Review* 29, pp.15-17). On 22 November 2017 Presidents Erdoğan, Putin and Rouhani met in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi. After the meeting, Erdoğan claimed that “we have agreed on an inclusive, free, fair and transparent political process under the leadership of the Syrian people”. According to Putin, the Syrian government would be committed to the peace process, constitutional reform and free elections.<sup>21</sup> The problem was that the Syrian

opposition doubted that this would be so. This became clear on 29-30 January 2018, when talks, optimistically entitled the ‘Syrian Congress of National Dialogue’, which included a Syrian government delegation, were held in Sochi. The ‘Dialogue’ was jointly sponsored by Russia, Turkey and Iran. It got off to a rocky start, as the Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC), the Syrian opposition’s umbrella group, voted not to attend, saying that it was designed to subtract from the UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva. The basic concern of the opposition was evidently that Russian pressure would endorse a plan which would allow the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad to stay in power during the transition process – and thus potentially indefinitely. Hence the FSA, with its strong links to Turkey, confirmed its boycott by saying that ‘this conference is tailor-made for Assad and his terrorist regime’.<sup>22</sup>

Turkey was evidently determined to keep the conference going if it could; accordingly its delegation undertook to speak in the opposition’s name. After the conference, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced its satisfaction with the results, since these included the formation of a constitutional commission for Syria. As prospective members of this, 50 names would be submitted by each of the three guarantor powers (Russia, Iran and Turkey). The UN Special Representative for Syria, Steffan de Mistura, would then decide the membership of the commission, of which one third would represent the Assad regime, one third the opposition, with one

<sup>19</sup> Semih Idiz, ‘Russia’s call for dialogue with Assad irritates Ankara’, *Turkey Pulse*, 27 February 2018: *Hürriyet Daily News*, 20 February, 3 March 2018.

<sup>20</sup> ‘Afrin offensive: 36 pro-Syrian government soldiers “killed in Turkish air strike”’, BBC News website, 3 March 2018.

<sup>21</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 November 2017.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 31 January 2018.

third of independent members. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, its list was composed in consultation with the Syrian opposition parties, and Turkey would monitor the composition of the commission in line with this. On paper, an advance had been secured. In practice, and although the Syrian regime was said to be angry with the result, it seemed likely that Russia would use the process to keep Assad in power, at least during the transition phase. As an indication of this, it was reported that Assad would agree to new elections to the (powerless) Syrian parliament, but not to the presidency, which he would continue to occupy.<sup>23</sup> This remained the most central political issue on which Russia and Turkey were divided, setting a severe ultimate limit to their overall political collaboration.

### **Turkey's relations with the US continued to follow a tortuous and conflictual path**

On 28 December, after months of wrangling, the Turkish and US governments agreed to end the row over issuing visas which had disrupted their relations since 8 October by re-starting normal procedures for the issue of visas to each other's citizens (*Review 30, p.9*).<sup>24</sup> However, this appeared to be the only definite advance in a relationship beset with complex issues.

One which obstinately continued, and seemed unlikely to be settled, was the Turkish demand that the Islamist teacher and activist, Fethullah Gülen, whose followers had played a crucial role in the organisation of the botched coup attempt of 15-16 July 2016, and had been resident in the US for many years, should be extradited to Turkey. Even if some officials in Washington might have been happy to get this issue out of the way, the decision would have to be made by the independent local court in Scranton, Pennsylvania, where Gülen is living. If the court's decision went against him, he could still appeal – ultimately, maybe, to the Supreme Court – so the case could drag on for years. On the other hand, the Turkish government could not drop the case without a severe loss of face, causing a constant irritant.

A second point of dispute, which had been brewing for some time, was the provisional Turkish decision to purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile system, which would be incompatible with NATO systems (*Review 30, p.11*). A credit agreement allowing the purchase of the S-400s came into effect at the end of 2017. In defence of this plan, it could be argued that the US Congress had, in effect, pushed Turkey over to the Russian side, due to its refusal to allow the sale of the US Patriot missile system to Turkey, used by the rest of NATO. In mid-February it was reported that President Trump was trying to work out ways of evading these bans, and that the issue had been discussed during Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's visit to Ankara on 15-16 February 2018, but there were no clear signs that the problem was being overcome.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 1 February 2018: Ibrahim Hamidi, for the London daily *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 'Anger in Damascus over Sochi's closing statement', translation from *Syrian Observer* website (<http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Commentary>) 2 February 2018: Joost Hiltermann, 'From Vienna to Sochi', *Valdai Club* website (<http://valdaiclub.com>) 30 January 2018.

<sup>24</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 28 December 2017

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 24 February 2018: Murat Yetkin, 'Turkey buys Russian missiles thanks to the US', *ibid*, 29 December 2017.

The most serious issue, however, arose from the two countries' conflicting policies in Syria. Since neither the administration, nor Congress or the American public, were prepared to commit substantial ground forces to Syria, the US military had to construct a proxy force from among the fractured Syrian opposition to help overcome the threat from the murderous Islamic State movement (IS) and protect its own interests. In doing so, it had to avoid the risk of a head-on collision with the Assad regime, and thus, potentially, with Russia. Given that most of the non-IS Sunni-Arab opposition had Islamist roots, was internally divided, and bitterly opposed to Assad, the US turned to the Syrian Kurdish minority, which had cooperated with Assad during the early stages of the civil war. Although it did not enjoy full support from Syria's Kurds, the PYD/YPG organisation seemed the only body which fitted the bill. Accordingly, it was supported by the US with money and weapons, having been grouped with some Arab militia units under the new label of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (*Review 30, p.9*).

Given that the PYD was widely regarded as the Syrian extension of the PKK – and was occasionally referred to as such by US officialdom<sup>26</sup> – the US-YPG alliance was bound to provoke bitter reactions in Ankara. These were complicated by mixed signals coming from Washington. There were suspicions that the US military was independently determining US strategy in the region, and that this reflected a general incoherence in the Trump administration's policies (or lack of them).<sup>27</sup> On 28 November 2017 Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım claimed that President Trump had admitted that it was 'wrong' to supply arms to the YPG,<sup>28</sup> but there was no sign that this was affecting US policy on the ground. Previously, the administration had maintained that the alliance with the YPG would only be good so long as the struggle against IS lasted, and that once IS had been defeated<sup>29</sup> – as it largely had been by the beginning of 2018 – cooperation with the YPG/SDF would be broken off. Nonetheless, on 14 January it was reported that the US military was working with the SDF, in which the YPG was dominant, to set up a 30,000-strong border force as a lasting element. Later, this was re-defined by the Pentagon as a 'stabilisation' or 'hold force'. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson claimed on 18 January that the US had no intention of building a Syria-Turkey border force. To add to the confusion, Turkish presidential aide İbrahim Kalın later stated that US Security Advisor Raymond McMaster had told him on 26 January that the US would 'no longer give weapons' to the YPG.<sup>30</sup> There was a similar lack of clarity in the US attitude towards the Afrin operation, with Rex Tillerson admitting on 23 January that Turkey had legitimate security concerns, but criticising the Afrin operation as a distraction from the remaining campaign against IS.

Another long-standing bone of contention was the fate of the northern Syrian town of Manbij, which had been occupied by the YPG in 2016, in defiance of the Turkish demand that the Kurdish forces should not be stationed west of the river Euphrates.

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<sup>26</sup> For instance, on 25 January 2018, State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert, in discussing the Afrin operation, openly referred to the YPG as 'the PKK'. Similarly, a report to Congress prepared by US National Security Director Daniel Coats and presented on 13 February described the YPG as 'the Syrian militia of the Kurdistan Workers Party': *ibid*, 26 January, 14 February 2018.

<sup>27</sup> Murat Yetkin, 'Is disorder in DC deepening Turkey-US rift?', *ibid*, 19 January 2018: 'Is the military running US foreign policy?', *ibid*, 25 January 2018.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 28 November 2017.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 14 January, 18 January, 19 January, 27 January 2018

On 24 August 2016 the then US Vice-President Joe Biden had been in Ankara, emphasising that ‘we have made it absolutely clear that they [the YPG forces] must go back across the [Euphrates] river. They cannot, and will not, under no circumstances, get American support if they do not keep that commitment’ (*Review 28, pp.12-13*).<sup>31</sup> However, neither the Obama nor Trump administrations have stood by this promise, allowing YPG forces to continue to occupy Manbij, and even reinforcing them with some US ground troops. It was probably the latter which deterred the Turkish forces from attacking Manbij as part of the ‘Euphrates Shield’ operation. Tayyip Erdoğan refused to back down on this issue, repeating the message that the US must carry out its undertakings on Manbij, but it was clear that, if the dispute were to be settled, this would have to be by diplomacy. The problem was tackled head-on on 15 February, when Rex Tillerson visited Ankara for talks with Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu. Although the two sides evidently remained far apart on this and other disputes, they agreed to set up three joint committees aimed at normalising relations, to meet in mid-March. The first of these would address the Manbij issue, the second the Turkish demand for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, and the S-400 question, and the third the less contentious question of the situation in Iraq.<sup>32</sup>

### **Turkey’s relations with the EU have remained stalled –**

Thanks to its deteriorating human rights regime, and the reluctance of several European Union governments to adhere to the Union’s commitment to the aim of the eventual accession of Turkey, relations between Ankara and Brussels have remained in the doldrums, with some serious points of conflict. What needs to be remembered, however, is that in spite of all the problems, and the supposed rise of political Islamism, a large and increasing majority of Turkish citizens still supports the principle of eventual accession. Hence, any Turkish government, whatever its ideological orientation, and in spite of frequent criticisms of EU policies, would be very ill-advised to abandon this aim. As an example, a public opinion survey carried out in 2017 and published in January 2018 by the Turkish Economic Development Foundation (İKV) found that 78.9 percent of its respondents supported the idea of EU accession, against 21.1 percent opposing it – an increase of 17 percentage points since a similar survey carried out in 2015. Interestingly, while 48 percent cited a prospective ‘increase in the level of welfare and economic development’ as the main reason for their support, 34.5 percent put ‘democracy and human rights will improve’ at the head of the list, with 38 percent citing the possibility of free movement between Turkey and the EU as the main reason for their support. Realistically, however, only 31 percent thought that Turkey would become a member in the near future, with 69 percent taking the contrary view.<sup>33</sup>

Predictably, the deterioration in Turkey’s human rights regime was the main reason cited by European leaders for the apparent deadlock in Turkey-EU relations. In response, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that she had asked the

<sup>31</sup> Quoted, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 August 2016

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 26 February, 28 February, 1 March 2018: ‘Syria conflict: US and Turkey agree to avert Manbij clash’, BBC News website, 16 February 2018: Semih İdiz, ‘Despite progress on paper, Turkey, US still leagues apart’, *Turkey Pulse*, 20 February 2018: Fehim Tastekin, ‘Turkey’s march on Manbij stalled by wall of reality’, *ibid*, 23 February 2018.

<sup>33</sup> *Türkiye Kamuoyunda AB Desteği ve Avrupa Algısı; Kamuoyu Araştırması 2017*, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları No. 295 (Istanbul, 2018) Tables 15, 16, 28.



