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The 2018 John Martin Lecture

Friday 30 November 2018 at 7.15 pm

Richard Moore

British Ambassador to Turkey, January 2014 to December 2017.

on

UK-Turkey relations in the Erdoğan Era

in

The Wolfson Lecture Theatre
Paul Webley Wing, Senate House,
SOAS University of London, Malet Street, WC1E 7HU

Registration from 6.45 pm

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Spring Symposium 2019

11 May 2019

at Emmanuel College, Cambridge
Details will follow (see also www.batas.org.uk for more information)
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Please note: Opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.
Editorial

Since the last issue of TAS Review (no 31) both this publication and its interest area, Turkey, have gone through significant changes.

Dr Brian Beeley, after a most successful co-editorship spanning nine years, resigned from this post last March. Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu agreed to take his place working together with Sigrid Martin, the remaining Co-editor. Two co-editors who are not native speakers of English need reliable proof-readers and Stephen Parkin kindly agreed to make sure that each article reads well. However, Brian has not been able to ‘retire’ completely from TAS Review, and most of the contributions in this issue have undergone his perusal, for which we are most grateful.

Turkey meanwhile has also gone through an unsteady period, with an escalating economic crisis, deteriorating foreign relations and elections for the presidency and the parliament which have consolidated a change in the regime from a democratic parliamentary system to presidential governance. The new presidency had been endorsed in April 2017 by the votes of only a slim majority (52% to 48%) amid widespread complaints that state resources and almost all the media had been unfairly used to the advantage of the administration. Furthermore, Turkey’s stance on freedom of expression continues to be a major concern both nationally and internationally. There are negotiations currently between the ruling party and its supporting partner in the parliament about who should benefit from a general amnesty which will probably release most detainees except offenders against children and women and supporters of ‘the enemies of the state’. Yet, it seems likely that the amnesty will (unfortunately) not cover many imprisoned academics, journalists, MPs and university students who criticised the government.

These problems apart, the main difficulty in Turkey today seems to be the economic crisis which has developed as a result of (1) the government investing for sixteen years in infrastructure instead of in areas with a return in productivity, (2) deteriorated relations with Europe and the USA, discouraging foreign investment, and (3) the military presence in Syria and coping with nearly four million Syrian refugees. The current multi-faceted situation is analysed in our lead article by economist Mina Tokşöz while Clem Dodd comments on developments in Northern Cyprus. Our readership’s broad interests are also catered for with cultural, literary, socio-economic and historical pieces, as well as book reviews and conference reports. In the ‘Reminiscence’ section the reader is taken back to events of 1968 and on a journey through Anatolia in 2016. Aspects of religion versus politics are covered in contributions by Gül Berna Özcan and Ceren Lord. Two prominent scholars who each left a profound mark on Turkish Studies – Professor Bernard Lewis and Dr Christopher Brewin of Keele University – are remembered in the ‘In memoriam’ section.

The next issue, just before our 2019 Spring Symposium, promises similarly diverse coverage. Please bring BATAS and TAS Review to the attention of all who are interested in Turkey and Turkish affairs.

Arın Bayraktaroğlu
Co-Editor

Sigrid-B Martin
Co-Editor
Turkey blundered into a sharp lira turbulence in August that had begun in May. The causes were the classic text-book combination of domestic policy mistakes, deteriorating global environment, and a foreign policy spat – this time with the US and heightened by the clash between two strong-man leaders. With the latest August plunge, the lira lost around 40% per year by early-September when it was still not stabilised, increasing roll-over risks for the heavily indebted banks and corporates. The travails of the lira rippled across into other emerging market (EM) currencies; European banks with exposure to Turkey were affected, while Italian bond yields rose and the Euro weakened.

As is usually the case, the actual events that set off the currency turmoil were not that momentous. In August, it was President Trump tweeting that he was doubling tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium even though Turkish exports of these items to the US amount to only around $1bn – a tiny fraction of total exports. In May, it was a statement by President Erdoğan in London that when re-elected he would take charge of monetary policy – repeating something he had said before. But, given the context of accumulated vulnerabilities of the Turkish economy and growing worries about central bank independence, both these high-level interventions alarmed international investors bringing a sharp sell-off of lira assets and a rush into foreign currency by domestic investors.

Since the start of 2018, the lira had been choppy. The global context for EM had deteriorated since April and in Turkey, the economy was steaming ahead growing 7.4% in the first quarter of 2018 that continued to widen the current account deficit (CAD) and fuel inflation. A reactive sharp rate rise by the CBRT (Central Bank) taking the main policy rate to 16.50% in response to the May lira plunge acted as a holding operation until after the June presidential election. But nervousness about Turkey continued about the impact of lira depreciation on the foreign currency debt of corporates and banks and worries that the new centralised Presidential system would further weaken institutions.

However, it was the CBRT’s failure to raise the policy rate at its July meeting that brought a major loss of confidence about its commitment to fighting inflation. Announcements that policies to rebalance the economy would be revealed with the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) in September were seen as lacking credibility and urgency. The escalation of Trump’s trade war, singling out Turkey, against a backdrop of wider deterioration in relations with the US added fuel to the lira bonfire. The new government wanted to engineer a gradual, soft landing for the Turkish economy; but it turned into a sharp adjustment instead.
Misjudging the global risks
The Turkish government has known for some time that they need to tighten policy and to implement structural reforms to rebalance the economy from its heavy reliance on imports and foreign capital. The new government wanted to engineer a gradual, soft landing for the Turkish economy but it misjudged the extent and speed of changing global economic and political conditions and seemed oblivious to the worsening international sentiment towards Turkey. This was in major contrast with the positive investor interest during the early years of AKP rule with the start of the EU membership talks in 2005. Their early years also saw high levels of foreign direct investment inflows associated with Turkey’s privatisation programme; a real appreciation of the lira; and falling inflation and interest rates – in complete contrast to current conditions. Moreover, the global role of the US had changed dramatically with the election of President Trump: previous US presidents would try to calm market turmoil, but he was prepared to intensify it.

Postponing policy adjustment since the global financial crisis (GFC)
This isn’t the first time that Turkish governments have misjudged global conditions and delayed adjusting domestic policy. Most famously it happened in the mid-seventies; as oil prices shot up, the Ecevit government failed to rein in public spending resulting in the payments crisis of 1977. Turkey had a fixed currency regime then that made the adjustment process more painful. Today, the flexible currency takes the first hit from external shocks with the overall impact depending on how vulnerable the economy is.

The Turkish economy’s large internal market, diversified exports, a well-regulated banking sector, and low public debt have provided the cushion against many external shocks in the past: the 2003 invasion of Iraq; the 2009 global financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis, followed by the sharp capital outflows in 2013 triggered by the US Federal Reserve’s ‘tapering’ policy. While the government can be credited with managing the economy through these shocks, there was insufficient attention to address the fundamental structural weaknesses: low domestic savings, energy import dependence, and low FX (foreign exchange) reserves. And once the global economy turned – especially after 2013 – these issues could no longer be ignored. This required a pre-emptive policy stance of tighter monetary and fiscal policy and a moderation of growth.

But the electoral agenda dictated against this. Since 2010, a series of elections and referendums locked policy into a ‘permanent-election-economy’ mode that magnified its structural weaknesses. Policy adjustment was also postponed as the impact of the 2016 failed coup was met with fiscal and credit stimulus that fed a rapid construction boom to maintain growth. A reluctance to pre-emptive interest rate rises -- which then forced the CBRT to hike more than would have been previously needed -- damaged central bank credibility and increased lira volatility. The decline in oil prices in 2014, and the low public debt provided room for policy to continue in its old way. The historically low international interest rates and the ‘search for yield’ that maintained Turkey as a favoured destination of portfolio investors also lulled the government into complacency.
Trying to rewrite the EM policy framework

There was also an effort by some presidential economic advisors to construct an alternative policy framework to tackle the Turkish economy’s dilemmas including opposition to using pre-emptive interest rate hikes to brake inflationary pressures. These ideas picked up on the theoretical debates in the US in the aftermath of the GFC questioning conventional economic theories with – neo-Fisherian -- studies showing a positive relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation. It is questionable if studies conducted in mature industrialised economies with reserve currencies and vast international assets can be applied to EM economies with a tenuous hold on monetary policy and negative international asset positions. But some monetary dynamics in EM with open capital markets seemed to suggest that the resumption of portfolio inflows as interest rates were raised and their recycling into the domestic economy via banks through the credit channel could increase inflationary pressures. However, while that causality may have operated in the early stages of a credit cycle, those conditions no longer held. In the first quarter of 2018, the Turkish credit cycle and international investor appetite for EM had peaked. At this point, delaying precautionary interest rate hikes only amplified capital outflows, forcing the authorities belatedly to hike more than would have been previously necessary to stabilise the currency.

As the lira began its descent from 2013, some argued that this helped regain competitiveness. But, from 2016 onwards, any such gains were more than offset by the inflationary pass-through and rising currency risk. Given its low foreign currency reserves, the central bank could only provide temporary support to the lira. Combined with a reluctance to raise interest rates this left the currency exposed to the gyrations of the US dollar and shifts in investor sentiment as business warned about the risk of a depreciation-inflation spiral (see TASR, Spring 2018). What some Turkish economists call ‘kur sendromu’ (exchange rate syndrome) gripped the public. Business and households became experts in hedging their currency risks with foreign currency deposits rising to almost half of total deposits – and that did not even include the proverbial ‘yastık-altı dolarlar’ (dollars under the pillow). The lira’s travails became the expression of the troubles of the global economy and the Turkish government’s reluctance to take pre-emptive policy measures to adjust to them.

What comes next

After the usual blaming of ‘foreign speculators’ – when it was the rush to foreign currency by domestic investors that was more significant -- and (in this case, credible) ‘US led attack on the Turkish economy’, the government responded with a hefty package of measures to the August 10 lira turbulence.

The initial response consisted of a mix of measures by the CBRT to inject US$ liquidity into the domestic market to meet the foreign currency needs of Turkish

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2 https://www.artigercek.com/haberler/turkiyede-kur-sendromu-var
3 Data released by the CBRT on spot FX demand in fact show it was the demand from domestic investors that shot up on August 10 to $10.1bn from a $4.9bn daily average since the start of the year to 9 August; this compares with non-residential (foreign) demand that only rose to $3.7bn from an average of $3.3bn over the same period.
entities. The BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency) imposed various restrictions to dampen speculative activity, limit swap operations, and facilitate the rescheduling of corporate debts falling due. The CBRT also raised the upper band of the overnight lending rate by 150 basis points to 19.25%. There was no change to the policy rate (the one-week repo lending rate) but various new restrictions amounted to a rate rise of around 300 basis points. To widespread relief, there were repeated reassurances that the government would not resort to capital controls, and that it would stand behind banks and corporates in difficulty. The government also had to calm domestic panic about the risk of the government seizing or converting FX deposits.

The repercussions of the lira collapse (even if it recovers from its over-sold levels), will reverberate through the economy for some time to come. Its immediate impact is on Turkish banks and corporates with foreign currency debt to service. Private sector foreign currency debt has almost doubled since 2007 (see chart). While the Turkish Treasury had kept a tight grip on its foreign currency borrowing since the 2001 crisis, it was private sector borrowing that funded the current account deficits. Even before the August crisis, there were corporates such as Doğuş and Yıldız Holdings in talks to reschedule their loans. The most vulnerable sectors are energy, construction and property. The rescheduling/restructuring of private sector debt is likely to take the non-performing loan (npl) ratio of the banking sector which was around 3-4% into double digits – closer to EU averages. This will brake credit growth that was one of the main drivers of growth in recent years.

There is also the impact of inflation on wages and salaries that will curb private consumption. Already the pass-through of the lira depreciation on domestic prices contributed to a 17.9% inflation in August. In addition to cuts in government spending a review of the mega-infrastructure projects and legislation to pass a fiscal rule is also being discussed. These will add to the sharp adjustment process already in train in the real economy. The decline in month-on-month industrial production already seen in May will now continue into the second half of the year with the economy...
likely to go into recession. Paradoxically, this will drive a sharp correction in the current account balance (already evident since the July trade data) and ease pressures on foreign payments. Double paradoxically, this shock has meant that the Turkish economy has rapidly reduced its exposure to international portfolio capital.

**A restructured bureaucracy**

In contrast with the slow response on the economy after the presidential election, there has been a speedy major restructuring of the state bureaucracy to establish the new presidential administration. New presidential commissions have been set up to take charge of policy and monitor ministries, many of which have been merged. The governance structure to steer the economy has been radically altered with eight ministries merged to four, focusing on finance, industry, agriculture, and trade.

There are two councils staffed by relevant ministers reporting to the President. One is the Economic Policy Council which was the main decision-making centre in the current crisis in coordinating monetary and fiscal policy. It is also tasked with strengthening export-oriented trade strategies and developing interest-free finance as a major feature of the Istanbul International Financial Centre project. The second is the Science, Technology, and Innovation Council to develop a long-term technology policy, increase R&D, and support strategic sectors, to improve the international competitiveness of the Turkish economy.

There are also four Special Presidential Offices with independent budgets staffed by experts: Digital Transformation (oversee the digitalisation of the public and private sector); Finance Office (deepen capital markets and monitor financial markets); Investment Office (improve the investment environment); and Human Resources Office (education and labour market policies). In addition, special commissions have been set up to monitor urgent issues including: Asset Freeze & Financial Crimes Investigative Committee; Unfair Competition in Imports Committee; Private Pension Advisory Committee; and a Wholesale Market Council.

The motivation of these moves is to enable better coordination of policy, reduce the power of ministerial fiefdoms, and improve policy effectiveness. Combined with the centralisation of political control under the Presidency, this moves Turkey institutionally closer to a version of the Asian model of development. It also carries all the risks of lack of transparency, increased corruption, and politicisation of the state bureaucracy of these models.

**Relations with the US will need to improve for policy measures to work**

Moreover, improving policy coordination and effectiveness requires more than new committees. Since he was appointed, Mr Albayrak’s orthodox economic declarations and reassurances to investors are being simultaneously challenged by presidential advisors taking on the global financial markets and, as one commentator put it, attempting to “rewrite the game plan for crisis management in EM”.

This duality in policy thinking hampers the government response and undermines credibility. Hence, confidence in Turkish economic policy making will be difficult to restore.

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However, the Turkish economy has some defensive features it lacked in the past that could limit the damage and help gain time for stabilisation measures to have an effect.

- Over a decade of having to cope with a volatile floating currency has forced business and authorities to establish measures to cushion against its volatility. Hence, FX borrowing has been limited mostly to exporting entities with FX earnings and with domestic banks which have high levels of FX deposits.
- There is still roll over risk but, according to the Fitch ratings agency, most banks have sufficient FX liquid assets to cover their funding requirements due in the next 12 months.
- The public sector fiscal position is strong and the public debt is still low, providing the government the option of supporting key banks and corporates in trouble.

