

# **Turkish Area Studies Review**

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**BATAS**

**SYMPOSIUM 2023**

**Emmanuel College, Cambridge**

**Saturday 22 April 2023  
10.00 to 16.15**

**Professor William Hale**, SOAS University of London

*The position of the Presidency in Turkey since 1924*

**Professor Bülent Gökay**, Keele University

*Turkey in the Global Economy, a historical perspective*

**Dr Gemma Masson**

*"Conqueror v. Impaler" comparison as an example of the representation of history in popular culture*

**Professor Martin Stokes**

*Media and other archaeologies in the Upper Euphrates: The case of singer Enver Demirbağ*

Details (abstracts and booking instructions) are available on the BATAS website and through Eventbrite.

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**16 .20 To celebrate the life of BATAS' Chair Celia Kerslake**

A meeting with drinks in the Robert Gardner Room is arranged.

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**The 2023 John Martin Lecture**

Friday 24 November 2023 (envisaged date)

Venue and time to be confirmed (via Eventbrite)



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**Please note: Opinions expressed, and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.**

## Editorial



The devastating news that we have to convey is the sudden death of Dr Celia Kerslake, the almost irreplaceable Chair of BATAS. It is due to her energy and dedication that our organisation is so flourishing, and it is hoped that we can carry on in her spirit, but for that we need a lot of help and support. A beginning is being made by not cancelling the Symposium whose programme was largely organised by Celia involving finding and inviting all the speakers. We have dedicated a number of pages towards contributions to her memory (pp 60-66).

This issue of TAS Review is rightly dealing with the monumental disaster in Turkey and Syria (C Finkel, B Gökay & İ Ertürk)), where Finkel gives a historical perspective, Gökay estimates the economic impact, and Ertürk notes the devastation around the epicentre of Elazığ/Adıyaman, but also the resilience of the ancient Nemrut Dağ sculptures. We also have predictions for the imminent elections in Turkey (E Kalaycıoğlu in his John Martin Lecture), with elections in the Republic of Cyprus (P Milllett) and their consequences to the Turkish Republic of Cyprus. Mina Toksöz, who is now the co-editor for the TAS Review alongside Sigrid Martin, invited Bülent Gökay to write the expert economic analysis. This means that the usual political and economic aspects are this time covered by different contributors which also provides our readers with different perspectives.

There are two Part 2 follow-ups from the last Review on 'The influence of Islam in Turkish Politics' (B Yeşilbursa) and 'Turkeys' place in the struggle for Polish independence' (A Bayraktaroğlu). Local history is involved in the article on the bell tower in Giresun (S Cagaptay) and in some of the book reviews, which are wonderfully wide ranging, touching the Ottoman Empire twice (W Hale), the Democrat Party Era and Turhan Dilligil's arrest (Ç Balım), as well as a 'book in progress' about Hiking Istanbul's Hinterland (C Finkel). One other obituary is in memory of John Norton, a long-standing BATAS member, who until fairly recently never feared the long journey from Durham to join our events.

The co-editors are indebted to all the contributors and are very grateful indeed to the proof-readers S Parkin, J Sindall, E Casassa and A Gillon. This gives us also the opportunity to thank Arin Bayraktaroğlu once more for helping with the last Review and she and Brian Beeley, who has been seriously ill, are still so very helpful from behind the scenes.

On this fairly positive note we have to ask for more contributions and/or suggestions who might be approached. Taking inspiration from the Nemrut Dağ BATAS will live on....!

Sigrid-B Martin  
Co-Editor

Mina Toksöz  
Co-Editor

**The 2022 John Martin Lecture**  
**The Tuke Common Room,**  
**Regent's University**  
**Regent's Park, London NW1 4NS**  
**11 November 2022**

## Neo-patrimonial Sultanism's Ordeal with Popular Elections

by **Ersin Kalaycıoğlu**  
 Political Scientist  
 Sabancı University, İstanbul



Turkish politics is fast approaching the next national legislative and presidential elections in the first half of 2023. This will be the twentieth multi-party elections of the country since 1946, the second since the regime changing referendum of April 16, 2017. The 1946, 1961 and 1983 elections were transitional elections from either one-party rule (1946) or military coup governments (1961, 1983) and they are not considered as free and fair elections. 2018 elections also took place under Emergency Rule (Olağanüstü Hal, OHAL) conditions and were not fully free and fair elections<sup>1</sup>, and according to the new constitutional amendments and amendments of the Elections Act (No. 298) in March 2018. The 2017 referendum changed the regime characteristics of the Turkish political system from the recently adopted semi-presidential regime by the 21 October 2007 referendum to a Presidential system. The previously designed semi-parliamentary regime (1982) had foreseen a powerful President and Presidency, that would be neither politically nor legally responsible for the ex-officio decisions that the President would make. However, between 1982 and 2014 Presidents were elected by the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi, BMM). The referendum in 2007 changed that practice to a popularly elected president who would work side by side by a popularly elected BMM and a government that emerged from its ranks and was responsible to the BMM. Hence the Turkish political regime had changed from semi-parliamentary to semi-presidential by the 2007 referendum, which came into effect when the tenure of President Abdullah Gül ended in August 2014. The 2017 referendum completely changed the executive branch of the government, which was converted from a systemic political structure to one that

<sup>1</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2022a) "A new national legislative election system? An assessment of the breakdown of consensus on the administration of elections," in Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (eds.) *Elections and Public Opinion in Turkey: Through the Prism of the 2018 Elections* (London and New York: Routledge): 9 – 21, and Moral, M. (2022) "Politics as (un)usual?: An overview of the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey 22," in Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (eds.) *Elections and Public Opinion in Turkey: Through the Prism of the 2018 Elections* (London and New York: Routledge): 22 – 50.

solely consisted of a popularly elected president (art. 8). The office of the Prime Minister (PM) and the Council of Ministers were abolished. The format resembled presidentialism, yet it had all the trappings of a sultanistic regime<sup>2</sup>, where the executive leader controlled the executive and the legislative branches of the government and had a long shadow over the judiciary, while the leader directly or indirectly, through the legislature, made all of the political decisions through his personal discretion as well<sup>3</sup>. 2018 was the first election of the sultanistic regime under OHAL conditions. 2023 will be the second national election under sultanism, without an overt OHAL regime, yet again it may have new elections rules, if the process starts after April 6, 2023<sup>4</sup>.

The parties started their campaigns in the latter half of 2022 though there is anything but a level playing field operating under neo-patrimonial sultanistic political rule<sup>5</sup>. The political deals made between the government and opposition parties in the pre-1950 and post-1961 national elections, which provided for free and fair elections, are no longer respected by the governing AKP and MHP<sup>6</sup>. Under the circumstances, the 2023 elections are not going to be an example of the democratic elections that took place before the 2017 referendum and 2018 national elections. As a flawed competitive election takes hold, will the voters act any differently in the 2023 elections than they had done in the past, or more specifically in the pre-2018 national elections?

We will not know the definitive answer to this question until the voters act in the 2023 elections. However, under the circumstances it is warranted to assume that the 2023 elections will be somewhat like the 2018 national elections<sup>7</sup>. In this paper the results of a field survey conducted by researchers from Sabancı and Koç universities prior to the 2018 elections will be used to analyze how the voting behavior of the Turkish electorate took shape in the first competitive elections under neo-patrimonial sultanism

<sup>2</sup> For a definition of sultanistic regimes and characteristics see Chehabi, H. E. and Linz, J. J. (1998) "A Theory of Sultanism I: A Type of Non-Democratic Rule," in Chehabi, H. E. and Linz, J. J. (eds.) *Sultanistic Regimes*, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press): 3 – 25.

<sup>3</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2021) *Halk Yönetimi: Demokrasi ve Popülizm Çatışmasında Dünya* (Popular Rule: World in the Conflict between Democracy and Populism), (Ankara: Efil Yayınevi): 119 – 121.

<sup>4</sup> The BMM adopted new set election rules that ushered in new standards, such as altering punishing national threshold for converting votes to parliamentary seats of 10 percent down to 7 percent. The new rules also stipulate that each political party in an election alliance need to go over the 7 percent national threshold to qualify to win any seat in the BMM. In the 2018 elections it was enough for the election alliance to go over the 10 percent threshold for all of the political parties in the alliance to win seats in the BMM according to their vote share. In short, it is critical for the political parties and election alliances to prepare differently for these different set of rules. As of the beginning of 2023 it is still not clear which rules will apply in the 2023 elections, as the date of the election is still a mystery.

<sup>5</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2021): 120.

<sup>6</sup> (Mülkiyeliler Birliği Demokrasi Adaleti Merkezi (June 13, 2018) Güvenliği Raporu" (Report on Fairness and Credibility of Elections) (Kızılay, Ankara: www.mulkiye.org.tr), and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (2022a) 17 - 18

<sup>7</sup> We need to emphasize here that in the 2018 elections the voters had not yet had a taste of neo-patrimonial sultanism to the extent that they have experienced it since the 2018 elections. The 2018 elections had taken place only about a year after the 16 April 2017 referendum that amended the constitution and established sultanism. However, the voters had not had a chance to fully observe the socio-economic and political outcomes of the sultanism in practice yet. Now that sultanism has been in effect from July 2018 until 2023 - almost five years - they have a much better chance of assessing its performance as a form and style of governance. Unfortunately, there is not enough scientifically rigorous research on the topic revealed yet. Therefore, we do not accurately yet know what percentage of the voters has a different opinion of how the AKP – MHP government has worked for them now in 2023 by comparison to 2018.



will be used to provide a first approximation of an answer to the question of how voting behavior is shaped under sultanism.

## Turkish Voting Behavior under Sultanism: Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?

Turkish electoral politics is deeply influenced by socio-cultural cleavages that deeply divide the society into several identity-based voter blocs that are positioned against each other with perceptions of irreconcilable interests and value choices. Deep running differences on the meaning and role of religion, particularly Sunni Islam, in society, economy and politics have been pitting large swaths of the political elites and the masses against each other. This development gradually developed as secular versus pious and revivalist Sunni Muslims emerged most visibly since the 19th century to struggle for the promotion or imposition of their image of good society on the country<sup>8</sup>. Another major cleavage that has been going on since the 16th century is the confrontation of the Sunni pious and revivalists against the Alevis. Thirdly, during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire society was deeply divided across different types of nationalisms, such as the Turkish religious, ethnic, and civic (homeland, *vatan*) nationalisms and Kurdish ethnic nationalism. In the recent years since the late 1970s it was these ethnic Turkish versus the ethnic Kurdish nationalism that have been further creating hard to reconcile voting blocs<sup>9</sup>.

Finally, in the post-World War II era Turkish society has been going through a rapid process of social mobilization, whereby the society has come under the simultaneous influence of urbanization and industrialization. In 1950 about 25 percent of the population was residing in urban areas and 75 percent lived in rural areas of the country, and by the end of the century about 65 percent were residing in urban areas and 35 percent in the rural areas, and by 2020 about 93 percent were living in urban areas and 7 percent in the rural areas<sup>10</sup>. In the meantime, the share of agriculture in the GDP dropped from 42 percent in 1950 to about 8 percent by 2010, while manufacturing industry increased from 13 percent of the GDP in 1950 to 16 percent in 2010 as Turkey moved from étatist to capitalist market based economic regime in the aftermath of World War II, then to import – substitution, and eventually liberal market economy in the post 1980's<sup>11</sup>. These dramatic and rapid changes have created a large plurality of voters from former landless peasants who became the urban poor and an urban underclass by the late 1990s.

The overall structure of the Turkish political system had stayed stable even through the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, where a powerful political elite (*askeri*) with a homogeneous culture removed from the rest of the society

<sup>8</sup> Berkes, N. (1964) *Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, Canada: McGill University Press).; Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2005) *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*, (New York, Palgrave – Macmillan), Çarkoğlu A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2021) *Fragile but Resilient?: Turkish Electoral Dynamics, 2002-2015*. (Ann Arbor; Michigan: University of Michigan Press), and Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E.(eds.), (2022) *Elections and Public Opinion in Turkey: Through the Prism of the 2018 Elections* (London and New York: Routledge).

<sup>9</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2005): *op.cit.* 48 – 50 and 150 - 155.

<sup>10</sup> For full reference see [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb\\_id=39&ust\\_id=11](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11)), and <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10736> and <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30709>.

<sup>11</sup> Pamuk, Ş, (2018) *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi: Büyüme, Kurumlar ve Bölüşüm* (200 Years of Economic History of Türkiye: Growth, Institutions, Distribution) (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları): 259, 305.

ruled from the Center over a polyglot, multi-ethnic, multi-national, and multi-religious Periphery (*reaya*)<sup>12</sup>. However, from the 1950 national elections onward the Periphery provided unwavering support for the political forces and parties of the Periphery to come to political power; erode the culture of the Central elites, and eventually oust them from political power by the beginning of the 21st century. What seems to be left behind is a new power struggle exclusively across culturally divided voter blocs, a *kulturkampf a la Turca*<sup>13</sup>.

Research on Turkish voting behavior indicated that several socio-cultural, political, and economic factors have contributed to the choices that the voters made across the party lists at the ballot box in Turkey<sup>14</sup>. Seven such sources seem to be identified as comprising the most important causes of party preferences of the Turkish voters. First is the Sunni Revivalist–Secular/Sünni but non–revivalist divide. Second, is another variant of the same phenomenon Sunni Revivalist–Alevi sectarian divide in Turkish society. These two cultural (religiosity based) cleavages precipitated different identities from childhood onward in the political socialization of the voters. Third is the Kurdish–Turkish ethnic identity differences and nationalist clashes<sup>15</sup>. Fourth is social stratification that mainly divides the society between the urban poor and underclass versus those who have secular, science education, profession and/or long-term employment or job<sup>16</sup>. Fifth is party identification. From age 11 – 12 onward a little less than half of the Turkish voters develop party identification<sup>17</sup>, which seems to be highly instrumental in determining the voters' choices at the ballot box<sup>18</sup>. The sixth factor seems to be ideological orientation of the voters across the left – right spectrum<sup>19</sup>. The

<sup>12</sup> Inalcık, H. (1964) "Turkey" in Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, Dankwart A. (eds.) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1964): 114 – 115, and Mardin, Ş. (1973). "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, vol. 102, no. 1: 169–190.

<sup>13</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E. (March 2012). "Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010," *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 17, no. 1: 1–22, and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2022a) 9 - 21.

<sup>14</sup> For an overview see Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2021). *op.cit*

<sup>15</sup> About 19 percent of the respondents are estimated to have Kurdish and the rest as Turkish identity in 2018, which had been somewhat similar throughout the Turkish Elections Studies from 2022 through 2015 (Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. 2021). *op.cit*.

<sup>16</sup> Approximately 35 – 45 percent of the respondents have been declaring that they had never worked for pay in their lives between 2010 and 2018. The modal value had been 40 percent. As a guesstimate it is warranted to argue that the 40 percent of the electorate consist of the urban poor, which constitutes the largest bloc of voters in Turkish politics.

<sup>17</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E and Sarıbay, A. Y. (1991) "İkokul Çocuklarının Parti Tutmasını Belirleyen Etkenler," [Factors that Determine the Party Identification of Primary School Children] *Toplum ve Ekonomi*, vol. 1(1): 137–149.

<sup>18</sup> In the pre- 2011 Elections about 56% of the respondent declared some intensity of identification with a political party, in 2015 the same percentage rose to about 66% and in 2018 it seemed to have risen to slightly more than 70%. See also Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2008) Kalaycıoğlu E. (2008) "Attitudinal Orientations to Party Organizations in Turkey in the 2000s," *Turkish Studies*, 9(2): 297 – 316, and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2022b) "Party identification and vote choice in Turkey" in Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (eds.) *Elections and Public Opinion in Turkey: Through the Prism of the 2018 Elections* (London and New York: Routledge): 169 - 193.

<sup>19</sup> Turkish Values Surveys, International Social Survey Program annual surveys and the Turkish Elections Study field surveys indicate that in 1990 about 22 percent of the Turkish voting age population had self-designated themselves as leftists (1 – 4), and 23 percent as rightists (7 – 10), and 55 percent as centrist (5-6) on a ten-point scale, where "1" indicates extreme left wing" and "10" as extreme right -wing ideological position. The distribution had started to change by mid-1990s and by 2007 about 17 percent self-reported their ideological position as left, 47 percent as right, and 36



seventh is satisfaction with the economy, which seems to be dependent on macro-economic indicators. Voters seem to be making retrospective and prospective evaluation of the macro-economic policies of the government at the time of the elections<sup>20</sup>. If they seem to be favorable, they tend to support the government at the polls, and if unfavorable vice versa. Although it happens rarely, some stochastic influences, such as war, waves of terror campaigns, international crisis do occasionally play some role in influencing the voters' choices at the polls, as an additional cause, as it happened during the November 2015 elections<sup>21</sup>.

This paper uses binary logistic regression to estimate the relative importance of each of the causes of voting behavior as well as the overall explanatory power of all causes. Tables 1.a and 1.b present the findings of pre-election field survey of June 2018.

**Table 1a: Voting Behavior after Sultanism (2018)**

<b>Party Preferences (Basic Model) (2018)</b>					
Parties	AKP	CHP	MHP	İYİP	HDP
Independent Variables	B	B	B	B	B
Ethnic Identity (Kurd = 1, Other = 0)	-.028 (.938)	-2.103 (.000)	-.434 (.629)	-17.721 (.995)	<b>3.382</b> <b>(.000)</b>
Secular versus Sunni Faithful	.094 (.253)	-.335 <b>(.008)</b>	.100 (.512)	-.357 <b>(.046)</b>	.036 (.862)
Social Class (Never Worked for Pay = 1, Other = 0)	.565 <b>(.022)</b>	-.015 (.962)	-.568 (.226)	-.531 (.185)	1.197 (.091)
Party Identification	<b>3.982</b> <b>(.000)</b>	<b>3.564</b> <b>(.000)</b>	<b>5.088</b> <b>(.000)</b>	<b>4.981</b> <b>(.000)</b>	<b>5.573</b> <b>(.000)</b>
Ideology (Self-defined Left-Right Position)	.334 <b>(.000)</b>	-.496 <b>(.000)</b>	.126 (.203)	.069 (.299)	-.227 <b>(.045)</b>
Economic Satisfaction	<b>1.115</b> <b>(.000)</b>	-.247 (.197)	.147 (.576)	-.683 <b>(.001)</b>	-.716 (.112)
Constant	-4.388 (.000)	-.124 (.751)	-5.157 (.000)	-3.913 (.000)	-5.959 (.000)
Cox & Snell R Square	.610	.456	.166	.215	.341
Nagelkerke R Square	.814	.754	.560	.560	.869
Correctly Predicted (%)	92.3	94.0	97.6	96.7	98.9

Note: The Dependent variable coded as a binary variable such that those who preferred a specific party as «1» all others as «0».  
Sources: Koçan and Sabancı Universities Turkish Elections Study 2018.

percent as centrist. Turkish voters had a dramatic voter re-alignment as the voters' preferences shifted sharply to the right and extreme right wing. By 2018 about 28 percent of the voters placed themselves in the extreme right wing.

<sup>20</sup> Respondents were asked in the field surveys of their evaluation of the government policies in the last one-year and how the country, their family, personally themselves have influenced them to measure retrospective economic satisfaction. They were asked to evaluate the government economic policies prospectively for the next one-year and register their expectations of the government party's handling of the macro-economic policies for the good of the country, their families and personally themselves.

<sup>21</sup> Aytaç, S. E. and Çarkoğlu, A. (2020) "Terror Attacks, Issue Salience, and Party Competence: Diagnosing Shifting Vote Preferences in a Panel Study." *Party Politics* 27 (4): 755 – 766., and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2018) "Two elections and a political regime in crisis: Turkish politics at the crossroads," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 18(1): 21–51.

**Table 1b: Voting Behavior after Sultanism (2018)**

<b>Party Preferences (Kulturkampf / Economy Model) (2018)</b>					
Parties	AKP	CHP	MHP	İYİP	HDP
Independent Variables	B	B	B	B	B
Ethnic Identity (Kurd = 1, Other = 0)	.019 (.943)	<b>-2.739</b> (.000)	-1.329 (.070)	-18.703 (.995)	<b>5.430</b> (.000)
Sunni Religiosity - Secularity	<b>.163</b> (.012)	<b>-.369</b> (.000)	.118 (.250)	<b>-.425</b> (.002)	.142 (.225)
Social Class (Never Worked for Pay= 1, Other = 0)	<b>.485</b> (.008)	-.100 (.679)	<b>-.673</b> (.052)	-.371 (.187)	.084 (.820)
Ideology (Self -defined Left – right Position)	<b>.444</b> (.000)	<b>-.690</b> (.000)	<b>.257</b> (.001)	.094 (.055)	<b>-.296</b> (.000)
Economic Satisfaction	<b>1.410</b> (.000)	<b>-.391</b> (.009)	-.109 (.536)	<b>-.822</b> (.000)	<b>-.967</b> (.000)
Constant	-3.578 (.000)	1.902 (.000)	-4.699 (.000)	-3.255 (.000)	-4.775 (.000)
Cox & Snell R Kare	.468	.368	.027	.070	.266
Nagelkerke R Kare	.624	.608	.091	.183	.680
Correctly Predicted (%)	83.0	90.7	95.8	93.5	95.3

**Note:** The Dependent variable coded as a binary variable such that those who preferred a specific party as «1» all others as «0».  
**Sources:** Koçand Sabancı Universities Turkish Elections Study 2018.

