Annual Symposium 2016
and
Annual General Meeting

Emmanuel College, Cambridge

Saturday 9 April 2016
10.00 am to 4.30 pm

Details (abstracts) enclosed (from p.55). Please act now!

For more information see: www.batasp.org.uk
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Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.
Friends of Turkey are alarmed at problems facing academics, journalists, and others in the country. Further sadness and dismay has followed the renewal of conflict involving Kurds and the attacks on innocents in Turkish cities by mindless bombers. As we go to press we are shocked by news of another horrific outrage in central Ankara. At the same time there is admiration for Turkey’s acceptance of nearly three million refugees within its borders and relief that Ankara is prepared to work with the European Union to restrain the flight of migrants westwards across the Aegean. Ankara feels under these circumstances to be in a position to make certain demands. Turkey currently faces challenges in its neighbourhood greater than for a long time. The decline of Syria into violence and destruction has drawn in other powers – notably the United States and Russia. The shooting down of a Russian plane is just one illustration of the level of tension and danger inherent in current uncertainties. Meanwhile within the country there are economic as well as political problems. The important tourism industry suffers and the Lira has weakened.

William Hale, who delivered the BATAS Special Lecture last November in a year that saw two elections in Turkey, is contributing a detailed report about those events. Professor Hale has recently relocated to London after several years in Turkish universities. Then once again we are also extremely fortunate to have an account of wider, constantly moving political developments in Turkey by Gamon McLellan and an update by Clement Dodd on Cyprus – which is now being drawn further into the wider questions of Turkey’s relations with the European Union.

In this issue is the usual variety of contributions to Turkish culture and research initiatives. We especially welcome her second article on Turkish poetry by BATAS chairperson Celia Kerslake. Thanks also to contributors to the book reviews and updating of recent publications. We report on a major project of the British Institute at Ankara, with which BATAS has developed links, and we look briefly at other organisations which share our concerns to bring awareness of Turkey and Turkish life and times to a wider audience in Britain.

We are preparing for another stimulating annual Symposium – this time again at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, on 9 April, when we will have a varied range of presentations (details on pp 55/56). We are grateful to those who give their time and expertise to speak to us at our meetings or to contribute to our Review. This includes our proof-readers. Indeed we need still more help as: BATAS is looking for a volunteer interested in developing and improving our Facebook page. Offers welcome!

Brian Beeley
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor
Since the spring of 2015 Turkey’s politics have been badly shaken by the resumption of the PKK’s campaign of violence, a harsh response by the security forces, and a serious drift away from democratic values as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government attempted to stifle opposition protest in the media and academia. Polarisation of opinion between the government and its opponents has been exacerbated by two general elections, the first of which suggested that the tight hold on power by the AKP might be at an end, with the second unexpectedly re-establishing its political dominance.

The Party array and the electoral system: In recent parliaments, Turkey has essentially had a four-party system, with the AKP winning an absolute majority in all elections since 2002. Throughout, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has been the main opposition group. Although politically poles apart, the remaining two parties have effectively had a ‘third party’ status, in which their principal function has been to alter the balance of power between the two leading parties, by gaining seats from the AKP, or the reverse. At the grassroots level, it appears that the boundary between the AKP and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) is porous, with voters prepared to switch between the two, as both are seen as culturally conservative. Similarly, a proportion of Kurdish voters appears to be mobile between the AKP and the People’s Democracy Party (HDP).

The Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkey’s unicameral parliament, has 550 seats. The electoral system is based on multi-member constituencies corresponding to the administrative provinces, in which each constituency receives a number of seats appropriate to its share of the national population, with a minimum of two.1 Parties draw up lists of candidates for each constituency, from which the voter selects one list. Seats are then distributed between the parties according to the D’Hondt, or ‘highest averages’ system, giving a slight advantage to the leading party.

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1 For easier management, the three largest metropolitan provinces are sub-divided, with Istanbul having three constituencies, and Ankara and İzmir two each
The most controversial feature of the system is the imposition of a high minimum vote threshold, or ‘barrage’, in which parties winning less than ten percent of the national vote are deprived of any seats, which are then distributed pro rata among the other parties. This can produce highly distorted results if numerous parties fail to clear the threshold: in 2002, for instance, the AKP won 66 percent of the seats with 34 percent of the vote, of which 46 percent went to parties winning less than ten percent each. Since then, the distortion has been much reduced, as voters have deserted small parties which are not expected to cross the threshold. In the 2007 general elections, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) evaded the barrage by running its candidates as nominal Independents to whom the ten percent rule does not apply. Once elected, they re-joined the party in parliament. This manoeuvre succeeded, as 20 of its candidates were elected. Its successor, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) repeated this tactic in the 2011 elections, increasing its tally to around 35 seats. In June 2015 the pro-Kurdish party, again renamed as the Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP), took the risk of running as a distinct party, trusting that its share of the vote could be raised to more than ten percent, compared to the 6.6 percent scored by the BDP in 2011.

**Political shocks and the slide towards autocracy, 2013-2015:** What was arguably the most serious public protest against the AKP government so far erupted in May-June 2013, when 11 people were killed and over 8,000 injured in demonstrations against the Istanbul municipality’s plan to build a shopping centre in Gezi Park, one of the few remaining open spaces in central Istanbul. These developed into widespread protests in Ankara and elsewhere at government policy in general. Hitherto, hopes that Turkey might be able to continue the progress towards a more liberal political system, which the AKP had begun during its first period in office, were pinned on the work of an inter-party Constitutional Commission which had begun its work in September 2011. Although the Commission made substantial progress in agreeing to the amendment of some 100 articles of Turkey’s defective constitution, progress was halted in October 2013, due primarily to the AKP’s insistence that the amendments should include a shift to a presidential, rather than parliamentary system of government. Since the opposition parties saw this as an attempt by Tayyip Erdoğan to become something like an elected dictator, they hotly opposed the proposal, bringing the Commission’s work to a halt.

In December 2013 the AKP’s democratic credentials were further undermined by the arrest of the sons of three cabinet ministers on corruption charges, with the police confiscating $17.5 million allegedly used for bribery of public officials. Contested

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evidence even suggested that Erdoğan’s sons Bilal and Burak were involved in the scandal, although these allegations were firmly denied by the premier and remained unproven. Four cabinet ministers were nonetheless forced to resign by President Abdullah Gül. The government then moved swiftly to limit the damage by re-assigning 5,000 police officers and public prosecutors responsible for the investigations, claiming that they were part of a vast conspiracy to undermine the state. This, it was alleged, was master-minded in the US by Fethullah Gülen, the reformist Islamic activist and missionary whose movement (described by the government as ‘parallel structures’) was active in Turkey as well as a wide range of countries around the world.

In line with constitutional amendments endorsed by a national referendum in 2007, Turkey held its first direct elections for the presidency in August 2014 (the President had previously been elected by parliament). Much as expected, Tayyip Erdoğan won an easy victory over a divided opposition. Constitutionally, the President is required to resign from his previous party (if any) and to act as a neutral head of state. To adhere to the letter of the law, the new President conformed to the first requirement, but showed no signs of adhering to the second, which is not clearly defined in the constitution. As an indication of this, he appointed Ahmet Davutoğlu, regarded as a successful foreign minister but without an independent support-base in the AKP, as the new Prime Minister and Chairman of the party. Since Erdoğan continued to control the party’s organisation in the country at large it was widely expected that Davutoğlu would be little more than a puppet. Public fears of Erdoğan’s apparently dictatorial ambitions were symbolically confirmed soon after the elections by his move into a huge new presidential palace, said to have cost $1.2 billion. The building was officially condemned as illegal by the Council of State, but the new President was evidently unmoved by this judgement. In fact, the government’s response to its critics was to attempt to silence them. In the run-up to the June 2015 elections, this resulted in a wave of arrests of opposition journalists, and restrictions on the electronic media as well as allegations of pressure on the judiciary.

By the spring of 2015 electoral prospects were again affected by Turkey’s seemingly unending Kurdish problem. Hopes had been raised in 2012-13 as the government engaged in originally secret talks with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, resulting in the start of a withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkey in May 2013. In the following year, however, the peace process appeared to be falling apart. Part of the cause was outside the Turkish government’s control, and arose from the rise of the ultra-Islamists of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) organisation to a dominant position in central Syria. In response, the main Syrian Kurdish organisation, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which controlled most of north-east Syria, originally with the compliance of the Assad regime, began a bitter conflict with the Islamist radicals. In September 2014 this led to the siege by IS forces of the Kurdish town of Kobane, close to the Turkish frontier. Turkey regarded the PYD with grave suspicion, due to its close links with the PKK. It refused to give any help to the embattled Kurds in Kobane although its forces were drawn up along the border. As aircraft of the US-led coalition began attacks on IS positions around Kobane, Turkey was accused of gross callousness, and even of siding with IS, provoking counter-demonstrations by Turkish Kurds.

4 In Turkish, Danıştay. Modelled on the French Conseil d’état, this is the supreme court for administrative cases.
Election Results and Trends, 2011-15: To illustrate the trends and continuities in Turkey’s electoral politics, we can compare the results of the two elections held on 7 June and 1 November 2015 with those of the previous elections of 12 June 2011. The first notable feature is the relative stability of voting patterns, especially when compared with previous periods in Turkey’s electoral history, with less than ten percent of the electorate changing parties from one election to the next. Between 2011 and June 2015 there was a shift away from the AKP to the two smaller parties (MHP and BDP/HDP) of nine percentage points. This was almost exactly reversed in November 2015, as the AKP regained 8.6 percentage points – again, almost entirely from the MHP and HDP. Hence, the November 2015 elections brought the Turkish parliament remarkably close to where it had been in 2011. Meanwhile, the CHP’s vote share was extremely stable, at 25 percent or just above; in fact the party’s electoral performance seemed to be quite insulated from the rest of the system (or, to put it negatively, the party failed to draw votes away from the AKP in either of the 2015 elections).

The party array

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Policy positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP)</td>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan/ Ahmet Davutoğlu</td>
<td>Centre-right ‘Muslim Democrat’ with authoritarian tendencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party (CHP)</td>
<td>Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu</td>
<td>Centre-left secularist modernist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Action Party (MHP)</td>
<td>Devlet Bahçeli</td>
<td>Right-wing nationalist with Islamic dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) formerly Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)</td>
<td>Selahattin Demirtaş &amp; Figen Yüksekdağ</td>
<td>Pro-Kurdish socialist with grass-roots links to illegal PKK terrorist organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shifts in voting were reflected in the distribution of seats between the parties. In June 2015, for the first time since the 2002 elections, the AKP had fewer seats than it needed to form a single party government. However, it recovered its loss in November. On neither occasion did it win enough seats to amend the constitution on its own, even assuming the change were endorsed in a referendum. Meanwhile, the HDP’s gamble that it could break through the ten percent barrier proved successful, as it won 80 seats in June 2015, falling to 59 seats in November.

5 The AKP also gained two percentage points from other small parties which fell short of the ten percent threshold.
6 Parties need 50% of the parliamentary seats (276) to form a government, 60% of the seats (331) to change the constitution with approval in a referendum, or 67% of the seats (367) to change the constitution without a referendum.
Maps showing voting outcomes need to be taken with caution, since they simply show the leading party in each province, ignoring those provinces where one of the other parties came a close second. This under-represents the strength of the CHP, since its votes were relatively evenly distributed over the country as a whole, while over-representing the strength of the AKP (shown here in light grey). The MHP, which was only in the lead in one small province, is virtually excluded from the map. On the other hand, popular support for the HDP was heavily concentrated in the Kurdish-inhabited east and south-east. Hopes that the party might emerge as a less ‘ethnic’, liberal-left party outside this region proved illusory, and in the November election it lost its lead in two eastern provinces along the border with Georgia. As in previous elections, the CHP’s main strength was in the Aegean coastal region, and in Turkish Thrace, although in June 2015 it also won majorities in the Black Sea province of Zonguldak, in Eskişehir (central Anatolia) and Mersin (Mediterranean coast). The last three provinces, plus Çanakkale in the Dardanelles, were re-captured by the AKP in November. Followers of the Alevi sect, concentrated in east-central Anatolia, are generally assumed to favour the CHP, but it is notable that the AKP was in the majority in all the provinces affected, but for the Kurdish-Alevi province of Tunceli, which was held by the HDP. The complexities of the Turkish electoral system are also illustrated by the fact that although the CHP apparently lost geographical ground in November 2015, it slightly increased its share of the national poll, and thus its tally of seats.

\[7\] That is, Osmaniye, home of the party leader, Devlet Bahçeli.
Results by province, June 2015

CHP leading party in chain of seven provinces:
In Thrace /Aegean plus Zonguldak (Black Sea)
Eskişehir (Central Anatolia) and Mersin (Mediterranean coast)

June 2015: why did the AKP lose support? Following the June 2015 elections, surveys of public opinion appeared to confirm expectations that Tayyip Erdoğan’s drift towards personal rule, and reaction to the corruption cases, were the main reason for the loss of the AKP’s support. Soon after the elections, the respected polling organisation Metropoll asked just under 2,500 respondents how they explained the AKP’s failure to retain its overall majority in parliament. Ignoring the 22 percent of ‘don’t know’ responses, 21 percent blamed ‘President Erdoğan’s speeches’, with five percent citing his ‘insistence on a presidential system’ and another five percent his ‘shift to authoritarianism’ – a combined total of 31 percent. Eighteen percent of the respondents cited ‘corruption’ as the main cause. Although the government’s economic performance was less successful in 2011-15 than it had been in previous years, with a fall in the economic growth rate and a rise in unemployment, only five percent of respondents cited this factor – in fact the AKP’s relatively successful economic track record was probably the main reason for voters’ loyalty to the party. Setting aside these poll findings, it is striking that the AKP’s loss of support redounded to the benefit of the MHP and HDP, not the CHP. Speculatively, it may be suggested that previous AKP supporters who opposed the AKP’s apparent concessions to Kurdish nationalism in 2012-13 switched to the MHP, which adhered to hard-line Turkish nationalism on this issue. Equally, by engaging in the peace process, the HDP may have won some respectability among conservative Kurdish voters who had previously supported the AKP, while others were alienated from the party by government inactivity in the face of the Kobane siege. In this way, Turkey’s Kurdish problem continued to have a powerful electoral effect.

June-November 2015: rising violence – Following the June elections, the security situation in the south-east took a distinct turn for the worse. On 20 July, 34 people were killed and over 100 injured in a suicide bombing attack at a meeting of Kurdish youth activists in the town of Suruç, in Urfa province. The attack was evidently the work of IS, but Turkish Kurds blamed the government for not preventing

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8 Metropol Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkez A.Ş., Türkiye’nin Nabzı Haziran 2015, 7 Haziran 2015, Milletvekilli Seçim Değerlendirilmesi.
it. In response, the PKK broke off the stalled peace negotiations with the government, and re-started its campaign of violence by proclaiming ‘liberated zones’ in areas of several eastern cities. Predictably, the government reacted with large-scale counter-attacks by the security forces, with repeated air raids on PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. On 24 August Selahattin Demirtaş, co-chair of the HDP, appealed to the PKK to halt the violence, but this call came too late and was without effect. According to government figures, by the end of September 130 soldiers and police had been killed, with numerous civilian casualties, and mass displacement of the local inhabitants. On 10 October, the terrorist attacks appeared to be gaining a country-wide dimension, when over 100 people were killed by suicide bombers who attacked a meeting of mainly Kurdish activists in front of Ankara’s main railway station. Again, IS terrorists were apparently the culprits, but the government was blamed for insufficient security measures, and its previously lax attitude to IS.

