The 2015 John Martin Lecture
Friday 30 January 2015 at 6.00 pm

Dr Eugene Rogan
Associate Professor in the Modern History of the Middle East,
Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford

on

Gallipoli from Both Sides of the Trenches

in

London School of Economics, New Academic Building,
Wolfson Theatre, 54 Lincolns Inn Fields, WC2A 3LJ

For further information and to reserve a seat see www.batlas.org.uk

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Spring Symposium 2015
St Antony’s College, Oxford

Saturday 25 April 2015
10.00 am to 4.30 pm
Details will follow (see also www.batlas.org.uk for more information)
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Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.
Editorial

In 2013 we saw violence on Turkish streets between secularists and supporters of AK Party policies, following the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. This year we have clashes between Kurds and Turkish security forces across much of the country. One of the reasons why this Review arrives with a delay is that Gamon McLellan has set himself the difficult task of observing unfolding events in south-eastern Turkey and giving us an insight into relations between Turkey and the US, Turkey and her neighbours and the position Turkey holds vis-à-vis external and internal issues. Other articles also cover various aspects of Turkish Politics. However, it might be pointed out that Turkey sits at about seventeenth position on world economic rankings and the leadership talks convincingly about putting the country into the top ten before long. There is indeed talk of a range of major infrastructure developments in railways and bridges while building construction remains generally buoyant in the country and in foreign contract locations. Even the prospects for tourism continue to be good. The AK Party government, led by – now President – Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, perhaps surprisingly (given its other distractions), proceeds with pro-EU initiatives. And Turkey continues to expand its contribution to international culture, attracting outsiders to high quality conferences, concerts, and exhibitions.

You will find in this Review – apart from a number of political articles (including an interview) – the traditional mixture of various historical appreciations (ie British Travellers and Jews in Ottoman times), cultural aspects (poetry, opera and an interview with a musician), and a couple of books reviews to whet your appetite.

This autumn issue informs the reader about the presentations at the BATAS’ 2014 Symposium at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. This is always a high point in our Association’s calendar; next year this will take place at St Antony’s, Oxford. On Friday 30 January we will have ‘The 2015 John Martin Lecture’, an annual event in London. We thank our speakers on those respective occasions most warmly for their contributions. But we are equally grateful to our regular contributors of articles, updates, and information for this Review. And we thank BATAS colleagues who help us with a range of editorial duties. Needless to say, we also depend, on articles from occasional contributors – please get in touch to discuss a possible submission!

All those interested in matters Turkish have been saddened by the death of Andrew Mango earlier this year. He has been a towering figure in Turkish studies and connections in the United Kingdom for decades and we offer, in this issue, a reflective on his life and contribution.

Brian Beeley
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor
Noteworthy Events
by Ayşe Furlonger

CONFERENCE

The Levantines: Commerce and Diplomacy
The First Levantine Conference in Istanbul

Date: 3–5 November 2014
Venues: Pera House (UK Consulate - General), 3-4 Nov
Italian Institute of Culture in Istanbul, 5 Nov
For more information: George Galdies, the Symposium Coordinator: george.galdies@btconnect.com

The First Conference on Levantine History organised by the Levantine Heritage Foundation will take place in Istanbul in November 2014. It is hoped that the research presented will provide a deeper understanding of the mixed identities of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, and go some way towards answering the question: ‘Who were the Levantines?’

LECTURE

The Dardanelles Campaign viewed from both sides of the trenches

Date: May 14, 2015 - 6pm
Venue: Royal Asiatic Society, 14 Stephenson Way, London NW1 2HD

A lecture by Dr Eugene Rogan, Associate Professor of the Modern History of the Middle East; Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford

EXHIBITIONS

Joan Miró. Women, Birds, Stars

Date: 23 September 2014 – 1 February 2015
Venue: Sakip Sabancı Museum, Istanbul

This exhibition brings together 125 works – oil and acrylic paintings, lithographs, etchings, and assemblages with relevant models and drawings, plus textiles and ceramics - by this Catalan artist and sculptor. The focus on Miró’s women, bird, and stars themes, inspired by his observations of Mediterranean geography and people, will enable viewers to understand his symbolic language.

Glass Unlimited – Made in Istanbul

Date: 14 June 2014 – 11 January 2015
Venue: The Glass Factory Museum, Storgatan 5, 360 65 Boda Glasbruk, Sweden
Further information: www.theglassfactory.se/english/exhibition/east-meets-west-turkish-glass/

Glass Unlimited gives an overview of Turkish glassmaking, focusing on the role of the glass industry and its most prominent glass factory Paşabahçe and the emergence of the free studio glass artists.

The exhibition highlights four coherent themes that illustrate the various aspects of Turkish glass: the general outline of Turkish glass and its development; the foundation and
The development of Paşabahçe Glass Company and its role and production today; traditions and techniques that shaped Turkish glassmaking; and Turkish studio glass – the independent artists. The exhibition displays historical artefacts alongside contemporary objects produced by Paşabahçe Glass Company and independent Turkish artists.

The Glass Factory has Sweden’s most comprehensive collection of art glass, which consists of about 30,000 objects from various glassworks by more than 40 artists who have worked with glass. It is an interactive glass museum that serves as a knowledge centre and creative meeting place for artists, designers and visitors.

One Hundred Years of Love
The Affair between Film and Audience in Turkey

**Date:** 25 September 2014 – 4 January 2015
**Venue:** The Istanbul Modern, Istanbul
Further information: www.istanbulmodern.org

The Istanbul Modern will present ‘One Hundred Years of Love’, an exhibition that looks at the 100-year history of Turkish cinema. Part of the museum's 10th anniversary celebrations, the exhibition covers the 100 years of film in Turkey starting from 1914, it features moments of encounter between film and audience and the amazing collective and individual worlds created by this encounter.

An important section in the exhibition features scenes from close to 50 Turkish films showing spectators and auditoriums.

Intersecting Worlds: Ambassadors and Painters

**Date:** November 03, 2013 - November 03, 2014
**Place:** Pera Museum, Istanbul
Information: en.peramuzesi.org.tr

Art patronage and ambassadors' portraits from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, with works selected from the Suna and İnan Kıraç Foundation Orientalist Painting Collection. This exhibition allows the visitor to travel across the meandering paths of diplomatic history under the guidance of art, but it also introduces us to intriguing personalities. Ambassadors and painters continue to communicate with us through a silent yet equally rich and colourful language of expression, presented in their reports and letters, and share with us their respective periods, worldviews, travels and experiences, as well as the ceremonies in which they joined.

Paintings depicting the audience of European ambassadors at the Ottoman Palace constitute a special group of works that not only demonstrate a diplomatic event and reflect court traditions and officials in a range of attires but they also act as portraits of foremost individuals, such as the sultan and the grand vizier.

**CONCERT**

Gülsin Onay and Erkin Onay: Piano and Violin

**Date:** 4 January 2015
**Venue:** Trinity College Chapel, Cambridge
Information: www.neweurope.org.uk

Turkey’s internationally renowned pianist Gülsin Onay, who has released more than 20 CDs and DVDs, and her son Erkin Onay, The Concertmaster of the Ankara State Opera and Ballet Orchestra will perform music by Beethoven, Brahms, Debussy and Saygun in the beautiful surroundings of Trinity College Cambridge.
Turkey’s Politics since March 2014:  
a Survey

by

Gamon McLellan, SOAS - University of London

Turkey’s new European Minister Volkan Bozkır was in Brussels on 18 September launching an impressive new five-year strategy for Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Nevertheless, in the last two years, Turkey’s application to join the European Union has not been a high priority in either Brussels or Ankara. Yiğit Bulut, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s chief economic adviser, argued that Europe will not figure in the three major groupings of world nations, and the new President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker spelt out to the new Enlargement Commissioner that “following the extensive enlargement of the Union in the last decade, the next five years will be a period of consolidation, with no further enlargement taking place during our mandate. You will be responsible for continuing ongoing enlargement negotiations, notably with the Western Balkans.”

As well as enlargement fatigue in the member countries, the Turkish authorities’ response to last year’s Gezi demonstrations in Istanbul and to the subsequent protests around the country soured the relationship perhaps irrevocably. The corruption allegations that surfaced at the end of 2013 and the legislation enacted this year to increase government control over the internet and the judicial system indicated that in many respects the Erdoğan government was moving in a direction diametrically opposed to European Union norms.

In one area specifically, Turkey has repeatedly had difficulty in demonstrating that it conforms to EU values and standards: health and safety at work. For years, reports of disasters in the mining sector, the construction sector and in shipyards – most strikingly in the Tuzla shipyard in Istanbul – have featured in the news, with little indication of any serious measures being taken to minimise the risk of such tragedies. In May, 301 mine workers died in a fire in the Soma mine in Manisa province – the Turkish Republic’s worst mining disaster. The mine owner was known to be close to the AK Party, and an opposition motion in Parliament in October 2013 demanding an investigation into the high numbers of accidents at the mine and its safety regime had been voted down by the AK Party majority. As the full horror of what had happened emerged over the days following 13 May fire, it was apparent that safety and general working conditions at the mine had been atrocious.

In his first press conference in Soma, Prime Minister Erdoğan pledged that the accident would be investigated in minute detail, but he warned that there were extremist elements who would try to exploit such situations. A journalist from Al Jazeera asked how a mine so unprepared for an accident could be allowed to continue to operate and raised the question of ministerial responsibility. Erdoğan replied that the correspondent clearly did not know much about how coal mines functioned: there were not many coal mines in Qatar. He then mentioned four major coal mining accidents in Turkey from 1942 onwards, and then cited international mining disasters, starting with Britain in 1862, and detailed a further 16 incidents in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: “…These are unexceptionable events… It’s not correct that it’s something that happens just in mines. In other industries they happen, work-place accidents. They happened here. They’re in the structure, in the nature of the business…”

This last sentence became a headline in the context of the sufferings of the miners and their families, and Erdoğan’s subsequent walk-about in Soma was a public relations disaster. The details were widely reported, with videos apparently showing abuse and assaults on members of the traumatised community. A Prime Ministerial adviser

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1 © Gamon McLellan, published Turkish Area Studies Review 24, Autumn 2014, pp
5 www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/238-iscimizi-kaybettik/63108#1
was shown kicking a resident while he was held down on the ground by two uniformed soldiers. Mourners and other town residents suffered tear gas and water cannon attacks by the security forces, who eventually stopped access to the town by outsiders. All this prompted protests around the country, which were reminiscent of what had started nearly a year earlier: the Gezi demonstrations, the violent response of the police, provoking sympathy demonstrations around the country, followed by more violence from the security forces.

The Soma disaster occurred two months after the death in an Istanbul hospital of Berkin Elvan, the Alevi boy who had been in a coma since he went out to buy bread in June 2013 during the Gezi protests and was shot with a police tear gas canister. What happened in Soma rekindled all this anger against the government by a large segment of the population, and against the Prime Minister, his personality, his style of government, his behaviour in public and in private. On the same day as the mine disaster, Mehmet İstif died. He had been suffering from oropharyngeal cancer (cancer of the base of the tongue) since June 2013, when a policeman in Mersin sprayed him in the mouth with tear gas at close range.

Despite affirmations by ministers that Turkey had excellent health and safety at work legislation introduced in 2012 to conform to EU requirements,6 they clearly were not being applied, and the lessons of Soma were not learned. On 6 September there was a further horrendous work-place disaster in the Şişli district of Istanbul, when a lift crashed down from the 32nd floor of a luxury apartment building under construction, killing 10 workers. Again mourners and protesters were violently dispersed. Popular anger was exacerbated by reports of earlier problems with the lift and by the discrepancy between the luxury on offer to future residents and the squalor in which workers on the site were housed. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), claimed the company constructing the building was an AK Party sponsor.7 The Soma and Şişli disasters came too late to influence the local government elections at the end of March. Protests, however, against arbitrary government decisions and the Prime Minister’s personal style had flared up intermittently ever since the Gezi protests died down. This year there were also the startling allegations of corruption in government circles.8

The results showed a clear victory for the AK Party, which won 44% of votes.9 In the assembly elections,10 the Republican People’s Party (CHP) won 21.61%, not very far ahead of the 19.27% of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). With the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) gaining 5.95% and the Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) winning 1.25%, the Kurdish nationalist vote totalled some 7.2%. The only other significant party, the Felicity Party (Saadet)11 gained 3.08%.

The mayoral elections, where local personalities come into play, saw rather different results. The CHP won 28.75% of the vote (31.04% in the metropolitan mayoralities), and the MHP 15.71% (17.76% in the non-metropolitan mayoral elections). The largest metropolitan districts remained in AK Party hands, apart from İzmir (where CHP retained control), Diyarbakır (where a BDP candidate was successful), and Adana which was won by MHP, although the AK Party won the assembly elections there (Isparta and Kars also returned MHP mayors with AK Party dominated assemblies). Seven provinces elected CHP mayors and AK Party led assemblies.12 Tunceli elected a BDP mayor and a CHP led assembly, and in Bitlis the BDP mayor was elected alongside an AK Party led assembly. In Mardin an independent mayor and a BDP dominated assembly were elected.

Some analysts13 suggested that the local government elections were in reality a contest between the AK Party leadership and Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement, with the latter effectively

8 See “Turkey’s Politics since October 2013: a Survey”, Turkish Area Studies Review 23, Spring 2014
9 Average of mayoral and local assembly elections
10 Municipal and Provincial General Assembly elections (Belediye Meclisleri and İl Genel Meclisleri). The figures given here are an average of the results from the elections for both types of assembly, not in this case the mayoral elections (source: Yüksek Seçim Kurulu http://www.ysk.gov.tr)
11 Islamist party headed by Necmettin Erbakan until his death in 2011
12 Burdur, Çanakkale, Giresun, Hatay (Antakya), Sinop, Yalova, Zonguldak
13 e.g. David Gardner, Financial Times 31 March 2014
eliminated as a political force. They were also, however, a further sign of the political ineptitude of the principal opposition party, the CHP. Its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, had put up a credible performance as mayoral candidate in Istanbul in 2009, despite only having arrived in the city from his party role in Ankara two months previously. Had he been in place several years earlier, he might have beaten the popular AK Party mayor Kadir Topbaş. Yet this year, under his leadership, the party again dithered before selecting its candidate for the crucial position of mayor of metropolitan Istanbul, which in 1994 had launched the career of Erdoğan. Only on 23 December last year did the CHP finally announce its mayoral candidates. The popular mayor of the Şişli district Mustafa Sarıgül was the Istanbul candidate. He achieved 40.05% of the vote, but failed to topple the AK Party mayor Kadir Topbaş, who won with 47.91%. The vote was even closer in Ankara, where the CHP candidate received 43.83% against the AK Party mayor Melih Gökçek, who won with 44.61%. The AK Party did well in the metropolitan mayoral elections, with 45.54%.

Maps of results nationwide reveal a country almost entirely in the hands of the AK Party, with a narrow strip of CHP control in Thrace and in west and south west Anatolia, together with Eskişehir and Tunceli. Osmaniye and Mersin returned an MHP assembly, while there is a solid BDP bloc in the Kurdish south east. The AK Party improved its share of the vote when compared to the previous local government elections in 2004 (41.67%) and 2009, (38.39%) but with a lower percentage than the 49.83% it won at its peak in the June 2011 parliamentary general election.

There were issues about the conduct of the elections. There were suspicious clusters of invalid votes in districts where the AK Party lead was narrow. Particular issues were identified in Ankara. Electricity power cuts occurred overnight in over twenty provinces while votes were being counted: commentators noted that some of the electricity companies involved were owned by AK Party supporters. Energy Minister Taner Yıldız provided rich material for cartoonists when he said that a power cut in Ankara was the result of a cat getting into an electricity sub-station. The opposition complained that in Antalya, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, then Minister for Europe (Foreign Minister since September), had been present when votes were being counted. Several results were contested, and runoffs were ordered in two provinces.

The CHP was again late in identifying a candidate for the August presidential election. Despite having challenged the election date at the constitutional court in 2012, they had identified no candidate for an election then, and by early summer this year they were no more prepared. Finally, on 16 June, after lengthy negotiations the CHP and MHP announced they would support the same candidate, who would be not a party candidate, but ‘Turkey’s candidate’. They selected Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a respected 70-year old academic who for ten years had held the international position of Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu explained that he had started the selection process by defining first who could absolutely not be President: “Someone who does not believe in the separation of powers; someone who slaps his own citizens and divides them in camps; someone who turns anger and hate into a political language; someone who does not believe in rule of law; someone who does not believe in gender equality; someone who lies and whose moral values are low; someone who has no international respect; someone who does not believe in a democratic, secular and social state; someone whose knowledge is insufficient, someone who disrespects artists; and someone whose past is shady.” The choice as candidate of İhsanoğlu, an unimpeachably respectable figure, nevertheless unsettled many, particularly the CHP membership.

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14 The CHP claimed its candidate won, but was unsuccessful in challenging the Ankara result
17 In Yalova, where the AKP candidate had been declared the winner by one vote, the mayoralty was finally awarded to the CHP, who appealed and won by 6 votes on 1 June in a rerun of the election
18 Known until 2011 as the Islamic Conference Organisation. İhsanoğlu’s term of office ended on 31 January 2014
At the end of June, the Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) named its candidate: the party’s joint leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, a 41-year old who was first elected a member of parliament for Diyarbakır in 2007 and who now represents Hakkari. Finally, on 1 July, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was declared the AK Party candidate, again waiting until almost the last moment. This had happened in 2007, when it had also been widely assumed he would be the AK Party candidate. Then he only announced that the AK Party candidate would be “our brother Abdullah Gül” on 24 April, three days before the first round of voting was due.20

It was clear that the election would be about two related issues: Erdoğan’s personality and style and the role of the presidency in Turkey’s democratic system. The AK Party had been arguing for an executive presidency, but lacked the parliamentary strength to submit the required constitutional amendment to referendum.21 Nevertheless, Erdoğan indicated during the campaign that he expected to use the full powers of the office if elected. Traditionally, the presidency is seen as above politics, a focus of national unity, and the president has to sever all political party connections when elected.22 Yet as Erdoğan spelt out in a speech to the AK Party MPs on 13 May,23 Atatürk and İnönü combined the role of president with that of CHP leader. Critics worry about an assertive, politically active president.