A careful examination of the Tables 1a and 1b indicate that party identification is indeed a very strong cause, which roughly explains about half the variance in the dependent variable, party preferences at the polls. Economic satisfaction follows party identification. Indeed, when party identification is eliminated from analysis, economic satisfaction emerges as the most important variable explaining the variance in the dependent variable. Economic satisfaction is a variable that measures the voters' perception of their own economic well-being. Therefore, it is feasible to assume that such perceptions also include what the voter expects to get from patron–client relations, to the extent that they are pertinent for his/her case. What David Easton<sup>22</sup> had referred to as specific support, that is support that accrues from benefits received from a governing party/coalition seems to matter as a major factor explaining the party preferences of the voters at the polls. Patronage networks created and mobilized by the governing party(ies) seemed to have been a critical factor explaining economic voting. Erdem Aytaç concludes in his analyses of economic voting in the 2018 elections that "...at least in this election voters seem to be responsive to their representative's performance in office..."<sup>23</sup>. Nevertheless, he calls for further research to study "...If the subjective evaluations of the economy are significantly disconnected from objective indicators like GDP growth, unemployment, or inflation, economic

<sup>22</sup> Easton, D. (1969) *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, (London, New York: Routledge).

<sup>23</sup> Aytaç, S. E. (2022) "The economic vote in the 2018 Turkish general election" in Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (eds.) *Elections and Public Opinion in Turkey: Through the Prism of the 2018 Elections* (London and New York: Routledge): 131.

voting's accountability function would be severely weakened"<sup>24</sup>. Indeed, there is evidence which indicate that party identification seems to be influential in the economic evaluations of the voters both in the 2007 and 2018 elections<sup>25</sup>. However, neither of these two most important variables seem to be wholly independent of the voters' religious, sectarian, ethnic and political/ideological values and positions in Turkish society. Secular - religious (Sunni revivalist) divide, ethnicity, and ideology follow as major determinants of the voters' party preferences. Social stratification emerges as an important variable when it is measured as consisting of two strata; one consisting of those who have not worked for pay all their lives and the other as those who have or had a professional long-term job. The former overwhelmingly vote for the AKP. AKP seems to emerge as the party of the urban poor, pious, revivalist Sunnis, also often favored by ethnic Turks, and those who seem to be benefiting from the economic policies of the AKP government. The main opposition Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) seems to emerge as the party of the secular, educated, left wing, with Turkish ethnic identity and economically dissatisfied with the policies of the government. MHP also shared some characteristics of the AKP, except for social class, but the main difference between the AKP and MHP voters seemed to be latter's lack of satisfaction with the economic policies of the AKP government.

Little seemed to have changed from the 2011 and 2015 elections to the 2018 elections as far as the causes of voting behavior is concerned<sup>26</sup>. What seemed to have changed in the 2018 elections (Tables 1.a and 1.b) is mainly that the MHP voters no longer demonstrated any dissatisfaction or satisfaction with the economic policies of the AKP. They were then a part of the ruling coalition, which seemed to have changed their perceptions of economic benefits and losses they were experiencing under the AKP/MHP government. We do not have evidence on whether the MHP voters' economic relations with the central government and their relations with the state budget and bids have changed in any drastic ways, or not. AKP voters seem to demonstrate all the same characteristics that they had demonstrated since the 2007 elections still seemed to be no different in 2018 as well<sup>27</sup>. Two new parties entered the election in 2018. The Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP, founded in 2012) emerges as an ethnic Kurdish party par excellence, irrespective of what kind of election rules are in effect. A newly established Good Party, (İyi Parti, İYİP, founded in 2017) after a major split from the MHP, seemed to be supported by the economically dissatisfied secular voters, and does not seem to be receiving support from the urban poor. Finally, the CHP still seemed to be the party preference of the well-educated professional class, secular, left-of-center voters, who were showing dislike for the economic policies of the AKP government.

The findings of the 2018 elections seem to indicate that the voters had not taken seriously the shift to sultanism after 2017. Indeed, when asked how democracy was performing in Turkey, more than 60 percent had declared that it was doing well. When asked how important it is personally for the respondent to live in a democratic country, more than 90 percent answered that it was very important. However, in 2018 Turkey had already ceased to be a democracy as the Freedom House had already declared it as "not free" in 2016, *The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index* placed

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*: 131.

<sup>25</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2008) *op.cit.* and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2022b): *op.cit.* 184 -186.

<sup>26</sup> Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2021). *op.cit.*

<sup>27</sup> See also Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2007). *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, protest, and stability in an Islamic society*, (London: I.B. Tauris), and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2008)

Turkey among hybrid regimes close to authoritarianism since 2012. The election laws had changed in a dramatic turn that undermined fair competition during March 2018 and the 24 June 2018 elections were taking place under emergency rule, which forestalled freedom of expression and restricted political opposition<sup>28</sup>. However, a large majority of the voting age population in Turkey still operated with the delusion that the 2018 elections had some democratic integrity. It was obvious that the learning curve of the voters was not very steep, and the message of regime change had not yet arrived with the majority of the voters by June 2018.

## Conjectures and Conclusions

These findings seemed to have indicated that a most important yardstick that the Turkish voters seem to be paying attention to is the government's performance at the helm of macro-economic indicators. The patronage networks that the governing party manages to establish with large swaths of the population and provide them with tangible pecuniary benefits in return for their support for the party in the elections seems to be critical to the success of the government party in winning elections<sup>29</sup>. From the very beginning of multi-party politics in the 1950s, in the eyes of the voters, democracy seems to be no more or less than a game of populist patronage<sup>30</sup>. In recent times research further corroborates that the meaning of democracy in the minds of the Turkish voters is not much more than an exchange based on voting procedure and the clientelism it produces<sup>31</sup>. A substantive understanding of democracy, where civil liberties, freedoms and rights, rule of law have precedence does not seem to enjoy much support among the Turkish voters. If tangible benefits accrue thanks to voting practices of the electorate and the exchange of votes in return for services and benefits bring any improvement in the social welfare of the voters, democracy exists; even though there may not be much freedom of expression or of the press and the media, association and the like.

Secondly, on the one hand, popular culture has low trust, low social tolerance, low level of association; and high xenophobia, chauvinism, racism and especially anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and anomie (thinking and living alegally, if not illegally) have a widespread acceptance and appearance, on the other hand, they are prevalent. The political expectations emerging from this socio-cultural mix is a strong and autocratic leader<sup>32</sup>.

Thirdly, the electoral rules and patronage politics lead to the hegemony of the most widespread plurality of the electorate in society, which consists of the urban poor,

<sup>28</sup> See for further explanation (Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2022a). *op.cit.*

<sup>29</sup> Aytaç, S. E. (2022) *op.cit.*, and also Sayarı, S. (2011) "Clientelism and Patronage in Turkish Society and Politics," in Birtek, F. and Toprak, B. (eds.), *The Post-Modern Abyss and the New Politics of Islam: Assabiyah Revisited: Essays in Honor of Şerif Mardin*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press): 81 - 94.

<sup>30</sup> Sunar, I. (2004) "Populism and Patronage: The Democrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey," in Sunar, I., *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, (Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publications):121 – 134.

<sup>31</sup> Akboğa, S. and Şahin, O. (2020) "Satisfaction with democracy in Turkey: Findings from a national survey," *Politics*, Vol. 41(2): 207–223.

<sup>32</sup> See for evidence and further analyses Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2009) *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*, (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave – Macmillan).

(around 40% of all voters now). Turkish election politics is at the discretion of its urban and rural poor.

Fourthly, with the constitutional amendments of 2017, a regime practice is being established in the spirit of "populist leadership based on the claim that it is the direct representative and choice of "the people/nation" and is entitled and empowered to do whatever the(ir) people demanded, instead of a practice of national sovereignty through a constitutional order, laws, and representative institutions.

Fifthly, partisan affiliations provided for the smooth transition of voter allegiances and voting behavior from the early 2000's to post-sultanism of 2017 and beyond. Partisan identities have provided for interpretation of the developments in Turkish politics through the prism of partisan feelings, sentiments, and beliefs. They precipitated that it was the same political parties, with the same political ideologies that presented themselves to the voters; hence it was business as usual. It did not matter whether the voters voted for the political parties of sultanism (a hybrid regime with authoritarian potential) or for the opposition, which represented a return to democratic politics. Party identification seemed to be the hinge that connected the religious and ethnic values of the voters, which instilled them with trust toward certain leaders and parties and against others to political ideologies that the political parties stood for. Party identification functioned as a filter in evaluating the economic performance of the governing party and their opponents. In this context, party identification functioned as the only factor precipitating the stability of the *kulturkampf* in Turkish politics<sup>33</sup>.

The moral of the story is that the Turkish political system has adopted a political regime that can be described as operating in a society dominated by the urban poor, (mostly overlaid with lumpen proletariat characteristics), with deep running cultural chasms which produced a process of *kulturkampf*, and a political system that functions as a presidency that will act by deciding on all matters it deems fit by means of the personal discretion of the president acting alone in lieu of the executive branch of the government.

Turkish politics is now facing a major challenge. The sultanistic regime seems to be inclined to turn the upcoming elections into a populist exercise of anointing the President through a ritual or a pageant of popular acclamation. They are ready to field the candidacy of Erdoğan for a third time, though it is not constitutionally permissible, while the AKP/MHP government also seem to be prepared to disqualify their opponents from electoral competition on flimsy charges of conspiring with terrorists, accusation of violating such laws as insulting the President or the judges of the high court thus stigmatizing them as enemies of the country or the people. The most recent sentence by the court against the Metropolitan Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu that he had violated the law by insulting the judges of the YSK (Supreme Election Board) in 2019 may just be a dry run of things to come. The 2023 elections seem to be running the risk of becoming a plebiscitarian populist pageantry of the type more regularly observed in Azerbaijan, Central Asian republics, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Haiti, in short, many other sultanistic regimes. What is yet uncertain is whether the 2023 Presidential and legislative elections will be another unfair but competitive election, or just a ritual

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<sup>33</sup> See Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2022b) *op.cit.*



for anointing the President, legally or illegally by popular acclamation? The way the elections progress will be the most important determinant of whether the country will have a continued sultanistic authoritarian future, or not.

## **Turkey's economy will face major challenges in 2023, including an uncertain global and national landscape, raging inflation, and staggering economic recovery**

by **Bülent Gökay**  
Professor of International Relations  
School of Social, Political and Global Studies (SSPGS)  
Keele University



Turkey's economy is in tatters. Runaway inflation and a collapsing Lira have pushed millions of people to the brink of financial ruin. High inflation environment aggravated income inequality, with real incomes melting and relative poverty deepening. More than two-thirds of people in Turkey are struggling to pay for basic items. But it wasn't always this way. Turkish economic growth was an average 5.8% between 2002 and 2022.

### **So, what went wrong?**

Since 2002 two parallel processes affected Turkey's position in the world economy. First, the global shift (a massive and complex shift in global economic power from the developed West and North to the underdeveloped East and South) has been changing the parameters of the worldwide conditions of trade, finance and growth; and second, there has been a fast neoliberal transformation of Turkey's economy that is centred on fast export-oriented industrialization, urban construction frenzy and financial restructuring. On top of this, straddling two geopolitical axes, one traversing the West-Atlantic and the other the Russian-Chinese, Erdoğan's Turkey has placed itself firmly to explore the possibility of using Turkey's "in between" status as leverage. In a real sense, the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy within the context of the global shift is the story of Turkey's massive transformation for the last twenty years, for better or for worse.

The dramatic weakening of economic performance in this second period of the AKP regime has been characterized by a series of currency crises, chronic rates of inflation, high unemployment, and rising inequality. Turkey has experienced a series of currency crises, which started in the summer of 2018 and continued in the fall of 2021. The Turkish Lira has experienced a dramatic decline in its value. As a result, Turkey has experienced a decline in its per capita income in dollar terms, which has been a significant blow to its attempts to break away from the middle-income trap. High-tech products, such as pharmaceuticals and computers, still remain seriously underrepresented in Turkey's export basket. At the same time, inflation sky-rocketed



and approached three-digit levels. This high inflation environment has aggravated income inequality. The minimum wage in purchasing power terms has since then been in serious decline.

Since spring 2021, the interest rates of Turkey's Central Bank have been pushed down to the extent that real interest rates are far into negative territory. Conventional Lira deposits, held by the vast majority of the population, are yielding massive losses. Meanwhile, commercial and consumer credit has been hugely expanded. As expected, these measures allowed Turkey still to attain high growth figures in 2021 and 2022, but at the cost of a deep devaluation of the Lira and skyrocketing inflation. High growth concealed a massive decline in living standards for the majority of the people. Average incomes have not kept pace with inflation despite government's compensatory measures such as hikes in the minimum wage, price controls and tax reductions. As a result there was an economic standstill towards the end of 2021 -- businesses were unable to make sound price calculations and many commercial contracts denominated in foreign exchange were lost. At the end, a full-scale economic catastrophe was narrowly avoided when a state-backed guarantee scheme for foreign exchange-hedged deposits were announced by the government on 20 December 2021.<sup>34</sup>

In 2022, election spending gave the Turkish economy a boost and it expanded rapidly because of buoyant consumer spending. The country's GDP increased by 5.6 percent on an inflation-adjusted basis; this rate was higher than the rate of the G7 group of advanced economies rate (2.3 %) and the emerging market economies (3.9%). This growth was achieved on the basis of the Turkish government's focus on pumping up economic output at the expense of high inflation. Consumer spending made up for about 60 % of this economic output, yet all this was at the expense of price stability.<sup>35</sup>

## Global Context of the crisis

During this period, more specifically since 2018, the global context for economy has been littered with major problems. The main areas are the escalation of the US–China trade war; slowing US growth; the long recession in the EU, but particularly in Germany; the impact of Brexit; the Chinese debt crisis; serious economic crises and political uncertainty in various regions of the earth, including Iran, Venezuela, Syria; the war in Ukraine; last but not least, the dire economic performance of several medium-sized emerging economies – Argentina, South Africa and Turkey. The bigger concern, however, was that ten years on from the financial crisis, the global economy has remained excessively financialized and fragile.<sup>36</sup>

Turkey was particularly vulnerable because of its high level of external debt, which had grown quickly since the 2008 global financial crisis. Although Turkey's total debt-to-GDP ratio was still below the emerging markets' average, Turkish economic development was extensively reliant on foreign capital; and because 70 per cent of Turkey's debt is denominated in US dollars and euros, any ups and downs in these currencies directly affect the Turkish economy. Turkey's current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was one of the largest among emerging market countries, close to 6 per cent of GDP, which is a broad measure of its balance between imports and

<sup>34</sup> Reuters, 17 December 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/turkey-extends-fx-protected-lira-deposit-scheme-year-2022-12-17/>

<sup>35</sup> Reuters, 28 February 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/turkeys-economy-grew-56-2022-pace-slow-after-earthquakes-2023-02-28/>

<sup>36</sup> B. Gökay, *Turkey in Global Economy*, Agenda: 2019, p.104.

exports and the income it earns on investments overseas. This makes the Turkish economy vulnerable to a serious shock if foreign investors pulled back. Among the similar type of emerging economies, such as Argentina, Egypt, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey witnessed a sharp increase in the share of debt since 2019, particularly of corporate debt.<sup>37</sup> The change of direction of global flows of liquidity, after the US Central Bank reversing its policy of quantitative easing, as well as the tectonic shifts in geopolitics of the Middle East and the exigencies of domestic politics, all compelled the AKP government to abandon some of its commitment to the more orthodox neoliberal model.

## Impact of the war in Ukraine on Turkish economy

The war in Ukraine couldn't have come at a worse time for Turkey. It has led to sharp hikes in prices, first for energy, and other commodities. Oil and gas have always constituted Turkey's largest import items. As a result of its economic expansion, Turkey's oil consumption grew for most of the 2000s, reaching 1,035,000 bbl/d in 2022<sup>38</sup>. The country has very limited supplies of fossil fuels, relying on imports for the bulk of its energy needs. Only a small fraction is domestically produced from small oil fields in Batman province in southeast Anatolia. This creates serious economic costs.

The majority of Turkey's oil imports originate in Russia, which became the country's top supplier in 2007, surpassing Iran for the first time.<sup>39</sup> In 2022, Turkey doubled its imports of Russian oil, to 200,000 barrels per day (bpd), compared to just 98,000 bpd for the same period of 2021.<sup>40</sup> Oil is not the only item Turkey gets from Russia, the two countries are developing cooperation in almost all sectors, including energy, trade, tourism, and agriculture. The Turkish president confirmed that he and Putin agreed on partial payment for Russian gas in Rubles. Some Turkish banks are also working on adapting to the Russian "Mir" payment system, which will enable Russians to make payments with Russian bank cards in Turkey. All these may lead to the risk of secondary sanctions against Turkey by the countries of the West.<sup>41</sup>

The war in Ukraine has directly affected Turkey's exports of goods and services. Ukraine's main ports are blocked, and air transportation has basically stopped due to security concerns. Turkey's exports to Ukraine were \$2.9 bn in 2021, which has become close to zero since the war started in February 2022. Large numbers of tourists (over 2 m a year) from Ukraine have disappeared too. The number of Russian tourists is normally much higher, close to 5 m, in peace time. Since the war less than one third of this number visited Turkey. The cost of losing these tourists is around \$5 billion.<sup>42</sup> Another important aspect of Turkey's economic relations with Ukraine and Russia is imported wheat and sunflower oil from these two countries, which was reduced to much lower levels due to the war. As a result food prices are rising globally,

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<sup>37</sup> UNCTAD 2019: 119

<sup>38</sup> <https://knoema.com/atlas/Turkey/topics/Energy/Oil/Petroleum-consumption>

<sup>39</sup> Energy Information Administration 2011

<sup>40</sup> *Reuters*, 22 August 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-doubles-russian-oil-imports-filling-eu-void-2022-08-22/>

<sup>41</sup> James Wilson, "Turkey's Cooperation with Russia May Trigger Secondary Sanctions", *EU Political Report*, <https://www.eupoliticalreport.eu/turkeys-co-operation-with-russia-may-trigger-secondary-sanctions/>

<sup>42</sup> Murat Kubilay, "The Ukraine war has upended Turkey's plans to stabilize the economy", *MEI*, 23 March 2022, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/ukraine-war-has-upended-turkeys-plans-stabilize-economy>

costing everyone to pay more for these essential items. Because in Turkey bread made from wheat is the main source of nutrition, this contributed to the cost-of-living crisis, which has potentially serious social impacts.

## February 2023 Earthquake and its impact on the economy

On 6 February 2023 a  $M_w$  7.8 earthquake struck southern and central Turkey, and northern and western Syria. The epicentre was 32 km (20 mi) west–northwest of Gaziantep. The earthquake had a maximum intensity of XI (*Extreme*) and was followed by a second  $M_w$  7.7 earthquake. This earthquake was centred 95 km (59 mi) to the north-northeast from the first, in Kahramanmaraş. There was widespread damage and tens of thousands of fatalities. This earthquake was the strongest to occur in Turkey since the 1939 Erzincan earthquake of the same magnitude, and jointly the second-strongest recorded in the country, after the 1668 North Anatolian earthquake. Within the space of nine hours, these quakes cost the lives of about 50,000. It was felt as far as Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus, and the Black Sea coast of Turkey. These were followed by more than 2,100 aftershocks.<sup>43</sup>

There are deeper reasons as to why so many buildings in these towns were destroyed by the earthquake, and why the previously designed earthquake codes were not enforced during the last 20-25 years of intense urban construction. This cannot simply be explained by corruption. Corruption refers to a deviation or abnormality, but such widespread neglect of earthquake codes in building sector was/is a core part of the Turkish accumulation mode. The total neglect of such codes is the norm in the latest rapid modernisation phase of Turkey's urban centres. This was part and parcel of Turkey's fast neoliberal growth model, which has been (mis)managed by the AKP regime: to build large scale modern accommodation for the people of Turkey as quickly as possible, and as cheaply as possible too. For this to be achieved cutting corners, ignoring all safety regulations, was allowed.

This wide-scale construction, so-called urban transformation, played an important role in the AKP's neoliberal market reforms combined with targeted clientelism and other forms of neo-patrimonialism, in which construction sector and urban land and rent have been given priority in the government agenda more than ever before. During the last 20+ years, the construction sector accounted for 5.4 % of the total GDP and employed 1.5 million people (2020 figures); and its contribution to GDP reached approximately 35% when triggered economic activities of other sectors were considered. Turkey-based construction companies also succeeded in increasing their footprints in the global market with the volume of new projects reaching 12.8 billion Euros.<sup>44</sup> Hundreds of developers and contractors have coveted vacant lands, publicly owned lands, old housing stocks and old urban fabric for investment opportunities. This rushed building frenzy created great expectations among the working and middle classes, creating an illusion of fast progress. Urban space has become a prime target of neoliberal accumulation strategies. "Turning the city over to the developers and speculative financiers redounds to the benefit of all!"<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> *The Guardian*, 21 February 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/20/turkey-new-6-point-4-magnitude-earthquake-hatay>

<sup>44</sup> <https://fiec-statistical-report.eu/2021/turkey>

<sup>45</sup> David Harvey, 'The urban roots of financial crisis: reclaiming the city for anti-capitalist struggle', *Socialist Register*, 2012, p.2.