– and the failure of coalition talks: As expected, a month after the elections, on 9 July, President Erdoğan gave Ahmet Davutoğlu the mandate to form a temporary minority AKP government, which began coalition negotiations with the CHP. Although the initial indicators were hopeful, these broke down on 13 August. Later, the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu claimed that this was due to direct intervention by the President: had this not happened, he implied, he could have reached an agreement for an AKP-CHP coalition. Fruitless talks were then held between Davutoğlu and Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the MHP, who refused to join a coalition so long as the AKP insisted on a switch to a presidential system. Under Article 116 of the constitution, if a government cannot be formed within 45 days of the election of the Speaker of a newly elected parliament, the President may call early elections. Although no previous President had done this, on 24 August Erdoğan used his powers under this Article to declare early elections, the date for which was fixed as 1 November. In the meantime, at a special convention of the AKP on 12 September he purged the Central Management Committee of the party of the intra-party oppositional group associated with former President Gül and the former Speaker Bülent Arınç: those expelled included prominent ex-ministers Ali Babacan, Mehmet Şimşek and Beşir Atalay.

How can we account for the AKP’s electoral comeback in November? Critics of the government chiefly argued that the AKP’s success in the November elections was due to undemocratic and unfair advantages – in particular, around three quarters of the media were clearly pro-government, with the opposition restricted in multifarious ways. As an observer mission from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported, there were serious restrictions on the freedom of expression, and physical attacks on opposition party members. The AKP also possessed an extremely well established and well organised grass roots organisation, which was far more successful in mobilising its supporters than the opposition, notably the CHP. However, it could be argued that it already enjoyed several of these advantages in June, and that this had not prevented its earlier setback at the polls. Some additional factors, which had not applied on the previous occasion, can be identified. The rising tide of violence probably induced many voters to swing back to the AKP, for the sake of stability and security. In this way, by re-starting its campaign of violence, the PKK played into President Erdoğan’s hands. It is suggested that since the HDP failed to draw a sufficiently clear line between itself and the AKP, many Kurdish voters who strongly opposed the violence deserted the party. On the MHP side, it is likely that the party’s loss of support was mainly due to
a change of heart by former supporters who were unhappy with Bahçeli’s leadership, and felt that he should have adopted a less negative attitude in his negotiations with Davutoğlu. The AKP’s success was thus more than partly due to mistakes by the opposition.

Results, 1 November 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Gains/Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>gains 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>gains 2, loses lead in Zonguldak, Eskişehir, Çanakale, Mersin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>loses 21, loses lead in Ardahan, Kars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>loses 40, loses lead in Osmaniye</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aftermath: challenges ahead: Once re-installed in government, Ahmet Davutoğlu and his team faced a series of daunting challenges. Abroad, there was the continuing tragedy of the Syrian civil war, and the resulting waves of refugees, combined with the rising power of the PYD and resultant clashes with the Obama administration on this issue. Problems which deeply affected both domestic and foreign policies included the continuing Kurdish conflict, the urgent need to restore law and order to the south-east and, if possible, re-start some sort of peace dialogue with the PKK. The search for a settlement in Cyprus, and the linked need to resume accession negotiations with the EU were among other formidable challenges. The future of the presidency, and the danger of a further slide into autocracy affected possible outcomes on all these issues. Four possible scenarios could be identified:

1. President Erdoğan could succeed in altering the constitution so as to become the official head of government, rather than a nominally neutral head of state. Since the AKP had less than the minimum of 330 seats needed to change the constitution, this seemed an unlikely outcome, unless the President managed to engineer yet another early election, in which either the HDP or MHP (possibly both) failed to clear the ten percent threshold. Even if the proposed change passed the 330 votes threshold, opinion polls suggested it might well be rejected by the electorate in a referendum.

2. Given his power over the party machine, it could be argued that Erdoğan did not need to enact a constitutional amendment to continue his de facto control of the government: in effect, the present situation could continue indefinitely.

3. In the longer term, Davutoğlu and his cabinet might acquire a greater degree of independence from the presidency – not by open revolt, but by dragging their feet over legislative initiatives by the President. In February 2016 it was reported that Ahmet Davutoğlu was not personally supportive of the idea of an executive presidency, and in the longer run he might prove to be more independent of Erdoğan than had been assumed so far.

4. By February 2016, the political airwaves were alive with rumours of a possible split within the AKP, with Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç mentioned as leaders of an oppositional group within the party, joined by other party heavyweights like ex-ministers Hüseyin Çelik, Sadullah Ergin, and Nihat Ergün. For the time being, it seemed unlikely that they would take the risk of splitting off to form a separate party, Instead, they would probably seek to exercise influence behind the scenes by, for instance, pressing for the re-opening of the Kurdish peace process, and for democratic reforms of the constitution and criminal law.
Turkey’s Politics since September 2015
a Survey

by

Gamon McLellan, SOAS - University of London

Following the AK Party’s victory in the 1 November elections, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s new government started work on 24 November. There had been speculation that the Prime Minister might have brought back Ali Babacan as Deputy Prime Minister with oversight for the economy – a post he had held since 2009. Babacan had left Parliament in June, and following the June election he did not figure in the 28 August pre-election government. Nevertheless, Davutoğlu had apparently insisted he be listed as an AK Party candidate for the November elections, regardless of his policy differences with the President. But despite having overseen the Turkish economy during some of its most successful years and enjoying widespread international confidence, Babacan was left off the list of ministers. Mehmet Şimşek, Finance Minister since 2009, took Babacan’s place as Deputy Prime Minister, and was replaced as minister by the former Under Secretary of the Finance Ministry, Naci Ağbal. The other Deputy PMs include Numan Kurtulmuş, former leader of the Saadet Partisi, and Tuğrul Türkeş (who had accepted the job in the provisional government in August and was promptly expelled from the Nationalist Action Party, the MHP: he is now an AK Party MP). Also re-appointed Deputy PM was Yağmur Akdoğan, who had led the process of negotiations which had culminated in the 28 February 2015 Dolmabahçe Palace meeting with HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) leaders – this had produced a 10-point plan for a way forward for resolving the Kurdish issue.

That process had then been overtaken by the President’s concentrating his rhetoric on the HDP during the two election campaigns last year, and by events on the ground in Turkey’s south east and across the border in Syria. A fifth Deputy PM is Lütfi Elvan, Transport Minister from 2013 until the pre-election period started in March 2015. That portfolio now went to Binali Yıldırım – who had held the position from 2002 until 2013. İsmet Yılmaz, Speaker of the Assembly from June until November, returned to the Ministry of Defence, and Volkan Bozkır, who had vacated his job as Minister for Europe in August to make way for an HDP replacement in what had ostensibly been a multi-party pre-election government, regained his portfolio. Efkan Ala and Bekir Bozdağ, both replaced in March as Interior and Justice Ministers respectively (a constitutional requirement), also returned to their old jobs. Mevlut Çavuşoğlu resumed his position in the Foreign Ministry: Feridun Sinirlioğlu, who had become minister in the 28 August provisional government, returned to his previous post as Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. The most controversial appointment in the new government was the selection of Berat Albayrak as Minister of Energy and Natural Resources: he is the President’s son-in-law.

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9 © Gamon McLellan, published Turkish Area Studies Review 27, Spring 2016
10 For details of the election and the results, see William Hale’s “Two Elections and their Aftermath” in this issue
11 See “Turkey’s Politics since October 2014: a Survey” Turkish Area Studies Review 25, Spring 2015
12 In November, the Assembly elected İsmail Kahraman as Speaker. He was a Refah Party MP in the 90s, Minister of Culture in Necmettin Erbakan’s coalition and is now AK Party MP.
Neither election in 2015 had given the AK Party the parliamentary strength it needed to submit a new draft constitution to the electorate, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stressed in a television interview that his government had other pressing priorities to attend to immediately.\textsuperscript{13} After the November election, contradictory noises on introducing a presidential system came from different AK Party figures, and it was clear that some members had strong reservations. That did not deter President Erdoğan. On 4 November, he told a gathering of Muhtarlar (local elected community leaders) that the most important message of the election was the need for a new constitution,\textsuperscript{14} and he reiterated the point a week later. Initially he was somewhat cautious – and, as William Hale’s article points out, refrained from chairing cabinet meetings with the new government. However, at a news conference on his return from Saudi Arabia on 31 December, he astonished the world by his answer to a question about whether a presidential system of government was compatible with the unitary nature of the Turkish state: “There are examples around the world. There are examples from the past, too. When you look at Hitler's Germany, you can see it there. You can see examples in other countries...”\textsuperscript{15} The Presidential Palace put out a statement attempting to correct “incorrect interpretations” of the President’s words, and the reference to Hitler’s Germany was deleted from the version which appeared on the Presidential website.\textsuperscript{16} On 22 February, Erdoğan resumed chairing cabinet sessions. Arguably, Turkey already has a presidential system – as Mustafa Akış argued a few days later, describing the President as head of state and head of the government (see below). Meanwhile, in mid-February the Republican People’s Party (CHP) walked out of the parliamentary commission working on a new constitution, complaining about the AK Party’s persistent promotion of an executive presidency. The CHP move was criticised within and without the party as a tactical error.

The new government’s programme vowed to enable everyone “whatever their ethnic identity, religious denomination and belief” to attain “an awareness of a shared democratic way of life on the basis of equal citizenship and universal principles and values.” It aimed “for a Turkey where everyone will enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms to the most advanced degree... We stand for an approach which guarantees the lifestyle of every individual in society.”\textsuperscript{17}

Despite this, the rhetoric against the HDP leaders emanating from the Presidential Palace and the government continued, and the appalling situation on the ground in the south-east became even worse, exacerbated by events across the border in Syria and northern Iraq. The population in specific locations on the Turkish side of the frontier had since September been subject to curfews and military operations against the PKK youth group who had taken them over and established no-go areas, following the PKK’s June decision to resume its operations against the Turkish state.\textsuperscript{18} The security forces intensified their operations from December, with curfews extended for long periods in the key locations. By early March, the 24-hour curfew in
Cizre was eased to allow movement during daylight hours, and residents who had fled started to return to a town parts of which had been totally destroyed, with bodies of residents, including children lying in the rubble. *The Times* correspondent described a town “turned into a maze of ruins atop a graveyard.”19 The Governor blamed PKK militants for destroying houses by placing explosives in them and for indiscriminate killing.20 In January, Amnesty International said that the long periods of curfew and denial of services (including access to emergency medical treatment) in Kurdish neighbourhoods amounted to collective punishment. Police and military operations in residential areas, Amnesty claimed, had been characterised by the use of heavy weaponry and sniper fire, endangering the lives of ordinary residents posing no threat to security forces or others. *The Times* headline was more blunt: “Thousands of People return to Kurdish town destroyed by Erdoğan”.21 Amnesty said that during ground research in Cizre in September 2015, “several deaths may have been caused by snipers at locations far from where clashes were taking place. Among those killed were young children, women and elderly people, who are very unlikely to have been involved in clashes with security forces”22. The devastation in Cizre was also seen in Sur, the historic centre of Diyarbakır, where the security operation ended on 9 March, although the curfew remained in place. In December, the army went in with tanks and heavy weaponry to root out PKK youth group militants, who had taken over parts of the old city. Many inhabitants had fled, but some were trapped in Sur until the curfew was briefly lifted in February to allow them to leave. By then, much of the city’s old housing had been destroyed. On 25 February, the independent Scottish MP Natalie McGarry was shoved and then detained for 45 minutes in Diyarbakır by people she thought were security forces. She had been using her smart phone to record the sound of bombs. Historic mosques, churches and other monuments were also badly damaged in the ancient walled city declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO last June. These include the Surp Giragos Armenian church, abandoned for many years but recently restored, which had become a symbol of Diyarbakır’s desire to welcome Armenian visitors amongst tourists visiting the city, as well as the famous Dört Ayaklı minaret of the Şeyh Mutahhar mosque, in front of which the head of the Diyarbakır Bar Association Tahir Elçi had been shot dead on 28 November. He had been campaigning against a controversial government plan for urban renewal in the historic area, fearing that this would involve removing the inhabitants and replacing their homes with new pastiche structures, as happened in the Sulukule area of Istanbul near the City walls. Suspicions were raised further on 1st February, when Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced plans to reconstruct Diyarbakır’s shattered centre to become “like Toledo”.23 There were also ambitious reconstruction

19 Hannah Lucinda Smith, *The Times* 3 March 2016
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/02/turkey-kurdish-people-cizre-return-to-ruins
21 The Times 3 March 2016
For the situation in Diyarbakır, see also David Lepeska *The Guardian* 9th February
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/feb/09/destruction-sur-turkey-historic-district-gentrification-
plans for Cizre. By 12 March, the security operations in Cizre, Silopi and İdil had been completed, according to Interior Minister Efkan Ala, but were to be stepped up in Yüksekova, Nusaybin and the centre of Şırnak.²⁴

The suffering of the inhabitants of these towns horrified public opinion around Turkey. Much of the anger was focused on the PKK and on the party accused by the government of being apologists for PKK terror, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Many, however, were appalled by the security forces’ apparently indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry and the extent of civilian deaths and urban destruction. On 11 January, 1,128 academics from around the world, including from Turkish universities, signed a declaration calling for the government “to cease the violence it has inflicted on its citizens.” As the scholars and academics of this country, they said, “We will not be party to this crime”. They demanded the establishment of conditions for negotiations and the creation of a solution for lasting peace. One of the signatories was Noam Chomsky. The declaration was read in Turkish and Kurdish at news conferences in Ankara and İstanbul, prompting a furious reaction from President Erdoğan, who accused the signatories of supporting terrorism and spewing out hatred against Turkey. YÖK, the Higher Education Board, condemned the declaration, and disciplinary action was taken against academics who signed, with summary dismissals in some cases and suspensions. This triggered further strong international support from fellow academics, extensive media coverage and sympathetic demonstrations and activities around the world. Prosecutors started investigating, and over 300 academics faced possible prosecution under article 301 of the Penal Code for denigrating the Turkish nation and for terrorism-related charges.²⁵ All this has been widely criticised internationally, including by Vice President Biden (see below).

The extensive use of prosecution against critics of the government and the President has intensified. On 2 March, Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ said that the number of cases where prosecutions were going ahead for alleged insults to the President had reached 1,845.²⁶ These include the retired football player and former MP Hakan Şükür (understood to be close to the Gülen movement). On 8 March Banş İnce, former editor of Birgün newspaper was sentenced to 21 months, and in February police burst into a family home in İstanbul and detained a 13-year old boy for allegedly sharing a rude comment about Erdoğan on Facebook.²⁷ In the same month a truck driver lodged a formal complaint with the prosecutor after his wife apparently cursed the President. More questionable methods were deployed to discourage criticism when the President addressed a meeting during his visit to Ecuador: his bodyguards violently ejected three women protestors, using what the Ecuadorian

²⁴ Cumhuriyet 12th March 2016
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/496635/Efkan_Ala___operasyon_baslayacak__dedi__zirhli__arac_takviyesi_basladi.html
²⁵ Cumhuriyet 11 March 2016
²⁷ Cumhuriyet 24 February 2016
government said was “disproportionate force” – one woman was reportedly placed in a headlock.28

Following calls by Erdoğan in particular, moves were under way in March to lift the parliamentary immunity of some HDP MPs, including the two joint party leaders Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, and Sırrı Süreyya Önder (prominent in the 28 February 2015 Dolmabahçe Palace meeting), for alleged membership of an illegal organisation. This would lead to their prosecution, as happened in the nineties to Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle, who spent a decade behind bars. The response of both Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ can be summarised as “Bring it on!”