Far from acting as a focus of national unity, Erdoğan continued to attack his critics. In his balcony speech after the local government election victory on 30 March, he thanked his brothers in Palestine, Egypt, Syria and the Balkans who were, he said, celebrating the result with the people of Turkey. He spoke contemptuously of the opposition leaders, but reserved his real venom for the Pennsylvania-based Fethullah Gülen and his Hizmet movement, calling them traitors, enemies of democracy and “worse than the Assassins”, castigating them in particular for the release online of video and audio recordings.24 The Prime Minister was furious at the dissemination a few days earlier of a recording of a conversation about Syria in the Foreign Ministry involving Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Hakan Fidan (Head of the Intelligence agency MİT) and the deputy chief of the general staff, in which Fidan appeared to be offering to send four men over the border into Syria to lob some eight missiles into an uninhabited stretch of Turkish territory so as to give Turkey a pretext to attack Syria.25 Two weeks later, Erdoğan returned to the attack on the Gülen movement, accusing them of working against Turkey with ‘the Armenian lobby’ and foreign media circles, and berating judges associated with Hizmet for releasing police and army officers who in January had detained TIR trucks they suspected of carrying arms near the Syrian border.26 On 11 May he declared that if purging traitors from public service counted as a witch hunt, a witch hunt was what the government was determined to do.27 On 19 September, he alarmed Turkish businessmen when he criticised Bank Asya (understood to be close to Hizmet) without naming it. Its chief executive, he said, complained the government was trying to sink the bank. “That bank has already sunk,” he declared.28

Other groups in society seen by Erdoğan as hostile did not escape his wrath. On 10 May, he lost patience when Metin Feyzioğlu, head of the Bar Association, criticised the government during a
formal state legal ceremony. The Prime Minister interrupted him and walked out after a heated exchange, leaving President Gül to follow meekly after him.29

Voting for the country’s first directly elected president took place on 10 August. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won 51.79% of the vote and was duly elected. The MHP-CHP supported candidate, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, won 38.44%. The HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş got 9.76%,30 a significant achievement for a party seen as Kurdish. İhsanoğlu did well, considering that he was not widely known in Turkey and did not have time to win the trust of CHP and MHP supporters, many of whom were suspicious of his religious background and origins (he was born and brought up in Egypt, where he studied in ‘Ain Shams and Al Azhar universities). Although he appealed to some religiously minded voters upset at Erdoğan’s divisive language and the corruption allegations, many secularists could not bring themselves to vote for him. Turn-out was particularly low at 74%. Erdoğan’s vote was 1.3 million ahead of the combined votes of the other two candidates. Nearly 15 million registered voters did not vote. Had only a small proportion of those who abstained voted for İhsanoğlu, there would have been a second round of voting between the two leading candidates.31 Erdoğan might or might not have won, but certainly would have found it harder to claim that he represented the national will in acting as a hands-on president. For the first time Turkish citizens living abroad could vote in their country of residence. Turn-out abroad was very low, some 8.25%. The election was criticised, because Erdoğan toured the country electioneering in his official capacity as Prime Minister, and the media gave his campaign disproportionate coverage.

After the election came another balcony speech by the victor: “Not just Turkey,” he proclaimed, “but Baghdad, Islamabad, Kabul, Beirut, Sarajevo, and Skopje have won today. Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Ramallah, Nablus, Gaza and Jerusalem have also won.”32

The first item on the agenda after the election was the choice of a new AK Party leader and Prime Minister. Erdoğan was criticised for refusing to resign as Prime Minister immediately after the election, continuing in office until he was sworn in as President on 28 August. He also stayed on as party leader and chaired the crucial national executive meeting which designated the candidate for party leader, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was duly elected at a party congress on 27 August. He formally became Prime Minister on 29 August and presented his government’s programme33 to Parliament on 1 September. The message was business as usual and reassurance to foreign investors. The central bank would continue to set monetary policy independently, and efforts would be made to reduce the current account deficit. Ali Babacan, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy, and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek remained in place. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, EU Minister, became Foreign Minister. Most of Erdoğan’s cabinet was unchanged.

The choice of Davutoğlu as AK Party leader was not a surprise. Abdullah Gül’s name had been mentioned, but he was seen as too close to the Gülen movement, and he is not a member of parliament.34 Leading AK Party figures such as Bülent Arınç and Ali Babacan will not be eligible for re-election to parliament next summer. Ahmet Davutoğlu has worked closely with Erdoğan, first as adviser and since 2009 as Foreign Minister. He is an effective speaker in both Turkish and English and is seen as an emollient figure with interpersonal skills which could allow him to build a strong personal base amongst the party grass roots. Critics claim he is merely executing Erdoğan’s orders and point to his famous “zero problems with neighbours” foreign policy: there are now significant problems with neighbours. A more serious criticism came from a former student of Davutoğlu,

30 Figures from the Electoral Commission (YSK) http://www.ysk.gov.tr/
31 50% of the vote was needed to win in the first round.
34 The Prime Minister has to be an MP (Article 109 of the Constitution)
Behlül Özkan, who in July argued that Davutoğlu believes that Islamic unity can be achieved by breaking the system of nation states in the Middle East and that Turkey should spearhead this by abandoning its traditional policy of remaining within its current borders and adopting instead an expansionist, pan-Islamist stance. Ahmet Davutoğlu's regional policy came under scrutiny when the self-styled Islamic State seized the Turkish Consulate in Mosul on 11 June, taking 49 people hostage. There was widespread concern for their fate in Turkey, and international understanding that Turkey would not join any operation against IS while its nationals were under threat.

Ankara's position, however, became increasingly uncomfortable. Iraq's Shiite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, an antagonist of Erdoğan, was replaced on 8 September by the less aggressively sectarian Haidar al-Abadi, but, despite all Erdoğan's rhetoric, Bashar al-Assad remained in power, while Ankara's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates suffered from Erdoğan's vehement support for deposed Egyptian President Mohammed al-Mursi. Qatar was pressed by its neighbours to expel Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members living in Doha. Three leading Brotherhood figures left for Turkey.

After the Mosul hostages were released unharmed on 20 September, Ankara came under pressure to take action against IS, to help relieve the plight of the mostly Kurdish population of the city of Kobani ('Ayn al-'Arab) on the Turkish frontier, who faced slaughter if the city were taken. Questions started to be asked about some of the details of the hostage-taking.

Accounts of how the hostages were released differed. President Erdoğan said there had been a successful operation by MIT, the National Intelligence Agency. Prime Minister Davutoğlu said it had been a result of MIT maintaining contact throughout. The Head of MIT, Hakan Fidan, said the release had been a result of patient, detailed work. There were differing reports also about the start of the crisis. Some accounts said the consulate staff wanted to leave Mosul before IS arrived, but had been told to stay put. Other press reports say the Consul-General had been ordered to leave, but had not done so.

As Kobani's inhabitants became increasingly desperate in early October, the government's reluctance to take action across the border to help them or to allow any of its citizens to do so incensed many of Turkey's Kurds. Violent demonstrations broke out in Turkey's Kurdish provinces and in the big cities. Two senior police officers were killed in Bingöl, and the official death toll nationwide reached 37 by 9 October. The rhetoric used by Erdoğan against Bashar al-Assad and his advocacy of military force against the Syrian President were contrasted with the refusal to help the Kurds of Kobani. Similar sentiments were being expressed in private by the Americans, who started bombarding IS forces in Iraq a few days after the release of the Turkish hostages. There was still no confirmation that Ankara would allow US forces to use the Incirlik air base against IS. Meanwhile, Turkish forces struck PKK positions in Hakkari on 13 October.

Ankara did not relish aiding the forces of the Syrian Kurds' Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is affiliated to Abdullah Öcalan’s PKK and aims for a Kurdish state in northern Syria, but Turkey also seemed reluctant to move against IS. The government asserted that there were no civilians left in Kobani, contradicting statements from United Nations officials. Negotiations between Washington

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36 Known also by the acronyms ISIS, ISIL and in Turkish IŞİD


40 Załewski, Piotr. *Financial Times*, 21 September


43 Dombey, Daniel, *Financial Times* 14 October 2014

and Ankara became more acrimonious. Turkey demanded a no-fly zone in northern Syria, a buffer zone on the Syrian side of the frontier and coalition action against Assad. The US, though, saw IS as the immediate threat, not the Syrian regime. Vice President Biden expressed US frustrations when addressing students from Harvard. Turkey, he said, had been supplying arms and money to anyone who would fight Assad, and that included the extremists. Biden eventually rang and apologised to Erdoğan. There seemed, however, to be an impasse between the two allies. On 17 October, a State Department spokesman confirmed that the US had been sharing some intelligence with the Kurdish PYD in Syria – an alarming prospect for Ankara who identify the PYD with the PKK. On 20 October, after phone calls between Washington and Ankara, some sort of resolution seemed to emerge. The US confirmed that it had dropped weapons supplies to the PYD in Syria, and it was announced that Kurdish Peshmergas from northern Iraq, who had been trained and equipped by the United States, would be allowed through Turkey to northern Syria to take on IS. The danger in Turkey’s south east, however, was underlined on 19 October, when a Syrian rebel leader was shot and wounded in an attempt to abduct him and hand him to IS in Syria – an indication that IS sympathisers are able to operate inside Turkey.

The fury amongst Turkey’s Kurds over Kobani’s plight suggests there is little hope for an early conclusion of the peace process with the PKK, despite the passing of a law specifically designed for that process. The Davutoğlu government reacted to the violence by announcing a new law to increase police powers still further, allowing police to search people and seize their property on “reasonable suspicion”. Many people were unhappy when the government decreed on 7 September that headscarves could be worn at school by girls as young as ten. There were more complaints that pupils had been enrolled in Imam and Preacher schools without their knowledge or consent. However, the bans on YouTube and Twitter (imposed in March to block recordings released to embarrass the government) were ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in May.

Yet another law to amend the appointment processes for judges and prosecutors was passed in June. There were significant glaring discrepancies in the administration of justice. On 17 October, prosecutors dropped all charges against 53 suspects in the corruption case which began with police raids on 17 December 2013 – they included the four ministers who had resigned. Meanwhile, a group of Gezi protestors face demands for life imprisonment for their part in the protests of summer 2013. Court orders have ordered the halting or demolition of various controversial construction projects – these have not been implemented. One such order was to stop construction of a gigantic government building complex on the land of the Atatürk Forest Farm in Ankara. President Erdoğan said construction would continue regardless and will use it as the presidential complex. Invitations have been issued to a reception there on 29 October, Republic Day.

Freedom of cultural expression is to be limited. The Ministry of Culture announced that all scripts in the State Theatres would need prior approval, as would casting. The Director of the State Theatres resigned. The Ministry also insisted that Fazıl Say, internationally celebrated pianist and composer, was to be dropped from the 2014-2015 programme of the Presidential Symphony Orchestra. In September, the broadcast regulator formally warned a television station for not displaying the 18+ rating symbol for Roman Polanski’s award-winning film *The Pianist*. 

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46 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/10/233114.htm#TURKEY
47 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/10/233166.htm#TURKEY
48 Daily Telegraph 19th October 2014
49 “Law to end terror and strengthen social cohesion”, signed by President Gül on 15 July
51 Radikal 20 October 2014
52 http://www.radikal.com.tr/kultur/bakanliktan_fazil_saya_da_sansur-1219935
53 Cumhuriyet 13 September 2014
Between Hard and Soft Power

Turkey used to be a country that was reliant on its hard power to belong to the transatlantic security community while distancing itself from the Middle East. In the past decade, however, it has become more reliant on soft power but also increasingly proactive in the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey is now at a juncture between its soft and hard power. The conflict within Syria and Turkey’s turnabout relations with the regime in Damascus have been pivotal in a transition to hard power because the situation in Syria impacts on all three spheres of Turkish foreign policy: (1) the humanitarian/normative dimension (which has direct bearing on the transatlantic sphere), (2) the ‘sectarian’ dimension, and (3) the Realpolitik of outside events impinging on Turkey’s own national security – such as the downing of a Turkish jet by Syrian forces last year and the firing of mortars into Turkey causing civilian casualties.

In particular the sectarian/ethnic/religious sphere can inhibit any military action by Turkey because it relies on its soft power exclusively and Turkey is wary of getting drawn into regional sectarian quarrels. In fact the pressures of military intervention on humanitarian principles intersecting with the sphere of ethnic/sectarian/religious ties might be expected to result in Turkey turning from the troubles of the Middle East to focus entirely on the West. But such a shift is untenable now that Turkey is involved in the region and there is no going back to its distanced regional posture in the Cold War. However, this dilemma tells us that, much as Turkey under the AK Party may have become a Sunni champion in the region, it nevertheless will continue to avoid getting drawn into sectarian regional squabbles.

Regional interference in the context of the first sphere of humanitarian values is not likely to occur either, especially with a less cohesive Western stance on Syria, reluctance for Western involvement, and Russia’s opposition to any military intervention and its role as a deal broker in the chemical weapons control agreement with the Assad regime. This just leaves the last sphere: Turkey will only intervene if there is a direct threat to its national security. Some may say that the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border does constitute such a threat but, despite the shots fired across the border and the downing of a Turkish air force jet, both Turkey and its NATO allies have been reluctant to identify such incidents under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Iraq is another case of being caught between soft and hard power. While relations with the Maliki government in Baghdad have chilled, links with the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq have been improving, not just in collaboration over Turkey’s own Kurdish problem, but also in the separate oil export deal which bypasses Baghdad. The harbouring of the former Iraq Vice-President (who has been sentenced to death in Baghdad) is another indication of how relations with Iraq interplay between the second sphere of sectarian sympathies and the third sphere of Realpolitik which shape relations with the KRG in Northern Iraq.
Perhaps one of the most poignant examples of soft and hard power oscillation is relations with Israel. When such relations are good they fall into the third sphere of common interests in regional and national security and military cooperation driven by pure Realpolitik. When relations are bad they fall in the second sphere, with Turkey becoming one of the strongest critics of Israeli policies towards Gaza and following the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. Interestingly enough, the first sphere of the normative transatlantic community has absolutely no influence over the Turkey-Israel relationship. Generally, the Turkish-Israeli relationship tends to oscillate between spheres two and three. While, at first glance, one might say that recent relations with Iran, particularly the nuclear swap deal reached by Turkey and Brazil and then Turkey’s voting against further sanction in the UN Security Council in 2010, might be seen as Iranian relations determined by the second sphere of religious regional ties, in fact, relations with Iran firmly belong to the third sphere of Realpolitik. Turkey’s reasonably good relations with Iran, given that country’s isolation from the West, are predominantly driven by regional Realpolitik considerations of keeping all energy options open.

Energy Choices

Turkey is a major energy importer and a transit route country. Therefore, geostrategically, its policy choices in the region can sometimes be puzzling. A good example is the Turkish attitude during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. Georgia constitutes the middle leg of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline taking Azeri oil to international markets from the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan. It also constitutes the middle leg of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, carrying Azeri gas to Turkey. Future gas supply from Azeri and Caspian sources into Europe will use this pipeline. Apart from Georgia’s pivotal role in Turkey’s energy interests at that time, Georgia was also perceived by the United States as a prospective NATO member - much to the displeasure of Moscow.

As a NATO member, Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Russian objections to NATO’s enlargement to Georgia, on the one hand, and its strong economic and energy ties with Russia, on the other, was far more complicated than the similar dilemma faced by other European countries. At NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO deferred the extension of its Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine, due to France and Germany’s concerns about deteriorating bilateral ties with Russia. However, after the Russian invasion in August, the reservations of both countries faded and a unanimous NATO declaration was issued in support of Georgia’s eventual membership of NATO. For Turkey the situation was far more complicated. Not only did Georgia have a crucial geopolitical role in the two pipelines that turned Turkey into a major energy hub for the supply of Caspian gas and oil to international markets but Turkey’s own relations with Russia were also based on an intricate economic interdependence on gas. Which is why Turkey consulted with Russia during the Georgian crisis before contacting any of the its NATO allies. The Turkish proposal for a Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Pact was also first presented to Russia, then Georgia. Turkey also strictly observed the Montreux Convention during the crisis with no exceptions - even for high tonnage US warships passing through the Straits or for the 21-day time limit in the Black Sea.

On the other hand, Russian business interests compel it to be a cautious and strong energy supplier for Turkey. Russia is Turkey’s number one trading partner with over $30bn a year and Russia has interests in gas distribution in Turkey and in contracts for building refineries (including the Liquified Natural Gas station in Ceyhan). In 2009 a series of energy deals showed that Turkey was a bold negotiator in keeping all its energy options open and cultivating the best deals. One of the bargains which Turkey made with Russia in exchange for the Blue Stream involved Russian participation in the Samsun-Ceyhan (SCP) oil pipeline – avoiding tanker traffic on the Bosphorus. Russia also extended the 1996 gas agreement, continuing its role as the main energy supplier to Turkey – along with agreement for Russian firms to build a natural gas depot in Salt Lake (Tuz Gölü) in eastern Turkey.

Perhaps the most significant of the deals signed between Russia and Turkey during that time was the South Stream, Russia’s rival plan for the then much talked about Nabucco pipeline to
take Azeri gas through Turkey into Europe. The South Stream would run under the Black Sea to Europe but was deemed unfeasible because of Ukraine being a littoral state. Around the same time, Turkey signed up to the Nabucco pipeline that was supposed to run from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to Bulgaria. In the summer of 2013, the Nabucco project, largely financed by the EU, was replaced by the Turkish-Azerbaijani Trans Anatolian Pipeline project (TANAP) which is due to be operational by 2018. This will connect to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) running through Greece and Albania and under the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. This route is 500 km shorter than that proposed by Nabucco-West. Both pipelines are envisaged to carry gas from the Shah Deniz II, the largest gas field in Azerbaijan. There is even speculation that Eastern Mediterranean Gas might sometime be transported through TANAP and TAP if the projects are completed.

Another energy exporter with which Turkey likes to keep its options open is Iran. Although, unlike Russia, Turkey does not view Iran as a reliable energy supplier, because the quality and quantity of Iranian gas have not always met Turkish demands, it receives some gas from Iran under a 1996 deal. However, the Iranian deals reflect Turkey’s overall interest to diversify its energy supply needs rather than any Islamist empathy. Therefore, Turkey’s policy of keeping all options open when it comes to the Realpolitik of energy is not linked to identity politics – although AK Party leadership rhetoric has at times demonstrated a populist approach that falls within identity politics. Therefore any energy deal with Iran has to be thought of in purely realist terms.

Perhaps it is the relationship with Azerbaijan – dominated by energy concerns – that is difficult to see in realist terms. The agreement with Azerbaijan to lay a gas pipeline from Iğdır in eastern Turkey to the autonomous Azeri exclave of Nakhichevan could have been seen as a way to smooth Azeri concerns over the then Turkish-Armenian normalisation of relations. In fact, Turkey’s energy minister Taner Yıldız stated that the Nakhichevan deal was not a question of trade but a symbol of ‘brotherly relationship’ between the two countries, placing it entirely in the ‘identity’ politics sphere. In that sense Turkey was also sending a message to Azerbaijan that Turkey may have all these various energy deals in place and a normalisation of relations with Armenia for regional stability and trade, but its relationship with Azerbaijan could not be classified as realism. The link with Armenia is not likely to normalise until there is a settlement regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

Conclusion

Reading Turkish foreign policy may be difficult given Turkey’s long standing ties with the EU and the United States, on one hand, and its policies towards its surrounding regions, the Middle East as well as the Caucasus and Russia, on the other. But adding onto that the AK Party’s rhetoric of identity politics in foreign policy, which became more pronounced during the Egypt crisis of the summer of 2013, makes it even harder to explain the parallel Realpolitik policies with Russia, while pursuing a pro-intervention stance on Syria – and the TANAP project making Turkey a key energy transit country. This diversity and constant juggling between the three spheres of foreign policy show that there is more continuity than change in Turkish policy and that the observable changes cannot all be attributed to a shift away from the West to the East. Regardless of public rhetoric about courting the Shanghai Cooperation Initiative, the EU is still a major trading partner for Turkey and intensified bilateral trade deals with many EU countries, who are at the same time critical of the AK Party government’s domestic policies, nevertheless show that Realpolitik is not just one sided. It exists for both the EU and Turkey. Similarly, the US is seen as an indispensable strategic partner, and the hosting of the NATO missile defence shield’s radar is a testament to the importance Turkey attaches to that relationship. Turkey has come a long way since its days as a functional ally for the West. It has become a tough negotiator and at times an intransigent ally but it is, nevertheless, the only one that the West can rely upon time after time in a tough neighbourhood.
Update on Cyprus
September 2014
by Clement Dodd

Readers will recall from the last Update (Review No 23) that President Anastasiades accepted a Joint Declaration for the then forthcoming negotiations. He had wanted the Joint Declaration to declare that the federation would possess a single sovereignty, but this was rejected since it would be to deny the very purpose of a federation, which is to divide authority between a federal centre and the constituent states. Of course, the federal state would have just one voice in international affairs, which the Declaration oddly described as ‘a single sovereignty’. So the future purpose of the negotiations was agreed, it seemed – but not quite. Anastasiades has since maintained that the road to a federal state will be by amendment of the existing Republic of Cyprus. To this the Turkish Cypriot President, Derviş Eroğlu, strongly objects. For him the federal state will emerge from agreement made by the two existing states, an approach supported by the Turkish Government. In 2004, in negotiations on the Annan Plan, the UN fudged this issue by referring to the two ‘communities’, but that may not suffice now.