This growth model was not invented by the AKP, it can be traced back to the initiation of neoliberal policies and wider culture of neoliberal restructuring in Turkey from 24 January 1980 decisions to the September 1980 military coup, which eliminated all real and potential resistance to neoliberalism in the country. The governments in the 1980s and 90s started to transform urban areas, by building and expanding cheap, shoddy buildings for the working classes.<sup>46</sup>

The AKP regime, after 2002, took this one step further, through much more intensive construction-based wealth accumulation. As a result, economic activity expanded significantly, and huge wealth was transferred to few major construction companies; while at the same time reasonably cheap, affordable accommodation was created for millions of people. The construction sector has been the backbone of many emerging nations during the last 30 years, triggering activity in scores of other sectors.

With interest rates at a historical low in advanced capitalist economies, with US Federal Reserve's expansionary monetary policies flooding the global markets with liquidity, at least until 2016, emerging markets such as South Africa, Argentina, Turkey, and Mexico were inundated with capital inflows, even while their composition shifted toward short-term portfolio investment. Turning Turkey into a construction zone, especially in big cities, has been an important lifeline for the AKP government in its 22 years in power.

The impacts of the 2023 February earthquake disaster undercut the country's manufacturing sector with supply chains and production lines affected in particular. Output was scaled back as some firms paused production due to the earthquakes, while new orders were also affected, and supply-chain disruption was also evident. The World Bank issued the Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation (GRADE) Report, in late February. Direct damages to residential buildings account for 53% (\$18 billion) of the total damage, with 28% of the damage (\$9.7 billion) in non-residential buildings (e.g., health facilities, schools, government buildings, and private sector buildings), and 19% of damage (\$6.4 billion) related to infrastructure (e.g., roads, power, water supply). The bank estimates that the earthquakes would also shave at least half a percentage point off Turkey's forecast gross domestic product growth of 3.5% to 4% in 2023. The report acknowledges that recovery and reconstruction costs will be potentially twice as large, and that GDP losses associated with economic disruptions will also add to the cost of the earthquakes.<sup>47</sup>

## **What forces will shape Turkey's economy in 2023?**

Shaping this rather dire outlook were a number of global headwinds, which were affecting the situation for much of 2022: Russia's war in Ukraine, volatile energy prices, sky-high inflation, the ratcheting up of interest rates and finally global slowdown, and pandemic related supply chain disruptions. Emerging market and developing economies have already bottomed out, with growth expected to rise modestly to 4% and 4.2% this year and next. For advanced economies, the slowdown will be more

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<sup>46</sup> Yeserin Elicin, "Neoliberal transformation of the Turkish city through the Urban Transformation Act", *Habitat International*, Volume 41, January 2014, pp. 150-155.

<sup>47</sup> <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099022723021250141>

pronounced, with a decline from 2.7% last year to 1.2% and 1.4% this year and next, and 9 out of 10 advanced economies will likely decelerate.<sup>48</sup>

As we move into 2023, all of these forces are there to shape Turkey's journey, the most important being the country's energy predicament. Then there is the high inflation and cost of living crisis, which will continue to temper country's economic growth.

What needs to be done? The voices from the main opposition parties in Turkey focus on the institutions, or lack of them. It has been claimed that the reforms initiated by the early AKP regime, in line with the IMF and the World Bank, gradually came to be reversed, and Turkey's institutionalised rule-based policy framework disappeared. Therefore, the urgent task to solve the economic crisis should start by going back to the early AKP period's institutional context.

Turkey's main opposition bloc, *The Opposition Alliance*, "Table of Six", claims that it will be relatively easy to take the Turkish economy out of the crisis, and explains its economic policy proposals in a 244-page document, where the emphasis is on policies aimed at creating macroeconomic stability with the Central Bank returning to fighting against inflation. The document mentions (re)establishing an institutional structure with more inclusive economic institutions, guaranteed by democratic institutions such as an independent judicial system that works justly and quickly. This institutionalist alternative, however detailed and economically sound, does not cut deep enough considering multi-dimensional historical and structural problems of the Turkish economy. The *Opposition Alliance* sees the source of the problem in Erdoğan's drift away from the neoliberal model of the Özal-Derviş reforms upheld by more inclusive political institutions. But it was the same neoliberal model, with a deep-rooted dependence on foreign capital and imports, which brought the Turkish economy to this sad state. This dependent neoliberal model itself is the cause of the crisis. The domestic factors relating to mismanagement contributed to the economic and financial headaches but were not the only reason for the crises emerging after 2014.

As in many other turning points in Turkey's economic development process during the past two decades, and the development processes of other dependent economies, the main structural reason for this sudden setback could be found in the global context. Since 2012 the growth of the world economy weakened considerably and continued to remain weak. Weaknesses in the main developed economies were at the root of the global economic slowdown. Many developed economies, especially those in the eurozone, were stuck in a vicious cycle of high unemployment, financial sector fragility, intensified sovereign risks, fiscal austerity and low growth. All these economic troubles in Europe, Japan and the US were spilling over to the emerging economies through a weaker demand for their exports and the need for foreign investment. When the U.S.Fed began hiking interest rates it weakened emerging market currencies everywhere. In this second decade of the AKP regime, when the global environment

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<sup>48</sup> Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, "Global Economy to Slow Further Amid Signs of Resilience and China Re-opening", *IMF Blog*, 30 January 2023, <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/01/30/global-economy-to-slow-further-amid-signs-of-resilience-and-china-re-opening>



was not so favourable for Turkey to attract external finance, continuous economic growth appeared to be extremely difficult.

At this critical turning point, when the country is trying to recover from the significant damage caused by the earthquake and is getting ready for probably the most critical elections of the last two decades, the Turkish economy remains caught between a rock and a hard place. The AKP is reluctant to impose IMF-suggested neoliberal remedies yet is unable to formulate a viable alternative. Whoever emerges victorious in the forthcoming elections, whether it is the current AKP government or the opposition alliance, they will have to struggle for a better economy amid very tough international financial conditions. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, it has also been evident that fiscal policy has been the significant driver of inflation, so most countries are experiencing excessive inflation. Inflation rates are at the highest levels in the last 40 years, and this will increase the cost of external funding for dependent countries like Turkey. The outlook for emerging market economies in 2023 will largely be dictated by inflation. Higher interest rates, together with the cost-of-living crisis, are expected to weaken domestic demand in these countries. Many emerging market economies are under pressure from rising debt, slowing growth and soaring yields. A number of commodity-importing emerging markets, such as Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Zambia are already facing major balance-of-payments crises. A global cost-of-living crisis is already here, disproportionately hitting those that can least afford it. Turkey is declining among emerging markets and, in terms of inflation, getting closer to the group of countries – such as Pakistan, Tunisia, and Egypt. The Turkish market has already been gravely affected by Covid-19 and rapid fluctuations of the Turkish currency against other currencies and, as a result, borrowing capacity within the Turkish market has decreased sharply. Foreign lenders are highly sceptical about Ankara's ability to pay debts back on time.

## The 2023 Earthquakes in Turkey and Syria

by **Caroline Finkel**  
Ottoman historian; formerly  
research assistant in seismology at  
Imperial College, University of London




The dreadful earthquakes of 6 February 2023 have devastated a huge swathe of territory in Turkey and Syria that lies astride the East Anatolian Fault System. The toll in human life and injury can barely be comprehended. The scale of the destruction to human-made structures and natural landscapes is beyond anyone's mental grasp. We grieve deeply with the stricken people of the region at this terrible time.

Shocks continue, and will for the foreseeable future. Forecasting the patterns of earthquake activity, and when major shocks will occur, has so far defied accurate



prediction. For some years I researched the history of earthquakes in the Ottoman lands. It was not always clear to me at the time how useful the resulting information might be until the Kocaeli earthquake of 1999, when Turkey's seismologists joined with their international colleagues to try to understand exactly what had happened below ground to produce such a catastrophic jolt.

However inexact it might be, given the nature of the source material, research on earthquakes that occurred in historical times – before the era of mechanical recording by seismograms that began in the later 19th century – offers essential data about events we would not otherwise know of. Seismologists interpret these data and assign magnitudes to suggest the size of historical earthquakes and the location of their epicentres, analysis that assists in modelling future shocks.



The Turkish-Syrian border zone where the 6 February earthquakes occurred is where the Arabian tectonic plate meets the three plates of Turkey, Eurasia and Iran. The North Anatolian Fault System, that was responsible for the very damaging 1939 Erzincan earthquake, meets the East Anatolian Fault System in the wider Lake Van region – and we remember the Van earthquake in 2011. According to the United States Geological Service, the force of the recent earthquakes was sufficient to shift parts of the North Anatolian Fault System by as much as three metres.

Earthquake faults can be all but silent for long periods of time, with little perceptible activity. This was the case with the East Anatolian Fault System until a few weeks ago. The three largest earthquakes in this zone during the 20th century occurred in 1905, 1971 and 1975, and were centred respectively in the provinces of Malatya and Bingöl, and in Lice district. Significantly larger was one in Malatya in 1893, that was exceeded in size by earlier ones centred near Amik Gölü in Hatay in 1872, Hazar Gölü in 1874, Afrin (today in Syria) in 1822, and Palu in 1789.

Historical data demonstrate that the East Anatolian Fault System's 20th century quiescence turns out not to have been typical of its longer-term pattern of activity. Had the responsible authorities had a better understanding of this situation, we might wonder if the building codes would have been more determinedly enforced. International-standard building codes for seismic-resistant construction became policy in Turkey in 1997, and were further strengthened after the devastating Kocaeli quake two years later. But good policy needs both public awareness and compliance, as well as consistent enforcement.

Following the 1999 earthquake, special taxes were imposed – on mobile phone usage for instance – for the purpose of retrofitting buildings. This was another tangible measure that recognised the need to take Turkey's vulnerability to damaging earthquakes seriously. Yet without acknowledging our ignorance or our restricted understanding of the inevitability of strong shaking in the East Anatolian Fault Zone, amnesties were extended a few years ago to property-owners countrywide for regularisation of the status of non-compliant buildings against payment of a fee that would top up state coffers. This populist measure was widely seen at the time as the height of folly, as a gesture that had the potential to elevate the risk of future death and destruction. Such amnesties were recently mooted again, pending this year's general election. The well-known saying that it is buildings that kill people, not the earthquakes themselves, carries more than a grain of truth.

Looking at photos of one fallen building amidst ten still standing, or one standing building amidst ten that have fallen, we are struck that lives could have been saved if better building practices had been universal. Rescue and relief attempts inevitably favour cities, where the population is denser. Help comes slowly to rural areas, which can be hard to reach owing to damage to transport links; loss of life and livelihood is just as traumatising there for the populations afflicted.



In the end, the adverse impacts of the dynamics of the natural world can only partially be mitigated. Today we are well aware of the threat to coastal communities as sea level rises owing to the heating of the planet, but we are reluctant to move elsewhere – even were there to be an elsewhere. Humankind chooses to live in places that offer hope for a productive life, and where their ancestors have put down deep roots.

By the same token, although the threat of another earthquake hangs over Istanbul—whose long-term seismicity is better understood than that of the East Anatolian Fault Zone – it is unthinkable that we would abandon the place. Rather, we should live with an awareness of Turkey's long history of earthquakes, and take responsibility for mitigating their impact as best we can. This means urgent and general compliance with the building codes adopted some 35 years ago and, critically, their enforcement. It also demands a programme of public education such as was enacted, if somewhat, patchily, after the 1999 earthquake, and then forgotten. In that way, we can continue to live our lives without regret that we could have done more to keep people safe and livelihoods secure, and in the knowledge that we have averted even greater tragedy.



## New Cypriot President

by **Peter Millett**

**High Commissioner to Cyprus (2005 to 2010)**

British Ambassador to Jordan (2011 to 2015)

British Ambassador to Libya (2015 to 2018)



In February Nikos Christodoulides was elected as the President of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC). What does this mean for the future of the island?

### What happened?

The elections were held to replace Nikos Anastasiades who was elected as President in 2013 and 2018. Under the 1960 constitution, Presidents of the ROC are only allowed two consecutive terms, so Anastasiades had to stand down. Since the breakdown of the constitution in 1963 and the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the system of governance, the role of the President includes heading the government,

i.e. the office holder is both President and Prime Minister. He is also the leader of the Greek Cypriot community in any talks to resolve the “Cyprus Problem”.

The first round was held on 5 February with 15 candidates. The three main candidates were Andreas Mavroyiannis, a former Ambassador who was supported by the left of centre party, AKEL; Averof Neofytou, the leader of the right of centre DISY party; and Nikos Christodoulides, former Foreign Minister who broke away from DISY and stood as an independent with the support of a range of smaller parties, DIKO, EDEK, DIPA, and Solidarity.

The first round saw 72% turn out with 32.04% of the votes going to Christodoulides; 29.59% to Mavroyiannis and 26.11% to Neofytou. The other candidates all received less than 10%. As a result, Christodoulides and Mavroyiannis, the top two, went through to the second round on 12 February when Christodoulides received 51.97% and Mavroyiannis got 48.03%. The turn out again was 72%. Christodoulides was therefore declared the winner and he took office on 1 March.

## Why did he win?

In the run up to the elections, Christodoulides cultivated a presentable image as a loyal and trustworthy supporter of the President. He campaigned widely and pressed the flesh with a large number of voters. As government spokesman he avoided confrontation and managed to win popular support by taking positive lines on major issues. He also managed a difficult balancing act of remaining Anastasiades’ close ally while succeeding in distancing himself from the accusations of corruption that were levelled at Anastasiades over the last 4-5 years, especially the highly toxic case of corruption in the issue of ‘golden passports’ to foreign investors.

But by breaking away from DISY, Christodoulides risked splitting the DISY vote, alienating himself from the traditional right/left divide in Cypriot politics. Greek Cypriot voters tend to follow their traditional party allegiances and back parties that have been supported by their families for generations, so by splitting away from DISY, he risked diluting the right of centre vote. But the official DISY candidate Neofytou had a negative image within DISY and among the public. So 70% of DISY voters backed Christodoulides while only 30% voted for Neofytou.

Mavroyiannis attracted 90% of AKEL voters. In the second round, he picked up a wide range of additional supporters by showing a sincere, straightforward approach to the issues. But since Cypriot voters tend to be loyal to their parties, only a small proportion of DISY voters who had backed Neofytou switched to support AKEL-backed Mavroyiannis. The left/right political division played in Christodoulides’ favour.



Christodoulides also had the backing of parties that are regarded as hard-liners. EDEK, a socialist party, rejects the formula that has been the basis of all negotiations up to now: the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (BBF). DIKO has strongly criticised the United Nations, wanting the UN to blame Turkey for the stalemate. Christodoulides was therefore seen as the person who represented the ‘Oxi’ voters, those who voted ‘No’ to the 2004 Annan Plan.

## What does this mean for the Cyprus Problem?

Christodoulides has wasted no time in focussing on the future of the divided island. In his victory speech, he said that his top priority was to end the Turkish occupation of

the north of the island and to reunify the country. He said that he would do everything possible to break the deadlock and resume negotiations.

When the Turkish Cypriot leader phoned to congratulate him, Christodoulides proposed that they should meet. They duly did so at under the auspices of UN representative Colin Stewart on 23 February. The UN announced that the two leaders' meeting had been "open and constructive" and had addressed several issues including the earthquakes in Turkey.

The Turkish Cypriot reaction to the election has been muted, mainly because of their preoccupation with the tragic death of a Turkish Cypriot girls volleyball team in the earthquakes in Turkey. 24 students, 4 teachers and 7 parents lost their lives, touching almost every corner of Turkish Cypriot life. This tragedy has consumed the community and the media. There is also a sense of 'wait and see' rather than jump to any conclusions about Christodoulides' real intentions.

However, Christodoulides needs to reward the hard-line parties that supported his election. Those parties expected to be given Ministerial positions and a voice in government. The meetings with those party leaders, where they haggled over Ministerial portfolios, were reported to be 'tense'. They were given Ministerial posts, but Christodoulides will probably run a 'presidential' system by running any Cyprus Problem issues from his Presidential office.

One point that did not emerge during the election is that the new President's doctoral thesis was about the merits of a bizonal, bicomunal federation. His academic conclusion that a solution should be based on this formula would not have been popular with the supporters of some of the parties that backed him. If the theme of his thesis reveals what he really thinks, it could be a useful indicator for the future.

Despite the urgency that Christodoulides appears to have adopted to relations with the Turkish Cypriots, his top priority is inevitably going to be to win a second term in five years' time. That means avoiding risks and recognition that the compromises needed to solve the Cyprus Problem are inherently risky for any Greek Cypriot politician.

In reality, nothing is going to happen until after the elections in Turkey. Ankara of course has other priorities with the aftermath of the earthquakes and is unlikely to devote time and energy to Cyprus in the short term. Ankara also has little trust in Christodoulides and regards him as one of the acolytes of Anastasiades who played a major role in the failure of the last round of talks at Crans Montana in 2017.

One of my former colleagues in London advised me once that no-one ever won money by betting on a solution to the Cyprus Problem. That remains sound advice.

## **Reactions to Review No 40**

### **A few opinions:**

What a rich issue! Congratulations.

A very good-looking product.

Extremely impressive, as usual.

## The influence of Islam in Turkish Politics: From the Democrat Party to the Justice and Development Party



by **Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa**

Professor of History,

Uludağ University, Bursa, Türkiye

E-mail: [bkyesilbursa@uludag.edu.tr](mailto:bkyesilbursa@uludag.edu.tr)

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6309-5703>



### Part 2

In Ottoman times, Turkish society's intellectual, aristocratic, and cosmopolitan elements were centred almost exclusively on Istanbul. The Ottoman society of Istanbul held the Turks of the Anatolian hinterland in contempt, (the word “Turk” was an insult and was used in the same breath as “donkey”). They were cut off from them for all practical purposes both by the absence of communications and any desire to establish contact. Anatolia was therefore left to develop for centuries in a strictly provincial and parochial framework. A major element in this provincial society was inevitably a strong conservatism of outlook, one of the manifestations of which was strict adherence to the Islamic faith, which, with all the accompanying religious observances, was guarded against outside pressures by the prevailing intellectual and physical isolation of the region.<sup>49</sup>

It is well known that one of Ataturk’s fundamental objectives was to strip Turkey of its Ottoman connotation and to develop and establish its genuinely Turkish character. The country's centre of gravity was therefore moved from the Ottoman setting of Istanbul to the unsullied remoteness of central Anatolia. At the same time, Ataturk and his entourage took drastic steps to eradicate the Anatolian Turks’ fossilised provincialism to set the rejuvenated country on the road to becoming a compact and modern “Western” State. However, it must not be forgotten that Ataturk and his supporters had themselves developed in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Istanbul and that, despite their objectives, they were far from being provincial Anatolians by background. Therefore, they could apply themselves to their tasks with intellectual objectivity unhampered by narrow and parochial prejudices.<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, it is probably true that, despite his dynamism, Ataturk’s social and moral reforms had generally been accepted only in the larger urban centres. In reality, they had not been accepted or assimilated in the rest of Turkey, where they received at best little more than lip service and outward observance. Ataturk died with part of his task incomplete, and for the next twelve years, the impetus created by his dynamic genius gradually died away.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> National Archives of Australia: A1838, 209/2/1 Part 1 (Turkey-Political Developments-General), From Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, (9 June 1958), (No. 49 Confidential). See F Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980*, (2010), pp. 463-496.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid* and see F Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (1993), pp. 52-102.

<sup>51</sup> National Archives of Australia and see E Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (1994), pp. 243-245.



However, the objective of transferring the centre of gravity of the country to Anatolia was achieved. Material progress had opened up the hinterland to an unprecedented extent. The Anatolian Turk, at last, began to play a part in the direction of the country's affairs. The advent to power of the Democrat Party in 1950 represented a new phase in the revolution in which the new leaders were, generally speaking, more Turkish than Ottoman and thus reflected more accurately the feelings of the great mass of the inhabitants of modern Turkey. Appeasement of the peasant and village majority at the expense of the urban minority was a main feature of the Democrat Party regime.<sup>52</sup>

Perhaps naturally, these new leaders did not possess the same reforming zeal or the destruction of their fellow Anatolians' time-honoured habits and customs that had fired Atatürk and his companions. They must also have been aware that certain aspects of the reforms had taken hold in provincial areas, and that the conservative Anatolian provincials would quite happily slip back into their old ways and be spared the rod of reform.<sup>53</sup>

As a result, partly through their own lack of enthusiasm for the cause and partly for vote-catching purposes, the Democrat Party steadily relaxed the imposition of the social and religious aspects of the reforms. Hence, there was consequently a general tendency to revert to the old way of life with its essential and popular element of stereotyped Islamic religious observances. As Bowker remarked, "the process which is going on at present is, in my view, not so much a genuine revival of Islam as a religion in Turkey, but a tendency to relax into provincialism". The fulfilment of the "Westernisation" objectives of the revolution depended on a combination of material modernisation and intellectual development. They depended increasingly on modernisation alone. The intellectual development essential for effectively bringing Turkey out of its Oriental and Asiatic position and providing it with the objectivity and ethical background that the Ottoman Turks had lacked was gravely threatened by the general tendency to revert to the old ways of provincial life.<sup>54</sup>

The events of the decades following the coup of 1960 represent a firm continuation of an alliance between Islam, business and secularism, which created a broad platform that ensured electoral success. The 1965 election brought to power Süleyman Demirel, head of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*), which succeeded the Democrat Party following the latter's closure. With Demirel, Turkey once more witnessed the mixture of liberal economics and personal religious beliefs that had been the hallmark of Menderes. Demirel's tenure "was even more colourful than that of Menderes".<sup>55</sup> Over the next two decades, Demirel was deposed by the army twice: once in 1971, and again in 1980.