On 26 November, Cumhuriyet’s Editor Can Dündar and Erdem Gül, its Ankara representative, were remanded in custody by a court, and in January a prosecutor demanded they be given life sentences for divulging state secrets and espionage. The case involved the publication last May of a story with photographs apparently showing that the TIR trucks belonging to MIT which had been intercepted in January 2014 on their way to Syria had indeed been carrying arms and ammunition hidden under medical supplies.29 The two journalists received a boost when Joe Biden insisted on meeting Dündar’s wife and son during his two-day visit in late January.30 The US Vice President also met journalists who had been sacked for critical coverage of the President and the government and declared that “when the media are intimidated or imprisoned for critical reporting, when internet freedom is curtailed and social media sites like YouTube and Twitter are shut down and more than 1,000 academics are accused of treason simply for signing a petition, that’s not the kind of example that needs to be set in the region.”31

On 25 February, the Constitutional Court ruled by 12 votes to 3 that the continued detention of Dündar and Erdem Gül was a violation of their human rights. The two journalists were released the following day – to the fury of President Erdoğan, who said he was not accepting the decision: he was not respecting it. It was not, he said, an acquittal, but a verdict to release. The case had nothing to do with freedom of speech: it was an espionage case. He had repeatedly inveighed against the two journalists since the first appearance of the story, and then repeated in a series of speeches his criticisms of the Constitutional Court, using this case as further argument for a new constitution with an executive presidency.32 The President’s refusal to accept the court’s verdict triggered an avalanche of outrage, with critics arguing that the President had done away with the rule of law. There was strong criticism from one of the architects of the AK Party, Bülent Arınç, who argued that the President was entitled to criticise the verdict – but that he should never have taken

28 BBC 5 February 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-35512926
29 Cumhuriyet 29 May 2015
31 Reuters 22 January 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-biden-idUSKCN0V01PC
the presidential oath if he had not been prepared to recognise the court rulings. Numan Kurtulmuş, deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman, argued that Erdoğan had just been giving his personal view. He was quickly contradicted by one of the senior advisers to the President, Mustafa Akış, who said Erdoğan had been speaking as the President, who “according to our constitution is head of state and head of the government and oversees the implementation of the constitution.” The President of the Constitutional Court Zühtü Arslan said that the decisions of his court could be and should be criticised – otherwise the law would not develop. But he stressed that decisions of the Constitutional Court were binding on every individual and institution, as set out in article 153 of the Constitution. However, there was support for the President, with İstanbul MP Metin Küülünk calling for the Constitutional Court to be abolished, and articles in pro-Erdogan media arguing that the court was packed with “parallel” elements (that is Gülenists). Meanwhile, Can Dündar wrote an open letter of thanks to the President, thanking him for having given him the opportunity to experience prison, to catch up on reading and writing, to keep him away from the state of civil war ravaging the country, swine flu and air pollution, and for having made it possible for articles about him to have appeared in The Guardian, The Washington Post etc., and for his family to have met the US Vice President. The trial was due to start on 25 March.

This case was but one of a number of legal moves targeting critical media organisations. On 4 March, a court in İstanbul appointed administrators for the Feza Media Group, which owns Zaman newspaper. Police arrived to deliver the order and enforce it, using tear gas and water cannon to disperse journalists, employees and others who gathered outside the Feza building to protest. This followed earlier moves against Zaman and the resignation of the editor on 5 October, and raids in September on the Ankara offices of Koza İpek, another Gülen media organisation which, like Feza/Zaman, found itself in the hands of court-appointed administrators. The editorial policy of Zaman changed overnight from vituperative criticism of the President and Government to compliant endorsement. The website was frozen for a number of days and then reappeared with anodyne news, but no columnists or other opinion pieces. At the time of writing, the English Today’s Zaman site remained as it was on 5 March, reporting the take-over of the paper, but with no subsequent editorial content. Reports suggest the Zaman electronic archive may have been destroyed. On 5 February the chairman, chief executive and two directors of Boydak Holding were detained in an operation against “the parallel state” [code for the Gülen movement], and on 8 March administrators were also appointed for the Cihan New Agency.

34 http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-basdanismanindan-kurtulmusa-yanit
35 Zaman 1 March 2016
37 See “Turkey’s Politics since March 2015: a Survey” Turkish Area Studies Review 26, Autumn 2015
38 This can be observed by comparing the front pages of the paper on 5th and 6th March http://www.memurlar.net/gazeteler/2016/3/5/zaman/ http://www.memurlar.net/gazeteler/2016/3/6/zaman/
39 http://www.todayszaman.com/home
Meanwhile, the situation in Syria and northern Iraq compounded the government’s difficulties, handicapping the operations against PKK-supported militants inside Turkey. Despite the agreement last summer to cooperate in launching air strikes against the Islamic State, Ankara and Washington remained divided over the PYD (Democratic Union Party, the principal Syrian Kurdish political organisation) and the armed People’s Protection Units (YPG) which have been fighting the Islamic State in northern Syria. Turkey still sees the PYD/YPG as terrorists allied with the PKK; The US sees them as valued collaborators in the struggle against IS.

The US-Turkish differences, however, have been overshadowed by the dangers presented by the Russian bombing campaign against Assad’s opponents. As Assad’s forces advanced on Aleppo, the PYD/YPG seemed to be moving closer to an understanding with Russia. However, Ankara was upset at a magazine article based on an interview with President Obama, which claimed that “early on, Obama saw Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West”, but that “Obama now considers him a failure and an authoritarian, one who refuses to use his enormous army to bring stability to Syria”. That had followed an article by two former US Ambassadors to Ankara, which argued that “Erdoğan has steered Turkey toward authoritarianism, economic slowdown and civil war. Clearly, democracy cannot flourish under Erdoğan now... If Erdoğan still wants to deliver a brighter future for his country, he has to reform or resign”.

Turkish concerns over what it claimed were Russian violations of Turkish airspace peaked on 24 November, when Turkish F-16 fighters shot down an SU-24 Russian attack plane which Ankara said had entered Turkish airspace. Russia denied that the plane had left Syrian airspace. Establishing who was right proved challenging. Turkey claimed the downed plane was warned ten times that it was in Turkish airspace: that seemed improbable, as Ankara also says the plane was in Turkish airspace for 17 seconds. It landed in Syrian territory. Two Belgian astrophysicists in Leuven calculated the plane would have passed through the narrow tongue of Turkish territory in seven seconds – they concluded that neither the Turkish nor the Russian account of the incident was entirely credible. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was incensed at the incident, particularly when it emerged that one of the pilots, who had ejected from the plane, was shot by Türkmen fighters in the region of Syria just south of the Hatay border. The other was rescued in a Russian operation. A very personal war of words between Erdoğan and Putin erupted, each accusing the other’s nation of illegal involvement in oil trading with the Islamic State – Putin pointed the finger directly at Bilal Erdoğan, the President’s son. Russia then banned the import of Turkish fresh fruit and vegetables – a major blow to Turkish agriculture, but a measure which also adversely affected Russian consumers, reliant on Turkish

40 See “Turkey’s Politics since March 2015: a Survey” Turkish Area Studies Review 26, Autumn 2015
agricultural produce to ease European sanctions. Turkish road hauliers have been hit by restrictions on transit between Turkey and Russia and through Russian territory to Central Asia.\(^\text{44}\) Russian tourists have also stopped coming to Turkey, which has had a catastrophic impact on the hotel industry, particularly in the Antalya region. Turkey’s leather goods industry has suffered severely from the drop in Russian visitors. Tours from western Europe have also been deterred by reports of bomb attacks (see below) and by the large number of refugees and other migrants in the Aegean coastal region. Flights from western Europe to tourist destinations have been reduced, cruise companies have rerouted their ships to avoid the Aegean and Turkey, and Elixir, a British firm specialising in holidays to Turkey, has ceased trading.

On 23 December Russia and Armenia signed an agreement on establishing a “Combined Regional Air Defence System” in the “Caucasian Collective Security Region”,\(^\text{45}\) and on 20 February, Russia sent 5 Mig-29 jet fighters and an Mi-8MT helicopter to Yerevan to join 18 Mig-29s and 7 Mi-24P helicopter gunships already based at the Erebuni air base in Armenia. This represents a significant escalation in the Russian military presence near Turkey’s north-eastern frontier. In military terms, Russia has become a next-door neighbour.\(^\text{46}\)

The policy of zero problems with the neighbours suffered further setbacks. In February, Turkey refused to authorise the flight path of the Greek Prime Minister’s plane, which had been expected to fly through Turkish airspace on its way to Tehran. The flight path included a stop-over at Rhodes, but the Greek Minister of Defence announced on 15 February that Turkish authorities had refused permission to fly over Turkey on the grounds that Alexis Tsipras’ aircraft was a military plane and that Greece had acted illegally in militarising Rhodes and other Greek islands.\(^\text{47}\) In the event, the plane bypassed Turkish airspace. This followed Turkish irritation with tweets directed at Ankara by Tsipras on 30 November, saying that what is happening in the Aegean was “outrageous and unbelievable: we’re spending billions on weapons. You -- to violate our airspace, we – to intercept you”. Tsipras went on to tweet “fortunately our pilots are not as mercurial as yours against the Russians.”\(^\text{48}\) Also in February, a diplomatic row broke out with Sofia, when Bulgaria expelled an attaché at the Turkish Consulate-General in Burgas. There was no official explanation given, but a former head of the Bulgarian national intelligence service commented that the activities of such diplomats were dangerous “because they realise major plots of the Turkish strategic programme included in Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book *Strategic Depth*...”\(^\text{49}\) There were accusations of interference with the running of mosques in Bulgaria and of involvement with political activities within the Turkish Muslim community. Press reports suggested that the

\(^{44}\) Zülfikar Doğan, “Russia keeps Turkish trucks parked”, *Al-Monitor* 28 February 2016 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/turkey-russia-jet-crisis-hits-turkish-trucks.html#ixzz42DdCf8ov

\(^{45}\) http://tass.ru/en/defense/846364


\(^{47}\) http://www.ekathimerini.com/206063/article/ekathimerini/news/turkey-rejected-pm-plane-route The Treaty of Paris (1947) which transferred sovereignty of the Dodecanese from Italy to Greece stated in article 14 “These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarized”

\(^{48}\) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/30/greek-pm-goads-turkish-pm-on-twitter-over-downing-of-russian-jet

Bulgarians were concerned that large sums of money had been channeled from Turkey to support one particular Bulgarian Turkish Party.\textsuperscript{50} Turkey retaliated by expelling one consul from the Bulgarian Consulate-General in Istanbul.

But for the European Union, the refugee crisis eclipsed most other issues. In February 2013, Günther Oettinger, then EU Commissioner for Energy, was reported as saying a German Chancellor would one day come on his or her knees to implore Turkey to join the European Union. That prediction has not yet materialised, but something not too dissimilar seems to have occurred between Angela Merkel and Ahmet Davutoğlu at dinner in the Turkish Embassy in Brussels on 7 March, on the eve of a European summit to address the refugee/migrant issue. The two leaders prepared a draft proposal which they submitted to the summit the next day, displacing the plan on the agenda which European Council President Donald Tusk had been patiently negotiating in European capitals over several weeks. The new proposal was to accelerate the EU payment (promised in the autumn) of 3 billion Euros to Turkey to cope with the 2.7 million Syrian refugees now in Turkey (UNHCR figures 3 March) and other migrants. A decision would be made on additional funding – Turkey is said to have demanded three billion Euros more to make a total of 6 billion. Travel to the EU for Turkish citizens would be eased with a view to introducing visa-free travel in the Schengen area by June, and steps would be taken towards opening new chapters in the Turkey EU accession process. In return, all new “irregular” migrants arriving in the Greek islands from Turkey would be sent back to Turkey, and for every Syrian national sent back to Turkey, another Syrian from inside Turkey would travel legally to be resettled in the EU. A decision was expected at a resumed summit in mid-March.

Angela Merkel was clearly enthusiastic about the deal, but not all EU member states are happy with the proposal, and it was by no means certain that it would be agreed. Cyprus threatened to veto the proposal if Turkey did not recognise the leadership in the south as the government of the Republic of Cyprus, and UNHCR raised legal doubts about the mass return of refugees to Turkey, pointing out that the collective expulsion of foreigners is prohibited by the European Convention of Human Rights. Turkey’s record in stopping the people smuggling operations along the Aegean coast has not been good. A few days after the Brussels summit a video emerged of Turkish coastguards apparently hitting with long truncheon-like sticks a flimsy dinghy carrying migrants to one of the islands, believed to be Lesbos.\textsuperscript{51} Most alarmingly, there have been reports of Syrian refugees being repatriated to Syria against their will, in breach of international law.\textsuperscript{52} Critics of the deal in Turkey have accused the EU of sacrificing its principles in rushing to do this deal and of abandoning commitments to free speech, human rights and unfettered media. They were also angered that the European Commission Progress Report on Turkey, normally published in mid-October, did not appear in 2015 until mid-November, after the election. The delay, believed to have been at President Erdoğan’s request, may have saved the AK Party potential lost votes.

\textsuperscript{50} http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/486563/Bulgaristan_krizinden_de_Bilal_cikti.html
\textsuperscript{51} BBC report 12th March 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35794563
\textsuperscript{52} Mark Lowen, BBC report interviewing Syrians in Turkey and quoting Andrew Gardner of Amnesty International 15 January 2015
On 13 March, early in the evening, a car bomb exploded in central Ankara, on the Atatürk Bulvarı by the Güvenpark in Kızılay, a crowded area where there was a cluster of bus stops. At the time of writing, thirty people had been confirmed to have been killed on the spot, seven had died in hospital and over 70 were reported wounded. This was the third bomb in Ankara in less than six months: 103 had been killed by a suicide bomber at the peace rally on 10 October, and 29 people died from a suicide car bomb on 17 February. A shadowy Kurdish nationalist organisation TAK, the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, claimed responsibility for the February bombing. There was also a suicide bomb on 12 January in the İstanbul Hippodrome (At Meydanı) in Sultanahmet, close to the Egyptian obelisk erected there by Theodosius. Thirteen people, twelve of them German, were killed. The bomber was said to have been a Syrian national resident in Turkey. There were bomb explosions in Diyarbakır (5 June 2015) and in Suruç (20 July). Over the last 12 months, more than 220 people have been killed in bomb blasts in Turkey.

The President and Prime Minister reacted to the 13 March bombing by reiterating their determination to fight terrorism. On 14 March, Turkey carried out air strikes against PKK ammunition dumps and shelters in northern Iraq. In most parts of Turkey, the political effect of yet another suicide bombing is likely to be increased support for the President amongst non-Kurds and reduced sympathy for the HDP. Another early election and a referendum on an executive presidency seem now more probable.

Update on Cyprus
2015/2016

by Clement Dodd

In the period under review the two sides did not get off to a good start. On 29 September President Anastasiades addressed the UN General Assembly in a speech in part critical of Turkey’s role in the conflict. For the nationalist parties in the South he had not, however, blamed Turkey enough. In a speech described by one opposition speaker from the nationalist and social-democratic party, EDEK, as ‘tragic’, he had not laid down the Republic’s ‘red lines’, and he had missed an opportunity to provide a proper understanding of the Cyprus problem as ‘one of invasion, occupation, and ethnic cleansing’. The President of the Green Party of Cyprus said that Anastasiades had forgotten to denounce Turkey. It was clearly not enough for many that he had only asked the international community to exert pressure on Turkey to take steps to open the road to solving the Cyprus problem.