Convergences
Talks between the two sides soon got under way, the official negotiators being Andreas Mavroyannis and Kudret Özersay, who have usually met once a week. They have devoted most of their efforts to formulating the structure of the proposed federal state, an approach more likely to provide agreement than concentration on the larger issues of property abandoned by Greek Cypriots in 1974, the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to the North, and the division of territory between the two federated states. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, supports discussion first of the less controversial issues of federal state organization. Nevertheless there are major problems here too. Should there be a system of ‘cross voting’ to allow the votes of each side to influence the election of, say, the president and vice-president? Which functions should be accorded to the federal authority, and which to the constituent states is, of course, also another prime issue.

To guide the discussions it was sensible to review the agreements that have been reached in previous negotiations, particularly those between the former Greek Cypriot President, Demetris Christofias, and his counterpart. This was, first, Mehmet Ali Talat, and then Dervis Eroğlu, when he had succeeded Talat in office. In order to help along the negotiations the UN Special Adviser, Alexander Downer, prepared a list of seemingly agreed ‘convergences’ on important issues. However, the Greek Cypriot side has refused to accept these convergences for discussion, and, indeed, the Turkish Cypriot side, whilst generally accepting them, has now found some of them not much to their liking. This issue of establishing convergences on issues often previously discussed has become a major concern of both sides.

The Wider Issues
Anastasiades believes that, as a matter of priority, the discussions should concentrate on the larger issues at stake between the two sides. How much land will be returned to the Greek Cypriot constituent state? What is to be done for the return of Greek Cypriot owners to their property in the North, and the return of other refugees who fled in 1974? On the issue of territory he has proposed that just 18 per cent of the island should constitute the Turkish Cypriot zone, despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot population is now about a third of that of the whole island. In past negotiations the Turkish Cypriots have never
accepted less than 29.9 per cent of the land. Moreover, Anastasiades has proposed that 100,000 Greek Cypriots should move into surrendered territory, these to be followed by a further 60,000. Eroğlu will not countenance any of this, since it would entail turning thousands of Turkish Cypriots into refugees.

On the constitutional issue, Anastasiades does not want a rotating presidency, a system on which there has been a convergence of views in previous negotiations. He is strongly in favour of a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president, as in the 1960 Constitution, but he wants both offices to be filled by votes of all Cypriots taken together without cross voting! This would mean the election of both offices by the Greek Cypriot majority. Even some Greek Cypriots believe that this was going much too far. The Greek Cypriot side also wants to have repatriated to Turkey the allegedly very large numbers of ‘settlers’ who, it is alleged, have established themselves in Northern Cyprus since 1974.

The Population of the TRNC
The Turkish Cypriot population census of December 2011 revealed a total population of some 295,000, as compared with 265,100 in 2006. These figures include, however, *inter alia*, the families of Turkish soldiers, Turkish students, tourists, registered workers in various trades having skills not available among Turkish Cypriots and, particularly, many illegal unregistered, often temporary, workers from Turkey. These are not the ‘settlers’ the Greek Cypriots believe have come in their thousands permanently to occupy former Greek Cypriot property in Northern Cyprus. Persons born in Cyprus are reported to number some 130-140,000, so there are, clearly, many Turks in the TRNC. However, to be able to vote in elections, and to fill any political office, it is necessary to be a TRNC citizen. Those of Turkish origin constitute some 25 to 30 per cent of TRNC citizens.52

Confidence–building Measures
A way to make progress in the negotiations has been to try to develop confidence-building measures (CBMs) in relatively minor issues, as with the existing joint technical committees. In this regard, the Greek Cypriots have proposed setting up joint committees to help familiarize the Turkish Cypriots with EU norms, but this seems to the Turkish Cypriots to be premature. Their concern with the EU is to obtain assurance that in a federation they would be able to obtain permanent derogations in some areas in order to prevent their domination by the larger Greek Cypriot side. As they had failed to obtain such derogations in 2004, they realize that they would be very unlikely to obtain them now, especially as the Greek Cypriots are opposed to any, even temporary, derogations. For this and other reasons there has been little enthusiasm on the Turkish Cypriot side for contacts with the European Union. Confidence-building measures are usually, and rightly, meant to relate to small issues, but the Greek Cypriots keep on insisting that Varosha should be handed over to them without any *quid pro quo*. In return they might allow the Turkish Cypriot airport at Ercan to be used by international traffic. However, the Turkish Cypriots do not consider that this is enough: in return for giving up Varosha, a major concession, they would expect recognition of the TRNC and the lifting of the embargoes, to which the Greek Cypriots will never agree.

A new Special Adviser
Eroğlu believes that Anastasiades is a much more difficult president to deal with than his predecessor, Andreas Christofias, but then Eroğlu can be just as firm as Anastasiades. They have come to know each other well having met in the negotiations seven times during the period under review. At the sixth meeting on 24 July each leader was frustrated by the

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52 These figures are taken from an article (in Turkish) by Mete Hatay, with no title, available at haberkibris.com74fe36-201112-25.html.
other on the issue of convergences, a meeting that Anastasiades reportedly left in high dudgeon. The seventh meeting took place in September in the presence of the newly appointed Norwegian UN Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, who had served as defence minister and also as foreign minister in the Norwegian Government. As is often the case, the appointment of a new Special Adviser held out the promise of much more positive approaches in the future by both leaders. Eide replaced Alexander Downer, who had resigned in April from what is often referred to as the Cyprus diplomatic graveyard.

After a torrid summer the atmosphere cleared with Eide’s arrival, and his almost immediate meeting with the two presidents, relieving the Deputy Special Adviser, Lisa Buttenheim, who in the meantime had carried the heavy burden of trying to help along negotiations. Eide thought that the differences between the two sides could be resolved. There was certainly an early sign of progress. After a dinner for Eide and the two leaders in the residence of the Deputy Special Adviser, Lisa Buttenheim, it was announced that the two leaders had agreed to move on to an ‘active stage’ in the talks, Eide declaring that he saw the Joint Declaration as a clear guide, ‘and not contradictory’.

The United States and Cyprus

There was an important American visitor to the island in late May, no less a person than the American Vice-President Joe Biden. He remarkably began his visit by declaring for all to hear that the Greek Cypriot government was the recognized Government of the whole of Cyprus. Perhaps he was making the point because he intended also to meet the Turkish Cypriot ‘leader’, President Eroğlu. The leader of DIKO, the nationalist Democratic Party, Nicolas Papadopoulos, thought that Biden’s emphasis on the sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic suggested that it was in some doubt! The meeting with Eroğlu was amicable enough, though there was some uneasiness about the lack of a handshake between the two.

Before the visit there had been some discussion with the American Ambassador on the need to have Varosha surveyed by a team of experts, foreign and Cypriot, to determine what had to be done in order to restore this devastated area. It was apparently hoped that the United States would fund such a survey, but the suggestion that Greek Cypriots should be among the experts to examine the area was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot government. For the Turkish Cypriots Varosha is a major issue that must form part of the overall solution: it is not a CBM.

The real significance of Biden’s visit lay in his marked emphasis on the importance now of Cyprus as ‘a genuine key partner of the United States in the challenging region of the eastern Mediterranean’. The Greek Cypriots were somewhat taken aback by this emphasis on their own importance to so great a power as the United States, a message subsequently reaffirmed by the American Ambassador. The reason generally adduced for the assertion of this flattering and unequal partnership is the American belief that Russia’s domination of the supply of gas to Europe would be reduced if a supply of gas from the eastern Mediterranean could be obtained. For this the easiest and cheapest route would be by Turkish pipelines to the Balkans, hence one extra need for a solution of the Cyprus problem, though whether there is, or likely to be, enough gas in the Cypriot area of exploration and development for so large a market as that of Europe is apparently open to question.

The Russian Government is not likely to welcome such a project. So it was not surprising that a little later the Russian Ambassador saw fit to crack the Russian whip. He upbraided Anastasiades for allowing a distinguished author who was, incidentally, a government

53 Makarios Drousiotis
employee, to allege in a book that in 1974 the USSR gave no help to the Greek Cypriots but, instead, stood aside believing that the ‘invasion’ would split NATO. It was an intervention that the political leaders on the left greatly welcomed as timely and essential, even if it reminded others that the Soviet Union still lived on.

Other ambassadors in Cyprus have recently been reprimanded, but this time by Anastasiades for accepting lunch invitations from the Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister, Özdil Nami. The visits really derive from a new realization by the Turkish Cypriots that it is necessary to give the world its own version of the Cyprus conflict. In this Kudret Özersay has played a significant part in visits to Europe and the United States. He, and Mavroyannis, also participated in an important conference in Brussels in early March for businesses from both sides organized by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Greek and Turkish Cypriot business leaders showed that they clearly want, and will exert influence, to promote a solution.

Visitors from Turkey
The American Vice-President was not the only visitor to Cyprus during the period under review. After having been elected President of Turkey in August, President Tayyip Erdoğan made a visit to the TRNC – his first visit abroad as President. In a speech he envisaged an agreement between two states in conditions of political equality, ‘The current window of opportunity,’ he warned, ‘will not remain open for ever. Everyone must know that Turkey will never accept a Greek Cypriot government that turns the Turkish citizens into a minority’. He supported ‘a bi-communal federation, political equality and two founding states . . . on the basis of the parameters established by the United Nations’. In his response Anastasiades clearly showed that he did not approve of the reference to ‘two founding states’ and said that Erdoğan’s remarks ‘cannot be the pretext for a new deadlock that would validate the Turkish side’s Plan B . . . The Turkish approach was disappointing’.54 Does the Turkish Cypriot side have a Plan B?

The next visitor, again from Turkey, was Ahmet Davutoğlu, now promoted to prime minister. ‘We have wanted’, he said, ‘Turkey, Greece, the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot Administration to come together to turn the eastern Mediterranean into a regime of peace. Now is the time for action. Let us lift the embargoes’. He also urged the United States and the United Kingdom to help and he declared that Turkey would never abandon the Turkish Cypriots. A Greek Cypriot spokesman tartly responded by saying that Turkey’s first priority was to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and relinquish Varosha. More recently, responding to pressure from its former inhabitants, the Greek Cypriot side has been calling for the immediate return of Güzelyurt (Morphou) the very fertile area of north-west Cyprus abandoned by the Greek Cypriots in 1974, a real sticking point in negotiations on territory.

The Future
How, if ever, will it all end? A two-state solution may well seem a safer solution than an unequal, and probably fractious, federation of just two communities whose leaders are at odds with each other. With two separate states, and both members of the European Union, there would be an opportunity for the two governments to learn to work together. It could be the best way to reunify the island. It has always been said that with such a solution the Turkish Cypriots would be prepared to cede more territory than they would for a federation. But in return would the Greek Cypriots acknowledge that the Turkish Cypriots also have a right to share in the island’s profits from the hydrocarbon deposits? According to Kudret Özersay this issue could be a real sticking point in the present negotiations, which are difficult enough.

54 Quotations from these and Davutoğlu’s remarks are as given in the Cyprus Mail, 2 and 16 September 2014 respectively. If the Turkish Cypriot side has a Plan B it has not been made known. Was it being assumed in order to show that the TRNC was not really interested in the success of the present negotiations?
Tribes, Turks and Persians in the time of Nader Shah 1698-1747

by Michael Axworthy
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Nader Shah rose to the throne of Persia in a period of anarchy after the collapse of the Safavid Empire in 1722. Having restored the frontiers held by the Safavids, he led campaigns well beyond them, conquering Delhi in 1739 and defeating the main field army of the Ottoman Empire on three separate occasions, in 1733, 1735 and 1745. In the twentieth century and since, he has been celebrated by some Iranian nationalists as a strong leader who rescued Iran from chaos and partition. But Nader’s first language was not Persian – he spoke a Turkic dialect. The tribe he was born into, the Afshar tribe, was Turkic in origin and much of his military power relied upon recruitment from Turkic, Afghan, Kurdish and other tribes. Some of his attitudes (notably to his Safavid predecessors) and some of the brutality of his reign can be ascribed to ancient tensions between settled Persian-speaking city-dwellers and peasants, on the one hand, and nomadic, tribal Turks on the other. Ann Lambton in an important article labelled the eighteenth century as a period of tribal resurgence and bureaucratic decline in the region as a whole. But in many ways Nader transcended his tribal origins. He did not belong to the leading elite of his own tribe; many Afshars regarded him as an insufferable upstart, and through his career many of them rebelled against him. His military innovations showed little sign of tribal traditionalism; nor did his radical religious policy, through which he attempted to reintegrate Shi’ism back into the mainstream of Sunni Islam.

The history of Turkic nomadic tribes in Iran goes back to the use of Turkic mercenaries and ghulams by ruling Islamic dynasties in the Abbasid period (and beyond). The Turkic presence grew until Turkic dynasties established themselves (under the Ghaznavids), escalating to larger-scale invasion and settlement under the Seljuks in the eleventh century. Further waves of settlement took place following the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and the invasion of Tamerlane in the fourteenth century. In the fifteenth century rival Turkic dynasties fought for supremacy until finally the Safavids came out on top under Esmail I at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Initially controlling the territory of Iran through subordinate Qizilbash tribes; but later establishing a more centralized, bureaucratic...
state and a standing army, Safavid rule lasted until the early eighteenth century. The Safavids retained their Turkic dialect as a court language, but became heavily Persianised, and imposed Shi’a Islam as the state religion.

The ethnic, social, economic and political patterns of tribal settlement in Iran in this period were highly complex. The Turkic Qizilbash tribes tended to be dominant but there were other important tribes and tribal groups including Lurs, Afghans, Lezges, Arabs, Baluch, Kurds, Jalayirs and Steppe Turkmen. The tribes fought each other and different tribes achieved supremacy at different times. New tribes and confederations formed under charismatic leaders. Tribes might confederate into larger groupings, and might themselves be divided into smaller clans and other sub-groupings. A term that signified a larger group in one territory might be applied to a smaller sub-grouping in another place or time. Cities depended on tribes for products like meat and wool, but often also for protection (in various senses of that word). Tribes needed the cities (and the settled agriculturalists associated with them) for grain and for manufactured goods, especially weapons. There was an uneasy symbiosis, but the tribes and tribal leaders tended to dominate politically, especially when central authority in the Empire was weak. There was a cultural antagonism between nomad and city-dweller; Turk and Tajik.

Nader was born in the north-eastern province of Khorasan toward the end of the seventeenth century. He belonged to the Afshar tribe but did not come from a leading family; his childhood was marked by poverty and trauma. He rose to provincial influence in the chaos that followed the Afghan revolt at the beginning of the eighteenth century, gaining a following of Kurds, Jalayirs and Afshars as his reputation grew. He attached himself to the Safavid prince Tahmasp and reconquered Isfahan from the Afghans at the end of 1729. But Nader was not content to be a general for a restored Safavid monarchy; he deposed Tahmasp in 1732 and had himself made Shah in his own right in 1736. He fought successful wars against the Turks, Afghans and others, restored the borders to their positions before the Afghan revolt, and then marched eastwards, defeating the Moghul emperor and conquering Delhi in 1739. He used the enormous treasure of the Moghul Empire to build even larger armies and invaded Ottoman territory again in 1743, but by this time his physical and mental health was in decline. He made impossible demands for tax from his subjects, beating and killing any who demurred, which led to revolts all over his empire. Finally he was assassinated by an alliance of conspirators including Afshars, Qajars and Kurds and led by his own nephew, in 1747.

Previous Shahs (notably Shah Abbas) had used resettlement as a policy to control and exploit the tribes. Nader used it to a variety of ends; to punish, divide and weaken rebellious tribes, but also to strengthen the vulnerable north-eastern frontier in Khorasan, which became his own personal power-base. Many of the cavalry recruits for his army were drawn from these resettled tribes. The sons of tribal leaders were taken into special, high-status units and were useful as motivated, elite troops but were also effectively hostages for the good behaviour of their relatives and became indoctrinated into the prestige and ethos of Nader’s regime. Lower-status tribesmen were taken into cavalry units recruited from their own tribe, and in battle Nader would set these units in competition against each other; using tribal rivalry to drive the troops to greater efforts. In this way (as in others) Nader bent tribal characteristic to his own ends.

Ann Lambton’s theory of an eighteenth century tribal resurgence is superficially apposite for the period, but shows itself wanting when Nader Shah’s career is considered in greater detail. Nader was not simply a tribal leader. Militarily, he was an innovator. Rather than depending on traditional devolved government through tribal chiefs, he devised and operated a more centralized, maximising state, within which tribes were controlled and held under tighter subordination. Despite the shortness of his reign and of the time available for his system to develop, there were the beginnings of a reformed and tighter administrative and fiscal organization, under the aegis of his finance expert Taqi Khan Shirazi. I have suggested
elsewhere\textsuperscript{56} that the expansion of his army, its tighter organization and its more systematic use of gunpowder weapons, combined with these nascent administrative reforms to support it, are all signs of the advent in Iran of what in Europe has been called the Military Revolution in several states in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His tribal policy anticipates that of Reza Shah in the twentieth century in its aspiration to control (with Max Weber’s dictum in mind, about the state retaining the monopoly on violence within its territory) if not in its methods. There are parallels also with the rule of Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Nader Shah’s period is still neglected in Iranian historiography – whether because the violence of his period is distasteful, or because his military and political skill (and achievements) do not accord with an analysis that stresses the weakness and backwardness of Iran and the Middle East region as a whole in the eighteenth century, or for a variety of these and other reasons. An understanding of his relation to his tribal and Turkic origins is essential to a proper understanding of Iran as it emerged into the modern period.

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Clash of the titans ... or mud-fight of false prophets?
The latest chapter in Turkey’s power struggles

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Turkey’s politics have often been dominated by the machinations of power-hungry individuals, opaque structures of governance and weak democratic institutions. While this regime of power has hardly changed since the introduction of multi-party politics in the late 1940s, its actors and ideologies have been more transient. The centre-right and its Islamic allies have fought against the Socialists and Communists since the 1960s, while the Kemalists and the military tried to disempower the Islamists and destroy the Kurdish movement in the 1990s. These bellicose antagonisms engendered recurring episodes of mass violence, corruption and economic crises. Above all, they were characterised by an ideological polarisation of society. Today, and in the absence of a credible secular alternative, it is two broadly Islamic movements and their leaders that are fighting for power and struggle for the future of Turkey: the Justice and Development Party of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that stands in the tradition of Turkey’s mainstream Islamist movement, Millî Görüş, and the Hizmet movement of the charismatic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who was socialised in the conservative Islamic reform ethos of Said-i Nursi. Both of them, Erdoğan and Gülen, or Hocaefendi, as his disciples refer to him, are larger than life figures, who enjoy almost unlimited devotion from their followers.

