The 2012 John Martin Lecture

Dr Christine Woodhead
University of Durham

on

The Art of Letter Writing among the Ottomans

at

The Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre,
10 Maple Street, London, W1T 5HA

Friday 20 January 2012
6 pm
Tea will be available from 5.30 pm

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Spring Symposium 2012
Emmanuel College, Cambridge

Saturday 5 May 2012
10.00 am to 4.30 pm
Details will follow
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*Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.*
Turkey’s stature in the Middle East grows apace as the country re-visits some of its Arab connections. To many of those caught up in the evolving Arab Spring, Turkey’s mix of democracy and Islam appeals strongly. Prime Minister Erdoğan has been welcomed in post-Mubarak Egypt. Foreign minister Davutoğlu reminds us of Turkey’s historic ties in the region (see Bill Park’s article in this Review). There has been special concern about repression in neighbouring Syria, with refugees fleeing across the border from that country but Ankara’s advice to President Assad has yet to be heeded. Further afield, Turkey is now heavily involved in construction in the Arab world and in central Asia. Ankara was quick to organise the rescue of Turkish workers and contractors when fighting engulfed Libya earlier this year – an indicator of the new assertiveness of its foreign outlook. The killing by Israeli forces of nine Turkish participants on the Mavi Marmara in a flotilla attempting to break through the blockade to Gaza has wounded relations between the two countries very severely – and worried the US where both countries are seen as its friends in an uncertain region. As we go to press British interests figure in a session on ‘UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role’ at the Palace of Westminster.

Internally, however, Turkey faces continuing challenges as intractable as the ongoing Ergenekon and Sledghammer cases and Kurdish militancy. Yet the economy grows strongly and puts Turkey in seventeenth place in world rankings. One sector, tourism, has even benefited from unrest in Arab lands- though Israelis have been cancelling their bookings. William Hale comprehensively sets out Turkey’s political fortunes both at home and abroad. His article is the last of a series by him for which we are most grateful. We hope to see more pages by Professor Hale in future issues of the Review. Another regular contributor is Clement Dodd whose current ‘Update’ sees Turkey likely to play a more decisive role in the persistent Cyprus conflict.

There is good news from Turkey’s cultural scene. Istanbul has a growing reputation as a centre of art and design – the recent Biennial being just one example. Ayşe Furlonger describes other events, in art, archaeology and music. There is Emre Aracı’s contribution on the Naum Theatre in Istanbul and we still have a brief poetry section. Arın Baraktaroğlu, another regular contributor and member of our Editorial Board, reports on new publications. Four of the papers in this issue are based on presentations at TASG’s Symposium at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in May, covering topics from controversies within Turkey, foreign policy, ethnic issues to modern cinema.

We look forward to listening to another range of interesting speakers to our 2012 Symposium (details in the next Review). Meanwhile we would very much welcome offers of articles or letters for future issues of the Review. Please get in touch if you can offer a contribution – or are thinking about doing so! Or contact us at TASG’s John Martin Memorial Lecture on 20 January 2012 when Dr Christine Woodhead will speak about ‘The Art of Letter Writing among the Ottomans’.
**Noteworthy Events**
by Ayşe Furlonger

**CONGRESS OF TURKISH ART**
Paris – 19-21 September 2011

Leading artists, scholars, and creative professionals from around the world gathered in France for the 14th International Congress of Turkish Art (ICTA) between 19 and 21 September 2011. The principal theme of this year’s summit was the ‘Relationship between Turkish and European Art.’ The programme included lectures on ‘Turkish Arts in the Empires of the Past,’ ‘Turkish Arts and Aesthetics in Modernity’ and ‘Auxiliary Sciences’ and there were excursions to the Musée Nationale de Céramiques at Sévres and the National Museum of the Renaissance at Chateau d’Ecouen, together with concurrent exhibitions of Turkish artists in Paris.

While focusing on Turkish arts in the ancient era, the congress also covered topics such as book arts, ceramics, glass arts, textiles, architecture, handicrafts and photography during the Ottoman Era. Among the highlights of the Congress was a concert by the musician, composer and musicologist Kudsi Ergüner on the 21 September. One of the foremost masters of our times, Kudsi Ergüner is particularly famed for his helping to introduce Ottoman and sufi music to the world with internationally acclaimed projects and recordings. The Congress closed with a reception at the Turkish Embassy.

**EXHIBITIONS**

**Dream and Reality - Modern and Contemporary Women Artists from Turkey,**
Istanbul Museum of Modern Art, 16 September 2011 – 22 January 2012

The exhibition ‘Dream and Reality’ at the Istanbul Museum of Modern Art celebrates the works of 74 women artists. Some of these artists are those about whose lives and productions we know little and whose names are almost forgotten. And there are the rediscovered artists who, for the last four decades, have been shaping the contemporary art scene with their intellectual attitude and practical actions. Formed by curators Fatmagül Berktay, Levent Çalıkoğlu, Zeynep İnankur and Burcu Pelvanoğlu, the selection encompasses the production which stretches from the mid-19th century to the present day and incorporates many different disciplines from painting to video. It will also include various discussions, as well as workshops, on women’s studies and feminism.

The exhibition takes its title from the 1891 novel *Dream and Reality* co-authored by acclaimed writer and journalist Ahmet Mithat and Fatma Aliye Topuz (a lesser-known figure even though she was one of the first female novelists in Turkey). As a romantic novel the two-part book features many of the period’s symbolic characteristics; the first part called ‘Dream’ was written by Fatma Aliye and the part laying emphasis on ‘Reality’ was by Ahmet Mithat, while the book’s cover lists its writers as Ahmet Mithat and “A Woman.”

**The Art of the Anatolian Kilim: Highlights from the McCoy Jones Collection**
Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco, Golden Gate Park, 50 Hagiwara Tea Garden Drive, San Francisco, CA 94118, 10 September 2011 -10 June 2012

A world-class collection of Anatolian kilims given to the Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco by H McCoy Jones and his wife, Caroline, is showcased in a choice exhibition of two dozen...
of the finest examples. Presented in the textile arts gallery at the de Young Museum, the Anatolian flat-woven kilims on view, dating from the 15th to the 19th century, include a variety of design types and regional styles, as well as superb examples of artistic and visual prowess. The selection displays weavings produced by semi-nomadic and village women of Anatolia. Curator Jill D’Alessandro explains, “These surviving examples, in their fragmented states, show the passage of time. Although structural disintegration has interrupted the design field on some of these pieces, their colours remain deeply saturated and their patterns simple and powerful.”

Kilims are flat tapestry-woven carpets or rugs; they are characterized by bold abstract designs that have been translated as symbolic renderings of architectural, human, animal and floral motifs. Over the centuries and up to modern times, both technique and design have been passed down from generation to generation of Anatolian women. Traditionally, they were used as floor and table coverings, room dividers, door flaps, prayer rugs and burial cloths.

The Fine Arts Museums’ textiles collection boasts more than 12,000 textiles and costumes from around the world. It is one of the largest and most comprehensive collections of its type in the United States. It comprises costume and costume accessories, loom-woven textiles, non-woven fabrics such as bark cloth, felt and knitting, and objects whose primary decoration is produced through techniques such as beading and embroidery. The kilims in the Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco’s permanent collection are considered the most important group of Anatolian kilims outside Turkey.

Lectures accompanying the exhibition are Anatolian Archetypes by Jill D’Alessandro, Curator of Costume & Textile Arts and Discontinuous Wefts: The Brilliance and Beauty of Anatolian Kilims by Cathryn Cootner, Textile Curator Emeritus. Both lectures are free and open to the public.

ARCHAEOLOGY

The Zeugma Mosaic Museum
İncilipınar Mahallesi, Şehitkamil Caddesi, No: 2, Şehitkamil, Gaziantep

The world’s largest mosaic museum, The Zeugma Mosaic Museum, opened on 9 September 2011 in Gaziantep (south-eastern Turkey) and was visited by a record number of visitors on the first day. The museum displays a total of 1,700 square metres of mosaics in an area of more than 7,000 square metres. The museum’s most popular piece is the Gypsy Girl mosaic.

Besides mosaics, wall paintings, fountains, columns and walls unearthed during various excavations at the site of the ancient Roman city of Zeugma are displayed in the museum. The ground floor of the museum exhibits a statue of the god of war, Mars, from the first century. The entrance floor exhibits mosaics unearthed in villas on the coast of the River Fırat. The Gypsy Girl mosaic is displayed in a special section on the museum’s second floor. Along with the Gypsy Girl, church mosaics from the Eastern Roman period are on displayed on the same floor.

Zeugma was founded in the 3rd-4th century BC by Seleucus Nicator I, one of Alexander the Great’s commanding generals. Thanks to its strategic situation the city quickly grew and developed, becoming one of the four major cities of the Commagene Kingdom founded in the 1st century BC in the post-Hellenistic period. When the region came under Roman power, trade brought wealth and, when that wealth attracted artists, Zeugma became a metropolis of 70,000 people. On the banks of the Euphrates merchants built villas and in the courtyards of those villas they added mosaic-paved pools. Though archaeological research in Zeugma goes back to the 1970s, most of what is known from the site was discovered during the extensive salvage excavations in 2000.
The Zeugma Mosaics Museum is close to the ancient Zeugma and it houses five conference halls, a depot, an archive and library, gift production craft shops, an art workshop for children, car parking facilities and an archaeological artworks and restoration centre.

‘Sagalassos, City of Dreams’
Gallo-Romeins Museum, Kielenstraat 15 3700 Tongeren, Belgium

Artefacts unearthed during excavations in the ancient city of Sagalassos in the southern province of Burdur’s Ağlasun district will be exhibited in Belgium. The exhibition, titled ‘Sagalassos: City of Dreams’, will start on the 25 October 2011, and continue until June 17 June 2012. The exhibition will be in the Gallo-Roman Museum in Tongeren, Belgium’s oldest city. There will be almost 250 objects. The objects are highly diverse, ranging from prehistoric tools and red-painted pottery dishes through fragments of bronze statues and oil lamps bearing Christian motifs, frieze slabs decorated with dancing nymphs, scripts, rings, pots, women’s portraits to eye drop bottles. The showpiece of the exhibition is the head of statue of Emperor Hadrian. This marble sculpture is one of the finest portraits of the emperor ever found.

Sagalassos is a vast archaeological site in south-west Turkey, some 110 kilometres to the north of the seaport of Antalya. Its remote location high up in the Taurus Mountains and a metre-thick erosion layer protected the remains of the city against plundering and decay after its decline in the 13th century AD. Consequently, the ancient city is exceptionally well preserved.

The exhibition at the Gallo-Romeins Museum will be led by the leading archaeologist Professor Marc Waelkens, who will explain why Sagalassos has dominated his life. A series of short films will provide a glimpse of the activities carried out during the many excavation campaigns he has led there over the years.

CONCERTS

Turkish pianist and composer Fazıl Say at Oxford Chamber Music Festival
Holywell Music Room, Sheldonian Theatre, University Church of St Mary the Virgin and Jacqueline du Pré Music Building
28 September 2011 – 1 October 2011

Renowned Turkish pianist and composer Fazıl Say will take the stage as part of the Oxford Chamber Music Festival, one of the most important music festivals in the world. This year’s festival will present Say as its composer-in-residence and all of the artist’s chamber music works will be played in the festival. Say will also perform as a soloist and conductor in the festival’s opening concert.

The Oxford Chamber Music Festival’s art director is the world-renown violin virtuoso Priya Mitchell, who will also perform Say’s violin concerto 1001 Nights in the Harem. This year’s theme is Cities of Dreams: Magical Journeys. The festival will start with an Istanbul-inspired concert and close with music linked with Prague.

Sezen Aksu
Royal Albert Hall, Thursday 20 October 2011 - 7:30 PM

The queen of contemporary Turkish music, Sezen Aksu, will appear at Royal Albert Hall for just one evening with her beautifully evocative songs and master musicians. Ranked amongst the world’s best alongside Billie Holliday, Caruso, and Placido Domingo in a recent 50 Great Voices series (United States National Public
Radio), Sezen Aksu is a diva whose inimitable voice touches deep into human soul whether or not one understands the Turkish of her deeply poetic lyrics.

Since starting her singing career 35 years ago she has penned over 500 songs, from fragile ballads to dance music. Her songs speak of love, but don't shy from social issues. Drawing on Turkish folk and even Ottoman Classical traditions, her songs have a unique signature that blends oriental roots with contemporary pop.

The programme will include her best-loved songs performed with fresh style. Her band features Grammy-nominated pianist and composer Fahir Ataköglu, percussionist Jarrod Cagwin and Dutch bassist Eric van der Westen alongside Turkish master musicians Mustafa Öztüy (percussion), Göksun Çavdar (clarinet), Fatih Ahiskalı (Guitar and Cumbus), Özer Arkun (Cello) and Nurcan Eren (vocals).

CCC

Turkey’s Politics since March 2011:
a Survey
by William Hale

In Turkey’s domestic politics, the general elections held on 12 June were the most significant event of the last six months. The result was a remarkable victory for Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) which increased its share of the vote to 49.95%, compared with the 46.58% which it won in the previous elections, held in 2007. With 326 of the 550 seats in parliament, the AKP had now won three general elections in succession – the first time any party had achieved this since the days of Adnan Menderes’ Democrat Party in the 1950s. Even more surprisingly, it had increased its share of the vote on each occasion. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) also saw a moderate increase in its vote share, from 20.88% to 25.94%, with 135 seats, while the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) suffered a small fall, from 14.27% to 12.98%, winning 53 seats. Like its predecessor in 2007, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) evaded the minimum vote threshold of 10% by running its candidates as nominal independents, increasing its tally of seats from 26 to 36, and continuing as the leading party in seven south-eastern provinces. Apart from the Kurdish inhabited south-east, and parts of the Aegean coast (notably İzmir) and eastern Thrace, where the CHP remained the leading party, the AKP headed the polls throughout the country, being the leading party in 69 of the country’s 85 constituencies. The government’s success in reviving the economy after the international financial crisis of 2008, its continuing hold over most of the working-class urban votes as well as those of peasant farmers, and its broad appeal to moderate Muslim conservatism, were the main feathers in its cap. It was also notable that the election of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as the CHP’s new leader in May 2010 had failed to make much impact on the electorate. As in previous elections, the AKP gained from the general weakness and internal divisions of the main opposition party.¹

While the AKP could congratulate itself on this result, turmoil in the CHP and BDP initially threatened to derail the democratic process. Two of the CHP’s newly elected deputies were unable to take the oath as members of parliament since they were being held on remand as

¹ Results from Hürriyet, 14 June 2011
suspects in the ‘Ergenekon’ trials in which they and a large number of serving and retired officers of the armed forces were accused of conspiring to overthrow the government by force (see below). The CHP leadership threatened that, if they were not released, then all the party’s MPs would refuse to take the oath. Similarly, six of the 36 nominal independents who rejoined the BDP were under arrest for membership of the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), which is in turn alleged to be a civilian extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organisation. One of them, Hatip Dicle, was also barred from taking his seat by the Supreme Election Board, since he had previously been convicted of supporting the PKK. On these grounds, all the newly elected BDP deputies also refused to take the oath. However, as Prime Minister Erdoğan pointed out, deputies who did not agree to be sworn in would be listed as ‘absent’. Under Article 84 of the constitution, any deputy who fails to attend parliament for five sessions or more within a month without permission can be deprived of his seat by a simple majority vote on the floor of the House. If more than 5% of the seats in parliament are vacant, then by-elections must be held: since Turkey has multi-member constituencies, and the AKP is the leading party in most of them, then most of the CHP deputies, as well as several BDP members, could be expected to lose their seats. On these grounds, both parties had a strong incentive to abandon their planned boycott of the oath-taking ceremony. On 11 July, the CHP members began taking the oath without first securing the release of their arrested colleagues: after a long delay, the BDP deputies followed suit when parliament reconvened after the summer recess on 1 October.

Following the elections, relations between the government and the armed forces jumped back to the top of the domestic agenda. In the ‘Ergenekon’ and ‘Sledgehammer’ cases, the trials dragged on of around 200 retired and serving officers, plus some civilian sympathisers, who were accused of conspiring to produce a breakdown of public order, and thus justify a coup d’état (see reports for March 2010 and March 2011). On 29 July several more generals and other ranking officers were charged with organising an internet campaign to undermine the government. A crisis point was reached in the run-up to the annual meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) which makes the top appointments to the armed forces, and is attended by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the armed forces commanders. Under Article 117 of the constitution, the Chief of the General Staff is responsible to the Prime Minister and appointed by the President, but in practice in the past the top commanders have normally made their own appointments, which were then rubber-stamped by the government.

On this occasion, there was a break with tradition, as the government refused to allow the promotion of 17 generals and admirals who had been accused of involvement in the ‘Sledgehammer’ conspiracy. In response, on 29 July the Chief of the General Staff, General Işık Koşaner, resigned, along with the commanders of the army, navy and air force, with General Koşaner claiming that “I am unable to fulfil my responsibility to protect the rights of my personnel as the Chief of General Staff”. President Abdullah Gül reacted swiftly by appointing General Necdet Özel, the Commander of Gendarmerie and the only one of the four force commanders who had not resigned, as Commander of Land Forces. This paved the way for his appointment as Chief of the General Staff at the YAŞ meeting, held on 4 August, at which new appointments to the command of the army, air force, navy and gendarmerie were also made. This was followed by a highly significant symbolic change in the ceremonial arrangements of ‘Victory Day’, held on 30 August, when the Prime Minister, President and other political leaders had previously called on the Chief of the General Staff in his office to give their greetings. On this occasion, the procedure was reversed, as President Gül went to the General Staff headquarters to receive the greetings of General

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2 Today’s Zaman, 4 July 2011
3 Hürriyet, 12 July, 1 October 2011
4 BBC news website (www.bbc.co.uk/news) 29 July 2011: Milliyet, 4 August 2011
Özel and the government leaders – a change which, apparently, the new Chief of Staff had himself proposed.\(^5\)

For the government, the most worrying development on the domestic front was the renewed campaign of violence by the PKK following the breakdown of the government’s ‘Kurdish opening’ in the autumn of 2009 (see report for March 2010). Since the general elections more than 100 people, including many civilians, have been killed in these attacks, in which the PKK has been able to use its bases in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq to launch attacks into Turkey. A particularly ruthless attack occurred in Siirt province on 20 September when four young women were murdered in their car while driving to a party. On the same day, the terrorist attacks were extended to Ankara, when four unfortunate bystanders were killed by a car bomb explosion – although in this case the attack was reportedly the work of the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, an ultra-violent offshoot of the PKK. In another PKK shooting, in Batman on 26 September, a pregnant woman and her daughter were killed, while the PKK was also reported to have tortured to death five of its women members who were trying to flee the organisation. These civilian deaths added to the steady death toll among police and soldiers, most of whom are young conscripts performing their compulsory military service. During September, the PKK also resorted to kidnappings, especially of village teachers: by 29 September, twelve teachers were reported to have been abducted in Diyarbakır and Elazığ provinces.\(^6\) These attacks provoked a renewed crackdown on those suspected of links with the PKK, with several hundred arrests.