EU Commission to reduce the level of pre-accession aid to Turkey. Although this idea was supported by the governments of the Netherlands and Belgium, it was not taken up by the Commission. On the other hand, President Erdoğan continued to get a tough message from European leaders. In a visit to Paris on 5 January 2018, he was told by President Emmanuel Macron that it was time to end the pretence that there was any prospect of an advance in the stalled membership talks with Turkey. The same message was repeated by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the EU Commission, who stated on 12 January that there would be no progress in Turkey-EU relations so long as Turkish journalists remained in prison. President Macron accepted the need to maintain a close relationship with Ankara, and suggested that this might be the moment to explore an option short of full EU membership. This idea, of 'privileged partnership', as it was referred to by President Macron's predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel's CDU-CSU party, was immediately rejected in Ankara, where the Minister for EU Affairs Ömer Çelik confirmed that his government would 'not even consider it', and would continue to pursue the idea of full membership.<sup>34</sup>

### **– but there are weaknesses on both sides**

The EU's reluctance to advance its relations with Turkey so long as the government's current repression of the opposition continues can be seen as quite justified, and is probably supported by liberal opinion within Turkey, which would value a 'European anchor' for democracy in the country. However, there are also some serious weaknesses on the European side, which reduce its authority on these issues. Apart from the obvious and chronic mistake of admitting Cyprus to the EU while excluding the Turkish Cypriots, and thus creating a constant stumbling block in Turkey-EU relations, the fact that several governments and individual parties in the EU reject full membership for Turkey seriously weakens its leverage over Ankara. What was the point of trying to meet the EU's democratic standards, some Turks might argue, if it was not ultimately prepared to admit Turkey as a full member anyway, dismissing the Turks as 'non-European'? The point was underlined in December 2017 when a new right-wing government under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz took office in Austria, with a programme which undertook to terminate the Turkish accession process, and to win allies in Europe to achieve this. This declaration was probably issued mainly for the domestic audience, and unlikely to win majority support in the rest of the EU. However, it provoked a not unjustified response from Minister Çelik, who complained of the rise of 'anti-Islam, anti-Semitic, anti-migration and xenophobic political parties' in Europe.<sup>35</sup> On another issue, Tayyip Erdoğan had reason on his side, when he complained to Chancellor Merkel at the end of November 2017 that, under an agreement reached in March 2016, the EU had undertaken to provide six billion Euros to help Turkey cope with more than three million Syrian refugees in Turkey, but had actually supplied only €800 million.<sup>36</sup> Thanks to the importance of the refugee deal to Europe, the weight of bargaining power was not entirely on the EU side.

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<sup>34</sup> 'Macron tells Erdogan: No chance of Turkey joining EU', BBC News website, 5 January 2018: *Hürriyet Daily News*, 12 January, 13 January 2018.

<sup>35</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 December 2017.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 30 November 2017.

## In early 2018 a crisis seems to have been avoided

With apparent anxiety on both sides about the risk of a head-on collision, moves to relax the tension between Turkey and the EU became apparent in February 2018. On 15 February Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım paid his first visit to Berlin for talks with Chancellor Merkel: (the fact that this coincided with the release of Deniz Yücel – see above – was probably not just an accident). Merkel took the visit as a ‘signal, showing that both sides have an interest in improving German-Turkish relations’ and promised that there would be ‘intensive discussions’ on bilateral problems.<sup>37</sup> On the following day, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu met his German counterpart Sigmar Gabriel on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, at which the two ministers pledged to ‘strengthen and deepen our bilateral relations’.<sup>38</sup> Coincidentally, an unexpected confirmation of the importance of Turkey for Europe came from the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland. This was of some importance, since although the Council is organisationally separate from the European Union, Turkey is a full member of it, and the Council’s Court of Human Rights has responsibility for enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Turkey is required to adhere. Predictably, Jagland emphasised the large number of violations of the Convention by Turkey. He pointed out that prosecution of those responsible for the attempted coup of 15-16 July 2016 should be in conformity with its rules. Nevertheless, he stressed that ‘Turkey belongs to Europe’, and that if Turkey were ever to be pushed away from Europe the continent would suffer ‘many more problems than it experiences today’.<sup>39</sup> Jagland’s remarks illustrated the essential dilemma faced by the European institutions in their approach to Turkey: on the one hand, they need to keep up the pressure on human rights issues if they could – on the other hand, extinguishing the light at the end of the tunnel would probably make the situation far worse.



### – and there is just the possibility of progress on the EU visa regime

Whether this improvement in the diplomatic mood music would have any effects on the important practical issues which separated the two sides remained uncertain. On the central question of a resumption of accession negotiations, there seemed to be very little hope of any progress so long as the State of Emergency continued – and there was no sign that the government was ready to end it. One problem which had been held in abeyance for over a year seemed to offer a slight hope of solution, however. In 2016 Turkey pressed for an easing of the visa regime for Turkish citizens visiting the Schengen zone countries, in line with that offered to some other non-EU European countries. To achieve this, Turkey was required to meet 72 criteria on human rights and other issues, of which all but seven had been achieved by 2017. To complete the process, Turkey needed to make important changes to its anti-terrorist legislation. On 7 February 2018 the Turkish government submitted proposals on changes to the law which it hoped could be discussed at a Turkey-EU summit in March. Whether its proposals would be accepted by the EU remained unclear, and the Turkish side apparently recognised that it would take a maximum of eighteen months to finalise an agreement.<sup>40</sup> Nonetheless, there did appear to be

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 16 February 2018.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 17 February 2017.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 17 February 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 8 February 2018.



some prospect of an agreement on this issue. This would have important benefits for the many Turkish citizens with relatives in Europe if it could be achieved.



## Roller- coaster economy

2017- 2018

by

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2017 was another roller-coaster year for the Turkish economy as the fiscal and credit stimulus delivered a double-digit GDP growth in the third quarter but also a surge in the current account deficit. The good news in 2017 was the recovery in growth from the shock of the 2016 attempted coup. But the economic recovery has been drowned out by political repercussions of the coup-attempt grinding through Turkish society and, linked to this, a series of diplomatic crises with regional allies and the US. These crises weakened the currency and, combined with the fiscal and credit, stimulus brought double-digit inflation.

2018 looks to be another volatile year with the key driver of economic policy, the upcoming presidential election, due by 2019 (but which may be held this year). The tiff over Qatar with Saudi Arabia and the UAE seems contained and relations with the EU appear patched up. But, international and regional relations are still a source of risk as tensions with the US remain high: 2018 began with the clash in military strategy in Syria that brought capital outflows and a dive in the Lira. There is more to come: the banking sector is bracing itself against the potential negative impact of the Halk Bank/Zarrab trial and the decision from OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) in the US regarding US sanctions on Iran.

### Capital markets “not that bothered”

All this is a boon for capital markets which thrive on volatility. Indeed, despite increased strategic risks, the Istanbul stock market kept climbing in 2017; it reached new highs early in 2018 on the news that the unused part of the CGF (Credit Guarantee Fund) could be rolled over into the new year. In the search for higher yields, international investors are not that bothered. At the end of January, in the midst of the Turkish army’s Afrin operation, a \$500m international bond issue by petrochemicals producer Petkim to finance the Star refinery (see below) was three times oversubscribed. Despite a couple of weeks of outflows, foreign purchases of government bonds took net portfolio inflows up to almost \$1bn since the start of the year to end-February.

### Inflation remains a problem

But this roller-coaster is preventing the return of confidence of domestic savers in the Turkish Lira who keep their savings in foreign currency (FX) and gold. FX bank

deposits stood at 44.2% of total at end-2017, up from 32% in 2012. The weakness of the currency in turn is keeping inflation expectations high. In 2017, the central bank (CBT) effective interest rate hikes of 500 basis points was not enough. Inflation is still double the target rate even though by February 2018 it had eased to 10.1% from last year's peak of 13% in November. Struggling against persistent political interference, the CBT has been reluctant to take a more aggressive stance, instead continuing with unorthodox policies and an array of macro-prudential measures (such as limits on foreign currency borrowing that were recently tightened) to control liquidity.

The new Presidential economic spokeswoman Hatice Karahan stated that inflationary pressures will ease in 2018 on base effects and the slowdown in credit growth evident in the fourth quarter of 2017. However, higher oil prices, lira depreciation, higher food prices due to prolonged draught and structural rigidities in distribution, hikes in administered prices such as in energy by BOTAS, and a Central bank reluctant to take decisive action in the lead up to the presidential election could combine to keep inflation high.

### **GDP growth to moderate in 2018**

Third quarter 2017 GDP growth was 11.1% up on the same period in 2016 when the economy had contracted 0.8%. As before the main drivers were the services sector and private consumption. Net exports made a negative contribution to growth with real imports growth surpassing exports. Although third quarter growth raised fears of an overheated economy, monthly data since then showed that the momentum of growth has slowed as the impact of the post-failed-coup stimulus waned. This factor will be more evident once the fourth quarter data becomes available because incentives on credit, durable goods and house and automotive purchases put in place after July 2016 terminated at the end of September 2017. However, growth for 2017 as a whole is still expected to be 6-7% but then slowing to around 4% in 2018 according to most forecasts.

### **The gold and oil imports widen the current account deficit in 2017**

The 2017 current account deficit (CAD) surged at the end of the year to \$47.1bn. Sharp increase in gold imports and a higher energy import bill as oil prices rose were the main factors driving the widening of the trade balance. Excluding gold and energy trade, strong exports and a recovery in tourism reduced the deficit to \$4bn – called the core current account deficit. This was an improvement on the \$10.9bn core deficit in 2016. The gold trade remains a bit of a mystery. Some possible causes of the rise in gold imports could be more domestic savings being put into gold, the central bank building up its gold reserves (see below), growth of the jewellery sector (imposition of VAT in the UAE has shifted many jewellers to Turkey), or payments for oil/gas imports. But there has been little official explanation. Responding to reporters' questions in Davos in January, Mehmet Şimşek promised he will ask the Central Bank to report on the gold trade.

### **...and it is likely to stay that way**

With oil prices expected in the range of \$60-70 per barrel in 2018, the period of low oil price windfall for the Turkish economy is now over. Unless there is a dramatic change in the net gold trade that contributed some \$10bn to the deficit, the 2018 current account deficit is not expected to fall much. At around 4-5% of GDP, it is one of the biggest among the major emerging markets. Funding the surge in the deficit at

the end of the year required a big drawdown in central bank FX reserves to make up for the shortfall in capital inflows. Central bank FX reserves fell from a high of \$95bn in October 2017 to \$83bn by the end of December according to Central bank data (this excludes central bank gold reserves which rose from \$14bn at end-2016 to \$23.5bn, partly explaining the high gold imports). This is a major weakness for the economy as the government FX reserves cover only around half of Turkey's gross external financing needs in 2018. The other main risk is the heavy reliance on fickle portfolio inflows to fund the bulk of the CAD. This was possible in 2017 as capital flows were attracted to big emerging markets such as Turkey but is likely to be more difficult to sustain as the US Federal Reserve raises interest rates.

### **IMF compliments Turkey on hosting Syrian refugees**

In the concluding statement of the Article IV review of the Turkish economy published on February 16, Turkey received a rare compliment from the International Monetary Fund on the country's "generosity in hosting refugees (that) serves as a global example". The IMF also noted that Turkey's prudent fiscal stance has been one of its strengths and "welcomed" the expiration of the tax breaks that supported the economy in 2016-17 as well as new tax measures including increased corporate, consumption and motor vehicles taxes, reductions of income tax exemptions, and the ongoing restructuring of the VAT system.

### **...but also highlighted policy risks**

However, the IMF warned that there was a "growing gap" between tax revenues and primary spending (on public sector wages, subsidies, and transfers) and the increase in off-budget items such as government guarantees on public-privately funded projects. On the latter, the Finance Ministry has already introduced measures to control off-budget items creating a new Tek Hazine Hesabı (Single Treasury Account) that will pool the financial transactions of off-budget funds (though not yet the State Enterprises or local authorities).