\textsuperscript{56} Michael Axworthy ‘The Army of Nader Shah’ in \textit{Iranian Studies}, Dec. 2007, pp 635-646
Can their dispute be truthfully described as a clash of the titans of Islamic mobilisation, now that Erdoğan has become President and appears to be in full control of the state? Are there any titans left in Turkey but Erdoğan? It doesn't seem so. Is this story of inner-Islamic conflict just a footnote in history, or is there more to it?

But let us go back to December 2013, when hitherto secret investigations on government corruption hit the headlines. Erdoğan's entanglement in a web of corrupt business practices was exposed, and it appeared as if an ever-powerful grey eminence living in the United States was able to move heaven and earth to discredit and dislocate Turkey's elected Prime Minister. Known for his robust authoritarian reflexes and powerful rhetoric, Erdoğan was stunned at the continued flow of highly incriminating evidence. Many believe, with some reason, that the leaks came from individuals associated with the Hizmet network, an intangible conglomerate of schools, prep-schools, businesses and media outlets, held together by sincere devotion to the movement's leader. Fethullah Gülen, feared and disliked by many a critic, appeared as the figurehead of a conspiracy intent on formatting Turkey's political process to his liking.

Yet, what was perceived by many as Gülen's moment of power soon subsided. Erdoğan and his close-knit cabal of advisors and loyal supporters in the party launched a vicious attack against the Hizmet movement, playing havoc with the country's institutions and removing thousands of civil servants with alleged (and in most cases clearly unproven) links to the movement from their positions of power. Despite the vitriolic rhetoric that the government would "smoke them [the followers of Gülen] out of their dens" not much happened in terms of judicial process. It seems that the "parallel structure" of the so-called Gülenists in the state, as proposed by Erdoğan, does not exist at all or at least not in the proposed simplistic form of 'Community Imams', who control the flow of information and carry operational messages from Pennsylvania, where Hocaefendi resides. Those who may well have been involved in the interception of private conversations and in the leaking of illegally obtained material will certainly not be found with the government's sledgehammer methods, which above all clear the way for Erdoğan's loyal rank and file to assume state office. Yet such people certainly do exist, and they may have indeed organic connections with the Hizmet movement, which has long held the belief that Turkey can be brought back into the realm of Islamic piety only with a march through the institutions of a 'golden generation' made up of modern but conservative Muslims.

The intrusive attack on Fethullah Gülen brought the Hizmet movement rejection and loss of legitimacy among many conservative supporters of the AKP. But Erdoğan did not emerge out of this battle as the invincible titan he once was thought to be, or hoped to be seen as. The Turkish Prime Minister-cum-President is now weakened, not only by the conflict with Gülen, but also by a series of failures in domestic and international politics. From the Soma mine disaster to the moribund Kurdish peace process, and from the debacle in Syria – with more than a million Syrian refugees in Turkey – to the capture of parts of northern Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the ensuing security threats on Turkey's south eastern borders, things have turned out badly for Erdoğan. Pretty much every recent policy initiative has led to terrifying or at least deeply frustrating results for the government. That he was elected President with slightly less than 52 per cent came as a reminder that even under the conditions of unfair elections and a manipulated press, Erdoğan's future is not as secure as he would like it to be.

At the end of this duel, which involved a heavy dose of Islamic polemic and mutual malodictions, there seem to be no titans left in Turkey at all, including Erdoğan. Nor are there any prophets. Fethullah Gülen has antagonised many with his failure to break with those extensions of his movement which have indeed turned to the pursuit of power and political influence. Erdoğan's recurrent references to Islamic themes ring increasingly hollow for a majority of the population, who have registered – if not yet audibly condemned – the rotten
underbelly of Turkey's political economy, as it has emerged from the leaks and investigations of
December 2013. They will not do so until they feel severe economic stress in everyday life.
This will certainly happen, but it is hard to say when.

What started off as a clash of the titans has turned into a mud-fight between two would-be
prophets, who now resemble two wounded and aging men well beyond their zenith of influence.
For many onlookers, the enmeshment of power, corruption and Islamic piety appears
increasingly forbidding. In the end, the Hizmet movement might emerge from this altercation in
a chastened form and return to its roots as an Islamic reform movement on a global scale. For
this it needs to cut the ties into politics and power and give up on the long march through the
institutions. Erdoğan's prospects are bleaker in that the political regime he has been building up
over the years is rapidly fraying, while in the international arena, he is progressively moving
beyond the pale. He bought some time with his bid for the Presidency, but it looks unlikely that
his party will get the majority required to change the constitution in the 2015 elections, provided
they are not held under even less fair conditions. For now, though, it is the mud which covers
the stage of Turkey's political drama and obfuscates the view of the deeper transformations of
Turkey's society. A society which may be increasingly less impressed with the AKP's mix of
neoliberal restructuring, exploitation of workers and natural resources balanced with good
public services, particularly when the course of the economy makes their financing impossible.

Say I am You –
A Love
Story

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Say I am You-Mevlâna (2012), is a contemporary opera in eight tableaux by Michael Ellison,
co-produced in its première run by IKSV (Istanbul Culture and Arts Foundation), together with
Istanbul Music Festival and Rotterdam Operadagen, with libretto based on Rumi’s poetry by the
composer and a video scenography by Tessa Joosse. Say I am You dramatically traces the
story of Jelaluddin Rumi (Mevlâna), and his transformation from ordinary scholar to ecstatic
mystic at the hands of wandering dervish Shams-i Tabriz.

The synopsis of the opera provided at the Rotterdam and Istanbul premières read as follows:

**Act One** (Tableaux 1-4) Mevlâna (Rumi)'s son Allaudin returns to the city from his studies in
Damascus, finding a joking welcome from his older brother Veled and then his father, who blesses
his return. Shams, upon arrival in Konya, is led to Mevlâna by his daughter Melike. After
challenging him with questions in their first, fateful, encounter, Shams vows to destroy the ties that
hold Rumi back. To the indignation of all, he throws all of Mevlâna's precious books away. Mevlâna
smarts under Shams' blows, but accepts everything.

**Act Two** (Tableaux 5-8) With Mevlâna and Shams behind closed doors for six months, Rumi's
students become impatient. Veled and Melike distract them with stories, but Allaudin stirs them up
to the point that Shams decides to leave. Veled goes to Aleppo to find him, and the students
celebrate this return with a sema (ecstatic dance). But then Allaudin expels Shams for good
(whether murder or something else, no one knows). Mevlâna, left alone, is devastated. First he mourns, but then eventually realizes that what Shams has given him is inside himself.\(^{57}\)

In its most skeletal form, the work’s dramaturgy traces the following events:

1. Meeting in Konya
   (Shams, looking for a true Shaykh. Mevlâna, seemingly contented, successful, respected)
2. A life-changing crisis
3. Withdrawal into sohbet
4. Societal crisis/rebellion
5. Shams’ first disappearance and return
6. Shams’ second (permanent) disappearance
7. Mevlâna’s transformation, forgiveness of Allaudin and students

\(\text{Say I am You}^{\text{5}}\)’s text is mainly in English, consisting of roughly 70% Mevlâna’s poetry placed into the mouths of all the characters, supplemented by 30% new material. The poetic passages are mainly taken from Mevlâna’s early ghazels in \textit{Divan-i Shams of Tabriz}. Since I wanted as much as possible to capture the spirit of the time around Mevlâna’s 1244 encounter with Shams, it made sense to concentrate on this ecstatic, passionate, poetry composed very close to the events depicted in the opera. These ghazels reflect a more immediate, ‘torn open,’ type of expression than the later, more majestic \textit{Mesnevi}, although some passages from this (notably the opening ‘Reed’ couplets from Volume One) play roles of introduction and summation. For the bulk of the poetry used in the libretto, Nader Khalili’s lucid translations\(^{58}\) seemed to me closest in sound and beauty to the Persian originals and form the majority of the libretto’s text, which is supplemented by translations of William Chittick, Coleman Barks, Annemarie Schimmel\(^{59}\) and others.

These choices were critical for balancing the creation of a stylistically coherent, integrated musical structure, with trying to avoid orientalist or ‘New Age’ clichés of Rumi. Indeed, one of the main reasons I had moved to Turkey in 2000, first researching Turkish music and then staying to teach for ten years, had been to try to absorb more \textit{emic} perspectives on Mevlâna. I also listened to the poems I’d chosen in Persian. Thus, \textit{Say I am You’s} version of events emphasises the painful – ‘struggle’ and ‘practice’ – parts of spiritual endeavor which the \textit{Divan-i Shams} clearly relates, not only its transcendent moments. Using the poetry as a lens, the opera attempts to reflect what Mevlâna’s inner experience was initially like when confronted with such an exacting master as Shams. This was most vividly realised in Tableau 4, as we shall soon see. In addition to this poetry and reality-informed perspective, as a composer I wanted to bring something fresh, vibrant and contemporary to the stage: something that would, through its vibrancy and immediacy, avoid what Peter Brook has famously dubbed the ‘Deadly Theatre’\(^{60}\), which I was conscious a too-historical approach could very easily lead to. Because of these artistic concerns, evidence of the painstaking research that went into researching the libretto mostly vanished into the background once I began thinking in serious theatrical terms about how to bring Mevlâna’s grown children Melike, Veled and Allaudin’s characters to life, and how to penetrate towards the essence of Shams and Mevlâna’s encounter.

**Dramatic and Musical Considerations**

One important decision made from the outset, was to be absolutely contemporary in approach to staging and musical style. The music, with its total integration of Turkish instruments and Azeri voice into a western contemporary ensemble, is steeped in the awareness of both Turkish and Western traditions (which are of course different in a number of important respects) yet simultaneously free of and ‘beyond’ both, as a truly contemporary work. Both philosophically, in

\(^{57}\) Rotterdam Operadagen, programme booklet for \textit{Say I am You-Mevlâna}, June 1, 2012.


\(^{59}\) Annemarie Schimmel, \textit{Look! This is love: poems of Rumi} (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), p. 21.

\(^{60}\) Peter Brook, \textit{The Empty Space} (New York: Touchstone, 1995).
harmony with Mevlâna’s ecumenical views, and particularly in the musical language, I hoped to obliterate what seemed to me to be false dichotomies between East and West. All sorts of misunderstandings between Islam and the West were being obtusely perpetuated and played out in a series of tragic world events throughout the period of the work’s gestation. But once fully into the work, since my own musical language had already absorbed Turkish influences for many years (having composed no fewer than five pieces integrating Turkish instruments and voices, in preparation for Say I am You), all awareness of what was ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’ gradually disappeared. The opera simply had a ‘sound’ of its own relating to its characters, and it was to that, as a composer, I was faithful. This sound included as essential elements a wailing ney, a kanun accompanying Shams at every turn, but also voices and instruments using techniques only found in ‘adventurous’ contemporary Western music.

The following summarises the most important practical decisions that shaped the dramaturgy and musical side of Say I am You:

- To use Turkish instruments, and an Azeri mugam singer, with dramatically high tessitura for Shams-i Tabriz. Ney is used in association with longing and Mevlâna, and the kanun in relation to Shams.
- To use smaller forces to give the opera a better chance of being performed further. (Eight singers and nine instrumentalists plus conductor are required to perform the work).
- To include a five-voice vocal ensemble who double as 1. ‘Unseen Chorus’ and 2. students of Mevlâna, and his sons Veled and Allaudin.
- Say I am You is conceived as a real opera, in the sense that the music would be the most important determinant of form. However, the singers of VocaalLAB performing it would have a far lighter, ‘cleaner’ contemporary sound than in traditional opera houses, not using vibrato to any large extent.
- Inclusion of Melike (Mevlâna’s daughter) as a central character (confidante, harbinger, go-between) with prominent ‘framing’ passages at the beginning and end of the work. This was mainly for musical aesthetic reasons.
- To build elements of verticality into the dramaturgy (i.e. inclusion of the divine as a dramatic element, c.f. French Tragédie Lyrique and Monteverdi’s Orfeo). This is achieved through Mystical Event Frames, where musical ‘windows’ open into different dimensions and ‘Unseen’ voices traverse the dimensions between the dhahir (seen) and the batin (unseen).

Shams as ‘Other’
Shams-i Tabriz is a polarizing figure in Say I am You, content to stop at nothing in his quest to provide the right conditions for Mevlâna’s transformation. He arrives in Konya in search of a true Friend, but having done so, finds himself a maligned other, or outsider when months of sohbet (spiritual conversation) behind closed doors pull the two away from Mevlâna’s students, causing profound resentment. The change he brings to Konya seems to threaten family respect and tradition and is thoroughly resented, especially by Mevlâna’s younger son, Allaudin, who initiates a plot to expel Shams from the community.

It is clear that Shams is essential for Mevlâna’s transformation, and the only one in Konya who understands the depths of Mevlâna’s spiritual capacity. In the opera, he acts as the instigator for change, and brings a startlingly provocative energy to achieve his aims:

how do you dare to
let someone like me
intoxicated with love
enter your house
Vocally, Shams is distinguished clearly by his Azeri mugam style of singing, his high tessitura, and unrelenting delivery style. This casting of Shams with an Azeri, ‘Eastern’ style corresponds to the use of ney and kanun in the ensemble, sharply delineating him from the other soloists and strengthening perception of him as ‘other.’

There are a number of contemporary resonances possible to infer here. In looking at different ways such a topic would be relevant for our own day, I saw Shams and his rejection by the community as a kind of metaphor – in Rotterdam this ‘other’ might be seen as the Turkish and ‘Middle Eastern’ population who are the current targets of immigration reform proposals; in Istanbul ‘the other’ might be those from the East (especially Kurds) who have migrated into Istanbul in recent years, many of whom remain only on the fringes of urban society. Indeed, every society, it would seem, has some kind of ostracized ‘other,’ who may nevertheless have something quite unique, even essential, to offer. Of course, none of this is explicitly stated by the work – only the parallels are there to infer.

Given diverse backgrounds of potential audiences even in its premiere run, one of the intriguing questions for scholarship raised by such a work is the question of whether the same piece still would be differently received in Istanbul as compared with Rotterdam. Art (here, opera) provides fertile ground for experimentation, providing a means by which to play with the apparently fixed meanings of tradition and culture, and allowing an audience the literal physical and sonic space to see and hear through new eyes and ears.

Mevlâna: Hamdím, Piştim, Yandím
I was raw, I cooked, I burnt

Mevlâna’s response to Shams’ challenges in Tableau 4 is at first a primal cry:

O Shams-i Tabriz! A faithful
person like me
desiring a blood-eater like thee!
O say no more! You are a blood-letting malpractor
at the side of the weeping patient.
These cruelties you have afflicted on me
no lover inflicts on his lover.
I asked, “do you want to shed my blood
without any offense or sin on my part?”

-(Tableau 4, Rumi/Chittick) 62

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61 Khalili, p. 15.
But in this pivotal moment emerges an ‘Unseen’ trio of three women’s voices, saying:

O friend seek no joy,
when the beauty desires heartache
for you are prey in a lion’s claws
if the heart-ravisher pours mud on your face
welcome it in place of Tatarian musk
She has afflicted you from every side,
to pull you back to the directionless
Every heartache and trial that enters your body and heart
Pulls you by the ear to the promised abode
-(Tableau 4, Rumi/Chittick) 63

The music thus gives the answer to Mevlâna’s question: ‘Yes.’ It is, moreover, precisely Mevlâna’s guiltlessness that has made him worthy of such suffering, such attention from the Beloved, such pain – such a call to submit, to, as the Prophet said, ‘Die before you Die.’ Shams returns at that moment to begin his most lyrical aria: “Come inside the fire, leave your trickery behind, go insane, go mad, burn like a candle moth.” After this sequence of events, and the ensuing months of sohbet with Shams (Tableau 5), Mevlâna seems to gently rise to another plane, no longer fearing loss of anything an ordinary human might. By letting go of his previous existence, Mevlâna, aided by Shams, falls into utter surrender, into a divine sohbet that could not have been possible before.

While on one side, Say I am You Mevlâna is a love story that ends in tragedy but ultimately transcendence, the ‘seen’ tragedy in Say I am You is that of a society unable to come to grips with what has transpired in its midst. We see how such an impassioned relationship can pull apart a community. In the students’ jealousy and misapprehension of Shams from this point onwards, we see the irony of those, who by their admiration and jealousy would (inadvertently) deny Mevlâna his very raison d’être for existence. Their ‘othering’ tendency is still on display even near the end of the last Tableau, when the newly emerged Mevlâna has miraculously forgiven the rebellious Allaudin and students responsible for Shams’ murder/departure. And even after this, when told that the blacksmith Saladdin Zarkub will succeed Shams as Rumi’s quasi-deputy, one student can’t help but stammer, ‘But…he’s Greek.’

In his actual autobiography, Shams is scathingly critical of those around Mevlâna who see him for his role and not his essence. 64 Since we can also consider that what Shams destroyed when he entered Mevlâna’s ‘house’ was Mevlâna’s attachment to ego, to understand what he had to surrender after Shams’ arrival we must look at all the things around him that supported this. Mevlâna is crystal clear in his poetry: his attachments included his position and fame as a teacher, as scholar and ulema, and all the trappings that went with that, including access to the sultan and policy makers in the Selçük Empire. Shams arrives and says, ‘fine, but these are not you.’ Astoundingly, Mevlâna, in a worldly position far above Shams’ lowly wandering dervish role, was able to understand this, who Shams was, and that his call was really a call from the Beloved.

Say I am You-Mevlâna is recorded on CD (Métier MSV 28539), available at amazon.com and can be listened to online at the Naxos Music Library. This article is excerpted from an article of the same title in Sumita Mukherjee and Sadia Zulfiqar (eds), Islam and the West: A Love Story? (Cambridge Scholars, forthcoming 2014).

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63 Ibid., pp. 238-239.
Turkey is a linguistic treasure-house, given the range of languages spoken by its multi-ethnic citizenry. This article focuses on Turkey's indigenous Caucasian languages (principally the North West family-members) and their study. The term 'indigenous' arises because it is unknown whence the ancestral speakers came to the Caucasus or when they arrived there. Depending on how one draws the dividing line between languages and dialects, the autochthonous inhabitants speak circa thirty-eight languages, divided into at least two and possibly three families, namely:

(a) South Caucasian/Kartvelian (Georgian, Mingrelian, Laz and Svan) vs North Caucasian, forming either a single genetic group or divided into
(b) Nakh-Daghestanian (North Central/Eastern Caucasian) and
(c) North West Caucasian (Circassian, Abkhaz-Abaza, Ubykh). Whilst most of these languages are still spoken in (parts of) their traditional territories, population-movements, especially in the 19th century, have resulted in altered patterns of distribution, particularly in the case of the North West family.