Politically, the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), a group affiliated to the PKK, had raised the stakes in July by demanding a unilateral declaration of ‘democratic autonomy’ of the Kurdish-inhabited region, with its own assembly, flag and defence forces. However, this was criticised by two of the BDP deputies elected in the general elections, on the grounds that such autonomy could only be granted to a region by a higher authority (in effect, that it would have to be negotiated with the central government).\(^7\) Meanwhile, a leaked voice recording, showing that in 2009 an agent of the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) – who is now head of the organisation – had had talks in Oslo with leaders of the PKK. (It was widely reported that MİT agents had additionally had talks with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in his island prison of İmralı, although these had also been broken off.) On these grounds, Selahattin Demirtaş, a co-chairman of the BDP, proposed that the government should return to open and direct dialogue with the PKK leaders in northern Iraq.\(^8\) There was little chance that the government would respond positively to this, since this would look like giving in to the men of violence. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s initial reaction was that there would be no negotiations with the PKK, although there could be a dialogue with the BDP if it returned to parliament (as it subsequently did): later, he signalled that there could be further talks with the PKK ‘if needed’.\(^9\)

More materially, the government was assured of continued support from the United States, by supplying ‘real time’ intelligence on PKK movements in northern Iraq – this being confirmed by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton when Tayyip Erdoğan visited Washington in July, and again two months later when he met President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 21 September.\(^10\) Officials of the Interior and Foreign Ministries also had talks with the Kurdish regional administration in Iraq, led by Massoud Barzani, in a bid to secure cooperation against the PKK.\(^11\) With US support, the Turkish air force carried out repeated air raids against

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5. *Today’s Zaman*, 31 August 2011
8. *Today’s Zaman* 16 September 2011
10. *Hürriyet*, 16 July, 21 September 2011
11. *Today’s Zaman*, 13 September 2011
suspected PKK bases in northern Iraq during August, in which it was claimed that over 100 PKK militants had been killed, and the government threatened that it might extend this into a ground operation. The difficulty was that the air attacks had failed to prevent the PKK's escalating campaign in September, while previous experience from the 1990s suggested that repeated military operations in Iraq against the PKK had relatively little effect. To stem the violence, some return to negotiations with the Turkish-Kurdish leadership on political reforms would be needed. The fact that the BDP had returned to parliament at the beginning of October, and that the government was apparently prepared to enter into a dialogue with it, was at least a hopeful sign.

In the broader context, the need to address the Kurdish problem was only part of the substantial programme of constitutional reform which the Prime Minister defined as his main objective in the new parliament, with the hope of legislating a new constitution by the middle of 2012. This would require the support of a two-thirds majority in parliament (i.e., 367 votes) or a three-fifths majority (330 votes) plus endorsement by a national referendum. Since the AKP had only 326 seats, the support of the opposition parties would be essential—in fact, the premier had recognised the need for national consensus on a new constitution from the start. The need for a new document was almost universally accepted since it was recognised that the existing constitution, drawn up by the then military regime in 1982, left Turkey woefully short of modern democratic standards. A hopeful sign was that, at the beginning of the new session, the CHP agreed with the AKP on the procedure to be followed, in which the new draft document would be drawn up by a Preparatory Commission, headed by the parliamentary Speaker, Cemil Çiçek, and including representatives of all the parties.

In foreign relations, the spring and summer of 2011 were dominated by events in the Middle East. The unexpected ‘Arab spring’, with the overthrow of autocratic governments in Tunisia and Egypt, left Turkish foreign policy, like those of other countries, in disarray. Previously, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his colleagues had assumed that Turkey could achieve ‘zero problems’ with its neighbours, without reference to the fact that most of them—in the Middle East, at any rate—had regimes which were far from democratic. They now had to alter their criteria. They also had to accept that, in spite of Turkey’s activist policies in the region, it had little influence over events on the ground and had to adapt itself to changing circumstances.

In the case of Tunisia, the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime happened quickly, and Turkey was left with the easy job of recognising the fait accompli. In the Egyptian case, Tayyip Erdoğan called on President Hosni Mubarak to step down in early February—before President Obama followed suit. His instinct paid off, as Turkey was now clearly on the winning side. The case of Libya was more problematic, however, since there were around 30,000 Turkish workers in the country, mainly working for Turkish construction firms with valuable contracts in Libya. At the beginning of March Prime Minister Erdoğan had strongly attacked the idea of NATO intervention in Libya. Instead, Turkey concentrated on organising a mass evacuation of its own and other foreign nationals. It also engaged in fruitless talks with Colonel Gaddafi in the hope of persuading him to enact political reforms. However, on 24 March foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced an abrupt change of course, as Turkey moved round to support of the NATO air operation, supplying five navy ships and a submarine to help enforce the arms embargo against Libya. By May the government was openly calling on Colonel Gaddafi to leave Libya, and on 3 July recognised the opposition administration, the Transitional National Council, as ‘the true representative of Libya’s

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12 Ibid  
13 Ibid, 29 September 2011  
14 Ibid  
people’.

Subsequently, Turkey acted as co-chair of the Libya Contact Group (LCG) of 28 countries which developed relations with the Council, hosting a meeting of the LCG in Istanbul on 25 August, and extending economic and humanitarian aid to Libya.

For Turkish foreign policy makers, the uprising in Syria against the Ba’athist regime which began in March raised the most serious problems. The previous entente with Damascus had been the centre-piece of Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy, and the government had put a great deal of effort into developing economic and political relations with its southern neighbour. Initially, Tayyip Erdoğan tried to persuade President Bashar al-Assad to enact social and economic reforms, but – as in the Libyan case – these attempts proved quite unavailing. The Syrian President made frequent promises of reform, but failed to carry them through effectively, while his regime continued violent suppression of the protests, in which 2,700 people were reported to have been killed by mid-September. As late as mid-May the Prime Minister was still claiming that it was ‘too early’ to call on President Assad to leave office, but by mid-June he had clearly changed his tune, describing the regime’s crackdown on the opposition as ‘savagery’.

The possibility of a wave of refugees seeking sanctuary in Turkey was a major worry for Ankara, which appeared to be born out in late June, with the regime’s onslaught against the opposition in northern Syria. At its high point, the influx brought over 18,000 refugees into Turkey, where they were accommodated by the Turkish Red Crescent in tented encampments: fortunately, by late September the number had been reduced to around 7,500 as most of the refugees returned to Syria to look after their farms and businesses.

Besides accommodating the refugees, for which it won international respect, Turkey also hosted the sharply divided Syrian opposition movement, representatives of which launched the Syrian National Council in Istanbul at the beginning of October.

This still left the government with its central problem unsolved, however. In an ideal world, Bashar al-Assad might back down, leaving Syria to follow the path of Egypt and Tunisia, but there was no clear sign that this would happen. Turkey was thus faced with the prospect that the country might fall apart in an inter-communal civil war – as had happened in the Lebanon in the 1970s – or that the oppositional movement might simply peter out in the face of violent repression. The government had clearly gambled that the Ba’athist dictatorship would eventually fall, but it was unclear what it could do if this failed to happen, or the country disintegrated.

Apart from the turmoil in the Arab world, Turkey’s continuing confrontation with Israel over the Mavi Marmara affair of May 2010 pushed the two countries even further apart during the summer of 2011 (see Gamon Maclellan’s report in the Review for Autumn 2010, pp 7-10).

Initially, the government acted cautiously, since it evidently hoped that some reconciliation with Israel might be arranged. Hence, in mid-May, it apparently persuaded the Turkish Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH), owners of the Mavi Marmara ship, not to join the planned repeat of the flotilla exercise in May 2011: (officially, the İHH stated that it had withdrawn from the exercise for ‘technical reasons’).

According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the Israeli Defence Ministry was prepared to issue an apology to Turkey for the attack on the Mavi Marmara, and it appeared that Israel might offer compensation to the victims’ families. However, the hard-line Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, refused to issue an apology, claiming that this would ‘harm Israel’s national dignity’.

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16 Hürriyet Daily News, 3 May 2011; BBC News website, 3 July 2011
17 ‘Conclusions of the Libya Contact Group Meeting, Istanbul, 25 August 2011’: from website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.tr)
19 Hürriyet Daily News, 25 September 2011
20 BBC News website, 2 October 2011
21 Today’s Zaman 17 May, 17 June 2011
22 Ibid, 7, 24 June, 17 July 2011
confirmed by the Israeli defence minister Ehud Barak, who stated that ‘[Prime Minister Benyamin] Netanyahu was on his way to reach a compromise, but was thwarted by Lieberman’, provoking a near breakdown of the Israeli government.23

A break-point came at the beginning of September, when a long awaited report by a United Nations committee headed by the former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer found that the Israel’s attack on the Mavi Marmara had been ‘excessive and unreasonable’ but that its naval blockade of the Gaza strip was legitimate under international law.24 The report was rejected by the Turkish government, which continued to demand an apology. On 2 September it effectively expelled the Israeli ambassador in Ankara by reducing mutual diplomatic representation to Second Secretary level and ending its defence cooperation agreement with Israel (although in practice this had been moribund for some time).25 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also rejected the Palmer committee’s finding that the Israeli blockade was legal, pointing out that it had not been endorsed by the United Nations, and announcing that Turkey would apply to the International Court at the Hague for an advisory opinion on the legitimacy of the blockade.26

Predictably, Turkey’s confrontation with Israel was applauded in the Arab world, where pro-democracy movements in Egypt and elsewhere looked to Turkey as a country which could combine personal attachment to Muslim values with a democratic government and a successful economy. In mid-September Tayyip Erdoğan paid a well-publicised visit to the new democratised countries of North Africa, beginning in Egypt, where he addressed a meeting of the Arab League, strongly supporting the Palestinians’ bid to achieve recognition as a state at the United Nations. Apparently, he had wanted to visit the Gaza strip also, but was persuaded not to by his Egyptian hosts. In Egypt, as well as in subsequent visits to Tunisia and Libya, he was received by large and enthusiastic crowds, emphasising his commitment to democracy and calling on his Arab audiences to follow the Turkish example of ‘neo-laicism’, establishing a secular state in which individuals could still adhere to Muslim beliefs.27

The main danger of the clash with Israel was that it might poison Turkey’s relations with the United States, as Israel’s essential (and virtually only) ally. As it was, it produced some fierce criticisms of Turkey in the US Congress, especially in the Republican Party, where the pro-Israel lobby was powerful.28 However, it appeared to have much less effect in the executive arm of government, where Turkey’s strategic value was still given priority, and President Obama appeared to have struck up a warm personal rapport with Tayyip Erdoğan. While the Prime Minister’s trip to North Africa aroused suspicion in Israel, it had the opposite effect in parts of the Washington establishment: according to Ross Wilson, a former US ambassador in Ankara, “there is now an extraordinary level of cooperation, coordination and consultation between the US and Turkey in the Middle East, particularly on the Arab Spring issue”.29 Apart from support from Turkey for the cause of democratisation in the Arab world, the US continued to need Turkish cooperation in helping to maintain stability in Iraq, and as the only Muslim country participating in the international assistance force in Afghanistan.

The ‘strategic partnership’ acquired a new dimension in September, when Turkey agreed to host an early warning radar station near the south-eastern city of Malatya, which would play an essential role in the long-discussed US-sponsored missile defence system for NATO. This

23 Ibid, 19 September 2011: Hürriyet, 19 September 2011
24 BBC News website, 1 September 2011
26 BBC News website, 3 September 2011
28 Hürriyet Daily News, 13 July 2011
29 Ibid, 29 September 2011
would support anti-ballistic missiles to be stationed in Romania and, initially, missiles on US frigates in the Mediterranean. The agreement had only been reached after long negotiations since the Turkish government, worried about the effect on its sensitive relations with neighbouring Iran, had insisted that the system should provide protection for all NATO states, and there should be no reference to any country (read Iran) as the likely enemy. As it was, the Turkish decision provoked predictable criticism from Iran, but the Turkish government evidently considered this was a price well worth paying, for the sake of enhancing its own security and strengthening its relations with Washington.31

Russia and Turkey: Parallel Destinies

by Richard Sakwa
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(30) Today’s Zaman, 14 September 2011: Hürriyet, 4 October 2011
31 Today’s Zaman, 6 September 2011
32 Aleksandr Ushakov, Fenomenon Atatyurka: Turetskii pravitel’, tvorets i diktator (Moscow, Tsentropoligraf, 2002).
33 Mango, Atatürk, p. 479.

Identity and national development: parallel, opposed or complementary?

While Turkey has spent the best part of the last century escaping from its Ottoman legacy, Russia is increasingly compared to some sort of neo-Ottoman fragmented state. Russia is likened to a neo-medieval system with segmented and overlapping authority. By contrast, Turkey has resolutely tried to build a modern state, symbolised by the escape from Istanbul, still haunted by the ghosts of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, to the modern city of Ankara. Turkey indeed led the way, since followed by Brazil, Nigeria and latterly by Kazakhstan, with the development of Astana (formerly Aqmola and before that Tselinograd) as a more central capital, designed precisely to be more centred on a centralised modern administrative system. By contrast, the Russian capital went the other way, leaving Peter’s ‘window on the west’ on the Neva to return to the Muscovite heart of Russia.

Russia learns from Atatürk

Russia’s ‘independence’ as a separate state in 1991 was accompanied by the publication of an avalanche of material on Turkey’s development in the twentieth century, including a number of mostly laudatory (although some accounts were quite critical) of Kemal Atatürk. This flood has now abated, but some important work is still published in the field, and there is a special Turkey studies programme at Russia’s leading foreign policy university, MGIMO. A recent book on Atatürk (published in 2002) takes a balanced view, arguing that under his leadership Turkey began to achieve - and I quote - ‘political stability and economic prosperity’.32 The book, however, also made no bones about calling him a ‘dictator’, which may well in part have been a coded call for more authoritative leadership in Russia after the chaos of the 1990s.

As we know, however, Atatürk took great umbrage at being called a dictator. He insisted that there was ‘line between single-party rule, which he had come to see as inevitable, and a full-blown totalitarian dictatorship’. 33 This came after his attempt to create a type of managed
opposition party. Atatürk was at the head of the ruling Republican People’s Party, but insisted that this did not impair his impartiality as president. He even sponsored the creation of an opposition party in 1930, the Free Republican Party, whose name he chose and whose programme he vetted. The experiment did not last long and the Free Republican Party was dissolved after little more than three months. As with the creation of Just Russia in Russia to provide some managed competition with the ruling party, United Russia, the Free Republicans were caught in an impossible trap: if they campaigned too vigorously as a genuine opposition, they risked splitting the elite and provoking anti-regime mobilisation; but if they remained too passive and obsequious, there was hardly any point in the exercise.

As Mango observes in a comment that is as valid for Turkey in the 1930s and 1940s as it is for Russia today: ‘Progress came in two stages: first rights with fraud, then rights without fraud’. Atatürk also fought attempts by the Republican People’s Party to place itself above the state, in a process that elsewhere saw the Nazi party and the Bolsheviks subvert the autonomy of the state. As he put it, he did not want to see a repetition of the mistakes of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress), the party of the Young Turk revolution from 1908, ‘which had allowed irresponsible politicians to interfere in the work of responsible officials’. In other words, one of Atatürk’s great achievements was to insulate Turkey from the spread of the fascism that was so prevalent in the 1930s and the system of exclusive one-party rule that dominated in the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, as well as in a number of interwar Eastern European countries: ‘In Turkey, it was the state and not the party which was the master’. In Mango’s words: ‘Totalitarian ideas seeped in, but Mustafa Kemal did not allow them to dominate the country. Turkey in the 1930s, in the last phase of his rule, was a disciplined country under an unopposed pragmatic government which respected the forms of constitutional democracy’. Ultimately this is the great difference with Russia in the twentieth century. Following independence Turkey was spared the great cataclysms that beset Russia, and even managed to keep out of the Second World War, whereas Russia is only now beginning to recover from its political and social disasters.

Eurasianism

When it comes to purely ideological projects, there is no shortage of schemes to unite post-Soviet Eurasia. The great majority in one way or another involve the notion of ‘Eurasianism’, and the idea provides the ideological justification for integrative projects in post-Soviet Eurasia. The Russian geopolitical thinker Dugin has made himself the doyen in this area, with numerous publications about Russian exceptionalism and the special path destined for this region. Eurasianism is posited as both a geographical and political-spiritual alternative to the West. More broadly, Eurasianism is extended into a fundamental critique of Western modernity and posits that Russia is the core of an alternative civilisational identity.

The philosopher and political scientist Alexander Panarin argues along similar lines. He was a stringent critic of the globalisation thesis, and attempted a sustained critique of contemporary international politics. In numerous works he analysed the key problems of Russia’s past, present, and future in the context of her contradictory relationship with Western civilisation. His broad view was an optimistic one, arguing that a new post-industrial society was emerging, with its own spiritual, cultural, and ecological features, and he insisted that Russia made a unique contribution to this new civilisation. Panarin examined

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34 Mango, Atatürk, p. 472.
35 Mango, Atatürk, p. 473.
36 Mango, Atatürk, p. 479.
37 Mango, Atatürk, p. 501.
38 Mango, Atatürk, p. 480.
39 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy geolpolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii (Moscow, Arctogaia, 2000).
40 A. S. Panarin, Revanch istori: Rossiiskaya strategicheskaya initsiativa v XXI Veke (Moscow, Russkii Mir, 2005).
contemporary Russian history in the framework of the main trends of world development. He argued that world history has shifted from a Western phase of development to an Eastern one, representing a shift from an emphasis on technological change towards spiritual revival, towards a post-economic and post-material period. With the exhaustion of socialism and liberalism the West has no new idea to offer the world. In its search for a new way, Russia, he argued, was redefining its values and its response to the Western challenge. The Russian Orthodox Church would play a large role in this, and indeed, Orthodoxy and its distinctive form of spirituality is the foundation on which the ‘East’ as an alternative civilisation would be based.