However, the re-introduction this year of a new set of ad-hoc tax exemptions and subsidies such as on employment and agriculture suggest warnings to curb the rise in primary spending are not likely to be heeded as the government gears up for the presidential election. There is also the pressure from the rise in defence spending. With the public debt to GDP a moderate 28%, there is some room for manoeuvre on fiscal policy. Also, the high import tax revenues from surging imports kept the budget deficit in 2017 smaller than expected despite higher than planned spending (up 16 %). The Medium Term Plan had expected a 2% GDP deficit in 2017, but it is now estimated at around 1.5% of GDP. It is one of those peculiarities of the relatively open Turkish economy that when the current account balance deteriorates due to higher imports, the budget benefits.

### **Similar warnings from business leaders**

There were similar warnings in the new year from business leaders that monetary and fiscal policies needed to be tightened to avoid another 'depreciation-inflation spiral' referring to increased cost pressures from the persistent depreciation of the currency and rising energy bills. TÜŞİAD High Advisory Council Chairman Tuncay Özilhan warned that Turkey should "normalize" policies rapidly. This seems to apply not just to economic policy as TÜŞİAD also warned against restricting debate and freedom of speech saying that democracy and national security are not opposites

but complement each other. (*Dünya, Tüsiad'dan düşünce özgürlüğü vurgusu*, 2 Feb 2018).

These warnings from TÜŞİAD are also unlikely to be heeded. On the other hand, long running farmers' complaints of high energy costs are being addressed this year (is there a key election coming up by any chance?). Prime Minister Yıldırım promised to pay half the fuel costs in farming in 2018, tripling energy subsidies to agriculture from April onwards. (*Dünya, 2018'de tarıma yön verecek 5 yeni uygulama*, 29 Dec 2017).

### Efforts to contain the energy import bill

Driven by the need to contain the energy import bill, the government unveiled a comprehensive plan in the new year to increase energy efficiency in the economy



and a focus on renewables. In addition, a major increase in hydroelectric supply will come from the Iisu dam that will begin filling its reservoir in the next few months. Once fully operating, its electric power capacity will be the fourth biggest after the Atatürk, Karakaya, and Keban dams. These will take a few years to have an impact. But quicker help should come from

savings on the imports of refined products when the new Star Refinery built by Azerbaijan's oil company SOCAR in Aliaga comes on-stream this year. Many years in the planning, it will add another 10m tons to the existing 28m tons of refined products output of TÜPRAŞ. Import substitution is also the aim in the \$1bn petrochemicals plant announced in February to be built in joint venture between Algeria's SONATRACH and two Turkish firms Ronesans and Bayegan in the Yumurtalık Free Trade Zone.

### ...and a move up the technology chain in the automotive sector

The automotive sector broke several records in 2017 producing 1.7 million units. Turkey now produces 2% of world output and is the 5th largest in the EU. The biggest producer as before was TOFAŞ (Fiat-Koc JV). Most of the production -- 1.3million -- was exported mostly to the EU with the leading exporter being Ford-Otosan. However, net export revenues of the sector are barely positive due to the high imports of components and imported cars. Imports accounted for around half of domestic car sales; but the weaker Lira in 2017 resulted in a 10% decline in imported cars, while boosting purchases of local models.

This high import content of the sector and reliance on assembly line manufacture has been criticised for many years. There is finally a national campaign backed by the government to produce a 'local car'. A consortium of five Turkish companies have been selected consisting of Zorlu (electronics, home appliances), Turkcell (telecom), Kiraca (Karsan bus manufacturer), Anadolu Group (commercial vehicles), and BMC (former British Motor Corporation, now a Turkish entity producing military vehicles). There is fierce competition for the location of production with Konya in the lead and the plan is to go beyond the combustion engine and aim for hybrid or electric motors. A prototype is to be produced by 2019 and production to begin by 2021.

### ...as Turkish economy gears up for difficult global conditions

In addition to the regional geo- strategic risks, global conditions for the Turkish economy are becoming more difficult in almost every way. International interest rates and oil prices are rising; there are increasing protectionist measures against Emerging Market exports in the bigger advanced economies; and FDI inflows look set to be negatively affected by on-shoring by multinational firms. In this more competitive global environment, investments such as above in energy and automotive will help to chip away at imports and boost exports to reduce the foreign payments gap.

But it is not clear if the AKP leaders understand the scale of the change that is needed in the current growth model that has relied on external funding and construction and credit-led growth. Business community and some members of the economic policy team such as Şimşek and Ağbal do seem to understand the challenge. There is for example increased focus on raising the national savings rate with new incentives to save for old age through the private pension scheme (BES). But then there are the political heavyweights who do not. It is telling that in response to signs of aging demographics in recent years, leading AKP figures suggested women have at least three children rather than seek an answer in increasing the participation of women in employment (at 34% it is half the average rate in the OECD) and other measures to boost productivity.

The AKP government came to power after the implementation of deep structural reforms in the 2001 crisis and an investment recovery in the Turkish economy. The economy also benefited from the initial positive sentiment from the start of accession negotiations for EU membership and an unprecedented wave of globalisation and historically low interest rates. Compared with current trends, those were very different conditions.

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## Update on Cyprus April 2018

by **Clement Dodd**

Readers interested in the Cyprus problem will recall that the latest round of the UN sponsored negotiations between the two sides was held in Crans Montana in Switzerland in the summer of 2017. These negotiations, followed earlier meetings of both sides in Geneva with ministers of the Guarantor Powers of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which created the Republic of Cyprus 'as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution'.

### UN Negotiations, 2017



Much was expected from these new negotiations, especially as the new UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, was present at the negotiating table for a while. Nevertheless they broke down.

Most important of the issues to be agreed was the Turkish Cypriot representatives' demand for a Turkish guarantee of their security in the



proposed federation under discussion. This would entail the presence of some Turkish troops in the Turkish Cypriot federal state. For the Greek Cypriot representatives this was unacceptable. In this they had the full support of Greece, one of the Guarantor Powers of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Closely following the course of the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus, and Greece, demanded the abolition of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, and the full withdrawal of all Turkish troops, or their inclusion in a small international security force to include both Greek and Turkish troops. This made some headway, but there was no agreement on how long such a force would remain in Cyprus.

An important issue for the Turkish Cypriots was their insistence that the presidency of the proposed Federal republic should be occupied in turn by the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot president, the former serving for two years and the latter for one. The Turkish Cypriot President, Mustafa Akıncı, has recently claimed that the negotiation process is still blocked on this issue. 'on which Anastasiades has still not yet given a clear message to his community.'<sup>41</sup>

In these recent negotiations the Greek Cypriot side wanted the return of Morphou (Güzelyurt) to their state, but the Turkish Cypriots proposed to return only part of the city and its area. These and other issues were left unresolved.



For instance, the Greek Cypriots want 28 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot coastline, which is currently 57 per cent of the island coastline. They also call for the return to the North of some 100,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who fled to the south in 1974.

An issue of some concern for some Turkish Cypriots, though on occasion ignored, is that the proposed federation would become a member of the European Union. Some Turkish Cypriots are aware that through the operation of the EU *acquis* the Turkish federal state and society could come to be infiltrated and dominated by the larger Greek Cypriot economy and society.<sup>42</sup> In these circumstances the Turkish Cypriots would find it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to insist, as many always do, on their cherished need for bi-zonality and bi-communality in any federal settlement with the Greek Cypriots that entailed Turkish Cypriot membership of the European Union.

### **Elections in the TRNC**

In January 2018 the Turkish Cypriots went to the polls to elect a new parliament, and government. It was expected that the party in power, the National Unity Party (UBP) would return to office, but it won only 21 seats in the fifty-member National Assembly. The UBP had been much criticised when in office for alleged corruption and inefficiency in government.

On 1 February the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the People's Party (HP), the Communal Democratic Party (TDP) and the Democratic Party formed a coalition

<sup>41</sup> As reported in 'News Headlines', TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 April, 2018

<sup>42</sup> If Turkey were to join the European Union, Greek Cypriots might well find it difficult to prevent being dominated by the much larger, and contiguous, Turkish economy. Not surprisingly President Anastasiades has vowed always to vote against Turkish membership of the European Union.



government. The leader of the moderate left Republican Turkish Party (CTP), Tufan Erhuman, has become Prime Minister in the coalition government, with Kudret Özersay, leader of the relatively new People's Party as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>43</sup> He gets along well with the Turkish Government, and firmly believes justice requires that the TRNC should be internationally recognised, and no longer subject to economic and other embargoes. He is already a leading light in the new government.

The parties forming the new government are collectively supported by 55 per cent of the TRNC electorate, but it has only 27 seats in the fifty-member National Assembly, which will need careful management. The Turkish Government has welcomed the new coalition government, but is waiting to see if the coalition has a common vision on the Cyprus problem. Meanwhile the new government has expressed its appreciation of the substantial Turkish aid directed to the development of the economy. In 2017 the TRNC was able to finance 83 percent of the TRNC budget, a 10 per cent increase over the situation in the previous year.<sup>44</sup>

### Presidential Election in the South

On 4 February 2018 President Nicos Anastasiades was re-elected President in a second round of the presidential elections. In his campaign he stressed that Cyprus would contribute to a common EU foreign policy, that Cyprus would strengthen its ties with the Gulf States, and would also seek a formal linkage of the EU's Mediterranean states with neighbouring countries.

The new Foreign Minister is Nicos Christodoulides. He declared that that "here will be no further talks on the reunification of the island while Turkey continues to block Cypriot gas and oil exploration". He was referring to Turkish military operations in the Cyprus self-declared Exclusive Economic Zone some fifty miles off the southern coast of the island, which has become an important issue between the two sides, and to which we now turn.



Drilling platform outside from Larnaca port

### The Conflict Over Oil and Gas Exploration

In spring this year Turkey's naval forces prevented the drillship of a large Italian Oil company working for the Greek Cypriots from entering the Cyprus zone, and reaching its target off the shores of Cyprus. This issue was brought up by Cyprus at the EU's Varna summit on 26 March, but with little positive response for the Greek Cypriots, while in Brussels Turkey's action only resulted in a statement of condemnation. There was no rift in Turkish- Italian relations: the Italian oil company decided not to test the waters again, aware that, if it did, the Turkish Government would prevent it from doing so. The Greek Cypriots are clearly mistaken in thinking that the oil companies will support them against Turkey.

This issue is of considerable importance to the Turkish Cypriots, and to Turkey. This is because in the Republic of Cyprus, established in 1960, the Turkish Cypriots were a junior partner in government, not a minority, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President having considerable veto powers. Therefore any decision to explore for oil in, and

<sup>43</sup> An academic by profession, Kudret Özersay was chief official negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots during the presidency of Derviş Eroğlu.

<sup>44</sup> As reported in the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (News Letter), February, 2018, p.8

around, Cyprus would have to be with Turkish Cypriot approval. However, they are now denied the right to challenge this decision because the Greek Cypriots unilaterally changed the 1960 Constitution in their own favour, a move then accepted by the UN Security Council. This raises the large issue of the alleged illegality of the UN's lack of respect for the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which has resulted in general acceptance of Greek Cypriot sovereignty over all of Cyprus.<sup>45</sup> Yet the UN is a political, not a legal institution. The proper body to decide on such an important judicial issue is surely the International Court of Justice.

### **The Future**

There is little desire in the TRNC for future negotiations, though President Akıncı is toying with the idea of tackling particular issues at stake between the two sides one by one – the difficult Varosha problem, for instance. Many former Greek Cypriot residents, who numbered some 16,000 might well want to return there, and live under Turkish Cypriot rule, or claim compensation for lost property. There would be problems. For instance, would the Greek Cypriot Government recognise, and deal with, an elected Greek Cypriot mayor of Varosha?<sup>46</sup> Also it is very unlikely that such a concession by the Turkish Cypriots would be matched by, say, Greek Cypriot recognition of the TRNC, or even of its airport.