The Caucasian isthmus was always alluring to outside powers, but it was the Russian Empire's drive to secure warm water ports that was to prove fateful for the NW Caucasians. The Great Caucasian War began in earnest with the appointment in 1816 of Aleksej Ermolov (1777-1861) as commander-in-chief of Russian forces in Georgia; Ermolov's brief was to pacify and incorporate the Muslim tribes in the North Caucasus to the east and west of the (mostly Christian) Ossetians. The war was conducted in two arenas: in the north-east (Chechenia-Daghestan) under a series of imams, the most legendary of whom was the Avar Shamil (1797-1871), who led the resistance from 1834 to 1859; and in the north-west, where the various NW Caucasian tribes had no unified leader(ship). The NW Caucasians were incensed by Russia's assertion that the Treaty of Adrianople, concluding the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish War, ceded to them the port of Anapa (in the north of Circassia) as well as the port of Poti (in Georgia's province of Mingrelia) plus the Circassian-Ubykh-Abkhazian territories lying in between, Anapa and Poti not having been mentioned in the Treaty! The valiant NW Caucasian resistance received the support of such figures as the Scottish diplomat and campaigner David Urquhart (1805-77), The Times' correspondent John Longworth, and the businessman James Stanislaus Bell, the latter two each composing (1840) 2-volume descriptions of their sojourns in the area. But after Shamil's capitulation in 1859, all Russia's forces were concentrated on the North West, leading to submission at Krasnaja Poljana in 1864. The resulting Great Exile (Maxadzhirstvo), commemorated on 21 May, resulted in the entire Ubykh nation, most
Circassians and most Abkhazians departing to the Ottoman Empire; only rump communities of Circassians and Abkhazians remained in the Caucasus. Georgian is the only Caucasian language with a history of writing (dating to the late 4th century). The 17th century half-Turkish, half-Abkhazian traveller Evliya Çelebi included in his famous travel-book some words and phrases for Ubykh, Abkhaz, Circassian, Mingrelian and other languages whose speakers he encountered. Such lists were augmented for some of the languages by late-18th/early-19th century travellers, but it was mainly only in the 19th century that serious study began and scripts were devised for the hitherto unwritten languages. Though not alone, the person usually identified as setting the tradition of mature study of North Caucasian languages is the Russian soldier-linguist Baron Pëtr Uslar. He composed seven monographs on these languages, the first being Abkhaz. This appeared lithographically in 1862 (printed 1887); Anton Schiefner, who reworked Uslar’s grammars while translating them into German, produced the German version of the Abkhaz grammar in 1863. Uslar’s Abkhaz grammar contains a short excursus (75-102 of the 1887 edition) on Ubykh. Apart from Çelebi’s contribution, this represents the only attempt to study Ubykh while speakers still lived on their ancestral soil (in the region/hinterland of Sochi).

Whilst a number of the 19th century immigrants to the Ottoman Empire settled (or were resettled) around its borders and thus eventually found themselves living in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Kosovo, we are concerned here with Caucasian communities in modern-day Turkey. The largest ethno-linguistic group consists of Circassians, generically known as Cherkess in Turkey, a term also loosely applied there to others of Caucasian extraction. Nobody knows the exact size of Turkey’s Circassian diaspora, but anecdotally between 2-4 million is quoted. It is sometimes stated that the Ubykhs identify themselves as ‘Circassians’ (which they might do to an outsider), though within their own communities they call themselves ‘Ubykhs’ (TwaXy in Ubykh). Thus, anyone wishing after 1864 to develop Uslar’s sparse data on Ubykh would have to do so in Turkey, which explains why Ubykhology is so closely associated with that country.

First to visit Turkey’s Ubykhs (near Sapanca in 1898) was the Dane Åge Benediktsen; already by this time the language was moribund. Ubykhs were perhaps always bilingual/trilingual in either or both of Abkhaz and Circassian. Always the smallest of the three NW Caucasian ethnicities, they found themselves intermingled with Circassians or Abkhazians in the four areas where they settled: (1) near Manyas (north-west Anatolia) in the villages of Hacı Osman Köyü and Hacı Yakup Köyü; (2) near Samsun (north Anatolia); (3) near Lake Sapanca (north Anatolia, east of Izmit), for example in Kırk Pınar; and (4) near Maraş (south-east Anatolia). Their elders apparently decided that newborns should learn the language of their hosts (Turkish) and that of their more numerous co-residents (Circassian or Abkhaz), and so they largely stopped passing Ubykh on. Benediktsen left with unpublished notebooks. His notes, subsequently lost, were consulted by the German Adolf Dirr (1867-1930) prior to his own visit to Kırk Pınar in 1913/14. Dirr, a remarkable linguist, worked in the Caucasus and wrote grammars (or at least grammatical sketches) of all the indigenous Caucasian languages. Having become the founding editor of the Leipzig journal *Caucasica* (1924-34), Dirr included in consecutive volumes (4-5) a grammatical sketch of Ubykh together with his collection of texts and vocabulary.

But it was the French scholar Georges Dumézil (1898-1986) who was destined to become the chief investigator of Turkey’s NW Caucasian languages and, without Dumézil, Caucasian

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66 See Footnote 1
studies would lack not only the majority of the existing Ubykh materials but also this specialist’s remarkable insights. Dumézil’s interest in Caucasian languages was ignited when he worked in Turkey (mid-1920s). His first monograph on Ubykh (1931), based on research once again in Kirk Pınar, was followed in 1932-1933 by three further works of a comparative nature devoted to the NW family and/or North Caucasian grammar/verb. Decades later he urged that no citations be made from these volumes without checking with him first, as he recognised that the depth of his then knowledge had not been sufficient to avoid errors creeping into some of his descriptions/interpretations.

As Dumézil was preparing his 1931-publication, the Hungarian Julius von Mészáros became the first investigator to visit (twice, in 1930-31) the surviving Ubykh hamlets near Manyas. The resulting monograph (Die Päkhy Sprache), containing a grammar, vocabulary and about 100 proverbs, was published in Chicago; the term Päkhy is an attempt to render the Ubykhs’ self-designation.

The challenges of the North West Caucasian family stem from both their demanding phonetics (Ubykh’s total of 80, possibly 83, consonantal phonemes was once thought to hold the word-record) and the fearsome complexity of their polysynthetic verbs. Virtually the entire syntax of the clause is packed into (or at least recapitulated in) the verb. Additionally, meanings are typically conveyed by short phonic material, often just a consonant-vowel.

Post-World War II, Dumézil returned to Turkey only in 1953, when, contrary to his expectations, he learnt that there were still speakers of Ubykh in the Manyas hamlets and was even more astonished to find a fully competent speaker only 49 years-old. This was Tevfik Esenç (1904-1992) from Hacı Osman. His command of the language derived from being reared by his grandfather, with whom he conversed only in Ubykh, learning Turkish upon starting school. Dumézil embarked on years of collaboration with Tevfik, whose name eventually appeared as co-author of their publications from 1975.

Dumézil understood that a primary task was to fix the nature of the complex phonological system, and, realising that his ears were untrained, he asked the Norwegian Georgian specialist Hans Vogt to conduct an analysis finally to establish the sound-system. Vogt travelled to Turkey in 1958 to work in Hacı Osman and also arranged for Tevfik to visit Oslo. Vogt’s Dictionnaire de la langue oubykh (1963) contains not only the requested phonological analysis but also a collection of texts with vocabulary. Dumézil did not particularly welcome the book, for, in addition to querying the interpretation of the vowel-system, he found so many errors that in his own Nouvelles Études Oubykh (1965), written to commemorate the centenary of the NW Caucasian migrations, no fewer than 60 pages (199-259) are devoted to Corrigenda.

Whilst most work on Ubykh has been devoted to their language and oral culture through the medium of their folktales, Ulrich and Angelika Landmann visited the Ubykh villages of Afikiye and Büyükçamurlu (Marash region), producing in 1981 two volumes devoted to a general ethnographic study of Ubykh village-life. The language in these villages had died out before any linguistic investigation could be conducted. Visiting Anatolia in 1974, I made recordings both in Hacı Osman and with Tevfik in Istanbul (all now available on the Net). And my own modest contribution to Ubykhology came in 1986 – The labialised sibilants of Ubykh is a corrective, based on spectrographic analysis, to the previously posited alignment of Ubykh’s labialised fricatives.

Dumézil’s final major work on the language was Le Verbe Oubykh (1975). Over the years, it had been his practice, having elicited a story in Ubykh, to have translations done into Circassian (both western and eastern) and sometimes Abkhaz too, for he never restricted himself to Ubykh in terms of his caucasological interests. And this magnum opus is comparative in nature, incorporating pan-NWC material.

Seemingly never monolingual, the Turkish Ubykhs’ principal Caucasian bilingualism was in Circassian, and it was assumed that Shapsugh was the western Circassian dialect concerned. But, two years after Dumézil’s death, the Dutch Circassian specialist Rieks Smeets studied the
Circassian recorded from Ubykh sources and concluded that it was/is in fact a distinct variety of western Circassian. This same author went on to make another significant contribution. Comparing the marking of plurality in Ubykh verbs as attested in all sources, he concluded that the greater regularity attested in what he designated ‘Late Tevlik Eseńč’ probably represented a hyper-correction resulting from the fact that during these years Tevlik, being ever more deprived of the opportunity to converse in Ubykh, might have become more a linguist, looking for regularity, than a true native informant, with an insouciant acceptance of the irregularities that abound in natural language.

One of Dumézil’s pupils was the French-born Georgian Georges Charachidzé (1930-2010), and, working with Tevlik in his last years, he continued his mentor’s type of publications, contributing the chapter on Ubykh for my edited 1989 volume The Indigenous Languages of the Caucasus 2: North West Caucasus, which death had prevented Dumézil from writing. But the work that everyone hoped that Charachidzé would publish was not only a fully corrected but an expanded version of Vogt’s 1963 dictionary. The work exists in manuscript form and may one day see the light of day, and that will be the last major contribution to the study of Ubykh, which effectively became extinct with Tevlik’s death in 1992. However, for the moment, the last sizeable work on the language is A Grammar of Ubykh, published in 2011 by Rohan Fenwick, an Australian archaeologist [sic].

As already noted, Dumézil himself worked extensively on Circassian, and another of his pupils, the late Hungarian-born Catherine Paris, specialised in this language. She produced a phonological study of the Bes(le)ney dialect of Zennun Köyü (1974), and with her native-speaker co-author Niaz Batouka, she compiled a 3-volume dictionary (1990s) of the Abzakh/Abadzekh dialect, the most widely spoken of Turkey’s west Circassian dialects, but which, back in the Caucasus, is spoken in a single village. The German Monika Höhlig developed (1983) a writing-system for Circassian based on the Roman alphabet but with the phonetic values employed for Turkish. Her conviction was that, whilst Circassians in Turkey might be illiterate in Circassian and would largely be unmotivated to learn one of the Cyrillic-based scripts introduced during Soviet times in the Caucasian homeland, they were probably literate in Turkish and thus could adapt their knowledge to use such a roman-based orthography to achieve literacy in their own variety of Circassian. Persuaded by this approach, I subsequently devised such a roman-based system for Abkhaz, expanded to accommodate any North Caucasian language.

Abaza, Abkhaz’s most divergent dialect, is spoken in Karachay-Cherkessia (Russian Federation). Whilst the number of Abkhazians in Abkhazia is c.100,000, in Turkey the Abkhaz-Abazinian total is estimated to lie between 300,000-500,000. In Turkey, the term ‘Abaza’ is applied indiscriminately to Abkhazians and Abazinians alike. In the early 20th century, members of the Abkhazian diaspora made moves to teach their language, producing a primer in 1919. Unsurprisingly, Abkhaz was also an object of study for Dumézil, who published in 1967 a short grammar and texts.

Though Charachidzé worked on Ubykh and Abkhaz, he also wrote a grammar of the Turkish variety of the Daghustanian language Avar, the most widely spoken of the indigenous languages in Daghestan itself. Another of the major Daghustanian languages is Lezgi, spoken in southern Daghestan and northern Azerbaijan. Speakers of this too can be found in Turkey, and their language was investigated by Marianne Moor (1985).

Since the Turkish-Georgian border leaves the ancient Kartvelian-speaking provinces of T’ao, K’lardzheti and Shavsheti in Turkey, Georgian-speakers are found here too. Their Imerkhevian dialect is known as chveneburi ‘our kind’. I am unaware of any study of the dialect by non-Georgians.

Lazistan, a strip of territory running roughly from Rize along to the Georgian border at Sarpi, is the traditional homeland of the Laz, relatively few of whom live in Georgia or Abkhazia. Dumézil
TAS Review                                                                                                     Autumn 2014

published a volume of texts, collected from a Batumi informant, with translations in 1937; his
later volume of texts (1967) incorporated a grammatical sketch.67

The German Wolfgang Feuerstein aroused the unwelcome attention of the Turkish police
when, in the early eighties, he travelled in Lazistan to encourage speakers to become literate in
their language as an aid to its preservation. A roman-based alphabet was devised for it at that
time. These endeavours have met with some success. Work is being conducted on (the Pazar
dialect of) Laz both by Turkish and other scholars (for example, Balkız Öztürk & Eser Taylan in
Turkey, plus Ulrich Lüders, Silvia Kutscher and Markus Pöchtrager in Germany) as well as by
such native speakers as Nuran Sevim Genç, Ismail Avcı Bucaklışi, his wife Eylem Bostancı,
and Ali Ihsan Aksamaz. In 2011 Laz joined the club of languages boasting a translation of The
Little Prince.

Ideally, such commendable efforts by Turkey’s Laz community will stimulate speakers of other
Caucasian languages across Turkey to emulate them.

Even this prodigious output did not exhaust Dumézil’s concerns with the Caucasus (including the non-
indigenous Armenian and Ossetic).

Interview with Cansin Kara:
A Young Cellist on the Rise

conducted by Hande Eagle

In January 2014, Cansın Kara was awarded the Aydin Gün Award, which had been initiated by the Istanbul Culture and
Art Foundation (IKSV) in 2013 to celebrate its 40th establishment anniversary of support for young talent in
classical music. Now, having completed his studies at the Yehudi Menuhin School under the exceptional Thomas
Carroll, Kara has been offered a place to study at the Hochschule für Musik und Theater in Munich with ProfessorWenn-Sinn Yang, who in 1989, at the age of 24 became the principal cellist with the Bavarian Radio Symphony Orchestra.

The first time I had the immense pleasure of listening to Cansın Kara’s human-sounding cello
was during a Talent Unlimited Concert at St. James’s Church in Piccadilly, London. The concert
was held on 25 April 2013, with the dedicated efforts of Canan Maxton, an aficionado of all
well-performed music and the founder of Talent Unlimited, a London-based international charity
for providing support and guidance to young musicians and music students. This really opened
my eyes to Kara’s soulful talent. Since then I have been following his progress in the world of
classical music from a distance. Therefore, when I was asked to do an interview with a young
and upcoming musician for TAS Review, the first name that popped into my mind was that of
19 year-old Cansin Kara, a promising and hard-working Turkish cellist. During the interview we
talked about Kara’s past in music, the challenges he has faced so far and his passions.

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**Hande Eagle:** I have always wanted to ask a young cellist what the everyday life of a cellist entails. What is your everyday life like?

**Cansın Kara:** For me it is hard work. Playing the cello, or any instrument, requires hours of dedicated work and much patience. I sometimes find it difficult to gather will power to do the work that needs to be done. When I work I try to pay attention to detail as much as possible and keeping concentration at such a high level is one of the greatest challenges. However, my awareness is becoming greater with the passing of time.

**H.E:** You started your music education at the age of four with basic music tuition and piano lessons. Then, some years later you began to learn the cello. How would you say this transition from one instrument to another helped you understand music better?

**C.K:** The transition you speak of took place many years ago. I was so young that I do not really remember what it was like. I have been playing the cello for most of my life, for twelve years to be exact. I couldn’t really imagine playing another instrument because the cello has become a very important part of my life.

**H.E:** Why did you choose the cello as your instrument?

**C.K:** I did not actually choose it myself. It was chosen for me when I enrolled at the Bilkent University Music Preparatory School in Ankara. I was six years old at the time and I originally thought that I would be playing the piano. I remember being quite unhappy when I found out that I would be playing the cello – though, after all these years – I now feel grateful for the decision that was made for me.

**H.E:** In 2010 you moved from Turkey to the UK to study at the Yehudi Menuhin School near London. How would you assess your experiences in studying the cello in two different countries? What kind of advantages/disadvantages did you encounter during this time?

**C.K:** I had a difficult time being away from home; that was the most difficult part. In terms of cello playing, or in general musically, it was indeed a correct decision. I have had the opportunity of working with some wonderful teachers and also had the chance to get to know many talented young people from all around the world. I have built strong friendships and I hope that I will have the pleasure of getting to collaborate with my friends from the Yehudi Menuhin School in the future.

**H.E:** You are also one of the young musicians supported by Talent Unlimited. How did this come to happen? Do you think you would have been able to be as successful without the support of Talent Unlimited? What kind of difference did that support make for you?

**C.K:** My parents and I met Canan Maxton, the founder of **Talent Unlimited**, around the same time as my enrolment at the Yehudi Menuhin School. It was with Canan Maxton’s help that I got to know many other young Turkish musicians living in London and later, I had the chance of collaborating with them. They were wonderful experiences, I am most thankful to Canan Maxton for her support over the years.

**H.E:** Over the last six years you have been awarded many prizes both in Turkey and abroad. Do you ever feel scared of being unsuccessful or not achieving as highly as you anticipated?

**C.K:** To me success is a strange concept. Performing is what is really important for me. Whatever I do, I want to do it well and I try not to care much about its consequences. I never anticipate that I am going to play well. I am not easily satisfied with the level of my performance, I always demand more from myself.

**H.E:** Do you perform better under pressure?

**C.K:** I always get stressed out before going on stage. The stress can sometimes be destructive and at other times it can help me achieve more. The key to this issue is...
perhaps the amount of stress I endure. However, I cannot really find a pattern that explains
the effects of stress on my performance. What I try to do is to remember to stay physically
relaxed and to keep the basic aspects of my training as a cellist. Becoming physically tense
is a recipe for disaster.

H.E: I’ve read a previous interview conducted with you in which you state, “I had never
composed before I started my training at the Yehudi Menuhin School. I tried to write a short
piano piece in Chopin’s style for an exam. My composition teacher said it was a nice start
as a composer. But at the moment I don’t see composing as my strong side.” Don’t you
think that composing your own music will carry you to a completely new and different level
of musicianship? What qualities would you say you need to develop to compose
memorable compositions in the future?

C.K: Composing is not really my cup of tea. Unfortunately, I lack the training and the
courage to create something from nothing, which I think of as very serious business. Even
though I have been encouraged to and required to compose in the last four years I have
never been comfortable with it. I prefer the interpretational side of music.

H.E: Which cellist, dead or alive, would you say inspires you the most? And, why?

C.K: Many cellists inspire me. When I was younger I was obsessed with the outstanding
Russian cellist Rostropovich. My teacher in Turkey had studied under him and I was
completely overwhelmed by his sound, which I still think is exceptional. Later on, I
discovered the great French masters of the cello, Paul Tortelier, Pierre Fournier, Maurice
Gendron and, in particular, André-Nicolas Navarra. I am also greatly inspired by the
Austrian cellist Heinrich Schiff, whom I had the pleasure of working with. It was truly an
amazing experience.

H.E: The first time I listened to your performance, I was convinced that you are going to be
a star in the world of classical music because of the sensitivity with which you play. What
would you say are the most important characteristics for someone to become a ‘star’ in
today’s world of classical music?

C.K: I don’t think there are any standard lists of boxes to tick for success these days.
However, it is undeniable that today’s world of classical music is much more competitive
than it was in the past. It is getting harder and harder to find jobs. At the end of the day, the
musician with either the best technical facility or with the best connections gets the job. It is
bold, but this is how I view it.

H.E: As time passed by fewer and fewer young people have a desire to build a career in
classical music. Please comment on this statement.