This latter aspect is reflected in the peculiar relationship of Dugin with the Turkish right wing. We know that at least since the foundation in 1970 of the ‘Hearths of the Fatherland’ (Aydınlar Ocağı) organisation (harking back to early twentieth century patriotic Hearth groups), bringing together business and political leaders and some university intellectuals, intended to break the so-called stranglehold of the left in Turkey, a proto alliance of Islamists and Secularists was in the making. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis sought precisely to argue that Islamism and Turkic/Hinduism had a unique attraction because of a shared commitment to justice, monotheism, and culture. Turkey in this reading was based on two pillars, as Zürcher puts it: ‘a 2500-year-old Turkish element and a 1000-year-old Islamic element’. This ideology remains popular on the political right, and influenced some in the military, despite their secularist affiliations, as well as prime minister Turgut Özal. For Özal the idea was to use the new synthesis as the foundation for a new modernisation drive that would allow Turkey not only to skip stages but ultimately to ‘catch up and overtake’ the West, as Stalin memorably put it.

Dugin is a complex figure but basically draws on the ideas of the French New Right rather than Russian Eurasianism. In other words, he is a type of neo-fascist, calling for the restoration of the Russian empire. He is a neo-Eurasianist arguing that Russian territory could provide the heartland for a new anti-bourgeois and anti-American revolution based on the rejection of Atlanticism and liberalism. Neo Eurasianism enjoys wide influence in Kazakhstan, being sponsored by the president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, and to a lesser extent in Turkey where it has developed under the moniker of ‘Avrasya’. The attempt to develop an imperial ideology of Ottomanism during the Tanzimat reform period (1839-78) was accompanied by the emergence of the definition of ‘Turk’ as more than its original meaning of peasant from Anatolia. To this day Turkish identity has numerous layers: Turkism, Turanism, Pan-Turkism, and Kemalism, with Eurasianism now emerging to challenge long-dominant Kemalist definitions of Turkism. The notion of Avrasya from the 1990s sought to sustain a broader mission for the country, enhancing in particular its regional role in post-Soviet Eurasia while avoiding the ethnocentrism of pan-Turkic ideas. Disappointment with notions of pan-Turkism had encouraged a turn to Avrasya well before Dugin stepped in to the scene, but in the 2000s he proved an adept at exploiting Turkish concerns and became well-known in the country’s politics. However, Avrasya was less militant than its Russian counterpart, and Dugin’s anti-American rhetoric did not go down well to those committed to the Atlantic alliance and secularism.

**Dreams of unity**

As with notions of pan-Turkicism, ideas of pan-Slavic unity circulate at the borders of structure and ideology. Pan-Slavism has always been a very selective idea, with the Poles

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41 A. S. Panarin, Rossiya v tsiklakh mirovoi istorii (Moscow, MGU, 1999).
42 A. S. Panarin, Pravoslavnaya tsivilizatsiya v globalnom mire (Moscow, MGU, 2002).
consistently resisting the idea that they form a community of fate with their East Slavic brothers, or even with their West Slavic neighbours such as the Czechs and the Slovaks. In post-Soviet Eurasia Ukraine has now taken the role traditionally occupied by the Poles, refusing to entertain the idea that its membership of a broader community should be taken for granted; although in contrast with the Poles, there is a deeper popular sentiment in favour of various forms of solidarity with the East Slav community. The core Slavic axis today is between Russia and Belarus, but even here plans for the creation of a common state have proceeded in fits and starts for over a decade, and are unlikely to result in full union in the foreseeable future. The presence of Kazakhstan as the great motor of integration, with its president, Nazarbaev, proposing various forms of Eurasian Union almost from the day after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is clearly anomalous. Although hosting a large part of Russsonia, the Russian diaspora, Nazarbaev’s plans clearly focus more on political and economic unity rather than trying to constitute some sort of Slavic entity.

These metapolitical schemes for Eurasian unity, however, encounter the harsh world of post-Soviet realities, and tend to have little to offer when it comes to practical politics. They provide the framework for what Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’, but as Helena Rytövuori-Apunen notes, the latter concept ‘offers a limited perspective extrapolating from an idea of coercive power predominant in the North-American discourse on international relations, or else is meaningless when power is simply synonymous with influence and attraction’. 46 Indeed, the abstract nature and idealist inclinations of these metapolitical ideas can have a harshly negative effect on attempts to formulate concrete policies. Claims that the Crimea should revert to Russia, a view espoused by many mainstream politicians including to a degree the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, carry within them a huge potential for violent conflict. Those who espouse the absorption of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria into Russia are playing an equally dangerous game. Although 97% of participants in Transnistria’s referendum on 17 September 2006 on independence and subsequent integration with Russia voted in favour, the vote was greeted with caution in Russia.

Although Putin insisted that the situations in Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have similar backgrounds, he was careful not to intensify the conflicts, unless provoked by irresponsible politicians in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the international community. Claims that Russia bears some sort of responsibility for these separatist regions cannot be dismissed quite as peremptorily as many do in the west. The complexities of state formation in the region have left numerous issues unresolved, and while Russia may well on occasion use these to place pressure on some of the new states, at the same time these ‘frozen conflicts’ and the emergence of de facto states reflects processes that are complex and which require patient analysis and diplomacy. 47 The process of ‘unfreezing’, as we saw in August 2008, took violent forms, and unless handled with care there may well be more conflicts.

Integrating the nation and integrating with Europe

At a time when Europe’s identity is being reformulated, Turkey is examining and rethinking its own identity, a process that began, as in Russia, in the nineteenth century. This is precisely the stage confronting Russia. Turkey, like Russia, finds itself divided into two camps. A modern, secular and western discourse is contrasted with a more traditional narrative that in Turkey takes Islamist and oriental forms. The tension was always there even at the height of Kemalist consolidation, but with the end of the cold war has once again burst out into the


open. Despite Turkey’s membership of Nato, deeper currents are at work than a mere military alliance. The fundamental question is whether Turkey’s reorientation along ethnonational and cultural lines will establish a permanent bar to Turkey’s accession, or whether ultimately both the EU and Turkey will find a way of transcending these divisions. Unless Europe defines itself as irredeemably Christian and the anti-European traditionalists in Turkey become predominant, then there is no reason why some sort of transcendence of traditional stereotypes could not occur. This does not necessarily have to take place in the framework of membership of the EU. There are other games in town whose rules we are just beginning to learn.

Just as Russia has a fundamental problem with the integration of the north Caucasus, which is much bigger just than the question of Chechnya, so Turkey has what some consider a problem with a nascent Kurdistan. Around a fifth of Turkey’s population are ethnic Kurds, but speaking Kurdish in public was banned between 1980 (following the military coup) until 1991, since it was considered a threat to the unity of the nation. The Kurdish language is still banned in all state institutions and official correspondence. So when an ethnic Kurdish MP, the leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society party, Ahmet Türk, on 24 February 2009 delivered a speech in parliament in his native Turkish, the live broadcast was cut off immediately and the incident caused a sensation. As in Russia, official views on nationhood are highly ambivalent. In November 2008 Erdoğan argued, obviously with the Kurds in mind: ‘We have said, “One nation, one flag, one motherland, and one state...”, Those who oppose this should leave’. 48 However, in January 2009 the state-owned TV channel TRT-6 launched 24-hour broadcasting in Kurdish, and in his welcome to the new broadcasts Erdoğan spoke in Kurdish. On 21 February Erdoğan went to Diyarbakır and announced that Turkey would welcome home the famous exiled Kurdish singer Sivan Perwer. 49

A certain strain in contemporary research paints equally unflattering portraits of the two countries. A study issued by the polling organisation Konda in February 2009 revealed that ‘Turks are xenophobic, socially conservative people who rarely read books, relegate women to second-class status and harbour ambivalent views about democracy’. 50 This was accompanied by a cult of Atatürk that at time reached ridiculous proportions, while the substance of Kemalist ideology became increasingly contested. 51 There is no shortage of studies demonstrating the lack of trust in public institutions in Russia, and the alleged Russian preference for order over democracy. Russia is too big, too powerful (at the same time too weak), too different and simply too Russian to be able to join the EU.

Similar views are propounded concerning Turkey’s membership of Europe’s premier institution. Ultimately the argument is made that issues of national identity inhibit Turkey’s inclusion into the EU, and concerns over the economy, democracy and human rights are secondary. According to a recent study, Turkey and Turkish national identity is perceived to be ‘alien’ and ‘other’. As the EU reinvents itself as a form of soft power, perceptions of Turkey as incompatible with Europe’s self-identity and emerging great power ambitions act as a serious obstacle. 52 Indeed, it has often been pointed out that the very term ‘Europe’ developed in opposition to the Ottomans, as opposed to the earlier designation of Christendom, especially as the Turks were besieging Vienna as late as 1683. However, as Turkish president Süleyman Demirel noted, ‘When the defence of European civilisation [against communism] was at stake, they didn’t say we were Turks and Muslims’. 53 ‘The end of the Cold War seems to have sent

48 EDM, 4 November 2008.
Turkey’s relations with Europe back in time to nineteenth century ethno-nationalism. The ideological east-west conflict, as Samuel Huntington argued in his *The Clash of Civilizations*, has been replaced by a return to earlier ethnic, religious and historical conflicts that emphasise Turkey’s non-Christian, and hence non-European character.

**Conclusion**

A number of factors may suggest a more long-term rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, demonstrating a deep complementarity that may in due course take institutional form. Both have a long history of empire and a sense of responsibility for an extended region beyond existing state boundaries. The two share elements of disillusion with the existing world system, a sentiment reinforced by rapid economic growth in the 2000s. This generated popular expectations that are far from being confined to the social sphere. The two countries also share comparable problems in the development of the polity, with continuing fears over the permanence of borders and territorial integrity. Although it is an exaggeration to argue that both are moving in the direction of one-party dominance, the two are governed by complex regimes that remain at the threshold of becoming consolidated liberal democracies. The greater self-confidence of the ruling elites accompanied by a more open international situation suggests that the twenty-first century may once again see Russia and Turkey emerging as great powers. It would be far better if they were able to do this in parallel rather coming into confrontation with each other. It would be even better if this could be achieved in partnership with the rest of the world through some sort of negotiated process rather than on a zero-sum foundation which provides the seed-bed for a new era of wars.

**Update on Cyprus 2011**

by Clement Dodd

Beginning in March this year tension has been rising in and around Cyprus. It has led to an increasing Turkish concern for the Turkish Cypriots and for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, and his ministers, now talk more like former President Rauf Denktaş, who was sidelined when, in 2004, he continued to oppose the Annan Plan. He would rejoice, but sadly this great champion of Turkish Cypriot independence has been, and still is, seriously ill in hospital after a stroke, and little, if at all conscious of the turn of recent events.

**Demonstrations in the North**

Before becoming ill Denktaş was warning the leaders of labour unions, who were continuing to organise massive anti-Turkish demonstrations, not to betray, or sell out, their state to the Greek Cypriots when directing attacks against the Government and Turkey. These demonstrations, which continued into March and April, were fuelled by the deep concern of the battalions on the public payroll that the economic reform demanded by Turkey included severe cuts in the salaries and pensions of civil servants, the employees of state economic enterprises and pensioners. Abuse was hurled at Turkey in general and at Erdoğan in particular. The Cyprus flag was paraded in front of the Turkish Embassy in Lefkoşa.

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especially significant since the new ambassador, Halil Akça, as mentioned in the last Update, is said to be the chief architect of Ankara’s austerity drive in North Cyprus. Under fire, the National Unity Party Government, with only a majority of two in the National Assembly, managed with some difficulty to survive internal dissension. Some Greek Cypriots welcomed the demonstrations as a sign that the Turkish Cypriots really wanted to return to the Republic of Cyprus, though others were beginning to realise that adding the Turkish Cypriot bureaucracy to their own substantial civil service, in a now creaking Greek Cypriot economy, was a nightmarish prospect.

The demonstrations continued into April and May, but fewer opposition party politicians joined them. ‘Patriots in the streets, puppets in parliament’ became a popular cry. It was to no avail. Ankara was determined to push for economic reform. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot specialists were recruited to help Ambassador Akca and the Turkish Cypriot Government to bring it about. Cuts in salaries and pensions in the public sector, and privatisation are clearly in prospect. One bright light in this economic gloom was the provision by the European Council, in its draft 2012 budget, of some 25 million Euros for the TRNC, this adding to the 264.5 millions in aid included in the EU budgets from 2006 to 2010. The funding is intended to help reunification; it is mainly used for developments in health and welfare, for promoting civil society, for improving the environment, and for the opening of new crossing points, as needed, between the North and the South.

The negotiations
Against this troubled background negotiations between the presidents have been continuing under the watchful gaze of the UN Special Adviser, Alexander Downer. According to some leaks, and to official statements, there has been some progress towards agreeing the conditions for a federation, especially on economic arrangements and with regard to relations with European Union. There has also apparently been some progress on governance, including acceptance of a rotating presidency, which is opposed by many in the South. However the rule is that nothing is agreed until all has been agreed. On the difficult issue of property, territory, and the guaranteeing of the settlement by the Guarantor Powers, namely Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, there seems to be no agreement.

On 5 March the two presidents, Christofias and Eroğlu, met in Geneva with the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon. In his report on the meeting Ban Ki-moon noted that major differences still remained on the issues of property, power sharing and government, which was rather disappointing for those who believed that some significant progress had been made in the last two issues. He also called for less public rhetoric from both sides, and less leaking of discussions. He urged the need for moves to a conclusion, saying that negotiations could not be an open-ended process.

When negotiations were resumed, the thorny issue arose of how many native Turks could remain in the North in the proposed federation. Christofias stated that the only Turks remaining should be those who had married Turkish Cypriots, and those who had lived in the North for 20 years. Eroglu’s proposals were completely different. He wanted all those who had been made citizens to remain, and he wanted no limit on the employment of seasonal Turkish workers in the North. This approach raises the question of how many citizens there are, an especially important issue since the Greek Cypriots maintain that the TRNC has accorded citizenship to many thousands of Turks. A study of the 2006 Turkish Cypriot census reported that out of a total population of 256,644, there were 178,000 citizens (who have votes) of whom 27,333 were born in Turkey, with the remainder mostly born in the United Kingdom.56

The Greek Cypriots do not believe these figures, and have therefore proposed two new
censuses, to be helped by UN experts, and to be held on both sides on the same day.
Eroğlu agreed on the need for a new census in the North, but he believed that to allow
simultaneous censuses would be to encourage the Greek Cypriots to claim that it was a
census for the Republic of Cyprus, thus denying the existence if the Turkish Cypriot state.
Christofias has also said that only 50,000 Turks should be allowed to stay in a federation,
and has demanded that the Turkish Cypriot population should never constitute more than a
quarter of that of the whole island.

Growing Turkish involvement
After the 5 March meeting of the two leaders with Ban Ki-moon it was becoming clearer that
the Turkish attitudes to the problem were hardening. Tayyip Erdoğan declared that to waste
an opportunity for a solution again would serve no-one’s interest. He also announced that a
beginning had been made in the long-mooted plan to pump water from Turkey to Cyprus.
“We have now started to roll up our sleeves and begin”, he said, “having made a start on the
dam that is necessary at Geçitköy.” 57 He declared that Turkey would never allow its
brotherly bonds with the TRNC to be weakened, and would never forget the tragedy with
which the Turkish Cypriots have had to live. Turkish efforts would be devoted to making the
TRNC a strong state with a strong economy. In July, making a visit to the North, marking the
occasion of the 1974 Turkish military intervention, Erdoğan took the opportunity to say that
there would be no response to the suggestion that before a settlement was discussed
Varosha (Maraş) might, as a gesture, be surrendered to the Turkish Cypriots. He also stated
that Güzelyurt (Morphou) would never be returned to the Greek Cypriots. “We gave enough
away with the Annan Plan; now it is the turn of the turn of the Greek Cypriots to do so. There
was no chance of opening Turkish ports to the Greek Cypriots [under the Turkey/EU
Customs Agreement] without reciprocal measures. Non-recognition of the TRNC is inhuman
– a denial of human rights. A federation must be formed by two states with separate regions.
If this is not accepted then we shall have to look for other solutions”. 58

Turkish impatience with, and hostility towards, the Republic of Cyprus have been developing
steadily during the period under review. In April the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet
Davutoğlu, refused point-blank to accept the presence of a Republic of Cyprus
representative in a NATO/EU meeting because the Republic of Cyprus was an illegal state.
When he also said that it was mistake to admit Cyprus into the EU, he was told by the Czech
Foreign Minister to mind his own business. At this Davutoğlu lost his cool. Cyprus had only
got into the EU, he declared, … “because Greece had blackmailed the EU into doing so!” 59

Second meeting with Ban Ki-moon
On 7 July Ban Ki-moon held another meeting with the two presidents in Geneva. It did not
get off to a good start when the hotel where the Turkish Cypriot delegation was to stay
refused on this occasion to fly the Turkish Cypriot flag, so they had to move to another hotel
that raised no objection. The Turkish Cypriots naturally detected a Greek Cypriot hand in this
incident. The UN Special Representative, Alexander Downer, hoped that the new meeting
would bring the moribund negotiations to life. The Turkish Cypriot delegation did respond, by
saying that they were thenceforth prepared to discuss territory in general, though with no
map on the table, a subject they had so far avoided.

57 As reported in Kıbrıs, 18 July 2011.
58 Ibid.
59 As reported in the Cyprus Mail, 10 April 2011. Later in the summer the British MEP, Andrew Duff,
responded sharply to the Turkish Government’s clinging ‘to outworn hostile rhetoric, and asserted that
instead of moving on from the failed Annan Plan of 2004, the Turks have actually gone backwards,
thereby putting themselves alongside the reactionary nationalism of the Greek Cypriot Church’.
(Reported in the Cyprus Mail, 24 July 2011).
At the meeting both sides agreed to intensify negotiations on basic issues by October, when Ban Ki-moon wanted another meeting. Both sides agreed that in the meantime they would accept a greater role for the UN in the negotiations. Welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot side, always the more pressing for a settlement, it was an involvement the Greek Cypriot side has never wanted. It was apparent that in October Ban Ki-moon would have to tell the UN Security Council whether the talks had failed. If he could report broad agreement, he would expect all issues to be resolved finally in an international conference, to be attended, presumably, by the Guarantor Powers of the 1960 settlement and by both sides.

The meeting has to be adjudged a victory for the Turkish Cypriot side: Christofias has always jibbed at accepting time-frames, or an international conference with Turkish Cypriots present, and attended only by the Guarantor Powers. If the talks fail both sides will have to put up with the status quo, which hurts them both. Should Christofias take over the EU presidency in July 2012 before an agreed solution, Ankara says that Turkey will have no dealings with the EU whilst he is EU President.

Dispute over the search for oil and gas
As if this were not trouble enough, there is more on the way. The Republic of Cyprus is going ahead with its plans to explore for hydrocarbons in its alleged Exclusive Economic Zone in the Eastern Mediterranean, an area potentially rich in oil and gas deposits. The Greek Cypriots have authorised an American company to locate a rig in its zone close to Cyprus. It is now in place and drilling is about to begin. Turkey and the TRNC claim that this development is the concern of both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus being illegal in their view. Any profits must therefore be divided between the two Cypriot states. There are reports from Ankara that Turkey may intervene militarily to stop the rig from operating, and/or will also start to explore for oil and gas in the same sea area. At the time of writing it is a situation full of danger.