There are also currency swap agreements with top trading partners such as Russia and China. Another $3bn was arranged with Qatar in late August in addition to the pledge of $15bn of foreign direct investment. But, these do not add up to the external sums needed if conditions deteriorate further. The Turkish government is realising how Turkey is uniquely isolated. It does not have recourse to emergency regional currency lines as in East Asia with the Chiang Mai currency swap arrangement or the Latin American FLAR. Government economic spokesperson Cemil Ertem has proposed the need for “IMF-like institutions by BRICS nations”. But none of the BRICS have been forthcoming with assistance as they all have their own acute problems. With its $800bn (or so) economy and some $200bn of external funding needs, Turkey is also too big for bilateral assistance, such as Gulf assistance that helped Egypt.

Not surprisingly, the government is making efforts to mend relations with the EU to try to form a common front against the Trump tariff attacks. There is talk of speeding up EU project credits in the pipeline. German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke of possible financial support even though it would be highly conditional and any major financial package from the EU would require IMF involvement. Eventually, it will also become apparent that what is crucial at this stage is international diplomacy and for President Erdoğan and Trump to dial down their rhetoric. Only if that happens, can economic measures have any chance of succeeding.

This analysis was based on developments to 3 September but events since have unfolded broadly in line with expectations. On 13 September, the CBT raised interest rates by 625 basis points taking the base rate to 24%. This brought some stabilisation of the lira, which was given further support at the end of September by expectations that the dispute with the US over the detainment of US citizens may be resolved in October.
Update on Cyprus 2018
by Clement Dodd

Readers of the last Update will recall that the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, attended the latest negotiations between the two sides in Switzerland in the summer of 2017. The Secretary-General outlined in his ‘Guterres Framework’ the outstanding issues of the Cyprus conflict, as he perceived them. One was the Greek Cypriot demand for the return of Morphou (Güzelyurt) which had been agreed in the 1974 UN-sponsored plan for a federal settlement, a plan which the Turkish Cypriots accepted, but which the Greek Cypriots rejected in a referendum. Guterres also called for Turkish Cypriot action to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to Varosha, but in return for concessions on this large issue the Turkish Cypriots have always wanted recognition by the Greek Cypriots of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or, at least, of its airport, which has never been forthcoming. Guterres also called for Greek Cypriot acceptance of a Turkish Cypriot President of a new federation on a rotating presidency with a 2-1 rotation ratio in favour of a Greek Cypriot presidency.

Most important in the Guterres framework was his statement that a system that allowed Turkey’s right of intervention on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots ‘could no longer be sustainable’, and could be replaced by ‘adequate implementation monitoring mechanisms’, in some of which the Guardian Powers could be involved. This was to downgrade the importance of the 1960 international Treaty of Guarantee that the UN had shown over the years. In 1964, it was decided to invite UN forces into Cyprus to relieve British troops from keeping order. For this the UN needed the permission of the government of the Cypriot state. For this permission the UN Security Council turned to Makarios, thereby recognising the legality of the Greek Cypriot government then in power as the Government of Cyprus! By this action the UN ignored the fundamental bi-communality of the 1960 Constitution.

The Guterres Framework reflected the lack of respect for the Treaty of Guarantee that the UN had shown over the years. In 1964, it was decided to invite UN forces into Cyprus to relieve British troops from keeping order. For this the UN needed the permission of the government of the Cypriot state. For this permission the UN Security Council turned to Makarios, thereby recognising the legality of the Greek Cypriot government then in power as the Government of Cyprus! By this action the UN ignored the fundamental bi-communality of the 1960 Constitution.

The UN always ignored the Turkish Cypriots’ contention that they were not ‘rebels’, as dubbed by the Greek Cypriots, but ‘partners’ in the system internationally
established in 1960, despite not being treated as such by the UN, and being subject to attack in 1964, and later, by Greek Cypriot forces acting under the influence of their secret Akritas Plan. This was a plan that had the support of Greek Cypriot leaders, and which intended by diplomacy, or if necessary by force, to subdue the Turkish Cypriots and oblige them to accept minority status. The irony of this situation was that the Western powers had recognised the administration which had itself repudiated the treaties and violated the Constitution.\(^5\)

Is this important today? It reminds us that the legality of the Greek Cypriot state, and its international recognition as the government of Cyprus, rest on questionable grounds, as Turkey is probably aware if, as seems, it is contemplating action to oblige the Greek Cypriots to make room for the Turkish Cypriots in its self-proclaimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

**The Cyprus Problem: A Two-State Solution?**

After the collapse of the 2017 negotiations for a settlement there was increased support in the North for a two-state solution in Cyprus. This was encouraged by a visit to the TRNC in late April this year by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Cavuşoğlu. He held a meeting with the leaders of the political parties represented in the National Assembly in order simply to ask for views on the possibility of a two-state solution of the Cyprus problem. There was no official record of the discussions, but a usually well-informed reporter produced an account of the proceedings. Seemingly, the possibility of a two-state solution was discussed at length. It was generally agreed that in the discussions for a federation the Greek Cypriots were finding it very difficult to share power with the smaller Turkish Cypriot community on an equal basis. It is reported that President Akıncı could not see it possible, however, to suggest in negotiations with the Greek Cypriots a two-state solution. Yet, it seems that the idea of a two-state solution was supported by the National Unity Party (UBP), the Democratic Party (DP) and the People’s Party (HP), though the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Communal Democratic Party (TDP) said that only their competent authorities could make such a decision, though none of them wanted the continuation of negotiations for a federation without result after so many years of discussion.

It is reported that Cavuşoğlu was not too pleased with President Akıncı’s disinclination to think seriously about a two-state solution, but Akıncı had, of course, to take notice of those who had voted for him as president, and of the quite warm relations of the labour unions on both sides, and their desire for a federal solution. Although Akıncı seems not to have mentioned it, there exists in Cyprus a ‘Bicommunal Peace Initiative, the United Cyprus Organisation’. Some of its members recently presented the UN’s Special Representative in Cyprus, Elizabeth Spehar, with a request calling for the UN to play a more active role in bringing about the reunification of Cyprus with a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.

This was useful support for Akıncı’s clear preference for further negotiations. In this regard Akıncı declared at the end of April that, if the Greek Cypriots accepted the Guterres framework, they could together announce it as a strategic packet agreement. After a month’s delay President Anastasiades rejected Akıncı’s proposal – which was criticised by the spokesperson of the Turkish ‘Good Party’, Aytun Çiray, who followed the advice, she reported, of a retired colonel, Ümit Yalım. The colonel

claimed that the Guterres framework, which called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, envisaged more crucial concessions than the 2000 Annan Plan. President Akinci later backtracked by declaring that the TRNC would never accept any future security measures that excluded Turkey.

In May Sibel Siber, former Speaker of the Turkish Cypriot National Assembly, called for discussion of a two-state solution instead of the federal model. She did not believe that the Greek Cypriots had the right mentality for a federation. Clearly dissatisfied with Akinci’s preference for more negotiations on a federation, Mrs Siber intends to stand as a candidate in the 2020 presidential election. She and many others are very disappointed that President Erdoğan has not, so far, advocated a two-state solution, which is seen to be the best way forward by the Turkish Cypriot rightist and nationalist partners in the present coalition government.

President Erdoğan’s Visit to London
In mid-May President Erdoğan visited London, where he spoke at Chatham House on the Cyprus problem, his main theme being the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to recognise the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots. He also warned the Greek Cypriots that if they insist on continuing their unilateral hydrocarbon activities in the eastern Mediterranean, security and stability in the area will be continuously in danger. “I am saying this openly and clearly”, he said. In his speech there was no mention of a two-state solution.

Earlier, in late April, two deputies of the Turkish Cypriot Republican Turkish Party met with a Labour Party group that included Fabian Haneton, who is the shadow Minister of Peace and Disarmament. The Turkish Cypriots called for talks within the Guterres framework for a federation. Later it was reported that the British Minister, Iain Duncan Smith, was becoming engaged in an initiative to promote direct flights from London to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but nothing more has been heard of this.

Somewhat surprisingly the possibility of a two-state solution of the Cyprus problem was not mentioned by Erdoğan, nor has it been subsequently. There has been some thoughtful response to the idea in the Greek Cypriot press by serious commentators, but a more popular response has been rather different. When Yusuf Kanlı of the Turkish Daily News visited the South he found some saying that a two-state solution would at least be better than having a Turkish Cypriot sharing the presidency of a federation! This seems to say something about popular Greek Cypriot attitudes!

In the TRNC Sibel Siber declared that she will be a candidate in the next presidential election, to be held in 2020. She claims that the Greek Cypriots are not ready for a federation, perhaps because, as others claim, they, as the major partner, always want to dominate it.

A Naval Base in the TRNC
There is strong support in Turkey for the contention that the Turkish Cypriots are entitled to a share of the proceeds from the carbon deposits in the Greek Cypriot self-proclaimed Exclusive Economic Zone in the eastern Mediterranean. In September it was surprisingly announced by Ankara that a Turkish naval base will be established in Northern Cyprus! It seems that Turkey is prepared to use the threat of force to prevent, *inter alia*, the Greek Cypriots extracting carbons from its EEZ. In the Turkish Cypriot view they are acting under the authority of the ‘illegal’ Greek Cypriot
state. A dangerous situation is in prospect, especially as the Greek Cypriots work quite closely with Israel and other states in the eastern Mediterranean.

**Visit of Erdoğan to the TRNC**

Many in the TRNC were looking forward to this visit in the late summer, when it was expected that Erdogan would say something about the nature of a solution of the Cyprus problem, and would especially give his views on the proposed two-state solution. The visit was marred, however, to some extent, by a demonstration by the teachers’ union that he should not have come. They demonstrated to this end outside the Turkish Cypriot National Assembly, though there was also a counter-demonstration, mainly by former soldiers. There had previously been considerable and persistent criticism of Erdoğan and Turkey by this vocal teachers’ union. They have been very frank in their criticism of some aspects of the Turkish presence in Northern Cyprus. In particular they have protested strongly about the expenditure of some US$33 million on the construction of a new large mosque, claiming that the Turkish aim is ‘to raise religious and vindictive generations, and to exert excessive pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to adopt Sunni Islam’. The money spent on this mosque, they asserted, could have been devoted to building three hospitals, more schools and new roads.

This criticism may be alerting Ankara to the possibility that an independent Turkish Cypriot state in a two-state solution might come under the political influence of groups critical of Turkey, like that of the Teachers’ Union. This could be worrying for Turkey, which must see its presence in the large island of Cyprus as very important for its own strategic interests. Would a radical Turkish Cypriot influence in a new Turkish Cypriot state be willing, for instance, to accept a Turkish military presence? It is a matter calling for Turkish caution, which is perhaps why Erdoğan has not come forward with any views on a two-state solution. To judge from his obvious friendship with Akınıç during this autumn visit to the TRNC, Erdoğan may prefer a federal, or no, solution of the Cyprus problem as long as the TRNC is able to profit from its claims to participation in the wealth generated by carbon deposits in the eastern Mediterranean.

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**Turkish-Israeli Relations**

by Deniz Tansı

Assoc Professor
Department of Administration
Yeditepe University, Istanbul

Israel was founded in May 1948 and Turkey was the first country with a Muslim majority to recognize the new state, in March 1949. Since then their relations have oscillated between harmony and animosity. Some of the complexities in the relationship stem from the ‘conservative realist’ approach favoured by some US
administrations. The outcome of this approach, termed the `New Conservatism`, is a doctrine which can be traced back to the UK Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in the last century, to George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau in the post-Second World War period, and to the Reagan administration followed by the presidencies of George Bush Snr and Jr. The doctrine emphasizes the necessity of pre-emptive strikes and wars on so-called ‘failed states’, and of war on terror, and it shaped military campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and the Second Gulf War in Iraq. In this new political atmosphere Turkey’s relations with Israel have fluctuated, the changes being affected to some extent by the political aspirations of the United States in its design for a new world order but also by the way the respective national interests of Turkey and Israel have been of influence.

Both countries are US allies and constitute a part of a ‘triangle alliance’, the US being the strongest power element. In addition to being a NATO member, Turkey also entered into cooperation with the US in policies including the Green Belt, Baghdad Pact, and CENTO which lasted until the 1980s. However, Turkey’s stance in terms of Israel has altered since the 1950s due to its concerns for regional stability. In the meantime, Israel provoked the animosity of Arab countries with the 1967 and 1973 wars. At the core of these struggles lies the fact that Israel regards each national threat as an existential ‘New Holocaust’. In Israel, use of force has not been perceived in terms of international rules but is legitimised as a survival tactic. Self-protection is the main element in Israel’s domestic and foreign policies. As a result, Turkey as a NATO member and as a US ally and Israel have sometimes met on common ground, while at other times they have acted in opposition to one another. The end of the Cold War encouraged the two countries to develop cooperation in certain areas. The 1996 and 1997 treaties were significant for bilateral relations and the Turkish-Israeli Strategic Agreement was signed in 1996. The agreement on ‘Military Training Cooperation’ in February 1996 included among other matters an exchange of military information, experience and personnel; access to each other’s airspace for training in the operation of military warplanes and joint training activities, while the ‘Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement’ of August 1996 provided the framework for the two ‘upgrading deals’ signed in 1997 and 1998 for the modernization of Turkish F-4s and F-5s. On the other hand, Turkey, being a Muslim country, has also other alliances in the region. She supported the Arab countries in the 1967 war and opened the air corridor to the USSR for logistical assistance to such countries. After the 1969 Al-Aqsa bombing, Turkey was one of the founders of the Islamic Conference Organization and, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, once again criticized Israel. In the post-Cold War era there were opportunities for cooperation to take precedence but the Palestine problem proved the most significant barrier to developing the alignment further.

The historical progress of sovereignty in Palestine is the key to Turkish-Israeli relations. The Palestine Authority was founded as a result of the Oslo process (1993), and became official in 1996. Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, won the Palestinian elections in 2006, after leader Yasser Arafat’s death (2005). In the same year, during the Second Lebanon war, Hamas attacked Israel in support of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. In June 2007, Hamas unilaterally

announced its withdrawal from the Palestinian National Authority and founded an unrecognized entity in the Gaza Strip which has no land connections to the West Bank, that is, to the central part and other areas of the Palestine Authority. In retaliation, Israel arrested Hamas MPs and ministers, causing Hamas to lose its majority in the parliament. Israel also blockaded Gaza from the sea while Egypt closed the border gate. In defiance of the blockade, several initiatives were taken by various parties to reach Gaza and its distressed Muslim population, but Israel did not let them in. Among these the most memorable attempt was the one initiated by the Islamic charity trust, based in Turkey, İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH).

In May 2010 a ship called Mavi Marmara and sponsored by the IHH set off to reach the Gaza coast. Israeli soldiers attacked the vessel in international waters and killed nine Turkish citizens.

Turkey responded harshly in diplomatic terms and requested that two international commissions investigate the incident. One of them was established by the UN’s Human Rights Council in Geneva. The other was set up by the Secretary General’s Panel of Inquiry which produced the Palmer report. The first commission concluded that Turkey was right in making a complaint for the reason that the Mavi Marmara was a civilian ship ambushed by the Israeli security forces, but the Palmer Commission’s report declared that, though Israel can be blamed for the ambush, Turkey was also in the wrong for allowing the ship to sail in the direction of Gaza irrespective of the blockade. Probably for reasons of domestic politics, Turkey announced in September 2011 that she would freeze relations with Israel at the diplomatic level, but there would be no economic leverage or embargo. Ankara also set three conditions which needed be fulfilled in order to normalize relations between the two countries: (i) an official apology, (ii) compensation for the victims, and (iii) ending of the blockade.