These exchanges reflected the very marked Greek Cypriot belief that the solution of the conflict lies with Turkey, not with the Turkish Cypriots. In this regard, however, in his speech Anastasiades had gained favour by calling for the end of the allegedly anachronistic system of the British, Turkish, and Greek guarantees of the 1960 treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus – under which Turkey intervened militarily in 1974. He had support in this respect from Greece, and from the United Kingdom, on whose behalf the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, said, on the sidelines of the Conservative Party’s annual conference in early October, that the UK
was of course one of the guarantor powers of the constitution of Cyprus. He added “we are completely flexible about our future role and relationship to Cyprus in that respect” – as flexible, it might be added, as the UK always has been.

The criticism of Anastasiades stems from the determination of much of the Greek Cypriot opposition to have it recognised that the proposed federation will really be nothing more than a reform of the existing ‘parent’ Republic of Cyprus. They will not accept the Turkish Cypriot assertion that the federation will be ‘a virgin birth’, a completely new structure that owes nothing to the parentage of the ‘illegal’ Republic of Cyprus. Not all Greek Cypriots, however, side with the diehards. Supporters in the South of the proposed federal state ask the leaders of the patriotic parties if, instead of a federation, they really do want the alternative, which is partition, the permanent presence of Turkish troops on the island, and the North confirmed as virtually a Turkish province. “They might choose”, it was said, “to carry on marking the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus every Independence Day (1st October) for the foreseeable future, but they should know what they would be giving up for good for this celebration”.

A Greek Cypriot Poll
What at that time did most Greek Cypriots think were the most important issues in the conflict? A poll was carried out of 1000 Greek Cypriots in September, 2015, before the visit of Anastasiades to Washington referred to above. As in this poll what were their most important concerns 40 per cent replied that it was security, followed by the property issue at 35 per cent. Of this latter group 88 per cent believed that Turkish Cypriot users of property should not have equal rights to those of the original owners.

80 per cent did not want any post-solution guarantors. 90 per cent of those questioned wanted the Turkish settlers sent back to Turkey. 77 per cent wanted to maintain the identity of the Republic of Cyprus in a federation (no virgin birth), but it is not clear how many wanted the removal of Turkish troops: surprisingly it was not rated as a top concern, nor was the economy, though there was some worry about its future. Almost 60 per cent opposed a rotating presidency for the new federation, but 35 per cent said that they could accept it. (The Turkish Cypriots insist on a rotating presidency.) How did they regard the president’s handling of the negotiations? Rather surprisingly, considering the generally negative views of the opposition political parties 51.3 per cent of the respondents gave him support. Most of the approval came from members of the President’s party, the moderate right-wing party, DISY.

On the property issue surprisingly only 20 per cent of those questioned thought that Turkey should pay the property costs. In fact Turkey has so far, indirectly, met the bill for compensation to Greek Cypriot property owners that has been obtained through

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53 It is not clear whether the constitution mentioned is that of 1960, or the present so-called constitution created unilaterally by the Greek Cypriots in, and after, 1965 in which the Turkish Cypriots are effectively reduced to a minority, and no longer a junior, and full, partner in government, as provided for in the 1960 Constitution, which was agreed by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and guaranteed by the Guarantor Powers - the UK, Turkey, and Greece.

54 Cyprus Mail, 21 September 2015.

55 It was carried out by LS Prime Market Research & Consulting Ltd.
the Turkish Cypriot Property Commission. To settle the issue of property in the event of a settlement it is expected that a joint property commission will be established of representatives from both sides.

With regard to property Turkish Cypriots fear that the amount of property that will come to be occupied by Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state may well result in the Turkish Cypriot zone not constituting the majority of both property and population, developments that would, they believe, undermine both bi-zonality and bi-communality. To this end the Turkish Cypriots want permanent derogations, but the general view is that they would be very unlikely to obtain them. The Greek Cypriots are of course opposed to any such limitations on the operation of EU principles. It has been suggested by Greek Cypriots that this is not as important an issue as the Turkish Cypriots make out: they believe that many Greek Cypriots will not want to live in the Turkish Cypriot state. Those of the original inhabitants who survive will now be well established in the South. Their offspring will also probably be too settled in the South to want to move homes, and perhaps to new occupations, in the Turkish Cypriot state alongside Turkish Cypriots who might not welcome them after years of conflict. Yet it is as well to remember that some Greek Cypriots will be aware that, before 1974, of the 2.4 million acres of land in the TRNC only 380,000 acres belonged to Turkish Cypriots while 1.550 million acres were Greek Cypriot owned, and 470,000 acres were public land.

The EU and Cyprus
According to political party critics in the South Turkey is to blame for attempts to deviate from EU rules. Yet Turkey is officially very supportive of a federation, and seems to believe that a federal government would not be in a position to veto Turkey’s progress to membership of the European Union, as the Republic of Cyprus has done in the past. If Turkey should become a member of the EU this would certainly benefit Cypriot trade in particular and the economy in general but it would expose Cyprus to an overwhelming Turkish influence on its economy, and on Cyprus generally, in the many ways that are allowed under EU rules. Many Greek Cypriots must be conscious of the dangers, aware no doubt of the current problems between Germany and Denmark, which would be greatly magnified in the case of Turkey and Cyprus. Arguably the EU hinders more than it helps to solve problems like that of Cyprus by imposing rules that do not fit the particular case of a small and divided country. In 2000, when the late Rauf Denktaş was the president of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriots proposed a confederation, which was immediately rejected by the Greek Cypriots. It could, however, have been a satisfactory solution, not least because the Turkish Cypriots said that they were prepared to give up more land than they would be for a federation. It would probably have worked quite well, by

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56 To the amount of £220,000,000 by January 2016, as reported by the Immoveable Property Commission, which reports that 26.5 sq. km. of former Greek Cypriot property has now become Turkish Cypriot.

57 The application of EU freedoms supports long-standing Greek Cypriot demands for ‘the three freedoms of movement, residence, and property ownership everywhere in the island’, freedoms the Turkish Cypriot government have always rejected, but which EU principles require the Turkish Cypriots to accept.

58 These figures are provided by Yusuf Kanlı, a well-informed Turkish Cypriot columnist in Hürriyet Daily News, but he gives no sources, and I have not been able to check the figures. Turkish Cypriot land in the South he reports as only 450,000 acres, but one would have to enquire whether land which was abandoned by Turkish Cypriots between 1963 and 1974 and sequestered by Greek Cypriots, then became owned by them. It is a subject for further enquiry.
providing an opportunity for both sides to co-operate without immediate problems on which they would have to agree. It could have become a gradual process of reconciliation dealing with the common issues of a small island, and in the process could well have encouraged inter-communal relations to develop without stress. Introducing the EU, with its rigid principles, very important and beneficial perhaps for relations between and among large and equal states, is proving something of a bar to reunifying the island of Cyprus by creating some alarm among the Turkish Cypriots.

**Issues under Discussion**

As agreed, little is being revealed by both sides as to progress in the negotiations - this in order to discourage disputes between and among politicians on both sides. Some of the issues under discussion do, nevertheless, make their way into the public domain one way or another. One is the issue of guarantees of a settlement. The Greek Cypriots do not want any guarantees, and the Guarantor powers, save Turkey, almost certainly will not want to give them. However, many Turkish Cypriots, and the Turkish Government, clearly believe that a Turkish guarantee of the proposed federal solution is essential.

There is as yet no agreement, it seems, on the amount of territory each constituent state of the federation would control, but the Greek Cypriot government has declared that Morphou (Güzelyurt) in the fertile northwest of the island must be returned to Greek Cypriot control. This has been rejected not only by Turkish Cypriots, but by no less a figure than President Erdoğan. To the Greek Cypriot argument that it was included as Greek Cypriot under the 2004 Annan Plan the reply is that the Greek Cypriots should have accepted that solution if they wanted Güzelyurt so badly.

Another issue apparently not yet decided is that of the nature of the presidency in the new federal state. The Turkish Cypriots are adamant on a rotating presidency, but this is too much for many Greek Cypriots and commentators. Another dispute is the seeming intention of the Greek Cypriot side to limit the Turkish Cypriot/Greek Cypriot population ratio at no more than one to four, a restriction that, with Turkish support, the Turkish Cypriots will not accept. Their population includes a large number of Turks who in recent years have come to work, and often to live, in the TRNC, and who hope to become, in due course, citizens both of the Turkish Cypriot federated state, and of the federal state itself. President Erdogan has weighed in strongly on this issue in support of the Turkish Cypriots, calling for more Turkish residents to be made Turkish Cypriot citizens. The contentious issue of who owns the carbon deposits in the Cypriot Economic Zone is apparently a matter that will be less of a problem, if a problem at all, when the new federation is formed. Despite the difficult issues that lie ahead in the negotiations, the EU Special Adviser, Mr Espen Barth Eide, who is diligently guiding the negotiations, is optimistic that an agreement will be reached to be put to referendums on both sides, though the projected date of March/April this year now seems unlikely to be achieved given the distraction of Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections to be held in May 2016.
Developments in the TRNC

In the absence of real news from the negotiations the Turkish Cypriots have been much involved with a problem of their own. Readers will remember that the Turkish plan to transfer water from Turkey to the TRNC by underwater pipeline has come to fruition. The opening ceremony took place in the presence of the Turkish President on 17 October 2015. The water is now flowing; the cost of this difficult operation, a credit to Turkish engineering, is said to be some $500 million.

A problem has since arisen, however, with regard to the distribution of the water. The two, unlikely, partners in the coalition government, are the leftist CTP/BG (Republican Turkish/National Forces Party) and the rightist and nationalist UBP (National Unity Party). The Prime Minister, Ömer Kalyoncu, is from the CTP/BG. The UBP’s strong preference was for a private company with the necessary expertise to distribute the water. This created a dispute with its larger partner in the coalition, who believed that the distribution should be left, as now, with the local authorities. The leader of the major coalition party, though not a member of the government, is no less a figure than the liberal and socialist former president of the country, Mehmet Ali Talat, an opponent of, and successor to, the late president, Rauf Denktaş. He had the issue discussed at a party conference in order, it was alleged, to exert pressure on the government. The dispute led to the UBP threatening to resign from the coalition. At this point a long-planned visit by Talat to Ankara was very suddenly brought forward, to 19 February. It was reported that in Ankara President Erdoğan told Talat, inter alia, that he was very worried about the water problem, and about opposition to the modernization of Ercan airport by a private company. He reportedly also discussed with Talat other matters, including the need to create more Turkish Cypriot citizenships for Turks living in the TRNC, the proposal to deliver electricity to the north by undersea cable, and the need for active support for the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team.59

On the water issue a compromise was duly reached by the government, with national distribution to be managed by a private company, but with local distribution to remain in the hands of local authorities. Particularly annoying for the UBP was that Talat had taken the issue to his party’s conference in order allegedly to exert pressure on the Prime Minister. It has been pointed out that if water were offered to the South, as Turkey envisages, the Greek Cypriot authorities would probably not accept it if it meant dealing with the ‘illegal’ Turkish Cypriot authorities and not with a private company.


Early this year the standing of the TRNC was enhanced when President Akıncı, as well as President Anastasiades, was invited to the Forum despite Greek Cypriot protests. There they together met the UN Secretary General, and had meetings with other political leaders. It was a blow to those many in the Republic of Cyprus who believe that the TRNC has no right

59 All according to the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Halkin Sesi, usually a reliable source of information.
to exist. The history of how in 1964 the Greek Cypriots came to have their authority over all Cyprus recognised is well known and need not be repeated.

**Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean**

During the period under review the Turkish Cypriots have become somewhat perturbed by a meeting held in early February in Nicosia of representatives of the governments of Greece, Israel and Cyprus to consider ways of exporting gas to Europe from the eastern Mediterranean other than through a Turkish pipeline. One suggestion was, it seems, for a pipeline direct to Greece for export thenceforth to Europe. It seems to have been an attempt to consider how realistic it would be to take that route to avoid the obvious route through Turkey.

Rather more important was a request in January this year by the Russian Government for certain military facilities in Cyprus similar to those enjoyed by France and Germany. These two states use an airbase in Paphos for refuelling, technical service, and for ‘evacuation operations’. (Russia is also currently expanding the programme of refuelling its ships in Limassol.) Some Greek Cypriot political parties, notably EDEK, the Greens, and the Citizens’ Alliance, argue in favour of offering military facilities to Russia. There is some hesitation by the Greek Cypriot government, but the Russian Ambassador is reported to have said, “I think we will find a way to get these facilities”. The Russians claim that it needs them in order to provide help for its struggles in Syria against DAESH! Perhaps the adage should always be borne in mind: “If you dance with the bear, make sure you don’t get tired”.

**Postscript**: In a recent interview with the *Financial Times* President Anastasiades said that Cyprus would continue to withhold its permission for five new chapters to be opened in Turkey’s bid for EU membership. This could scupper the EU’s intention to ease Turkey’s road to EU membership in return for Turkish assistance with Europe’s refugee problem. There is surely no chance that the Turkish Cypriots would allow this veto to be possible in the new federation they and the Greek Cypriots are trying to create for Cyprus. So the conclusion seems to be that a federal solution of the Cyprus problem is a long way off. (I am grateful to David Barchard for bringing the interview to my attention, and for his comments on the refugee problem).

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**Heritage**

by Semra Eren-Nijhar,
Sociologist, Author and Documentary Maker

The first permanent Ottoman ambassador to Britain, Yusuf Agah Efendi, came to London around 1793-1797. Nearly eighty years later, in 1862, the London and Provincial Turkish Bath was built (destroyed during the London Blitz on 17 April 1941) and in 1895 Navill’s Turkish Bath Limited built the bath which now stands along the Bishopsgate Churchyard among towering modern office
buildings, having survived the Blitz. Although these facts can be known easily, not many people still make a connection between the large Turkish community living in the UK and their historic connection to London going back as far as the 17th century.

If we look at ‘heritage’ in context, we see how it is highly politicised and tends to favour a conservative view of the past. Present politics and British national identity still fail to recognise or reflect the diversity of the ethnic communities in the UK of which the Turkish community is one integral and important part. The primary reason for this is the lack of accessible records and research on the history of Turkish people in Britain. The ‘Heritage Industry’ in the UK has failed to acknowledge the diversity of Turks in Britain although records indicate that the first of them settled in England during the 16th century when some were counted among King Henry VIII's mercenary troops.

Minorities and heritage have to be seen through a wider lens within culturally conditioned economic and political constraints. A clear historical illustration is the British involvement with the Ottoman Bank which, with Sir Edgar Vincent as its first general manager, opened a London branch in 1856 as a joint venture between British interests, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas of France and the Ottoman government. This case indicates that the economics of the past influenced the formation of modern British identity. Such shared heritage should be truly shared, not just recorded and acknowledged. Where the existence of common heritage is denied there is equally a denial of facts.

Heritage can be defined as 'property that is or may be inherited' which adds value to history and culture and thus has a right to be conserved. Heritage can be passed from one generation to the next and is something that younger generations can feel part of and own.