The future
There is much that is hanging in the balance at present in the Cyprus conflict, especially as Turkey is now apparently determined to play a more decisive role.

If the search for hydrocarbons is somehow managed without violence, the next important stage in the dispute will be the meeting of the two presidents with Ban Ki-moon in October and his report to the Security Council. In the past the Greek Cypriots have rejected a Taiwan-type solution as likely to lead to gradual recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. If the present drive for a federation fails, the status quo will remain, to the disadvantage of both sides, and the TRNC would very likely in this event come more and more under Turkish influence and control, a prospect that most Turkish Cypriots do not relish. The only alternative solution would seem to be to have two separate recognised states, which is arguably a more stable solution anyway than a probably troublesome federation of two very unequal entities, between whose political elites there is good deal of antagonism: it would hardly be conducive to the harmony that federations have to create in order to be successful.

There would arguably be great advantages for both sides in a two-state solution, especially if both states were members of the European Union, which could be a step towards reunification. In fact, if there is continuing impasse in the efforts to construct a federation, the only way forward would then appear to be for the Greek Cypriots to be persuaded that a two-state solution would be to their great advantage. For instance, they might well gain more territory, there would be no need for Turkish troops in the North, whom the Greek Cypriots
see as a great threat, and trade would be opened up with Turkey, which would greatly benefit Greek Cypriot shipping interests.

Just to slip back into the status quo would probably bring to a complete halt Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, in which so many chapters are now blocked by the Greek Cypriots. This cannot be in the interests of those states that wish to see Turkey close to Europe, nor to many Turks. The Greek Cypriots cannot be forced into accepting such a solution. They need to be persuaded, through a concerted international diplomatic effort that a two-state solution would be in their best interests, both politically and economically. There are said now to be some in the South who are beginning to believe this to be the case.

FROM THE 2011 TASG SYMPOSIUM

Some Controversial Issues and a Quandary in Turkey

by Metin Heper
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Since the inception of the Republic in 1923, Turkey has gone through three major revolutions. Those were the cognitive revolution of the early Republic, the democratic revolution of the mid-1940s, and the economic revolution of the 1980s. Atatürk (1881-1938), the founding father of Republican Turkey, had his major project of enabling the country to ‘catch up with the contemporary civilization and, if possible, to surpass it’. The starting point to achieve this purpose was going to be a cognitive revolution to bring up new generations of Turks who would use their own reasoning faculties rather than turn to the Book and/or religious personages whenever they had to make an important decision. The thinking behind that goal was that although in its original version Islam was a rational religion, later dogmas and superstitions were incorporated into it by scheming religious personages who were greedy and thought of nothing else but their petty interests. They conveyed the dogmas and superstitions of their own making to the people and at times they even came up with false hadiths.

Backed up by an educational system designed on Western lines, the cognitive revolution has turned out to be quite a successful project with considerable progress made towards a modern society and politics in Turkey. The country has become a member of such important Western international institutions as the United Nations (UN, 1945), the Council of Europe (1950), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1952), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1961). In 2005, the European Union (EU) started accession negotiations started with Turkey for full membership. In the 2000s, Turkey began to be perceived as a regional power. One consequence of this was that for some time now Turkey has been perceived as a role-model for the Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa. At an international conference in 2006 in Abu Dhabi the present author gave a paper entitled, How has Turkey become the present day Turkey? This was not
surprising; Turkey had indeed evolved into a country with a relatively effective soft power, in addition to its relatively strong hard power.

Turkey made its transformation to multi-party politics in 1945. It is true that democracy had its ups and downs, having faced three direct (1960, 1971, and 1980) and one indirect (1997) military intervention. In ‘normal times’, too, the military high command had come up with public declarations on some critical issues, in particular on the left-right ideological divide, secularism, and the Kurdish question. However, direct military interventions had always been short-term; the military had not stayed in power indefinitely. In any case, from the very beginning democracy had turned out to be the ‘only game in town’, with no influential social, economic or political group, or the military, opposing democracy in principle. On the whole, the political parties, which were inclined to bring and/or maintain restrictions to democracy for the sake of secularism and/or national unity and territorial integrity of the country, had not been able to garner sufficient numbers of votes to bring them to power. Since the 1990s, Turkey's wish to become a full member of the EU led it to clip the wings of the military. Today (2011) the military gives the impression that they have come close to the idea that ‘civilians should have the right to make mistakes’ while the civilian governments acquired greater ‘subjective’ control over the military, to use Samuel P Huntington’s terminology.

The economic revolution of the 1980s, too, developed into a success story with new vistas opening up after the Cold War, particularly the Turkish economy. With the shift from state-control to a market-oriented economy, Turkish businesses began to compete successfully in international markets. The fiscal banking reform of the late 1990s helped the Turkish economy to leave behind the economic crises with minimum damage. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the economic growth rate in Turkey became four to five times bigger than in several European countries. For sometime now, Turkey has become an attractive country for foreign investors.

In the process, education in Turkey, too, registered significant improvements. In 2010, according to the UK-based Times Higher Education World University Rankings, two Turkish universities were among in the first 200 in the world, Bilkent University with a ranking of 112th and the Middle East Technical University at 183rd. This was not surprising. On 28 March 2011, The Financial Times in the UK reported that Turkey has improved its scientific performance at a rate close to that of China, showing a six-fold increase in research and development (R&D) spending between 1995 and 2007 – with research increasing by 43 % and with four times as many papers being published by Turkish authors. Moreover improvement was not only in quantity, but also in quality. While, in 1985, Turkey was ranked 43rd in Science Citation Index journal articles, in 2010 it was 17th. There was similar progress in Social Sciences and Humanities.

From 1923 to the present, Turkey could have made even greater progress in its economy, social life, and politics if during those several decades it had not had to grapple with a number of controversial issues. Attention continues to focus on high politics at the expense of bread and butter issues. Despite the consolidation of democracy, there have been endless debates on its procedural rules because there lingers in Turkey some misperceptions on such critical issues as Kemalism/Atatürkism, religion, and ethnic identity. One may also argue that certain groups of the people at large, politicians, and the intelligentsia, including academics, are unnecessarily divided on these issues. Some academics, themselves relatively free from misconceptions on the above issues, are not able to free the groups in question from cognitive shackles because of another misconception – one about the social sciences in Turkey.

One controversial issue in Turkish politics is Kemalism/Atatürkism. By Kemalism reference is made to Atatürk’s thought patterns and/or some policies pursued during his time in government. Particularly from the early 1980s, Kemalism has come to have a rather
negative connotation for Atatürk is assumed to have been an authoritarian leader and, thus, the policies adopted during his era (1923-1938) are perceived to have been tutelary, illiberal, non-democratic, and assimilative. In contrast, Atatürkism can be viewed favourably for its support of modernity, laicism, national unity, and the territorial integrity of the country. Thus a resort has been made to Atatürkism by some political parties, the military, and the judiciary to render legitimate their policies, interventions, and rulings, respectively.

Despite the fact that there have been references to Kemalism and Atatürkism with the suffix ‘ism’, the eponymous leader kept his distance from all closed systems of thought. When at some point an author close to Atatürk, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, had suggested to him that an effort should be made to formulate in systematic ideological manner the rationale behind the modernist and reformist policies pursued at the time, Atatürk disagreed, arguing that such a move would ‘freeze’ the modernization process that he had started. In the last analysis, the modernization Atatürk had in mind was an open-ended process defined in rather broad terms. Atatürk took contemporary civilization to be modernization on Western lines. He also concluded that democratization was an integral part of the modernization in question.

It is true that from 1923 until 1945 Turkey was ruled under an authoritarian system of government. Yet Atatürk and and his close colleagues were not intent on ruling the country in an authoritarian manner as long as they could. The kind of transformation at the individual, societal, and political levels that Atatürk had in mind unequivocally shows that their long range goal was a liberal and democratic state. To begin with, they tried to substitute a secular nation for the religious community inherited from Ottoman times. Freed from the shackles of religious dogmas and superstitions, the new generations of Turks could now use their own reasoning faculties instead of turning to the Book and/or religious personages whenever they were going to make a significant decision. In order to make this critical transition possible, Atatürk and his colleagues attempted to bring about a cognitive revolution in Turkey.

The shifts in identity and thinking patterns in question were the major steps towards shoring up the constellation of pre-requisites for a more open political regime. Since Atatürk wanted to achieve a cognitive revolution, Kemalism did not leave for the future generations a set formulas to be adopted at all times. It was not an ideology placing emphasis on what to do: it was a world view, a mentality, to show people how to think. People were to come up with their own formulas drawn up with a view to the problems at a specific time and under given circumstances.

Looked at from this perspective, it is not appropriate to hold Kemalism responsible for the tutelary tendencies one has come across in Turkey during recent decades. Responsible would be those who have not made the necessary mental progress themselves. It also does not make sense to consider a particular social, economic or political policy as Kemalist/Atatürkist on the grounds that the same policy was adopted during the Atatürk era. In the post Atatürk era, a particular policy can be Kemalist/Atatürkist if that policy would be the most appropriate one given its specific time and circumstances.

A second controversial relationship in Turkey is that between religion and democracy. One dimension of this controversy is whether or not religion, in this case Islam, and democracy are compatible. Many people in Turkey do not realize that the response to this query would depend upon what version or versions of Islam is/are predominant at a given time and place and its/their implications. Islam may play a role at individual, societal, and/or state level(s). At the individual level, religion may be a belief in the metaphysical and/or a source for virtues which people may internalize and act upon. Religion may play a role at the societal level, too. That is, people may like to see others living their religion as they themselves do and are inclined to exert pressure accordingly. Finally, the state itself may be premised on religious rules and, in turn, may attempt to impose those rules on people. If religion plays a
role only at the individual level, religion and democracy would be compatible. If religion plays
a role at the level of society, too, religion and democracy would be less compatible. If
religion plays a role at the state level, religion and democracy would be incompatible.

In Turkey, the different roles Islam may play are not always appreciated. If we refer to those
who practice their religion and live it at the individual level as Muslim (dindar) and those who
would like to see religion play a role at the societal and/or state levels as Islamist (dinci), in
Turkey this distinction is hardly made. All Muslims are considered to be Islamists and all of
them are perceived as persons who would long for a state based on Islam. Since in Turkey
a cross section of the people who until recently were rather influential in the polity and who
have tended to think that Muslims are engaged in the act of simulation (takiyye: concealing
one’s intentions until the time is ripe to act on them) the country has become deeply divided
between the so-called ‘laicists’ (laikler) and those who laicists think are ‘Islamists’. If the
distinction between dindar and dinci had been made in Turkey and if more attention had
been paid to the findings of reliable nation-wide surveys which indicate that approximately
four-fifths of the people in Turkey who are assumed to be dinci are in fact dindar, Turkey
would have been a considerably less conflict-ridden country.

A third controversial issue in Turkey is the problem of ethnic identity. The term ‘Turk’ is taken
as being a Turk in an ethnic sense. Consequently, it is assumed that the phrase ‘Turkish
nation’ excludes all ethnic groups except the ethnic Turks. This is in fact another criticism
levelled at ‘Kemalism’ which is perceived as a discriminatory policy against those citizens
who are not ethnic Turks. It is further argued that as a consequence the Kemalist state
carried out a policy of forceful assimilation against the ‘non-Turks’, in particular the Kurdish
citizens of Turkey. On several accounts these assumptions are not persuasive. In the early
1920s, when Atatürk was explaining the rationale behind the talk of a ‘Turkish nation’
instead of the Muslim community, he pointed out that, for several centuries different
population groups in the Ottoman Empire with different ethnic identities and religious beliefs,
had gone through a mutual acculturation, and thus one could now begin to refer to them all
as a ‘nation’ – which, of course, is expected to display a significant degree of homogeneity.
On the question of why he called that nation ‘Turkish’, Atatürk’s thinking was that ‘Turk’ and
‘Turkish’ were the most widespread and thus most appropriate terms for the purpose. In
other words, for Atatürk ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’ were names and not adjectives; they were
umbrella terms referring to not only the ethnic Turks, but all other ethnic groups in Turkey.

In the process, the Republic first adopted cultural nationalism, i.e. all those who shared
common values and attitudes made up a nation, and then, with the 1924 Constitution, the
Republic adopted civic nationalism, i.e. all those who considered themselves citizens of
Turkey formed a nation. The former version of nationalism was discriminatory against the
non-Muslims; the latter was discriminatory to none of the religious groups, at least in legal
terms. It follows that for Atatürk the term ‘Turk’ had a double meaning. On the one hand, it
connoted the primary identity of all the people irrespective of their ethnic identity, and on the
other, it was the secondary identity of the ethnic Turks, just as ‘Armenian’, ‘Kurd’, and similar
terms were the secondary identities of those particular ethnic groups. Consequently, the
ethnic engineering the Republic adopted was ‘integration’: keeping together the different in a
state of harmony, not ‘assimilation’: rendering the different the same. It is because many
people in Turkey consciously or unconsciously overlook the distinctions indicated here, the
issue of ethnic identity, too, leads to polarizations and tensions.

Why do most Turks continue to see conflicts and confrontations over what to the present
author are in fact non-problems? Perhaps some are aware that the ‘problems’ in question
are, in fact, non-problems but they find it useful to act as if they are problems. One may then
raise the same question in respect to those who think that what are considered here as non-
problems are in fact problems! An explanation may be offered. From the Ottoman times to
the present, there has been a general tendency in Turkey to focus on the question of ‘What
should be?’ rather than the questions of ‘What is?’ and ‘Why?’ In the Ottoman Empire, the statesmen tended to think that they could successfully carry out all kinds of social engineering despite the fact that the society in that Empire had remained a black box for them. In the Republic, in this regard not much has changed. For a long time the society again remained a black box for the rulers. Again high politics continued to be salient. Debates have been over Westernization, democracy, left-right conflict, the ethnic issue, and the problem of religion versus the state. Consequently the conflict continued to be between ‘values’ rather than ‘opinions’. It has been, of course, difficult to arrive at a consensus where there was a clash between values rather than opinions.

In the process, everybody has been preoccupied with their own values. In the process, if someone read and wrote about opposing value(s), it was considered a betrayal to the cause and/or providing legitimacy to the opposing cause in question. Hence there tends to be an assumption that one supports whatever one studies and writes about, confusing an essentially empirical-analytical effort with a normative one. This particular thinking pattern leads many people to assume that if a person is not in the same camp with them, that person’s views do not deserve any attention at all. Thus, if someone argues that some ‘problems’ are not, in fact, problems, those who think that those same ‘problems’ are, in fact, problems, the latter would try to find out who has the opposing view, not whether or not that opposing view makes sense.

After all in a country where on the whole the emphasis is on ‘What should be?’, and not on ‘What is?’ and ‘Why’, there would not be many people who would argue that some ‘problems’ are not really problems. Normative stance in the absence of empirical and analytical one often leads people to criticize and oppose for the sake of criticism and opposition.

Turkish Foreign Policy under
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There is today much comment, conjecture and some concern about the recent direction of Turkish foreign policy. It is argued that it has undergone a ‘paradigm shift’, that there has been ‘a shift in axis’ (from west to east), or that it is characterised by a kind of ‘Turkish Gaullism’. In the US in particular there is some debate about whether Turkey has been ‘lost’ to the west, and why. This paper will (a) trace the origins of this supposed shift in policy, (b) outline its underlying philosophy – in particular the thinking of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, (c) consider some of the content of current Turkish foreign policy, and (d) offer a critique of Turkish foreign policy as it has evolved in recent years.

Origins
With the end of the Cold War new foreign policy opportunities were opened up for Turkey in the post-communist world, including in the (partly former Ottoman) Caucasus, in the former Ottoman Balkans, and in Turkic Central Asia. Turkey was the first state to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence and to open embassies in the Central Asian republics, initiatives
that were in part driven by pan-Turkic aspirations. Economic and cultural agreements followed, as Ankara established student programmes, training schemes for civil servants, established TV channels, and despatched trade delegations. In 1992 Ankara established the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA: Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı), tasked to provide and coordinate development assistance of various kinds to the Turkic republics. Turkey also initiated the formation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992.

In the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s, Turkey played an active and constructive role, but also championed the Bosnian Muslims. The coalition government which preceded that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), under the guidance of Foreign Minister Ismael Cem, sought with considerable success to restore relations with Greece. In the Middle East, after the 1998 crisis with Syria the signing of the Adana Agreement led to a remarkable transformation of the relationship with a country with which Turkey’s relationships had hitherto been particularly frosty. This opening reflected the greater diplomatic fluidity and room for manoeuvre that was now replacing the rigidities of the Cold War, which had sometimes pitted pro-Soviet and radical Arab states against anti-Soviet NATO Turkey.

There were other pre-2002 developments that influenced the subsequent course of Turkish foreign policy. During the 1990s Turkey suffered economically as a consequence of the embargo on Saddam Hussein’s regime, and politically with the emergence of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq and its use as a safe haven by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Developments relating to Iraq led Turks across the political spectrum to question the degree of mismatch between Ankara’s interests in the region, and those of the US. There was recognition too that greater diplomatic interaction with its regional neighbours had become a necessary means to garner regional support and cooperation with respect to the Kurdish and wider Iraqi issue. The 1980s Turgut Özal’s government also laid the economic foundations for the emergence of the mercantile and trading economy that we see today. This has created an imperative for Turkey to align its foreign policy with its economic interests. It has also led to an increase in demand for energy. This has meant that its relationships with Russia and Iran in particular have become imperative for Turkish foreign policy makers.

All this preceded the 2002 AKP election victory. In a reactive, incremental, and not always fully articulated way, both the context and content of Turkish foreign policy was already undergoing considerable change by the time the Justice and Development Party gained office.

The AKP’s foreign policy approach
The AKP’s November 2002 election victory was seen as a domestic challenge to the secular and Kemalist order in Turkey. The events of 9/11, and the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis with which it sometimes became associated, put AKP-led Turkey under the international spotlight too. The AKP government quickly prioritised Turkey’s EU bid, leading to the opening of accession negotiations in October 2005. It showed considerable political courage in its support for a solution to the Cyprus crisis. Trade, tourism, and military and intelligence cooperation with Israel were sustained and, in November 2007, Shimon Peres became the first Israeli president to address the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Turkey also tried to soften the confrontational post 9/11 global diplomatic atmosphere. Thus, in 2005 Turkey and Spain jointly initiated the ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ under the auspices of the UN. Its purpose is to help counter the forces that fuel polarisation and extremism, and encourage instead greater dialogue and understanding. Turkish secretary general of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the first Turk and the first elected official to that post, has been instrumental in persuading the organisation to undergo a process of structural reform and to adopt a ten year programme of action. As foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu noted in his speech at the OIC’s foreign ministers’ meeting in May 2009,
'this guiding document embraces shared values and principles that uphold peace, transparent, accountable and democratic good governance, the rule of law, the rights of women, respect for human rights and human dignity'. Indeed, Washington sought to present Turkey as a 'model' to less democratic and less developed Muslim states, first in Central Asia and then in the Middle East.