## 1971-1996

However, it was Necmettin Erbakan and the sequence of parties he formed who campaigned extensively and openly in the name of Islam, under the movement named the National Vision (*Millî Görüş*). His active presence in Turkish politics would eventually cause a split in the centre right, with parties aligning themselves according to their



<sup>52</sup> National Archives of Australia and see F.Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pp.102-121 .

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> D Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey* (1999), p. 40.





orientation to religion. Erbakan was an engineer and academic known for his piety, and he set out to join the Justice Party led by Demirel. When refused, he stood as an independent candidate for Konya in the 1969 general election and succeeded. Once part of the Assembly, he formed the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) at the beginning of 1970. The party was widely known to be supported by the *Nakshibendi tarikat*, so it did not come as a surprise when the constitutional court closed it down 20 May 1971, immediately following the second military coup.<sup>56</sup>

However, in October 1972, he formed a new party, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*), which enjoyed a surprise success in the October 1973 elections. On 26 January 1974, he formed a coalition government with Bülent Ecevit, head of the Republican People's Party, and became Deputy Prime Minister. The coalition was unstable and short-lived, coming to an end nine months later. Although Ecevit was unable to form another government, Erbakan stayed in power to become Deputy Prime Minister in the next government, a broad-based coalition which was headed by Demirel and known as the 'Nationalist Front'. Erbakan and his party were not quite as successful in the subsequent general election of 1977. Even so, they had a short role in power as part of another coalition under Demirel's leadership.<sup>57</sup>



The fact that Erbakan's first party, the National Order, was closed down for being based on Islamic ideology is not surprising given the founding ideals of the Republic. What is surprising is that he was able to form another ideologically similar party, which he sustained over the decade and even played a major role in government. Thus, whatever the circumstances and motives behind these events, 1972 is considered to be a benchmark in the development of Islamic party politics in Turkey.<sup>58</sup>

In 1970s, the political divide between left and right became so wide that the government was paralysed, with neither side being able to achieve the majority. Because each side had the option to form an alliance with smaller, more extreme parties, a succession of coalition governments ensued. This caused the tension to worsen, and the economy eventually collapsed. Consequently, the third coup took place in September 1980.

What is noteworthy is that the leaders of the 1980 military coup depended on Islamic institutions and symbols for legitimization, and blended Islamic ideas with national goals in the hope of creating an Islamic community that was more socially homogeneous and less politically active. The emerging doctrine was the so-called '*Turk-Islam synthesis*'. In this way, the army ironically laid the foundations for the rise of Islam in the 1990s and 2000s. With the increase in religious lessons at school and the installation of a larger number of mosques, a more pervasive presence of Islamic doctrine and practice was felt in the public life of the country. This in turn laid the foundations for an orthodox Islamic ethos upon which activists could use to their own ends. The general consensus was that the army used a lenient approach to Islamic practice as a means of restoring civil peace, and that they truly believed that they

<sup>56</sup> F Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde*, pp. 463-496. and D.Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, pp. 87-109.

<sup>57</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>58</sup> *ibid*.

would be able to restrain excessive zeal whenever necessary. However, it did not turn out like that at all.<sup>59</sup>



Political Islam received another boost from the Motherland Party and its leader, Turgut Özal, who was elected to government in November 1983 in the first elections following the military coup of 1980. The compulsory religious instruction that Özal introduced into Turkish schools was largely of the old, stereotyped kind. It could not be regarded as a serious attempt to meet the challenging problems of secularism in a Muslim State or imbue Turkish youth with the moral fibre and sense of responsibility, which had been one of Atatürk's fundamental aims.<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, the rapid rate of material progress during the 1980s did not save it from the extremes of political and religious bigotry. Moreover, modern communications and the growth and development of university education have not led to the immunity of the younger generation to reactionary tendencies. If, however, this trend continues, the process of Westernisation is likely to assume a mainly materialistic form, similar to that of the Arab States, and lack the objectivity which Turkey needs to make it fully "reliable" from the Western point of view, which only an intellectual development could produce. Therefore, the danger to the West is one of increasing nationalism and possibly active fundamentalism: the nationalistic Moslem Turk against the exploiting infidel foreigner. It was hoped that modernisation would ultimately win the tug-of-war with social reaction. However, unless material developments were coupled with those in intellectual areas, the process may well be further prolonged.<sup>61</sup>

During the 1980s, the successor to the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), was not closed down, but excluded from the political arena. Though the army had returned the country to democracy, it kept tight reins on the process. All previously active political parties were abolished and a ten-year ban from politics was put on their leaders, including Erbakan. Thus, Erbakan and the Welfare Party remained outside parliament for the whole of the decade.<sup>62</sup>



However, during the 1990s, the Welfare Party, still led by Erbakan, bounced back spectacularly. In the general elections held in 1991, it succeeded in passing the 10 per cent barrier, gaining 40 seats in the Grand National Assembly. In 1994, it gained the metropolitan municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul, as well as more than 300 others in small towns and cities across Turkey. In the general election of 1995, it expanded and emerged as the largest political party, with 158 deputies, and 22 per cent of the vote overall. This gave Erbakan the opportunity to form a government. He did his best, but he failed to reach an agreement with Tansu Çiller (head of the True Path Party), who formed a coalition government with Mesut Yılmaz (head of the Motherland Party) in March 1996. However, three months later, the Çiller-Yılmaz coalition government collapsed, and in June 1996, Erbakan agreed to a surprise coalition with Çiller. Thus, Erbakan became the first leader of an Islamic party to head a government in the history of the Republic.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>59</sup> D Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, pp. 40-44.

<sup>60</sup> T Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi, 1950'den Günümüze* pp. 327-377 (2008), and see F Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde*, pp. 463-496.

<sup>61</sup> F.Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pp. 102-121.

<sup>62</sup> D Shankland *Islam and Society in Turkey*, pp. 110-131.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*

## 1996-2002

As a result of increased criticism from within his own party, a decrease in support for the coalition among the True Path Party, and widespread explicitly pro-secular civil protest, he resigned in June 1997. He had hoped that the premiership would go to his coalition partner, Çiller. However, President Demirel asked Yılmaz, who was in opposition, rather than Çiller, to form a new government. In January 1998, he was found guilty of acting against the secular constitution and suspended from politics for five years, and the Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional Court on 16 January 1998.<sup>64</sup>

In the foresight that their party would be banned, a group of Welfare Party members had formed the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) on 17 December 1997. The remaining Welfare representatives in parliament joined this new party following the closure of the old one. At the first Virtue Party Congress held on 14 May 2000, the rift between the traditional and reformist wings within the party became apparent, with Abdullah Gül at the head of the latter. On 22 June 2001, the Virtue Party was closed, again for acting against the secular constitution – specifically the appearance in Assembly of the Virtue Party representative, Merve Kavakçı, wearing Islamic head covering.

The traditionalist wing of the Virtue Party formed the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) on 20 July 2001. However, the reformist wing did not join, saying that they had changed their course and departed from the National Vision movement. Thus, reformists Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül formed the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP*) on 14 August 2001. At the general elections of 3 November 2002, the Justice and Development Party won the necessary majority to form a government on their own. They have been in power ever since.



Nevertheless, until the 1990s, Turkish political parties considered the preservation of the founding secular structure preferable to using Islamic references in state administration. In the political history of Modern Turkey, two parties with strong Islamic tendencies have come to power. One was the Welfare Party (WP), established by the late Necmettin Erbakan soon after the 1971 Semi-Coup; and the second as a natural out runner of the latter, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) was founded in August 2001, after the turbulent years of the so-called 28 February 1997 post-modern coup era. After a long struggle, the Islamist Welfare Party came to power in 1996. In the same year, it was accused of threatening secular lifestyle and subsequently toppled by the cooperation of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and secular elitist bureaucracy. Interestingly this post-modern coup paved the way for an unpremeditated trigger effect. The domino stones pushed by the secular bureaucracy and TAF unpredictably cleared the path for another movement from the same roots with almost the same traditions. Thus, the second wave of Islamic movement came when JDP seized power in November 2002 and still rules today.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*

On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council presented Erbakan with a series of demands which they described as being designed to protect secularism. At the meeting, Erbakan refused to ratify the proposals, though he finally capitulated and signed later.

<sup>65</sup> T Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi*, pp. 327-377 and see F Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde*, pp. 463-496.

Since the start of the multi-party system in 1946, no party other than the Democrat Party (1950-60) had stayed in government for over 10 years. The JDP came to power in November 2002 and has governed the country continuously for almost two decades, with the support of parties with similar ideologies. Similar to their international counterparts, ruling parties who want to maintain their power in Turkey have to implement some fundamental policies. These are:



- (1) a growing economy. Turkey has a young population and has received a rising number of irregular immigrants; thus, a growing economy is vital for voters,
- (2) Strong combat with terrorism and perseverance of public order and security,
- (3) Protection of democracy and the secular state structure,
- (4) Strong Islamist discourse and political stance are also crucial for voters' political choices.

In political science, the economy is regarded as a factor of social infrastructure that has always shaped society's voting behaviours, regardless of religion, culture, nationality, or other factors. Because Turkey is a developing country with a young population, economic indicators are more effective than in developed European countries. Economic development is strongly correlated to the increase in the number of votes. Hence, when income levels rise, voting rates also rise; conversely, when income levels start to decrease, voting rates also begin to go down. The JDP was voted into government in the climate of the economic crisis of 2002. Until 2009, a time considered the heydays of JDP rule, the country experienced a fast economic growth rate paralleled in the number of JDP votes. However, serious economic problems began to emerge with the lack of needed investment in the economy and education.

When economic indicators began to worsen, the ruling party needed new leverages to attract the voters. The JDP reverted to the age-old method to relieve the worsening living standards: religion and nationalism. Experiences throughout history have shown that power-loving leaders always benefit when these two constructs are brought into play.

## Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the rise of political Islam in Turkey, particularly since the 1980 coup, has had highly significant effects on the country. It may even become stronger over the next decades, with a substantial portion of the political right increasingly pressing for more Islamic involvement in the life and government of Turkish society. The tendency of the opposition parties on the right to fracture, even when ideologically compatible, such as the split between the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and İYİ Party, has resulted in the lack of viable competition. The left has similar problems.

The public perception of religious sentiment has shifted dramatically, and Turkish society appears to be becoming more openly and deeply divided into the secular and non-secular groups that Rustow had tentatively suggested in his seminal article of 1957.<sup>66</sup> While young people tend to support the former, villagers and urban migrants

<sup>66</sup> D Rustow, 'Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920-1955', in R Frye, (ed.), *Islam and the West*, (Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1957), p. 101-107.

lean toward the latter. While Islam is very much alive in almost all areas of Turkish life these days, it should neither be a replacement for, nor an alternative to, the founding principles of modern Turkey. Rather, it should be an integral part of life in the country as it grows and develops.

However, the long-term programme of the political Islamists is quite clear. It has been a gradual endeavour: changes in civil service personnel, control over art and other activities of which they disapprove on the grounds that they are immoral, support for orthodox religion leading to a greater control over the public spaces of the community, a shift away from the Western orientation that has characterised the Republic until now, and the creation of a parallel judiciary through the re-introduction of *Shariah* family law. They have a devoted lifetime in the pursuit of these goals.<sup>67</sup>

Today, the key question in Turkey is whether the political Islamists will take absolute power in the general elections in May 2023 and change the political and social system in Turkey in accordance with their goals. However, there is no foreseeable chance that they will do so: the secular people are still too strong and too aware for them to confront head-on with any chance of success. However, the long-term effect that political Islam will have on Turkish society is not yet clear, though there can be no doubt that it is now an established and popular mass movement.

If in the future the JDP, or whatever replacement may emerge in May 2023, refrains from explicit calls to religious violence, it can obviously only be a good thing. However, this does not imply any necessary lessening of their goals. It would be naïve to believe that a political programme driven by those who have spent their lives in the pursuit of achieving the slow accumulation of Islamic change is going to be abandoned simply because of an encounter with opposition.

However, does this mean, then, that there is no alternative but for the army to intervene once again as violent clashes between non-secular and secular groups lead the country into internal chaos? I believe not. Such a violent confrontation may happen, but it is not inevitable. A full-scale coup today would have instant repercussions in a country that is vastly more integrated with the international market than previously. The issue is rather whether they may become strong enough to render an explicit, and violent, division between secular and non-secular sectors of the population. It is widely held in the West that the army is simply, or unambiguously, anti-religious. Indeed, prior to 2002, the army abhorred fanaticism, and viewed the influence of religion in politics with the greatest suspicion and regarded its ultimate task as to preserve the Republic. However, this is no longer the case.

If a coup is not an easy way out, are there other possibilities? One frequently promoted theory is that over time, military interventions may no longer be necessary, because Islam will have become routinized. Moreover, since the Republican system is now well established, it has shown itself very flexible to change. The direction that Turkey will take partly depends on the actions of the international community. Although the international community may not claim a desire to interfere with Turkey's internal affairs, they are already indirectly part of the conflicts within Turkey in many different ways. There are the formal links with NATO, with the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Even the process of globalisation itself, which has received so much of its

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<sup>67</sup> D Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, p. 174.



stimulus from developed countries, is partly responsible for developments in Turkey and for the positions that the Turks have adopted.<sup>68</sup>

Some may conclude that Kemalism has failed. In part, they would be right. The current situation today in Turkey differs in many ways from the future envisaged by many of the Republic's founders. However, it must be remembered that the Kemalist system has survived a hundred years of political, social and economic transformation with remarkable resilience. If the Kemalist movement has been a failure, it is so only in parts and to parts of the population.<sup>69</sup>

## TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POLISH INDEPENDENCE

by Arin Bayraktaroğlu

Member of Combination Room  
Lucy Cavendish College  
University of Cambridge



### Part 2

Michał Czapkowski became a Muslim in 1849 and was given the name Mehmet Sadık Paşa.<sup>70</sup> At the time he was living on a farm in Sazlıbosna where the locals called him *Kont Çayka*. Within the vast grounds of his farm he had a small mosque built and he employed a hodja by the name of Mahmut Ağa to give him religious education.<sup>71</sup> Michał's conversion to Islam surprised many people in France but there was a reason for it. During his years in France, Czapkowski was married to Marianna Karol Różycki, with whom he had four children. His French wife stayed in Paris when he went to Constantinople where he became involved with a Polish lady named Ludwika Sniadecka. As divorce was impossible in France under the existing Catholic law, conversion to Islam enabled Czapkowski to marry his new love interest.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid*, p. 174.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>70</sup> Beydilli Kemal, (2008). "Mehmed Sadık Paşa", *DİA*, 35: 396-397.

<sup>71</sup> Çelikdönmez, Ethem. "Mehmet Sadık Paşa Rus Başbakan Aleksandr Kerenski'nin dedesi mi?" *Kafkassam*, 19 March 2022 (<https://kafkassam.com/mehmet-sadik-pasa-rus-basbakan-aleksandr-kerenskinin-dedesi-mi.html/> accessed 25/03/2022).

**Ludwika Sniadecka**

Born in 1802, Ludwika Sniadecka was two years older than Czajkowski. Both were in their forties at the time, so this was a romance of mature people. She was an outstanding personality in her own right, and there exists a very interesting biography of her written by Maria Czapska.<sup>72</sup> Sniadecka was the daughter of a celebrated Polish scientist, a medical doctor and professor of chemistry at Vilnius University, Jędrzej Sniadecki. His brother, Ludwika's uncle, was for many years the rector of Vilnius University. How Sniadecka found herself in Constantinople is a separate romantic story.

The Polish State website<sup>73</sup> describes Sniadecka as the first love of poet Juliusz Słowacki, one of the principal representatives of Romanticism. He reflected his love for Sniadecka in several of his poems, but his feelings were not reciprocated. Instead, Ludwika fell in love with Vladimir Rimski-Korsakov, a young Russian officer and a son of – not the famous composer – but a Lithuanian governor. Rimski-Korsakov was martyred in 1829 during the Ottoman-Russian War. At the time the Russian armies were holding prolonged sieges to three Ottoman cities, Shumen, Varna and Silistra, just as they did in 2022 to Kiev. Although the capture of Varna and Silistra proved to be difficult for them, Shumen's fall was easy, despite the fact that Vladimir Rimsky-Korsakov and thousands of other Russian soldiers had lost their lives.

Sniadecka, mourning for her lover for years, went to the Ottoman Empire in 1842, 13 years after his death to find his body. She was planning to commemorate him by his grave and to establish a foundation for orphans and elders in his honour. In Constantinople she met Michał Czajkowski, leader of the most important political camp of the Poles in exile, and also the first director of the Polish Oriental Agency.

They were of contrasting characters but found solace in one another. In the words of an observer,

“Michał Czajkowski was a man of vision, courage, and great energy, but it seems he was also impulsive and touchy, that he lost control over his nerves, became angry, quarrelled with people. Sniadecka, on the other hand, was a woman of great tact and self-control, an excellent judge of character, and -- most important in politics -- possessed of a steady, unidirectional will and indomitable determination. Ludwika became her husband's principal political advisor and aide; she ran his secretariat, and his political correspondence. She wrote in a letter to a friend in 1856, ‘Now I am everything to him. Wife, mistress, friend, confidante, and nurse.’ “<sup>74</sup>

Czajkowski confesses his deep attachment to Ludwika in his book, *The Strange Lives of Polish Men and Women*. He refers to Sniadecka and himself as follows: “These two souls were born to understand each other; God has brought these two hearts together to pound for Poland on the shores of the Bosphorus [...] One day, one of our

<sup>72</sup> Maria Czapska, *Ludwika Sniadecka*. (Biblioteka Polska, 1938).

<sup>73</sup> (<https://www.gov.pl/web/turkiye/ludwika-sniadecka-english/>) accessed 25/03/2022).

<sup>13</sup> Rudnytsky, Ivan L. (1987). “Michał Czajkowski's Cossack Project During the Crimean War: An Analysis of Ideas”. (*Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, 1987). (Transcript of a lecture delivered at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 27 October 1983) (<http://www.ditext.com/rudnytsky/history/czajkovski.html>) / accessed 15/03/2022).

descendants, shall say speaking of our strange life: they both loved and served for Poland." <sup>75</sup>

Ludwika Sniadecka died on February 22, 1866. By the order of Czajkowski, she was buried in the village of Adampol. Because she passed away as the wife of a Muslim, her grave was kept initially outside the cemetery. Today, the tomb of Sniadecka is inside the Catholic cemetery of the village, but is located at some distance from other tombs.

According to Rudnytsky<sup>76</sup>, Czajkowski was spiritually exhausted due to the death of Ludwika. After some time spent on his own he married a Greek girl, Irene Theoskolo, who was considerably younger than he was. Partly under the influence of his third wife, and partly because of his awareness of the futility of his life in exile and the failure of his plans, he appealed, in 1873, for a pardon to Czar Alexander II, who he hailed as leader of all the Slavs. This pardon was granted, and he returned to Russia, which for him was Ukraine. Once again, he changed his religion and converted to Orthodoxy. He was given a small landed estate in Left-Bank Ukraine, but was boycotted by the entire Polish society which was populist in orientation and had no use for such an archaic figure as Czajkowski. His young wife cheated on him with the local estate clerk, and Czajkowski, moving out of their joint accommodation, lived together with an aide-de-camp and companion, Morozowicz. Rudnytsky reports that after the death of his friend, Czajkowski took his own life in 1886. His body was moved to Krakow and buried in the grounds of Wawel Castle. His resting place was as extraordinary as his life story had been.

Ludwika and Michal had two daughters. Michal's son from Marianna Karol Rozycki, the wife he left in Paris, was named Wladyslaw Czajkowski (1843-1907) who also came to Constantinople, outlived his father and held very important positions in the Ottoman administration where he was given the name of Muzaffer Paşa. He was even appointed as the governor of Lebanon at a later stage. The state website of the Republic of Poland<sup>77</sup> reports that Wladyslaw Czajkowski was a guest in Ludwika's home on one occasion and described her as a 'Diplomat wearing a skirt'. She was a strong character leaving a positive impression on whoever was around her, even if it was the son of her husband from an earlier marriage.

### Adam Mickiewicz



Another famous name that is involved in the Polish independence struggle with Turkish connections was that of Adam Mickiewicz, the Polish national poet, political activist and all-round national Polish hero. Sent by Hotel Lambert, he arrived in Constantinople to meet with Michał Czajkowski. His mission was to recruit Poles in support of the Ottomans in the effort to remove Russia from Crimea and then move on to reclaim Poland. Consequently Mickiewicz spoke at many of the Polish cultural events and would have left a great impression on patriotic Poles.