C.K: I am not quite sure about this, because the competition seems to be getting tougher
with each passing day. I believe this is firstly because the standard of performing gets
higher and, secondly, there is an increasing number of performers with whom to compete.
It is a risk to build a career in classical music, even though that might be true with regards
to any line of work. Despite all that I still think many young people choose to go down the
path of classical music.

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Note: For more on Cansin Kara, visit http://www.talent-unlimited.com/profile6.html
POETRY

by Oktay Rifat, translated by Ruth Christie

AL UĞULTU
Hangi yalnızlığa dönsem yüzümü, o dam
Dalların arasında, kuşları, kulesi;
Her açıyı, her bahçeyi tutmuş, orası.
Bin sesle örülmüş bu uğultu her akşam
O konaktan esiyor, al. Ora neresi!

CRIMSON HUM
Whatever loneliness I face that roof is there,
its birds, its turret, among the branches;
preserving every angle, every garden.
That hum woven from a thousand sounds
breathes crimson every evening through that dwelling.
That place, where?

by Gülay Yurdal-Michaels and translated by the author

HAFTASONU YALNIZLIĞI
Ben her yerde Adana’ya kadar giderdim
Buldum mu benzer bir ağaç
Durur, anıları dinlerdim.
Ben sizden önce yokolursam şimdi
Unutmayım beni, daha da çok sevin annemi ... 

Aklın yolu bir olsa da
Yürek bin türlusünden seçer.
Güçlü bir istekle çıkarım sokağa yine
Yaş almış üç
Yolun sonu yakın
Gel, kon gönlüme ey kuş
Kon da konuş.

WEEKEND LONELINESS
I used to go as far as Adana;
everywhere I went
I used to stop and listen to memories
Whenever I found a like-minded tree.

If I die now before thee
Forget me not, love my mother even more...

Even if there is a single way for the intellect
The heart selects from a thousand.
I go out with a strong desire still –
I am sixty-three
End of the way is nigh –
Come, alight on my heart oh bird
Alight and speak with me.
Interview with Mogens Pelt

Arın Bayraktaroğlu interviewed Professor Mogens Pelt (University of Copenhagen) on 10 March 2014 in Copenhagen prior to the publication of his book:

Adnan Menderes’ election to power in 1950 signalled a new epoch in the history of modern Turkey. For the first time a democratic government ruled the country, challenging the political monopoly of the Kemalist elites. However, this period was short-lived. In 1960, Turkey’s army staged a coup d’état and Menderes was hanged the following year. Although the armed forces officially returned power to the civilians in 1961, this intervention allowed the military to become a major player in Turkey’s political process, weakening the role of elected politicians. [From I B Tauris, publisher]

AB: Thank you for giving me this interview for the Turkish Area Studies Review. Would you please let us know how your interest in Turkey arose in the first place?

MP: I started getting interested in Turkey in the late 1990s. Previously my research was focused on German and Greek relations and also the 1967 coup d’état in Greece. In studying these matters I used American/German resources: Kennedy Archives where I found a lot of CIA material and BIR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research). These sources were also rich with material relating to Turkey’s Democrat Party era (1946-1960). Looking at what had gone on before the 1950s I found out that there was disappointment among the Turkish public for being left out of politics, being looked down upon, being forced to live in a way which clashed with their beliefs - all of which culminated in anger. This was the time when migration to large cities started, resulting in gecekondu mahalles (shanty towns) in the peripheral areas of the metropolis. With the foundation of the Democrat Party peasants/voters felt that they were included in the political scene and the administration was establishing a close connection with them. Political practice which had been the norm until then was changing. Different layers of the society were getting connected together. People liked that and voted for Adnan Menderes, the leader of the Democrat Party, overwhelmingly.

AB: Some critics say a dent in secularism was first caused by Menderes who should be blamed for the way Turkey has changed to become a more religious country as we see today. Do you agree?

MP: Menderes wanted to have his people practise religion openly and had a liberal approach in this sense but did not have organic links with religious/pious entities. He came from a prosperous family background and had had a secular education. He was not an Islamist but he was permissive to pious brotherhoods and in favour of expanding liberties. During his times, for instance, urban women were not covered as they are now. One should not forget that prior to Menderes’ rule, CHP (Republican People’s Party) was also using religion to their advantage so this was not something new for Turkey - but Adnan Menderes’ liberalism allowed what had been practised secretly until then to come out in the open (Said-i Nursi, for instance). This liberalism developed in time to bring about the Turco-Islamic synthesis of the 1980s.

AB: How would one summarise the ten-year period of Democrat Party rule?

MP: Menderes was an MP from CHP but later he fell out with his party and joined the Democrat Party. The first five years of his rule were marked by unprecedented economic growth. However, as from 1957, the tensions between his party and that of the main opposition (CHP) had intensified and relations with the military who had always been CHP-oriented deteriorated. There were earlier signs indicating that things were heading towards a difficult period. In 1953 a civilian became a Minister of Defence for the first time in the history of the Republic and the army did not like this. They were in need of modernising their equipment and required governmental support to keep themselves abreast with
rapidly developing technology. In the meantime the social reputation of military officers was weakening, resulting in dissatisfaction in the armed forces. As things got more confrontational the government tightened its grip on the Kemalists, arresting hundreds of people, including notable journalists. In the 1920s and 1930s, too, the opposition had had a tough time; journalists were also silenced then – in fact scores of dissidents were executed, but in the Menderes era there were additional grievances. As a result, Menderes became more impatient with how things were developing and fell out even with some members of his own party; he was in fear of losing his power and followers. As 1959 began, his impatience with the opposition was at its peak.

AB: What area was Adnan Menderes especially weak in?

MP: Menderes' foreign policies contributed to his downfall as on almost all fronts he suffered criticism. The Cyprus issue created as a result of insistence on taksim (partition) and the soured relations with the Middle East, especially with Syria, were only some of these problems. Syria was opposing the Baghdad Pact which Turkey had joined. Bringing tanks to the Syrian border drew Syria into the arms of Egypt, culminating in the 1957 Syrian-Turkish crisis. Russian demands on the Straits were also frightening, as they were pressuring Menderes. He felt he had to change his policies regarding Cyprus and so made a u-turn from partition but the military were not in favour of this dithering. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, his Foreign Minister, seemed more organised on the Cyprus issue than was Menderes. In 1954 The Cyprus is Turkish Society (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) was established to promote the views of the Turkish side in advance of the London Conference which was to be attended by both the Turkish and the Greek delegations but, in 1955, the same society was accused of staging the 6-7 September events which had destructive effects on the Greek minorities of Istanbul. On another front, Turkey did not enjoy much popularity at the time in the UK and the USA either, due to her abstention from the World War II. She had to become a part of NATO in 1952 to show her good will. Participating in the foundation of the United Nations had happened (1945) before the Democrat Party came to power but the country was drawn into the Korean War as a result of this participation during the time of Menderes. All in all, we can say that his management of foreign politics was pretty disastrous.

AB: Did Turkey have a smooth ride in the aftermath of the 1960 coup?

MP: No, the years immediately following the military coup were unsettling for Turkey. Once the civilian rule came back to power, Süleyman Demirel continued the Menderes legacy of allowing rural people to speak their mind and be proud of their identity, but the military intervention created a fear factor and destroyed the political culture in its infancy. The army, by accepting Süleyman Demirel, got the party-less voters under control. Turkey will no doubt one day enjoy the full advantages of the democratic system but it will be through a trial and error route.

AB: The current ruling party in Turkey, AKP, claim that they are the continuation of the Democrat Party. Can you see any similarities between these two?

MP: The AKP learnt from Menderes how to establish a connection with large masses and tried to catch up with his legacy. Although there may be some similarities, one should also mention that in the ten years of Democrat Party rule in Turkey there were no major accusations of bribery and vote-snatching in exchange for benefits as the present pre-election campaigns are accused of. These did not exist at the time, or at least I did not come across any sources suggesting such vote-rigging. Rather than being attracted by material goods at the time of elections, people in those years reaped the benefits afterwards by keeping the administration in power. Tayyip Erdoğan and Adnan Menderes
were different in their personalities and approach, but perhaps the voters have not changed that much and cannot see the differences clearly.

AB: Professor Pelt, thank you for your time in answering my questions. This will make interesting reading for our BATAS members.

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JEWBS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Part 2

by Jill Sindall,
Ottoman historian

The hopes raised among non-Muslims by the early nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms, technically giving equality to all Ottoman citizens, ran in parallel to deep resentment by many Muslims who felt that Christians were being given special privileges. This gave rise to hostility and bloodshed. Nevertheless, these reforms led to huge changes in the Jewish millet, empowering lay council members to introduce a more secular regime, sideling Orthodox traditionalists, and the establishment of state schools with modern curricula. The impetus for modernization of the Jewish millet was mostly driven by urban notables (financiers, merchants), many of whom became agents of European Jewish businesses established in the wake of the Crimean War when the Porte began to encourage foreign investment. Together with Haskalah (a group whose aim was to teach Hebrew language and literature), they laid the ground for the work of Jewish philanthropic organizations whose ambition was essentially to bring about a Jewish ‘renaissance’ and to turn Jews into ‘productive’ citizens. The Alliance Israelite Universelle, founded in Paris in 1860, became a highly respected organization, training artisans, finding work for poor youngsters, and running schools. Sciaky transferred from a Jewish school to an AIU lycée and wrote 68 that it “accomplished what the missionary schools could not. The lycée was untrammelled by religion, unhampered by the zeal of disseminating faith.”

By 1912, the AIU operated 115 schools in the Empire: 71 for boys and 44 for girls. Emphasising patriotism, the dangers of nationalism and the benefits of assimilation, it met with Government approval. Moreover, it did not seek the protection of foreign powers. It established a network of organizations, such as alumni associations, mutual aid societies and literary societies, thus strengthening ties between Ottoman Jews within and without the Empire. Although its curriculum and use of French facilitated acculturation to Western society, it rather alienated students from their traditional backgrounds. Furthermore, Ottoman Turkish was not taught. By the end of the nineteenth century it was estimated that out of 300,000 Jews in the Empire, about 100,000 could read and write French, but only 1,000 understood Turkish and, with no instruction about history or geography, students were ignorant about their Empire. Under pressure by Ottoman and foreign Jews (eg Sir Moses Montefiore), the AIU schools and other institutions began to redress this.

68 Leon Sciaky Farewell to Salonica (Paul Dry, Phil. 2003), p157
With the secession of Christian Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia from the Empire in 1878, Jews became the only trusted and respected minority: as Shaw remarks⁶⁹: “... very much like the situation following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453”. Many rose through the professions, were recruited into Abdul Hamid’s bureaucracy, and served as consular representatives throughout Europe. In Istanbul, increasing prosperity was used to widen the roads of the Jewish quarter of Balat, install street lighting and sewage systems, and build bigger, modern houses. Some wealthy Jews moved up the Bosphorus to Beşiktaş and Ortaköy, and others to the Asian side. Edirne became a vibrant centre of Jewish business and professional activity, and Izmir grew in size and prosperity (only to be devastated during the Greek occupation of 1919-22). The CUP’s administrative and tax reforms and lifting of trade restrictions after 1908 enhanced this prosperity, and in 1914 the Capitulations were abolished. In 1910 the first non-Muslims joined the Army and many Jews supported the War effort in 1914.

The secular Judeo-Spanish press reflected a cultural revival and began to publish popular Jewish literature and articles to entertain and inform. Ottoman officials did not concern themselves much with non-Ottoman Turkish publications and left it to the Chief and Grand Rabbis to draw attention to any journalistic abuse, giving the Chief Rabbi greater power over the press. However, many Jews remained in poverty and lacking in education because reactionary Jewish leaders in some communities acted as a barrier to modernization; because of persecution by Christians many of whom hated Jews more than they hated Muslims; because of frequent epidemics of cholera and plague, especially in crowded, poor areas; and on account of fire which often ravaged urban districts, destroying homes and workplaces.

Inevitably, many progressive, educated Jews became increasingly politicized and supported the Young Turks’ movement to end the Sultan’s despotic rule and restore the 1876 constitution. Salonican Jews such as attorney Emmanuel Carasso (later to become CUP Parliamentary deputy under the name Karasu) played an important supportive role. Rabbi Haim Nahum (Allianciste alumnus from Manisa who studied law in Istanbul and Semitic languages in Paris) established a relationship with Young Turks in exile in Paris. He was highly regarded by the CUP and became very influential after his appointment as Grand Rabbi in 1909 following the Young Turk revolution of 1908. He in turn was supported by fellow Alliancist notables who, after his election, formed the central core of the secular structures of the chief rabbinate and who thus became powerful in community politics. Four Jews were elected to the new Parliament in 1908.

Zionist activity began to creep into the Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. At first its aims were non-political: to make Jews more aware of their cultural heritage by teaching Hebrew and the love of Zion. The Zionists increased their following by stressing their allegiance to Mosaic traditions to religious leaders and forging alliances with them. The activists were then permitted to talk about Zionism in synagogues. There were difficulties in spreading the Zionist word, partly because of the lack of understanding on the European activists’ part of their Ottoman co-religionists, and partly due to the language barrier. Heavy censorship of the press under Abdul Hamid also hampered dissemination of information. The concept of nationalism was not unfamiliar to many Jews, especially those who lived adjacent to the former European provinces and in Arab lands, where a sense of national identity was on the rise, superseding sectarian loyalties. However, traditionalist Jews continued to relate their identity to their religion and considered Zionists to be atheists and a threat to tradition. Since most had not suffered at the hands of their Muslim rulers they, like the modernizers such as the Alliancistes, wanted to remain Ottoman under a reinstated Constitution and were not inclined to change the status quo. Their main political interest lay

⁶⁹ Stanford S. Shaw The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (NYUP, 1991), p 208.
in local community affairs. Many were hostile to Zionism, fearing accusations of treachery by their home country, insistently avowing their loyalty to and support of Ottomanism. Others were merely indifferent. The Zionists went on to infiltrate various organizations (for example, German gymnastic organizations (Turnvereine) transformed their local branches into Zionist agencies) and – under cover of the Anglo-Levantine Banking Company – attracted support from wealthy traditionalist Jews who opposed Western-style, modernist trends (especially in the field of education as exemplified by the AIU) in their community. In the main, before World War I, and after the 1908 Revolution, those attracted to Zionism were the socially and economically underprivileged who had little or no hope of self-advancement or were members of the middle-class with no means of participation in central politics.

There was a minority, however, who believed that since the establishment of a Zionist state was an extremely remote possibility, Zionism could be complementary to Ottomanism. Jewish nationalism was a logical and acceptable ambition and could work as a bridge between traditionalism and modernism.

Theodore Herzl concluded that Zionist goals could only be achieved with the support of one of the main colonial powers: Germany or Britain. Asserting that the migration of Jews from Germany would not only reduce societal problems caused by anti-Semitism but also the number of Jewish revolutionaries in Germany, he persuaded the Kaiser to discuss with Sultan Abdul Hamid, on the former’s tour of the Middle East in 1898, the possibility of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Herzl had already promised the Grand Vizier in 1896 that wealthy European Jewry would pay off the Ottoman national debt in return for this homeland (a promise which seems to have had no basis). By modifying the demand by some European Zionists for a Jewish state and suggesting, instead, an autonomous vassal state...under the suzerainty of the Sultan...and paying substantial tribute to (him)\textsuperscript{70}, Abdul Hamid agreed to a meeting with Herzl in 1901. The Sultan reiterated his opposition to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, but consented to immigration into Anatolia. He proposed the idea of colonizing Syria with Jews as a means of checking Christian influence\textsuperscript{71} (later rejected by Herzl). After losing his European provinces Abdul Hamid was intent on reviving the Empire by consolidating Ottoman Arab support with his Pan-Islamic policy; further Jewish settlement would not be conducive to achieving this ambition and there had already been violent protests by non-Jewish Palestinians.

During the 1870s, German and Austrian Ashkenazim fled rising anti-Semitism in their countries and many went to Palestine, joining the Sephardim refugees from the Balkans. Tension already existed between the latter and the traditional Jewish religious communities who were supported by charitable funds donated by international Jewry, and this was exacerbated by the arrival of the German/Austrian and, later, the Russian Ashkenazim forming the First Aliyeh (wave) of refugees from pogroms between 1882 and 1904. About 30,000 immigrants created about 23 new agricultural settlements, in spite of the Porte’s decree that there should be no foreign immigration to – nor sale of – land in the area. Many of their number were middle-class with no experience of working on the land, and – apart from their faith – had nothing in common with members of the existing communities who were poor and uneducated. They left. The continued existence of the settlements was thanks to the financial support of philanthropists such as Lord Rothschild\textsuperscript{72} and Sir Moses Montefiore, and to the importation of Yemeni Jewish labour.

\textsuperscript{70} Stanford S. Shaw \textit{op. cit.}, p.213
\textsuperscript{72} Rothschild at first denounced Zionism and declared “These are my colonies and I shall do what I like with them” in Paul Johnson \textit{History of the Jews} (Harper NY, 1988), p.432
Asim Bey, Lieutenant-Governor of Jerusalem, wrote in a prescient note to Istanbul in 1891:

“... if this migration continues, it shall create political difficulties in the future, difficulties which are already felt and are too many to be counted. (In) Jerusalem, Jaffa and Hebron a large part of the buildings and land has passed into Jewish hands. Commerce, crafts, and, partly, agriculture has been taken over by them, and the public wealth has passed to the Jews.”

Land sale to foreign Jews (even long-term residents) in Palestine was forbidden from 1904, but local application of the law was inconsistent, mostly through officials' ignorance about – and indifference to – Zionism, which enabled some Ottoman Jews to circumvent the law and sell land to foreigners. When local Arabs protested, it was decreed that Ottomanized Jews could only buy land after 15-20 years' residence. However, during and after the Balkan Wars (1912-13), the CUP formally agreed to lift these restrictions to increase agricultural development in order to supplement food supplies and to raise extra tax revenue needed to fund the military.

Another controversial issue relating to foreign immigrants was that of citizenship. In 1884, the Hovevei Zion societies encouraged migrants to become Ottoman subjects in order to qualify for residence in Palestine. Many of those who did hold passports preferred to retain their nationality to avoid payment of Ottoman taxes (though many preferred to pay the bedel-i askeri rather than perform military service). While Ashkenazim flocked to Palestine, many Ottoman Sephardim emigrated. During and after the Balkan Wars many moved to Europe and the US and, after the Greek invasion of Salonika in 1913, others returned to the country of their forefathers with the assistance of the Spanish Government. Thousands had already fled to Macedonia, Thrace and Anatolia (see Part 1). The Jewish population in the province of Thrace almost tripled between the 1882-93 and 1906-7 censuses, with that of Edirne itself increasing from 12,000 in 1873 to 28,000 in 1914 (only to fall to 13,000 as a result of the Balkan Wars). In total, about 120,000 Ottoman Balkan Jews relocated within the Empire in the period 1862-1914.

Public debate about Zionism became increasingly heated, and a press war ensued between Jewish supporters and detractors, with furious anti-settler articles appearing in the Arab press. Groups such as the Jewish Society for Arabic Publishing and The Shield tried to appease the latter with reassurances that Zionists wanted to work with their Arab brethren for the betterment of their shared homeland, a view which “would earn them the opprobrium of the local Ashkenazi Zionist community.” The impetus for political Zionism came primarily from this group. Impoverished and without national identity, “for a thousand years the Russians and their Church have done their best to exterminate the Jews and their religion...Persecution has only engendered a poison and a running sore...” they wanted a homeland and they did not want to share it.