Turkey constructively supported the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan in December 2001, and was one of just eighteen NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries that contributed in this initial phase. Turkey has subsequently twice commanded ISAF and currently has around seventeen hundred troops in the country. Turkey is also contributing 1000 Turkish troops to the UN SCR 1710 – mandated UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon. And Ankara has engaged in much frantic effort at mediation between regional adversaries, much of it helpful. It has sought to mediate between states (Israel-Syria, Syria-Iraq, Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia, Iran-US, Pakistan-Afghanistan, etc) and within states (Iraqi Sunni factions, Lebanese factions, Palestinian factions, and – most recently – between the Libyan government and opposition).

In general, then, Turkey’s western allies were content with the direction of Turkish foreign policy during the early years of the AKP government. However, Ankara is guided by a set of ideas that pose challenges to Turkey’s traditional western alignments. First as foreign policy adviser, then since May 2009 as foreign minister, Davutoğlu is identified as the driving force behind this ‘new’ Turkish foreign policy, although Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül also have significant inputs. Davutoğlu has articulated his thoughts in his book *Strategic Depth*, and in numerous articles, speeches and interviews. It is important to consider his ideas if we are to understand contemporary Turkish foreign policy. His main tenets are that;

- Geopolitically, historically, and increasingly economically, Turkey is a central rather than a peripheral country. Thus, it can forge links with and between regions, and across civilisations. Its own wellbeing depends on multiregional security and stability. It is simultaneously a European, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Balkan, Caucasian, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, Islamic, democratic, and economically emerging (member of the G20, 16th largest economy in the world) country, and its foreign policy should reflect that complexity and multi-directionality.
- Turkey should strive to achieve ‘zero problems’ with and between neighbours. This requires diplomacy, engagement, and mediation, and has obliged Turkey to engage with regimes of all types (in Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, etc). It also requires an emphasis on ‘soft’ power – trade, diplomacy, cultural interaction and societal contact – rather than on ‘hard’ power. This might eventually have an impact on the scale and domestic political influence of the Turkish military, to add to the domestic challenge to its status that is already underway.
- Western hegemony is coming to an end. A multi-polar, culturally diverse, and globalised international system is emerging. Turkey’s experiences and prospects are similar to those of the emerging powers – the so-called ‘BRICS’ (Brazil-Russia-India-China).
- Barriers to interaction within and between regions should be dismantled. This entails the removal of obstacles to travel, trade, and cultural interaction. State boundaries should be softened, and ‘natural’ links re-established – for Turkey, with its former Ottoman, Balkan, Black Sea, and wider Muslim neighbours. Turkey is now a mercantile state, and this too should drive its foreign policy and determine its interests. Turkey’s trade with its regional neighbours has soared while EU trade as a percentage of the Turkish total has declined.

Some worries
Some of Davutoğlu’s ideas, and their implementation, have worried the west. They imply that Turkey’s western alignments enjoy lower priority, and that Turkish foreign policy is
undergoing a deeper ‘axis shift’. The slowdown in Ankara’s EU-inspired domestic reform programme reinforces this impression. Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric towards Israel offers another example, although his sentiments broadly reflect those of the Turkish public. The 2006 hosting in Istanbul of Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, the January 2009 row between Erdoğan and Shimon Peres in Davos, the October 2009 cancellation of an air force exercise involving Israel and - above all - the May 2010 Gaza humanitarian aid convoy crisis, all further highlight the apparent shift in Turkish policy.

Turkey also seems to have gone out if its way to befriend some of the region’s more anti-western regimes, including Iran and Syria, thereby arousing some suspicion in the region’s more pro-western capitals. Erdoğan congratulated Ahmedinejad on his contested election victory, and Turkey has sought to develop its energy relationship with Iran in the face of US unease. In the summer of 2010, Turkey not only sought with Brazil to secure a nuclear swap deal with Iran, but also voted against a subsequent toughening of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Erdoğan has also courted Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir and, in November 2010, became the last recipient of Muammar Ghaddafi’s International Prize for Human Rights. Indeed, Erdoğan’s actions and utterances appear to account for most of the damage to western perceptions of Turkey.

The ‘new’ Turkish foreign policy
There is now an Islamic identity to aspects of Turkish foreign policy, for example, in the Balkans – where Ankara has made a particular effort to cultivate Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo – and in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey can also be seen as a ‘model’ for Islamic states, although the preferred term in Ankara is ‘source of inspiration’. Turkey’s support for better governance, human rights, democracy, freedom, and economic development in the Islamic world is clear, but it also thinks countries should find their own path. There is evidence that one current of the ‘Arab spring’ has been a degree of admiration for Turkey’s achievements.

However, Turkey has also developed healthier relationships with non-Muslim countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Georgia and Russia, and has sought to normalise its relations with Armenia. Some have detected a neo-Ottoman strain (although Davutoğlu dislikes this term) to Turkish foreign policy given that its regional focus overlaps with former Ottoman territories. However this fails to capture the totality of Turkish policy. Ankara is cultivating Turkic states and, further afield, Pakistan, South Korea, China, and sub-Saharan Africa, none of which are former Ottoman territories. Rather, Ankara is bidding to be economically and diplomatically more globally engaged.

In any case, Ankara’s pursuit of improved relationships with neighbours who also happen often to be former colonies can be regarded as a ‘normalisation’ of foreign policy. After all, most countries seek to engage with their neighbourhood, and most former imperial states maintain contact with their former colonies. What is clear is that Ankara now pursues policies that are informed more by its assessments of its own interests than by any automatic instinct to align with its western friends and that it is prepared to stand in opposition to US and EU preferences where it deems it appropriate. In other words, there does appear to be a strain of Turkish ‘Gaullism’ at work in its foreign policy, of a more independent spirit. Turkey also prefers that regional issues be addressed regionally, and isn’t happy with external intervention. This has been apparent in Turkey’s initially cool reaction to the 2011 western initiative in Libya and can serve to put Ankara at odds with the west.

Some questions
There are some deeper question marks against Turkey’s diplomatic approach. One is that to regard Turkey as central to many regions, and as part of a less west-centric global order, is inevitably to relegate the significance of Europe in Turkish foreign policy. There might not be a drift eastwards as such, but there is surely a drift away from the west, for all Ankara’s
continued commitment to EU accession. In this context one might query the ‘centrality’ Davutoğlu attributes to Turkey. The Balkan states aspire to join the EU, and will probably achieve this aim before Turkey does. The Arab world has internal preoccupations. Russia remains the major power in much of the former Soviet space. Iran is hardly more trusted by the Arab world than it is by the west. Is Turkey in fact rather peripheral to all the regions that it neighbours? Will Turkey’s reward be to loosen its western friendships without creating alternatives? Furthermore, Turkish power and potential do not match that of China or India. Indeed, Turkey’s diplomacy is over-dependent on Davutoğlu’s ambition and energy. Turkey’s foreign ministry is small, its list of foreign policy issues long and complex, and it is overcommitted to a range of mediation and other foreign policy initiatives. Its behaviour can easily appear as self-aggrandizement, and as over-stretched.

In aligning itself with the Islamic or Turkic side in so many of the world’s contests, Turkish foreign policy can serve to reinforce some of those very barriers to interaction that it claims it is committed to lowering. Thus, its sympathy with the Palestinian cause has undermined its relationship with Israel. Its support for Azerbaijan obstructs the normalisation of its relationship with Armenia. Its commitment to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) bedevils its relationships with Nicosia, Athens and of course the EU. Its sympathy with the Turkic and Muslim Uighurs of China blots the relationship with Beijing. In any case, it is difficult for Ankara to avoid being compromised given the plethora of nearby regional conflicts – between Israelis and Palestinians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Russians, Iranians and the US, Iranians and conservative Arab states, and so on. With the Arab Spring, Turkey has also now found itself delicately poised between its friendships with many of the region’s regimes on the one hand, and its support for democratisation, economic development, and the people’s will on the other.

In addition, a degree of hypocrisy has crept into Turkey’s foreign policy postures. Thus, Erdoğan has criticised Israel’s excesses, but has also embraced Ahmedinejad’s disputed Iranian election victory and the Sudanese leadership - despite international condemnation of its human rights abuses. Turkey’s treatment of its own Kurds and its approach to the Armenian ‘genocide’ issue, combined with its failure to sign up to the International Criminal Court, also sit uncomfortably with the norm-based international system Davutoğlu advocates. Perhaps in more actively embracing a complex and fractious world, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly mirroring the inconsistencies and contradictions of that world.

Burgaz, The Princes Islands of Istanbul: Negotiating Ethnic, Class and Religious Differences
by Deniz Duru
Department of Anthropology, University of Sussex

The Princes Islands, a small archipelago of nine isles, are in the Sea of Marmara, southeast of Istanbul60. Of the six inhabited islands, Burgaz - the third biggest – is five kilometres from the Asian coast (30 minutes by boat) and seventeen (45-60 minutes) from the European side of Istanbul. It is 1.5 km²

(perimeter: 5km). No cars are allowed on the islands. Thus, the islanders walk, cycle or take horse carts. The population of Burgaz increases from 1,500 in winter to 15,000 in summer\(^\text{61}\) when wealthy, upper-middle class, intellectual, business men, artists, writers, journalists, actors, architects and lawyers move to their summer properties on the island or rent flats or houses. When the schools open and the weather gets worse, these people move back to their homes in Istanbul. Depending on the weather between October and March, people visit the islands at the weekends.

The Princes Islands are seen as a model of harmony and coexistence for a plural society. Burgaz is home to some thirty different ethnic and religious groups such as Jews, Armenians, Rum (Greek Orthodox), Sunnis, Alevists, Kurds, Suryani Christians, Levantines and German Catholics. Using Burgaz as my case study and having done 14 months of fieldwork (July 2009- September 2010), the main purpose of my research is to explore how people from different backgrounds negotiate their personal and collective self-understandings and coexist in communities mixed by class, ethnicity and religion. I explore coexistence at the grassroots level, investigate everyday social interactions - notably people’s exchanges, sociability and the shared ways of living together on the island. My focus is on the current population, its patterns of diversity and I note some empirical examples collected during my fieldwork.

**The political and socio-economic context of migration**

My research is grounded in an exploration of the critical historical and political events that have affected coexistence in Burgaz over time. In this section, taking on board my informants' interviews, I document particular political events and socio-economic factors as a result of which some ethnic and religious groups have left and others have settled in Burgaz.

During the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and in the formative years of the Turkish nation-state in the 1920s the majority of Burgazians were members of the Rum Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey. Starting from the westernization period from the 19th century onwards, French, British and Ottoman elites used the islands as resorts\(^\text{62}\). For example, the Austrian Catholic Chapel and the adjacent residence for nuns and priests were built on Burgaz. Germans who worked under the Ottoman Empire as gardeners and architects got property on the island to use as summer resorts. Then, in the early years of the Republic, Sunni Muslim elites moved to the island in the summertime. In the 1930s, Sunni Muslim captains from the Black Sea coast of Turkey, mainly from Ordu and Trabzon, settled in Burgaz for economic and employment reasons.

Due to the tensions between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in the mid-1950s, the events of September 6th and 7th in 1955 (when the houses and stores of non-Muslims were attacked and looted in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara), the expulsion of Christians with Greek citizenship in 1964, and the intervention of Turkey in Cyprus in 1974 triggered the migration of the Greek Orthodox minority out of Turkey. However Burgaz was not affected by the riots in 1955. In contrast to all the other islands and places in Istanbul, Burgaz islanders showed solidarity and cooperated with the local police to protect the island. They waited at the harbours and bays and prevented outsiders from landing to attack the properties and stores of non-Muslims.

The island is not isolated from the mainland. Hence, whatever happens in Turkey and Istanbul has an impact. The summer inhabitants live half of the year on the island and half in Istanbul. People commute to their work from and to Istanbul. It is in this context of political tension that the Rum community felt uncomfortable and hence left the island and the country, despite hitherto living comparatively peacefully in Burgaz.


While the Rum were leaving, Burgaz kept receiving migration from Istanbul and different parts of Anatolia. From the 1940s onwards, Jews from Heybeliada (another of the Princes Islands) and Istanbul got properties in Burgaz. Between 1950 and 1960, Zaza and Kurdish Alevis from Erzincan, Sivas, and Dersim/Tunceli moved in for economic reasons and brought their families with them. They did menial jobs in construction, driving horse carts, gardening, and carrying the furniture and goods of the summer residents. In the 1990s Shafi and Sunni Muslim Kurds from the villages of Van and Muş in south-eastern Turkey came to Burgaz to work during the summer season when more menial jobs became available. They then sent some of the money they earned back home – though a few of them also brought their families with them.

Due to political events and socio-economic changes, the Jewish community has started to decline over the last 20-25 years. The economic crisis that has affected Turkey during the last decade has also made it difficult to keep a flat/house in Burgaz and the Jewish people have preferred to go to the south of Turkey for vacations or to spend time in Istanbul. Furthermore, the worsening relationships between Israel and Turkey, as indicated by the bombings of synagogues in Istanbul in 2004 and the Gaza and Mavi Marmara events, have made the Jewish community feel ill at ease. Thus, some of them stopped renting houses or sold their properties in Burgaz. Even though the Jews of Burgaz still feel relatively peaceful in Burgaz, their discomfiture continues.

From 2000 onwards, Armenians from Kinalıada, another of the Islands, moved to Burgaz. They did not like the increase of day trippers and picnickers back in Kinalıada. From 2000 onwards, workers from Central Asia, from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan started to come to the island to work temporarily with horses, helping grocers to deliver goods to island customers. Currently, the variety of ethnic and religious groups in Burgaz is evidenced by the three Rum Orthodox churches, one Rum Orthodox monastery, one Austrian Catholic Chapel, one mosque, an Alevi meeting house, and one Muslim and one Rum Orthodox cemetery.

**New Diversities**

Couroucli argues that in contemporary Turkey, multiculturalism is the remnant of the coexistence under the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. She distinguishes between “(...) cosmopolitanism, a spirit related to the lifestyle of the minority elites of the Ottoman society, and the reality of religious plurality and tolerance in Ottoman society, which allowed shared practices at certain moments”. She indicates that these syncretic practices such as Ay Yorgi day do not now exist in the everyday life on the Princes Islands which she sees as places for the elite educated upper-middle class and where most people belong to non-Muslim minorities. She states that Istanbulites’ nostalgia for the coexistence of Ottoman times does not reflect today’s reality. This kind of multiculturalism praised by the bourgeois class and the politicians in Turkey is actually aimed to ‘promote minority and human rights’ for Turkey’s entrance to EU. Thus, Couroucli concludes that it would be wrong to treat the life style on the Princes Islands as ‘cosmopolitan’. In Turkey, cosmopolitanism is thus the representation of past coexistence under the Ottomans. Yet, rather than explore coexistence in daily life on these islands she has merely considered a few events. People from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds still live together – coexist – on these islands. Furthermore, the Princes Islands are not only the residue of what is left from the Ottoman Empire. In the case of Burgaz, while the Rum left the island, Jews and Armenians from other Princes Islands, Sunni

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64 Ibid. 234.
65 Saint George day takes place in Ay Yorgi Rum Orthodox Church in Büyükada, the Princes Island of Istanbul. The majority of the visitors on that particular day are Muslims who visit from Istanbul.
66 Ibid. 234.
67 Ibid. 234.
Muslims from the Black Sea Region, Zaza and Kurdish Alevis from Eastern Anatolia, and Sunni and Shafi Kurds from south-eastern Turkey and workers from Central Asia arrived.

Burgaz is not an elite resort of non-Muslim minorities. In this sense, one can counter Couroucli’s dichotomisation between the lifestyle of the secular upper-class and that of the Anatolian people and her argument that only the former is present on the Princes Islands. In doing so, one can suggest that there is still a synthesis and symbiosis of diverse ways of living on Burgaz. There is also a significant class difference between the permanent and the summer inhabitants of the island. The economy of Burgaz depends on the mutual relationship between the permanent inhabitants (mainly Zaza, Kurds and Turks who are Alevi, Sunni, or Safi from eastern and southeastern Turkey) who run the shops, restaurants and the summer inhabitants who are the customers, clients and sometimes the employers (for instance hiring cleaners, gardeners, care takers etc.). There are strong community relationships and friendships between customers and shop owners which go beyond economic exchange. For example, a Muslim family who immigrated from Eastern Anatolia takes care of the Greek Rum Orthodox church in Burgaz. Their son’s circumcision ceremony took place in its garden – as a present from the Rum community to this Muslim family.

The fact that Couroucli sees cosmopolitanism and coexistence as something of the past (Ottoman times) implies a model of coexistence and cosmopolitanism that limits differences according to the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire. That *system* differentiated Muslims from non-Muslims and divided the latter into three main categories: Rum, Armenians and Jews. I argue that this model of cosmopolitanism and coexistence limits diversities because it divides groups according to their ethnic and religious differences and undermines the ‘diversities within’. 99 % of the population in Turkey is Muslim. Even so, in different regions, cities and villages in Turkey there are diverse styles of living, practices of religion and traditions. Thus, diversity should go beyond the differences in ethnicity and religion and one should explore both the differences in living styles and shared practices.

For example, in the same restaurant can be seen a table where Muslims break their fast and another where Muslims and non-Muslims consume alcohol. Some Muslim women swim in bathing suits while they fast during Ramadan. Some Muslim men consume alcohol eleven months of the year and fast during the month of Ramadan. The *imam* and the Rum Orthodox priest watch football matches together in the priest’s house. Alevi restaurant owners serve their restaurants in the way that the Rum used to do, offering Rum *meze*. On important religious days, such as Ay Farounia, the day of the Virgin Mary, funerals and *mevlut* (death anniversaries), the Rum Orthodox churches are visited by Gregorian, Catholic and Orthodox Armenians, Bulgarians, Sunnis, Alevis, Levantines, Italians and Jews. The Austrian Catholic Chapel is frequented by different ethnic groups, Suryanis, Keldanies (Arab Catholics), Germans, Rum, Armenians, Italians and Levantines. For the German-speaking community and the Suryanis who speak Turkish and some Arabic, the masses are held in German, Latin and Turkish. Before and after the mass, in the garden, the visitors speak French, Armenian, Greek, Turkish and Italian with each other. Armenians, Keldanies, Suryanis, German Catholics, Sunni Muslims play scrabble, swim and socialize in the same social club. Alevis celebrate *henna* nights and perform their religious rituals, different from those of the Sunnis, in their Alevi meeting house. Examples of this are *sema* (whirling dancing) and *saz* (a fretted instrument through which the Alevi philosophy is transmitted) which are both prohibited in Sunni Islam.