<sup>75</sup> From the state website of the Republic of Poland: (<https://www.gov.pl/web/turkiye/ludwika-sniadecka-english/> accessed 24/03/2022).

<sup>76</sup> See Footnote 11.

<sup>77</sup> ([https://www.gov.pl/web/turkiye/ludwika-sniadecka-english/accessed 12/04/2022](https://www.gov.pl/web/turkiye/ludwika-sniadecka-english/accessed%2012/04/2022))

Born to an impoverished noble family Mickiewicz met the love of his life Maryla at the age of 24. They could not marry because he was poor and she was already engaged to Count Puttkamer. He was arrested for his clandestine nationalistic activities while studying at Vilnius University and deported to Russia. There he befriended Alexandr Pushkin and was influenced by his poetic genius. He published his second volume of poems, *Poezye*, in 1823. It was possible to see in some parts that he was alluding to the never-ending feud between Poland and Russia. Pushkin's influence on him was also apparent. The poem that Pushkin wrote in 1821 about the 'Fountain of Tears' <sup>78</sup> referring to the fountain in the garden of *Bahçesaray Palace* in Crimea, was echoed in one of Mickiewicz's Crimean Sonnets: <sup>79</sup>



### Bakhchisarai

Still vast, but desolate, the dwelling of the Girey kings!  
 On stairs, in vestibules once brushed by Pashas' brows  
 And across sofas that were thrones of power, sanctuaries of love,  
 Grasshoppers veer and bounce, the serpent winds,  
 And rank vines crawl through myriad-colored windows  
 To invade mute vaults and voiceless halls, conquer  
 Man's labor in the name of nature, and inscribe  
 There in the letters of Balthazar: DESTRUCTION.  
 In the center of a hall, a basin hewn in marble:  
 The fountain of the harem, still intact,  
 Whispers its tearful pearls alone, as if to ask:  
 Where are they, grandeur, power and love? Their term  
 Was to have been forever, and the stream's, ephemeral,  
 But they have passed and the white fount is here.  
 (*Translated by Angelica Caro*) <sup>80</sup>

As the poet says, the fountain still stands in the same place, in the garden of Bahçesaray Palace, and is guarded by a bust of Alexandr Pushkin, with no mention of Mickiewicz in its vicinity.

Mickiewicz was allowed to leave Russia in 1829 on the grounds of ill health. On his way home he stopped in Weimar where he was entertained by the writer, scientist, and statesman Goethe. At the time of the November 1830 uprising he was in Rome and did not go to Warsaw to join the fight but his passion for independent Poland remained strong. For some years he had taught literature in different educational establishments in Rome and Paris and became a frequent visitor of Hotel Lambert. In 1855 Prince Adam Czartoryski sent him to Turkey to mediate between factions of Poles preparing to fight with the Allies in the Crimean War. He worked with Michal Czajkowski in carrying out these duties.

His apartment was on *Yenişehir* Street in the Pera district of Constantinople, and this is where he died after coming from one of his visits to military camps, possibly of

<sup>78</sup> This phrase comes from the Bible, the book of Jeremiah where Jesus cries out to God, "Oh Lord, that my head was a spring of water and my eyes a fountain of tears, that I would weep day and night for the slain of my people".

<sup>79</sup> *Bahçe* means 'garden' in Turkish, and *Saray* means 'palace'; as a compound noun it means 'palace with a garden'.

<sup>80</sup> [http://info.filg.uj.edu.pl/~jrybicki/courses/polpoet/mic\\_crim.htm](http://info.filg.uj.edu.pl/~jrybicki/courses/polpoet/mic_crim.htm) / accessed 27/03/2022.



cholera. Unfortunately he could not see the end of the Crimean War. Many attended his funeral procession down to the port for his body to be transported to France. The occasion was described in a letter written by one of those attending the event:

“A pair of oxen pulled a plain casket through the muddy streets of Beyoğlu. I assumed there would be nobody but us Poles taking part in the procession, but it wasn't long before we understood how wrong I was. A teeming mass of mourners wearing black filed in behind us, covering the street. People from all nations were present, Serbians, Dalmatians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Italians, with Bulgarians in the majority. This was their way of showing respect for the genius of the Slavic poet.”<sup>81</sup>

His remains were transported to France in 1855 but later moved to Poland and entombed in the grounds of Wawel Castle in Krakow, just like the remnants of his compatriot and colleague Michal Czajkowski. As for the wooden house where he had lived in Constantinople, it was destroyed in one of the fires, but later its replica in stone was built in the same place. The new building was named The Mickiewicz Museum and is still open to visitors to Istanbul.

**Polonezköy** The Polish village Polonezköy which was associated with all the above



mentioned names in one way or another has survived to date albeit in an ever changing character. The settlement originally started with twelve Polish emigres but became crowded with about 100 families by 1863. During this time the Lazarists gradually departed, leaving the whole village to the Poles. The

remaining population initially made their living with farming and producing dairy goods.<sup>82</sup> When the government demanded tax on the income made out of these activities, the Polish *muhtar* (the village administrative leader) recommended that villagers should acquire French citizenship, like the owner of the village, Adam Jersy Czartoryski. This did not go well with the Ottoman administration which threatened the village residents with deportation. In later years Bulgarians, Austrians and even the Russians sent envoys to the village trying to lure them to accepting their respective citizenships. In each case the Turks stayed firm and did not allow the Slavs to change their citizenship. The problem was eventually resolved when most villagers accepted Turkish citizenship in return for a tax-free status.<sup>83</sup>

In the meantime public amenities were coming one by one to the village: In 1904 a police station was established and in 1914 a church (Mother Mary Church) and a Catholic school were built. There is also a museum in Polonezkoy, the House of Zofia Ryży, built in 1881-1883 by Wincenty Ryży and named in honour of his wife and last occupant. In her life time Zofia Ryży had promoted the mother tongue and history of

<sup>81</sup> Letter excerpt from T.T. Jez (<https://humaozay.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/adam-mickiewicz.html> / accessed 12/03/2022).

<sup>82</sup> Even today the Polonezkoy *Beyaz ve Kaşar Peynirleri* (different kinds of Turkish cheese) are sold as quality products.

<sup>83</sup> Topaktaş, Hacer. (2015). “Polonezköy (Adampol) (1842-1922)”. *Bellekten, Türk Tarih Kurumu*, Cilt 79, No. 284, 293-318.




Poland among the youth in Adampol. The museum houses the remnants of the village history and old photographs. The historical Polish Cemetery, the Culture House, and the open air Wooden Arts Exhibition are among the most popular places to visit in Polonezköy.

In time farming lost its initial attraction for the villagers and a new craze of running guesthouses started. By the 1940s Polonezköy was a well-known holiday spot for wealthy Istanbulites, especially for weekends. Its prominent visitors included Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1937 and Leh Walesa in 1994. By the 1970s, however, the Poles left the village completely, either to settle down elsewhere in the country or to leave Turkey altogether.

Today Polonezköy is still an exceptionally beautiful area and is complete with modern hotels and even a country club.

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Franklin D. Roosevelt is reported saying in 1932, "In the truest sense, freedom cannot be bestowed; it must be achieved."<sup>84</sup> The Polish struggle for independence was an achievement of those not only in the lands of the Ottoman Empire but in many parts of Europe where Polish people had lived until the end of first World War under the domination of different powers. Polish liberation was secured only when the triple entente countries won the war and a national hero, Josef Pidsulski arrived in Warsaw on 11 November 1918 to be declared the Head of State of the newly founded Republic of Poland. As for Ukraine, independence came at a much later date. She was declared an independent state on 24 August 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The struggle of both nations cost many lives, but like hundreds of other courageous individuals who fought for this noble cause, Czartoryski, Czajkowski, Sniadecka and Mickiewicz, will be remembered for their contribution to the liberation of their country, and Turkey will be remembered for her part in their struggle for independence.



## First Commagene Biennial in 2022 in Kahta, Adiyaman and how it can help rebuilding after the earthquake

by Ismail Ertürk

Senior Lecturer,  
PMO Management & Organisation Studies,  
University of Manchester

The news of the devastating earthquake in south-eastern Turkey in early February has saddened me in more ways than one. The losses, both human and material, are beyond comprehension even for a region and country that regularly experience big earthquakes. Almost apocalyptic scenes from historically and culturally unique cities like Antakya and Hatay brought tears to the eyes of many. I was also sad for a personal reason. A unique cultural initiative, the Commagene Biennial in Kahta, a sub-

<sup>84</sup> Fiala, Karen. *Alterquest: The Alternative Quest for Answers*. (Lulu.com, 2006), p. 53.

province in Adiyaman Province, that aims to celebrate the region's history and cultures will be another victim of the earthquake, at least for the time being. The archaeological ruins that have lasted thousands of years hosted a successful contemporary art event in 2022 – the 1st Commagene Biennial.

Just before the earthquake struck Adiyaman and the region I was working with the curator of the Commagene Biennial, Mr Nihat Özdal, in planning the 2nd Commagene Biennial in 2024 and the 2023 pre-biennial events. The February 2023 earthquake stopped all normality in the region and our work, too. Within the grand scheme of things and the colossal damages that the earthquake has caused, ours is, of course, an infinitely insignificant problem. But, at the same time, this first ever biennial in Adiyaman Province can be a source of hope in rebuilding efforts. This one-year-old art and culture initiative can contribute to the rebuilding of Adiyaman and its environs because art can and has proven to heal social and personal traumas and sufferings. Art and culture, through the Biennial and its related annual activities and events, can also play a significant role in socially and economically reviving the region.

I was invited to speak at the 1st Commagene Biennial at the beginning of September 2022. In my session Prof. Mark J P Wolf, an academic from the USA, whose work is about imaginary worlds in literature and cinema, and I talked about imagining alternative civilisations and socio-economic systems. The session was moderated by the renowned Turkish author and actor Ms. Pelin Batu. All three of us were visiting Kahta and Adiyaman for the first time in our lives and were impressed by the local interest in our session and by the Q&A session afterwards. The big auditorium was packed with local administrative dignitaries and teachers and secondary school pupils. The theme of the 1st Commagene Biennial, 'An Imaginary Civilisation', was inspired by the small and short-lived syncretic kingdom of Commagene that had existed between 163 BCE and 62 CE near today's Kahta sub-province in south-eastern Turkey. The ancient Greek city of Samasota was Commagene Kingdom's capital. Commagene was founded in south-eastern Anatolia after the breakup of Alexander the Great's empire and the kingdom's culture displayed both Hellenistic and Persian characteristics.<sup>85</sup> The theme of the Biennial was a tribute to the Commagene Kingdom's peaceful fusion of the cultures and belief systems of the competing civilisations in the region. This small kingdom had solved the existential problem of lying on the geopolitical fault lines of two big civilisations by inventing its own unique belief system that embraced and blended both civilisations' characteristics in a successful and aesthetical way- a success that was recognised by UNESCO as of World Heritage quality in 1987.<sup>86</sup> The Commagene kings took names like Mithradates and Antiochus and had declared ancestral lineages relating them to both the Greek Seleucids and the Persian Achaemenids.

The photographs of the ancient sculptural ruins at the summit of Nemrut Mountain are ubiquitous in travel brochures for Turkey. In particular the fallen heads of monumental, seated statues of the Commagene Kingdom's gods among the ruins are universally known. According to Seton Lloyd<sup>87</sup> the small and short-lived Commagene Kingdom could easily be overlooked in the rich history of Anatolia, were it not the majestic Hierotheion (temple-tomb and house of the gods), a stone tumulus 145 meters in

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<sup>85</sup> S. Lloyd, *Ancient Turkey: A Traveller's History of Anatolia* (London: British Museum Publications, 1989) and <https://www.worldhistory.org/Commagene/>

<sup>86</sup> UNESCO, "Nemrut Dağı", see <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/448/>

<sup>87</sup> Lloyd, p. 150

diameter and 50 meters in height, rising from natural rock, built by King Antiochos I (c. 69- c. 34 BCE). Seton Lloyd, who was the first Director of the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, used a colour photograph of the heads of the gods Apollo-Mithras and Zeus-Oromasdes, reflecting the Persian and Hellenistic influences on the Commagene culture, on the front of the dust jacket of his book *Ancient Turkey*, an archaeological book written for travellers of Anatolia – referenced in footnote 1. In 1987 UNESCO designated Mount Nemrut a World Heritage Site praising the engineering and artistic achievements – unique at that period – in the making of the funerary mound of King Antiochos I and the statues of the Commagene's gods.

The young and visionary governor of Kahta sub-province, Mr Selami Korkutata, and the young curator Mr Nihat Özdal, who are both from south-eastern Turkey but have worked and travelled in other parts of Turkey and internationally, decided to use the biennial format to transform the cultural scene in the region and, at the same time, to help the region to develop socio-economically through cultural tourism. The Biennial has attracted new kind of visitors, cultural tourists, to the region and offered traditional visitors, who come to see the ancient ruins, something new and modern. This increase in the number of national and international visitors has made a positive contribution to the region's economy even in the short period of time from August to October during the Biennial. The captain who takes the visitors on a boat to the art installations on the islets on the reservoir of the Atatürk Dam told the curator Mr Özdal that he plans to open a café to serve the visitors drinks and snacks as there are no facilities at the site. There are university students who act as temporary guides at the biennial sites who consider becoming full-time guides for the Biennial. The local hospitality sector, too, is bound to attract investment and create employment for the locals as the Biennial and the related cultural and art events grow over the years. There have been successful examples elsewhere in the world and Turkey of using culture for developmental purposes creating employment and economic growth. Kahta and Adıyaman wanted to emulate such successes.

Governor Korkutata and curator Özdal have another objective, too. They want to introduce contemporary art and other less represented art forms to local people. Özdal, who himself comes from south-eastern Turkey, invited contemporary artists to create artworks that engage with archaeology and history in a wide-open space, unlike most biennials where a big city or an urban environment or an art gallery envelopes the artworks. Here, artworks are dispersed over a very large area, expanding square kilometres not square meters. Mr Özdal also wanted artists to engage with the environmental issues in the region. The reservoir of Atatürk Dam reaches the outskirts of Kahta. The Atatürk Dam was built as part of the gigantic South-East Anatolia Project (GAP in acronym in Turkish) on the Euphrates River and is one of the largest earth-and-rock fill dams in the world. The ancient city of Samosota (Samsat in present-day Turkey), which was the capital of the Commagene Kingdom, now lies submerged in the reservoir of Atatürk Dam. Some of the unsubmerged mounds in the flooded area became islets on the Atatürk Dam reservoir, only accessible by boat. Curator Özdal commissioned several artworks to be exhibited on these uncanny islets.

Nihat Özdal himself experienced first-hand the submerging of his own historic Armenian town of Halfeti, on the banks of the Euphrates River, when another GAP dam, Birecik Dam, was built. The GAP Project, the Turkish government's South-Eastern Anatolia Project has a long history in the Republican era going back to the early years of the Republic in the 1930s when the foundations of today's General

Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) were laid. The aims are to generate electricity and stimulate an agrobusiness-led economic development in low-income south-eastern Turkey. Indeed, the output of basic cereals in the region has more than tripled since the completion of the GAP irrigation system. When the GAP project is fully completed it is expected to increase the employment in the region by 3.8 million and the per capita income by 209%.<sup>88</sup> When fully completed, the GAP project will provide almost 50% of Turkey's energy needs. This gigantic developmental project has inevitably caused ancient towns and villages to be submerged in the reservoirs of the giant dams, attracting criticism from locals and national and international conservationists. Some of Özdal's own artistic work reflect his and the region's trauma of witnessing their history being submerged under the giant dam reservoirs. Most recently a team of Italian academics have comprehensively documented the effects of the three of the dams – Atatürk, Birecik and Karkamış – on the archaeological and cultural heritage of south-eastern Anatolia using longitudinal satellite data.<sup>89</sup> Their conclusion is that better documentation and policy could prevent the deterioration of the remaining parts of the submerged archaeological sites.



Engaging with both ancient and modern traces of human activity in the region at the 1st Commagene Biennial in 2022, 51 artists from 23 countries exhibited their work at historical sites in Kahta and its vicinities.<sup>90</sup> Mount Nemrut, Kahta Castle, Karakuş Tumulus, the ancient city of Arsemia, Cendere (Septimus Severus) Bridge, two islets on the Atatürk Dam reservoir, in the proximity of the neolithic settlement of Nevalı Çori, were the archaeological and historical sites where the artists exhibited their commissioned installations responding to the theme of the Biennial, “An Imaginary Civilisation”. Each site is historically significant. Mount Nemrut, as I wrote above, with its tumulus and statues of Greco-Persian gods, is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Kahta Castle, built on a cliff overlooking Kahta (Nimphaios) creek, dates back to the Commagene Kingdom but was substantially rebuilt by Mamluks in the 13<sup>th</sup> century CE, and was used successively by Artuqids, Seljuks and Ottomans. Karakuş Tumulus was built by the Commagene king Mithridates for the women of his family. Cendere (Septimus Severus) Bridge was built by Romans around first century CE. Arsamia was a royal seat of the Commagene Kingdom and has the Hierothesion of King Mithridates I Kallinikos, built for him by his son and heir Antiochos I.<sup>91</sup> The Atatürk Dam is a modern addition to the anthropogenic impact on the nature and a controversial one as its construction, like other dams built in the region as part of the South-Eastern Project, caused flooding of archaeological and historical sites as well as the unpopular displacement of local people.

<sup>88</sup> K. Kaygusuz, “Contribution of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) to Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power Production in Turkey”, *Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy*, 5:2, (2010): 199-209

<sup>89</sup> Nicolò Marchetti, Gabriele Bitelli, Francesca Franci, and Federico Zaina, "Archaeology and dams in southeastern Turkey: Post-flooding damage assessment and safeguarding strategies on cultural heritage." *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 33, no. 1 (2020): 29-54.

<sup>90</sup> See <http://kommagenebiennial.com> and <https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/events/kommagene-biennial-greets-peaceful-coexistence-of-ancient-kingdom>

<sup>91</sup> See <https://turkisharchaeonews.net/>



The Covid-19 pandemic caused an unexpected interruption to the realisation of the Commagene Biennial in 2020 and 2021. At last it came to fruition in 2022. A second natural disaster, the earthquake of February 2023, is now causing a second interruption. The pre-biennial events in 2023 in the form of a series of year-long cultural activities have been temporarily suspended. Both the Governor and the Curator have been working on a long-term financially sustainable strategy for the Commagene Biennial and have already established an art foundation involving all stakeholders, public and private, in Kahta and Adıyaman. Therefore the earthquake will delay but will not stop the initiative. In my recent telephone conversation with Mr Özdal when he was in Kahta organising sessions of psychological support for the survivors of the earthquake, he sounded determined to use art in rebuilding the region with the support of local officials and local people. The Commagene Biennial that started as an art event to celebrate and reflect on Kahta and Adıyaman's rich history and cultures now has a new mission: helping local people to build a new future by using arts and culture as resource. Governor Korkutata and curator Özdal have already started to plan art lessons for the children in Kahta who are traumatised by the earthquake and are in temporary accommodation in tents. Mr Özdal is organising a group of local artists to give art lessons to the local children. Sadly some of Mr Özdal's artist friends in the region have lost their lives in the earthquake, mostly in Antakya.

The remains of the old civilisations in south-eastern Anatolia inspired the theme of the 1st Commagene Biennial and will continue to inspire future biennials. The earthquake in February 2023 tragically reminded us of the precariousness of life in this geography. But people who have lived on this geologically unstable but agriculturally fertile and naturally beautiful land have produced long-lasting civilisations. Art and cultural events like the Commagene Biennial will provide opportunities to reflect upon both the precariousness and resilience of human existence in south-eastern Anatolia. The Biennial can also act as a reminder to everyone the need and necessity of building human dwellings and societies that can resist strong earthquakes and are in harmony with nature. The engineering and aesthetical achievements at the summit of Nemrut Mountain that go back two millennia and the 1st Commagene Biennial celebrated can only make us realistically optimistic for the future.



## How Giresun remembers its past?:

The story of  
a bell tower,  
a Greek Mayor and  
a giant hazelnut

**Suna Cagaptay**

Postdoctoral Fellow  
Islamic art and architecture  
University of Cambridge

During my childhood years, I was addicted to a memory game that was played by naming a fruit or vegetable and a monument or a historic figure for which each Turkish



city was famous. During recent travels in my home country, I was quite surprised to see that, in fact, the image of an agricultural or an industrial product often dominated the public squares or major roundabouts of almost every city I visited, big or small. While it was fun as a kid to remember Bursa was famous for peaches, Giresun for sweet cherries or Finike for oranges, I began to wonder, could this be the only way to remember a city? Why were the local governments so keen on decorating the public squares with representations of a teapot made out of *çini* tiles or a gigantic loaf of bread, or an apricot made of Bakelite? What can this choice tell us about how the civic memory is interpreted and reworked? Many cities in Turkey have a complex background and fascinating monuments standing as a testimony to it—more fascinating, perhaps, than a certain type of agricultural or industrial produce. Do we, then, get more satisfying answers when we turn our attention to monuments that are coming from the past? This is a question that is often in the back of my mind as I work on old buildings and city walls – standing, buried, or demolished – as part of my academic inquiry.