On the issue of future negotiations there is very little or no desire for them in the North, where they are now regarded as a waste of time. President Akıncı has accepted a lunch invitation by President Anastasiades, but says that it is not the beginning of new negotiations, which he sees as blocked on the issue of the rotating presidency.

With the failure of the recent negotiations the two-state solution is now being much discussed by the Turkish Cypriots, but has not emerged yet from Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot side as a Plan B. It is generally realised that a two-state solution is anything but popular in the South, even though it could be the best solution for both sides. Nor would it necessarily affect the operation of the British bases, and other British facilities, in the South.

For a two-state settlement the Turkish Cypriots might be prepared to reduce its share of territory from the present 36 percent to about the 29 per cent that has been suggested during recent negotiations and a figure the late President Rauf Denktaş had in mind in much earlier negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. It is arguable that what these two Cypriot neighbours really need is a good fence between them, internationally recognised, and manned for a while, if need be, by UN forces. The current vogue for solving conflicts by having disputants under one, say, EU roof, is not necessarily good sense. With an international boundary between the two states the Greek Cypriots would not need to be alarmed by the presence of Turkish troops in the Turkish Cypriot state, but in fact there would be little need for them. With no solution the TRNC seems inevitably to become closer and closer to Turkey, even although many Turkish Cypriots do not want that to happen. Cyprus badly needs a Plan B that confronts the present realities of the Cyprus problem. Most of all, the Greek Cypriots need to realise that, in the absence of a solution, Turkey will


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<sup>45</sup>For the legal arguments see Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, revised second edition, Oxford, OUP, 1993, pp.238-9.

<sup>46</sup> These and other important issues that would arise are examined by Yusuf Kanlı in *Hurriyet Daily News*, 1 August 2017.

inevitably figure ever more largely in the TRNC, and that there will always be Turkish troops in Cyprus, clearly a matter of great concern for the Greek Cypriots. New initiatives are needed now since a federal solution does not seem to be the solution, as the UN now also seems to realise.

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## TURKEY TOURISM

by Jeremy Seal  
Travel Writer, Journalist &  
Broadcaster on Turkey

I've been writing about travel to Turkey for the best part of three decades, often for publications including *The Sunday Times*, *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Australian* but, as I look back at my cuttings, I'm especially struck by one fact: just four years ago I was detailing complex strategies to avoid the crowds at ancient sites such as Ephesus and Istanbul's Aya Sofya Basilica, or explaining how to time visits carefully to the city's Grand Bazaar to avoid the hordes from the cruise ships.

One thing we can safely say is that the queues are no longer a problem for visitors to Turkey. Since 2015, with the country's slide into authoritarianism and civil unrest – suicide bombs, assassinations, attacks on Istanbul's airports, an attempted coup, and the xenophobia issuing from a largely government-controlled media – the problem has been the acute shortage of visitors. Numbers, especially from western Europe, have collapsed, causing the closure of many of the specialist UK companies that once served the country. Upmarket villa operator Exclusive Escapes, Anatolian Sky, Elixir and archaeology specialist Westminster Classic Tours all gave up the fight as their clientele evaporated, citing security fears and, in some cases, ethical objections to the repressive regime of President Erdoğan. The mass market followed suit, scaling back its operations dramatically.

All of this has had a drastic effect upon the livelihoods of the millions of Turks who make a living from tourism. Hotel staff have been laid off in their thousands and tour guides have seen their rates plummet; bars stand empty and even famed restaurants such as Lokanta Maya in Istanbul's Karaköy district have closed. In the Grand Bazaar there is understandable despair. There has been some adapting, not least as Turkey's burgeoning middle class has begun to holiday in significant numbers and at least the Russians are back after the boycott the Kremlin imposed in retaliation for Turkey shooting down one of their fighter jets in 2015, but this welcome business goes nowhere near closing the gap. This leaves people in Turkey's tourism sector wondering what it will take for their European guests to start returning.

I have been visiting Turkey all through the troubles and can confirm I've encountered no difficulties whatsoever. The traditional hospitality – which in Turkey goes far

beyond the reality elsewhere, whatever national tourist offices may claim – remains entirely unaffected and prices, especially for accommodation, have plummeted by two thirds or more. Flights with Turkish Airlines are also extremely competitive. And the plunging lira, at nearly five to the British pound – currently its lowest rate for many years – only confirms the excellent value the country currently offers the visitor.

The reality of the security situation is that while Europe saw multiple attacks during 2017, not least in London, Turkey's last comparable atrocity took place in the early hours of New Year's Day when a gunman attacked an Istanbul nightclub. There have been plenty of other outrageous incidents, not least the purge of tens of thousands of individuals, but Turkey's tourism sector has remained largely unaffected.

Also noteworthy is that the country's troubled years happen to have coincided with some spectacular cultural and archaeological discoveries. New museums at Van, a long overdue window on Eastern Turkey's spectacular Urartian civilisation, and at



Troy are soon to be unveiled. The one at Urfa in southeast Turkey, not far from the spectacular Neolithic site at Göbekli Tepe, has also been getting rave reviews (I'm due there soon to see for myself). There has been amazing excavation work in the Meander Valley where a vast and pristine Roman-era stadium has been uncovered at Magnesia. The same is also true of Laodikeia, near Denizli, where a vast city from the early Christian era has emerged.

While there have been casualties, the outstanding hotels have survived. I spent a few blissful days last October at the Villa Mahal in Kalkan, a hotel that has had a deeper influence upon the individual and upmarket end of Turkey's tourism scene than any other. This is down to the vision and ever-present attention of owner İpek Tolbaş, who has made the Villa Mahal not so much her work but her life, and it shows. I had barely arrived before the delights of the Turkish Riviera at its best – simple style, superb food, effortless service, the sea beyond a tumble of terraces shaded by olive trees – had begun to work its alchemy upon me.




In recent years I myself have been trying to do my bit for the country's tourism sector by developing a small cultural touring programme of my own ([www.somewherewonderful.com/tours/](http://www.somewherewonderful.com/tours/)), largely using traditional timber *gulet* schooners ([www.somewhere wonderful.com/gulets/](http://www.somewhere wonderful.com/gulets/)) to explore the landscapes and classical sites along the Carian and Lycian coasts in the country's southwest. This has been in response to the gratifying refusal of a hard core of Turkey fans, many of them former clients of Westminster Classic Tours, even to countenance the possibility that their favourite holiday of the year might no longer be available to them.

In partnership with Yunus Özdemir, a brilliant walking and archaeology guide, I began in 2017 when we succeeded in running two highly successful tours along the Turkish coast. There were issues – not least the spat which caused the Turks to block visits by US passport holders, and the Turkish ban on their *gulets* from visiting adjacent Greek islands such as Symi and Rhodes. But there were also glorious advantages. In many ways 2017 was a throwback to the 1990s, when few visitors had yet discovered the joys of the *gulet* holiday. We had overnight anchorages to ourselves, and even the more popular ancient sites like the Lycian capital at Xanthos were all but deserted. Nor was there at any point the least suggestion of heightened security issues in the local region. We had a joyous time, not least because of Yunus Özdemir's intimate knowledge of these areas, the local people and the outstanding places to eat.

2018 looks to be a better year, if not for the people suffering from Erdogan's judiciary, then certainly for the country's tourism sector. There has been considerably more interest in our programme for this year, which now includes some short inland forays such as to the Meander Valley region and to hinterland Cappadocia, troglodytic centre of eleventh-century monasticism. Part of me secretly hopes, of course, that the crowds continue to stay away; but the more generous part knows that these places, and the people who serve them, deserve all the visitors in the world.

I'll be happy when the Turks get their visitors back and I once again find myself working out crafty strategies for avoiding the crowds. I've a hunch, though, that it will be a year or two yet before that's the case. Which is to say; why not beat the rush and get in there first?

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### Invitation

We need a regular contributor for our **Noteworthy Events** feature. If you might consider compiling such a list for our two annual issues please contact one of our Co-Editors for more details.





## AHMET HAMDİ TANPINAR<sup>47</sup> (1901-1962)

### Authentic Voice of Turkish Literature

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar was one of the most distinguished creators of twentieth-century Turkish literature. He was a poet, novelist and essayist, and wrote *The History of the Nineteenth-Century Turkish Literature* (1949), a book still unsurpassed in its profound scholarship and intellectual outlook. Although some of his work has appeared in anthologies of Turkish literature in English, he has only recently become known in the West with the publication of translations of two of his novels, *A Mind at Peace*, translated by Erdağ Göknar (2008) and *Time Regulation Institute*, translated by Alexander Dawe and Maureen Freely (2013).<sup>48</sup> He wrote five novels and a book of essays, as well as poems and numerous articles.

Tanpınar was born in Istanbul in 1901. His father, Hüseyin Fikri Bey, was an Ottoman judge who worked in several cities of the empire. The family lived in Sinop, Siirt, Kirkuk and Antalya. Tanpınar's mother Nesime Bahriye Hanım, also a native of Istanbul, passed away from typhus in Kirkuk during World War I. Tanpınar – deeply affected – wrote the poem *Annem* (My Mother) which was published in the literary magazine *Dergâh* in November 1921. The poem expresses his deep sorrow over her burial in a strange far away city, Mosul.

**A pile of earth, a piece of marble  
You're buried there with your secrets.**


After attending many schools, including a French school, in the cities where his father was posted, Tanpınar entered the Department of Literature in Istanbul University in 1919. He was already writing poems that were published in *Dergâh*. Yahya Kemal, the famous Turkish poet, was Tanpınar's professor at the university. Well informed about French literature and poetry, Kemal was a pioneer in modernizing Turkish poetry, abandoning the old forms and clichés of Ottoman poetry, and expressing more personal feelings. He also believed that Turkish literature could strive toward a synthesis of Eastern and Western literatures. After graduating from the university, Tanpınar taught in Erzurum, Konya, Ankara, and at the Fine Arts Academy in Istanbul. In 1939 he was appointed to the newly-founded

<sup>47</sup> Article written by Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy who lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She graduated from the University of Ankara and from Columbia University, New York and is the translator and editor of *Short Stories of Turkish Women Writers* (Indian University Turkish Studies, 1994) and other books and was the first translator of Nazim Hikmet's poetry, in collaboration with Rozet Avidor.

<sup>48</sup> *A Mind at Peace*, originally published by Turko-Tatar Press, was reprinted by Archipelago Press in 2011. *Time Regulation Institute* was published in Penguin Classics.

chair of 19th century Turkish literature at Istanbul University. At this time he translated some of the French poets he liked – Baudelaire, Verlaine and Valery. Between 1942–46 he was a member of the Turkish National Assembly and lived in Ankara. In this period too he was able to work on his writings. He considered himself first and most of all a poetic soul. He wrote only thirty-seven poems in his life but avoided publishing them as a book; he felt they were incomplete and kept working on them and changing them. The poems were published for the first time as a collection in 1976, long after he died.

In 1946 Tanpınar published his book *Beş Şehir* (Five Cities), a wonderful collection of essays on Erzurum, Konya, Ankara, Bursa and Istanbul, the cities where he had worked and spent a good part of his life. His description of these cities was deeply personal as he narrated their natural environment and architecture. The passage on Bursa's Yeşil (Green), describing its Green Mosque and green Mausoleum, is a poetic testimonial of his admiration of the historic city of Bursa with its green mausoleum, green mosque, green plains and the most heavenly architecture. The part about Istanbul, the longest chapter, was a well-researched and deeply felt eulogy or song of praise. Tanpınar embraced the cosmopolitanism of Istanbul. He considered East and West not as separate entities but as a synthesis. In a letter to a friend he wrote: "The only meaning of my life is my love of Istanbul." Tanpınar published his much renowned book, *The History of the 19th Century Turkish Literature*, in 1949. This book is the outcome of years of research on the prominent 19th century writers of Turkey - Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Namık Kemal, Ahmet Mithat Efendi, Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem Bey, Abdülhak Hâmid and Muallim Naci Efendi, and articles written about them and about the century. He made the era and its intellectual problems come alive in his descriptions of the personalities of the writers and the social and political controversies they were involved in.