**Conclusion**

The tensions between Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the currently difficult relations between Israel and Turkey have made the Orthodox and Jewish minorities in Turkey feel uncomfortable because of their ethnic and religious identities and have stimulated them to

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68 Ibid p. 223.
leave the country. Following the homogenization process, new diversity patterns appeared on the island. After most of the Rum left Burgaz, Jews, Armenians, Alevis and Kurds arrived with their own roots and traditions and themselves changed through their interactions with the islanders and changing island life – a change which is inevitably enduring. For this reason, my term ‘coexistence’ reflects not only peaceful coexistence but also the tensions brought up through living together. This embodies all kinds of differences, shared ways of living, dynamic and changing social relations across time in plural societies.

NEW CINEMA OF TURKEY:
WHAT IS ‘NEW’? WHY IS IT NOT ‘TURKISH’?

by Özlem Güçlü
Mimar Sinan University, Istanbul, and SOAS, London

The mid-1990s witnessed a revival of cinema in Turkey, with important changes and innovations in film production, distribution and visual style. These changes, reflecting a multitude of practices and voices that cross national boundaries, make it essential to reconsider whether ‘Turkish cinema’ is still a useful concept. Following the alternative concept, ‘new cinema of Turkey’, suggested by film scholar Savaş Arslan, I discuss why such a new framework is necessary to conceptualize the contemporary position.

Turkish cinema entered the 1990s in a severe crisis – called ‘the years of decadence’ by many film critics. One of the main causes of the crisis was a change in the Foreign Capital Law (Yabancı Sermaye Yasası) in 1987 which allowed foreign companies to found a company or open a branch for distribution and exhibition in Turkey. With the arrival of ‘Warner Bros-Turkey’ and ‘United International Pictures’ in 1987 and 1989 respectively, a new epoch in cinemas and distribution began and American films dominated the film market. Even though there was a significant increase in the number of spectators, cinema in Turkey no longer referred to Turkish cinema, but rather to Hollywood. While the first cause of the crisis is seen in the changes in the Law, the second cause was the incipient private channel broadcasting which brought about a new understanding of ‘entertainment’ in people’s homes. As a result, Turkish film productions declined and only a few of those produced could be screened.

These developments behind the major crisis in the early 1990s lead to the dissolution of the Yeşilçam system. After the crisis years, Turkish cinema entered the mid-1990s with new energy. From a commercial perspective, one could claim that a revival occurred through the utilization of Hollywood weapons in commercial productions: collaborating with the new big distribution companies, promoting films with huge campaigns, using media as a marketing tool, and casting TV celebrities and thus attracting the existing TV audience and existing advertisers. As for the art house productions, the increasing financial support of the Ministry of Culture, becoming a member of the European co-production fund Eurimages and the increasing acclaim at international festivals can be seen as determining factors. Moreover, advance in film technology, recognition of the importance of cinematography, changing expectation of Turkish audiences towards more sophisticated narratives along with the

69 Yeşilçam (Green Pine) is the name of a street in Beyoğlu, Istanbul, where production companies resided in the golden years of Turkish cinema. It also refers to a mode of production and a specific narration and style.
dominance of Hollywood films in cinemas, and the considerable relaxation of censorship regulations were further contributory factors.

In the early 1990s, the state started to finance films for the first time in Turkey. In 1990, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe Fund, which has contributed significantly to the new cinema. Between 1990 and 2006, *Eurimage* subsidized fifty-two Turkish films and provided over €8 million in support of Turkish productions. In this way, film-makers not only managed to complete their projects but were also in contact and in exchange with their European counterparts. In addition to *Eurimage*, filmmakers started benefiting from other foreign support such as the World Cinema Fund and the Hubert Bals Fund, an initiative of International Film Festival Rotterdam.

During this era, art cinema witnessed the emergence of new and young directors, most of whom directed their first films in the second half of the 1990s. These directors, who are familiar with international film and artistic convention, use different aesthetic strategies that are in dialogue with global cinema. The films of such directors left behind the domestic, popular cinematic language of *Yeşilçam*, and addressed themes that spoke to Turkish, as well as international, audiences. Art cinema, with small budget productions and limited distribution and promotion opportunities, initiated a new epoch, both through its breakaway from the classic Turkish cinema patterns and its critical international success.

Apart from all these, one of the most important novelties of the new cinema is its ‘hybrid’ identity, in terms of representing a diverse range of opinions, voices, genres, styles, themes, narrative forms and filmmaking modes. This diversity differs from *Yeşilçam*, Turkey’s national and nationalist cinema, which was made by Turks, watched by Turks and depicted Turks, and which for the most part failed to reflect the multitude of voices in the country70. For his part, Andrew Higson reconsiders the use, and questions the usefulness of the concept of national cinema71. According to him, the problem of the concept originates in the tendency to describe a national cinema as a pure, stable and limited space where identities other than national identity are closed off72 which causes national cinema to be fetishized rather than merely described73. The concept of national cinema is very much appropriate to provide a means to describe the cinema in a given geography in terms of its specificity and therefore cannot simply be dismissed. Higson suggests that it does not acknowledge transnational dimensions of cinema production, distribution and reception, and overlooks “the degree of cultural diversity, exchange and interpenetration that marks so much cinema activity”74. His reconsideration of the concept of national cinema that reveals its limits can illuminate a discussion about whether it is still useful to identify this cinema as ‘Turkish’.

Savaş Arslan suggests that what is needed is “an alternative framework which reflects the multitude of voices in the contemporary cinema of Turkey”75 and proposes the term ‘new cinema of Turkey’ instead of ‘new Turkish cinema’. By withdrawing emphasis from Turkish, this kind of framework manages to release cinema in Turkey from national(ist) boundaries. Arslan explains this as crucial not only to portray the diversity and heterogeneity of the voices and viewpoints in the contemporary cinema of Turkey but also to acknowledge the diverse range of new themes, styles, representations and forms of filmmaking. Indeed, unlike *Yeşilçam’s* monolithic system that is “a hub of cinema having specific set of distinctive characteristics in terms of production, distribution, and exhibition network, and a specific

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72 ibid. p.66
73 ibid.,p.64
74 ibid.
filmic discourse and language developed by bringing together different films under one umbrella, the new cinema of Turkey, as well as having numerous common threads, is heterogeneous with multifaceted tendencies and diverse tracks.

On the other hand, as Higson notes, national reference is not necessarily the best tool to understand and address cultural production as it leaves the national itself unquestioned and neglects transnational perspective. In this respect, ‘Turkish’ cinema becomes a problematic category once the increasing transnational practices to which it has been subjected after the 1990s are considered. Contrary to Yeşilçam that depends merely on a national production, distribution and exhibition chain, the examples of the new cinema of Turkey are highly transnational. In terms of film production, most of the examples are co-productions with various foreign companies and/or are produced with the support of Eurimage and international funds. As for distribution, most art house productions rarely achieve box-office success in the national market and appeal mainly to international festival audiences – and are therefore subjected to international market regulations. For commercial productions, most of the domestic blockbusters are distributed by foreign companies, such as Warner Brothers and UIP, and a majority of them are released in European countries.

When it is considered that significant number of films create a critical image of Turkish official history, Turkish identity and belonging and that increasing number of films touch upon the experiences and situations of marginalized ethnicities, such as Kurds or other minorities, it would be reductive to define the contemporary cinema of Turkey with the national boundaries. Furthermore, various languages, accents and dialects started to be represented on screen along with the new cinema, which differs from the Yeşilçam era where one language, with a high Istanbul accent, dominated the cinema screen. Therefore, it is unhelpful to persist with the concept of national cinema and limit the picture of cinema and film culture in Turkey after the mid-1990s merely by the national, while it is very much open to transnational influences.

In these regards, the alternative framework suggested by Arslan, with its stress on geography and temporality, rather than nationality, is better suited to the reality of the contemporary cinema of Turkey. However, the difficulties of using a new term must be noted, as ‘Turkish Cinema’ refers to a history, a meaningful baggage, and therefore a knowledge and a public awareness. Nonetheless, as the framework that it proposes is no longer sufficient to reflect the changing cinematic conditions of the era, it becomes crucial to use a new term.

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76 Savaş Arslan, op.cit. 2010, p.17
77 op.cit., p.72
Naum Theatre:
The lost opera house of Istanbul
by Emre Aracı
Music Historian and Composer

Part I
From its earliest conception, operas in the *bel canto* style made up the essential repertoire of the Pera Theatre and this tradition continued under the direction of Naum brothers when their first season was inaugurated in December 1844 with a performance of Donizetti's *Lucrezia Borgia* to be followed by the popular operas of Rossini and Bellini for the rest of the season including *Il barbiere di Siviglia*, *Semiramide* and *Sonnambula*. In 1846 Giuseppe Verdi (1813-1901), the new and fresh voice of Italian opera, made his debut in Istanbul when *Ernani*, became his very first work to be staged at the Ottoman capital, two years after its premiere at La Fenice in Venice and a year before it opened in New York. Naum brothers were eager to follow the latest trends in Europe and before the start of each season Michael Naum personally went to Italy to engage artists for their theatre. But his greatest problem was due to the lack of sufficient facilities in the dated building, which the management attempted to tackle with not much success at the start of every season. Cramped seating, a small stage and lack of proper ventilation, as people smoked despite attempts to put a stop to the practice, drew bitter complaints from artists, as well as members of the public.

In January 1847 when a great fire struck Pera – not uncommon at the time – and the old theatre burnt down, the construction of a new and modern structure became inevitable. In actual fact prior to the fire, the Naums had already raised some funds, plans had already been drawn for a new theatre and the old building was going to be pulled down at the close of the season, but a disaster of this nature made it possible for a petition, asking for financial support, to be presented to Sultan Abdülmecid (1823-1861; r.1839-1861), the son and successor of Mahmud II. The young Sultan, already with a developed taste for European music and arts due to his father’s upbringing, on the advice of his ministers was not hesitant to make the necessary donation for the immediate start of the construction of Pera’s new and modern theatre, which was built by the British architect William James Smith, who was at the same time working on the construction of the British Embassy, known as Pera House. The foundation stone was laid on 5 July 1847, with Giuseppe Donizetti, also present among the attendees of the ceremony.

The new theatre, had three tiers of boxes, with another tier subsequently added and could seat nearly about a 1000 people. There was an Imperial box for the Sultan decorated in crimson and gold with its own street entrance and on the ceiling of the auditorium were portraits of famous opera composers encircled in medallions, as well as a grand central chandelier manufactured in London. The theatre was entirely cande-lit, until gas lighting was installed in 1857. The building was inaugurated on 4 November 1848 with Verdi’s *Macbeth*, which was conducted by the young and energetic Italian maestro Angelo Mariani (1821-1873) who had been engaged for the new season and who was subsequently to become one of Verdi’s greatest friends and promoters, with an eventual fall-out due to the composer’s alleged affair with his fiancée Teresa Stolz (1834-1902), who was also to appear
at Naum Theatre. For the 1848-49 season Naum brothers were able to engage excellent artists, including sopranos Giuseppina [Josepha] Vilmot-Medori (1827-1906) and Emilia Cominotti. This was mainly due to the revolutions sweeping across Europe; but convincing the artists to come to Istanbul was no easy undertaking still; since the threat of cholera and fires in Pera were well known.

Mariani was later to remember his arrival at the port of Constantinople, on board the Austrian Lloyd steamer from Trieste, in his memoirs in the following fashion: "Our voyage was somewhat disastrous. We had no little stormy weather, and having gone ashore at Smyrna for a few hours to get something to eat, we found there more than a thousand cases of cholera a day. After leaving Smyrna we had, too, the misfortune to see cholera manifest itself on board [...] When we were in the Dardanelles, near the Iles of the Princes (it was night-time), we saw Pera in flames! You can't conceive what a desolate impression this made on us; it was such that having disembarked from the Lloyd steamer, at the sight of that heap of smoking ruins we wished above all things to return to Italy. But the brother of the impresario Naum, suspecting our intention to repatriate, had recourse to the police to prevent us embarking".78 Despite this awkward start Mariani remained in Istanbul for nearly three years, staying at the Russian Embassy. He played the violin at social gatherings, taught the piano to well-connected aristocratic ladies and commemorated his sojourn in a series of love songs, some based on the verses of Giacomo Casanova (1725-1798), and collectively titled *Rimembranze del Bosforo*.

Life among artists of the theatre was not always peaceful; prima donna rivalries and partisan behaviour among the audience at times nearly brought the seasons to a halt. For instance the news of a scandal involving a rivalry between Vilmot-Medori and Cominotti at the Pera Theatre even reached as far as the columns of the *The Knickerbocker* magazine in New York: "A good Italian company is now 'in full play' on its boards, and the enterprise has this winter been very successful. There has been, however, the usual 'noise and row' of such places, and a rivalry between the 'Prima Donnas'. The result has been shown by wreaths of flowers showered in abundance on the stage, varied by cadeaux of turnip-tops, cabbage-leaves and a live gobbler! This latter, you will say, I suppose, is but natural in Turkey; and yet the unfavored Donna thought very differently. A duel ensued among the admirers, as bloodless as the cabbage itself, and now all goes on quietly again".79 Not so, when a similar incident took place few years later involving Marcella Lotti (1831-1901) and Rosina Penco (1823-1894), both eminent singers of their time, which ended with a fatality of a member of the audience, whereafter the theatre was temporarily closed on the orders of the police.

Well known names continued to appear on the stage of Naum Theatre; in 1852 it was Anna Caradori, who built for herself a brilliant career in the world's greatest opera houses from La Scala to Covent Garden and when *La Traviata* was premiered in Istanbul in the 1855-56 season it was Fanny Salvini-Donatelli (c.1815-1891) who sang Violetta, who actually created the original role when the opera was premiered at La Fenice in Venice on 6 March 1853. Though the original production was a catastrophe for Verdi since an obese soprano dying of consumption caused much ridicule, despite Salvini-Donatelli's voice being exquisite. The famous actress Adelaide Ristori also starred in Shakespeare plays at the theatre in 1864. French soprano Adelina Murio-Celli (1825?-1900), who sang under Luigi Arditi's (1822-1903) baton in the same season as Salvini-Donatelli, also became extremely popular with Constantinople audiences including the Sultan and ladies of the harem.80 Carlotta Patti (1840-1889) was also among the celebrities who appeared on Naum's stage in 1869.

Apart from presenting Italian operas Naum's Theatre was also a variety stage where ballet, magic shows, concerts, and Mardi Gras balls in February before Lent were presented. In

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80 Albert Parkes, 'Great Singers of This Century', *Godey's Magazine*, 1896, Vol. 133, p. 293
In latter years Naum Theatre’s repertoire included French grand opera with the production of major works by Meyerbeer, although not with much great success. Wagner operas were never presented; his orchestral music, however, was played at concerts with a Wagnerite conductor, such as Henry Ketten (1848-1883) in charge of the artistic direction. Among the great names who passed through the theatre’s doors, one today remembers Henryk Wieniawski who played Mendelssohn’s famous violin concerto in E minor, and Pablo de Sarasate, who appeared as a member of Carlotta Patti’s company. Gustave Flaubert (1821-1880) saw Lucia Lammermoor there in the autumn of 1850 and later incorporated the opera to Madame Bovary, where the setting became the Opera House in Rouen. The theatre occasionally hosted European royalty as well. In April 1869, Sultan Abdülaziz (1830-1876; r.1861-1876) accompanied the Prince and Princess of Wales on their state visit, to a gala performance of Meyerbeer’s L’Africaine and a few months later the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph came to watch a performance. A state visit to the Istanbul opera had also been organised for Empress Eugénie of France, when she stayed at Beylerbeyi Palace in the same year, but was subsequently cancelled due to her busy schedule on the day.

Michael Naum died on 5 June 1868 following which, for the last two years of the theatre’s existence, his brother Joseph took over its management. By a strange and sad coincidence 5 June also marked the final date for the theatre, for in the summer of 1870, the great fire which swept Pera destroyed almost half of the neighbourhood and along with it reduced to ashes its historic opera house in a matter of hours. What the flames started, time finally

81 Journal de Constantinople, 4 November 1848
82 The Times, 15 September 1859
finished off; Pera’s lost opera house was gradually confined to the oblivion and erased from people’s memories. The community which supported it most also gradually dispersed and vanished. On today’s İstiklâl Street, Çiçek Pasajı stands in its place and a marble plaque humbly commemorates its once glorious and chequered past.


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Gülay Yurdal Michaels, Poet and Translator

**For Baby Duru**

You who’ll delve into sorrows
looking at soil and sky
sing a song, a poem
we can listen to
without being disgusted with ourselves

Say it so we can know
why we are here
the low clouds
and the density of rain

Do not give us too many hardships
so that we find all around
the formula of the future happiness
retrieve the aroma of the rose
and make green again
the barren twigs on the ground.

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**Duru Bebek İçin**

Bir göge bir yere bakarak
hüzünlere dalan kız
tıksinmeden kendimizden
dinleyebildiğimiz şarkıyi, şiiri söyle

Söyle ki neden burdayız bilelim
açık bulutların yönünü
yağmurun yoğunluğunu

Çok zorlamasınlar bizi
bulalım her tarafta
gelecek mutulukların formülünü
gülün kokusunu geri verelim
yüşertelim çörek
çöndallarını toprağımızın yeniden.

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**Necati Münir Ertekün, OBE, QC**

by Osman Ertekün, MA, Barrister

As my late father Necati Münir Ertekün was closely involved in all stages of the Cyprus problem as it evolved from the 1950’s to the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, in a sense his life reflects the milestones in the Cyprus dispute. The education which he provided for me is perhaps the most important contribution that he
made in my life. I have always appreciated his great personal sacrifices in order for me to have the best possible preparation at the most difficult times in Cyprus.

My father’s own father attached importance to good education. After Britain took over the administration of Cyprus from Turkey at the end of the 19th century and introduced the English Legal System, my grandfather, the late Sir Mehmet Münir, decided to go to England for his legal education in order better to serve the Turkish Community of Cyprus under the British Administration. He was one of the first Turkish Cypriots to qualify as a Barrister in England and subsequently held important posts during the British colonial period in the island. Having experienced the benefits provided by good education, my grandfather decided to educate all his sons, including my father, in England.

My father completed his secondary education at Brentwood School in England between 1935 and 1940. After a break in his schooling due to the Second World War, he returned to England for his university education at Cambridge where he read law and graduated in 1946 with a first class honours degree. In 1947 he joined Gray’s Inn and qualified as a Barrister in the same year. Having completed his pupillage in England, he embarked upon his legal career in the British Colonial Service serving first in East Africa and then in Cyprus until independence there in 1960.