The Israeli PM apologized in a phone conversation with Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the US President Barack Obama’s visit to Israel in 2013. Eventually, Turkey and Israel signed a deal in 2016, in which Israel agreed to pay US$20 million to the victims’ families as compensation and to end the blockade to Gaza though only for Turkish ships.

This reconciliatory period has not lasted long. In his election campaign Donald Trump promised his electorate that he would move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thus recognizing the city as the capital of the state of Israel. Furthermore, he withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal, and positioned Israel and Saudi Arabia at the centre of US Middle East policy. He conducted a Middle East tour including visits to Saudi Arabia and Israel in 2017. His actions in relocating the US Embassy to Jerusalem led to intense clashes and killings in the region. His special emphasis on ‘principled realism’, thereby securing America’s national interests by whatever means, is very much like George W. Bush’s crusade for bringing democracy to the Middle East. Trump’s controversial decision about Jerusalem and the escalation of violence in the area has had repercussions on Turkish-Israeli
relations in which a new crisis has developed leading to the recall of the countries’ respective ambassadors in 2018, after they had been appointed upon the normalization of relations after the *Mavi Marmara* incident.

There have also been other regional issues feeding structural conflicts. Israel recently discovered natural gas (2009) in the eastern Mediterranean and is planning to deliver the gas to Europe and international markets.\(^7\) During the normalization process, there were rumours about possible Turkish-Israeli cooperation in laying natural gas pipelines, but these plans did not materialize. Israel developed relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration after the *Mavi Marmara* incident. Also, new deals were made to include Egypt and Lebanon in the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf. Turkey feels threatened by these developments.\(^8\)

In summary, we can say that the eastern Mediterranean has a potential for both confrontation and collaboration. For instance, Gaza and the natural gas route could have been beneficial for Turkey’s economic development, thereby encouraging bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. Israel’s innovative technology in the Negev desert may become a further attraction for Turkey. On the other hand, the Cyprus issue, Turkish-Greek tensions, and trilateral cooperation between Greece, Israel and Egypt could intensify the Turkish-Israeli conflict. Israel has warm relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries (excluding Qatar) which are disenchanted with Russia’s presence in Syria while Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia and Iran creates potential problems for Israel. It must be noted, however, that, in spite of the problems, current Turkish-Israeli economic relations are stable.\(^9\) Hence, it is not possible to evaluate the relationship between the two countries as merely one of potential alliance hostility.

Explaining the relations only in terms of religious and regional history cannot show the whole picture correctly. All the regional, political and global conditions in play will determine the future of bilateral relations. Incidentally, the role of the US must not be overlooked either. We may pose a final question: will Turkey’s relations with Israel be shaped by new threats or new opportunities? Only the future will tell.

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\(^7\) [http://archive.energy.gov.il/English/Subjects/Natural%20Gas/Pages/GxmsMniNGEconomy.aspx](http://archive.energy.gov.il/English/Subjects/Natural%20Gas/Pages/GxmsMniNGEconomy.aspx)


Turkey’s dramatic political reversal since the early 2000s rests on the conservative instincts of its pious Anatolian capitalists. We are at a crisis point, the issue at heart is not a spiritual or pious matter. It is a fundamental loss of moral righteousness and sense of justice. In my talk at the BATAS symposium on 10 March 2018 I examined the transformation of Anatolian businesses from local isolation to national domination through their engagement with a political discourse of ‘piety’ and ‘just development’. The analysis is based on my studies in economic geography, sociology of entrepreneurship and business studies, and the recent research of others.

Since the early 1990s the rise of authoritarian piety passed through three main phases. The first was characterised by horizontal build-up during which such groups remained in opposition but actively built effective business networks with social pressures from below, especially after winning the municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul in 1994. Vertical mobility marked the second phase, which occurred under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) from 2002. In government, the Party initially followed a pro-business agenda with fundamental market reforms and facilitated economic mobilisation through state institutions. The break-up of alliances and the weakening of moral arguments shaped the third phase through single leader authoritarianism. Political and economic purges displaced piety and justice in favour of power concentration in the 2010s (visibly with Gezi in June 2013 but – in particular – since the coup attempt in July 2016). Currently, many of those fringe entrepreneurs who galvanised mainstream politics with ideals of Islamic ethics have abandoned their model of markets and are crumbling under the forces of political power concentration and corruption. The moral outcome has been a devaluing of piety as a business asset and the broader vision of a just order with no future ambition remaining.

My research followed a path of studies on the business-politics evolution in Turkey, starting with my PhD thesis on small firms in Denizli, Gaziantep and Kayseri (Özcan, 1993; 1995). I extended that theme to address the early split in the business bourgeoisie with the rise of Islamist politics (Özcan, 2000; 2006; Özcan and Turunç, 2011). Later
work with a colleague analysed alternative capital formations through multi-ownership companies in Central Anatolian towns, Konya in particular (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2003; 2006). Most recently I have studied the growing political connections in business in the context of liberalisation and herding tactics demonstrating that a deep-seated transformation took place in Anatolian towns. An indigenous form of ‘piety’ conquered centrist politics with its promise of a moral economic liberalisation guided by the Islamisation of business as well as politics. Their animosity towards Turkey’s old business groups energised their solidarity and facilitated upward mobility through political and social activism. This took place first through collective investment companies and through local power struggles and succeeded by dominating access routes to state resources in municipalities, government procurement and privatisation schemes. A number of recent PhD theses support these findings and offer new conceptual frameworks. These include a study of the local strategies of elites in competition with the central government for urban projects along with rising global neo-liberalism (Bayırbağ, 2007), the social mobilisation strategies of Islamic businessmen to attain power through new business associations (Sezer, 2014) and the moderating role played by Islamic beliefs as a source of moral energy for entrepreneurs (Uygur, 2009).

More than two decades ago, when I was researching small firms, Marxist approaches were popular implicitly or explicitly linking the existence of small businesses and artisans to subservient and underdeveloped capitalism (Bademli, 1977; Kıray, 1978). Petty commodity production and artisans were in-between classes to be eliminated by industrial capital. This position was shared by modern developmentalist thought as well (Von Velzen, 1977). They survived only because the mainstream capitalist system was too weak to absorb them, and small businesses filled a vacuum in poor markets. Sociologists such as Dikerdem (1980) and Aktar (1989) on Bursa and Ayata (1991) on Kayseri challenged this view and showed that small craft-based firms were fully part of the capitalist economy and were as engaged in accumulation and the modernisation of their technologies as others.


My research demonstrates that small firms in Anatolian cities were undergoing major transformation and restructuring while industrialisation was diffusing into formerly closed economies along with growing wealth by small capitalists. Yet, strong traditionalism and the rise of Islamist politics challenged the liberal attitudes of the Anatolian bourgeoisie. Turkey’s semi-peripheral status at the European fringe was changing as its economy was integrating into world markets along with the post-1980 liberalisation. Yet, at the time, Anatolian towns were underdeveloped, and outside a few metropoles, the country was rural. Capital mobility was almost nil among provinces and large industrialists had not penetrated into Anatolia, except for a few symbolic investments. The local economic environment was dominated by the state élite and their bureaucrats. There were other historical deficiencies (Kuran 2018) in Anatolia: i) for several centuries Muslims economically had played inferior roles; ii) they shied away from capitalist enterprises; iii) localities did not recover from skill gaps after the departure of non-Muslims; and iv) they had a general mistrust of the state and held the belief that large corporations and foreigners (cosmopolitan capitalists) were unfairly taking the lion’s share of the economy.
The belief was that these local capitalists were righteous and able to succeed but were not given fair chances.

By the late 1990s, contestations between centre right parties and political Islam took place at local as well as national levels. Similarly, the Turkish bourgeoisie had a deep split cutting across old established local élites and their rivals, the newly rich, as well as between secular and Islamist leanings. MÜSİAD (Müştakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – Independent Association of Industrialists & Businessmen) established in 1990 initially was a fringe association and opened a branch in Gaziantep in 1993. The organisation later became a competitor to TÜSİAD (Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – Turkish Association of Industrialists & Businessmen) established in 1970 as the Turkish bourgeoisie fragmented along secular versus pious lines (Çokgezen, 2000). Other organisational divisions followed suit, including trade unions. When I re-visited Denizli, Gaziantep and Kayseri to examine decentralisation and local economic projects in 1998, I observed that Kayseri was locked in a severe political battle as the municipality, controlled by the Refah (Welfare) Party, challenged well-established local business leaders in order to take control of large development projects. Since then, the town has remained tightly in Islamic political hands through key AKP members such as Abdullah Gül and mayors active in AKP politics, Şükrü Karatepe (mayor, 1994-1998), who was later an advisor to President Erdoğan and Mehmet Özhasi (mayor, 1998-2015), who served also as the Minister of Environment and Urban Planning. This process was not evenly spread across cities at the time. Denizli was in a turbulent state as its textile markets were drifting away.

In Gaziantep social democrats remained in local power through CHP’s charismatic mayor, Celal Doğan (1989-2004)11, and other popular local actors such as the secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Mesut Özal. While Islamist politics was flexing its muscle, Gülenists were actively recruiting and the Zaman newspaper was visible everywhere. Bayırbağ observed a relatively well-balanced cooperative stage under secular and left-leaning leaderships until the late 2000s in Gaziantep. This was part of the politicisation of the local élite to increase local benefits and to overcome central state limitations: ‘...Gaziantep’s local agency was constructed through the political mobilisation of its local bourgeoisie, led by the industrial faction, and took the form of a ‘local corporate regime’ whose main agenda was to promote and sustain a local accumulation regime whose focus became increasingly multi-scalar’. (Bayırbağ 2007, p 296) The AKP in government paralysed urban projects and subsequently seized control of the Gaziantep municipality as well.

During the early asymmetric rise and split of the bourgeoisie, horizontal consolidation and power sharing among local élites brought about new alliances and cooperative business strategies. A growing civil society effort along with neo-liberal loosening of the state created ample opportunities; Gülenists were most active in building a Hizmet network during this period. They channelled donations from businessmen to establish educational institutions, boarding schools and to showcase their early success abroad with Turkish schools in other countries. In addition to growing business opportunities within local alliances, actors mobilised alternative financial resources: local savings and Turkish workers abroad were attracted to business investments in inner Anatolian towns. Using Islamic symbols and ‘just development’ rhetoric, these alternative capital formations promised a new industrialisation and collected money from Turkish workers in Europe (especially in Germany). Located mostly in Konya, Kırşehir and Yozgat, diversified companies such as Kombasan and Yımpaş and a dozen others displayed outright incompetence and fraudulent behaviour with no investor protection or

11 Doğan in recent years joined the HDP.
institutional involvement (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2003). Although they were unsuccessful at the time, informal money transfers continued with other sham ventures such as Deniz Feneri. Despite our findings about these dubious financial practices, piety was widely used to create a façade of morals and good business. No lessons were learned from previous failures while state regulation lagged (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2006).

Other researchers suggested that the use of piety and religiosity in business generated new moral energy with a profit-seeking mentality. Uygur (2009) saw this as a new force in social transformation for a worldly capitalism in Islam, almost in similar terms to Max Weber’s Protestant work ethic. The European Stability Initiative published a highly popular report, Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia (2005), which analysed the industrialisation of Abdullah Gül’s home city, Kayseri. The report argued in favour of a faithful transformation in Islam towards thrift, money and hard work in a similar vein to the Protestant work ethic as the supposed moral force behind early European capitalism. The expectation of this short-cut scenario was that the trend would continue to diffuse and lead to economic development and prosperity through a ‘just political system’.

However, the vertical expansion and further consolidation of business interests evolved in a different direction following greedy fights for market power and authority. This began to take shape starting from the second term of the AKP government along with the increasing strength of two parallel forces: then Prime Minister Erdoğan and the expansion of the Gülen network. With the establishment by the Gülenists of TUSKON (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu – Turkish Confederation of Businessmen & Industrialists) in 2005 it became the strongest association, representing thousands of SMEs\textsuperscript{12}. Sezer (2014) identified the penetration of Islamic business networks and mobilisation as new trends in Gaziantep after Bayırbağ’s analysis, but emphasised organisational splits. With data from energy utility privatisations and the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (Özcan and Gündüz, 2015a), we identified increasing AKP ties in business as well as the growing role of Erdoğan connections. However TUSKON emerged as a successful business association with its members attaining better business performance than MÜSİAD (Özcan and Gündüz, 2015b).

Power clashes between Gülenists and President Erdoğan escalated after the 17/25 December corruption allegations which were covered up by the government. The turning point came with the widespread purge and power concentration following the 15 July coup attempt in 2016. The AKP bulldozed the vertical domain of Anatolian businesses and de-legitimised any opposition to government and its leadership. Those capitalists who were once behind the rise of Islamist politics as well as piety and justice fell victim to their own political vision. TUSKON was closed down; its once popular chairman left the country. Many well-established local bourgeoisie in Denizli, Gaziantep and Kayseri lost their status, freedom and wealth. The Nakipoğlu family, who first established the MÜSİAD branch in Gaziantep in 1993 (Özcan 2000, p 229), the Boydaklar who were the best-known family business in Kayseri and many others have been sentenced to prison terms and their companies confiscated by the government. The Financial Times reported on 7 July 2017 that Turkey had seized assets worth at least US$11bn from nearly 1,000 businesses as part of a government crackdown in the year following the failed coup. The government had seized or appointed an administrator to companies that employed 46,000 people, for allegedly having links to Fethullah Gülen. The figures have increased much more along with continuing arrests and confiscations. The country has been ruled

\textsuperscript{12} Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
by martial law until recently and many more students, academics, politicians and others have been arrested. Judicial processes have been arbitrary and politicised.

Personal and institutional boundaries between politicians and businessmen are increasingly blurred in democracies. It is no coincidence that we observe intensified irredentist arguments around the world in favour of new, different, authenticated development routes. The foundations of these isolationist and emotional arguments are both supported by and brought about in response to a collusion of politics with wealth and corruption in the context of neo-liberalism. As an early reformer in neo-liberal economic policies, Turkey both exemplifies market advancement and its contradictions, with trends of backward developments in the capacity of political institutions and the rule of law. We can also see deepening linkages between business and politics in leadership styles and regime type through the experimentations of Islamist modernisers elsewhere.