After Herzl’s failure to enlist German support for a Jewish homeland, European Zionists turned to the British whose sympathy resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Thereafter, leading Zionists supported a British invasion of Palestine in order to ‘liberate’

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74 Lovers of Zion: non-political organizations in Eastern Europe and Russia formed to promote Jewish migration to Palestine.
76 John Reed War in Eastern Europe: Travels through the Balkans in 1915 (Phoenix, London, 1994), p.96
Palestine with the help of a ‘Jewish Legion’ and the secret NILI society which spied on the Ottoman military and passed information to the British.

From the beginning of his tenure in 1909 (a year after the opening in Istanbul of the first Zionist office outside Europe by Victor Jacobson), Grand Rabbi Haim Nahum continued to support Ottomanism and, in an attempt to wrest support from the Zionists, founded Bene Israel, the aims of which were to inspire Jewish homogeneity. He and his oligarchic supporters had many detractors in addition to pro-Zionists: traditionalists disapproving of his modernism, and those who wanted to democratize local Jewish communities accusing him of autocracy. After the armistice in 1918, the Grand Vizier, Izzet Pasha, despatched him to Europe to act as an intermediary with the Allies, but the latter refused to allow him to travel beyond Belgium. His opponents took advantage of his absence to create the democratic Jewish National Assembly to govern the millet but, on his return, Haim Nahum dissolved it. His sympathy for the CUP evolved into support for Turkish nationalists, giving evidence in their favour to the King-Crane Commission\(^{77}\) in 1919. He resigned as Grand Rabbi in 1920, the year of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Allied occupation of Istanbul. He attempted, unsuccessfully, to speak on behalf of the Nationalists at the Paris Peace Conference, but did act as an advisor to the Turkish delegation in 1922. He never returned to live in Turkey. A group of pro-Ottoman Jews formed the Osmanlı Musevileri İntihab Cemiyeti (Ottoman Jews Election Society) which rejected the Ottoman Government’s acceptance of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, and many went to join the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia.

Part 1 of this article appeared in Review 23, pp.40-44

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Some British Travellers to Ottoman Kurdistan, 1580-1921

Part 1

by Gerald MacLean,
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1. Britain takes charge of Ottoman Kurdistan, 1918-21

In 1921, William Rupert Hay (1893-1962), the British political officer put in charge of dismantling the Ottoman administration in Erbil Province claimed that the British “had never heard of the Kurds until the First World War of 1914-18”. In the preface to his memoirs, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer, 1918-1920, he introduces himself thus:

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\(^{77}\) Formed by the US administration to explore the views of the peoples of the defunct Ottoman Empire as to how it should be partitioned.
During the last three years, it has been the writer’s fortune to serve in the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, always in more or less remote parts of the country. Mesopotamia, though by no means unmapped, was before the war to most people *terra incognita*. Baghdad was the capital of the land of fairy tales, the Arabs we pictured spurring fiery steeds over the trackless desert, while the Kurd we had never heard of, or heard of only as the wildest of brigands.  

It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that he is writing about himself and his own lack of knowledge. Since Hay, who preferred to be called ‘Rupert,’ evidently thought this way, and he was the product of an expensive education that took him briefly to Oxford, this assertion about public ignorance of the Kurds cannot have been entirely misleading even if it was by no means entirely accurate. Certainly, British travellers had been reporting occasional encounters with Kurds since at least the late sixteenth century. These earliest reports were, admittedly, regularly confused and confusing, based as they were on misunderstandings of often unreliable informers, and many of their confusions and errors were adopted and repeated by later travellers.

Hay’s claim that the British “had never heard of” the Kurds until the second decade of the twentieth century” is particularly significant since it is the view of an important administrator in the area and yet boldly ignores a considerable number of well-known and widely-read nineteenth-century books recounting travels in Kurdistan, many of which were regularly reprinted on both sides of the Atlantic. The British Library Catalogue lists more than twenty publications with ‘Kurdistan’ in their titles that appeared between 1813 and 1849, the year that Austen Layard’s bestseller *Nineveh and its Remains: With an Account of a visit to the Chaldean Christians of Kurdistan, and the Yezidis, or Devil-Worshippers* was first published and reprinted.  

Appearing amidst the considerable literary success of Alexander William Kinglake’s *Eothen* (1844), Layard’s two-volumes of adventures discovering ancient Babylon swiftly captivated readers’ imaginations with their numerous steel-plate engraved illustrations of ancient Assyrian deities and monuments, thrilling accounts of discovering ancient sites, and encounters with the tribes of Kurdistan. Layard regaled his readers in London, Boston and New York with tales such as that of returning one day to find a “Kurdish chief, with a numerous suite, in the full enjoyment of my premises. The whole party were dressed in the height of fashion” with arms “of a very superior design and workmanship”. Layard explained that his illustrious guest, Mullah Ali Effendi Bey, was “chief of a large tribe of nomad Kurds

**NOTES**

I presented an earlier and shorter version of these observations under the title ‘British Views of Kurds and Kurdistan, 1600s-1920s,’ at the international conference on ‘Kurds and Kurdistan in the Ottoman Period,’ held at Salahaddin University, Erbil, on 16 April 2013, and would like to thank my sponsoring hosts in Erbil and at Artuklu University in Mardin.


79 Here I must emphasize that this essay is work-in-progress which ventures a number of generalisations based on the not-very scientific evidence thrown up by some preliminary searches for publications containing ‘Kurdistan’ (and its cognates) in their titles through the British Library Catalogue of Printed Books; of these I have read some carefully, some cursorily, and others not all.

80 First published in 1849, *Nineveh and its Remains* was reprinted at least three times the same year and quickly appeared in several US editions, some of which bound the two volumes into one. In 1851, Layard’s London publisher, John Murray, issued an abridged version, *A Popular Account of Discoveries at Nineveh*, and reprinted it numerous times throughout the century. This ‘popular’ version also appeared throughout the 1850s from numerous US publishers in New York, Boston, and even Cincinnati. I base these observations on a search of the numerous copies currently for sale (July 2014) listed online at (www.abebooks.co.uk).
who inhabit the mountains in the neighbourhood of Rowandiz during the summer, and the plains around Arbil in winter”. Layard’s anecdote mostly serves to illustrate his own mastery of diplomatic rhetoric and prowess at defusing potential problems, leading to the proud claim that he “was no more troubled with visits from Kurdish Chiefs”. 81 Unlike Hay seventy years later, Layard certainly took for granted that his readers knew who the Kurds were without comment, and those he introduced were magnificently costumed and stylishly armed, hardly the ‘wildest of brigands.’

It seems that Hay was equally unaware of the widely-read accounts by Christian missionaries to the region, which had been appearing for some time in organisational newsletters, pamphlet publications, travelogues and autobiographies. 82 Although Kurdistan does not appear in the title, perhaps the earliest book-length account in this kind appeared in 1831 by a Plymouth Brethren missionary. Published in London, the Journal of Mr. Anthony N. Groves, Missionary, During A Journey from London to Bagdad describes meetings with Kurds, and was reissued with supplemental materials by his widow in 1857.83 The first book-length study of this kind to include ‘Coordistan’ in its title, however, was the Reverend George Percy Badger’s important The Nestorians and their Rituals: with a narrative of a mission to Mesopotamia and Coordistan in 1842-1844 ... and 1850 published in 1852, but not reprinted. 84 Assessed exclusively in terms of their printing history, though not necessarily their volume of readership, books of archaeological adventures in Kurdistan seem to have out-performed books by missionaries. In 1853, Layard brought out his sequel, Discoveries in the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon: with travels in Armenia, Kurdistan and the Desert, cashing in on readers’ demands for further accounts of travels, discoveries, and encounters in Kurdistan.

By the mid-nineteenth century, publishers and writers continued to suspect that books with ‘Kurdistan’ or ‘Coordistan’ in their titles might attract readers: the term would appear in the titles of more than a dozen full-length books before the end of the century. While British interest in Kurdistan in the first half of the century had doubtless been spurred by diplomatic and political crises of the period – in short, Bonaparte and protecting the overland routes to India – travellers later in the century who were evidently inspired by the adventures of Layard and others include the redoubtable Isabella Bishop, whose two-volume Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan was published by John Murray in 1891. Readers interested in learning more about the possible Christianity of the Kurds, meanwhile, continued to be well served by accounts such as John Athelstan Lawrie Riley’s Narrative of a Visit to the Assyrian Christians in Kurdistan ... 1884, published in 1889. 85

82 My thanks to Christine Allison, Ibrahim Ahmad Professor of Kurdish Studies at the University of Exeter, for calling my attention to the widely-read works by missionaries that would not, for the most part, show up in a search conducted of books with ‘Kurdistan’ in their titles.
83 [A. N. Groves, (Plymouth Brethren Missionary)], Journal of Mr. Anthony N. Groves, Missionary, During A Journey from London to Bagdad, Through Russia, Georgia, and Persia. Also, A Journal of Some month’s Residence at Bagdad (London: Nisbet, 1831), and see A Memoir of the late Anthony Norris Groves, edited by his widow (London: Nisbet, 1857).
84 George Percy Badger, The Nestorians and their Rituals: with a narrative of a mission to Mesopotamia and Coordistan in 1842-1844, and of a late visit to these countries in 1850, 2 vols. (London: Joseph Masters, 1852). In a prefatory note, signed from Aden on the 28 October 1851, Badger describes the initial difficulties finding a publisher, viii.
85 John Athelstan Lawrie Riley, Narrative of a Visit to the Assyrian Christians in Kurdistan ... 1884 (London: Christian Knowledge Society, 1889).
Rupert Hay, it seems, grew up unaware of the widespread interest in the region and its peoples, an interest that continued well into his own times. Books of travels announcing ‘Kurdistan’ in their titles continued to appear from the London press into the early twentieth century. One example: In 1914, on the outbreak of the war that, according to Hay, first brought the Kurds to the attention of the British public, W. A. and Edgar T. A. Wigram published their widely celebrated *Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan.* Hay may perhaps be forgiven for not noticing the appearance of the Wigrams’ book because he was otherwise occupied that year, quitting Oxford after only a few months to join the army who posted him to Mesopotamia. So we might well suspect that his declaration that “before the war to most people” Mesopotamia was “terra incognita” and the Kurds a nation “we had never heard of”, might well reflect his own not-untypical state of non-knowledge in the year war was declared. What made Hay special is that in consequence of the war, he would find himself put in command of Kurdish tribes inhabiting the area around Erbil (Hewler) that has, since 2012, been an autonomous region governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government.

In 1913, Hay entered University College, Oxford. He had regularly won prizes for divinity at his school, Bradfield College, but, having been born in December 1893, he was only a few months shy of twenty when the college roll first received his name. Possibly a slow learner but capable of eventually getting into Oxford, Hay typifies his class and generation whose lives were shaped by the war. By 1918, the year his memoirs begin, Hay was barely twenty-five when he was appointed Political Officer commissioned to take over the government of Erbil Province from the Ottomans. The eminent Kurdologist Cecil Edmonds once remarked upon the “self-confidence and high spirits with which I think most of the young officers of the war-created ‘Mespot Political’ tackled their duties”, going on to wonder whether that self-confidence and those high spirits “perhaps made up for lack of training and experience.” From among these young officers Hay, would go on to achieve a distinguished career in government foreign service that would earn him a knighthood in 1952. Yet, as Hay’s editor Paul Rich observes, “when he arrived in Kurdistan the major experience in his life had been public school”. Only four years later, Hay was put in control of an entire province of Kurdistan.

In his memoirs, Hay makes up for his lack of education and experience by casting himself as an adventurer, regularly imagining himself to be something of a first, an explorer in a new world writing about it for the first time. In the preface to his book, Hay contradicts, or at least qualifies this claim, admitting that others have been there before him. “No Bibliography is given”, he announces, “and the only books other than ordinary works of reference which have been consulted are C J Rich’s..."
Residence in Koordistan, 1836, and Major E. B. Soane’s To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, 1912. Yet he begins his short conclusion:

So with a heavy heart I turned my back on Kurdistan, wondering if ever again it would be my fate to partake of her lavish hospitalities or tempt the perils of her dark mountains. For here we have an unspoilt country inhabited by an unspoilt race; hilly recesses never penetrated by the European traveller, a primitive people still in its Golden Age adhering to the simple purity and naive savagery of primeval mankind.

Followers of Mary Louise Pratt will recognise here the ‘imperial eyes’ of the Western traveller with colonial power on his mind, while followers of Edward Said will recognise the standardized ‘orientalist’ trope of backwardness, assigning ‘oriental’ peoples to past ways of living, here in its romantic form of nostalgia for a lost primeval innocence that industrialization had spoiled throughout the developed western world. Wistfully longing ‘to partake of her lavish hospitalities’ at an uncertain date in the future, Hay’s self-assigned affective relation with this extravagantly hospitable and feminized Kurdistan, this “unspoilt country inhabited by an unspoilt race”, also hints at the erotic attractions of the orient as he imagines himself being the first to enjoy entering those “hilly recesses never penetrated by the European traveller”. Hay is keen to be a pioneer entering virgin terrain, boldly going where no former European travellers had been.

In fairness to Hay, his memoirs do provide the earliest and most detailed account by a British writer about Erbil Province and the peoples living in the geopolitical region between the two great rivers at the time. Hay’s book offers an informed record of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the as-yet unsettled settlement of new national and regional borders. He also offers a geo-physical description of the Erbil region, its flora and fauna, enthusiastic tales of riding across landscapes both beautiful and sublime, a generalized ethnography of the local peoples, together with detailed character portraits of the leading local figures who were active during these first years of the British mandate. Hay also provides an insider’s narrative of the widespread anti-British uprisings that took place in the summer of 1920, as a result of which the British lost control of Rawanduz but held Erbil. In these ways, his book serves as a useful contemporary account for local historians of this area of Kurdistan during that period, cataloguing and describing local leaders and their dynastic claims.

89 Hay, Two Years, vii.
90 See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992).
92 But see Colonel J. Shiel, ‘Notes on a Journey from Tabriz through Kurdistan, via Van, Bittis, Seert, Erbil, etc. in July-August, 1836,’ Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 8 (1839): 54-104. Of ‘Arbela,’ Shiel merely notes: ‘the road was excellent and level, and far to the left lay the mountains of Kurdistan: the town is placed on a large mound sixty or seventy feet in height, and 300 yards in length by 200 in breadth; it is enclosed at the summit, with a brick wall having bastions, with a few small guns in them: at the foot of the mound there is another town, inclosed by a mud wall, a great part of it being in ruins, in which respect it resembles both the upper and lower town; the latter especially is almost desolated. There are no ruins or remarkable buildings. A short distance to the west of the town, there is an immense brick pillar standing by itself on the plain; it looks old, but seems to be a Mohammedan building; nothing is known of it excepting that it once was the minaret of a mosque. I saw no river near Erbil, and the people declared there is none. The troops of the Amir of Rawanduz made a short resistance at this place, but a small and ineffectual mine having been exploded in the mound, they were alarmed, and surrendered. Erbil contains 6,000 people, three large mosques, and two baths.’ 98-99.
to authority. Hay was, of course, a British colonial officer and his work suffers from the rhetorical foibles of his imperial and orientalist gaze. David McDowall rightly, I think, criticizes his “simplistic state of mind”, but goes on to criticize Hay’s administration accordingly, accusing it of unleashing ‘resentment to government and within the Miran family still felt by its descendants today.’ These are not matters I am capable of addressing, but Hay does – it seems to me – provide useful names, places, and dates for historians engaged with other sources, and his detailed portraits of local leaders can be informative if read against his evident and obvious biases.

In what follows I explore some historical challenges to Hay’s claims to be a first by pursuing, in broad brush-strokes, some accounts of Kurds and Kurdistan written during the Ottoman period by the first generations of British visitors to the region. I have limited my focus to those who travelled during the first hundred years following the Anglo-Ottoman trade settlement of the 1580s. During this century a number of travellers record visiting Kurdistan and encountering ‘Coords,’ and as I have suggested, some of their confusions would persist through to later generations of writers. Judging from a preliminary survey of titles listed in the British Library Catalogue, ‘Kurdistan’ or its cognates seldom appeared in the titles of eighteenth-century English language books, with very few notable exceptions. Doubtless there are a substantial number of accounts of Kurdistan in books published then, both travel writing and history that do not feature ‘Kurdistan’ in their titles. However, the great age of British travel writing about Kurdistan was the nineteenth century. It was ignited by Bonaparte, flourished as Christian missionary activities in the region inspired the pious and ancient Assyrian archaeology captured the imaginations of secular readers, and from here developed seamlessly from the (now largely forgotten) adventures of James Baillie Fraser riding ‘Tatar’ across Kurdistan into the ‘Great Game’ escapades of Fred Burnaby. And that is a story beyond my scope here. To be continued in TAS Review No 25

95 The only book-length account with ‘Kurdistan’ in the title to be published that century of which I am currently aware is John Jackson, Journey from India, Towards England in the year 1797 ... Through Kurdistan ... (London: Cadell and Davies, 1799). The best-known eighteenth-century account of travels to Persia, Jonas Hanway’s An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea: with a Journal of Travels from London through Russia into Persia ... 4 vols. (London: Dodsley, 1753), only once mentions ‘Kourds.’
96 See: James Baillie Fraser, Narrative of Journey into Khorasan, in the years 1821 and 1822 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1825), and A Winter’s Journey (Tatar,) from Constantinople to Tehran (London: Richard Bentley, 1838); Fred Burnaby, A Ride to Khiva (London: Cassell Petter and Galpin, 1877). Sarah Searight, The British in the Middle East (1969; rev. London: East-West, 1979) is good on the place of travel writing and the politics of the region at this time, see chapters 10 (‘The Great Game’) and 11 (‘The Road to India’), 132-60.
The fourth World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies took place at the Middle East Technical University outside Ankara from 18 to 22 August. Local co-hosts with METU were the Turkish Social Sciences Association led by their president, Galip Yalman. Previous WOCMES meetings have been in Mainz, ‘Amman, and Barcelona. This one was the biggest so far and took place on what must be one of the largest campuses; it was not unknown for delegates to take a taxi from one building to another (partly with the excuse of the hot weather!).

More than 1000 presentations were delivered in METU’s Culture and Convention Center or in the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, in nearly 400 sessions over the five days. Turkey was well represented among Congress speakers with more than a quarter of the total. The British contingent accounted for nearly one in ten – mostly academics originally from the Middle East itself but now based in the UK – and there were a resolute few BATAS members in evidence. Overall over sixty countries were represented, with Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia most prominent. As at previous WOCMES meetings, several hundred of those registering attended for the discussion and interchange without offering presentations.

One paper in four focused on a particular country, with Turkey unsurprisingly in the lead. Of some ninety presentations on aspects of politics, the Arab Spring and the Israel-Palestine conflict figured prominently. Nearly half the talks on people and society were on topics related to women. Papers on religion or on the Ottomans were perhaps less in evidence than one might have expected, given the current prominence of both subjects in Turkey and beyond.

Outside the discussion sessions, there were plenary gatherings, receptions, concerts, films, exhibitions, and excursions to historic Ankara, all of which added to the possibilities of informal contacts among the large numbers present. Some well-known publishers brought samples of their wares. Much appreciated were the efforts of cohorts of students and staff from METU and elsewhere who assisted delegates to find rooms, food, taxis, displays, or perhaps simply where to register for this latest WOCMES. Some visitors were disappointed not to see the Turkish government represented at the Opening Ceremony but it was clear that the ongoing transition to presidential rule in Ankara was taking most official attention during mid-August, 2014.