We are used to seeing not only in Britain but across Europe the opening of coffee shops in large numbers as they are increasingly popular and in demand. Most people accept that coffee has been exported from Turkey since the Ottoman period but further information about the first coffee house which was opened in the City of London in 1652, sponsored by merchants from the Levant Company, is still not well known. At the beginning of the 1700s coffee houses spread across London with some 2,000 where people from all backgrounds from the world of work, politics, religion or business could meet. Redefining the identity of Britain, with all the carefully researched historical facts, leads one to an essential next step in the identification of the Turkish heritage in Britain. Such historical facts – accessible to the rest of society – can, for example, ensure the recognition that coffee shops are not something new in the 21st century, but their origins are from Turkey in an earlier period of British history.

The experiences of the Turkish community must be recorded and themes identified and put together as local history, with creative outputs in the form of publications, exhibitions and educational initiatives. Ethnic identities are important and the richness of British culture and identity can be further enhanced with the practice of actively seeking out all contributing histories. Cultural heritage was first addressed in International Law in 1907 and its protection has been developed by UNESCO and by
other intergovernmental organisations since the 1950s. Thus it seems to be a prime time to bring the relationship between history and Turkish heritage and factual knowledge together, in order to create positive and constructive understanding of the evolving national British identity. Collective memories can define heritage and can reconnect the local hopes and dreams of a community and they can be conserved in official documents for their value and later for appreciation and study.

Minority groups such as the Turkish community can often be complex, possessing their own internal factional divisions and conflicts, and responses to them can be equally complicated. However, the formulation of researched facts provides the basis for a balanced analysis of history from which a collective shared heritage of the community can show it to be part of a common British heritage. By recognising shared heritage with a clear link to history and the ties between the various diverse ethnic minorities, the Turkish past becomes an integral part of British society with its own dynamic. Historians have inadequately explored the heritage of the Turkish community in Britain and this has resulted in the Turkish historical presence not being truly recognised in the modern UK.

It is important to use migration as a historical theme in this context and not to label Turkish people as ‘others’ but rather to view them as being part of a ‘collective’ historical theme of British history. Although some research indicates that the first arrivals from Cyprus came to Britain in the 1920s, not much other research has been conducted on people who arrived from Turkey.

One specific piece of research which was conducted in this area, and which is a good example of migration memories, concerns a Josef Gershon’s arrival in the UK in 1907-08. Josef, from a Jewish background, arrived with his family and about a dozen of his business workers and settled in Hammersmith, West London. They continued to live and work in the area for another 10-15 years as rug and carpet dealers and as a carpet cleaning agency.

All this information has been collected in Istanbul by his grandson, with oral interview and recording techniques. Such research findings can be used to explore the history of Turkish people in the UK and their part in British heritage today. For their part, government heritage schemes should recognise the history of the Turkish people in their policies along with that of the other ethnic minority communities which currently contribute to British identity. For us within the Turkish community, in order to preserve and protect the legacy of a ‘Turkish Heritage in Britain’, we must co-operate with the wider conservation sector, government agencies, local, national and international level organisations.

Noteworthy Events

by Ayşe Furlonger

Conferences

Turkey and Britain 1914-1952: From Enemies to Allies

Date: 1 - 2 April 2016
Venue: Organised by the British Institute at Ankara at the International Strategic Research Foundation in Ankara (Tandoğan)
Further information please visit: http://fromenemiestoallies.com
The Past in the Present of the Middle East

**Date:** 15-16 April 2016  
**Venue:** Council for British Research in the Levant and the London Middle East Institute, SOAS, London  
**For further information please visit:** www.cbrl.org.uk  
*There is a charge for attendance*

Networks: Connecting the Middle East through Time, Space and Cyberspace

**Date:** 13-15 July 2016  
**Venue:** British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Wales Trinity St David, Lampeter Campus  
**Further information on:** www.brismes.ac.uk/conference

The Levant and Europe: Shipping and Trade Networks of People and Knowledge

**Date:** 2 - 4 November 2016  
**Venue:** The Levantine Heritage Foundation, Europe House and the Hellenic Centre, London  

This, the second LHF conference, aims to build on the success of the first in 2014. It will emphasize the theme of trade as the central dynamic in the creation of a Levantine world. Confirmed Keynote Speakers are Elena Frangakis Syrett (Professor of History, Queens College & Graduate Center, City University of New York), Sibel Zandi Sayek (Associate Professor, Department of Art and Art History, The College of William and Mary) and Emrah Safa Gürkan (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Administration, Istanbul 29 May University)  

**For further information please visit:** www.levantineheritage.com

Seminars on Turkey

BATAS Spring Symposium

**Date:** 9 April 2016  
**Venue:** Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge  

Speakers: Professor Sinan Bayraktaroğlu, Edward Charlton-Jones, Dr İpek Demir, and Dr Eylem Atakav.  
**Details on** www.batas.org.uk

The Mesopotamia Campaign from both sides of the trenches, 1914 – 1917

**Date and time:** Tuesday, 10 May 2016 / 18:30-21:00  
**Venue:** Wolfson Auditorium, British Academy 10 Carlton House Terrace London SW1Y 5AH  
To book visit: www.biaa.ac.uk/events or call 020 7969 5204  
**Ticket Price:** £ 10.00 (Free for members)

The Ottomans and the Anglo-Indian Army both approached Mesopotamia as hostile terrain. This lecture by Professor Eugene Rogan explores the common experiences of all soldiers who fought on the Mesopotamian front, a campaign which marked the end of Ottoman rule and the beginning of Britain’s moment in the Middle East. Eugene Rogan is Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at the University of Oxford, and Director of the Middle East Centre at St Antony’s College. He is author

**The 2016 John Martin Lecture**

**Date:** November 2016 (tba)  
**Venue:** SOAS, London; BATAS event  
**Key speaker:** Professor Margaret MacMillan, University of Oxford

**EXHIBITIONS**

**The Museum of Innocence at Somerset House**

**Date and time:** 27 January - 3 April 2016 / 10:00-18:00 (last entry 17:15)  
Late night Thursdays & Fridays until 21.00 (last admission 20.15)  
**Venue:** Somerset House, Courtyard Rooms, South Wing, Strand London WC2R 1LA  
**Free admission**

Somerset House hosts a collaboration with Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk which sees a version of his collection ‘The Museum of Innocence’, the physical manifestation of his novel of the same name, travel to Somerset House. Both the novel and the museum tell the story of engaged wealthy socialite Kemal Bey’s obsessive love for Füsun, his twice removed cousin and a beautiful shop girl, through an array of everyday items which have taken on special emotional significance as mementos and keep-sakes of the couple’s ill-fated romance.

**The Golden Age of King Midas**

**Date:** 13 February – 27 November 2016  
**Venue:** Penn Museum, 3260 South Street, Philadelphia, PA USA 19104  
**Admission:** (includes general Museum admission) is $20 adults; $18 senior citizens $15 for children and full-time students with ID; $5 for active military. Admission is free for Penn Museum members, PennCard holders, and children 5 and younger.

The Penn Museum, in this noteworthy and exclusive exhibition, will feature a spectacular array of some 120 specially-loaned ancient artefacts from Turkey to tell the story of King Midas, who was a very powerful ruler of the Phrygian kingdom in what is now central Anatolia. Since 1950, archaeologists from the Penn Museum (the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology) have been excavating at the important ancient site of Gordion, the city in which King Midas lived c 750–700 BCE. A rich site, Gordion is particularly known for being home to a series of wealthy tombs belonging to Phrygian royalty and elites. In fact, the Penn Museum excavated a spectacular tomb, the Tumulus MM (Midas Mound). The tomb chamber within still ranks as the oldest standing wooden building in the world, and is believed to be the final resting place of King Midas’ father Gordias.

**Istanbul: Passion, Joy, Fury**

**Date:** 11 Dec. 2015 – 30 April 2016 / Tue–Fri, Sun: 11.00–19.00; Sat: 11.00–22.00; Mon: Closed  
**Venue:** MAXXI (Museo nazionale delle arti del XXI secolo), Via Guido Reni, 4 A, Rome, Italy  
**For more information and tickets:** www.fondazionemaxxi.it/en/events/istanbul-passione-gioia-urore/
This exhibition, which is curated by Hou Hanru with Ceren Erdem, Elena Motisi and Donatella Saroli, tackles the dynamics, the changes and the cultural demands of contemporary Turkey. Beginning with the recent protests at Gezi Park, the exhibition examines five major themes: urban transformations; political conflicts and resistance; innovative models of production; geopolitical urgencies; and hope. The work on display will demonstrate the passion for creativity, the joy that emerges from achieving objectives and the fury of the city.


ARCHAEOLOGY

Archaeologists find Bronze Age shipwreck off Turkey’s southwest

Underwater works carried out by Dokuz Eylül University since 2007 have unearthed one of the oldest shipwrecks ever found in Turkey’s seas. Excavations off the western province of Muğla’s Marmaris district have unearthed a shipwreck in the Hisarönü Gulf dating back up to 4,000 years, one of the oldest ever found in Turkish waters.

The work is part of a project initiated in 2007 to reveal Turkey’s underwater heritage, supported by the Development Agency. The project coordinator, Dokuz Eylül University Marine Sciences Associate Professor Abdurrahman Harun Özdaş, said underwater archaeologists, marine physicists and marine biologists are working in a 15-person team. It has been said that more than 100 wrecks and their potential fields, 20 underwater harbours and 400 anchors from between the Bronze Age and the Ottoman era have been found.

Historic church discovered in Nevşehir

Another historical church has been discovered underground during excavations in Turkey’s Cappadocia region, with experts saying the frescoes inside could change the history of Orthodoxy.

The church was uncovered by archaeologists during excavation and cleaning work in an underground city discovered as part of the Nevşehir Castle Urban Transformation Project, implemented by the Nevşehir Municipality and Turkey’s Housing Development Administration (TOKI). The rock-carved underground church is located within a castle in the centre of Nevşehir that
spreads over an area of 360,000 square meters. It is reported that some of the frescoes here are unique. There are exciting depictions such as fish falling from the hand of Jesus Christ and of Him rising up into the sky, and bad souls being killed. Archaeologist Semih İstanbulluoğlu, who heads the works in the underground city and the church, said the thin walls of the church collapsed because of snow and rain but they would be fixed during restorations.

MUSIC

Istanbul Music Festival

The 44th Istanbul Music Festival, 1-24 June 2016 will present an impressive programme built around this year’s theme inspired by Shakespeare’s verse, “If Music be the Food of Love, Play On”. The Festival will host close to 600 local and international artists, including names like İdil Biret, Murray Perahia, Gautier Capuçon, Angel Blue, Gérard Caussé, Herbert Schuch, Patricia Petibon, Alice Sara Ott, Maria João Pires, Antonio Meneses, Maxim Vengerov, Richard Galliano, and Sylvain Luc, as well as some of the world’s leading ensembles, such as the Vienna Symphony Orchestra, Venice Baroque Orchestra, Orchestra of the Swan, Artemis Quartet, Academy of St Martin in the Fields, and Warsaw Philharmonic Orchestra, this year’s Guest Orchestra in Residence. The festival will take place across 17 different venues.

One of the new additions this year, Music Route concert series will take festival followers on an excursion full of music and history across five churches in Beyoğlu: Surp Yerrortutyun Church, Church of Panayia Isodion, Sent Antuan Lower Church, Palais de Hollande Chapel, and Crimea Memorial Church, which will all be used as concert venues for the first time. The Weekend Classics series, the free festival event that has already become a tradition, will take place at the Garden of Austrian Culture Forum, Fenerbahçe Park, and the Garden of Sakıp Sabancı Museum.

The world premiere of Michael Ellison’s total music theatre based on Yaşar Kemal’s 1978 novel, will take place at the Süreyya Opera House on 11 June, following Cevat Çapan’s speech on Yaşar Kemal’s work at 19:00, as part of the Pre-concert Talks. One of the greatest accordionists of the modern era with a compositional range including classical music and jazz, Richard Galliano and unimpeachable jazz guitarist Sylvain Luc will be the festival’s guests, reinterpreting Edith Piaf’s unforgettable chansons.

AUCTION

Sotheby’s: Arts of the Islamic World (Spring 2016)

Date: April 20, 2016
Venue: Sotheby’s New Bond Street, 34-35 New Bond Street, London W1A 2AA, UK
Featuring over a thousand years of artistic exchange and influence in the Islamic world from China, to India, Persia, Turkey, North Africa and Europe, Sotheby’s sale of Arts of the Islamic World is led by a magnificent Ottoman tortoiseshell, mother-of-pearl and brass-inlaid scribe’s box of exquisite craftsmanship from the sixteenth
century. Also hailing from the Ottoman world is a superb dagger with a blade finely inlaid with gold with a carved Mughal jade hilt. One of the earliest works included is an extremely rare Qur’an leaf written in Eastern Kufic script on a background of delicate foliate scrolls from a manuscript dated between 1075 and 1125 AD. There will also be important works of art from the collection of the distinguished lawyer, journalist and advisor to the ‘Ali Pasha dynasty at the turn of the twentieth century, Octave Borelli Bey (1849-1911).

Poetry in Turkey in the middle decades of the Twentieth Century

by Celia Kerslake
Oriental Studies, University of Oxford
Chairperson BATAS

In a previous article (TAS Review 26, 2015, pp.33-39) I outlined the ways in which poetry developed in the early decades of the Turkish Republic. My purpose in this article is to focus on two contrasting currents in the poetry of the 1940s and 50s, with a brief onward glance over the following two decades as well. One of these two currents is socialist realism and the other is the avant-garde movement known as İkinci Yeni.

In the previous article we saw how Nazım Hikmet had introduced free verse into Turkish poetry, feeling the need to break down all conventional constraints in order to give expression to his Marxist revolutionary vision. We also saw how, in 1941, a trio of young poets led by Orhan Veli published a book of poetry called Garip (‘Strange’), which gave its name to an extraordinarily popular new movement, based on the notion that poetry must be written in the language of everyday speech, eschewing not only metre and rhyme but all figures of speech as well, in order to be fully accessible to the entire populace, especially to those struggling to earn a living. Garip-style poetry was intellectually and artistically undemanding and politically unchallenging. It was therefore not only popular with the general reading public, inspiring many to try their hand at it themselves, but it was also acceptable to the political establishment of the İnönü years, and was extravagantly acclaimed by Nurullah Ataç, unquestionably the most influential literary critic of the age, and a strong supporter of the Kemalist reforms. A literary scholar of our own time has described Garip as “the poetry that was expected”, meaning that both its rejection of the aesthetic tastes of the past and its insistence that literature must be in the language of the people made it fully in tune not only with the Kemalist revolution but also with the entire thrust of modernisation in Turkish literature from the Tanzimat
period onwards. However, this avowedly ‘non-poetic’ poetry was hardly going to satisfy poetic aspirations in the longer term and, in the very different political and cultural climate of the 1950s, a number of poets branched out in a radically new direction.