Anatolian entrepreneurs dislocated their economic seclusion by moving to the centre stage of politics through social mobilisation and becoming active participants in resource allocation. However, authoritarian politics eventually removed the chances of their broader and deeper engagement with economic opportunities and technology at the global stage. One argument is that their capacity to absorb these complexities remained low. Subjugation to AKP’s dominant power and its hierarchical control became the fate of a short-lived dynamism and economic freedom. Another argument is that their failure is due to poor political leadership. Finally, their naivety about the virtuousness of a norm-based business resting on the premise of being ‘good Muslims’ brought with it no appreciation of the need for good formal institutions. The outcome is that their ability to pursue economic interests and allocate business resources is now severely reduced at local as well as national levels. Political endorsements and patronage remain in charge. Anatolian capitalism faces its moral and institutional crisis at a scary altitude, unprepared for global trade disorder and new technologies.

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The Diyanet’s Expanding Reach and the Tariqa Orders

by Ceren Lord

Modern Middle Eastern Studies
Oxford University, St Antony’s College

The push by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, from here on referred to as Diyanet) for greater regulation and control of the tariqa orders and religious communities (çemaat) reflects both the body’s growing role in Turkey but also the move by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: (AKP) to redesign the Islamist movement and religious life.

In January 2017, the state body charged with overseeing the religious life of Muslims in Turkey, the Diyanet, met with the representatives of some 26 tariqa orders and...
religious communities (cemaaat). The gathering was unprecedented in the history of modern Turkey and the Diyanet, and had followed a series of smaller meetings organised by the body with individual groups. The Diyanet, as the chief Islamic authority in Turkey, has enjoyed a monopoly on overseeing Muslim religious life since it was established in 1924, and is legally tasked with carrying out ‘affairs related to the beliefs, worship and moral foundations of Islam, enlightening society about religion and managing places of worship’. The meeting was unprecedented in the sense that tariqa orders have been officially banned since 1925, when a law on the closure of dervish lodges and orders was adopted following a rebellion led by (Naqshbandi and Kurdish) Sheikh Said in the southeast of the country – in part provoked by the abolition of the caliphate as well as Kurdish nationalist stirrings. However, in reality, particularly since the transition to multipartyism from 1946 and the liberalisation of politics, these religious groups have been operating more freely, for example forming charitable associations and foundations and organising around particular (Diyanet) mosques. Indeed, the leaders of some of the most influential and largest tariqa orders and cemaaat, including the Nurcu, Gülenists, Süleymançısı and İskenderpaşa groups, were all Diyanet employees. While not officially acknowledged therefore, tariqa orders have continued under the Diyanet umbrella since 1925 despite the official ban. Likewise, for example, Fethullah Gülen originally built his following while he was a Diyanet imam in the 1970s, and his appointment as an emeritus preacher by the Diyanet in 1989 had enabled him to preach at major mosques across the country and thereby widen his influence in the 1990s.

The Diyanet’s decision to announce an official meeting with the tariqa orders and cemaaat in January 2017, however, had followed an entirely new debate concerning the role of tariqa and cemaaat in politics that emerged after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has blamed on its former allies, the Islamist Gülen movement led by Fethullah Gülen (currently designated by the state as Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ). Since the coup attempt, there have been growing calls by the Diyanet and within Islamist circles, particularly those close to the AKP, for greater state regulation and oversight of the tariqa orders and cemaaat, which is again unprecedented in modern Turkey. Their stated concern was the need to prevent the emergence of another group like the Gülenists, which has been blamed for establishing a ‘parallel state’ within the state through placing its own cadres within the bureaucracy (where they act according to the group’s own hierarchy) and ‘exploiting religion’. The debate was kick-started by the then chief of the Diyanet Mehmet Görmez (2010-2017) in September 2016 when he outlined the body’s plans to meet with the various religious groups and stated that ‘precautionary’ measures had to be taken to avoid a repeat of the case of the Gülenists. In view of this, at the January 2017 gathering, the Diyanet outlined five essential principles for the tariqa orders and cemaaat including: i) refraining from declaring people ‘unbelievers’ (‘tekfir etmek’); ii) refraining from

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14 Many tariqa orders and cemaaat in Turkey trace their lineage to the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi order, a Sufi tradition of Islam founded in the late fifteenth century by Bahá’u’lláh Naksibend of Turkistan. For more details see: M. Hakan Yavuz. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

‘othering’; iii) not departing from Islam; iv) refraining from resting faith and belief on a single individual or personality (‘şahisçi olmayacaksin’), and v) standing against violence.\textsuperscript{16}

However, there have been increasing calls to do more to regulate and control the tariqa orders and cemaat, including by AKP circles and the Diyanet. In October 2016, Prof Mustafa Öztürk, a member of the Religious Affairs High Council (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu, DIYK – the brains behind the Diyanet) warned that various religious groups, including the Menzil cemaat\textsuperscript{17} and the various Nurcu offshoots were vying with each other to replace the Gülenist cadres within the state and needed to be regulated.\textsuperscript{18} Over 3,000 personnel (approximately 3% of the total) have been dismissed from the Diyanet through state of emergency decrees since the July 2016 coup attempt based on allegations that they were connected to the Gülenists. Again in October 2016, Görmez stated that the solution was ‘transparency’ and that any organisation engaged in social services should declare the fact and should not step beyond its bounds. His words came amidst news that the state authorities were considering methods of officially recording and monitoring activities, together with its membership, through a regulatory body, in order to monitor ‘unrecorded activities’ including religious education courses and student accommodation.\textsuperscript{19} Such debates have gathered pace more recently following the declaration by the mufti of Istanbul Hasan Kamil Yılmaz\textsuperscript{20} in January 2018 that the state must regulate the tariqa orders and cemaat.\textsuperscript{21} Since then, the new chief of the Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, who was appointed in 2017, has also stated explicitly that ‘a control and guidance mechanism should be established that will not undermine the civilian structure of religion, will not undermine liberties and will provide security for religion’.\textsuperscript{22} According to Erbaş, ‘tensions in religion-state relations over the last century’ have resulted in a ‘complex and unregulated’ environment conducive to the ‘exploitation of religion’, and for this reason the Diyanet is leading and guiding a mobilization against this ‘exploitation’ across Turkey.

While unprecedented for the Turkish Republic, the current debates over greater control over the tariqa orders and cemaat are not entirely novel. It is significant for

\textsuperscript{17} The Menzil cemaat also emerge from the Naqshbandi order, originating in the south eastern city of Adıyaman. Prior to the AKP era, it was close the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) and is currently thought to be influential particularly in the Ministry of Health.
\textsuperscript{20} Yılmaz himself was previously the head of a Naqshbandi foundation, the Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Vakfı.
instance that a solution proposed by the Istanbul mufti, Yılmaz, is the establishment of a similar organisation to the Meclis-i Meşayih, which was established in 1866 by the Ottoman state under the office of the Sheikh ul-Islam, the chief Islamic authority, to control and prevent security threats emanating from the tariqa orders. The current growing debate on the Diyanet’s control and regulation of the tariqa orders and cemaat therefore needs to be situated in a historical context that recognizes continuity between the Ottoman ulema and the Republic’s Diyanet. Indeed, according to the Diyanet’s own institutional description of its role, this involves advancing the ‘traditional mission’ of the Ottoman Sheikh ul-Islam, in which the Diyanet sees itself as ‘historically rooted’. Such a reading differs from the current accepted thinking on the Diyanet which sees the institution as a passive ideological apparatus of the ‘secularist’ and ‘Kemalist’ state for controlling and nationalizing religion and more recently under the AKP as an ‘imposer’ of the Islamist government’s ideology. The secularisation reforms of the early Republic and the conscious efforts by the one-party regime to abandon the word ulema have resulted in a sense of a break between the Ottoman ulema and the Diyanet, which has been reinforced by the rare use of the word ulema to refer to the Diyanet in studies on the institution. However, as the Diyanet absorbed the Ottoman ulema when it was established in 1924 in place of the Ministry of Shariʿa and Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti, something which was instituted in 1920 by the nationalist government in Ankara to replace the Sheikh ul-Islam’s office), the Diyanet’s institutional identity as an Islamic authority was greatly shaped by this legacy. This in turn has underpinned the Diyanet’s agency, which is overlooked in conventional wisdom on the Diyanet which regards it as a mere tool of the political regime.

From this perspective, the Diyanet’s push to regulate and bring the tariqa orders and cemaat under its control can be regarded as a move by the institution to re-assert its monopoly and standing as the chief Islamic authority in the country. Indeed, the Diyanet has used opportunities arising from political openings, and efforts by other factions of the state and governments to ‘use’ it, to facilitate its institutional expansion and widen its scope of authority. In the AKP era, thanks to a greater overlap in interests, the Diyanet has been experiencing a new wave of expansion that has involved a greater social policy role for the Diyanet, increasing attempts to penetrate private spaces, to influence education and to attack secularism. This however does not mean that the Diyanet is distinct and stands apart from the tariqa orders and cemaat; the boundary between them is much more fluid and the Diyanet itself is not a unitary or monolithic entity. As elaborated above, within the Diyanet itself there are members of various tariqa orders, just as the official ulema employed within the state in the Ottoman Empire also often belonged to tariqa orders. From this perspective (and particularly given the fact that there is no designated clerical authority in Islam), an important question, as Muhammad Qasim Zaman has argued,

23 See the Diyanet’s website: https://diyanet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/kurulus-ve-tarihce/8
24 See, for example, İstak B. Gözaydın. Diyanet, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Dinin Tanzimi. İstanbul, (İstanbul; İletişim, 2009); Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, “Turkey’s Diyanet Under AKP Rule: From Protector to Imposer of State Ideology?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16(4), (2016): 619-635.
28 Ibid.
is ‘how that authority [of the ulema] is constructed, argued, put on display, and constantly defended’. Even if the boundaries between the tariqa orders and Diyanet ulema are blurred, the ‘official’ ulema will seek to defend itself as being above different religious communities and as the chief authority spreading the ‘correct’ version of Islam.

At the same time, the Diyanet’s push for greater control of tariqa orders and cemaat is provoked by the AKP’s apparent aim to redesign religious life and the Islamist movement. A new presidential decree, issued in July 2018 with little public debate, takes significant strides in bolstering the Diyanet’s rising role and its monopoly over religious life. The decree underlines that no written, audio, video or electronic interpretations of the Qur’an (Kuran meali) can be published or disseminated without the approval of the Diyanet’s Board for the Investigation of Copies of the Qur’an. Publications not approved by the Diyanet or without its institutional stamp will be sequestered and destroyed following the Diyanet’s application to the relevant authority for the prevention of publication. Since the decree, there have been calls by pro-AKP circles to ban the publication of alternative interpretations of the Qur’an – such as those by critics of the AKP including İhsan Eliaçık (associated with the Anti-Capitalist Muslims group active at the 2013 Gezi protests) and those regarded as more ‘liberal’ and republican such as the late Yaşar Nuri Öztürk.

In addition, there are increasing reports and rumours of an impending security operation and clampdown on various tariqa orders and cemaat. Alongside crackdowns on the Gülenists, news from the controversial televangelist Adnan Oktar, and the Islamist Furkan Vakfi (Furkan Foundation), suggests that the new target is the highly influential and traditionalist Naqshbandi cemaat, the Süleymancılar. Thus, alongside the Diyanet’s growing role in Turkish social and political life, there is a struggle within Islamist and religious communities vying for power. The Süleymancılar had for years opposed the growth of imam-hatip schools which resulted in their declining influence within the Diyanet whose Qur’an courses had also felt the competition. In particular, this meant that they were at odds with the currents of the Islamist movement that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan identifies with. While the differences between these competing factions of the Islamist movement are not necessarily related to substance – they ultimately pursue the Islamisation of state and society using different ways and means – the struggle can be and has been intense and violent. The latest moves to assert greater control over the tariqa orders and cemaat and the ongoing crackdowns therefore portend a new era for the Diyanet and the Islamist movement in Turkey.

The Characteristics: The four stages of Spirituality through the practice of Shariat, Tariqat, Haqeeqat, Marifat. **Sharia**: the law in jurisprudence (Fiqh). **Tariqa**: Arabic for ‘order’; thus Sufi orders are Tariqat. This is the second stage of the spiritual path. **Haqeeqa**: true experience or knowledge from communication with God. **Marifa**: final stage of spiritual experience. **Murshid**: a spiritual guide. **Mureed**: a disciple. **Bay'ah (Ba'ath)**: oath of allegiance to Murshid and Tariqa

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“Throughout European, and a great portion of Asiatic Turkey, as also in Persia and Central Asia, people travel on horseback.”

David Urquhart, *The Spirit of the East* (1838) \(^{32}\)

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**Some British Equestrian Travellers in Ottoman Anatolia**

by Gerald MacLean  
Founder & Co-Director of Turkish Studies, University of Exeter

In 1880, an anonymous reviewer in *The Spectator* set about demolishing James Creagh’s two-volume travelogue, *Armenians, Koords, and Turks*. \(^{33}\) ‘No doubt,’ the reviewer wrote, ‘at the present, and for some time to come, a man who has travelled in Asia Minor, and has spent about a year in Armenia, can hardly fail to have something to say.’ However, the review continues, Creagh is ‘absolutely the worst kind of man to engage in such work’ since his ‘natural leader’ is ‘Captain Burnaby... whose origin Mr. Herbert Spencer does not, perhaps, err in attributing to “the athletic

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Standing at 6 feet 4 inches with a 46 inch chest, ‘Fred’ Burnaby certainly personified a popular Victorian ideal of rugged and intrepid British manhood. His thrilling accounts of long distance equestrian adventures, *A Ride to Khiva* (1876) and *On Horseback through Asia Minor* (1877), had made him into a celebrity in the London press and among imperial idealists: on his return from Khiva he ‘was lionized, and summoned by the queen to dinner at Windsor.’ Yet if, in the view of The Spectator, Burnaby’s influence disqualified Creagh’s travelogue from offering sound or reliable observations on the Eastern Question, something very much like the ‘athletic mania’ had been inspiring British travellers for more than a century. And while reviewers of their books were sometimes, but not always, just as dismissive, the reading public bought them in large numbers.

Since the 1740s, a new breed of British traveller had been evolving – the athletic equestrian traveller – for whom the more remote regions of the Ottoman Empire had proved especially attractive, not least for providing opportunities for travelling where few had previously ventured. ‘Indeed,’ wrote Charles Perry as early as 1743, ‘the Turkish Empire, at least the more central Parts of it, (such as Constantinople, the Archipelagean Isles, the Sea-coasts of Asia Minor, and of Syria) are now become pretty trite Subjects.’ Animated by adventure, the challenges of tough going, and personal achievement, this new breed were career-oriented young men, mostly employed by or associated with the East India Company, who started travelling between India and England by what came to be called ‘overland routes’ linking Basra with Aleppo and Constantinople.

Their daily logs of these arduous journeys mapped routes between London and India that might prove faster and safer than maritime alternatives. The earliest among them travelled by camel along the ancient desert trading routes that took them west of the Euphrates, but in 1773 and to much critical acclaim, Edward Ives published *A Voyage from England to India*, describing an ‘Unusual Route’ he had taken back in 1758-9. From Baghdad, rather than going by camel, Ives had taken to horseback and headed northwards through the Zagros mountains before swerving westward to skirt the desert areas from Mosul to Diyarbakir before continuing to Urfa and Birecik en route to Aleppo. Inspired by his exciting adventures and the possibilities of fast travel by horse, others soon followed even as the British authorities in London, Bombay, and Madras were becoming increasingly anxious about French and later Russian threats to their possessions in India and the strategic importance of overland routes from Basra became paramount.