When I examine monuments that have been preserved, one thing I immediately observe is that they are all restored with a ‘curatorial’ style of conservation and rebuilding done in such a way as to make them look flawlessly timeless. Preserving the monuments of the past in an ageless way has become so embedded in contemporary heritage politics, mainly commissioned by the municipalities in Turkey, that it is almost impossible to grasp the evidence for multiple urban transformation processes in each city. Just as a Bakelite sculpture of an apricot or a loaf of bread is insufficient to make a reference to the cultural and urban memory of Malatya or Trabzon, it is also problematic to resurrect a lost building and restitch it into the contemporary and ‘privileged’ city. And so, I question, how can a city remember its past?<sup>92</sup> Accordingly, I would like to present the curious biography and afterlives of a bell tower from Giresun, a city on the coast of the Black Sea.

The Giresun bell tower was originally built by Kaptan Yorgi Pasha, the Mayor of Giresun from 1885–1904. The tower was then demolished at the turn of the century and was subsequently rebuilt in 2016 before being demolished again in 2019. Its story is both dramatic and palimpsestic. First, the bell tower was engraved onto the landscape and erased, with the shape of the previous erasure leading to a mimicry of the old bell tower on the new landscape, and then its final erasure one last time. The metaphor of palimpsest, which is a literary term by origin, is a definition frequently used in urban studies to discuss the power of the erasures and reworkings in shaping the present, which compresses complex, often non-linear, temporal change and transformation into a single space. My aim in this short essay is to discuss the ever-changing meaning of the bell tower in each period it was built and destroyed and discuss how we can interpret these actions.

Let’s start with a few facts. Giresun, formerly Kerasous or Kerasounda, was like any other city in Anatolia – a hub for intense cultural, religious and ethnic overlaps ranging from the Hittites to the Hellenistic period and from the Genoese to the Byzantine. The Ottomans took control of the city in 1468, exactly seven years after the dissolution of

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<sup>92</sup> As aptly framed in a collective volume edited by S. Goldhill, *Being urban: Community, conflict and belonging in the Middle East* (Routledge, 2021), 17.

the Empire of Trebizond. In the late Ottoman period, Georgios Konstantinides, a Greek by origin, became one of the most important political figures in the history of the city. Commonly known as Kaptan Yorgi Pasha, he lived from 1828 to 1906 and served as the Mayor of Giresun from 1885 to 1904.<sup>93</sup> Yorgi came from a Pontic Orthodox family of mine owners from the Kopuz area in Gümüşhane, a city located in the Black Sea region, which is famous for its silver mines. Studies focusing on his identity as a tradesman and a politician extensively discuss how he was instrumental in forming the hazelnut trade, for which Giresun is still famous. His mayorship policies included widening the roads, paving the streets, providing better infrastructure and hygiene and the afforestation in and around Giresun. Yorgi also engaged in construction activities, including building schools and churches. One such project was the construction of a bell tower accompanied by a monumental tomb tower. He designed the mausoleum for himself in the courtyard of the Church of the Metamorphosis, complemented by an *hagiasma* dedicated to St. Panteleimon, and he invited an architect from Russia to execute the project. Although it seems the project was not well received by the Ottoman government, and representatives in the Trebizond (modern-day Trabzon) province wanted to stop the construction and even started an investigation, Yorgi carried on commissioning both of the structures.

A nineteenth-century postcard allows us to examine the architectural characteristics of the belltower as well as the tomb structure (Fig.1). In the bell tower we find a four-



Fig. 1 Nineteenth-century postcard showing the bell tower and the mausoleum (Accessed October 4, 2020, <https://pontosandaristera.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/ker43.j>

storey building rising from a round centre and surrounded by an octagon. The opening on the ground floor has pointed arches while the ones on the first floor have round arches. The second storey has tower-shaped protrusions imitating the *gavit* or *zhamatun* (narthex) found in Armenian churches, and each tower is topped with an onion-shaped dome. The top storey maintains its round centre and is also topped with an onion-

shaped dome. The bell tower bespeaks Armenian and Georgian architecture, drawing

<sup>93</sup> Prof. Sezai Balcı's works reveal the history, the political personality and the family origins of Captain Yorgi Pasha, see for example, 'Giresun Belediye Başkanı Kaptan Yorgi 1829–1904', II. Uluslararası Canik Sempozyumu, Samsun, 2012, 1311–1332; 'Kaptan Yorghı Paşa', *The Encyclopedia of Pontus*, Fifth Edition, 260–264: <https://pontosworld.com/index.php/history/biographies/124-georgos-konstantinidis-1828-1906>. Accessed on September 10, 2021, as well as Sezai Balcı and Merve Kalafat Yılmaz, 'Captain Yorgi Konstantinidi Mayor of Kerasounta 1829–1904', presented at the Ο Πόντιος στην ύστερη Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία (1774–1908) Κοινωνία και Οικονομία, Πρακτικά 3ου Διεθνούς συνεδρίου Ποντιακών ερευνών, Θεσσαλονίκη (Thessaloniki, 2016), 87–121.

a comparison to the now-destroyed bell tower of the Surp Giragos Church in Diyarbakır.<sup>94</sup>

The tomb structure is built on the rocky outcrop on which the courtyard of the church rose. At first glance, the mausoleum seems to be built in a Neo-Egyptian style, which was a common type in Christian cemeteries due to admiration for the Egyptian funerary and the church architecture that has dominated the Western world from as early as the seventeenth century.<sup>95</sup> Perhaps this was the reason behind the pyramidal finial. Over the past few years living in the United Kingdom, I have been observing buildings recalling Egyptian-inspired structures, for example the conical caps that one notes in contemporaneous churches in the UK such as Saint Peter's Church in Cambridge (Fig. 2) or the period tombstones display. But perhaps there is another possibility behind the origin of the pyramidal caps. Judging from the cultural context in which the bell tower and the tomb were built, it could make more sense to attribute this form to the 'Vainakh' type towers (Fig 3). This form is often noted in the military, residential or funerary architecture of Chechnya and Ingushetia. Formed by a square base, built of stone and measuring 10 to 20 metres tall, these towers had tapering walls and a shale roof. This typology emerged in a region of turmoil and military invasions, with its origins harking back to the Bronze Age onwards.<sup>96</sup>



Fig. 2 Church of St Peter, Cambridge  
(Photo: Author)




Fig. 3 Military tower at Chanta, Chechnya  
(Wikipedia Commons)

When Yorgi Pasha died in 1904, he was interred in his tomb. But by the 1920s, one source tells us about cracks in the mausoleum and another refers to the bell tower being dynamited. Giresun is in close proximity to Samsun, the city that is regarded as the place where the Turkish War of Independence began in 1919, which instigated strong anti-Greek sentiments. Thus, it is not surprising to find that monuments associated with the former Greek mayor of the city suffered. It was also claimed that the retreating Greeks destroyed monuments on their way out. By the 1950s, all the remaining debris around the two structures was collected, and there the story of the bell tower could have ended. But in the first two decades of the 2000s, there was growing interest in reconstructing the multi-faith and ethnic past in Giresun. During this

<sup>94</sup> <https://diyarbakirhafizasi.org/ote-mahalleden-bir-can-sesi-surp-giragos-kilisesi/>. Accessed on September 08, 2021.

<sup>95</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Egyptomania-Sphinxes-Obelisks-and-Scarabs-1688349>. Accessed on September 08, 2021.

<sup>96</sup> For an overview of this typology, D. Dursun, 'Kafkasya', *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 2001, Istanbul, Vol. 24, 160–162.



time, the City Council decided to rebuild the bell tower in a new location near the harbour, maintaining its original details. Construction was completed in 2016 (Fig. 4). While respecting the original details, the City Council decided to give the tower a more contemporary and less religious function by building it as a clock tower. The hope was to diminish its visual perception as a tower speaking for a Christian religious notion of time and instead appreciate it as a tower representing secular time.<sup>97</sup>




Fig. 4 The clock tower's construction in progress (left) and a nineteenth-century postcard showing the original bell tower (right) (Source: Habertürk, published on 09.06.2021, 13:56).

However, the rebuilding activity received a huge amount of criticism from the members of the opposition in City Council, ultimately leading to a case being made for its demolition. People against the tower argued that, irrespective of its new function, its image evoked a Christian element that was deemed unfit in a city that is now Muslim. Another group focused on historic preservation ideals argued that the rebuilding was conducted illegally without official approval from the Council of Monuments and that its choice of construction material was unacceptable as it solely used Bakelite. Due to mounting pressure and a social media campaign, the Municipality of Giresun decided to tear the tower down in 2019. Then, a new clock tower with geometric patterns inspired by Anatolian Seljuk art was built in its place. This tower is clad with green tiles decorated with giant hazelnut berries gilded with gold paint (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5 The clock tower prior before it was dismantled (left) and the new tower (right) (Source: NTV Haber, published on 11.06.2021 – 11:19).



Behind these man-made interventions, we can see in the birth, death, resuscitation and eventual demise of the tower the discarding that runs against the layers of urban memory in Giresun. Returning to the palimpsest metaphor, the bell tower was written, scraped, rewritten and finally erased and completely discarded. How is the palimpsest metaphor helpful for us to understand this process? Let's dig deeper into the metaphor itself to elaborate. One of the earliest uses of the palimpsest metaphor is derived from the deep, layered relationship between human consciousness and memory as

<sup>97</sup> M. B. Uluengin, 'Secularizing Anatolia tick by tick: Clock towers in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42 (2010): 17–36.

discussed in *The Palimpsest of the Human Brain*, which is thought to be part of a work of prose poems written by the Englishman Thomas De Quincey in 1845. Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, proposed the concept of palimpsest as a mental exercise in his book *Civilization and Its Discontents*, published in 1930. Freud primarily focused on Rome, which he defined as a 'psychic whole', and argued that the layers of the past of Rome continue to exist together with the ones belonging to the present. Freud also suggested the following: 'If we want to understand the historical series spatially, we can only do so by juxtaposing these features in that location', adding, 'The same space cannot have two different contents'.<sup>98</sup> We see this in Giresun: the old and the new do not really interfere with one another, but rather there is a disassociation between the former and the new communication as displayed beautifully by the bell tower of the nineteenth century and the clock tower built in 2016. Accordingly, can we say that the bell tower in Giresun is a good case of palimpsest in that it is the result of an attempt to scrape away the previous choices that have been made on how to use a vehicle for communication in order to use the same vehicle to communicate something different? What makes up the parchment, is it the city itself or the overall urban fabric? Maybe the ground is the parchment, and the belltower is the text. We see that the new communication emerges around the traces of the former communication.

In the 1940s and 1950s, W G Hoskins presented palimpsest as being characterised by a strong presence of the underlying layers, discussing going 'behind the superficial appearances, to uncover the layers of the palimpsest and to see, for example, a piece of the tenth century street makes an abrupt turn or does something else unexpected'.<sup>99</sup> In a sense, this idea is compatible with how the relationship between the layers of Giresun's Greek and Orthodox past have come to light – through archaeological research and restitution and with the help of maps, postcards, drawings and especially photographs, we can observe the transformation of the tower, and we find that the relationship between different palimpsestic attempts and the surroundings surprises us.

On the other hand, the metaphor of palimpsest is not always a useful approach to reading and interpreting urban memory. In fact, in the works of urban memory and heritage specialists, there has been a serious inquiry since the 1980s into whether this metaphor is useful at all in the context of memory. Although the bell tower and the mausoleum, built in the courtyard of a pre-existing church, are a reminder for us to observe the Greek/Orthodox past of the city, they cannot provide a complete visualisation of the memories, persons and monuments of the period. The construction of the clock tower in 2016 in a new location shows that there was an attempt to revive the old communication, that is the bell tower as constructed by Yorgi Pasha, the Greek Orthodox Mayor of the city under Ottoman rule. But, through re-assigning its role as a clock tower, moving it into a new location and not really appreciating its structural value, the actual message was side-lined and instead a secular and acceptable image was reinscribed. By adding a crescent in the place where the cross used to be, the

<sup>98</sup> For an origins and overview of the term, its uses as a metaphor in urban and cultural studies and the Freudian reading, see E. Key Fowden, S.Çağaptay, E. Coghill Zychowicz and L. Blanke, 'Historical distance, physical presence and the living past of cities', *Cities as Palimpsests?: Responses to Antiquity in eastern Mediterranean urbanism*, E. Key Fowden et al., S. (Oxbow Books: Oxford, 2022): 4–28.


<sup>99</sup> W. G. Hoskins, *The making of the English landscape* (London, 1955), 270–274.



newly built tower was Islamised as well. Hence, the design of 2016, rising on top of the remains from the traces and erasures of the old communication, completely effaces the original layer and turns the tower into an image that does not really say much about its context. The people behind the construction of the 2016 clock tower argued that they privileged and wished to commemorate a particular moment in the history of the city. But building it out of context misleads us into seeing the metaphor of palimpsest as static and one that represents a particular 'moment' rather than acting as an ever-evolving reminder about Giresun's cultural, ethnic and religious pedigrees.

The case of the bell tower is a reflection of the infrastructure that allows the formation of visual culture by the people who make up the urban life and the material culture associated with them. Cultures, buildings and people come and go, but the squares, streets and natural resources are permanent. The cycles of construction, demolition, rebuilding, and displacement remind us how interrelationships in space and time are often far from their original contexts. Thus, the transformation and change of the urban fabric should be read by avoiding inanimate abstraction and paying special attention to the cultural background in line with the choices of what to keep and what to erase, which supports urban accumulation. Through my work on Anatolia, I come across a rich array of landmarks and landscapes that help me remember, rediscover, and reinterpret the moments and monumental figures who were in charge of building or commissioning them and consider their interplay with the urban fabric. In the case of the Giresun bell tower, I find that rebuilding a clock tower based on the formal qualities of a bell tower, transporting it to a new temporal and topographical setting has an element of the absurd and does not really help us to appreciate the rich ethnic and religious past of the city. We do not need to look at a kitsch tower to commemorate the deeds of an eccentric Greek mayor who ruled a city that once was predominantly Christian – but then again, an out-of-place Anatolian-Seljuk-inspired clock tower with husked hazelnut depictions does not do the trick for me either.

## Book Reviews & Publications



Ryan Gingeras  
**The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire**

London, Allen Lane, 2022  
 339 + ix pp. Maps, illustrations, bibliography, index.  
 ISBN 978-0-241-44432-0. Hardback £30.00.

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Hakan Özoğlu  
**The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Rise of the Turkish Republic: Observations of an American Diplomat, 1919-27**

Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2021  
 213pp. Bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-4744-8037-6. Paperback £19.99



In Turkey's twentieth century history, the first quarter was undoubtedly the most violent, traumatic and transformational. The turmoil began with the Young Turk revolution (actually a coup d'état) of 1908. This was followed by the Balkan wars of 1912-13, the alliance with Germany and eventual defeat of 1914-18, and the narrow escape from near-extinction with the collapse of the Ottoman state and the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-22. It ended with the birth of the republic in 1923. As such, it has attracted an almost continuous flow of scholarly literature. The two books reviewed here re-tell the story, albeit from contrasting perspectives and with uneven results.

Of the two, *The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire* is easily the weightiest and more ambitious. In the first of his five over-lengthy chapters, Ryan Gingeras starts by summarising the late Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century, the Young Turks' takeover of 1908-09, the 'big stick' election of 1912, Enver Pasha's seizure of power in 1913, and the fatal decision to join the central powers in 1914. He pulls no punches in bringing to light the attacks on the Christian minorities organised by the Committee of Union and Progress in 1913, and the uncertain planning of what is widely recognised as the genocide of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915, before coming to the reluctant Ottoman acceptance of defeat in 1918. His second chapter continues the story during the brief period of peace after the armistice of October 1918, switching attention to the Versailles peace conference, and the attempted diplomatic manoeuvrings of the final Ottoman governments of Sultan Vahdettin (Mehmed VI). The outlook was then dramatically altered by the landing of Greek troops in İzmir in May 1919, in advance of any agreement with the other entente governments, and the simultaneous arrival in Samsun of Mustafa Kemal, symbolically marking the start of the nationalist resistance movement in Anatolia. Effectively, the war resumed but, as Ryan Gingeras explains, it was initially in a chaotic situation in which power was exercised by unpredictable local warlords, of whom the most powerful, Ethem the Circassian ('Çerkes Ethem') was eventually suppressed by the Kemalist forces in January 1921.

Gingeras calls his fourth chapter 'Towards a Sovereign State', but most of it is concerned with the bitter struggles for power in southern and eastern Anatolia, and the fate of the Arab provinces of Syria and Iraq rather than the institutional reconstruction of the Turkish state. In the course of this, he gives us much original detail on the alliance between the French and local Armenian nationalists in Cilicia, Maraş and Antep, and their eventual defeat by local Turkish forces. In endorsing the 'National Pact' in January 1920, the last Ottoman parliament accepted the loss of the Arab provinces, although hopes were expressed that they might be allowed plebiscites to rejoin the Turkish state, and there were disputes over the status of the province of Mosul and the district of Alexandretta. This prepared the ground for the takeover of Syria and Iraq by France and Britain respectively.

Any hope that there might be a negotiated settlement between the nationalists and the entente powers, to include the Sultan's government, was meanwhile dashed by the publication of the Treaty of Sèvres, accepted by the Ottoman government in August 1920. In describing subsequent developments, Gingeras branches out to describe reactions in North Africa and India, where there was substantial support for the Turkish nationalist resistance movement – although in the Indian case in the mistaken belief that Atatürk and his movement would support the continuation of the Islamic Caliphate in Istanbul. On the ground, the Greek advance to the Sakarya in the summer of 1921 is described, with the subsequent Turkish victory in 1922 continued in the final chapter. Following the Anglo-Turkish confrontation at Çanakkale in September 1922, and the

subsequent armistice of Mudanya in October, the Grand National Assembly took the historic step of abolishing the Sultanate on 1 November 1922. At this point, with the end of his historical narrative, Gingeras offers some brief conclusions on the ‘lessons learned and unlearned’ from the end of the Ottoman empire. However, it is not quite clear what he thinks these are, apart from the fact that after 1923 western commentators began to see Turkey through kinder eyes, and that under Tayyip Erdoğan there has been some attempt to rehabilitate the empire in the eyes of its current citizens.

The main merit of this book compared with the army of other accounts is that it casts the spotlight the horrific human sufferings caused on both sides by the cataclysm of the first world war and its aftermath, and points up the importance of the separate struggles in southern and eastern Anatolia during the ‘National Struggle’ of 1920-22. Against this, it tends to promise more than it delivers, and leaves the reader without important details on crucial issues. In his Introduction, Ryan Gingeras tells us that his main objective is to ‘re-center the story of the Ottoman Empire’s last years’ since the armistice of October 1918 ‘did not result in the fall of the Ottoman sultanate’ (p 5). Strictly speaking this is true in the sense that the Sultanate was not abolished until four years later. However, no previous account has ever suggested otherwise, so it is hard to see how the story is being ‘re-centered’. At the beginning of his first chapter, he introduces us to two young army officers, who graduated from the military college in Istanbul shortly before the first world war – Hüseyin Fehmi and Kalusd Sürmenyan, one of only five Armenians who received a commission in the Ottoman army in 1912. If the records existed to allow us to see the events on the next ten years through the eyes and experiences of these two men, then a fascinating human dimension would have been added to the history. Sadly this is not the case – in the rest of the book there are photograph portraits, but only scattered references to either of them.

More seriously Gingeras fails to provide us with essential information which would help to interweave the diverse strands in the complex historical web. As an example, he relates that only ten percent of the Ottoman soldiers fighting in the battle of Sarikamış allegedly survived, but fails to tell where Sarikamış is, what was its strategic significance, or even when the battle took place. In various parts of the book, there are scattered references to the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, but no information of what its provisions were or why they mattered. In what is presented as a comprehensive survey, details like this would have been a great help to confused readers.

Hakan Özoğlu covers much the same period as Ryan Gingeras, but his book has a much sharper focus, by concentrating on the career of Admiral Mark L Bristol as US High Commissioner (in effect, ambassador) in Istanbul between 1919 and 1927. His penetrating account is based on the archives of the State Department, and Bristol’s private papers stored in the Library of Congress, as well as the late Ottoman and early republican Turkish records. It gives us engaging insights, not only into Bristol’s own character and ideas, but also into overall US regional policy and Turkish reactions, especially during the transformational phase between 1919 and 1923. As a career navy man, who had risen to the top rank of Rear Admiral by 1918, Bristol had no diplomatic training, but he turned out to be an acute observer who set up an extensive and penetrative intelligence system in Anatolia and was prepared to think outside the box of established western opinion. He was a prolific correspondent – a former aide later



complained the 'if something could be said in seven lines, the Admiral would take seven pages' (p 25) – but this has given Hakan Özoğlu plenty of material to explain and analyse.