Tanpınar's novels cannot be adequately dealt with in this short essay. They gave a well-defined background of the social environment, that is, the city of Istanbul, and the men and women who inhabit it. The clashing values of old and new, East and West, were the subject of his satirical novel *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü* (Time Regulation Institute). It was serialized in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* in 1954 and published as a book in 1961. Tanpınar received education grants to travel in Europe in 1954 and visited France, Belgium, Holland, England, Spain and Italy. The letters he wrote about these trips were published as a book and went through six printings (1974-2014).<sup>49</sup>

It is necessary to say a few words about Tanpınar's language. After the proclamation of the republic there was a determined effort by the government and writers to encourage use of the Turkish of the common people. Until then Ottoman literature – much influenced by the Arabic and Persian languages – had a mixed vocabulary. In the period of transition, the new Turkish literature was shedding Arabic and Persian words. Tanpınar started writing in this period but he never forced himself to write in

<sup>49</sup> *Tanpınar'ın Mektupları*, edited by Zeynep Kerman. Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2001.

an artificial language. His Turkish was the Turkish of an educated person. In his novels the language he used was the true replica of the people belonging to the more educated classes of Istanbul.

Music played an important role in his creative life. His appreciation of Western classical music opened new depths of perception for him. But he was also very much interested in Turkish classical music. He created parallels to forms of music in his literature; one of his novels was called *Mahur Beste* (Festive Composition).

Tanpınar passed away in 1962 at the early age of 61. The world-renowned poet Nazim Hikmet, his contemporary, died in 1963. Nazim Hikmet and Tanpınar represented two different but not contradictory aspects of modern Turkish literature. It is only in a modernized Turkey that new forms of expression in art and literature could take place and complement each other. In the case of Nazim Hikmet his leftist ideas always got him into trouble, trials and prison terms. Modernization of life also opened arts and literature to women who, with rare exceptions, had been excluded in the past. The Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar Literature Studies Center was opened in Istanbul on 18 December 2017. It includes a museum and library. The archives will be open for research and the Center will arrange seminars, conferences and publications about him. It will contain information on Istanbul neighborhoods which were written about in literature. A book was recently published under the title *Bir Gül Karanlıklarda* (A Rose in the Darkness) with one hundred essays on Tanpınar and his work by seventy prominent Turkish writers, some of them his students at Istanbul University.

For this essay I have selected my translations of a prose passage from Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's long essay on Istanbul in *Beş Şehir* (Five Cities) and three of his poems<sup>50</sup>. First the prose passage

Nature is a frame and a stage. Our nostalgia makes it possible to fill it with our own actors and our own ambience. But no matter how good and delicious this nectar is, we cannot forget that Turkish society is at the threshold of a new life. Istanbul itself is waiting impatiently for this new life and the new age that will create new values. Let us allow the memories themselves to choose the hour when they want to talk to us. It is only in the moments of such awakening that the voice of the past becomes a discovery, a lesson, something that makes our day. We only have to abandon ourselves to the new, robust and productive winds of our day. They will take us to a dynamic and happy world where the beautiful and good and consciousness and dreams go hand in hand.

Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy

### **SHIP THAT IS ASLEEP AT THE PIER**

Ship that is asleep at the pier  
Do you remember the ocean,  
The rough waves, the seaweed  
And the roaring of the seas?

<sup>50</sup> From Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Bütün Şiirleri*, Dergah Yayınları, 1976, pages 37, 38, 102 respectively.

Let infinity call us  
 At the morning hour one day.  
 Let the ship raise its anchor at once,  
 Let a beautiful journey start.

Like the weathered sails  
 We would be alone with the ocean,  
 In the coolness of the dawn  
 We would go to sleep.

Ship that is asleep at the pier  
 Do you remember the ocean,  
 Those who left and never came back,  
 And the ones who are waiting in vain?

### **EVERYTHING IS JUST RIGHT**

Everything is just right: the cypress tree by the pond,  
 A cupboard faraway is moaning nonstop;  
 Objects seem to be reflected from an enchanted sleep  
 Climbing vines and insect whirrings surround the house.

Everything is just right: the table, the jug and the glass.  
 In the light filtering through the branches  
 Time appears like a magic gazelle,  
 Silence is falling on the ground leaf by leaf.

I know you are asleep in the shade  
 That is deep and cool like a seaside cave;  
 Your eyelashes are tightly closed in a world of joy,  
 A smile on your face in this laden afternoon.

Perhaps these freshly opened roses are your dreams;  
 This tender light on top of the branches,  
 This eternal song in the cooing of the pigeons...  
 Since our life's dream has passed into things.

Everything is just right: a cupboard faraway  
 Is moaning nonstop like a tormented soul;  
 It may be remembering something of our adventure...  
 Dry autumn leaves are strewn in the wind.

### **FOR MY MOTHER**

We didn't spend a day without you but now  
 we are longing even for your grave,  
 mother.

A lonely cemetery in a desolate place  
 In the shade of a huge temple  
 A pile of earth, a piece of marble,  
 You're buried there with your secrets.

A pile of earth, a piece of marble,  
 Your date of birth and your name written on it,

Over your head dark colored cypresses  
As if they tremble with the sadness of life.

Mother we buried you years ago  
With our tears in this wretched place,  
A lonely evening is like the lights  
Imparting gloom to sick hearts.

A lonely evening eternally worn out,  
As it melts with its sorrow, Tigris too is silent.  
Stricken with a grief called orphanhood,  
We were the special dead in this land.



## Noteworthy Events

by **BATAS** Editorial Team

### ORGANISATIONS

**British Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS)** holds a one-day symposium in the spring (location varies) and an annual lecture at SOAS, University of London, in the autumn. [www.batas.org.uk](http://www.batas.org.uk)



**London Middle East Institute:** BATAS is associated with the LMEI which is based at SOAS, University of London. LMEI publishes a monthly journal *The Middle East in London* which regularly lists events in London –and some elsewhere, including a number pertaining to Turkey and the Turkish area: [www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis/events/](http://www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis/events/)

**Centre for Turkey Studies (CEFTUS):** A UK-based think-tank which organises lectures and other events in London (usually in the Houses of Parliament). [www.ceftus.org](http://www.ceftus.org)

**Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL):** Holds events in London, some of which relate to Turkey. [cbri@britac.uk](mailto:cbri@britac.uk)

**SOAS Friday Seminars on Turkey** (Modern Turkish Studies Programme): held in the spring and autumn terms on occasional Fridays from 12.00-14.00 in the LMEI building at 21 Russell Square, London. Open to the public: Information from [www.soas.ac.uk](http://www.soas.ac.uk) or [gd5@soas.ac.uk](mailto:gd5@soas.ac.uk)



**LSE Chair for Contemporary Turkish Studies** focuses on culture, religion, politics and memory in Turkey and its diaspora population. It holds seminars and conferences open to the public. [www.lse.ac.uk/contemporary-turkish-studies](http://www.lse.ac.uk/contemporary-turkish-studies)



**LSE Middle East Centre,** holds public lectures and other events: [www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/forthcoming-events](http://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/forthcoming-events)

**The Yunus Emre Institute** (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü), 10 Maple Street, Bloomsbury London, W1T 5HA, has since 2010 offered a range of activities, including Turkish and Ottoman language classes, courses on traditional Turkish arts and





lectures on aspects of Turkish history and culture: [londra@yee.org.tr](mailto:londra@yee.org.tr) Phone 020 7387 3036.

**The British Institute at Ankara**, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH (and in Ankara) organises research and sponsors lectures and other events on Turkish archaeology, geography, history, and politics in London and Turkey. Phone 020 7969 5204 in London. [biaa@britac.ac.uk](mailto:biaa@britac.ac.uk)



**The Anglo-Turkish Society** holds public lectures in London on a range of Turkey-related topics. [www.angloturkishsociety.org.uk](http://www.angloturkishsociety.org.uk)

**The Levantine Heritage Foundation** arranges lectures, conferences and other events relating to Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean. [www.levantineheritage.com](http://www.levantineheritage.com)



**Cornucopia** monthly magazine regularly produces lists of events relating to Turkey and the Turkish area. [cornucopia@atlas.net/tr](mailto:cornucopia@atlas.net/tr)

## 2018 CONFERENCES

### British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES)

**Dates:** 25-28 June, 2018

**Venue:** King's College, University of London

**More Information:** [www.brismes.ac.uk/conference/contact-us/](http://www.brismes.ac.uk/conference/contact-us/) A part of the Conference is devoted to Turkey and the Turkish area.

### Fifth World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES 5)

**Dates:** 16-20 July, 2018-03-20

**Venue:** Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, Seville, Spain

**More Information:** WOCMES 2018 Seville Secretariat [wocmes@trescultural.org](mailto:wocmes@trescultural.org)

Will include sessions and coverage of topics relating to the Turkish area.

### From Enemies to Allies: Britain and Turkey during World War II

**Date:** Monday 24 September, 2018; 10.00-18.00

**Venue:** St Antony's College, Oxford

**More Information:** This workshop, organised by BATAS and the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is the third in a series tracing the changing relationship between the two countries in the period 1914-1952. The convenor is Professor William Hale ([wh1@soas.ac.uk](mailto:wh1@soas.ac.uk))

### Third Levantine Heritage Foundation International Conference

**Dates:** 2-4 November, 2018

**Venue:** Athens, Greece

**More Information:** [lhf-athens2018@levantineheritage.com](mailto:lhf-athens2018@levantineheritage.com); [www.levantineheritage.com](http://www.levantineheritage.com)

## LECTURES

### 'Welcome to Hell: in search of the real Turkish football'

**Speaker:** Dr John McManus

**Date and time:** 26 April, 2018; 18.30

**Venue:** British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH

**More Information:** free, booking required [www.biaa.ac.uk/events](http://www.biaa.ac.uk/events)

**‘A Life on the Road: the Exploits and Adventures of the 17th Century Ottoman Traveller, Evliya Çelebi’**

**Speaker:** Dr Caroline Finkel

**Date and time:** 17 May, 2018; 18.30

**Venue:** British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH

**More Information:** £10 (BIAA members free), booking [www.biaa.ac.uk/events](http://www.biaa.ac.uk/events)

**The John Martin Lecture (BATAS)**

**Date:** Friday 30 November, 2018

**Venue:** SOAS, University of London

**Speaker:** Mr Richard Moore

**More Information:** [www.batas.org.uk](http://www.batas.org.uk)

## OTHER EVENTS

**Book Launch:** *Özlem’s Turkish Table: Recipes from my Homeland*, by Özlem Warren

**Date:** 17 May, 2018; 18.00-21.00

**Venue:** Royal Anthropological Institute, 50 Fitzroy Street, Fitzrovia, London W1T 5BT

**More Information** (including booking): [www.angloturkishsociety.org.uk](http://www.angloturkishsociety.org.uk)

**International Istanbul Puppet Festival:**

**Date:** Second week in May, 2018

**Venues:** Various, across Istanbul

**More Information:** Puppet, marionette and shadow theatre in the –almost forgotten – Ottoman tradition; suitable for both adults and children.

**Conquest of Istanbul Re-enactment:**

**Date:** 29 May, 2018

**Venue:** Between Tophane and Karaköy and on the shores of the upper Bosphorus.

**More Information:** Lively re-enactment of Mehmet the Conqueror’s 1453 victory. Features exhibitions of traditional Turkish arts and parades by ‘Ottoman’ Mehter band and fireworks.