In 1788, Thomas Howel followed the first stage of Ives’ *Unusual Route* from Basra to Diyarbakir, but from here he took his own *Route Partly Unfrequented*, by turning northwest to Elazığ, Sivas and Amasya and on to Constantinople.

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34 *The Spectator* (6 November 1880), p. 21.
35 Roger T. Stearn, ‘Burnaby, Frederick Gustavus,’ *ODNB*.
his companions continued to Baghdad and there hired ‘Tatars’ (or ‘Couriers’) to take them through Mosul, Diyarbakir, and Natolia, to Constantinople, since, unlike the desert routes to Aleppo, going this way ‘promises a succession of new and various objects, that cannot fail of amusing and instructing the curious traveller.’ Howel explains that the hard-riding Tatars ‘are persons of some consequence’ who could be hired to provide travellers with necessary guidance, permits, and protection. ‘Employed in conveying public despatches from one Government to another,’ the Tatars travelled non-stop and at speed along set routes linking Constantinople with provincial capitals, changing horses every thirty or so miles at established menzils. (p. 60)

Reviewers of Howel’s book were surprisingly unfriendly, while the most hostile of them all reveals just how popular athletic equestrian travel accounts had already become. ‘Of all the journals that ever were published,’ wrote one reviewer in 1790, ‘even at a time when the public avidity for this species of composition is excessive, that before us is the most uninteresting.’ But readers clearly disagreed; initially printed ‘for the Author,’ a second edition appeared in 1791 from a commercial publisher, and a French translation appeared in 1796-7.

To a growing list of equestrian adventures in remote parts of Anatolia, in 1799 John Jackson added his Journey from India, towards England, in the year 1797; By a Route Commonly called Over-land. Seemingly unaware of Howel, and eager to advertise the singularity of his own achievements, Jackson’s title announces that he travelled through regions ‘not much Frequented ... many of them hitherto unknown to Europeans.’ Jackson casts himself right from the start and throughout as a rugged adventurer and sportsman who was equally keen on horses, hunting, and shooting. He provided a number of engraved illustrations, including a striking one representing himself on horseback dressed in his ‘Tatar’ costume.

39 Thomas Howel, A Journal of the Passage from India, By a Route Partly Unfrequented, Through Armenia and Natolia, or Asia Minor... (London: for the Author [1789]), pp. 31, 32.
41 The Analytical Review: Or, The History of Literature, Domestic and Foreign, 6 (Jan-April 1790), pp. 512-3; this passage p. 512.
Jackson described his costume in detail, before swiftly establishing his equestrian credentials:

One servant usually leads one or two horses, and those are whipped by the Tatar or other servants who follow. One of the servants rode up to whip my horse; but, being as well mounted as any of the party, I thought myself able to ride as well as they... I turned round and lashed him. This was a broad hint, to be sure; but it had the desired effect; for they never offered to whip my horse afterwards. Travelling still on full gallop, we passed more of those encampments.43

Jackson ‘gallops on’ a great deal, commenting on the different qualities of the horses he is assigned, and describing the special thrill of “being exceedingly well mounted” when accompanying two “Arabs armed with their long spears” on an impromptu boar hunt. “To me it was one of the greatest treats that could possibly have happened”, he comments, noting that they later “saw a large brown wolf” come along where they had left “the hog dead upon the ground.”(pp. 144-145)

Leaving Mosul, Jackson envied the guards their purebred Arabian horses as they galloped about and “exercised with their spears, which to me was one of the finest sights I have ever beheld” (p 135). After nine days of hard-riding, Jackson finds himself setting forth from Diyarbakır on his very own white Arab and pushing on through the night. By one o’clock the next morning they ‘entered a very mountainous country’ and Jackson becomes nervous:

As our way lay through many narrow and dangerous passes, I was under great apprehensions from my horse having too much spirit, as a false step would have been inevitable destruction to us both; yet, I thought it not advisable to check him, and very fortunately he brought me through all our perils without any accident.(pp. 181-2)

Other equestrian travellers would record learning how to ride a strange country by trusting to the native horses. Here Jackson shows himself sufficiently sensitive and confident to know when and how to let his horse take charge without interfering. But he was not sentimental about particular horses and left this spirited and intelligent Arab behind in Hasançelebi two days later without comment. A week later, he describes galloping fifteen miles into Marsiwan (Merzifon), “the Turk leading the horses, and I acting the part of a Tatar, in whipping the horses to keep them on a gallop”. On arrival, he admits:

... our horses were completely knocked up; even mine, though a very good one, was, by galloping from one side to the other to whip the horses, become so weary, that I was afraid I should have been obliged to leave him before we reached Marsiwan. (p. 218)

They made it safely, but casually abandoning broken horses along the way was a feature of hard-riding with the Tatars.

The Gentleman’s Magazine praised Jackson personally for exemplifying all that was heroic and resolute in the national character.

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43 John Jackson, Journey from India, towards England, in the year 1797; By a Route Commonly called Over-land, through Countries not much Frequented... (London: Cadell and Davies, 1799), pp. 118-9.
As there are no bounds to human curiosity, so it must be acknowledged, to the honour of our country, that it is not wanting in persons of intrepidity and perseverance to brave every risk in gratifying it.44

Such brave and strenuous journeys undertaken ‘to the honour of our country,’ continued to appear in print as the new century unfolded, the French challenge receding as the threat to India from Russia intensified, and the challenges of ‘riding Tatar’ continued to inspire athletic British travellers to undertake perilous journeys discovering routes through remote parts of Anatolia. They invariably describe negotiating perilous mountain tracks, forced gallops over rough, often non-existent roads, spending long hours in the saddle intermitted with only brief stops to change horses, and participating in forms of horsemanship unthinkable in Britain.

In March 1817, William Heude describes descending from Maden towards Elazığ through deep snow drifts. Struggling to keep up, Heude is rescued by ‘one of the Tartars’ who ‘assisted me with a lesson in horsemanship.’

In England, when we descend a hill, we generally hold our horses up, and proceed at a moderate cautious pace; with the Tartar it is directly the reverse: he throws his bridle on the horse’s neck, and spurs and flogs him on at every step; a practice that forces the animal from his natural timidity, and gives his fore-feet, perhaps, a firmer hold, on being dashed with restive fretful violence to the ground. A few trials, and the necessity of keeping up, soon gave me confidence; and we reached the bottom in five hours, with the loss of only one horse; which was dashed to pieces down a precipice, and carried away almost immediately by the rapidity of the torrent that foamed beneath. In four hours more...we...reached Karpoot [Elazığ].45

Snow storms continue to hinder Heude’s travelling party into early April. On the 10th, they leave Bolu:

The unfortunate animal I rode was soon knocked up, and fixed to the ground, quite unable to extricate himself: we left him to perish in the snow. The next mount was in appearance something less miserable... [but] within the next mile, he fell under me a third time, right on his head as if he had been shot, and rolled over me into a swamp, whilst I was left nearly senseless on the other side: the unfortunate creature was stone blind. I now insisted on a change, but the other led horses had all been used in consequence of similar accidents; and I was obliged to rest contented with my own: such is the mode of travelling with Tartars overland. (p. 251)

Dressed in local costume, once they put a foot into a stirrup, British travellers in eastern Anatolia temporarily entered a ‘mode of travelling with Tatars,’ embracing ancient, sometimes brutal, ways of living and travelling with horses, learning how to ride in ways that had changed little in centuries but were new to them. And they felt triumphant in their personal achievements.

44 The Gentleman’s Magazine, 1st Ser 70 (1800), pp. 237-9; this passage p. 237.
45 William Heude, A Voyage up the Persian Gulf, and a Journey Overland From India to England, in 1817... (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1819), p. 239.
Travelling from Doğubeyazıt to Erzurum in 1831, J. H. Stocqueler is invited by a friendly Agha to join his party and to meet the local Pasha who will assure his safety. The only condition attached to my compliance was the temporary adoption of the costume of the party, in order to escape notice on the road... The dress was brought me, and I had no sooner equipped myself and sprang on my horse, than I felt myself “every inch a Koord.” I brandished my lance, put my horse to a hard gallop, and made for the high road, followed by several of the party, shouting and laughing with delight at the spirit with which I entered into their views. Donning the costume and becoming, however ironically, ‘every inch a Koord’ signals a powerful fantasy famously expressed many years later by John Buchan in Greenmantle that ‘we are the only race on earth that can produce men capable of getting inside the skin of remote peoples.’ These sporting travellers were nothing if not sons of the British Empire and in the years following Waterloo – despite the continuing Russian threat – such nationalist, colonialist, and orientalising fantasies are hardly surprising.

Two years after Stocqueler, in 1833, James Baillie Fraser was officially sent on a diplomatic mission that entailed riding Tatar between Constantinople and Tehran through winter conditions in twelve days. He described that outward journey in A Winter’s Journey (Tatar) from Constantinople to Tehran of 1838, and his return journey, Travels in Koordistan, Mesopotamia, &c, two years later. Both travelogues consisted of two lengthy volumes that say nothing about his mission and little about the growing threat of a Russian alliance with Persia, and are mostly given over to recounting his adventures travelling over 10,000 miles on horseback. The reviewer for The Athenaeum noted the absence of “political, geographical, or even public interest”, yet condescended: “the personal narrative of his adventures is none the less pleasant”. For a while, Fraser’s multiple volumes seem to have exhausted the market for accounts of riding Tatar.

British travellers in Anatolia continued to write about horses and riding, but not until Fred Burnaby’s books would the thrills and dangers of athletic hard riding once again form the core of a narrative travelogue through eastern Anatolia. His books’ contemporary success and subsequent status as classic accounts of the Russo-British Great Game are doubtless because, alongside thrilling escapades on horseback, Burnaby unlike Fraser also maintained a regular commentary on contemporary affairs, instructing readers in what was going on in north-eastern Anatolia on the eve of the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878, however idiosyncratic his opinions.

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48 James Baillie Fraser, A Winter’s Journey (Tatar) from Constantinople to Tehran; with Travels through Various Parts of Persia, &c... 2 vols.(London: Bentley, 1838), and Travels in Koordistan, Mesopotamia, &c. Including an Account of Parts of those Countries Hitherto Unvisited by Europeans... 2 vols. (London: Bentley, 1840).
49 Cited from Reinhold Schiffer, Oriental Panorama: British Travellers in 19th century Turkey (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), p. 375.
Not to be outdone, British women travellers also took to the saddle. Mary Leonora Sheil was eager to present herself as someone keen to enjoy a fast gallop. Sheil’s *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia* (1856), narrates numerous equestrian travels during four years residence in Tehran (1849-53). Unfortunately her journey home to Britain which took her from Urmia via Erzurum to Trabzon proved to be “the most disagreeable part of my Eastern experience”.  

50 Being the wife of a ranking British government minister, she was obliged to travel cramped up inside an airless takhterewan, “a large box ... suspended between two mules, in which one creeps along with ambassadorial dignity", exposed “in mountainous country ... to some danger and a great deal of terror”(p 98). In 1890, ending several months of equestrian travels in Persia, the intrepid Isabella Bird also set out from Urmia to return home via Trabzon. Not subject to diplomatic protocols and schedules, Bird was free to ride and headed for a community of Syrian Christians near Hakkari before riding north to Van, Bitlis, Erzurum and Trabzon.51

The appearance in the mid-nineteenth century of travel guides to Turkey like Murray’s *Handbook* of 1840 marked a ‘discursive shift in orientalist travel literature’ announcing the ‘gradual disappearance of the adventurous traveller who undertook the troublesome journey in search of new ‘knowledge’, with the arrival of ‘the ordinary sort of travelers’ who took advantage of ‘improved traveling conditions.’52 If tourists were being guided in groups to visit Constantinople and Aegean Asia Minor, remoter regions of eastern Anatolia continued to provide the adventurous with places to travel, by horse, where few Europeans had visited previously. With the twentieth century, however, the machine age reached across Anatolia and into the Ottoman domains in the form of the Baghdad railway.

In 1903 the Ottoman government alarmed the British by consigning construction of the rail line from Konya to Baghdad to a company controlled by German banks. Armed with his camera, in early 1908 David Fraser set forth by train from Constantinople to Konya and then along the recently constructed line from Ereğli to

Adana, where he took to horse over the mountains to Aleppo and onward, eventually reaching Baghdad and Basra. An account of travelling in the year of the Young Turk rebellion, Fraser’s *The Short Cut to India: The Record of a Journey along the Route of the Baghdad Railway* (1909) records personal adventures in south eastern Anatolia and comes complete with numerous photographs.53 But, in the manner of Burnaby, he also pondered the implications to British commercial and political interests of a German rail link from Berlin to Baghdad, for which his book was much admired by *The Spectator*.54 With its explicitly contemporary interest in the future being shaped by trans-Anatolian rail links, Fraser’s *Short Cut to India* is not simply a product of the ‘colonial nostalgia’ that we might anticipate from a late nineteenth-century ‘belated’ traveller, but in some ways an updating and re-enactment of those numerous journeys to and from the Persian Gulf undertaken to report on current conditions and lines of communication between England and India since 1745.55 Adventures were still possible where the tourists had yet to arrive, and Fraser’s observations about Diyarbakır continue to inform historians of eastern Anatolia.56 But railways and motor vehicles were replacing horses; telegraphs were replacing couriers; and the days of the athletic equestrian traveller, riding non-stop with the Tatars, came to an end.

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Urban research centers have appeared in different institutions in Turkey in the last few decades, along with new city museums that concentrate on local history. In fact, urban history and city museums seem to have developed mainly after the changes in municipality regulations that gave them more freedom to act both financially and  

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53 David Fraser, *The Short Cut to India: The Record of a Journey along the Route of the Baghdad Railway* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1909).
administratively. The decentralization of higher education in the main big cities of Turkey (İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Erzurum, Eskişehir, Antalya, Adana) grew with the formation of state and foundation universities in various other cities. Regional and local research developed in these areas, creating a wealth of documented and archived local histories.

Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research and Application Center was founded earlier than these developments by Vehbi Koç (1901-1996) who was one of the leading industrialists in Turkey and a pioneering figure in the economic and industrial life of the country. Dedicated to scientific research on Ankara, the capital of Turkey, and its surroundings, the Center occupies two traditional Turkish orchard houses which are seen as part of Turkey’s cultural heritage from the times when the citizens of Ankara would move for a few months to summer houses on the outskirts of the city. The Keçiören suburb where the Center is located was then full of large gardens shadowed by fruit trees and looked after by their owners.

One of the two premises of VEKAM was used for many years as the Koç family’s summer retreat. Vehbi Koç’s father purchased the house from Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak in 1923 and Vehbi Koç’s children were born there. The family used it as a summer house until 1950 when they moved to İstanbul. This house was renovated between 1992 and 1993, and Vehbi Koç donated it in 1994 to the Foundation which bears his name as a repository for all types of information on Ankara. In 2014, the Center became part of Koç University. It continues to function as a unique research center for Ankara.