His account is original, thoughtful, and well balanced, shedding light on a complicated but crucial story. In 1917 the Ottoman government had broken off diplomatic relations with the United States when America joined the European entente powers in the war against Germany, but neither country ever declared war on the other. Hence, at the end of 1918 the US government was left in a relatively neutral position – unfavourable towards the Sultan's government, but not supportive of the entente states in their campaign to help themselves to the territories of the Ottoman empire. In January 1919 Bristol was sent to Istanbul as 'Senior United States Naval Officer Present, Turkey', but by the following August he had succeeded in getting this altered to 'High Commissioner', so as to give him parity with the High Commissioners of the former entente states in the occupied Ottoman capital.

As a supporter of the 'open door' policy which would allow all countries equal access to the markets and resources of the region – a 'permanent world order based on liberal capitalist internationalism' (p 36) – Bristol strongly opposed what he called the 'imperialistic tendencies' of the entente governments, especially Britain, which was 'doing everything in her power to provide a peace that will give her the lion's share of the spoils of Turkey and leave the other people to shift for themselves' (p 62). In May 1920 he complained that 'the selfishness of these European countries is almost beyond imagination', with the British support for the Greek invasion of Anatolia 'not much less than a crime' (p 134). In response the British government made more than one unsuccessful attempt to remove Bristol from his post in Istanbul.

Nor was the opposition of the European states the only problem Bristol faced in urging an even-handed policy towards Turkey. Within the United States, in Congress and the press, opinion was heavily anti-Turkish, influenced in particular by American Christian missionaries who had worked or were working in Anatolia, as well as the important Armenian diaspora. Bristol also faced some opposition from workers in the American-based Near East Relief organisation, which was mainly concerned with aiding the Ottoman Christian communities. The missionaries provided valuable medical and educational services in Anatolia and were well-informed, but had made almost no headway in converting the Muslim majority. Hence, they worked almost entirely in a Christian milieu, absorbing strongly anti-Turkish views. At a time when black Americans still suffered from serious and legally enforced discrimination, Armenian activists like the lawyer Vahan Cardashian promoted influential but openly racist propaganda, urging that 'the Armenians belong to the Latin branch of the Indo-European family [i.e 'Aryan'] and are vigorous and progressive Christian people', whereas 'the Turks of Turkey.... are an irresponsible and destructive aggregation, amalgamated principally from the undesirable elements of a score of the races and tribes of the east'. Hence, they were 'morally unfit for self rule' (p 106).



Bristol strongly opposed these views, but fortunately, the State Department resisted repeated attempts by domestic lobbies to remove him from his post. However, the hostile majority in Congress prevented the US government from normalising its relations with Turkey until 1927, when President Coolidge bypassed congressional opposition by arranging a diplomatic 'exchange of notes' with the Turkish government.



This allowed the establishment of a US embassy in Ankara, and the appointment of Joseph Grew, a career diplomat, as America's first ambassador to the Turkish republic. Bristol finally returned to America in May 1927, to resume his naval career. His first mission, as Commander-in-Chief of the US Asiatic Fleet, was to try to arrange a ceasefire in the Chinese civil war between the Communists and the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. His attempt failed, but Bristol returned to Washington in 1929, to become Chairman of the General Board of the Navy Department, a position close to the top of the naval establishment in Washington, in 1930. He retired in 1932, but continued his association with Turkey, notably through the establishment of the Admiral Bristol Hospital (now the American Hospital) in Istanbul. He died in 1939, with two US Navy ships subsequently named *USS Bristol* in his honour.

Besides his reports on the position of the ethnic minorities in the dying Ottoman empire, and its foreign relations, reports by Bristol's colleagues gave important information on social and economic conditions at the time. Conditions in Istanbul were dire, thanks to rampant inflation, leading to impoverishment of the masses while the élite maintained its opulent lifestyle. For those who could afford it, ample food supplies were available, leaving those without in dire need. Public utilities like water, electric light and the tramways were frequently cut off, due to the lack of fuel. The city was filthy, as garbage went uncollected. Outside Istanbul, huge areas had been devastated by the war, with towns in ruins and the inhabitants forced to flee. By any standards, the later republican government was faced with the Herculean task of reconstruction and resettlement.

In the main part of his book, Hakan Özoğlu explores Bristol's views on the Turkish government, the Armenian nationalist movement, and the Greek invasion of Anatolia, all in illustrative detail. In facing up to the nationalist claims of Armenians and Greeks, Bristol never sought to deny or defend the 'systematic massacres' (p 145) of the Armenians in 1915 (the term 'genocide' had yet to acquire currency) but he opposed Armenian claims to a separate state in eastern Anatolia under an American mandate, as well as Greek territorial ambitions in the west. Instead of division of the Ottoman empire, he initially proposed that the US government should be the mandatory power in the whole of its territory. By 1922 he had abandoned this unrealistic idea, in favour of a vaguely-defined 'Armenian home'. With the establishment of the Ankara government as the accepted power in 1923, he again shifted his position in favour of the eventual absorption of Armenians as citizens of Turkey.


In his attitude to the Greeks, Bristol consistently opposed the idea of the attachment of western Anatolia to Greece, condemning atrocities by both Greek and Turkish forces. In July 1919 the entente leaders' meeting in Paris set up an Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry into the issue. Bristol was appointed the US Commissioner, along with other Commissioners from France, Britain and Italy. The Commission's report, issued in October 1919, firmly opposed the annexation of the region by Greece, and backed the proposal that the 'occupation should not be entrusted to Greek troops



but to allied troops' (p 129). Although he had originally supported the appointment of the Commission, Britain's Prime Minister David Lloyd George convinced his French and Italian colleagues that its report should not be made public, encouraging Greece into launching its disastrous campaign in Anatolia without giving it any material support. In sum, although his critics in America labelled him as 'pro-Turk', Bristol argued that Greeks, Armenians and Turks were all as bad as one another: as he told A J Allen, the former Governor of Kansas, in 1923 'so far as moral character was concerned they were all much alike' (p 145). In his own words 'there was only one thing I tried to be, and that was pro-American' (p 32). This straightforward line seems the best summary of his ideas and principles. In exploring these and other aspects of Bristol's illuminating career in Turkey, Hakan Özoğlu gives us a wealth of original information and perceptive insights.

**William Hale**

Emeritus Professor, SOAS, London



## **Gözaltında 170 Gün: Bir Aydının Günlüğü**

by Turhan Dilligil  
Compiled by Arın Dilligil Bayraktaroğlu



Akılçelen Kitaplar 2021  
ISBN 978-625-7586-18-4 (181 pp)

On 27 May 1960 the Turkish Armed Forces overthrew the Democrat Party (DP) régime and arrested all the leaders of the government and DP deputies. The Committee of National Union presided over by General Cemal Gürsel, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Land Forces, assumed control. The arrested were sent to the island of Yassıada on the Sea of Marmara.<sup>100</sup> The trials began on 14 October 1960 and lasted until 15 September 1961. The defendants included former President Celal Bayar, former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and former speaker of the Parliament Refik Koraltan, the entire cabinet, all DP deputies, several former provincial governors, the former Chief of General Staff, local officials and police officers, a number of businessmen, and journalists.

Turhan Dilligil (1920-1997) at the time was the editor of *Zafer*, a pro Democrat Party newspaper. He was arrested and was sent first to Yassıada then to the Balmumcu garrison, and was kept in custody for 170 days during the investigation into his

<sup>100</sup> For a detailed account of the events in Turkey before and after 1960, see: Yeşilbursa, Behçet Kemal. The 'Revolution' of 27 May 1960 in Turkey: British Policy towards Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Jan. 2005, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan. 2005), pp. 121-151.  
Hale, Bill. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. Routledge, 1994.

professional and private life. In the end he was found to be innocent and all charges were dropped. Dilligil continued his professional life and founded the *Adalet* newspaper, and he was an independent MP between 1965-69. He is especially remembered for his efforts as a peace maker in 1969 to bring İnönü and Celal Bayar together. Throughout his life, Dilligil won prizes as a journalist and was well respected by his colleagues of all convictions.

While in custody, Dilligil wrote notes secretly on small notebooks and papers that he could find and managed to smuggle them outside the prison. Apparently he started keeping his diary on June 1, 1960, but had to get rid of what he wrote during the first 10 days because he was scared of getting caught during the ward inspections. The diary we have now starts on 10 June 1960 and ends on 13 November 1960. His notes tell us of everyday events, the actions and feelings of the people he shared the ward with, and sheds light into life in custody at the time. Names of over 70 inmates who were in Ward 2 at Yassıada with him are given at the beginning of the book, which is helpful because the reader can identify them when names are mentioned in the notes.

Primary sources (such as eyewitness accounts, diaries, letters) are vital to our understanding of historical events. There are very few, if any, such sources for what really took place in Yassıada. Dilligil's diary sheds light into an otherwise unknown part of Turkish history.

Dilligil's notes have been prepared for publication by his daughter Dr Arın Dilligil Bayraktaroğlu. It is significant that the Foreword is by his colleague Oktay Ekşi, who did not share any of his political views but respected him highly as a person and as a journalist, and after reading the diary, the reader is left with the same respect for Dilligil. One is struck with his compassion for humankind, his loving nature and his sense of justice. It is apparent that he is doing his utmost to act professionally as a journalist even when he talks about the brutality, cruelty and injustices he witnesses. The book is highly recommended as a primary source for anyone interested in the political history of modern Turkey.

**Çiğdem Balım**  
Indiana University

## HIKING ISTANBUL'S HINTERLAND

Exploring its Villages and Suburbs  
and the Places in Between

A Work in Progress

by **Caroline Finkel**, with **Nick Hobbs**  
and *HikingIstanbul*

Introducing a new guide: <https://carolinefinkel.wordpress.com/>  
by **Caroline Finkel**



Some ten years ago, a couple of hillwalkers living longterm in Istanbul embarked upon a venture they hoped would enable the people of their adopted home to get out into the countryside more easily. They envisaged a network of hiking routes in the city's hinterland that could be accessed by public transport. The hikes would each be doable in a day by a moderately fit person with curiosity and energy. Given the hilliness of much of Istanbul province, with its uplands trending north-south, around 20km seemed to be the right length.

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Nick Hobbs is a musician and cultural worker, and I am an Ottoman historian. We grew up in Wales and Scotland respectively and were well used to hiking. We found our lives in Istanbul, although otherwise charmed, almost unbearably sedentary, with only rare excursions beyond city limits to the Belgrade Forest, say, or to the coast. At the time, Turkey's long-distance hiking routes – created over recent years partly under the auspices of the Culture Routes Society/Kültür Rotaları Derneği and its first president, Kate Clow, were distant from Istanbul, and did not answer our need. We were intrigued and inspired, however, by local artist and academician Serkan Taycan's *Between Two Seas* project, that established a route from Yeniköy on the Black Sea to Küçükçekmece on the Marmara.

There have long been hiking groups in Istanbul, and these proliferate, whether their members be students or older people. What we knew about them, however, suggested that they had not attempted to establish a network of routes and often relied on private transport – minibuses or cars – implying either the need for a driver, or else necessitating the choice of a circular route. Our founding principles are that the hikes we make should be accessible by public transport, plus the price of a bus ticket and the cost of a packed lunch.

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Looking back through my records, I see that Nick and I first set out on 22 December 2013, long before dawn on a cold Sunday morning, to walk from Mahmutşevketpaşa to Reşadiye via Polonezköy. Everyone in Istanbul knows Polonezköy, but Mahmutşevketpaşa and Reşadiye are not on most people's mental map. Our hikes usually demanded early starts: buses or minibuses are few on week-end mornings, and the journey to the start of a hike could be circuitous. The metro developed since often allows us a bit longer in bed.

The habitats we hike are forest and woodland, pastureland and the edges of arable, heathland, river and seaside, and villages and lightly-settled suburbs. Every hike we did in the early days was in *terra incognita* – we had never walked there before – but Nick proved a genius at finding the way through thick and thin. Whoever had turned up to join us followed, undeterred by whatever we might find ahead. All we knew at the outset of a hike was that we hoped to walk from point A to point B and would do it however we could. We did not stick to obvious tracks: there are forestry tracks in the hinterland, and in farming areas, and paths of more or less distinctness here and there, but the reality is that walkers in the hinterland who want variety and interest must for the most part forge their way as best they can. Paths are created as footfall increases.

*Hiking Istanbul* announced its presence with a facebook page in English – despite long residence in Istanbul, neither of us can write Turkish with ease. We advertised the hikes there, and soon found we had companions on our forays. These were young people, among whom the most numerous were Erasmus students and their Turkish girl/boyfriends. Young Turks soon joined us, and Arabs from many countries who were often students at Istanbul's universities. Before long, we regularly had a changing group of 30 or more fellow-hikers. Dogs often join us too, bored by their mundane existence wherever they found themselves. We are unable to advise them otherwise, and they bring added joy to the hikes. We can only hope they find a better life where they end up when our ways part.



We have many adventures – getting stuck in bramble patches is the least of them. Wandering into military land is one hazard – fences are few, and signs frequently

lacking – but we have been met with courtesy on the occasions when this has happened, albeit that our identities are recorded for posterity. The gendarme have trailed us on more than one occasion. Once we had to take a Black Sea swim in April, across a small inlet, to avoid retracing our steps across the huge, slippery rocks of the coast. Wet feet from marshes or river crossings are barely worth mentioning as a hazard.

Freedom to roam has long since been recognised in Scotland, where we are accustomed to walking pretty much wherever we choose. In England and Wales, by contrast, less than 10% of land has open access, and there is a well-defined network of public footpaths and bridlepaths. Turkey is therefore very heaven: freedom to roam is almost unrestricted, exceptions being military areas and the land of other public bodies such as the Istanbul water board (İSKİ), although today the amount of land that has been privatised and is out of bounds increases exponentially.

In the age of the ubiquitous *megaproje*, hundreds of hectares of land in Istanbul's hinterland have been enclosed and access forbidden, if not by security guards, by high fences. This has consequences for our trail-making: we can rarely walk the same trail exactly as we did before, because a motorway, a university campus, a factory, a quarry, has sprung up across our path. The most conspicuous example is the new airport, which has come to occupy ever more land, and whose expanding borders



require that we re-route each time we walk on its fringes. By virtue of hiking regularly over a decade, we have chronicled the destruction of so much that gave the countryside outside the city its uniqueness and enchantment, and have witnessed the dispossession of the villagers, most of whom are farmers, who have lived here and stewarded the land for generations. The most

egregious threat hanging over the future of Istanbul's hinterland is of course Kanal Istanbul.

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*Hiking Istanbul's Hinterland...* is a work in progress. It is the first part of the *HikingIstanbul* project to be made generally available, and for open access, pending the release of the GIS tracks for the some 60 hikes that form the network we set out to create – with the mapping expertise of our *HikingIstanbul* co-founder, Suha Ülgen. In a continually shifting landscape, adjudging that a hike is the best it can be, and does not risk being destroyed in the immediate future, is a gamble, and makes finalising many of them a tricky business.

We also await the completion of the editing (in Turkish and English) of essays by (mostly) Turkish scholars on topics such as geology, flora, insects, and much more; we owe these contributors particular gratitude for agreeing to share their knowledge on phenomena we non-specialists can merely observe and wonder about.

Also growing out of *HikingIstanbul's* network of hinterland day-hikes is a related project – to create a continuous route from west to east across Istanbul province – the 'Istanbul Traverse'. This comprises some 8 days of hiking, and is part of the Via Eurasia, the unbroken route from Canterbury to Demre in southwest Turkey, whose Turkish section is overseen by the Culture Routes Society/Kültür Rotaları Derneği.

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*Hiking Istanbul's Hinterland...* embraces the human aspects of Istanbul's hinterland. It includes essays on water and farming then and now, essays on 56 historical villages and suburbs that we hike through, and notes on places of interest on the Thracian side (so far) of the Bosphorus, along with an extensive bibliography and other apparatus.

The village and suburb essays recall the pasts of the places we hike through, and of the people who once lived there, as well as celebrating them as they are today. Their individual histories reveal their role in the long life of the metropolis and remind us of their different functions and origins. Some supplied the city with all manner of goods, while others maintained the water supply. In some there are strategically located fortresses that defended it, as do the various rural military bases that are their modern equivalent. Forest and woodland villages once offered tranquil royal retreats and, less tranquilly, hunting-grounds that hunters still roam today in season. Now-vanished Ottoman Christian communities once had their homes in Istanbul's villages. Some villages were settled soon after the Ottoman conquest of 1453 by deportees from newly conquered territory. Others provided sanctuary for the waves of Muslim refugees fleeing the frontiers as the empire collapsed, notably during the '93 *harbi*', namely the 1877-78 war with Russia. Yet others are inhabited by descendants of Muslims who lived for centuries in the territory of modern Greece until they were caught up in the population exchange of the early 1920s.

If we are to highlight the past of particular villages, these are a few of the most interesting. They all retain surprising visible or intangible traces of their pasts, in addition to the sights for which they are better known.

#### On the Thracian side of the Bosphorus:

- **Cebeci** was key to the maintenance of Istanbul's water supply system. The monumental Güzelce aqueduct, built by Architect Sinan, stands nearby in good repair, and a substantial, ruined indigenous Greek (*Rum*) church can also be seen.
- **Rumelifeneri** lighthouse protects one of the many shrines (*makam türbesi*) of the revered medieval Muslim saint Sarı Saltuk. The Lifeboat Service Museum (*Rumelifeneri Tahlisiye Sergisi*) beside the lighthouse exhibits all sorts of gear relating to the effort expended in saving lives along this inhospitable coast.
- Just north of **Şamlar** is a graceful, curving dam completed in 1828 to provide a constant source of water for the mills of the Azadı gunpowder works 5km downstream. The lengthy inscription in the small mosque shows it was built soon after, also by order of Sultan Mahmud II.
- **Sazlıbosna** was settled in the early 1860s by Tatars from the Crimean Peninsula escaping the aftermath of the Crimean war.
- Just north of **Terkos** (Durusu) are the ruins of a small medieval fort on the lake's edge. The extensive mid-19th century plant built to pump water from the lake to Istanbul still stands and is scheduled to become the Water Civilisations Museum (*Su Medeniyetleri Müzesi*).

#### On the Anatolian side of the Bosphorus:

- **Akbaba** is named for a saint from Bokhara who is said to have retired here after the Conquest. It became a place of pilgrimage where Canfeda Hatun, senior housekeeper (*kethüda kadın*) of Sultan Murad III's *harem* built a mosque that is again a popular pilgrimage site following recent restoration.




- **Alemdağ** was one of the few Istanbul hinterland villages settled by Armenians, from c.1700. The former Sırp Nişan church, dating from 1835, became a mosque c.1936 – Vakıf Camii – and has recently been restored.
- **Beykoz** was one of Istanbul's earliest industrial hubs, being situated on streams that produced power, and on the coast for ease of transport. Among the goods made here, in fits and starts, from the early 19th century, were glass, ceramics, gunpowder, paper, cloth for military uniforms, and shoes and boots.
- **Kılıçlı** mosque preserves one of the 'sacred beards' (*sakal-i şerif*) of the Prophet Muhammad; this is brought out from safekeeping on the last day of the holy month of Ramazan so that men may kiss its container.
- In the early 20th century, part of today's **Sultanbeyli** was a Jewish agricultural colony worked by several Russian/Ukrainian families. Toponyms including the word Yahudi (Jewish) remained on maps of the area until recently.



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Enormous pleasure is to be derived from venturing outside the city and simply putting one foot in front of the other. No guidebook is ever entirely up-to-date, especially given the drastic changes in Istanbul's hinterland we are witnessing at first hand. We have to draw a line, however, and here begin to put down for posterity the knowledge and experience we have accumulated over recent years. I am no longer in Istanbul permanently, but Nick has clocked up more than 300 hikes under the *Hiking Istanbul* banner – that's a lot of kilometres. But we all have to begin somewhere, and we encourage anyone who feels keen to hike to join us, and to experience the abundant delight that is to be found so close at hand.



## Democrat Party Era in British Embassy Annual Reports

(Internal-External-Economic Affairs)  
(1950-1960)

by **Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa**

Paradigma Akademi Basın Yayın Dağıtım 2021  
ISBN: 32427

In 1583, William Harborne, a merchant and former member of parliament, was appointed as Britain's first ambassador to the Ottoman Empire by Queen Elizabeth I. At the time the main British interest in developing diplomatic relations with Turkey was to promote trade, but political interest in British friendship with Turkey speedily gained

importance. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed for ten years between 1914 and 1924. Following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, friendly diplomatic relationships between the two countries began to develop.

The Ambassadors reported extensively on the events between the two countries - the UK and the Ottoman State in the past, and the Republic of Turkey now. These reports included different periods: daily, weekly, monthly and annual. Apparently when deemed necessary, there were also reports written regardless of the time intervals in question.

The Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Turkey is the head of the UK's diplomatic mission in Ankara. The Ambassadors during the period covered by the book were:

**1949–1951: Sir Noel Hughes Havelock Charles**

**1951–1953: Sir Alexander Knox Helm**

**1954–1958: Sir Reginald James Bowker**

**1958–1962: Sir Bernard Alexander Brocas Burrows**

In 1950 the first free elections were held in Turkey, and the one-party system since Atatürk ended. After 27 years of government by the People's Republican Party (PRP) power was transferred to the Democrat Party (DP). The book summarizes the coming to power of the Democrat Party and its relations with the PRP and other opposition parties, using the reflections of the British ambassadors of the period about the policies carried out in internal, external and economic fields in Turkey. In these reports Turkey's relations with the United Kingdom and other countries, Turkey's approach to foreign affairs, such as NATO, the Korean War, the Balkan and Baghdad Pacts and the Cyprus Issue are examined.