**Royal Shakespeare Company**


**WEAREARRESTED** (play about exiled Turkish editor),

by Can Dündar, adapted by Pippa Hill and Sophie Ivatts

**Date:** 31 May to 23 June 2018

**Venue:** Studio Theatre@The Other Place, Stratford-upon-Avon, 200-seat studio theatre.

**More Information:** Tickets £15.00; to book call 01789 403493 or online at [www.rsc.org.uk](http://www.rsc.org.uk)



**West London Turkish Summer Festival**

**Date:** 8 July, 2018; from 10.00

**Venue:** Springwest Academy, Feltham, London (Hounslow)

**More Information:** An annual celebration of Turkish culture organised by the local community. [www.eventbrite.com](http://www.eventbrite.com)

**Tüyap Book Fair:**

**Date:** Late October and November, 2018.

**Venue:** Tüyap Fair Center, Beylikdüzü

**More Information:** Showcases prominent writers, academics and intellectuals.

## A 100th anniversary

'I do like England, but my heart belongs to Cyprus':  
UK Turkish Cypriots mark centenary at V&A

### Turkish Cypriot Celebration in London

A Report by Belma Ötüş-Baskett, with Semra Eren-Nijhar

On Saturday, 9 December 2017, a number of events celebrated the 100th anniversary of the start of Turkish Cypriot migration to the UK. In 1917, the British Government signed a treaty with the Ottoman rulers of Cyprus, whereby Turkish Cypriots were asked to choose between British nationality or retaining their Ottoman status. This prompted many Turkish Cypriots to leave their island in search of a better life in the United Kingdom and the migration has continued to this day.

The 2017 cultural events were organised at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London by the Council of Turkish Cypriot Associations in the UK (İngiltere Kıbrıs Türk Dernekleri Konseyi). CTCA UK – established on 8 March 1983 – is the largest, democratically elected Turkish Cypriot membership organization in Britain. It works to represent the British Turkish Cypriot community and to empower it through civic engagement, education and advocacy.



The celebrations at the V&A were scheduled 12:00

to 17:30. Following refreshments on arrival, there were speeches from the leaders



of the CTCA UK, the Association's president Leyla Kemal, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot government in London Zehra Başaran, and senior and much respected members of the Turkish Cypriot community in London. There was the première screening of 'My Heart Belongs To...' which draws on the memories of the pioneer immigrants starting with their life in Cyprus,



reasons for migration, challenges and joys of life in the UK and nostalgia for home. There were many photographs illustrating life in Cyprus and in London and interviews with several of the early arrivals. The film was well-made and very poignant, directed and produced by Eithne Nightingale and Mitchell Harris. A special treat for the audience was a folk dance presentation by two Turkish Cypriot schools in London: the Dr Fazıl Küçük Turkish School and the Hornsey Atatürk Turkish School.



The highlight of the celebrations was the photographic exhibition: 'My Journey from the Güvercinlik'. Güvercinlik (Pigeon Loft) is the name for Trafalgar Square where the newly-arrived Turks congregated until the 1940s in the absence of associations, clubs, or cafés where they could meet and socialize. The photographic exhibition was organized by the founder of 'Turkish Heritage in the UK', Semra Eren-Nijhar, a sociologist who has written extensively on migration and organized other exhibitions not only in the UK but also in Belgium and Germany. The themes of the exhibit were mostly about identity and the need for memory as the bridge between the past and the present within a collective heritage (<https://www.londonturkishheritageday.com>).

The photographs in the exhibit showed Turkish Cypriots at leisure and at work and with family, or participating in public life. Also included were some by Ismail Bey and Faruk Eskiöglü who was one of the first to photograph Turkish Cypriots in the UK – including the very first kebab shop owner.

It was a memorable day for the Turkish Cypriot community and their guests and the V&A was a worthy site – with an amphitheatre for the film and folk dance show and several halls for the exhibition and for socializing. I want to finish with a poem by Semra Eren-Nijhar about the Turkish Cypriot immigrant experience symbolized by the pigeons in Trafalgar Square.



## Pigeons in Trafalgar Square by Semra Eren-Nijhar©

Doves and pigeons  
Were given the names of Ali  
Fatma and Mehmet  
Each of them pinned their hopes  
On this country  
And we're just arrived

All the pigeons  
In Trafalgar Square  
Became our guide  
Our friends  
New friends  
In a new country  
In a new journey  
In the new world  
In our new struggle  
They became our acquaintance  
And our confidant  
As well as  
Our enlightenment

We are here  
All of us to the core  
With body and soul  
With our children  
Here in Britain,  
Where we call  
Our second home

Our grandchildren  
Are the harbourer  
Of our heritage  
Of our history  
Of our memory  
And they are  
Part of this country  
Part of this nation  
Part of this collective heritage

They all have much to tell you;  
About their belonging;  
As well as  
Their own culture  
And their parents' home country,  
Intimate feeling of love  
About the past and present

And their own beliefs  
And yes  
All about their dreams  
They have much to tell you  
Listen to their words  
But listen very carefully

\*\*\*\*\*

## South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX),

St Antony's College, University of Oxford

The Programme on  
was established in  
SEESOX's main areas  
has hosted many  
from Turkey and  
research. The mission  
foster research on  
network of established  
organize lectures,



Contemporary Turkey  
2003, as part of one of  
of focus. Since then, it  
prominent academics  
supported their  
of the Programme is to  
Turkey, to work with a  
scholars and to  
seminars, workshops



and conferences. The Programme aims at promoting academic debate on Turkey's politics, geopolitics, economy and international relations – with particular focus on its relationship with the European Union and the region of south East Europe – through numerous activities and publications.

**Ezgi Başaran**

Istanbul and St Antony's College, Oxford  
Programme on Contemporary Turkey Coordinator  
ezgi.basarankarli@sant.ox.ac.uk

## Reminiscence

### **Three seasons in Ankara: Reflections of a visiting teacher**

by Michael Berthoud

When I think of the few months I spent in Ankara, I find that disparate recollections come tumbling out of the recesses of the memory and one detail remembered calls forth another. The neurological truth – as I understand it from people on the radio – is that we don't actually remember things, we remember our last memory of remembering them.

However, I can state with some certainty that I got off the train at Sirkeci station in Istanbul like any other budget traveller, at the beginning of October 1985 and, for two or three weeks, I travelled round the country by bus and train, an out-of-season tourist in the shortening days. Often, in the evenings in cheap hotels, I caught the television news, of which I understood little other than a frequently intoned “bin dokuz yüz seksen beş, bin dokuz yüz seksen dört, Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren, Başbakan Turgut Özal” (“1985, 1984, President of the Republic Kenan Evren, Prime Minister Turgut Özal”). It was the beginning of my education, always incomplete, in Turkish politics.

While perusing the *Turkish Daily News* in Izmir, I spotted an advertisement for English language teachers in Ankara; I decided it was time to stop the somewhat aimless travelling and implement my half-formed plan of studying Turkish while continuing my English language teaching career.

In Ankara, I initially remained a tourist: I visited the citadel and the Atatürk Museum in the old Parliament building, beginning my piecemeal introduction to the





history of the Turkish twentieth century. I admired the early Republican architecture. I recall standing outside my hotel witnessing a pink partial lunar eclipse; as I write, I find that there is a website to tell me my memory is reliable, and that there was such an event on 28/29 October 1985; coincidentally fitting in with the Cumhuriyet Bayramı (Republic Day) holiday.

As a result of finally making the necessary phone call, I obtained employment as a teacher in a little language school on Esat Caddesi. I also found a daytime job as a sub editor/proofreader on the *TDN*, for which there was a vacancy. If truth be told, there was always a vacancy. I found the work on the paper quite congenial and interesting, particularly as at the time the political situation involved the gradual relaxation of military control over the reins of government. The owners of the newspaper were supporters of Süleyman Demirel, and it was through the pages of the newspaper that the temperature of liberalisation was tested, in that it was the first to publish his call for a lifting of the bans on the parties existing before the military intervention of September 12, 1980. My modest role in Turkish history consisted of making adjustments to the English of the translations of Mr Demirel's words produced by the owners of the newspaper. In the subsequent months of that winter and following spring I gradually became accustomed to the alphabet soup of the pre-and post-coup political parties, in Turkish and English: ANAP/MP, SODEP/SHP, CHP/RP etc., etc. and to some extent the personalities associated with them.

My two jobs were not unconnected, the link taking the form of one Sadık Bey, sole proprietor of the 'Diplomatik Servis' company. The gentleman in question was a portly Black Sea businessman with, shall we say, a wide range of activities. As the name of his company might suggest, he provided all manner of services to the diplomatic and generally expatriate community: as I recall, rental property and the supply of motor vehicles were those he advertised. Whatever the source of his wealth, he used some of it to fund the *TDN*, whose owners were not entirely reconciled to this financial dependence but viewed it as a regrettable necessity. I should add, however, that Sadık Bey was also for the time being my landlord – or host – as I was initially put up in the accommodation attached to his office in the Aşağı (or was it Yukarı?) Ayrancı district, a reasonably well-heeled modern suburb in the hills north of the city centre.

Sadık was also the backer of the little language school that filled my evening hours, being the significant other of its principal and manager, the cheerful and energetic Zeynep, who had grown up in Germany. She was assisted in her endeavours by David, the director of studies. One of David's duties before my arrival had been to compile the syllabus of the new establishment to the satisfaction of the Ministry of Education. So far so good, until it was discovered that the Ministry was not in fact satisfied; doubtless an indirect result of David's *curriculum vitae* turning out to be a work of considerable imagination. The consequence was that the school was summarily closed down in the spring. Meanwhile, David had been replaced by Peter, an Australian teacher of more solid credentials. It seemed that the best thing I could do was to continue to teach my class in the living room of the flat I shared with him in Reşit Galip Caddesi.

Meanwhile, my daily routine began with going down to the newspaper's city centre office shortly before lunchtime, and getting a lift out in the *servis* (the company minibus) to the main office, which was in a somewhat isolated spot on the rolling plateau landscape a few kilometres out on the Etimesgut road, some way beyond the Middle East Technical University.

It was a two-storey building, the main office being upstairs, flanked by the editor's office at one end and the typesetting room at the other; between them was the larger space occupied by the journalists' and correctors' desks. This was of course before the Internet and IT age, although I think the composing equipment was fairly state-of-the-art; at any rate, I never penetrated its confines, as no unauthorised person was allowed to set foot in it, presumably for fear of dust. In the main room there were tables bearing various very heavy and fairly antiquated typewriters with, of course, impossible (for me) Turkish keyboards. The working conditions were pleasant enough; we had views over the surrounding steppe-like hills, and enjoyed a supply of tea delivered to our tables, and a free canteen downstairs. 'Lucky' the dog would sometimes make his presence felt and Fevzi the caretaker would be summoned with mop and bucket.



Of my other colleagues, I recall Udo (although he was a much more established permanent member of staff); I don't know how long he had been in Ankara, but having come from his native Nigeria – where he was apparently of princely descent – to study anthropology at one of the universities, he had stayed on, and was now chief sub editor at the newspaper. Apparently this position had, initially at least, brought him into conflict with some of his colleagues, who were presumably not used to taking orders from a person of colour, and fisticuffs had ensued as a matter of honour.