The second building of VEKAM, Gedikoğlu Orchard House (Ankara Bağ Evi), is one of the last remaining historic orchard houses in Keçiören. Constructed in the early 1900s by Vehbi Koç’s uncle, Ali Gedikoğlu, it remained in the family for many years. Semahat Arsel, the elder daughter of Vehbi Koç who inherited the building donated it later to the Foundation for reconstruction and re-opening in 2007 as a historical house-museum. Experts from the Hanım Museum in İstanbul refurnished it with objects representing transformation from traditional everyday life to ways of modern living. The museum also houses the Ottoman period copper collection of Semahat and Dr Nusret Arsel. (777 objects, some in copper, ceramic, and glass, carpets, embroideries and furniture). Both houses are registered as museum houses at the ‘Demeure Historique’ group of ICOM (International Council of Museums) of UNESCO.
The Library: The VEKAM Library, enriched through years of collection and classification of information relating to Ankara, has become the memory of the city. It contains some 8,000 reference books, dictionaries, yearbooks, almanacs, encyclopedias and guidebooks. There are literary works from Turkey and abroad featuring Ankara, including novels, memoirs and biographies, the memoirs of foreign diplomats who were posted to Ankara, publications on the history, culture, geography, economy and architecture of the city, books written by travellers; scientific and academic publications containing research on Ankara’s history and culture, reports by local governments, trade unions and chambers of commerce, and various national and international newspapers and magazines.

The library also houses the Ali Esat Bozyiğit Collection, donated to VEKAM by the Bozyiğit family in 2006. It contains around 4,800 items including Ali Esat Bozyiğit’s (1945-2006) own research as well as a rich collection on Anatolian folk culture.

The Archives: The Center’s archives consist of two main collections, one on Vehbi Koç and the other on Ankara. The Vehbi Koç Collection, consisting of 12,835 pieces, is a wide assemblage including documents from the early period of Koç Ticaret A.Ş., the company established in 1938 by Vehbi Koç, as well as his photographs, letters, notes, documents and personal effects. One important source is the collection of newspaper cuttings about the work of Vehbi Koç and the partners of the Koç group between 1956-1996. The Collection contains important historical documents, making it an essential source for research on the economic history of the Republican era, the commercial life of Ankara and Vehbi Koç himself.

The Ankara Collection of 20,954 documents is made up of primary sources, with a focus on the city’s social and cultural history, planning, architecture, the history of education, urban sociology, anthropology and the history of economics. Important aspects of the collection include rare engravings depicting Ankara before 1900, and photographs and postcards from 1900 to 1980, illustrating the city’s architectural, social and cultural development. Another important work is the Ankara Cultural Heritage Inventory covering buildings in the city, photographs and architectural plans. Maps of Ankara and its surroundings show the administrative, political and geographical development of the region from early ages into the Republican era. Ottoman documents include bills, writings, letters, invitations, advertisements, banners and documentary records.

Unique to the Ankara Collection are educational documents dating from the period after the implementation of the ‘Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu’ (Centralization of Education Law 1924-1940s). These were classified for research as part of VEKAM’s ‘Age of Reason’ project, which began in 2003 on the 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. There are photographs, writings, documents, report cards and diplomas, as well as a rare collection of curricula from primary, middle and high schools. The collection has been enlarged with documents from the ‘Musiki Muallim Mektebi’ (Music Teachers’ School, now the Hacettepe Ankara State Conservatoire) which played an important role in the educational modernization process.

These items in the archives, library and the museum are organized to allow digital research (www.vekam.ku.edu.tr). One can additionally access and research important documents and objects from VEKAM’s collections at the Europeana digital library website: https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en
**Activities:** VEKAM aims to foster both national and international research networks on Ankara and to disseminate results of research to both scholars and the public. To this end, the Center organizes with partner institutions or on its own exhibitions, symposia, workshops, monthly lectures and panels. VEKAM publishes a peer-reviewed biannual interdisciplinary journal, *Ankara Araştırmaları Dergisi* (Journal of Ankara Studies) which is also available online. It contains exhibition catalogues and scientific books on Ankara as well as methodological works related to the themes of the Center’s activities.

VEKAM gives five awards per annum (maximum 10,000 TL each) to research related to Ankara. Applications, which may relate to any time period or topic, are peer-reviewed by specialist academics. In addition, to encourage young researchers, the *Journal of Ankara Studies* offers once a year an award of 1000 TL to an article by a scholar under the age of 35. The premises of VEKAM welcome not only student groups as visitors but also NGO members, associations and individuals. Students often use the premises for creative drama workshops or for scientific research activities. Internship is open to undergraduate and graduate students alike.

Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu  
Koç University  
Director of VEKAM  
www.vekam.org.tr

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**SAİT FAİK ABASIYANIK**  
(1906-1954)

The Short Story Master of Modern Turkish Literature

Short stories have a special place in Modern Turkish literature. Indeed they have always been a part of the oral and written literatures of Turkish peoples, going back to the Oğuz epic that was created when Turkish-speaking peoples lived in Central Asia. Later, as they moved westward and accepted Islam, they became familiar with Arabic and Persian literatures and incorporated their stories into their own culture and language. An oral tradition developed since the majority of people in the Ottoman Empire lived in rural areas and were largely illiterate. Story-telling was widespread as men and women gathered in groups to listen to professional story-tellers. After the political and social modernization movements in the 19th century, called Tanzimat, in the Ottoman Empire, there was also a change in literature and the arts as European philosophical and literary works, especially French novels and poems, influenced Ottoman literature. Turkish authors began to write novels, plays and short stories.
When Sait Faik was born in Adapazarı on 21 December 1906, Turkish literature already possessed a wide collection of short stories. Writers such as Refik Halit (1888-1965), Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920), Halide Edib (1884-1964) and Reşat Nuri (1889-1956) were writing short stories that had become a part of the modern Turkish literary scene.

Sait Faik (his surname is usually skipped) was the son of Mehmet Faik Bey who was a lumber merchant and a prominent trader in the Adapazarı area. His mother Makhbule Hanım was a reader of novels. When Sait Faik was young the family moved to Istanbul. Sait Faik had his high school education in Istanbul and Bursa. He was already writing poems and they were published in literary magazines. Later he attended Istanbul University’s Department of Literature without graduating. He continued his studies in Lausanne and Grenoble attending literature classes against his father’s wish that he study economics. He did not want to work in his father’s business and wanted to dedicate his life to writing. In 1942 he worked for a short period as a court reporter for the newspaper Haber. This experience gave him the keen observations he would use in his short stories about the tragicomic incidents of courtroom life.

After his father’s death, Sait Faik moved to Burgaz, one of the beautiful islands in the Sea of Marmara near Istanbul, and lived there with his mother until he died. His settling in Burgaz gave him the opportunity to be close to people of different ethnic backgrounds who lived there. He observed closely the daily lives of fishermen which was one of his main interests. He accompanied the fishermen of the Marmara region on their expeditions and wrote many short stories about them. He became familiar with their special argot which he used in his stories.

Sait Faik wrote about common people bringing their colorful everyday life and language into literature. He saw, he heard, he touched and smelled and he tasted life. He was a true sensualist deeply connected with nature and people.

His short story The Last Birds has an uncanny perception of environmental vulnerability before this became universally accepted. He was deeply concerned about the disappearance of the birds from his favorite islands because they were being caught as food.

In 1953 the Mark Twain Society in the United States elected Sait Faik as an honorary member.

He passed away on 11 December 1954. He would have created many more wonderful stories if he had lived. His mother dedicated the proceeds of his work to Darüşşafaka (a school for orphans). A Sait Faik Award for Literature was established in 1963.

After the death of his mother in 1964, his four-storey white house in Burgaz became the Sait Faik Museum and his collections of stories were published by the prestigious publishing houses Varlık and Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları.

I offer here my translation of Sait Faik’s story Sleeping in the Forest. It represents his unique literary style of creating a story by the observation of the world around.

Nilüfer Mizanoğlu Reddy
Sleeping in the Forest

On summer nights when I sat on a Tring Galata bench under a big umbrella pine to watch the lights of the shrimp and crabcatchers’ rowboats off Kaş Adası shores, I would recall my childhood days: The table set under a large mulberry tree, my father sitting at the head of that table surrounded by friends, their raki glasses. And the black mulberries falling into the plates. The lamb tethered to the sloe tree, the dragonflies with shiny purple and green wings swarming over the town lake and the reeds around it, my swarthy and affectionate friend for whose sake I would willingly sacrifice my wristwatch, the lambs, my father’s novels that he kept under lock and key, the birds and ants and chickens – where are you all?

For exactly two years I had been running away from people. I didn’t know whether I was happy or sad. I was only pretending to love. My tongue felt rusty; my sleep was disturbed. But now I can’t believe that my sickness that was cured by the lights of the fishermen ever existed at all. I don’t need the bromides or the tonics any more. I have turned into a person who is a cross between a doctor and a poet and I say: “Every morning at this hour after dinner, mix the carbide from the lamps of the shrimpers with lots of sea water and drink it. The whole world will change its color. You will sleep as you did in your childhood, like a plant, like a living creature that grows taller every day without even noticing it.”

When I was ill my feelings and my thoughts had an ineffable quality that seemed like a dark poem. I could easily find the reasons why I didn’t love people. I was full of hatred and rancor. Every single beauty dragged me beyond normal pleasures and when my lips touched other lips, I felt the approaching steps of stagnation and death. Did people die like this? If so, what is called the last breath was such a horrifying thing. I would go and embrace another person with the fervor of a man who had no power of combative ness left. Every now and then, I erupted like a volcano in order to become an entirely new person.

The fishermen had gone to the other side of the island. I got up from the bench and went home by a dark road. As soon as I was in bed, I fell asleep. I had a long and sound sleep. When I awoke, the sun was up and had entered my room. I heard the chirping of a bird. I felt as though I was seeing and enjoying the tree in front of the window for the first time in my life. I watched the shiny silvery leaves to my heart’s content. I looked at the children with lithe legs, who were carrying fish in basins through the deserted streets of the village. I gave some money to the stunted children with skinny legs. I lit my cigarette with the matches of the elderly servant of a seaside mansion. I went down to the shore. I started walking toward the beach.

I saw a very fair girl. She had freckles on her nose. She was quite plump, almost fat, curvaceous. Her face was the face of a four- or five-year-old: it was undefined, small, and limpid. Her lower lip was fuller than her upper lip. I used to see girls like this all the time; I was always filled with a melancholy feeling and my nerves would burst with an irresistible desire. I wanted to do something, but couldn’t - I ended up gulping and shaken. However, all those feelings belong to the past: this girl’s beauty and its effect on me now seem quite ordinary.

Now, I could hold out my hand and touch this creature lying in the shimmering water. In the past, I thought that touching the girl lightly would make me lose some of my desire. But now, I know that touching doesn’t lessen the desires; on the contrary, it increases them. I went into a cabana and undressed. I lay next to the young girl. I looked at her. She wore blue earrings.

57 A foreign company that advertised its name on benches and billboards in Istanbul in the early part of the twentieth century.
After I had lunch, I went to the fields. I became a referee for the kids who were playing soccer on the grass. I ran among them but, when we had arguments about a penalty, just to be impartial I didn't look at their faces. Some children were very good-looking.

I so much liked the fifteen- or sixteen-year-old healthy girl I saw on the beach yesterday morning that I went to find a friend who could make women laugh and could become friendly with them in four or five minutes. I said to him, "Hey, pal, can we talk to this girl?"

The moon had transformed the sea into a tasty liquid. First, like most people, I wanted to be able to walk on water. Then, I wanted to lean over and drink, listening to the sounds around, like a wild but harmless animal; then, with its lust, I wanted to pet this young girl under the bushes.

My friend had managed to do what I asked him to do in ten minutes. I could only see her two little shiny blue earrings. How strange!

"What kind of desire does moonlight give you?"

Without waiting for her answer, I said, "It makes me want to cry!" I really wanted to cry, "Young lady, I am an incurable romantic!" "It makes me want to sleep under a mosquito net. My friend had found things to say about love and marriage.

The young girl said, "In our tradition, the girl buys the boy. Most girls without money can't find husbands. Our young men don't know anything about love. They say such a thing doesn't exist anywhere in the world."

"As for us, the men buy the girls?"

"That's worse!" she said.

"Does this show that there's no love, or that mutual interest creates love?"

My friend said this in French. I didn't fully understand the meaning of the phrase, but it suggested that one expected affection in exchange for the money paid.

Like a grown-up, the young girl said, "I want to sleep. Nothing, no arm of a young man, could prevent me from sleeping for another hour. I am not in love with anybody. Dancing once in a while pleases me, but only with my relatives. I am not sentimental in the moonlight, or on a dark night. I am a young girl and I want to sleep." "Then, good night!"

I also wanted to sleep. I went to sleep in my moonlit room, prepared to have a dream with the girl who wore the blue earrings, and later in my dream I saw these things:

In the moonlight, I am again a wild animal with big ears and four long legs. I stand stiff as a ramrod. Stretching my long neck, I drink water from a lake - being on the watch and alert lest a more ferocious animal should attack me while I drink. Then I listen, and run with the speed of a rabbit into the forest and the bushes through the strawberries and the fig trees. The southern wind brings to my nostrils the smell of a nearby female. The air is charged with electricity and my fur is shiny. Under a pine tree I copulate with a female, who is sweaty from running.

I suddenly woke up. I looked at the clock in the anteroom. It was 11.30 p.m. I ran outside. Presently I was climbing a steep pathway. There were no trees around and there was plenty of light; everything seemed gilded. Down below was the small town. The huts and the palaces were undisguisable. After climbing a little more, a pine forest became visible. The crickets were chirping nonstop. Otherwise I might have thought I was still dreaming, and the minutest crackling sound would wake me up and, like a frightened sleepwalker, I would grope my way around for many minutes. I crossed the pine forest from one end to the other. I found myself on the terrace of a small outdoor café. All of a sudden I saw the sparks of cigarettes under a trellis. I walked quietly and sat down.

Soon I could hear a French song in which the words ‘travel’ and ‘village’ were often repeated. Also feet shuffling along on the dance platform. At an hour when everybody else was sleeping, the young sleepless ones were dancing in a hidden, deserted outdoor café in the moonlight. This is happiness! I feel so serene! I have always been opposed to dance halls, bars and even
balls. They irritate me. It seems to me that there is only one purpose in such places — to seduce women. The rest — the band, the lights, the drinks, and the dances — are the vulgar means to that end. But here I don't think like that. Here, I say, a woman is a woman. She won't be seduced. She is the seducer. This is the proper way, the better way. It's been this way all along! What am I thinking about? What is the meaning of being seduced, or seducing? Here, in the moonlight, in a quiet, deserted outdoor café, 'seduced' and 'seducing' have no meaning. I think, this is a different world. But, a minute later, I change my mind and think that perhaps in this outdoor café the moonlight has no influence on these people who are turning around on the dance floor. They are as they would be in a dance hall. The rules of that world are valid here too. The people who are not dancing but sitting on the sides with their cigarettes flickering, secretly control everybody. Maybe they are the parents. Therefore, here too, seducing and being seduced matter.