The reports of the British Ambassadors touch specifically upon the British embassy's evaluations of the Democrat Party governments of the 1950s, and the military regime that succeeded them in 1960. What is also very interesting in the book are the personal observations of Sir Alexander Knox Helm (1893-1964) and Sir James Bowker (1901-1983) on the characteristics of the Turks and the situation in Turkey.

In the Appendices the biographies of the four ambassadors are given. The Bibliography includes Archival Sources (National Archives of Australia – NAA; The National Archives, UK. All references to sources prefixed by FO and FCO refer to materials held at the UK National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, formerly, the Public Record Office), and secondary sources on the period in question.

This is an important primary source especially for students and researchers of Turkish history, and International Relations. It also makes interesting and compelling reading for anyone who takes an interest in Turkish-British relations. The author/researcher Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa is currently a professor in the Department of History at Uludağ University, Bursa, Turkey. He is the founding editor of the Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations (JATR).

**Çiğdem Balım**  
Indiana University

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### LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Altun, Selçuk. *Farewell Fountain Street*. (Telegram Books, 2023). ISBN: 184659216X.

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Kuçlu, Fikret and Murat Demirdöğen. *Ottoman Empire and The Republic of Turkey Numismatic Catalog – 2022*. (NumismaWorld, 2022). ISBN: 6057026918.

Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

## Appreciation



**John Norton**  
1929 - 2023

Obituary by  
**Dr Robert W Banks**  
Department of Biosciences &  
Fellow of St. Cuthbert's Society  
Durham University

John Norton, Principal of St. Cuthbert's Society in the University of Durham from 1985 – 1990 and formerly lecturer in Turkish, died on Friday 6 January 2023. John and his wife, Joan, who had died in December 2021, were staunch supporters of St. Cuthbert's Society, both during his Principalship and afterwards as members of the Senior Common Room

and as Fellows. They are both remembered with a mixture of great affection and admiration by staff and students and will be much missed.

John's early career was as an army officer: after leaving school and national service, he received officer training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. From Sandhurst Lieutenant Norton was sent to Malaya, where he was wounded in 1951. Marriage to Joan soon followed and they had two daughters, Anne and Sue. In 1956, the family was back in the UK where John was working at GCHQ in Cheltenham. He was stationed in Cyprus with the rank of Captain in 1959, leading up to the creation of the independent republic in 1960. John was subsequently posted to the British Embassy in Turkey as military attaché, where he taught himself Turkish; then to Canterbury where he was in charge of young men who had joined the army straight from school at 16 years old; and finally to Warminster with the rank of Major. In 1967, on leaving the army, he enrolled at Durham University as an undergraduate in St. Cuthbert's Society, completed his bachelor's degree in two years, and followed that with teacher training. John first lectured in Liberal Studies at New College, Durham, before being appointed Lecturer in Turkish in the School of Oriental Studies in the University in 1972.

After his appointment as Lecturer in Turkish, John also returned to St. Cuthbert's Society as a tutor, before becoming the sixth Principal in 1985. St. Cuthbert's Society had originally been founded in the late 19th century by students themselves. Although, by the 1970s, it had a governing structure similar to the maintained colleges of the University, it retained a strongly independent character and was the natural home for mature students such as John himself. The post of Principal was part time and in John's case it was in essence a secondment from the School of Oriental Studies, which provided his salary. When, therefore, the University closed the School in the late 1980s following the resignation of its director, Professor John Harris, John faced a dilemma: despite his strong desire to continue teaching his subject, his academic post had gone. Although he was offered the Principalship of St. Aidan's College, he was committed to St. Cuthbert's Society and his subject, so chose to retire early from the University. By setting up a private company, the Centre for Turkish Studies Ltd, John was able to continue teaching and supervising undergraduate and postgraduate students.

In later life John was a patron of the arts in the North East generally and in the University in particular; he was, for instance, responsible for getting the mining artists Tom Lamb and William Hindmarsh exhibited in Durham and their works included in the University collection.

## ONCE AGAIN: **Subscription Reminder**

Current BATAS subscription rates for the different membership categories still apply in 2023, and these may be checked by referring to the Membership page on our website. UK members who pay by Standing Order are kindly asked to ensure that their payments are made at the appropriate levels, and payment by BACS bank transfer is also welcomed. Further information, including details of the BATAS bank account if needed, is available on application from the Treasurer (contact details on page 67).



## In Memoriam



# Celia Kerlake

## 1946 - 2023

### **‘Celia was undoubtedly our driving force’ by Nick Baird**

Diplomatic postings in Kuwait, Brussels, and Muscat

2006-2009 Ambassador in Ankara

**The President of BATAS**



I first came to know Celia when she approached me, as a former British Ambassador to Turkey, to be honorary President of BATAS around 4 years ago. As I had, at the time, a full-time job as well as a number of time-consuming voluntary roles, I was initially hesitant but the combination of Celia's courteous determination and ability to motivate people around her enthusiasms won through.

It is these two characteristics that I remember most about her in our all too brief friendship. Although BATAS relies on the efforts of many, Celia was undoubtedly our driving force. It was she who came up with most of the ideas for themes for our symposia and lectures, she who identified excellent speakers from the extensive network of contacts in her little black book, and she who chased them up to confirm their attendance. The breadth of her interests and her intellectual curiosity meant she was always one of those who asked engaged and searching questions of speakers and in a way that showed how closely she always listened and how much – usually! – she had enjoyed what she had heard.

Although Celia could be quite formal in her dealings with others, those of us who came to know her better also felt her warmth and interest in others. Hearing the recollections of former students, academic colleagues, and fellow environmental campaigners since her death, this comes through in the small remembered kindnesses, the willingness to offer support and advice, the time given to collaborative partnerships.

Celia was still very much in her prime. She left us far too early and those of us in BATAS are hugely in her debt.



## Celia, Our Chair(person)

by Jill Sindall MA  
Member of TASG/BATAS Council 2003-2022



Celia was Chair of the Council of the British Association of Turkish Area Studies (formerly known as Turkish Area Studies Group) for nearly 13 years. These years presented many changes and challenges in the Association's history such as boosting membership, funding, venues for lectures, presenting talks on-line via Zoom at the time of the pandemic. Celia gripped all these problems with determination and courage. Her attention to and mastery of detail was renowned and, combined with her profound love and knowledge of Turkey's history, language and culture made her a formidable Chair. Her enthusiasm and commitment will be greatly missed, and the Association is deeply in her debt.

## Colleagues

### **Celia's Academic Career by Roger Goodman** **Nissan Professor of Modern Japanese Studies** **Warden of St Antony's College**

Celia will be much missed by all those who knew and worked with her in Oxford – at St Antony's, within the Faculty of Oriental Studies (as it was then called) and the wider Turkish Studies community.

Celia was educated at St Paul's Girls' School before taking a Double First in Oriental Studies (Turkish and Arabic) from Girton College, Cambridge. She embarked on her doctorate in 1968 under the supervision of Dick Repp at St Anne's College, producing a translation and critical edition of a historical text, written sometime between 1557 and 1566, concerning the rise to power and the achievements of Sultan Selim I.

Following her doctoral studies, Celia held research fellowships at, first, New Hall in Cambridge and then Lady Margaret Hall in Oxford, before becoming a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh in 1980. She remained in Edinburgh until she took up the University Lectureship in Turkish with a Fellowship at St Antony's in October 1988 succeeding Geoffrey Lewis. Celia was a stalwart of the St Antony's community for the following 23 years.

Upon her retirement in 2011, Celia was elected to an Emeritus Fellowship and remained very involved in the College's academic activities, in particular the SEESOX programme, and was a regular attendee of MEC (Middle East Centre) and other College events.



Celia was a scholar of the old school. She set very high standards in her teaching and research - for both herself and others being secretly delighted when she won a well-deserved Teaching Award, nominated by her students, in 2009.

Celia's control of Turkish language sources was legendary, and many Turkish colleagues said her accent and expression were indistinguishable as non-native. She published a series of important scholarly papers throughout her career, but she was best known for her book *Turkish: An Essential Grammar*, published by Routledge in 2010. She was currently working on a second edition with her long-time writing colleague, Aslı Göksel, with whom she was in discussion the day before she died.



### Celia - a fellow traveller into Turkish

by Aslı Göksel, Professor (Emeritus)  
Boğaziçi University

In her final e-mail message to me, Celia talked about two topics. One of these was my usage of the pronoun *kendi* 'self' in a previous mail which, she noticed, contradicted our description in *Turkish A Comprehensive Grammar* (Routledge 2005), noting that we had to revise that section in the second edition we were currently working on. The other topic was the earthquake in Kahramanmaraş where the scale of the devastation had not yet come to light, and how the BBC, to her joy, had found representatives from the Red Crescent who spoke English well. Together with family matters and our daily lives, points of grammar on the one hand, and events and politics in Turkey and Britain on the other were the main interests that fuelled her quiet but never-ending curiosity.

In the mid-1980s a friend of mine visited me in London and brought along two friends of hers, Gülen and Celia. I remember Celia discussing the functions of the passive voice, my dissertation topic, in her impeccable Turkish. From then onwards we were in communication, first by telephone, then by e-mail, and these exchanges led to our collaboration on two grammar books and an edited volume of conference papers from the Ninth International Conference on Turkish Linguistics held at Lincoln College, Oxford.

Our meetings for the grammars took place in England and Turkey in our respective offices at the University of Oxford and Boğaziçi University, our homes in Middle Barton, Camberwell, Arnavutköy, Gülen's flat in Erenköy, my mother's flat in Suadiye, our final meeting in Cihangir at a friend's flat, most memorably the long weekends at Celia's house in Chipping Norton sitting by the fire Celia lit by using the branches she collected from the woodlands, and several times at chilly Paddington Station, a location we chose because it was equidistant to where we lived and worked.

The long and detailed discussions we had, face-to-face or by e-mail and always in Turkish, would lead to one of us writing a section and sending it to the other, and then keep on revising until both of us were satisfied with the result. Celia would usually prepare a whole section in a form close to final. But she was never completely satisfied

**Turkish**  
An Essential Grammar  
Aslı Göksel and Celia Kerslake

even when we had considered a particular version ready for publication. After long periods of silence, she would come up with a counterexample to one of our descriptions, forcing us to rewrite that section. These silences were precious. In loving precision, Celia would think, rethink, go back to a single word, a sound, a phrase, the gloss of a suffix, and being equally versed in the old erudite forms of Turkish, the colloquialisms of modern discourse, the different registers and slang, and the news readers' usage of Turkish, usually on the political opposition channel Halk TV, she would bring to our work a wealth of examples based on her long-lived experience of Turkish and Turkey.

Upon hearing of her death, a colleague from the Middle East Technical University wrote, 'I will try to pass on to future generations the scholarly attitude and meticulousness of Celia. We shall miss her'. I too, will miss a dear friend and a fellow traveller into Turkish who left in mid-conversation.

### The daunting task of replacing her during her research leave

#### Laurent Mignon

Professor of Turkish Literature,  
Fellow in Turkish, Middle East Centre,  
St Antony's College



One of the challenges for post-holders in what the Germans poetically call "Orchideenfächer" – rare academic subjects – such as Turkish in British universities is the expectation that they cover the whole breadth of the subject from history to literature to linguistics to politics. Celia did not only lecture on and teach all those subjects, but she also wrote works and articles that are must-reads in all of them. The engaging and extensive *Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar* that she co-wrote with Aslı Göksel and the stimulating articles that she prepared for the third edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, among others on the poets Cemal Süreyya and Attila İlhan and on the *Edebiyat-ı Cedide* movements, are a testimony, among many, to her wide-ranging skills and knowledge.

Even though I had done my BA in Turkish and then PhD in Turkish literature in the United Kingdom – at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London – I had never really exchanged with Celia before 2009, despite our paths having crossed on rare occasions at conferences and Turkey-related events. Celia was planning to go on a well-deserved sabbatical in the academic year 2009-2010 and I had been short-listed for the position of Departmental Lecturer in Turkish at the Faculty of Oriental Studies who had the daunting task of replacing her during her research leave. She was a member of the selection committee, and I thought that I had covered all the bases before the interview. This was until Celia asked me about Turkish folk literature, the one topic I did not know much about, having mostly taught 19th and 20th century

Turkish literature at Bilkent University in Ankara since 2002. I managed to save the day, because, as co-editor of the Journal of Turkish Literature, I had just received a copy of İlhan Başgöz's *Hikaye: Turkish Folk Romance as Performance Art* which I had been browsing before coming to Oxford.

Nevertheless, this had been a stern warning that it would never be possible to cover the ground the way Celia did it. If I somehow managed to get through my one-year stint in Oxford in 2009-2010 trying to juggle Celia's heavy teaching load and administrative duties with a bit of research on the side, this was only because she was so generous with her time throughout that year. Whenever I felt at a loss about how to deal with what seemed to me to be the rather arcane practices of our Faculty, she was always ready to help with patience and great empathy, for which I will always be thankful.

## Former Students



### **Celia was supportive of her students**

by Polly Davies

Undergraduate & Postgraduate Studies in Turkish, Maritime Law and Social Anthropology,  
working now at Oxford University Press,  
Council Member of BATAS

Celia interviewed me in 2002 for the undergraduate course in Turkish with Islamic Art and Archaeology at Oxford. It took place one dark late afternoon in the Oriental Institute (recently renamed the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies). She asked me a question about the Hagia Sophia and even then, in that intimidating situation, I remember her being kind and genuinely interested in this 17-year-old who loved Istanbul and liked learning languages but otherwise had no particular connection to Turkey.

At every stage, Celia was supportive of her students. She helped us (there were two of us moving out at the same time) find accommodation in Istanbul when moving there for our second year, until we found our feet. I ended up in Çengelköy and the daily trips by dolmuş, down to the ferry, across the Bosphorus and then bus to a language school in Şişli got too much very quickly – especially in the winter, either in snow or torrents of running water - and I ended up off Cumhuriyet Caddesi, with Celia visiting later in the year and meeting my housemates.

As a teacher, Celia was strict. It was not a comfortable position to be in if you turned up to a class (especially with so very few of us in there) not having done the necessary work. Of course that was a very good thing – we got to grips with a difficult language



incredibly quickly. She also taught me 20th century Turkish literature, late Ottoman texts and 20th century Turkish history, with others taking on the teaching of the older Ottoman areas. At one point she found me a rare Sir James Redhouse English/Turkish Lexicon, a giant of a book originally published in Istanbul in 1890 and reprinted by the Librairie du Liban in Beirut 100 years later. Sadly, I don't use it much these days, but it is a beautiful book and made the difficult job of studying Ottoman far more enjoyable. Another time, she offered her students the manuscript of the first edition of her grammar book, suggesting that we make a small donation to a charity in consideration.

I stayed in touch with Celia after I graduated and much later called on her for advice (and references) when contemplating postgraduate study, meeting up with her in London and getting a good long list of helpful people to speak to. Moving from being a maritime lawyer (albeit one working predominantly with Turkish ship owners) to studying again, I did feel a bit of an imposter, but Celia was nothing but encouraging and supportive. Others have said this about Celia as well, she was so genuinely interested in what others were working on, always finding time and never judging. She once arranged an Oxford viewing of a documentary a diplomat friend of mine had made in Istanbul about Camondo Han; another time she was impressed by the literary knowledge of a Turkish barrister friend of mine. It was around the time of discussing postgraduate study that I became more involved in BATAS, joining the Council. In this capacity I have always been struck by her dedication and hard work, her patience and extremely thoughtfully worded and appreciative emails. Tracking down some other students of hers, since hearing the sad news, all have said what a brilliant and loyal teacher she was, and we were lucky to have been taught by her.

## The great debt I owe to Celia

by Dimitar Bechev  
Oxford School of Global and Area Studies (OSGA)  
International politics of Eastern Europe and Eurasia



It is hard to put in words how great a debt I owe to Celia. We met more than 20 years ago, while I was still working on my DPhil at Oxford. It was thanks to her I made my first steps in learning Turkish. I could not have hoped for a more dedicated and knowledgeable teacher. To this day, I reap the benefits of my studies under her. My work on Turkey - including the book I published last year on the Erdoğan era - would not have been possible without Celia *hanım*. Her departure is a sad loss for all of us - generations of students she educated at Oxford. She was a kind, caring person as well as an outstanding scholar. Celia will stay in our hearts forever.

# Family



## A Tribute to my sister

by Hilary Vaughan

Celia was born in London in 1946, the eldest of three sisters. Ours was not the easiest of families to grow up in, as our father strongly preferred his own ideas and attitudes; he was often dismissive of the differing views of others. However, from an early age, Celia developed her own personality, and her qualities of enthusiasm, commitment, tolerance and good humour. As a youngster, Celia was an excellent and nimble gymnast and dancer. She also enjoyed outdoor activities, including camping with the Girl Guides. However, her love of studying, thirst for knowledge, and powerful intellect, suggested that an academic career might be her choice.



The three sisters Rosie, Celia & Hilary;  
Rosie's daughter & son with their daughters  
Photo taken in January 2023

Celia's educational success began at St Paul's Girls' School, followed by Girton College Cambridge, where she achieved a Double First in Oriental Studies; Turkey and all things Turkish became her life-long passion and career. She then

achieved her Doctorate, studying and working at several institutions before becoming an Oxford University Lecturer, and Fellow of St

Antony's College. She was a true and meticulous scholar, expecting the highest standards of herself and of those she taught. At her funeral, many tributes were read about Celia's qualities as a teacher and mentor.

In the 1960s, Celia first spent time in Turkey, where she always felt happy; she learnt her perfect Turkish, and made many friends. Her greatest friend, and indeed her life partner, was Gülen, the woman into whose family she was drawn. Their partnership lasted over 50 years, and they spent as much time together as they could. Gülen was Celia's senior in years, and she died in 2021, with Celia, battling Covid, at her side.

Celia's very sudden and unexpected death came as a great shock to all her family and friends. Her commitment to environmental conservation and to the Green Party encouraged us to choose a natural burial, which was attended by around 100 people. This, in itself, was a great tribute, and she will be remembered with love, affection and respect by all who knew her, and will long be missed by all her family.



## British Association for Turkish Area Studies

### Membership application form

BATAS is an entirely independent and voluntary association whose aims are:

- to promote interest in and knowledge of Turkey and its cultural/geopolitical area, its history, culture, people and current affairs
- to generate support for Turkish studies in the UK
- to maintain the publication of *TAS Review*

When applying for membership of BATAS, you can choose a membership type that includes receiving a hard copy of *TAS Review* (published twice a year) or one that does not. In either case membership will give you free or reduced-rate entry to BATAS events and entitle you to attend and vote at the Annual General Meeting, to stand for election to Council and to receive emailed information about forthcoming Turkey-related events (arranged by a variety of organisations) that may be of interest to you. The annual subscription rates for the different types of membership are shown in the last section of the application form below.

Please enter below your personal details, the type of membership you are applying for and (unless you are applying for the free student membership option) your chosen method of payment.

Then either scan the form and email it to [tokere@regents.ac.uk](mailto:tokere@regents.ac.uk) or post it to Elif Toker-Turnalar, Regent's University London, Inner Circle, Regent's Park, London, NW1 4NS.

Your email address will be used only for communications about BATAS matters and (unless you opt out of receiving them) notices of other Turkey-related events. If you are not applying to receive a hard copy of *TAS Review*, your postal address will be used only in the event of a failure to reach you by email. Any information that you are willing to supply about yourself in the 'Date of birth', 'Occupation' and 'Knowledge/Areas of interest' boxes will help Council to build up a profile of BATAS members and to plan its activities accordingly.

\*Surname:

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
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## Request for contributions

**TAS *Review*** welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements, and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be in A4 format and, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors Sigrid-B Martin [sigmartin3@gmail.com](mailto:sigmartin3@gmail.com). and/or Dr Mina Toksöz [mina@blauel.com](mailto:mina@blauel.com). Submissions for the Spring issue would be particularly welcomed by 1 September 2023 or earlier.



<https://kadineserleri100yil.beykoz.edu.tr/en/home/>



### Call for Papers

The Chair of Turkish Studies at the University of Vienna invites researchers from all over the world working in the fields of history, linguistics, philology, literary studies, social sciences, anthropology, and political sciences in Turkey and the Turkic world to participate in the Fourth European Convention on Turkic, Ottoman and Turkish Studies (Turkologentag 2023). The conference will take place on September 21 – 23, 2023 at the University of Vienna. It is organized in co-operation with GTOT e.V. (Society for Turkic, Ottoman and Turkish Studies).

<https://turkologentag2023.univie.ac.at/call-for-papers/>



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## Turkish Area Studies *Review*

### Co-Editors:

Dr Mina Toksöz, 37 Claylands Road, London SW8 1NX

☎ 0207-7356793, email: mina@blauel.com

Sigrid-B Martin, The Red House, 49 Hackington Road, Tyler Hill, Canterbury, Kent CT2 9NE,

☎ 01227-471222, email: sigimartin3@gmail.com

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