Among the Turkish staff was Fikret, a kindly young man who had not been able to complete his university course. (As a Turk he was paid less than the foreigners; I repeatedly became aware of this discrepancy during the time I spent working in Turkey but no, I never volunteered to take a cut in salary.) Of the other foreigners already *in situ* when I arrived was Douglas, an irascible and frequently choleric Australian of a certain age who self-identified (as we would say now) as Buddhist, having previously gone through a long period of adherence to Scientology; an entertaining colleague, but his time at the newspaper came to an abrupt end when he suffered an attack of rage and swore at a Belgian female journalist. There was also Wynne, a well-travelled Welsh engineer possibly in his 60s, who had come to Turkey years previously to build a pipeline. He had met and married a Turkish woman and settled down in Ankara. His younger wife, he told me, was in the habit of playing away; so, within the time I knew him, his drinking got the better of him, he lost his job on the newspaper and was dead by the spring; I was too late for his funeral but visited his grave. I can't remember why, but he had written down for me the words to the song 'the Miller of Dee': "I care for nobody, no not I, and nobody cares for me."

Later, we were joined by Tony, a Ghanaian mining engineering graduate of the Camborne School of Mines. Precisely what had brought him to Turkey I don't remember; but he had no desire to start his career in his native land because of its

deep-rooted corruption, and he had experienced racism in England, so that was not his country of choice either. His ambition was to find work and settle in Australia, reasonably enough in view of his qualifications; so he made friends with the staff at the Australian embassy, and joined their cricket club, which subsequently eased his path to the all-important visa. Stacey was an American, recently graduated from his university in, I think, the Pacific Northwest where he had taken a course in Turkish. His particular talent was for writing humorous pseudo-articles mashing up whatever news was current at the time; reports on the doings of MPs of various persuasions, agriculture, Armenian terrorism. He left us after a few weeks, having got a presumably better paid job at the PX shop on the US air force base. There, however, having discovered his superiors were operating some sort of scam, he unmasked the skulduggery to the top brass and as a result had to be placed under the protection of the military police while the affair was investigated.

And what international news stories featured in the paper that autumn, winter and spring? A few stand out in my memory. The Channel Tunnel project was about to become a reality; I arrived one lunchtime to be told that I had been castigated that morning in my absence for having invented the term 'Chunnel', which had then duly appeared in the headline of that day's paper. Fortunately in the midst of the discussion, the subscription copy of *Time* or *Newsweek* magazine had been delivered with the very word emblazoned on its cover, and my sub editorial reputation was saved. I also came in for criticism from Oktay, the deputy editor, for referring to 'atomic' energy when everyone knew the correct term was 'nuclear' energy. I recall this incident not to settle petty scores decades hence but to illustrate the proprietors' difficulty in trying to publish a quality product in a second language on effectively a shoestring, relying on a set of native speakers possessing varying levels of editing skills in their first language. And of course there were the occasional embarrassing misprints (a reference to 'Ulster boobies' in a prominent headline comes to mind – 'bobbies' being intended, as Udo had decided on this as an appropriate synonym for 'British policemen'). But I was not above being educated by my Turkish colleagues: when the chief editor, İlnur Çevik, accompanied Prime Minister Turgut Özal on his visit to India that spring as part of the press pack, his faxed copy had me running to the dictionary in search of the Indian terms 'crore' and 'lakh' to describe large numbers, of which I was ignorant.

And then there was the mysterious assassination of Olof Palme; and later the Chernobyl disaster, one of the main effects of which, in Turkey, was apparently to make the Black Sea tea crop unusable; though I somehow doubt that all of it was allowed to go to waste.

The newspaper's relationship with the authorities was evidently delicate in the period of political transition, but it must have been considered to be fulfilling a useful function, as during its 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations, which included a visit by all staff, including myself, to a wreath-laying at the Anit Kabir on a fine May morning, an evening cocktail party was given at an Ankara hotel (rather grander than the sort I had got used to staying in); again all employees were invited, and several members of the government were in attendance. We humble correctors were also included, along with all the rest of the staff high and low, in a group photograph with the Prime Minister.

After finishing my afternoon stint at the newspaper, I would get on the red-and-white public bus or the blue-and-white private one, or occasionally a minibus back into town, and to the school in Esat Caddesi while it was still open. When it closed, I seem to recall that my lessons migrated to the morning, in the rather sparse ground-floor flat in Reşit Galip Caddesi with its linoleum-tiled floor and not entirely satisfactory plumbing (one had to make sure that a tap was open before lighting the geyser to avoid risk of explosion).

Teaching from home was fine as far as it went but not strictly above board. I was actually an illegal immigrant – for which I belatedly apologise to the Turkish Republic and its people – but I was apparently tolerated to the extent I was supplying services for which there was a demand. However, what I learnt from my very polite and friendly students about Turkey was at least of as much value as anything I taught them.

As for my competence in the Turkish language – ostensibly the main reason for coming to the country in the first place – it was not as rapid as I might have hoped. I worked steadily through my increasingly well-thumbed copy of Professor Lewis's *Teach Yourself Turkish*, a worthy work whose small compass, however, led to the material in each successive chapter becoming increasingly dense. It became clear that getting a grasp of the language was a taller order than gaining some sort of fluency in a more familiar European tongue. A (probably not at all original) parallel suggests itself to me here: the gap separating Turkish from Western European languages seemed to reflect the distance between West European assumptions and the Turkish outlook on the world. I took some lessons with a retired teacher of French, whose explanations were admirably clear. One of her teaching examples that stays in my mind involved her recollections of the time (presumably in the 1930s) when the most convenient way of travelling from Turkey to France was to take ship from Izmir to Marseille.

The insufficiency of my Turkish meant that a lot of the nation's culture was closed off to me and so I ended up doing expatriate things like visiting the British Council library and going to see films at the French Institute. I also recall a matinée performance of Tom Stoppard's *The Real Inspector Hound* by British Embassy staff; and a winter's evening in the German Institute witnessing some Turkish students' interpretation of the Max Frisch drama *Andorra*, which was marked by a heart-stopping *coup de théâtre* as a body of black-clad 'police', heavily armed with worryingly authentic-looking automatic weapons, burst not onto the stage but into the modestly sized auditorium; a particularly effective stunt in view of Turkish political circumstances.

I have made no mention of the weather: it was not unlike England or north-western Europe, but then I didn't experience the height of summer there. There was a period of heavy snow. But I was particularly struck by the thick rolling yellowish fog which occasionally made its appearance in the course of the winter; it was not difficult to make a connection with the piles of roughly hewn brown coal that appeared here and there on the pavements. (They reminded me of the London fog of 1962 which was grey, presumably because the coal was black; and, as British air had become cleaner, so did Turkey's as the country started importing Soviet gas.) At any rate, it put me in the appropriate mood as I read *Hard Times* and *Bleak House*. I hadn't read Dickens before; perhaps it was the sight and experience of a conservative society going through industrialisation that prompted me to read him.





Some evening hours, as the days grew longer and warmer, were spent on walks taking in the extensive *gecekondu* on the city outskirts. To translate that term by 'shanty town' would create the wrong impression, as they seemed remarkably tidy and orderly. However, an attempt to walk on the hills further outside the city was met with solicitous requests as to what difficulty I was in, and did I need help?


If these jottings attempting to convey something of what I look back on as my three seasons in Ankara give an impression of randomness, it would be because it was a time when things just happened, one thing leading to another, rather than a period that was planned. What they actually say about Ankara I don't know, other than it was a place that accepted me into its midst as a somewhat marginal expatriate, or perhaps long-term tourist. But I had obviously not finished with Turkey, or Turkey had not finished with me, as the following autumn saw my reappearance in Istanbul.



## THE HITCHHIKER OF VAN...

One bright day in 1963 I found myself, with two colleagues from the State Planning Organization (Devlet Plânlama Teşkilatı) being driven from Tatvan to Ahlat near the western shore of Lake Van. Our vehicle was provided by the local office of the Agricultural Extension department while we were based at the government compound near Muş.

Barry, Erol and I had been sent from Ankara to visit Agricultural Extension Agents (Ziraat Teknisyenleri) and to assess the needs for such technical staffing in Turkey's south-east. Back in the *Meclis* (the SPO was located in the Parliament building at that time) the three of us, grandly titled 'Human Resource Development' operatives, had included a questionnaire in our preparations. Right away this required us to explain to agents and others that the word *tarım*, which was among new terms required by the Turkish Language Organization (Türk Dil Kurumu), was the replacement for the familiar *ziraat* (agriculture). But at least this was an ice-breaking talking point when we conducted our survey...



As we drove towards Ahlat from Tatvan on that summer morning our government vehicle clearly advertised that it was on official business with the words 'Resmî Hizmet Mahsus' emblazoned on it in large letters. There was very little traffic on

the road as we discussed our aims and expectations for our next visit. Indeed the only interruption was the appearance at the roadside of a lone man, dressed in local costume, who put out his hand, hitchhiker-style, to stop us.

We offered the man a lift but he seemed more interested in finding out who we were. He was evidently puzzled that two of the four travellers were foreigners. His eyes



scanned what he could see inside the vehicle and he was slow to respond to my increasingly impatient demands to know whether he wished to join us or not. Finally he stood back with no more than a resigned “Güle! Güle!” and on we went. Our discussion returned to matters in hand and we thought no more about the incident. Until, that is, we returned to Muş many tiring hours later. Once inside the government compound we joined others for an evening meal. Some were discussing a local news sheet which carried a headline about a

government vehicle being held up by ‘highwaymen’. The report included a map suggesting that the incident had occurred near the point on the road to Ahlat where we had encountered the inquisitive man much earlier in the day. A strange coincidence? On studying the report in more detail, with the help of our dinner companions, it became clear that the official vehicle involved had encountered a lone man beside the road, as we had done, but, far from releasing the vehicle to continue on its way, he had somehow signalled to a number of men who leaped out of ditches beside the highway and demanded the money (pay and other official funds) which they expected to be in that vehicle.

The story had a happy ending insofar as the gang were persuaded that there was no money, at which point they quickly made off. I myself sustained a feeling of delayed apprehension and worried about the increasingly impatient tone which we had adopted with our ‘hitchhiker’ during our encounter earlier that day...


Brian Beeley



## CYPRUS

We are looking for a contributor who will write a **CYPRUS UPDATE** for our two annual issues. This will continue the coverage of new events in the island which has been provided for many years by Professor Clement Dodd. If you might be able to write this feature for *TASReview* please contact one of the Co-Editors.

## Books



### Three Daughters of Eve

by Elif Shafak

Penguin, 2017, 384 pp. ISBN-10:0241978882

The story moves rapidly between recent life in Istanbul and reminiscences of student days in Oxford in the 1980s. It is told by Peri, the protagonist, who is now married to a wealthy industrialist. She has a busy family and social life, getting stuck in the inevitable traffic jams, arguing with her daughter and dining with sophisticated friends in their shore side residences. Peri had grown up in a warring household where her humanist father was constantly sparring with her religious mother. One of her brothers was imprisoned and tortured for belonging to an illegal organisation, reading revolutionary books and hiding a gun. For years she wrote to him, but he never replied.

While driving to join her husband at a dinner party she is mugged and robbed and a photo falls out of her bag which reminded her of her Oxford days where she had arrived, nervous and confused. She had shared a flat with two other young Muslim girls. One was the Iranian Shirin, confident, worldly wise and irreligious. The other, Mona, was a devout Egyptian who wore a headscarf. Peri herself, due to her parents' opposing influences, was uncertain of her religious views. All three joined a group where they were tutored by the handsome and controversial Azur. He, like a modern-day Socrates, taught about God mainly through questioning and often embarrassing his students. Unfortunately, although studious, Peri could not cope with her emotions and had returned home without completing her degree.

Later, Peri arrives at the dinner, shocked and bedraggled by her attack and joins the other guests at the table as they talk of moving to the West. "Not easy to stay, not easy to leave!" observes Peri. They eat exotic food and are then entertained by a psychic. But she is distracted by the photograph of the three girls at Oxford and phones Shirin for the first time since she left the place. Finally, the mature Peri is able to look back and face up to her traumatic return.