Nevertheless, here, from a distance, I see a world the way I'd like it to be - a world without gossip and without lies. Moonlight makes the hut and the palace look the same and has the same effect on people. Every hut person is also a palace person. In fact, this includes me, too. I heard the crackling of a branch nearby. I trembled. I turned back: at a distance of about ten steps, there was an apparition standing against a tree. That apparition was looking in my direction. I took a few steps: it ran away; I ran after it and a little later, breathing heavily, we both fell under a pine tree.

Who was she? Was she beautiful or ugly, did she wear blue earrings? I don't know. The only thing I remember is that her skin was ice-cold from perspiration. But this is something all people who perspire have in common. She was definitely very young. One can tell the mouth of a young person from its smell; it is the smell of a bird, of feathers. We had a noiseless, quiet fight. Her face was covered with sweat. I'll always see her white, sweaty forehead which was a little low. I didn't see her eyes since I was kissing them constantly. We'll never see each other again because kissing the eyes doesn't bring good luck. Well, well! But something in me was saying, too bad, too bad! I sniffed her breath. Her mouth was open inside my mouth. She neither kissed nor bit; her mouth was open as if she was stunned and bewildered. A little later I kept mumbling, "Mon enfant, ma soeur." Finally my feet got untangled from hers and my hands released her waist. I crouched in a corner, like a timid child. I pulled my knees toward my nose like a sleeping child, and watched her. She had gotten up. She had her back turned toward me. She made some bending and stretching movements. Her hair was tousled and the back of her neck looked lovely! She turned and looked and made a sweeping, effusive gesture with her hand as if she was saying, "Thank you!" or "Greetings!"

I closed my eyes and slept. I felt as though I was on the plains lying in a meter of snow. I felt numb and cold. In a book I had read in my childhood, a rider traveling on a snow-covered plain sees a pole. He tethers his horse to this pole, covers himself with his sheepskin coat and goes to sleep. In the morning he wakes up to a bright sun. He finds himself in the courtyard of a church. He looks for his horse. The horse neighs from the bell tower of the church. I also feel that the snow is melting slowly and I am coming way down to the courtyard of the church. As a child I often wondered about how that rider had brought his horse down. I still wonder. Then I feel as if I am not asleep. For a minute I hear the wind and the gramophone, then I fall asleep again.

I used to hate the mornings more than anything else in the world. I hated them as much as a Parisian does. For years I haven't seen the sunrise. For years I haven't seen how life renews itself. I didn't even want to. I used to go out after everything had taken its daily course. At night I used to walk around the streets in a certain quarter of Istanbul. I was surprised and saddened to see that at around 10 p.m. all the shops were closed and the windows darkened. This gave me a feeling of despair. But, this morning I got up as early as a Muslim tradesman who opens his shop in the bazaar before sunrise and strokes his beard with the money he receives from his first customer. I have the joy, the laziness, the softness, and the sensuality of a southerner. I want to lie down in the sun like a native of Marseille, Piraeus, Naples, or Alexandria. Once I was in Naples on a January day. I saw a boy with an extraordinarily beautiful face, sleeping, curled up in front of a building that protected him from the north wind. Later, I walked across a square
and there, too, I saw a group of people lying around, with a lazy sensuality, under the morning
sun. In Piraeus I watched shoeshine boys, immigrants from Turkey who spoke with Anatolian
accents, sleeping by panniers of red grapes. I’ve never been to Egypt, but there, too, the
children of the south wake up early on hot days, but later feel drowsy and fall asleep because of
the lust and the torpor that come from their blood and from the sun. I thought about the people of
the rainy northern cities who are always restless and run around to make more and more money
while the people of the south remain poor, wretched, lazy, and sensuous, but good and artistic.
In all profits made in the north and in that type of civilization, I saw injustice committed against
the children of the south. The gambler in Naples and the porter who sleeps on the steps of Yeni
Cami in Istanbul are miserable but good in their sensuality and laziness. And the northerner is
rich and bad. No, the northerner is good and drunk with the rain, the bar and the booze. Oh,
God!

Do sensuality and laziness have roles to play in human happiness? Could a genuine and balanced
civilization come into existence from the differences in spirit and character between the people of
the north and the people of the south? I wondered if working hard to make a lot of money was
really bad. The forest was shimmering with the light of the leaves. I felt as if I was immersed in an
ocean. The wind was blowing. I heard a sound of breathing. Did the trees in the forest continue
sleeping despite all this wind? I place the palms of my two hands behind my head. First of all I think
of a cup of well-steeped, hot, dark tea, a slice of toast, a piece of white cheese with holes, a glass of
water, and a bunch of grapes. Then, I think about people, life, all kinds of fruits, and the world. I think
of inhaling and exhaling, of sensuality. The joy of sleeping here in the forest is beautiful! It is good to
love people and to love life. We can only love people. But how can one person love all people? There
are two ways: one way is by being a great man. How wonderful this is! But who knows how difficult it
is to be a great man and how much torture one has to go through? There is also another way to love
people: by being an adventurer. This is to love life more than people. The difference between an
adventurer and a great man is that the former knows more about life and loves it while it is the other
way around with the latter. I understand the difference between Don Quixote and Cervantes.

Setting my eyes on the prickly bosom of the forest and the azure sky beyond, I think about the
difference between loving people as a great man and loving life as an adventurer. I am inspired by
the ambition of being somebody who loves people immensely and wants to do a great deal for
them. I feel the tensing of my body and my nerves. However, I feel neither a great desire nor a
disappointment due to my lack of desire. Since my mental condition isn't disposed to
disenchantment, I am immediately filled with the spirit of an adventurer: to run at full gallop to a
new adventure. Then, I think of my sleep that would be ruined again along with my family
happiness, stuff like the centrally heated rooms, a living room with modern furniture, which has a
radio that talks, and the movies that stifle all the dreams and destroy the adventures of the people
in the city. No! Perhaps this, too, is impossible. If so, it is quite possible to love people as a human
speck, humbly to the extent that one can, but this morning, as a human speck with a futile love, I
love all the people, all the children, all the birds, all the fruits, all the wretched, and the hungry. No
time to be sad. I jump to my feet. I run out to meet the first ferry. I wait.

A lot of strangers disembark from the ferry. I can't find a single face of a friend. I have so
much to tell. Since nobody I know comes off the ferry, I return to the embrace of the paper
and the pencil.

Yahya Kemal Beyatlı’s Nights of Melancholy

**Gece Bestesi**

O kuş en kuytu bahçelerde öter;  
Sarmasıklarla yükü kaldınde;  
Hiç bir el değişmemiş ağaçlarda;  
Geceden tâ şafak sökünceye dek  
Yükselir perde perde içli sesi;  
En uzun nağmesiyle, bir müddet,  
Gaşyeder yer yüzyünde dinliyeni;  
Bir zaman gök yüzünde yalnız o ses,  
O terennüm kalır;  
Gaşyolur dinledikçe yaldızlar.

O kuş ancak bahâr olunca gelir;  
Nereferden gelir?  
Kimse bilmez, bu bir muammâdır;  
Bahâr erince sona  
Kaybolur, başka bir bahara kadar.

O kuşun ömrü, bir güzel gecede,  
Bir güzel beste söylemekle geçer.  
O kuş en kuytu bahçelerde öter;  
Hayâl içinde yaşar,  
Hayâl içinde ölür.

**Night Song**

That bird, it sings in the most remote gardens,  
In ivy laden lowlands,  
On trees untouched,  
To dawn from night.  
Its touching voice grows,  
Its longest melody fleetingly enchants,  
All who listen.  
Just that sound for a while in the air  
Just that sound is heard.  
Stars enchanted as they listen.

That bird, it comes in spring only.  
Where from?  
No-one knows, a mystery.  
Spring ends, it disappears,  
Till another spring comes.  

Its life on a beautiful night,  
Singing beautiful songs spent.  
That bird, it sings in the most remote gardens.  
In imagination it lives,  
In imagination it dies.

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**Akşam Mûsikisi**

Kandilli’de, eski bahçelerde,  
Akşam kapanınca perde perde,  
Bir hatıra zevki var kederde.

Artik ne gelen, ne beklenen var;  
Tenhâ yolun ortasında rüzgâr  
Teşrin yapraklarıyle oynar.

Gittikçe derinleşir saatler,  
Rikkatle, yavaş yavaş ve yer yer  
Sessizlik dâima ilerler.

Ürperme verir hayâle sik sık,  
Hep bir kapidan giren karanlık,  
Çok belli ayak sesinden artık.

**Evening Music**

In Kandilli, in the old gardens,  
As dusk gently falls,  
 Comes pleasure of reminiscence in sadness.

No more anyone to expect, no more does anyone come;  
Along the deserted road, winds  
Play with autumn leaves.

Time gradually deepens,  
Silence slowly spreads,  
Unceasingly, tenderly.

Often imagination trembles  
As always through the same door, darkness enters.

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http://www.siir.gen.tr/siir/y/yahya_kemal_beyatli/gece_bestesi.htm

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Gözlerden uzaklaşınca dünyâ
Bin bir geceden birinde güyâ
Başlar rü'yâ içinde rü'yâ.

Now, familiar from its footsteps.
When the world is out of sight,
As if in a thousand and one nights,
Dreams are within dreams.

http://www.siir.gen.tr/siir/y/yahya_kemal_beyatli/aksam_musikisi.htm

Rindlerin Akşamı

Dönülmez akşamın ufkundayız. Vakit çok geç;
Bu son fasıldır ey ömrüm nasıl geçersen geç!
Cihana bir daha gelmek hayal edilse bile,
Avunmak istemeyiz öyle bir teselliyle.
Geniş kanatları boşlukta simsiyah açılan
Ve arkasında güneş doğmayan büyük kapıdan
Geçince başlayacak bitmeyen süksunlu gece.
Guruba karşı bu son bahçelerde,
keyfince,
Ya şevk içinde harab ol, ya aşk içinde görmül!
Ya lale açmalıdır göğsümüzde yahud gül.

The Evening of Free Spirits

We are on the horizon of the evening of no return. It is too late;
O life! Pass how you will, this is the last phase.
Even if we could imagine there is rebirth,
The comfort of its consolation, we would not want.
The endless silent night starts,
As you pass through a great gate.
Its wide wings opening in emptiness,
pitch-black, with no sunrise.
In the final gardens, facing the sunset, as you wish,
Either perish in desire or be a heart in love!
In our bosom, let bloom either tulip or rose.

Translations of these three poems are from
One Hundred and Nine Turkish Poems, Thirty Poets by Şeref Hazinedar 2017 (privately printed).
Mr Hazinedar is a writer and translator based in Istanbul and accessible at
www.hazinedar.wordpress.com

Some Noteworthy Events
Compiled by Sigrid-B Martin

2018/19 CONFERENCES

Third Levantine Heritage Foundation International Conference
Dates: 2-4 November, 2018
Venue: Athens, Greece
More Information: lhf-athens2018@levantineheritage.com; www.levantineheritage.com
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES)

**Dates:** 24-27 June, 2019  
**Venue:** University of Leeds

**More Information:** Title: ‘Joining the dots: Interdisciplinarity in Middle East Studies’  
www.brismes.ac.uk/conference/contact-us/

**LECTURES**

**London Middle East Institute:**  
**Lecture Programme on the Contemporary Middle East**  
**Times:** Tuesdays, 5.45pm (unless stated otherwise), starting on 16 October 2018  
**Venue:** Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS  
All lectures in this series are free and open to all.

**More Information:** www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis/events/

**Brigadier-General Sir Wyndham Deedes and the London Halkevi (1942-1950)**  
**Speaker:** Sandra Nichols (SOAS)  
**Date and time:** Friday, 16 November, 2018; 12.00-14.00  
**Venue:** 21 Russell Square, London (MBI Jaber Seminar Room)  
**More information:** admission free. Organised by Turkish Studies, SOAS

**The John Martin Lecture (BATAS)**  
**Date:** Friday 30 November, 2018  
**Venue:** SOAS, University of London  
**Speaker:** Mr Richard Moore  
**More Information:** www.batas.org.uk See inside cover.

**The Making of Everyday Precision Cultures: Sewing Machines, Women, and Labor in the Late Ottoman Empire**  
**Speaker:** Dr Ceyda Karamürsel (SOAS)  
**Date and time:** Friday, 7 December, 2018; 12.00-14.00  
**Venue:** 21 Russell Square, London (MBI Jaber Seminar Room)  
**More information:** free admission. Organised by Turkish Studies, SOAS

**EXHIBITIONS**

**The Curious Case of Çatalhöyük**  
**Dates:** 12 October to 16 December, 2018; 10.30-17.00  
(Tuesday-Saturday; late opening to 20.00 Thursdays)  
**Venue:** Brunei Gallery, SOAS, London

**More information:** Organised by Koç University’s Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations with support from BIAA. Incorporates innovative exhibits such as 3D prints of finds, laser-scanned overviews of excavation areas and immersive digital displays.
Jerusalem: Coinage and empire from antiquity to the 19th century

Dates: 2 October 2018 to 28 January 2019

Venue: The Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge

More Information: The Holy City of Jerusalem is central to the three Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Control of the city has been contested by the great empires of the region and has changed hands many times. This special display explores the history of Jerusalem through the coins minted and used in the city from the earliest coinage to that of the Ottoman Empire.

37th International Istanbul Book Fair

Dates: 10-18 November 2018

Venue: Tüyap Fair Convention and Congress Center, Büyükçekmece, Istanbul

Visiting Hours: Weekend 10.00-20.00; Weekdays 10.00-19.00; 18 November 10.00-19.00; The International Hall will be open to the public 10-13 November 2018

MUSIC

Ottoman Court Music Recital with Q&A

Dates: Tuesday 23 October, 6.30 pm

Venue: Leighton House Museum, London

More Information: Ottoman court music, grace Leighton House audiences with the rich sounds of the beautiful Turkish Makam, found throughout folk and dance music; in court audiences as well as Mevlevi ceremonies. All to be found in one of the most beautiful buildings in London and a perfect representation of Victorian Orientalism. The Musicians will provide contextual information and answer questions from the floor.