Before turning to that, however, I want to consider the ‘socialist realist’ movement in Turkish poetry that is particularly associated with the so-called ‘1940 generation’ (1940 kuşağı). These were young poets who, inspired by socialist ideals and by the example of Nazım Hikmet, saw poetry as a means of exposing social inequalities and showing solidarity with peasants and workers. Because of the regime’s implacable opposition to any expression of Marxist ideology (it will be recalled that Nazım himself was behind bars from 1938 to 1950), leftist intellectuals were extremely restricted in what they could say or do. The leftist poets of the 1940s did not write about the global class struggle nearly as openly as Nazım had done, but the treatment of themes such as the evils of war, hunger, deprivation and the struggle to earn a living could suffice to get a book banned and its author prosecuted for subversion. The collection *Sınıf* (‘Class’) by Rıfat İlgaş (1911-1993), published in 1944 was one such book that fell foul of the authorities and brought its author a prison sentence. İlgaş, who was of humble background and worked as a teacher from 1930-1946, wrote several poems based directly on his observations in that profession. The book takes its (obviously ambiguous) title from a poem of the same name in which a teacher reflects on the social circumstances of some of his pupils. Although the socialist realist poets were not much interested in the aesthetic aspects of poetry, and much of their output was of little artistic value, İlgaş’s work from the 1940s exemplifies this movement at its best. A poem like the one presented below (also taken from *Sınıf*) shows how effective the transparent, everyday language that the socialist realists shared with the Garip poets could be in conveying pungent criticism of the social order.

**Kuş misali (II)**

Sekiz aylık çocuk bu kadar yaşarmış,
Dört gün yaşadı.
Çok bilişmiş insanlar gibi
Gitti sabaha karşı…
Haber verince bekçiye,
Soruldu ekmek karnesi.
Doğuma bakarak,
Yerinde buldular ölümü
Hemen ızın çıktığı gümüldümesine.
Dört gündür, soğuktan,
Su yüzü görmeyen yetimiz,
Geleneye uyun yıklıd.”
Çıkarken kucakta
Bulamadı beklenen göz yaşını.
Çocuklar düştü arkanıza,
Yüzü kirli çocuklar…
Dört yanımı saranlara,
Su dökenlere, yasın okuyanlara
Dağıttım son meteliğe kadar.

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60 Yalçın Armağan, *İmkânsız Özerklik: Türk Şiirinde Modernizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), 100-2.
Like a bird (Part II)

It seems this is as long as a child lives if it's been born at eight months,
He lived for four days.
Like people who think they know a lot,
He slipped away in the early hours…
When we informed the watchman
We were asked for our ration book.
After checking the birth
They found no problem with the death
And permission was immediately given for his burial.
Our little one, who because of the cold
Had not been washed at all in four days,
Was now washed as custom required.
As we carried him out of the house
He didn’t encounter the expected tears.
Children pursued us,
Children with dirty faces…
I handed out money down to my last farthing
To those who crowded round me,
Those who poured water on the grave or recited from the Kuran.
The worst of it was that he went at the end of the month.
The midwife’s money had to wait until payday.
Just as the poor little thing was born at the wrong time,
He chose the wrong time to die,
Flying off like a bird!  

An important aesthetic reaction to Garip, to socialist realism and indeed to the entire poetic culture of the Republic took shape gradually in the 1950s. It was not an organised movement, and the name by which it has become known, İkinci Yeni (‘the Second New’) was not chosen by any of the participants themselves but given to it by Muzaffer Erdost (1932-), the editor of the art and culture pages of the weekly Pazar Postası, who did much to open up a critical space for this radically different approach to poetry. The names most closely associated with İkinci Yeni are those of Cemal Süreyya (1931-1990), İlhan Berk (1918-2008), Turgut Uyar (1927-1985), Edip Cansever (1928-1986), Ece Ayhan (1931-2002) and Sezai Karakoç (1933- ). It was in the pages of Pazar Postası in 1956-8 that the work of these poets – most of them only in their late twenties at the time – first appeared together, along with theoretical writings by some of them.

The general election of 1950 had been a watershed in Turkish political life, the first in which the people of Turkey had had a real choice between two political parties. The greatly increased involvement with the Western democracies since the end of the War and the Democrat Party’s encouragement of private enterprise combined to produce a very different cultural atmosphere from that of the one-party period. This,

61 All the translations in this article are my own. CK.
it can be argued, indirectly created the conditions under which the İkinci Yeni poets felt emboldened to seek a new ‘autonomy’ for poetry. Although generally holding left-wing political views (the Islamist Sezai Karakoç being an exception), they believed it essential to emancipate poetry from subjection to any cause outside itself. They saw the poet not as a man entrusted with a public mission but as a rebel against all established conventions, especially as these related to artistic expression. Not satisfied with the idea of representing the world ‘as it was’, they understood the poet’s task as the creation of a new, artistic reality inherent in the work itself. In this process, language itself might need to be used in unconventional configurations. The result was a poetry that challenges the reader to make associations between images and ideas that often seem to have no ‘logical’ connection.

İkinci Yeni poetry was met with extreme hostility by most critics of the time, who denounced it as ‘incomprehensible’, ‘meaningless’, ‘abstract’ or ‘escapist’. These epithets reflected the conception of poetry that had dominated Turkish cultural thinking ever since the modernisation process began in the nineteenth century. It was believed that poetry (and indeed literature in general) should serve a social purpose. Poets and writers had a duty to use their talents for the common good, for the enlightenment and progress of society. This view had inspired the ‘National Literature’ movement under the Young Turks, and for the founding elite of the Republic it was a direct and natural inheritance. Similarly, as noted above, it was adopted by the socialist opponents of the Kemalist order in the name of their own vision of a better world. The Garip poets, for their part, were trying to write poetry that would appeal to working people. Transparency and simplicity of language had always been a key part of this ‘social’ attitude to literature. The message must be unambiguously expressed, and it must be articulated in the common idiom, so that it would be comprehensible to all and have socially cohesive power. The İkinci Yeni poets were thus flouting a deeply ingrained tradition. Their individualism was seen as frivolous and self-indulgent, while more conservative critics also condemned their poetry as immoral on account of its uninhibited treatment of sexual desire and pleasure, a topic that had found virtually no place in Turkish poetry hitherto.

The two examples I have chosen to illustrate İkinci Yeni represent different aspects of this poetry. The first, from Cemal Süreya, is an example of the erotic tendency:

San
Kırmızı bir kıstur soluğum
Kumral gözlerinde saçlarının
Seni kucağıma aliyorum
Tarıfsiz uzuyor bacaklarından

Kırmızı bir at oluyor soluğum
Yüzümün yanmasından anlıyorum
Yoksuluş gecelerimiz çok kısa
Dörtnala sevişmek lazım. (1957)


62 For an inspiring exploration of the idea of poetic ‘autonomy’ and the long-lasting resistance to it in modern Turkey, see Yalçın Armağan’s book cited above.
Fame
My breath is a red bird
In the brown eyes of your hair
I take you in my arms
Your legs become indescribably long
My breath becomes a red horse
I know this from the way my face burns
We’re poor and our nights are very short
We must make love at a gallop.

The second example, from İlhan Berk, also has erotic undertones, but has been chosen primarily because it illustrates two other distinctive characteristics of (some) İkinci Yeni poems: firstly, the wide range of international cultural references that are one of the features leading to accusations of elitism from the movement’s detractors; and secondly, grammatical ‘deviations’ - in this case the use of infinitives where finite verb forms (marked for tense and person) are required - which obviously support the charge of incomprehensibility so often levelled against these poets.

Paul Klee’dede Uyanmak
Uyandım çiçek gibi dayanılmaz güzel kızlar
Ad Marginem’den asma köprüler kurmuşlar İstanbul’a
Nehirler, aylar çevirmişler o Ayla’lar, Münibe’ler
Tümü bir uzak denizde A’lar, V’ler, U’larla
Gece san bir evde bir iki yaprak evlerinin önünde
Açı açacaklar dünyamızı açtı açtı açacaklar
Bu denizi Ayla ayaklarını soksun diye getirdim
Bu dünyaları onun için actım bu balıkları tuttum
Bir sabah çıkmak güneşler, aylar bir sabah çıkmak
Bir ağacı bu evleri sari ters bir kuşu düzeltmek
Edibe bu sokağı al götürmek istemiyorum
Edibe bu evleri Edibe bu göğü bu güneşleri Edibe
A’lar V’ler U’larla olmak Paul Klee’de uyanmak (1958)


Waking up in Paul Klee
I woke up; unbearably beautiful flower-like girls
Had put up suspension bridges from Ad Marginem to Istanbul
Those Aylas and Münibes had encircled rivers and moons
With A’s, V’s and U’s, all of them in a distant sea
At night in a yellow house in front of one or two leaf-houses belonging to them
They are on the point of opening up our world, opening it up
I brought this sea so that Ayla could dip her feet in it
It was for her I opened up these worlds and caught these fish
One morning to come out suns and moons one morning to come out
To set right a tree these houses an adverse yellow bird

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63 Any attempt at translating a poem of this nature, where the syntactic relationships between words are often unclear, inevitably involves a large measure of conjecture.
Edibe take this street away I don’t want to see it
Edibe these houses Edibe this sky these suns Edibe
To be with A’s, V’s and U’s to wake up in Paul Klee

The military coup of 1960 that toppled the (by now highly authoritarian) Democrat Party regime was followed in 1961 by a remarkably liberal new constitution that made it possible for the first time for the Left to organise openly in Turkey. One result of this was that leftist ideologies came to dominate Turkey’s intellectual life from the mid-1960s down to the military coup of 1980. Under such conditions political commitment and (ironically) adherence to ‘pure Turkish’ (öztürkçe) became the touchstones of literary orthodoxy, and even the İkinci Yeni poets felt the need to adopt a more accessible style. It was not until after the entire politico-cultural configuration of the country had been transformed by the military intervention of 1980-83 that a pervasive new individualism brought the poetic ideals of İkinci Yeni a status that they had never enjoyed in Turkey before.

Poetry

Gülay Yurdal Michaels
Poet and Translator

Experience is the master of fools

Unconditional Love
As the body gives way, we got up from experiences
Dreams are still joined to the eaves of my eyes
Passion is down, love is now frayed
Questions going beyond our wind increased fast
Since supposedly global poverty does not go well with the world
Didn’t we know each flower was a revolution?
When it reached us ageing should have brought hope.

Deneyimler aptalların efendisidir

Koşulsuz Sevgi
Gövde çökerken deneyimlerden kalktık
Gözlerimin saçaklarına düşler takılı hala
Aşk dindi, yıprandi sevgi artık
Rüzgarımızı aşan sorular çoğaliverdi
Yoksulluk çünkü küreselmiş, yakışmadı dünyaya
Bilmez miydik her çiçeğin bir kalkışma olduğunu
Umut getirmeliydi yaşlılık yetiştirince...

64 John Trussler
I didn’t want to enter others’ world
Wanting to understand I did
But I also did jobs I didn’t like
I had put on my youth…
The employer said I want to kiss you
I said I didn’t even want your job forsooth.
I didn’t clothe myself in a burkha
I suffered silently without crawling
In partnerlessness childlessness before death -
Understand me
Even if I cannot explain…

Başkalarının dünyasına girmek istemedim
Anlamak istemekle girmiş oldum
Ama sevmediğim işler de yaptım
Gençliğini giyinmiştir
Seni öpmek istiyorum dedi işveren
İşinizi de istemiyorum dedim gerçekten
Burkalara bürünmedim
Sineye çektim sürümeden
Eşsizliği çocuksuzluğu ölmenden
-
Anlayın beni
Anlatamazsam da…

Translated by
Gülay Yurdal Michaels

Conferences, Workshops & Organisations

Turkey and Britain 1914-1952
From enemies to allies

A research programme of the British Institute at Ankara

TAS readers will be pleased to learn that the first workshop of the four planned for this programme (reported in TAS Review No.26) is about to take place. The project has been organized by the British Institute at Ankara and represents the Institute’s first substantial engagement with Turkey’s history in the early Republican period. The organization of the programme encountered a hiccup when collaboration with the Institute’s first Turkish partner, the Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi (attached to the Turkish Foreign Ministry), faltered. Fortunately a new partner was swiftly found: the International Strategic Research Foundation (USAK), an independent Turkish think-tank. The first meeting of the programme will take place as scheduled on their premises in Tandoğan in Ankara, on 1-2 April 2016. Jill Sindall, BATAS representative on the BIAA council, will provide a report for the next issue of the TAS Review.
Workshop programme:

Panel 1: Anglo-Ottoman entanglements on the outbreak of war

Camille Cole, Yale University - *Steamship and dams: capital and investment in Ottoman-British relations in Iraq, 1861-1914*

Piro Rexhepi, University of Graz - *Colonial Peripheries in British-Turkish relations during the First World War and the emergence of transnational pan-Islamism*

Sevtap Demirci, Boğaziçi University - *The Dardanelles campaign and contending strategies for war*

Keynote Lecture

Eugene Rogan, University of Oxford - *Soldiers on the Ottoman Front: the view from both sides of the trenches.*

Panel 2: Determining the front, contending strategies for victory

Warren Dockter, University of Cambridge - *Churchill’s wartime vision*

Talha Çiček, Istanbul Medeniyet University - *The holy war in Syria: the Ottoman plan to conquer Egypt during the First World War*

Ayhan Aktar, Istanbul Bilgi University - *Who sank the Battleship Bouvet on 18 March 1915? Problems of Imported Historiography in Turkey*

Panel 3: New arrivals, Japan, America and the Anglo-Ottoman war

Selçuk Esenbel, Boğaziçi University - *Japan and the Great War: negotiations between Minister Uchida Sadatsuchi, Sir Horace Rumbold, and the Turks in occupied Istanbul*

Charlie Laderman, University of Cambridge - *Britain, the Armenian question and American intervention in the First World War*

Panel 4: The war after the war, Turkish and British visions for post-Ottoman space

David Katz, Tel Aviv University - *Arnold Toynbee, the Turkish War of Independence, and the clash of civilisations*

Ozan Arslan, Izmir University of Economics - *An unexpected Anglo-Ottoman front of WWI: the Ottoman Caucasian Army of Islam and the British Caspian campaign in 1918*

Matthew Ghazarian, Columbia University - *Rethinking Britain’s Caucasus operation, 1918-1920*

Details of future workshops on [http://fromenemiestoallies.com](http://fromenemiestoallies.com).
The project (2016-2018) has received additional support from the British Academy, which has partially funded a research fellowship in 2015-16, held by Dr Daniel-Joseph Macarthur-Seal whose own work builds on his Cambridge PhD thesis – ‘Britain’s Levantine Empire, 1914-1923’ – examining the Allied military occupations of Istanbul, Thessaloniki, and Alexandria during and immediately after the First World War. Dr Macarthur-Seal is now revising his thesis for publication including additional Ottoman sources.

Stephen Mitchell

THE LEVANTINE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

The Levantine Heritage Foundation (LHF), UK, is a non-profit membership association, which promotes research, preservation and education in the heritage, arts and culture of the different ethnic and religious communities of the wider Levant region of the Ottoman Empire between the 17th and 20th centuries. The Ottoman Levant comprised most of present-day Balkans, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine and Egypt, and its influence extended far beyond the borders of those countries. The Empire was made up of many different ethnic groups, including Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. They were joined over the centuries by traders and diplomats from every part of Europe, from England to Dalmatia, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish, many of whom settled in the region and intermarried with the local population. In recent years, it has become common to refer to these European settlers in Ottoman lands as ‘Levantines’. However, research into their cosmopolitan world is still in its infancy, and much remains to be discovered about their way of life and their legacy.

Although the Levant has been part of Eurasian trade networks for millennia, it played an increasingly central role, and provided a formative geocultural space for exchanges, during the creation of the modern world: the economic expansion of capitalism, accompanied by imperialism, nationalism, and the movement of people through the Levant, shaped the Middle East as we know it. The essential ‘engine of history’ in most of these developments was trade, providing the material exchanges and networks which, in turn, generated an array of social and cultural interactions.