My father was also aware of the benefits of a good education and, following the example of his own father, he desired to send me to England for my secondary and university education. In fact, he registered me at a public school in England while I was attending an English primary school in Nicosia, Cyprus. I was due to go to England after passing the requisite Common Entrance examination in 1965. However, in December 1963 the well known Greek Cypriot armed attack against the Turkish Cypriots took place and, as my school was situated in the part of Nicosia occupied by Greek Cypriot armed gangs, I could not attend there. Initially, the English headmaster of the school agreed to give lessons to Turkish Cypriot pupils at his house on the Turkish side of the border, as a temporary measure. At the time it was thought that effective international action would restore the status quo ante in Cyprus and end the coup through which Greek Cypriots illegally took over the Government by armed force.

However, the situation created by the events of December 1963 did not end quickly as anticipated and, in April 1964, the headmaster informed my father that he could not continue to provide lessons to Turkish Cypriots indefinitely and so I would not be able to pass the Common Entrance examination in order to enrol at public school in England in 1965 as planned. Faced with this dilemma, my father reluctantly decided to send me to a boarding prep school in England at the age of eleven in April 1964. Due to the prevailing situation in Cyprus, as a Turkish Cypriot it was not possible for him to take me to the airport which was in the Greek Cypriot occupied part of Nicosia. Accordingly, I was taken to the airport in a Red Cross ambulance escorted by an English nurse!

The period after 1964 was very difficult for both me and my father. When we parted in the extraordinary circumstances then prevailing in Cyprus, we did not know whether we would ever see each other again. In fact, at that time my father had appointed his cousin in England, who held a senior position in the British Nuclear Energy Commission and whose financial position was good, as my guardian and he secured a promise from him to support my education in England in the event that my father were to lose his life in Cyprus.
In 1963 the Greek Cypriots cut off all forms of communication between the Turkish Cypriots and the outside world, including telephone and post and so it was not possible for me to communicate in any form directly with my father. I remember distinctly that when leaving Cyprus under those difficult circumstances he emphatically told me to send my letters to a certain ‘Audrey Ball’, not to put his name on the envelope but just his initial after the lady’s name and to address my letters to the British Forces Broadcasting Service at the British Bases in Cyprus. I found out many years later that Audrey Ball was married to a Turkish Cypriot and worked for the Service at that time. She smuggled my letters through the border to the Turkish part of Nicosia giving them to my father and, in turn, posted his letters to me from the British bases. During that period these letters were the most valuable thing for me.

After I went to England I was unable to see my parents for over three years because transport links between Turkish Cypriots and the outside world were also severed by Greek Cypriots, but these weekly letters enabled me to maintain my close relationship with my family. However, I have to confess that when I heard on the news in England that throughout that period Greek attacks on Turkish Cypriots were continuing, I felt extremely anxious as to whether I would ever see my parents again.

In the meantime, due to the fact that Turkish Cypriots were living in enclaves under the siege and because they were deprived of all economic means and merely survived with restricted aid from Turkey, as was the case for all Turkish Cypriot civil servants, my father’s salary was dramatically reduced and necessarily limited to a modest amount barely sufficient for the daily living expenses of the family. Under these circumstances my father could not afford the expenses of my education in England - and at that time there was no possibility of a bank loan. I later discovered that, in order not to interrupt my education, he was forced to borrow money from his cousin in England which he could only re-pay once the economic situation of the Turkish Cypriots had improved after the Turkish Peace Operation of 1974.

My father, thus, made huge sacrifices in order to give me the best possible education during the most difficult times for him. Subsequently, like him, I had the good fortune to attend the University of Cambridge where I also read law. At Cambridge, I met distinguished academics who had known my father when he had been a student there and, when I heard the praise expressed about him, I felt proud as his son and this gave me added confidence.

Returning to my father’s legal career, between 1948 and 1953, he served as a Crown Counsel in the British Colonial Service in what is now Tanzania and was then known as Tanganyika. In fact, I was born in Dar-es-Salaam in 1952. In the following year, when I was just one year old, he was appointed Solicitor General of Cyprus, then still a British colony.

My first memories after my father’s return from Africa to Cyprus were at our house in Nicosia. In 1955, when I was just a small child and the EOKA terrorist campaign to unite Cyprus with Greece had started, I remember that there were English soldiers in our garden and sometimes I played with them. At that age, obviously I did not know exactly what my father’s occupation was. Only later did I find out that, after Africa, he continued to serve in the British Colonial Service as Solicitor-General for Cyprus. At that time, the former President Rauf Denktaş was also working in the same department as a Crown Counsel and my father’s lifelong friendship with him began.

Following the intensification of the EOKA terrorist campaign, the Greek Cypriot Attorney-General left his post as it was embarrassing for him to continue and my father was appointed as acting Attorney-General whereupon he undertook huge responsibilities at a young age. During this period he worked closely with General Harding, who had been appointed as the Governor of Cyprus by the British Government, on legal measures to combat EOKA. At this time my father also prepared the necessary Order in Council to enable Archbishop Makarios to be exiled to the Seychelles. Even though there were curfews in place, as a result of his official duties he had to go to Government House for meetings with the Governor and risked
his life in the face of EOKA terrorists. In fact on one occasion when my father was with the Governor, they were the target of an EOKA bomb attack which fortunately was not successful. Owing to his excellent legal skills he gained the respect of General Harding and, on account of his commendable services in the British administration at that time, he was awarded the O.B.E. and also made an honorary Queen’s Counsel.

After Britain decided to grant independence to Cyprus in the late 1950s, my father took part in the Legal Commission set up to prepare the 1960 Constitution. Subsequently, when the Republic of Cyprus was established in accordance with that Constitution, he was appointed as the Turkish judge of the Constitutional Court which was made up of a Turkish judge, a Greek Judge and a neutral President. I remember that this period was exciting for my father. Equal rights were given to all Cypriots under the 1960 Constitution which was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece so that Turkish Cypriots could finally look to the future in confidence and in the belief that their rights would be fully protected. My father’s function as a judge of the Constitutional Court would play an important part in the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights. With his profound legal expertise as well as his impeccable integrity, from the beginning he gained the utmost respect of Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral German President of the Court, as well as his assistant Dr. Christian Heinze.

Unfortunately the Greeks did not give up their obsession with union with Greece even after the establishment of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus and, as a result, problems started to emerge soon after the establishment of the independent state. Greek Cypriot politicians, who were mainly former EOKA terrorists, also exerted undue pressure on the Greek Cypriot judge of the Constitutional Court and an extremely challenging period began for my father. As a judge of the Constitutional Court, the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights in accordance with the Constitution were amongst his judicial functions and these rights were being blatantly breached by the Greek Cypriot wing of the Cyprus Government. In accordance with his judicial function he had to convince the German President of the Constitutional Court, through legal reasoning, of the just cause of Turkish Cypriot claims in the face of Greek Cypriot breaches of the Constitution. He eminently succeeded in doing this - so much so that Dr. Christian Heinze, an impartial academic lawyer of the utmost integrity, was declared by the Greek Cypriots to be a persona non grata and unjustly branded as a Turkish spy.

The problems my father faced in the Constitutional Court came to a head with the well known 'municipalities case' which concerned the refusal of the relevant Greek Cypriot Minister to implement the provisions of the Constitution requiring separate Turkish and Greek municipalities in the principal towns. When my father, together with the President of the Constitutional Court, gave a majority judgment in accordance with the Constitution in favour of the Turkish Cypriot claimants, the Greek Cypriot President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, declared that he would not recognise the judgment of the Court. In the face of this unprecedented and unconstitutional stance, the German President of the Court had no alternative but to resign. Shortly afterwards, in December 1963, premeditated Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriots resulted in the unilateral abrogation of the 1960 Constitution and the end of the bi-communal state as well as of the Constitutional Court.

After the events of December 1963, my father, together with other Turkish Cypriot judges, continued their judicial functions in the Cyprus High Court until they were forcibly prevented by Greek Cypriot police in 1966 from attending the Court whereupon, as the most senior Turkish judge, my father was given the task of setting up the Turkish Cypriot courts and judiciary in the areas of Cyprus then under Turkish Cypriot jurisdiction. Subsequently in 1967 he became the first President of the Supreme Court which was established as the highest court of the then Transitional Turkish Cypriot Administration.

The Turkish Peace Operation which took place on 20th July 1974, following the bloody Greek coup of 15th July 1974 (aimed at finally uniting Cyprus with Greece) was a cause for great excitement and hope for my father, as it was for all Turkish Cypriots, and it constituted
an important turning point not only for the Turkish Cypriots as a whole but also in my father’s personal and public life.

Following the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975, my father was appointed as its first President of the Supreme Court and he continued to serve in this post until his retirement from the judiciary in 1978 when he became Legal Adviser to Rauf Denktas and, in this capacity, participated in every important stage of the negotiations aimed at resolving the Cyprus dispute. During this period he also acted as a consultant to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on the legal aspects of the Cyprus problem and had close cooperation with eminent constitutional lawyers from Turkey as well as with senior diplomats from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In the meantime, in 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared and he participated in the critical preparations in the lead up to this declaration which constituted an important milestone in the history of Cyprus.

After the declaration of the TRNC, he became a member of the Constituent Assembly, which had the task of preparing the new Constitution of the Republic and, between 1983 and 1985, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the transitional Government. He continued his role as Adviser to the President until the year 2000 when he retired at the age of 77 for health reasons. Owing to his worthy services up to this time, in 2001 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Plaque by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey which was presented to him by the late Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. I know that he was deeply touched to be so honoured by the Motherland and the whole family felt very proud of him.

Like every Turkish Cypriot, my father’s life was inseparably bound with the Cyprus problem but, because of the various public offices he held, he lived with the problem from many different perspectives. He was proud of being Turkish and at every opportunity he promoted with passion the just cause of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. His promotion of this cause was not in the nature of propaganda but based on his in-depth knowledge of historical events and his legal competence, thus enlightening others about the realities of the Cyprus problem and the Turkish position. In this regard, he gained the respect of officials in Turkey, Turkish Cypriot politicians and foreign diplomats alike. He also made his mark in the sphere of international law through his legal expertise and impartiality and had good relations with eminent international lawyers such as Professor Lauterpacht of Cambridge University. He wrote two books and many articles on legal aspects of the Cyprus problem.

My father died in December 2009 at the age of 86.

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May in Istanbul

by Sally Mustoe

Journalist, Broadcaster, and Traveller

I don’t now remember why I decided to go to Istanbul in May this year instead of in September as usual. I experienced climate (ex)change; the average temperature was 13 in Istanbul and 23 in London which had no rain while, in Istanbul and its environs, it rained most days. I took all the wrong clothes and had to buy a rather strange garment from the
Nahil Gift Shop run by the Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work. To raise funds for their early child care and education centres, they sell a fascinating range of second-hand clothes, mostly 60s and 70s gear, as well as all the many different items handmade from natural materials. Some of these would make excellent presents but my other purchase kept me warm. It is black thick wool, like a very long, very wide scarf with long fitting sleeves.

I no longer shivered even on the one and a quarter hour ferry ride from Yenikapi to Yalova which suffered considerably in the 1999 earthquake. Much rebuilding and many thriving businesses support a population of about one million now but just twelve kilometres away is Thermal a lush green valley with natural springs (eye water, stomach water, foot water) and over a million trees – wonderful trees of all shapes and sizes and shades from majestic pines to new plantings. I’m happy to be termed NAT (Nutty About Trees) the phrase coined by dendrologist Roger Whitworth and I have a ‘tree warden’ certificate after completing courses on British laws and diseases, etc pertaining to trees.

About a decade ago, I visited the Karaca nursery on the Yalova road. Run by Habibe Güler, seeds and cuttings from all over Turkey were – I hope still are – collected and propagated and exchanges made worldwide with centres such as Kew Gardens. The founder was a highly-respected environmentalist quite apart from being known for his chain of Karaca fashion shops. Habibe identified many trees new to me in the area.

I have a collection of booklets about Termal, the village and the Yalova Thermal complex and I treasure some of the quotes. They rival Gerard Hoffnung’s bricklayer’s letter in his speech to the Oxford Union (see internet) or his letter from a Dolomite hotelier who offered ‘a French widow in every bedroom affording delightful prospects’. Lovely exotic phrases like ‘visual rhapsody’ are rightly used frequently in describing the flora and the thermal spring waters ‘prevent lots of diseases, pass the liver and kidney sand’ and ‘refresh(es) the secretion and increase the sexual emotion by means of affecting the internal glands’. Nowadays that situation has been totally changed by the two new hotels in the complex but I was enormously relieved and glad that the beautiful valley looks the same.

It is claimed that the waters have been of benefit for over 2,000 years since the first thermal baths were built by the Emperor Constantine in the fourth century AD. The area lost popularity later because the Ottoman capital Bursa had its own spa, only to regain its prominence when Sultan Abdülmecit’s mother recovered from rheumatism in Yalova Thermal. Again, the area went out of fashion until Atatürk was ‘awestruck with the natural beauty’. His many artisans worked on re-planning and reconstructing and the area is now ‘a first degree natural, archaeological and historical SIT site’. Atatürk’s own kiosk is currently being refurbished.

My first visit was about sixteen years ago with American writer Charles Adelsen and Turkish photographer Naim Kula. Apart from the magnificent scenery, we loved the baths in the hotel basement with hot thermal water gushing out of huge taps. There were then two smallish hotels. In the Çamlık, on the hillside, all the rooms had balconies amid the trees and they overlooked more trees, walks and the warm thermal swimming pool. The Çinar closed off the end of a small village square with six or seven shops and a gigantic plane tree spreading its propped-up branches over the ‘snacks area’. Both hotels are closed now that ‘services’ are no longer functioning but I’m glad they don’t look derelict yet and it is mooted that they will be rebuilt. Nearby, it was such a pleasure to find the artist Ziya still plying his unique karikatür talent.

I knew there was a new hotel on the entrance road to Termal at the end of the warm thermal swimming pool because I’d watched the irregular bouts of rebuilding the original structure over seven years and I went back again to check on the Yalova Thermal hotel’s progress last September. One of the managers gave me a tour when he recognised me from my Çamlık visits. What I didn’t know was that there was yet another large local development, an
even more ambitious project restoring other original historic buildings. Using the bones of its derelict but valued and protected wooden framework, the Limak Thermal Boutique Hotel is in fact three buildings, one smaller than the other two and now connected by a glass corridor, all impressively designed with grand exteriors guarded by two large lions at the main entrance. It is perched on a slight incline above the small village of Gökçeşere.\(^{83}\) Limak used a team of 300 specialists working with Gazi University on the restoration and they have numbered the forty-eight rooms and suites from 1881, the year of Atatürk’s birth as he was the first guest in the original hotel. The overall effect is of expensive gold and red opulence and it is a very pleasant surprise to find bills less than expected!

One of the channels on room television sets is devoted entirely to showing facilities at other Limak hotels in Turkey so comparisons can be made. Apart from the Atatürk Meeting Room, there are other small and two large conference rooms, separate catering if needed and a car park for 40 cars, all set in six kilometres of well-kept gardens which even include a children’s playground. I do hope they’ll install a climbing frame in the playground (it would be a special favourite of my small grandchildren and their friends).

The cold wet weather put me off trying either the indoor or outdoor pool even though both had heated thermal water. I used the power shower in my room but not the jacuzzi, the spa and Wellness Centre, the Turkish bath (with or without peeling and foam treatment), sauna, the Fitness Centre with its fearsome machines, the steam bath or the Massage Centre. What a choice – from the Exclusive Pythia to the Traditional Balinese Massage or the Ocean Memory Ritual! This is obviously very well equipped for conferences. While I was there, a group of young Turkish men and women from J&J were on initiative tests. They had already raised enough money to buy bicycle kits for a group of deprived children and I was allowed to watch them attempting to win a race to assemble them. I’ve ridden a bike since I was seven and know how much pleasure this charitable gesture will give.

My own ideal candidate for a gathering amid all the beauty and peace (no cars) of that overwhelming scenery and bewildering array of health and sports equipment would be a meeting of Tree Trusts. I was a founder member of one; my last public appearance in this context made the front page of my local north London ‘Ham&High’ newspaper when, about eight years ago, our activities included establishing ourselves in trees endangered by ill-considered plans to build yet another supermarket. How can we combat unintelligent remarks such as ‘we’ll put in new plantings when we remove the stand’ (of healthy but inconvenient trees which have been there for a couple of centuries). The opportunities for research and discovery, for discussion, for verbal or artistic exercise and for walks to simply stop and stare are endless.

The reason I haven’t mentioned the Limak food is that one would expect it to be good and it certainly is, thanks to senior chef Müzaffer Topcuol. One Turkish/American couple told me they always stay in Limak hotels in Turkey for the food. My one complaint is that I hate to hear europop musak in a decent Turkish restaurant when the range-classical, court, folk, Turkish pop, etc is so abundant and available. And the rain? How can I complain about the rain? These beautiful trees, bushes and flowers and the hard bright green of the thick grass would make a poor show without it as I remarked when I saw the yellowing state of rain starved lawns in London.

\(^{83}\) Yes, Peregrine Worsthorne! It is another hill – but well worth the climb. My letter in The Spectator deplored his decision not to visit Istanbul because hills can be difficult as we get older – true, but what a depressing outlook! Public transport – including cheap taxis – in Istanbul is to be praised…
Norman Stone and I disagreed on a Radio 4 programme ‘Excess Baggage’ some time ago when I explained my preference for travelling alone so that people talk to me. He does not like people talking to him. He loves Ankara and I, as usual, praised Istanbul where Naim took me to see İhlam Kasrı park in Beşiktaş. The old stone buildings are attractive but I was totally absorbed in admiring one of the tallest pines I’ve ever seen and delighting in the way its wonderfully shaped branches swept elegantly down. As well as ‘my pine’ there is a gingko biloba, nearly 50 feet high. It is the second largest in the world in terms of the size of fruit and was planted when the area was originally landscaped for Sultan Abdülmecit in 1840. The leaves are reputed to benefit diabetes sufferers and the pips to cure Alzheimer’s.

It was an honour to be invited to join Belma Ötüş Baskett’s celebrations for the birthday of her husband Sam. He is ninety now, a little tired and fragile but still with a lot of the old fire as he remembered more than I did about a particular political argument we had several years ago. We dawdled over a special volume in honour of Sam’s birthday prepared by Belma and by Oya Basak.84

Almost all the other dinner guests were Turkish or American academics living in Istanbul and this certainly wasn’t the first time I’ve heard visitors and local residents complain about the early hour at which water transport shuts down! Belma and I share the same birthday (18 January) and we worked together on Turkish Cookery85 to raise money to help children whose parents had been earthquake victims.