Brian Beeley
The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement
Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey
by Y.Doğan Çetinkaya
I B Tauris, 2014, 291 pp
ISBN 978 1 78076 472 6

The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement by Y Doğan Çetinkaya will interest anyone intrigued by the history of the late Ottoman Empire and its disintegration. It offers a unique insight into the role class and nationalism may have played in this process. It challenges the existing literature on those years by looking beyond the actions of national leaders and into what was going on beneath the surface of Ottoman society in terms of social movements and the political turmoil they can produce. Çetinkaya argues that whilst this traditional approach may have merit – and we can learn a lot by studying the actions of ‘great men’ – they cannot tell us the whole story. This is the gap the author wishes to fill.

The book seeks to explore the role of ethnic and religious dynamics in the death throes of the Ottoman Empire. Hence the first chapter focuses on political and economic changes within the Empire partly being brought about by internal changes and partly by the external buffeting of international politics at that time which, of course, was the run up to the First World War. Chapter Two looks at the emergence of the economic Boycott Movement as a political weapon in 1908 and the consequent re-emergence of pan-Ottomanism which brought together the different religious and ethnic groups within the Empire.

However, whilst the 1908 boycott was a unifying factor to a greater or lesser extent after that the nature of the movement changed. In Chapter Three the author looks at how, by 1910, the Boycott Movement was starting to highlight divisions between Muslim Ottoman subjects and their Christian (ie Greek) counterparts. This was partly expedited by the Balkan Wars which had led to an influx of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and fuelled the fires of Turkish Muslim nationalism which inevitably alienated
the Christian minorities in the Empire. By the end of 1913 Muslims were being called upon to support each other economically through boycotts on non-Muslim businesses – and minority groups were being accused of “betraying the Empire”.

The last chapter highlights how the boycott movement became associated with Turkish and Muslim nationalism in the last days of the Empire and took on a violent tone not seen before in the run up to World War One. Ultimately it changed the way the Empire was ruled because it affected the dynamics of Ottoman society in a way which has never been reversed. The book will cast light on the reasons why modern Turkey and Greece have had such a problematic relationship in the past 100 years and it could be argued that the roots of the mistrust and dislike which is still evident, and has had significant geopolitical implications for all concerned in the eastern Mediterranean, stem back to this time. For, as the author points out, the boycotts were not so much religious in nature as nationalist – they were anti-Greek rather than anti-Christian.

It is a thoroughly researched piece of work drawing on a wide variety of primary sources and taking a novel theoretical approach to the issue which draws on political science and sociology as well as pure historical methodology. As such, it is not an easy read but well worth the effort for anyone interested in this period.

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Travel and Artisans in the Ottoman Empire: Employment and Mobility in the Early Modern Era

by Suraiya Faroqhi

I B Tauris, 2014, 296 pp

Mobility – or lack of – it is an important and often controversial concept for historians who use the term in a variety of ways to interpret social or economic trends in societies. So I was intrigued to find out how Professor Faroqhi would deal with the subject in her new book, analysing ‘people and their products on the move’ – particularly the
‘ordinary’ people – pilgrims, craftspeople and traders in the pre-modern (mainly 18th century) Ottoman Empire.

For too long we have underestimated the ability, and the need, for early modern men and women to travel beyond the borders of their villages and towns. In sight of where I live runs the Icknield Way, existing for over a thousand years as a trackway between East Anglia and South West England for ordinary travellers, traders, state officials, pilgrims and presumably a good few people setting out to seek their fortunes. Perhaps it even saw some of the Anglo Saxon warriors who, certainly in the years after AD 1066, managed, over nearly two thousand hazardous miles, to find their way to Constantinople, becoming the core of the Byzantine Emperors’ Varangian guard from the 12th century onwards. People therefore often want or need to move for a variety of reasons and will find ways of doing so. Faroqhi’s book seeks to throw some light on mobility in the relatively unstudied Ottoman 18th century and is set out in three main sections, focussing on members of the elite when they travelled; commoners who did the same thing (pilgrims, artisans, slaves); and those who did not or could not not travel.

The first section on elite travellers sets the trend for the book as a whole with its encyclopaedic potpourri dealing with (for example) ambassadors travelling to Hapsburg lands (highlighting inter alia her view that studies of the period have adopted ‘orientalist’ perspectives by failing to take Ottoman records into account); nuances of diplomacy; relations with Russia; visits to western Europe and highlighting those (like King Charles XII of Sweden and groups of Sephardic Jews, to take two very different examples) who took refuge in Ottoman lands. Descriptions of Cairo (by Evliya Çelebi) and Venice conclude this first part. The second section covers groups as disparate as pilgrims to Mecca (and their souvenirs), Bursa and its textiles and fugitive slaves. These ‘ordinary people and their products on the move‘ at least could move from place to place. The key word here is ‘could’ because as Faroqhi highlights – particularly in the third section – the Ottoman Empire depended on agrarian taxation and therefore it actively discouraged mobility -certainly amongst the peasant class on whom tax revenues depended and who could not move from their villages without permission from local administrators. She also points out that even artisans whom we might expect to be more mobile, looking for better opportunities, were restricted by the fact that the crafts guilds (particularly in the capital Istanbul) increasingly became more protectionist/monopolistic and maintained gediks (slots or bundles of rights) mainly for established masters and their sons. Obtaining a new gedik was extremely difficult – a clear disincentive to move.

However, working from a vast and impressive list of primary and secondary sources Faroqhi uses vignettes and specific cases to show how, for example, Tunisian fez sellers travelled to Istanbul and how the trade was controlled, often by the self-regulating guild responsible, which ensured that the Ottoman authorities, keen to restrict uncontrolled immigration into the city, were kept content with a traffic that was ‘selective, conditional and controlled’. Similarly she discusses the example of the baklava sellers (helvaci) whose (gedik) monopoly on the sale of their product was reconfirmed in 1759 – and the fact that bakers of sweet rolls (çörekçis) were not allowed to produce baklava too! However, as she muses, was this restriction – like others – followed to the letter and enforced, or in practice was it largely ignored? We cannot tell.

This is both the strength and weakness of the book for, packed as it is with fascinating detail, there are few conclusions drawn due to the lack of supporting evidence. This is deliberate and may well be the right scholarly approach – not jumping to conclusions
about, for example, such restrictive practices as guilds and *gediks* and using them to build a case that showed they were one symptom of the inability of the Ottoman state to develop its economy in a way that other states had done and perhaps in part leading to the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century. But the piecemeal presentation of facts without developing them can be rather frustrating for a non-specialist reader. The book also is clearly a collection of essays which can be read separately and independently and consequently there is little narrative flow, despite the lengthy and wide ranging introduction which tries to pull the whole together.

Overall, therefore, this is certainly a remarkable work, full of rich detail, requiring further study of the information unearthed and making us think carefully about making too many knee-jerk conclusions about Ottoman society and the state without much more knowledge – whilst revealing the rich and varied experiences of very different ‘ordinary’ subjects of the Sultan as they tried to live their everyday lives. Indeed there is so much information and so much food for thought that – particularly because of its structure – like the box of baklava, it is best sampled in small pieces, to be dipped into with pleasure from time to time.

Keith Nuttall

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Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

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New subscription rates apply for 2015 and can be found on the loose page. UK Members who pay by standing order are please asked to ensure that their payments are at the appropriate levels of £20 for ordinary or £30 for joint membership. Standing order forms are obtainable from the Treasurer. Payment by bank transfer is also welcomed and relevant details of the BATAS bank account can be supplied by the Treasurer.
The sad loss of Dr Andrew Mango is mourned beyond his family, by a wide range of personal friends and colleagues in journalism and academe, and particularly by all students of Turkish affairs. Not only was he always a notable analyst of Turkish current affairs he was also a distinguished scholar learned in Ottoman history, and possessed of an enviable command of Ottoman, as well as modern, Turkish. Born and brought up in Istanbul, and by then already a talented linguist, he became in the late 1940s a student in the School of Oriental and African Studies, where, as well as developing his Turkish, he studied Arabic and Persian and was awarded a doctorate for a thesis on ‘Studies on the legend of Iskandar in the Classical Literature of Classical Persia’. He also read history, his ‘teacher’, as he tells us, being Professor Bernard Lewis. Before going to London Andrew worked for a while as a translator in the British Embassy in Ankara, where he ‘got to know Turkish friends and developed a totally new perspective on Turkey, which I lacked in Istanbul, where I met very few Turks socially’.97

After SOAS he decided not to pursue an academic career, mainly, it seems, because he had a marked interest in the affairs of contemporary Turkey, an interest he could further pursue in the BBC’s Turkish Service, for which he had already worked when a student. He soon became a talented radio journalist, rising to become head of the Turkish Service from 1958 to 1972, after which he was appointed to manage the South European Service. In this position, he said, he had the opportunity to see Turkish affairs in a comparative light. He was an early, and constant, reviewer of books for Middle Eastern Studies, a journal to which over the years he also contributed a number of articles on Turkish topics.

His first book on Turkey, simply entitled Turkey (1968), used a pattern that he developed in most of his later books. After a historical background the book explores education, culture, arts and crafts of the Turks and provides a, still interesting, insight into their character. In its description of Turkey’s main regions a good deal of emphasis is placed on the economic pursuits of each region, while in a final chapter the Turkish economy as a whole is examined. Prophetically, and unusually for the time for most

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97 Interview with Research Turkey in 2012.
analysts, the book concluded that the long-term prospects for the economy were excellent.

The next book, *Discovering Turkey* (1971), is essentially a book for the intelligent and inquisitive tourist. The first chapter on geography and history is particularly noteworthy for its foray into the ancient history of Anatolia, going back to the *Hatti*, the precursors of the Indo-European Hittites. In a knowledgeable summary of the ancient history of Anatolia much emphasis was laid on the benefits of the Roman occupation of Anatolia that, beginning in 133BC, ended the Hellenistic period of the history of Turkey. Moreover, an intriguing original insight concluded that 'Roman rule unified the territory of the present Turkish Republic and attached it to what we would call today the western world.' In writing history Andrew often provided food for thought, but always kept close to his sources, as a historian, or as an analyst of contemporary political, economic, religious, and other social, issues. He was not speculative.

His analytic capacity was soon recognised by those who appreciated the importance of Turkey in world affairs when, after the Second World War, the Cold War began to preoccupy world leaders, and many academics, in a period of decolonization. His next book was *Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally* (1975), a Washington Paper. It was an incursion into foreign affairs at a time when Turkey had become wary of its relationship with the United States. Ankara’s intention to intervene militarily in Cyprus in 1964, in defence of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots under the 1960 international treaties, was prevented by President Lyndon Johnson. He warned the Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, that the other members of NATO had not had any opportunity to consider whether they had an obligation to protect Turkey should the Soviet Union intervene. Ankara took this as a serious rebuff. This, and other issues that arose, led the Turkish Government to develop a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. For the United States Turkey had indeed become ‘a delicately poised ally’ and at a time when Turkish politics was being seriously disrupted by violence promoted by radical minorities on the right and the left, and when the Turkish incursion into Cyprus threatened relations between the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey.

Rightly impressed by this book the Washington Institute looked for more from the same author in the decade following the military intervention of 1980, and the seemingly hazardous return to democracy. The outcome was *Turkey: the Challenge of a New Role* (1994). In the Foreword, the eminent academic authority on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, Professor Heath Lowry, considered the book ‘a most welcome and timely addition to the nearly non-existent monographic treatment of contemporary Turkey’.

A decade later the last general book (*The Turks Today*, 2004), again on history and society appeared, with updated information on the economy, education and religion, the last including an account of the Gülen movement as well as a survey on religious observance in Turkey. Only a fifth of respondents to a survey quoted wanted the return of the şeria, though many of them had little idea of what the şeria meant. Neither in this, nor the 1994 book, is there any discussion, however, of the basis of the important approaches to Islam initiated by Said Nursi and the Nurcular, for which it seems Atatürk had no time – if he went so far as to try to understand them. Said Nursi was imprisoned twice, in 1935 and 1943. As a historian and analyst of contemporary affairs Andrew concentrated on the here and now: he seems generally to have accepted that increasing modernization, not religious reform, would be the key to Turkey’s future.
Andrew’s major work was, of course, his earlier massive biography, of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, entitled simply Atatürk (1999). It was principally based on an exhaustive study of mainly Turkish material – memoirs, diaries, histories of the Republic, and accounts of particular events – material mostly in the public domain, and mainly in Turkish. A truly monumental work, it corrected much that had been written about Atatürk. It was a sympathetic study, but not adulatory, and was in some ways healthily irreverent. Of course, as is the case with any academic work, it had its critics. One criticism was that in the early years of the war of liberation Atatürk’s role had been overplayed. Another thought that Atatürk did not come alive enough. It would be hard to agree with this when considering Atatürk’s active leadership in the early years. However, it was certainly difficult to make Atatürk ‘come alive’ in his later years when he was President. He himself declared that “he was often bored to tears” having nothing much to do. His main diversion from a rather solitary life was his frequent entertaining at his dinner table of a core of special friends and some ministers. This was, we learn, the high point of the day, when night was turned into day, but when the accompanying “cloud of alcoholic depression lifted...he found new fields of endeavour” (p 491). How serious and informed such table talk was is open to question, but Atatürk did have some interest in, and knowledge of, French history and politics, as we may learn from a source not available in 1999. Like Rousseau, we are told, “he considered the principal aim of a republic not to assure individual liberty, but to give expression to the ‘general will’ “. He much admired the Third French Republic, ‘a genuine republic and the most successful regime in the history of humankind’. His belief in the republican state, allied to his belief in solidarity, doubtless led him to reject domination by any political ideology that threatened totalitarianism. As Hanioğlu says, “the various ideas he collected tended to be tools for the implementation of his grand project, not goals in and for themselves”. This matched Andrew’s assessment of Atatürk’s character that he was a practical man of action, “a realist with a vision”. This vision was clearly for a republican democratic state, a political system difficult both to establish and sustain.

Although new source material will doubtless in time become available to modify Andrew’s biography, his painstaking five-year study of Atatürk’s career, so vital for understanding Turkish history, will assuredly stand the test of time. Andrew’s major contribution to the understanding of Turkish history and society was recognized, among many other honours, by the award in 2007 of the prestigious ‘Service Prize’ by the Atatürk Research Centre of the Atatürk Culture, Language and History Institute in Ankara, a prize handed to him personally by the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

During his career Andrew was closely connected to the School of Oriental and African Studies - from being a student to participating in the School’s Modern Turkish Studies

100 Ibid.
101 A term of French origin, ‘solidarism’ was used to indicate that Turkey was a stable and classless society to which Marxist and other divisive theories were, and would remain, irrelevant.
102 Hanioğlu op cit, p. 229
103 Atatürk, p. 396.
Programme in the 1980s. It was fitting that SOAS made him an Honorary Research Associate.

One supposes that for many scholars, eighty-one years of age, the massive book on Atatürk would have marked the end of their careers, but not so for Andrew. As mentioned above, in 2004 he wrote another major study of Turkish history and society *The Turks Today*, to be closely followed by *Turkey and the War of Terror* (2005), a very well researched study of Kurdish and communist terrorism inside Turkey and Armenian attacks on Turkish diplomats abroad. He notably called on liberal European states not to provide succour for terrorist organizations. As Andrew was aware, there is sometimes a tendency among liberals to believe that terrorist violence must be a response to unjustifiable oppression.

Finally, Andrew turned to review another subject, the peace conferences of 1919 to 1923, and their consequences, entitled *From the Sultan to Atatürk* (2009), proclaimed by one reviewer as his best book. Like *Atatürk* it was based on Turkish sources, including rare and out of print books.\(^{104}\) After a historical introduction it concentrated on Turkish politics leading up to the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, and the emergence of the Republic, with emphasis on the important leading role in these events played by Atatürk. A beautifully produced book, it was a credit to both author and publisher, and a fitting conclusion to a lifetime study of Turkish affairs.

What were Andrew Mango’s views on Turkey’s past, present and future? In 2012 the Oxford-based group Research Turkey interviewed Andrew on a number of topics.\(^{105}\) In response to a question on Kemalism Andrew replied that in Atatürk’s time Kemalism was usually defined broadly — as modernism. He did not say who were the Kemalists in present-day Turkey but said that they were not as pragmatic as Atatürk, not coordinating their thought with what is happening in the modern world. He did not however say which elements in society today were Atatürkist. As for the governing Justice and Development Party, the AKP, he likened it to the Christian Democrats in Europe, who were not the proponents of clerical regimes, saying that in lots of ways the AKP was not a religious party. Asked about the arrests of journalists, military officials and academics, especially under the Ergenekon case, who were accused of terrorist offences, Andrew thought that it was all “a disaster, an absolute disaster”. On the possibility of military intervention, he said, there might have been plots by junior officers, but none of the heads of general staff allowed plots to go forward. As for to the military take-overs in 1960 and 1980 they were necessary evils. Andrew remembered what Turkey was like before those military interventions: he thought that the military prevented civil wars in Turkey on those two occasions. On the subject of the judiciary he believed that “it was being controlled by, infiltrated by, supporters of the government. It was politicized before: it is politicized now, just politicized in a different direction”. He was not in favour of Turkey’s joining the European Union, but believed that European standards in market regulation, and human rights would be beneficial. Did Turkey have a phenomenal problem with politics? This, he said “was a very old-fashioned view…Turkey is, in a way, less developed than modern European society”, a remark that reflects his belief in modernization, broadly as Atatürk saw it, as the way

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\(^{104}\) An earlier detailed study of this period was by Salahi Ransdan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy, 1913-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement* (London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1975). It was based on British and Turkish archival sources and English, Turkish, and Greek printed material.

\(^{105}\) The ensuing publication of the interview was published under the title *Turkey’s Walk from 1923 to 2023; A Critique of Past and Recent Political Challenges* (Oxford: Research Turkey, 2012).
forward towards a modern European type of state. Significantly, as he wrote in this Review, Andrew deplored the present frontal attack in Turkey on the so-called official history...” often amounting to denigration of Ataturk’s role in Turkish history”.  

It will be very difficult, probably impossible, ever to have again an analyst of Turkish affairs like Andrew Mango, who was both an insider and an outsider. A major concern for him was what he saw as the lack of a proper understanding of Turkey in this country and elsewhere. He did not write just for the scholar, but for the intelligent person who wished to know more about the past and present of this important country. He was, therefore, an enthusiastic supporter of the revival of the Turkish Area Study Group, from which this Association (BATAS) has emerged. We have something, and someone, to look up to.

Clement Dodd
To join the
British Association for
Turkish Area Studies

Either
Go to the Website www.batas.org.uk

Or
email the Administrative Secretary
Stephen Parkin – snjp@btinternet.com
and ask for an application form

HELP is really needed!

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BATAS Council is discussing the possibilities of an electronic version of this Review and would like to hear from anyone who is able to offer relevant technical advice. Please contact
Brian Beeley (bw.beeley@gmail.com) or
Sigi Martin (sigimartin3@gmail.com) or
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TAS Review welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at bw.beeley@gmail.com and/or sigimartin3@gmail.com. Submissions for the Spring issue would be particularly welcomed by 15 February 2015.
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Printed at the Design & Print Centre, University of Kent