In November 2016, the Foundation is organizing its second interdisciplinary conference, on ‘The Levant and Europe:
Shipping and Trade – Networks of People and Knowledge’, in London, at Europe House and the Hellenic Centre. Building on the success of the ground breaking first international LHF conference on Levantines, held in Istanbul, 2014, this next meeting will emphasize the theme of trade as the central dynamic in the creation of a Levantine world.

Other events and contacts are organized by LHF in Britain and in the Levant. One of these was a reunion of members of the Whittall family held in London in September, 2015, when descendants of the well-known family from no fewer than twelve countries heard addresses from John Whittall and David Whittall.

For information on the Foundation visit www.levantineheritage.com

Brian Beeley

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**Turkey Year of Science and Innovation - Cooperation in the Area of Social Sciences and Humanities**

A workshop to establish closer cooperation links between the UK and Turkish researchers working in the area of social sciences and humanities was organized on 15 January 2016 in London, with the joint efforts of the British Embassy in Ankara, UK Higher Education International Unit and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK). The programme started with presentations by İilter Haliloğlu (Newton Kâtip Çelebi Fund Manager in Turkey) and Dr Claire Pascolini-Campbell (International Officer, The British Academy), focusing on funding opportunities for joint research. The programme continued with short presentations by the researchers from both sides, denoting their research expertise and areas of interest for cooperation. There was a lot of networking activity and one to one meetings among researchers to discuss planning for closer collaboration. As part of the programme, on the 14th, the Turkish researcher delegation also paid a visit to King’s College and afterwards had a short training session on H2020 and proposal writing by UK Research Office (UKRO). More information about TÜBİTAK, which has its head office in Ankara, on www.tubitak.gov.tr/en and more information on Newton Kâtip Çelebi Fund on www.newtonfund.ac.uk or from Ilter.Haliloglu@fco.gov.uk

İilter Haliloğlu

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The Centre for Turkey Studies (CEFTUS), which is based in London, was founded by İbrahim Doğuş in 2011, with support from the then UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, to provide an independent forum for discussion about Turkish matters for British people and for Turks and Kurds in the United Kingdom. The co-director is Raife Aytek. A major aim has been to bring together a varied range of British and Turkish expertise to discuss matters of interest to both countries in seminars, panel discussions, and conferences. Many of these initiatives have led to the production of reports and policy briefings. Some CEFTUS events are held in the Houses of Parliament in London with the support of members of the British political establishment. Topics considered range from the study of Turkish political parties and elections to reviews on progress in the Cyprus dispute and to consideration of Turkey’s relations with Europe and with its neighbours in the Middle East. The programme also includes social events and includes a ‘British Kebab Award’ which raises money for the organisation. CEFTUS stresses that it is not funded by government, university, or other institutional sources but needs donations and the support of its growing membership. For more information email: info@ceftus.org or go to www.ceftus.org.

Brian Beeley

FACEBOOK CO-ORDINATOR NEEDED!

We are looking for a volunteer to establish and co-ordinate BATAS’ Facebook page. This would involve updating and posting information about BATAS and publicising its activities through the account. For further details please email one of the co-editors: bw.beeley@gmail.com or sigimartin3@gmail.com
Reminiscence

Turkey 1964

İsmet İnönü, Prime Minister, Republican People’s Party (CHP)

Süleyman Demirel, Leader of the opposition, Justice Party (AP)

MY FIRST VISIT TO TURKEY, 1964

by Malcolm Wagstaff, Visiting Professor, University of Southampton

It began with a letter. In the autumn of 1963 I had been appointed as a research assistant in the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. I was based in the Geography Department, headed by W.B. (‘Bill’) Fisher. The letter came from the University’s finance officer sometime in the Lent Term. My application to the Rockefeller Fund for a research visit to Turkey, it said, had been accepted. Consternation. I had not made any application. I went to see Howard Bowen-Jones (‘B J’) who was my line manager and also in Geography. His reaction was something like this. Oh, we were going to send you to Cyprus but it is too dangerous at the moment so we thought we would send you to Turkey instead. Go and see Mr Turner at Oriental and ask him to teach you Turkish. I dutifully toiled up the hill from the Science Laboratories, where Geography was located, to the Oriental Museum, where the teachers of Arabic, Persian and Turkish were based. Mr Turner was in. His reaction to my request was something along the lines of “I cannot teach you Turkish; I am too busy. Here are the records and there is the book. Get on with it”. I was too nervous to say that I did not have a record player.

A few days after the end of the Trinity Term I flew into Ankara. Arriving in the evening, I was soon installed in a very smart hotel in what I eventually learned was Ulus. A dressing gown was laid out. Slippers and patens were tucked under the bed. It seemed a bit like James Bond (I had seen ‘From Russia with Love’ which had been released in 1963). The next few days are a bit of a blur. I remember meeting up with John Dewdney, also from the Durham Geography Department, who was just finishing the study leave in which he had collected information for his book, Turkey (1971). John must have put me in touch with the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (now the British Institute at Ankara). I certainly moved there after a day or so. Then towards the advancing edge of the built-up area, the Institute occupied one of fast-disappearing villas in Kavaklidere and had a garden.
The BIAA is now in a small block of flats across the road. Michael and Mary Gough welcomed me there, and I soon got into the rhythm of life. A leisurely breakfast was followed by mornings and early afternoons in the town visiting offices and collecting information. There was afternoon tea in the common room, accompanied by animated conversation. Ferdie’, the Belgian dragoman, had a fund of stories. I soon learnt that he could fix anything. All the residents had dinner together in the evening, presided over by Michael dispensing Buzbağ wine. Afterwards I read in the library or walked to Luna Park. The conversation was always sparkling.

There was great excitement one morning at breakfast. ‘Bean was coming in’. This was George Bean. He had been out in the Mediterranean coastlands with a couple of colleagues collecting inscriptions. On another occasion, Miss (Gertrude) Caton-Thompson came through with a small entourage on her way to, I think, Yemen after driving from Cambridge! Many regulars at the Institute routinely drove between the UK and Ankara.

Much of my time was spent at the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the State Statistical Service. Limited, if any photocopying, meant I copied pages of statistics by hand. Amidst these labours, and probably arranged by John Dewdney, I met Clem and Nesta Dodd, as well as Brian Beeley for the first time. We have been friends ever since. Brian was a graduate in Geography and Anthropology from Newcastle and Clem was in the Politics Department at Durham, but at the time a visiting lecturer at Bilkent. He took me to a graduation ceremony on that campus, then just beyond the fringe of the built-up area. We still use the earthenware cooking pot which Nesta gave me. Brian probably told me how to get hold of maps. I certainly ended up with two topographical sheets and a large number of larger scale contour maps. The Geological Survey used the latter for field mapping. Statistics and maps were basic to the study I was to make of agricultural land use in the Ege (Aegean) Region.

Time seemed to pass very quickly and I was soon on the bus across the plateau to Izmir. For the first day or two, I was based in a hotel on the waterfront, but I was soon installed at a Toprak Su (Soil and Water Office) building in Bornova, about eight miles to the north-east. Bornova then was a pleasant small town, quite separate from Izmir, characterized by the gardened villas of the Levantines. I am not sure how this happened. Maybe it had been arranged from Ankara. Maybe it was Mr Whittall, the British Consul in Izmir, like his forefathers, who knew a man who was able to organize my accommodation. I had been advised to meet him early on, which I did in his office on the waterfront. One way or another, I was soon based in Bornova and looked after by an elderly couple. Every day I took the train into the city to begin my research and usually had dinner there. Early on an agricultural extension officer placed me under his wing. Again, I am not sure how this came about. Attila Bey took me on one of his inspection trips south from Izmir. The tour lasted several days, the two of us and a driver. Two things stand out very clearly in my memory. The first is the sound of the müezzin singing the dawn prayer. I must have heard it before, but on this occasion, in Kuşadası, the sky was just beginning to lighten, thin curls of smoke rose quietly as fires were lit. Suddenly this gentle, ethereal voice came out of nowhere – no warning – from a crackling microphone. It was unbelievably beautiful. The second highlight was my first visit to Aphrodisias in the hills above the Büyük Menderes valley. It is a lovely site, still fairly isolated. Some of the old village had yet to be cleared but the latest round of excavations had begun only two years before. The director, Kenan Erim, was a courteous and gracious host.
On a subsequent visit, sitting outside amidst ancient statues, I and colleagues had lunch accompanied by piano music. Attila Bey took me to extension schools where young farmers were encouraged to take courses in husbandry and learn about new techniques and new strains of cereal. We pushed on south, from the tarmac road on to rutted dirt tracks. These ended in Fethiye (formerly Makri), an unpretentious place, little more than a fishing village. The results of the 1961 earthquake were clearly visible. In retrospect, it was a wonderful opportunity to see the town and some of the neighbouring villages before mass tourism changed them completely. It was also my first encounter with Greek-speakers whose families had fled from Crete in the late nineteenth century. I met some others north of Izmir on a subsequent occasion.

Apart from this excursion, I made my own way round the region, generally using the buses and walking. Attila Bey had probably suggested how I could organize my field work. The buses started across the road from Izmir main station. They took me all over the region. Generally, I went to some local centre and walked out from there, unless a convenient village bus happened to be available. I walked the Gediz delta from Manisa and along both Menderes valleys. As I travelled on the bus, I looked out of the window and noticed how the cropping pattern changed, where animals were grazing and the location of the yayla buildings and pastures. I had trained myself in previous years to remember what I saw and how each observation related to the topography and the villages. Later, in a quiet spot or back in Bornova, I made my notes and filled in my maps. The buses took me north to Ayvalık, where there had been a thriving Greek community until the 1920s, and to Bergama with its theatre and temples. I travelled east to Kütahya, Afyonkarahisar (what a wonderful name), Aydın and Denizli. I visited Pamukkale with its hot springs and spectacular tavertines. When it was necessary to over-night, I stayed in small cheap hotels. Frequently, though, I was often able to get back to Bornova.

For most of the time, I was unaware of the security situation arising from events in Cyprus. On perhaps a couple of occasions it became apparent that things were perhaps not as quiet as they seemed in the countryside. Troops suddenly arrived to guard Izmir station. Some Americans attached to the NATO base whom I knew slightly started talking about evacuating family and non-essential personnel. There seemed to be more US sailors in the bars on the waterfront.

After so many weeks, I caught the night boat from Izmir to Istanbul hoping that I would arrive at dawn and have that thrilling experience which so many travellers describe, of seeing the domes and minarets of the city rising out of the early morning mist, catching in the early morning light. My arrival was less poetic – broad daylight and no romance at all. A taxi took me to a hotel in Beyoğlu recommended by the Goughs, not far from Taksim Square. The next few days were wonderful. I just roamed about the old city, fascinated by the architecture and the associations, finding London-made clocks in the mosques, exploring the Grand Bazaar, sitting in teahouses and watching the passing scene. Finding the bookmarket was a great delight, and the neighbouring Beyazit Cami is still my favourite Istanbul mosque. Few tourists were about in those days. Gentrification and pedestrianisation were some years off. My biggest surprise, I think, was the Fener, where I went in search of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Dirty, scruffy workshops lined the streets and ran along the waterside. The Golden Horn was polluted. The Patriarchate itself was black from smoke; the church gloomy. (But the caretaker spoke Greek.) Gülhane Park was disappointing too, but it was interesting to visit the spot where the famous decree was issued in 1839. Nearby is The Porte – and I was surprised that there really is a
portal/gate. I had an appointment in the Archives one morning to look at the first tahir defter for the Morea (Peloponnese), dated c.1450. To get access I had been advised to apply through the British Foreign Office. Either the embassy or the British Council made the arrangements, despite being surprised at the request. Anyway, I had my first viewing of this remarkable document. I could not read the Ottoman script so I arranged for a microfilm to be made, confident that I would get to read it. A photographer was brought in and – maybe a week later – I had the film. It turned out to be only part of the original survey; the other, longer part turned up in Sophia several years later. With help from Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, a senior colleague from Erlangen, I did manage to get useful information out of my part of the document.

I am not sure how long I spent in Istanbul, (and visits tend to merge with time) but eventually I crossed the Bosphorus by ferry to Haydar Paşa station and took the train back to Ankara. It was a slow journey, but a fascinating experience. I reported back to my friends in and around the BIAA, somewhat relieved to be in a – sort of – familiar environment and not having to struggle with limited Turkish. After a short while, I was back in Britain and on the night train to Durham – just about in time for the new term.

Book Reviews & Publications

Turks Across Empires

Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856-1914

by James H. Meyer


James H Meyer traces the lives of leading Russian-born pan-Turkist and Muslim activists in the tumultuous era leading up to and during the dissolution of the Russian and Ottoman empires, focusing on Yusuf Akçura, Ismail Gasprinskii, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu. A major contribution of this work is its use of original source material in Turkish, Ottoman Turkish and Russian. Using personal correspondence and Ottoman and Russian Tsarist era archives, Meyer traces four distinct periods in these figures’ trans-imperial existence as they moved back and forth between Istanbul, Kazan, Crimea, and Azerbaijan.

The first is in late 19th century Russia where they led a modernising mission amongst the far-flung Muslim population of the country numbered approximately twenty million despite waves of expulsions and pogroms. They promoted curriculum reform – known as usul-i cedid that Meyer calls jadidism, introducing science and mathematics in Moslem schools in Russia. Ismail Gasprinskii, a Crimean Tartar
based in Bahçesaray, was the key figure in forging a common Turkic language called *Lisan-i umumi* that was a hybrid of Ottoman Turkish and Tartar, in his journal *Tercuman* (The Interpreter) founded in 1883 and which had a circulation of 5-6000 throughout Russia. This period was also one in which the policies of the Tsarist authorities were aimed at increasing the assimilation of Muslim communities, including compulsory Russian language teaching in schools. These policies were resisted by the traditional Muslim *ulema*, who saw the measures as an attack on their cultural and religious autonomy and a precursor to forced conversions. Neither were the *ulema* keen on the new jadidist schools, most of which accepted the teaching of Russian as a practical necessity for Muslims.

The new schools, backed and funded by mostly wealthy Tartar benefactors, mushroomed after the Russian revolution of 1905. This marks the second phase of the story of the Russian-born Muslim and pan-Turk leaders who made the transition from being local community activists to national politics. During 1905-06, they organised three All-Russian Muslim Congresses, formed a political union called *Ittifak*, and entered the Russian Duma winning 25 seats in an electoral alliance with the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets). Yet, when the Tsarist crackdown began in 1906, Yusuf Akçura and many others were imprisoned for ‘terrorist’ activities. Wholesale closure of the new schools followed.

The third phase sees many – with the exception of Gasprinskii who remained in the Crimea – fleeing Russia to seek refuge in the Ottoman Empire and settling in Istanbul. The attraction of Istanbul for the Russian Muslim émigrés was enhanced by the Ottoman 1908 revolution and the ready audience they found among the Young Turks for their ideas. These years were the political highpoint of the Russian-born pan-Turkic figures. Along with pan-Islamism, and pan-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism was considered as one of three options for the Ottoman Empire – as Akçura wrote. With the loss of the Balkans and growing resistance to Ottoman rule in the Middle Eastern provinces, pan-Turkism increasingly appeared to be the only option to the Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). As World War I broke out, the military trio of Enver-Talat-Cemal embraced pan-Turkism with an anti-Russian thrust and its catastrophic consequences for the Armenian population in Anatolia.