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Ahmet Haşim and the Christmas Controversy

by Laurent Mignon

St.Antony’s College, University of Oxford

“Christmas, the end of year festival of Christians, is approaching. The illustrated newspapers of Europe are full of adverts for Christmas presents. Toy factories expose new products in all the shops of the world. […] On Christmas night, Father Christmas, that is to say St Nicholas, towards dawn, discreetly enters through the chimney into the house and leaves presents in children’s shoes left around the fireplace. How full of hope and surprises those Christmas mornings are for children.”86 Had they been written in a British newspaper, the above sentences would have attracted little attention. Some readers might have complained about their triteness, others dissecting the issue as to whether it is in shoes or stockings that Santa Claus is supposed to place his gifts.

But those lines were published in the Turkish daily İkdam on 12 December 1928. The author was no less than Ahmet Haşim (1884 - 1933), one of the most talented, and tormented, poets of his generation. He had not only authored two remarkable poetry collections, namely ‘Hours by the Lake’ (Göl Saatleri, 1921) and ‘The Chalice’ (Piyâle, 1926), but had also recently become a fervent columnist, keen on controversy. He wrote on a variety of topics from new literary trends in the former

84 A Voyage through American Literature and Culture via Turkey. A Festschrift for Sam S.Basket’s 90th Birthday, prepared by Belma Ötüş Baskett and Oya Basak, published by Boğaziçi Univ., Istanbul.
Ottoman capital to the latest intellectual fashions in Paris. A short piece on Christmas was thus not really out of character.

In his column ‘A Festival for Children’ Haşim was not so much interested in the religious dimension or in the commercial significant of Christmas but, rather, he loved the idea that “this festival was the festival of the children”. He suggested that Christmas ought to be adapted just like novels, poems and plays had been. In Turkey, he complained, “no hygiene, no clothing, no food, no festivities, no parks exits for the children... We cannot claim to value children’s happiness. What is a child’s happiness? One has to go to the countries where children are cherished to grasp this.” Haşim’s concern for the wellbeing of kids was not surprising. He never really got over the feeling of loss and abandonment caused by the untimely death of his mother. His father’s attitude, often ruthless and unforgiving, did not help. Hence the column, though, arguably, oddly phrased, should not have caused more than a few raised eyebrows in literary Istanbul. Little did Haşim know, when he penned it, that the Istanbul correspondent of the Times would be one of his readers and dedicate a whole article to his column. His interpretation of Haşim’s piece was about to cause a storm which, thankfully, remained within the boundaries of the teacups of literary salons: “[Haşim’s] suggestion derives special interest from the fact that for some time past there has been an ever-growing belief among Turkish people that the Moslem religion may be abolished in Turkey. [...] It is, of course, hardly likely that, the Ghazi Pasha – in spite of the startling and successful reforms which he has so far accomplished – will interfere in religion unless he is absolutely certain that such a step would be popular among the more important elements in the country, for the abolition of Islam in Turkey would certainly far transcend in importance and gravity all the changes hitherto effected. Nor is anything at present known as to what kind of religion would take the place of Islam. Would it be a form of Protestant Christianity, or would it be an entirely new faith?”

The journalist had over-interpreted Haşim’s proposal, and the poet was incensed. This was not a good time to be suspected of promoting Christianity. Revolutionary changes were being implemented in the Republic of Turkey, including the alphabet reform of which Haşim had been very supportive, while members of the opposition, largely silenced, were concerned that the secularisation of the state would be equivalent to its Christianisation.

In any case Haşim had few friends. Born in Baghdad in 1884, knowing almost no Turkish when he moved with his father to Istanbul in 1906, he had experienced on many occasions the tribulations of being an Arab teenager in the Ottoman capital, at a time when Turkish nationalism was on the rise. Moreover his attempts at fusing the lyricalness of Ottoman classical poetry with the approach of French-language symbolists (mainly Stéphane Mallarmé, 1842-1898, and Emile Verhaeren, 1885-1916) were frowned upon by the literary establishment that encouraged nationalist and populist poetry. Even the socialist Nazım Hikmet (1901-1963) had little good to say about the one he called the “Beggar of Baghdad”. But when it came to literary controversy Haşim was certainly not helpless and he knew how to respond to his adversaries. In a long article in French on recent trends in Turkish literature, published in the prestigious Mercure de France journal in July 1924, he had attacked Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944), whose works were seen as exemplary by nationalist versifiers. Haşim had a way with his pen. His language could be harsh and hurtful: “Mehmet Emin Bey was only a poet by name. Short-breathed, flat-minded and of mediocre sensitivity, his nonexistent imagination annihilated the efforts of those who desperately tried to turn him into the national bard. His antipathetic art made the movement that he was supposed to represent equally antipathetic.” Haşim’s assessment was correct

87 Ahmet Haşim, ‘Çocuklar İçin Bayram’, 177.
from a poetical point of view but, politically speaking, it had not been such a good idea to
humiliate one of the fathers of Turkish nationalism, whose works were appreciated by
Mustafa Kemal.

After his Christmas column and the *Times'* article, the wolves were at the door and Haşim
knew it. He could not leave the prestigious English newspaper's article unanswered. Four
days after its publication, he counterattacked with an article entitled 'The *Times'* Mistake'.
He argued that the journalist had misunderstood his article, probably because his knowledge
of Turkish was insufficient. The poet conceded that he had written that he wanted to
dedicate a festival to children but stressed that he had “never written that Christmas ought to
be adopted with its religious significance.”

Haşim was being a little disingenuous. Though it
is true that he had not written anything about the spiritual meaning of Christmas in the life of
Christians, he had nonetheless made the point that Christmas should be adapted "just like
numerous novels, poems and plays.”

The comparison was rather odd, the more so as Haşim had not felt the need to elaborate on the topic in his original column or in his
response. That the article in the *Times* was taken seriously by the Turkish authorities is
shown by the fact that Yunus Nadi, the chief editor of *Cumhuriyet*, a daily close to the
Kemalist leadership, intervened in order to whitewash Haşim and the reformist endeavours
of the republican regime. Nadi believed that the *Times*’ article was dishonest and aimed at
sowing the seeds of civil unrest. He was concerned that the *Times*’ correspondent’s views
coincided with the worries expressed by opponents of Mustafa Kemal. Nevertheless he
conceded that Haşim’s article was ambiguous and was conducive of misunderstandings.

Haşim, again, was not amused. In a column entitled 'Worse than a Mistake', published on 30
December 1928, he responded to Nadi and maintained that “the great journalist’s accuracy
when representing [Haşim’s] intention gave [him] the assurance and the satisfac-

Auto-criticism was not one of Haşim’s strength. In the
concluding paragraph of his response to Nadi, he charged the British journalist once more
and accused him of not only having misrepresented his views but also of having “offended
the conscience of the people he was a guest of by spreading conclusions based on his own
delusions.”

But what were Haşim’s views? His column was not only a slightly incongruous call to adopt
and adapt Christmas as a festival for Turkish children. It had a socio-critical dimension which
had escaped the *Times*’ journalist. The poet was critical of the westernised bourgeoisie and
condemned their mimicry of European customs: “It was unavoidable that this celebration,
which is not religious, would appear among us after the adoption of the Gregorian calendar.
But it only exists among those people, who love balls, and are considered distinguished
because they live in big apartments. It serves them as an excuse to dance and drink
champagne for one more night.”

Christmas, in one form or another, was already
celebrated by the *alafranga* bourgeoisie, he argued. All he did was to suggest that
Christmas should be given back to its rightful owners: children. Stealing from the rich and
sharing the booty with Anatolian children... Now, that was a truly radical proposal. Probably
too radical for the *Times* in 1928.

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90 Ahmet Haşim, *'Times’in Hatası’, Bütün Eserleri : Bize Göre İkdam’daki Diğer Yazılar*, eds. İnci
91 Ahmet Haşim, ‘Çocuklar İçin Bayram’, 177.
92 Ahmet Haşim, ‘Hatadan Fazla’, *Bütün Eserleri : Bize Göre İkdam’daki Diğer Yazılar*, eds. İnci
94 Ahmet Haşim, ‘Çocuklar İçin Bayram’, 177.
What does Turkey think?
edited by Dimitar Bechev

European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011
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and in PDF format, from
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/what_does_turkey_think

Since 2002 Turkey has been undergoing a revolution in attitudes. Just how radical the changes have been can be gauged by reading What does Turkey think? The grandiosely-named European Council on Foreign Relations – ‘the first pan-European think-tank’ – has brought together a group of leading protagonists, including an advisor to the prime minister and a former AKP member in parliament, and several writers noted for their staunch advocacy of the changes of the last decade.

All agree that Turkey has undergone a sea-change. “The old Turkey was haunted by anxieties, paralysed by tensions...the AKP-led Turkey is brimming with confidence”, writes the editor in his introduction. (Another contributor notes that the EU is now the ‘confused and paralysed’ one.)

This short book is indeed a celebration of the changes the AKP has introduced. The past before 2002 becomes the ‘tutelage regime’. “It is possible to say that there has been a move away from a culture of forgetting and the suppression of memory towards remembrance”, writes Ayşê Kadioğlu. A Kurdish contributor writes that the Turks and the Kurds can face the skeletons in the Turkish Republican closet “by remembering the 1915 Armenian-Assyrian genocide, the 1938 mass annihilation of Dersim Kurds, and more recent internal strife”. The word ‘Kemalist’ now seems derogatory.

The book is emblematic of the close interplay between the European intellectual establishment and the AKP revolution in the country, despite “moments of apparent rupture between Turkey and its Western allies”. The authors hint that Turkish EU accession is still possible, perhaps after 2015, even though the “EU’s moment is over”. But, even without membership, they believe that the country will continue travelling down its present trajectory towards wider democratic freedoms.

David Barchard
This very short account of the history and nature of the Cyprus conflict seeks to give the gist of the problem. It is a well-organised book designed in the form of questions the author believes that the reader will wish to have answered. He includes an account of enosis in the nineteenth century, though he does not mention the Turkish Cypriots’ fearful and hostile reaction to that movement. On personalities he asks ‘Who was Makarios and who is Rauf Denktaş? He should perhaps also have included a note on Glafcos Clerides, a major actor in the Cyprus drama. He and Denktaş knew each other well. In their strenuous efforts to reach agreement on how to solve the Cyprus problem they were once aptly described as two acrobats on the same rope.

Other questions asked are: “How did the 1960 Constitution break down?” and the vital question, “Why is UN security Council Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) so important?”, “How did the Turkish invasion happen?”, “Why and when did the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declare independence?”, “Should a divided Cyprus have been allowed to join the European Union?”, “What sort of federal system and governmental structure do the sides want?”, “Could a solution be based on a confederation or a unitary state?” There are 111 questions! The author does not ask why the Geneva conferences in 1974 broke down.

The questions are very much to the point, but what about the answers? Some, including those on the present situation are convincing. However, readers with some knowledge of the Cyprus conflict will not always be satisfied with the answers to some of the historical questions posed and the comments made. For instance, on the outbreak of violence in 1963 the author is not wholly convinced of the existence of the famed Akritas Plan, which sought to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots, by force if necessary, and revise the Constitution. However, the Akritas Plan has never been officially denied by the Greek Cypriots, so some more discussion would have been helpful. In this period, the author believes it highly likely that ‘many former members of the TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation) were determined to destabilise the situation in the hope or expectation that Turkey would in fact invade and that this would lead to formal partition’ (p.35). There certainly were some Turkish Cypriots who wanted partition, but the formidable Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia and the Turkish Premier İsmet İnönü would have none of it. İnönü wanted the 1960 settlement to stick: Ankara had played a major part in framing it. After the 1960 revolution in Turkey he also wanted the military back in their barracks.

Answering the very important question, “Did the Turkish Cypriots voluntarily withdraw from government or were they forced out (in 1963-64)?” the author gives a fair range of possible answers. İsmet İnönü told Vice-President Küçük that they should return, but Küçük was adamant that to do so would put their lives at risk. The Greek Cypriots nevertheless claimed that the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned their offices in order to establish their own state. In 1964 the UN Security Council, seemingly accepting this version of events, tacitly accepted the rump Greek Cypriot members of the government in office after the flight of the Turkish Cypriots ministers and civil servants as the Government of Cyprus. It was an assumption of immense importance. The author correctly notes that it was and still is deeply resented by the Turkish Cypriots, but it was not just a matter of their resentment; it determined the whole course of future events. International considerations played a large part in the decision,
particularly the Anglo-American concern that the Soviet Union might get a foothold in Cyprus, and the British bases threatened if Greek Cypriot interests were not respected.

In 1965 the Turkish Cypriots formally requested through the UN Secretary General’s Representative, to be allowed to return to their seats in parliament. They were refused unless they accepted constitutional amendments made unilaterally by the Greek Cypriots that, in effect, accorded them no more than minority rights. Clerides gave this response to the Turkish Cypriots, but there is no mention of it in his memoirs!

On the 1983 Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence we are told that ‘it appears to have reflected the personal ambition of Rauf Denktaş to be the founder of a Turkish Cypriot state’ (p. 52). He was in fact, already the elected president of the then existing Turkish Cypriot Federated State of Cyprus; it was established by referendum in 1975, and was intended to be a component in due course of a federal republic of Cyprus that it was hoped and expected would be established.

In 1983, incensed by a damning resolution (A/37/253) of the UN General Assembly, and by the relentless internationalisation of the dispute by the Greek Cypriots whilst negotiations were in progress, the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly asserted the Turkish Cypriots’ equal rights and status, and declared their right of self-determination. This was not the repudiation of federation, but insistence on equal rights and status in future negotiations. The Declaration of Independence only became possible because half the members of the major opposition party supported it. In the end it was voted for unanimously by the Legislative Assembly and was later approved in a referendum. It is not, therefore, really convincing to suggest that ‘the decision was shaped more by personal vanity than by a desire to do what was best for the Turkish Cypriot people’ (p.52). Indeed, shortly afterwards Denktaş was re-elected president of the newly named state by over 70 % of the voters on an 87 % turnout. Incidentally the author claims that ‘the economic and social isolation faced by the Turkish Cypriots (the embargoes) resulted from ‘the decision to unilaterally declare independence in 1983’(p.7). This is a point often urged by Greek Cypriots to justify the crippling embargoes, but it is untrue: the embargoes were in operation long before then. In 1979 Denktaş pointed out that by maintaining the embargoes the Greek Cypriots were jeopardising the talks then in progress.

In January 1985 Denktaş and Kyprianou met to sign up to an Agreement drawn up by the UN after long ‘proximity talks’ with both sides. At that meeting President Kyprianou very suddenly and unexpectedly declined to sign up to the agreement. The author avers that Denktaş only signed up to it because ‘apparently he had received word that Kyprianou would reject the agreement’ (p.53). This does not ring true at all. Denktaş could not have backed out of an agreement strongly advocated by Ankara. Moreover, he could agree to the ‘Draft Framework Agreement' because it did not contain measures to give effect to the Greek Cypriot demands for the three freedoms of movement, settlement and the right to return to their property in the North. The Turkish Cypriots accepted the constitutional proposals, as they later did nearly all those in the UN’s Set of Ideas (1992), but they rejected the proposals then made on territory, displaced persons and property’. Incidentally, it was not at all unreasonable in the Greek Cypriot interest for Kyprianou in 1985 to turn down the 1985 Agreement, even at the last moment.

With regard to the Annan Plan, it is certainly right to say ‘that had EU membership not been on offer to Cyprus, there would not have been a peace process in 2002’ (p.73) That Cyprus was being allowed to join the EU as a divided state exerted pressure on Turkey to support the Annan Plan, for the sake of its own then strong desire to join the European Union. The reasons why the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan against outside expectations are fully and convincingly explained.
In common with many foreign diplomatic observers the author regards former President Denktaş as the main and ‘intransigent’ obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus problem, but he was not a dictator. He worked in a very political environment, in which some were more hard-line than Denktaş, and he had always to contend with active and influential left-wing parties sympathetic to the nominally communist AKEL, party and inclined to solutions many Turkish Cypriots regarded as likely to undermine their independence. Denktaş was not ‘voted out of office’ in 2005. He decided not to stand for re-election as president.

On the present and future of the Cyprus problem, on the ‘Key Issues’ and on ‘Current and Future Settlement Efforts’ there is an informed and balanced assessment of current problems and prospects. It is reported that in the South ‘in moderate circles some appear to have concluded that ‘the north is all but lost for good and that maybe it is time to open up discussions on a formal separation’ (p.112).

This is in many ways a very useful book as long as ‘what everyone needs to know’ does not come to be interpreted as all that everyone needs to know. It provides the gist, as the author sees it, of the history of the Cyprus problem and possible solutions, but it is perhaps better regarded as a lively and challenging introduction. Omissions in the books recommended for further reading are the indispensable The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, by Zaim M. Necatigil, 2nd revised ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1998), which is much more focused on history than its title suggests, and the work of other writers on the Cyprus problem, including, Tozun Bahceli, Necati Ertekün, A.J.R. Groom, Michael Moran, Altay Nevzat, Ergün Olgun and Salahi Sonyel.

Clement Dodd

Mother Land

edited by Dmetri Kakmi

London: Eland Publishing Ltd, 2009, pp. 231
ISBN 978 1 906011 39 0

This is an autobiographical novel. The author uses the familiar device of an exile’s return to the land of his birth to give a picture of what life was like for the Greek community on the island of Bozcaada/Tenedos in the period 1968-70, before he and his family left for Australia. This is part one of the novel. The story is told through the eyes of the ten year-old author. The Greek schools had been closed and all children attended the one school. The Turkish teachers tended to be nationalist. Rum Greeks of all ages felt pressured. Relations between indigenous Greeks and Turks
became strained and strayed into violence. The police acted in partial and heavy-handed ways. Turkish settlers were brought in from the mainland. Greeks left, slipping away secretly. Domestic violence flared under the strain. We learn that the author’s mother had lived for a time as a servant to wealthier relatives in Istanbul and acquired a cosmopolitan veneer. His father, though, was a barely literate fisherman. Only in part two, when the author describes his home-coming, do we discover the circumstances of their marriage and its parallels with the story of his girl-friend who disappeared from the island in mysterious circumstances. All is revealed. But the return is sad. Everywhere seemed smaller than the author remembered it. Houses had been neglected, while others had become gentrified as second homes for people from Istanbul. The church was almost empty for the Sunday liturgy. I don’t want to say more and spoil the story for you. It is an interesting read and a fairly convincing portrayal of what life must have been like as the old ways of mixed community living broke down. The momentum is slow at the beginning but gradually builds up into a sort of thriller.

Malcolm Wagstaff

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Request for contributions

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