The story is spiced with a theft, magic, an affair and a betrayal. The author, an intellectual citizen of the world, draws cleverly on her own experience and feminism to add authenticity and immediacy to this vivid fictional tale.


Chris Ponsford

## The Sultans

### The rise and fall of the Ottoman rulers and their world: a 600-year history

by Jem Duducu

Amberley Publishing, Stroud, 2018, 306 pp  
ISBN 978 1 4456 6860 4 (hb); eISBN 978 1 4456 6861



This is attractive, easy-reading history, minimally indexed and unencumbered by footnotes. Duducu is the author of several titles in Amberley's '100 Facts' series and of *Deus Vult: A Concise History of the Crusades*. In *The Sultans* he notes his Ottoman origins; his paternal grandparents, long established in Bulgaria, moved to the Turkish 'homeland' (Balıkesir) in the 1950s. Now, however, he says he has no links with modern Turkey and can write with 'no agenda'.

The narrative starts as early Ottoman expansion saw the final stages of Christian crusading endeavour and culminated in the first acquisition of territory in Europe in the mid-fourteenth century. Thereafter the book follows the contributions made by successive sultans through the expansion and shrinkage of the Empire until only the Turkish core in Anatolia remained to be rescued from further dismemberment by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the nationalists in the early twentieth century. The book is, however, much more than a succession of biographical sketches of sultans. Duducu adds a wealth of historical detail and context – and comment – to the roles of the personages in the imperial succession. Particularly useful for the less well-informed are the information-boxes, some more than a page in length, which describe a range of specific topics from janissaries and harems to schnapps and Turkish delight. Eight pages of colour illustrations add further flavour to the presentation.

Duducu's aim to be agenda-free is largely achieved. For example, his treatment of the Armenian disaster (pp.278-281) is balanced; his sadness about what happened emerges with the facts. Equally even-handed is the account of the Ottoman 1565 siege of Malta (pp.120-1123) which is often presented by European writers as a struggle for Christendom between noble knights and the 'terrible Turk'.

The author signs off by congratulating the Ottoman Empire and its Sultans for holding together 'a myriad of cultures, ethnicities and religions' in a region nowadays known for violence. Perhaps we can allow Duducu this departure from his attempt to avoid agendas.

Brian Beeley

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## RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

### HISTORY

Akçetin, Elif and Soreiya Faroqhi (Eds.). *Living the Good Life: Consumption in the Qing and Ottoman Empires of the Eighteenth Century*. (Brill, 2017). ISBN: 978-90-04-35345-9.

Bardakçı, Murat. *Neslishah: The Last Ottoman Princess*. (The American University in Cairo Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 9774168372

Fleet, Kate, Gudrun Kramer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas and Everett Rowson (Eds.). *Encyclopaedia of Islam – Three*. (Brill, 2018). ISBN: 978-90-04-35663-4.

Provence, Michael. *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. (Cambridge University Press, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0521747511.

Shaw-Lefevre, G. Baron Eversley. *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay*. (Palala Press, 2018). ISBN: 10: 1378241754.

Yorulmazoğlu, Erol. *The Turks: The Central Asian Civilization that Bridged the East and the West for Over Two Millennia*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018). ISBN: 10: 1541359577.

### LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Batuman, Elif. *The Idiot*. (Penguin Books, 2018). ISBN: 10: 014311106X.

Flemming, Barbara. *Essays on Turkish Literature and History*. (Brill, 2017). ISBN: 978-90-04-35576-7.

Golden, Christopher. *Ararat: The Novel*. (St Martin's Press, 2017). ISBN-10: 1250117054.

Kenne, Mel, İdil Karacadağ, and Neil Doherty (Eds.). *Turkish Poetry Today*. (Red Hand Books, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1910346217.

### POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Başaran, Ezgi. *Frontline Turkey: The Conflict at the Heart of the Middle East*. (I.B. Tauris, 2017). ISBN: 10: 1784538418.

Basharat, Peer. *A Question of Order: India, Turkey and the Return of the Strongmen*. (Colombia Global Reports, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0997126426.

Sekulow, Jay. *Burning Bridges: Turkey's Return to Islamic Authoritarianism 2017*. (American Center for Law and Justice, 2018). ASIN: B071ZY1DZV.

Uğur, Alparslan, Kenan Tozak, Ayhan Yatbaz (Eds.). *Turkish World Socio- Economic Strategies*. (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2017). ISBN: 10: 6202074175.



Yılmaz, Bediz, Cavidan Soykan, Gerda Heck, İlker Ataç, Philipp Ratfisch (Eds.). *Movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies Vol. 3, Issue 2/2017: Turkey's Changing Migration Regime and its Global and Regional Dynamics*. (Transcript Verlag, 2018). ISBN: 10: 3837637190.

### **SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION**

Keddie, Patrick. *The Passion: Football and the Story of Modern Turkey*. (I.B. Tauris, 2018). ISBN: 10: 1784538027.

### **MISCELLANEOUS**

Bayraktaroğlu, Kerem. (2018) *The Muslim World Post-9/11 American Cinema: A Critical Study 2001-2011*. (McFarland & Company Inc. Publishers, 2018). ISBN: 1476666679.

Castelli, Lida and Maria Vittoria Capitanucci (Eds.). *Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge: the New Gateway between East and West*. (Rizzoli, 2017). ISBN: 10: 0847860787

**Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu**

## **In Memoriam**



**Nesta Dodd**

**1925-2017**

BATAS members are among those saddened by the death of Nesta Dodd. Her funeral took place on 3 November 2017. Nesta was born in Tregarth near Bangor in North Wales, a very Welsh village. So not surprisingly, she did not begin to learn English until the age of ten. As was not unusual in those days, she had a long walk to school in Bethesda, always accompanied by her faithful small dog who waited for her all day in the playground or inside the school. Nesta was a born teacher, as was apparent when, at a very early age, she lined up her dolls and gave them lessons. This led in due course to her becoming a student in a training college in Bangor where she met her husband-to-be, Clement Dodd, who was doing national service military training in Anglesey. After his army service abroad, they were married in

1951.

In 1959 when lecturing in Manchester University, Clement was invited to be a visiting academic in the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara. By now with two very small children, this was quite a challenge for Nesta, especially as there was a very full social life in Ankara. Having previously had to learn English as a second language, Nesta now set to and acquired a working knowledge of Turkish. This was in 1960, the year the military took control and executed the prime minister and two other ministers. They were hectic times. I had my first job teaching at METU in 1960 when the University was closed. So I met the Dodds when there was ample time for socializing. Nesta was the first Welsh person I met and her name intrigued me. I had known the name Nestor from Homer but not Nesta. In the Spring of that year we all took a trip to Antalya accompanying some Dutch doctoral students. The students went in a METU bus; we travelled in the Dodd station wagon. There were seven of us – the Dodds, my husband and I, a Dutch woman, a lecturer also at METU and the two Dodd daughters. It was a memorable trip. The roads were not as good as they are now and there were very few rest areas but we managed several stops for 'comfort breaks' and tea.

On returning to Manchester, Nesta took up her teaching again, this time teaching English to immigrant children, mainly Chinese who learned very quickly – if with a Welsh accent! Then when Clem was appointed to a chair in Government in the University of Hull, Nesta began to teach in their village school in Walkington near Beverley – only a few yards away from their house. This was probably the best part of her long teaching career. At age 60, Clem was appointed to a post at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. This meant yet another move, to Hemingford Grey near Huntingdon. In the Hemingfords Nesta had two major interests in addition to her love of St. Margaret's church – her garden and playing bridge.

Since Clem was in Cyprus a good deal, researching and writing on the Cyprus conflict, the Dodds decided to buy a small village house in Northern Cyprus. Nesta loved the village life which reminded her of her childhood in her Welsh village and she got on very well with the villagers. However, on one occasion, she frightened small children at a Turkish Cypriot morning coffee party when she arrived clad in her Welsh witch costume. The children fled in fear to their grandmothers' skirts – they had never seen a witch before.

I met the Dodds again in 1992 when I was teaching in London. I had been invited to join the Turkish Area Studies Group (predecessor of BATAS) where they were prominent members. During the years I was editor of the Group's *TAS Review*, I remember Nesta telling me that she enjoyed the new literary material I was incorporating into the publication. She said that the variety pleased her and she kept the *Review* at her bed-side because she found much to read. For my part I recall many pleasant, intelligent conversations with her. Nesta was loving, wise and unique in many ways. I especially think of her as a caring wife, mother, and friend and, together with her many other friends and acquaintances, I will miss her very much.

Nesta is survived by her husband Clement, their daughters Rosemary and Hilary and their son Nigel.

Belma Ötüş-Baskett



## British Association for Turkish Area Studies

### Membership application form

BATAS is an entirely independent and voluntary association whose aims are:

- to promote interest in and knowledge of Turkey and its cultural/geopolitical area, its history, culture, people and current affairs
- to generate support for Turkish studies in the UK
- to maintain the publication of *TAS Review*

When applying for membership of BATAS, you can choose a membership type that includes receiving a hard copy of *TAS Review* (published twice a year) or one that does not. In either case membership will give you free or reduced-rate entry to BATAS events and entitle you to attend and vote at the Annual General Meeting, to stand for election to Council and to receive emailed information about forthcoming Turkey-related events (arranged by a variety of organisations) that may be of interest to you. The annual subscription rates for the different types of membership are shown in the application form provided separately.

Please enter on the attached form your personal details, the type of membership you are applying for and (unless you are applying for the free student membership option) your chosen method of payment.

Then either scan the form and email it to [J.E.Moreton@leeds.ac.uk](mailto:J.E.Moreton@leeds.ac.uk) or post it to Dr John Moreton, 35 Lincombe Bank, Leeds, LS8 1QG.

Your email address will be used only for communications about BATAS matters and (unless you opt out of receiving them) notices of other Turkey-related events. If you are not applying to receive a hard copy of *TAS Review*, your postal address will be used only in the event of a failure to reach you by email. Any information that you are willing to supply about yourself in the 'Date of birth', 'Occupation' and 'Knowledge/Areas of interest' boxes will help Council to build up a profile of BATAS members and to plan its activities accordingly.

## **Another Reminder!!**

### **Invitation**

We need a regular contributor for our **Noteworthy Events** feature. If you might consider compiling such a list for our two annual issues please contact one of our Co-Editors for more details.

## **We need a new Events Coordinator!!!! Please volunteer and help**

The Events Coordinator organises (with the help of others on the BATAS team) just two major events: The Spring Symposium and the annual John Martin Lecture in the autumn. Tasks include booking venues, liaising with speakers, and organising registration.

Don't hesitate to contact [celia.kerslake@orinst.ox.ac.uk](mailto:celia.kerslake@orinst.ox.ac.uk) if you are interested or would like more information.

## **Request for contributions**

TAS *Review* welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at [bayraktaroglu@btinternet.com](mailto:bayraktaroglu@btinternet.com) and/or [sigimartin3@gmail.com](mailto:sigimartin3@gmail.com). Submissions for the Autumn issue would be particularly welcomed by 31 July 2018.

# BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR TURKISH AREA STUDIES

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Prof William Hale (Acting President): email: wh1@soas.ac.uk

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Dr John Moreton (Treasurer & Membership Secretary): 35 Lincombe Bank, Leeds, West Yorkshire LS8 1QG, email: J.E.Moreton@leeds.ac.uk

Dr Brian Beeley (Co-Editor of *TAS Review*), to be succeeded by Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu  
Sigrid-B Martin (Co-Editor of *TAS Review*)

Events Coordinator: **position to be filled**

Dr Natalie Martin (Public Relations Officer)

### Elected members:

Professor Çiğdem Balım; Michael Berthoud; Polly Davies; Kathy Hale; Dr Gül Berna Özcan;  
Dr Mina Toksöz

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