The fourth phase begins after 1918 with the defeat and carving up of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious Allies that sees the influence of the Russian-born pan-Turkists decline rapidly. By 1919, many in the CUP leadership had been rooted out and sent to prison in Malta by the British who had occupied Istanbul. This included Ahmet Ağaoğlu who had served as an MP in both the Ottoman and Azerbaijan parliaments. Those pan-Turkic figures remaining in Turkey were also reined in and some briefly imprisoned by Mustafa Kemal. Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Akçura and Ağaoğlu (the latter after a stint in parliament and an attempt to set up an opposition party) retreated into the background, taking up academic positions in Istanbul University. Others, such as Fatih Kerimi, returned to Russia where in the initial years of the revolution the Bolshevists were borrowing and adopting jadidist ideas in their approach to the nationalities question, only to fall victim in 1937 to Stalin’s purges.

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65 ‘Three Types of Policy’ by Yusuf Akçura had been published by *Turk*, a Cairene newspaper, in 1904.

This book completes a missing piece of the puzzle on pan-Turkism. Meyer’s interest is not so much the strategic developments in Europe that gave rise to pan-Turkism. He is more focused on tracing the lives of the individuals who led the movement and who lived in Russia. The nineteenth century was the era of numerous ‘pan’ ideas with pan-Turkism embraced by a wide swathe of peoples including not just Russian-born Moslems and Ottoman Turks, but also winning supporters amongst Hungarians. Pan-Turkism emerged in response to pan-Slavism in Russia which in turn was initially a reaction to then pan-Germanism of the Bismarck era. Turks across Empires focuses on the practical, physical and economic motivations of the pan-Turkic figures in responding to the specific conditions prevailing at the time of the decline of the Russian and Ottoman empires. Meyer argues that they were very much a product of their ‘trans-imperial’ lives which included lengthy periods of study in European capitals and travel between the two multi-ethnic empires.

Secondly, Meyer highlights rarely examined actors in Russian history. The roles of Russian-born Moslem and pan-Turkic figures in late 19th century Russia and their part in the 1905 or the 1917 revolutions have not hitherto received much attention from historians. For example Meyer reports that, following the 1905 revolution, the “countercoup of June 3, 1907 targeted Muslims in particular”, especially the proponents of the new schools. He also notes that the Tsarist authorities were assisted in their crack-down by the traditional conservative ulama who took the opportunity to eliminate their rivals. This repression by the authorities of the modernising, secular Muslim opposition, while forging an alliance with the traditional conservative Islamists, was to become a pattern, to be disastrously repeated in the 20th and 21st centuries in the region. Finally, by meticulously tracing the evolution of the ideas and lives of these figures, Meyer traces how ethnic and religious identity became increasingly politicised in the lead up to the First World War. He suggests that there are lessons to be learnt from this period given the politicisation of culture and religion that confronts us today.

Mina Toksöz

The Economic Transformation of Turkey: Neoliberalism and State Intervention

by Nilgün Önder

I B Tauris, London & New York, 2016, 400 p

This book analyses the neoliberal transformation of Turkish economy and politics from an ‘interventionist import-substitution industrialisation and inclusionary state’ to an ‘export-led industrialisation and exclusionary state’ with a special focus on the 1980s and 1990s. It presents an inquiry into the change in the form of the state and

67 See for example, Jacob Landau, Pan Turkism in Turkey, 1981.
also the state’s attitude towards the working class during neoliberal restructuring. The book offers a unique account of the tendency to maintain the exclusionary policies of the state in industrial relations in the transition from military to parliamentary civilian regime. In this respect, the key contribution of the book is its emphasis on “the continuity of the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish political economy … despite the political regime change” (pp 2-3).

In Chapter 1, Nilgün Önder provides a fruitful summary of the main argument of the book and an overview of Turkish political economy starting from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. This chapter provides readers with concise background information on the transformation of economic policy and the state’s policies towards labour especially for the period 1960-1980, which is key to understanding the neoliberal transformation started in 1980, the military regime (1980-1983) and the transition to the parliamentary civilian regime in 1983. Önder also makes references to the economic policies of the previous periods throughout the book, and this ensures a comparative take on industrial relations.

Chapter 1 also outlines very briefly the theoretical framework of the book. It discusses the conceptions of state, corporatism, civil society, international forces, neoliberalism and labour, based on “Marxist state theories (Miliband 1973; Poulantzas 1978; Jessop 1990, 2002) and the Gramscian analyses of political economy (Hall 1988) and international political economy (Cox 1986, 1987; Gill 1993, 2003)” (p 5). As the rest of the book scrutinises the state’s inclusionary/exclusionary policies towards labour, a deeper analysis of these concepts would have better served the purpose of investigating state-labour relations with reference to international forces and civil society. Moreover, it would have been useful to introduce a more comprehensive elaboration on class, class struggle and trade unions to provide readers with a more precise understanding of capitalist society. Especially the comparative analysis of state-labour relations under the military regime and the civilian regime requires a more solid conceptualisation of the working class and the capitalist class. It might also be argued that the empirical research on the transformation of Turkish political economy would have benefitted from a more intense theoretical discussion on the relation between the state and capital and between labour and capital. I would have loved Nilgün Önder to question the dialectical relationship between the state, capital and labour.

Part 1 (Chapters 2 & 3) examines the transformation of the economic role of the state in neoliberal restructuring with a specific focus on the new mechanisms of increased state intervention in industrial relations. It presents a detailed evaluation of labour’s relation to the state in both economic and political terms.

Part 2 (Chapters 4, 5 & 6) discusses the instruments used by the military regime to suppress the trade union movement; analyses the relationship between the state and trade unions with the theoretical toolkit offered by corporatism literature; and also introduces the international dimension by allocating a chapter to the international context, major Western powers (NATO, the US and the EU), and international labour organisations (the ILO and the ETUC). The reader is exposed to a comprehensive interpretation of the use of repression to curb any opposition by organised labour and international reactions to the regime of suppression. Önder also systematically investigates power relations at the international level, and
highlights the influence of “the constraints and permissiveness of world order pressures” on the restructuring of the Turkish political economy (p 341).

Part 3 (Chapters 7, 8, 9 & 10) delivers a sense of state-labour relations during the restoration of the civilian regime in the period 1984-1991. It distinctively highlights the continuation of the exclusionary policies of the state, which were institutionalised during the military regime, by the civilian one. It also provides insight on the reaction of labour to politicisation and struggle in the second half of the 1980s.

Part 4 (Chapters 11 & 12) interprets the increased class struggle and the fall of the single party government of the Motherland Party, the principal civilian architect of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, as an “attempt to create a new ‘national-popular’ consensus” in the early 1990s (p 263). Based on this conceptualisation, Önder argues that the new coalition government aimed for a new political project with “a more inclusive inter-class settlement”, which failed “mainly because the neoliberal economic model in Turkey did not allow enough room for the state to mediate labour-capital relations to offer concessions to both economic and democratic demands of labour without undermining the interests of capital” (p 263). Considering the fact that the methodological predisposition of the book is to analyse the neoliberal transformation of Turkish political economy by observing the relationship between the state and labour, I would have liked this strong statement to be supported by some references to the labour-capital relations in Turkish political economy. Part 4 also allocates some space to discuss neocorporatism and social dialogue, with emphasis on the tendency of the capitalist class to advocate tripartite corporatism. This debate would have also been nourished by a scrutiny of the interrelationships among the state, capital and labour.

In conclusion, I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in understanding the neoliberal transformation of Turkish economy and politics in the 1980s. We gain a deep comprehension of the relations among labour organisations, the state, international labour organisations and Western political powers in neoliberal restructuring through a regime change from military to civilian rule

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RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

ARTS AND ARCHAEOLOGY


HISTORY


LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE


POLITICS


SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION


MISCELLANEOUS


Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu

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GÜLTEN AKIN

1933-2015

Gülten Akin was born in the central Anatolian town of Yozgat in 1933. She graduated from the Ankara School of Law in 1955. She worked as a lawyer and teacher and lived in different regions of Turkey with her husband who had an administrative job. Her poetry is influenced by the folklore and folk poetry of Turkey. She combines this source of inspiration with a thoroughly modern sensibility that deals with themes of nature, love, a feeling for history and social injustices. She has been active in defense of human rights and social justice.

Far away from Ankara, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on a bright sunny fall day with yellow and red leaves on the trees shimmering against a deep blue sky, I sadly learned about the passing away of our beloved poet from our newspapers which I read every day on the internet. I was extremely distressed.

I had translated several of her poems into English and they were published in anthologies of Turkish literature. Gülten Akin was the truly authentic voice of Turkish literature. In her productive life she published many volumes of poetry and prose that brought her prestigious literary awards. Her poems were always inspired by Turkish landscapes and people residing in them; her penetrating gaze went beyond simple observations to the deepest thoughts and feelings of people, in a sense deep into their souls. It was the outlook of a woman who had lived and worked in different parts of the country and was well versed in the nuances of the Turkish language spoken in those parts.
Poverty and injustice were major themes of her poems. She often wrote about women and children and the oppressive power of men over them. She believed that the roots of Turkish social literature existed in the folk literature and poetry and in the lives of the people. Her aim was to elevate the substance and forms which existed among people in a dialectical manner that would eventually help to improve their lifestyles. The staleness of styles, slavish dependence on books, and the cheap sentimentalism of a muddled language were her antagonists. Hopefulness, faithfulness to life and to a simple heartwarming language were Gülten Akın’s most cherished values.

She can sleep in peace as generation after generation will read and admire her poems which exalted Turkish language and literature to new heights.

Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy

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**Sardunya by Gülten Akın**

Yasadır ansitalım:  
Tohum ekenlerin, fide dikenlerin  
Kimse durduramaz yağmurunu  
Güneşini kimse kesemez

Fesleğen ekiyorum, sardunya  
dikiyorum  
Arsızmış, öyle diyor komşum  
Artık siz istemeseniz de  
Açar tohumunu, yayılır toprağınızda

Ne güzel ne güzel ne güzel tanrım  
Fesleğen ekiyor, sardunya  
dikiyorum  
Bitiيومur arsızlığına çimenin  
çičeğin  
Arsızlık bugünden geri  
Umut ve direnç demektir  
Sokulmak demektir yaşamın  
koynuna  
Özdeşlik demektir yaşamla  
İnan olsun dostlar, inan olsun  
Dalından kopan sardunya

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**The Geranium translation by N.M. Reddy**

Let us remember the rule:  
No one can stop the rain,  
No one can block the sun  
For the planters of seeds and saplings.

I am planting basil and geranium.  
My neighbor says they’re hardy,  
Even if you don’t want them,  
They take root and keep growing in your garden.

My God, how wonderful, wonderful,  
I am planting basil and geranium  
In love with the hardiness of grass and flowers.  
What is hardiness?  
It is hope and resistance  
It is to plunge into the bosom of life  
It is to be one with life  
Believe me, friends, believe me  
A geranium shoot separated from the plant  
Does not die at all, does not even droop  
It keeps blooming in the earth where I planted it.
Abstracts of Symposium Contributions 2016

Dr Ipek Demir, id34@le.ac.uk
Department of Sociology, University of Leicester

Kurdish and Turkish communities from Turkey: From ‘economic immigrants’ to ‘political diasporas’?

My talk will examine how economic migrants from Turkey have over time become a political diaspora in Europe in general, and the UK specifically. I will focus in particular on Kurdish communities (from Turkey) in the UK. Kurds from Turkey make up a sizeable proportion of London’s ethnic minority population. In fact it is thought that many who are regarded as ‘Turks’ in London are of Kurdish origin, having arrived in the UK from the late 1980s onwards. Much work on Kurds in Europe focuses on the Kurds’ antagonistic relationship with Turkey, examining Kurds’ desire for the recognition of their ethnic identity and struggle, and their associated anti-Turkey mobilisation and activities. My paper will go beyond this by focusing on two themes, namely the Kurdish community’s continuing memleket ties, and their de-Turkification efforts. It will first elaborate what I call the memleket ties as a reflection of the close and intimate relationship Kurds continue to have towards Turkey. I will then analyze how Kurds engage in de-Turkification, that is correcting, interrupting and shedding the intense Turkification and assimilation of which they have been recipients in Turkey. The paper will trace three types of critical discursive interruptions: one of them posits language ‘I speak Turkish but I am Kurdish’, the other region ‘We are not doğulu, we are Kurdish’ and the third one religion ‘We are not Alevis, but Alevi Kurds’. Findings indicate two central points: that distancing is with Turkishness, not with Turkey; and that Kurdish brokers are challenging the political and intellectual architecture of Turkish modernity at a distance. They are re-drawing the epistemological and ontological contours not only of Kurdishness, but also Turkishness, flattening differences and questioning the Turkish gaze as these previously self-identified ‘Turkish economic migrants’ over time become self-identified ‘Kurdish diaspora’.

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Dr Eylem Atakav, E.Atakav@uea.ac.uk
Department of Film and Television Studies, University of East Anglia

‘Growing Up Married’ — Representing Child Brides on Screen

According to the UNICEF report entitled ‘Ending Child Marriage: Progress and Prospects’ (2013), there are 700 million women who were married as children, and 280 million girls are at risk of becoming child brides. In Turkey, according to the reports written by feminist organisations, in one in three marriages there is a child. These figures are alarming and signal the need for further and urgent research in the field. Working on a documentary film on ‘child brides’ in Turkey is my first exposure to filmmaking, therefore it poses challenges to me as an academic, who focuses on theories around feminism and media rather than filmmaking practice.

In my BATAS talk I will critically reflect upon and share the findings of my research into the representation of child brides in the media, with the aim of answering a key question: what kind of visual language is used in the Turkish media in the depiction
of girls as brides? I argue that on screen portrayals of married girls are presented as individualised stories of victims, and they reinforce a focus on tradition and religion rather than identify issues inherent in the law, politics and society.

In linking theory and practice, I will also present an account of the methodological issues around representation in the production of my documentary on ‘child brides’ in Turkey. The film explores what happens after child marriage by focusing on the stories of four women and making their experiences visible, in an attempt to advance debates around this significant, complex and emotionally charged human rights issue which has often been discursively silenced.

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**Professor Sinan Bayraktaroğlu**, sinanbayraktaroglu1@gmail.com
Visiting Professor, Hacettepe University, Ankara

_The issue of Turkish versus English as languages of higher education in Turkey_

The talk will discuss the highly controversial issue of Turkish versus English as the medium of instruction in higher education in Turkey today. I will review the issues and problems inherent in the teaching of Turkish as the medium of instruction and I will examine the current circumstances and unfortunate consequences in Turkish universities of the role of English – a foreign tongue and a worldwide _lingua franca_. The central focus of my presentation – the use of a non-native language in a national higher educational system – has a comparative resonance in many countries nowadays.

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**Edward Charlton-Jones**, edwardcj@googlemail.com
Allen & Overy LLP, London

_White Russian Refugees in Constantinople, 1918-23_

My work explores the social and cultural life of Russian émigrés in Constantinople in the period immediately after World War One. Although many were destitute after losing everything in the Bolshevik revolution, this eclectic group came to influence profoundly the Ottoman capital in its final years and left a significant legacy: they reshaped music, dancing, food, sport and fashion among other areas of life. Aristocrats and ballerinas, soldiers and farmers alike were forced to reinvent themselves, often in ingenious ways. Their plight was an international humanitarian issue and was in a sense the first modern refugee crisis, representing a considerable challenge for the nascent League of Nations. But it also marked a time of furious energy and lavish hedonism. Constantinople was occupied by the British, French, Greeks and Italians until 1923, and an abundance of Entente, Russian and Turkish primary sources lend a unique colour to this episode in history.

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