İlhan Şesen

Dates: 4 November 2018

Venue: Islington Assembly Hall, Upper Street, London, N1 2UD

More Information: İlhan Şesen, also known as the uncle of pop music who always gives unforgettable songs to Turkish Pop Music such as “Neler Oluyor Bize, Ellerimde Çiçekler” is getting ready to meet with Londoners. Şesen will be performing his most famous songs with this amazing event which will take place in Islington Assembly Hall, Sunday the 4th November

Doors Open: 19:00 - Concert Starts: 20:00; 07858 525 425 - 0207 686 8686

ORGANISATIONS

British Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS) holds an annual lecture at SOAS, University of London, in the autumn, this year it will be on
Friday 30 November. The other regular event, a one-day symposium in the spring, will take place on Saturday 11 May 2019 in Emmanuel College, Cambridge. For more detailed information: www.batats.org.uk

Centre for Turkey Studies (CEFTUS): A UK-based think-tank which organizes lectures and other events in London (usually in the Houses of Parliament). www.ceftus.org

Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL): Holds events in London, some of which relate to Turkey. cbrl@britac.uk

SOAS Friday Seminars on Turkey (Modern Turkish Studies Programme): held in the spring and autumn terms on occasional Fridays from 12.00-14.00 in the LMEI building at 21 Russell Square, London. Open to the public: Information from www.soas.ac.uk or gd5@soas.ac.uk

LSE Chair for Contemporary Turkish Studies focuses on culture, religion, politics and memory in Turkey and its diaspora population. It holds seminars and conferences open to the public. www.lse.ac.uk/contemporary-turkish-studies

LSE Middle East Centre, holds public lectures and other events: www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/forthcoming-events

The Yunus Emre Institute (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü), 10 Maple Street, Bloomsbury, London, W1T 5HA, has since 2010 offered a range of activities, including Turkish and Ottoman language classes, courses on traditional Turkish arts and lectures on aspects of Turkish history and culture: londra@yee.org.tr Phone 020 7387 3036.

The British Institute at Ankara, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH (and in Ankara) organizes research and sponsors lectures and other events on Turkish archaeology, geography, history, and politics in London and Turkey. Phone 020 7969 5204 in London. biaa@britac.ac.uk

The Anglo-Turkish Society holds public lectures in London on a range of Turkey-related topics. www.angloturkishsociety.org.uk

The Levantine Heritage Foundation arranges lectures, conferences and other events relating to Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean. www.levantineheritage.com

Cornucopia monthly magazine regularly produces lists of events relating to Turkey and the Turkish area. cornucopia@atlas.net/tr
In late 2017, the Department for Near Eastern Studies at the University of Vienna hosted a six-lecture series, *Ottoman Crossings / Osmanische Schnittstellen*, co-sponsored by the Orientalische Gesellschaft (ORGES) and the Österreichische Orient-Gesellschaft Hammer-Purgstall (ÖOG).

The first lecture was given by the series’ organizer, Prof Dr David Selim Sayers (University of Vienna). His talk, *Gender unter Druck: Normen und Technologien im Istanbul des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Gender Norms and Print Technologies in Nineteenth-Century Istanbul) addressed the question of how gender norms among the élites of the Ottoman capital changed in the 19th century under the influence of Western ideas. Analyzing the ‘Tifli Stories’, an Ottoman genre of prose fiction primarily published in the second half of the 19th century, Prof Sayers argued that the adoption of Western gender notions in the texts produced by Ottoman literati was anything but straightforward. Rather than showing a gradual and chronologically linear move towards Western gender notions, he pointed out, the ‘Tifli stories’ display different gender discourses depending on which print technology they employ.

In the second week Prof Dr Evangelia Balta (National Hellenic Research Foundation in Athens) used her talk, *Karamanlidika Studies and the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Populations of the Ottoman Empire*, to provide a historical overview of the printed legacy of Karamanlidika, an Ottoman written idiom that...
combined the Turkish language with the Greek script. It was employed by the
Turkish-speaking Christian Orthodox population of Anatolia and was finally
destroyed, along with this community, by the Greek-Turkish ‘population exchange’ of
1923. From the early 18th to the mid-19th century, Prof Balta argued, production of
Karamanlidika texts was dominated by the Patriarchal printing press and various
missionary organizations.

The third lecture, *Men at Arms, Reporters, and Novelists: the First World War in
Turkish Literature*, was by Prof Dr Timour Muhidine (Institut national des langues et
civilisations orientales (INaLCO) in Paris) who pointed out that, while there has been
an increase in scholarship and awareness about World War I as the conflict marks
its hundredth anniversary, the Eastern European and Middle Eastern fronts of the
war have not received due attention. He addressed this shortcoming by presenting
an overview of wartime literary production by Turkish authors, focusing on diverse
genres such as didactic poetry, short fiction, the novel, and reportage.

In its fourth week, *Ottoman Crossings* welcomed Janina
Karolewski, Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study
of Manuscript Cultures, University of Hamburg. In a talk entitled *Das Alevitentum in einem Buch? Zum Umgang mit Buyruk-Manuskripten* (Alevism in one Book? On the Utilization of Buyruk
Manuscripts), Karolewski focused on the Buyruk, a genre of religious literature
employed by many Alevi communities. The Buyruk, Karolewski maintained,
comprises a variety of manuscripts and printed editions, produced from Ottoman to
modern times, which contain Alevi religious narratives and articles of faith. With
examples from different Buyruk manuscripts she demonstrated that the Buyruk must
not be understood as an equivalent to standardized and widely disseminated ‘holy
books’ such as the Bible or Qur’an, but as unique artifacts that only acquire specific
meaning when utilized by Alevi elders in lived, communal religious ritual.

The fifth lecture of the series was given by Prof Dr Mehmet Kalpakli. Chair of the
Departments of History and Turkish Literature at Bilkent University in Ankara. His
talk, *Love at the Ottoman Court: Poems, Poets, and Parties*, focused on the social
context in which Ottoman love poetry was produced and performed. Rather than
viewing Ottoman poetry as a literary product to be enjoyed in solitary reading,
Kalpakli maintained, one must see it as a central performative aspect of social
gatherings or parties at which Ottoman élites came together to relax, amuse
themselves, and network. While the content of the poetry could be concerned with
the beauty of the location or the festivities themselves, its central image was that of
an unidentified beloved to whom poems of praise, complaint, and supplication were
addressed in an often erotic language.

In its final week, the lecture series hosted Prof Dr Hülya Adak from Sabancı
University in Istanbul to talk on *Begegnungen: 1915 in der zeitgenössischen
armenischen Literatur in der Türkei und der Diaspora* (Encounters: 1915 in
Contemporary Armenian Literature in Turkey and the Diaspora). Pointing to a major
blind spot in contemporary scholarship, Adak maintained that Armenian literature
produced in Turkey is still not studied in conjunction with Armenian literature from a
variety of diasporas. It is only through a combined study of these different literary
strands that scholars can reach a nuanced and multi-faceted appreciation of how
literature has dealt with the issue of the Armenian Genocide.
Throughout its run, *Ottoman Crossings / Osmanische Schnittstellen* challenged conventional topics and methodologies of Ottoman history and literature, demonstrating that Ottoman Studies cannot be reduced to the study of a single religion, language, culture, or society. Rather than appearing arbitrary, the diversity of the lecture topics contributed to the series’ central assertion that it is precisely in the crossings, intersections, or fault lines occasioned by such diversity that Ottoman history comes alive.

The fifth ‘edition’ of the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) was hosted this year from the 16th to 20th July at the large and magnificent University of Seville, the former tobacco factory of ‘Carmen’ fame. This proved to be a very central and conveniently-located venue, with all panels or other academic events fortunately able to happen under one roof, unlike the case at the previous WOCMES 2014 in Ankara (TAS Review No 24, 2014, p 49). The overall organiser of the event this time was the ‘Three Cultures of the Mediterranean Foundation’, a joint Andalusian and Moroccan initiative since 1998, and naturally the historical and cultural heritage of ‘Al-Andalus’ was a major theme.

This was certainly a mega-event, with the number of registered participants reaching a new record of 3,184, and with a total of 1,785 individual papers and 405 panels proposed (if not actually delivered, as things turned out). But one statistic in particular should be of interest to TASR readers. This is that, of the ten countries with the highest number of participants, Turkey came in fifth, with 153 (even though not all managed to appear for whatever reason, especially from a certain university in Konya). This compares well with the UK’s participation figure of 188, and illustrates the active and growing involvement of Turkish scholars in Middle Eastern studies, embracing the entire MENA region as well as Turkey itself.

Suffice it to say that the congress covered every aspect of the general topic that could possibly be imagined, with a formidable programme of concurrent panels, roundtables and other events from morning to early evening over the five days. There were also, of course, plenty of the latest books to browse or buy. Aiming to combine some academic stimulus with a bit of a holiday, your correspondent demurely passed up such offerings as ‘Sex in the Middle East and North Africa’ in order to attend at least some of the many panels dealing either with current Turkish domestic and foreign policy or other matters or with aspects of Ottoman history.
and society. There were also some limited opportunities to distribute flyers for BATAS. On Day One, for example, I participated in ‘Geographies of gender in the Ottoman First World War’, a fascinating look at the Ottoman ‘home front’ a century ago through researches into the sex trade, desertions and the family and other sources of conflict between the Ottoman state and its female citizens at that time. I was impressed by the panel chair, Elif Mahir Metinsoy from Galatasaray University in Istanbul, who has recently published a book with Cambridge University Press on Ottoman Women during World War I. Later in the week there was another stimulating roundtable discussion of new scholarly perspectives on the study of the post-Ottoman Middle East. As to more contemporary Turkish affairs, there were several panels covering a range of topics, from politics and identity construction to media, migration, youth and even fairs and festivals. Meanwhile one of the many poster presentations was by an Italian researcher and traced ‘the persistence and evolution of authoritarianism in contemporary Turkish politics’.

Finally, geography and gender (specifically, the fateful hold of the one over the other) came to the fore again when I had the chance to see (as part of the accompanying film festival – and probably the star item) the critically acclaimed 2015 film Mustang, by the Turkish-French director Deniz Gamze Ergüven. I had heard about this after its success at Cannes in 2015, but had missed it and had remained mystified by the title, which I now understand refers to the headstrong, rebellious spirit of the five orphaned girls living in a village somewhere in the Black Sea region who do what they can to resist the pressures put upon them to become perfect rural brides. If you haven’t yet seen it, I strongly recommend that you try to do so.

John Moreton
University of Leeds
four decades ago, Ottoman topics now account for half the papers presented, with the rest – unsurprisingly perhaps – tackling aspects of Turkish politics and Islam. Most of the speakers on Turkish themes this year are based in United Kingdom institutions as lecturers or as post-graduate students. Their greatly increased numbers reflect the burgeoning of the university sector in Turkey, though it is concerning to note that numbers of them expressed doubts about getting appointments at home. The University of Leeds will host BRISMES’ 2019 conference, 25-27 June.

Brian Beeley

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Third conference in the BIAA's 'From Enemies to Allies' series takes place in Oxford

Following successful conferences in Ankara and Cambridge in 2016 and 2017, the focus of the day was the position of Turkey during the Second World War. The conference was convened by Emeritus Professor William Hale (SOAS; BIAA; BATAS), and introduced by Dr Celia Kerslake (St Antony’s, Oxford; BATAS) and Professor Stephen Mitchell (St John’s, Oxford; BIAA).

The day began with Professor Dilek Barlas (Koç University) giving a thorough account of the Turkish position leading up to and during the Second World War, with particular attention to Turkish-British relations. She emphasised the significance of the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, and the subsequent establishment of British naval and air bases in Turkish territory. Professor Barlas also highlighted little-known historical events such as the Turkish visit to Malta the same year, and discussed the unequal basis of an alliance in which the main enemy of Turkey was a resurgent Italy, which posed an immediate threat to its Aegean regions, while British attention was focused on Germany. The motivations of each nation, with Turkey not wanting to lose its relationship with Britain to
Italy, and Britain not wanting to lose Turkey to Germany, and the limited nature of the parties’ commitments to one another, were also discussed.

The second presentation, by Professor William Hale, focused on the Tripartite Treaty between Turkey, Britain and France in 1939. He further discussed who was pressing for an alliance, at what point, and why, looking in particular at the personal roles of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his then Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax during the period of appeasement. Professor Hale argued that Turkey did not have a pre-meditated long-term strategy, and that the Allies’ position lacked realism: both sides suffered from muddled thinking and divided councils, and both were blind-sided by Hitler’s pact with Stalin, as the Alliance had assumed that the USSR would cooperate in a war against Germany. The Allies’ commitments to re-arm Turkey’s forces could never have been met: it represented an “ill-fated alliance”, and Turkey’s neutrality from 1941 was a fall-back position after the Tripartite Treaty collapsed.

Professor Mustafa Aydın (Kadir Has University) gave a fascinating and detailed overview of the period with a particular focus on how Turkey negotiated and tried to avoid becoming involved in the War. As an International Relations expert, Professor Aydın’s contributions included asking if ‘neutrality’ is the correct way to describe Turkey’s position. He described how Turkey had signed non-aggression agreements with several countries including the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Italy, Iran, Britain and France in the 1920s and 1930s. Of these, only the Balkan Pact and the Tripartite Agreement contained clauses that could bring Turkey into the War. Turkey also signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, making it the only nation to have signed such agreements with all of the warring countries in Europe. He argued that there was a “crisis of trust” between Turkey and the Allies, and that Turkey only joined the war at a point where little was expected of them. The Yalta and Potsdam summit meetings again raised the key question of the Montreux agreement and USSR’s access to the Straits, and thus foreshadowed the tensions of the early Cold War years.

After lunch, Dr Warren Dockter (Aberystwyth University) spoke on the personal role of wartime British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Although, as he argued, nothing in history is determined by one person, Churchill’s role was particularly critical. He examined Churchill’s own politics and historical perspectives; for example, the legacy of Gladstonian ideas. He highlighted how Churchill had been positive about Turkey in the inter-war period, and wanted to bring Turkey into the Alliance, in contrast to Chamberlain’s position. Churchill met President İnönü at a meeting near Adana in January 1943, and his vision for a post-war order for Europe included Turkey as a leader within a ‘Balkan bloc’. Whilst Dr Dockter described Churchill’s views as “ambiguous”, he was certainly never anti-Turkey, and understood the complex and multiple identities of Turkey as both a European and Middle Eastern state.

Dr Edward Corse (University of Kent) followed with an analysis of British propaganda in Turkey during the Second World War, looking in particular at the role of the British Council, the Ministry of Information, the Foreign Office, the Special Operations Executive and the BBC. All had different roles to play in propaganda, including both overt and covert efforts. For example, Cephe was a Ministry of Information publication distributed in Turkey, in Turkish, in response to similar German publications. It was a victim of its own success, and was quickly banned by the Turkish authorities. Dr Corse argued that it is difficult to say whether or not propaganda was effective, although it was certainly necessary to counter the more extensive German efforts. He described the aim as “keeping the pot boiling”, as the Turkish were largely already pro-British.

Professor Şuhnaz Yılmaz (Koç University) looked at the Turkey – Britain – USA triangle. The Second World War was the period during which the world order moved from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana. Whilst Turkey tried to preserve its neutrality in Europe, this defined their global relationships, particularly with the United States. Professor Yılmaz
described the Allies’ tactics as a “wedge strategy”, designed to stop Turkey from joining the other side, giving a name to the strategies other speakers described earlier in the day. The British had been given the lead by the Americans in establishing the relationship with Turkey. She also emphasised that Turkey joined the war with the clear purpose of becoming a founding member of the United Nations, having acted on a “dual balancing strategy” until this point. Warm relations between Turkey and the USA were symbolised by the visit of the USS Missouri to the Straits in 1946, committing the Allies to support for Turkey in the face of expanding Soviet power.

The final talk of the day came from Professor Bülent Gökay (Keele University), whose focus was the relationship between Turkey and the USSR. He described pro-Soviet propaganda in Turkey during the War, sponsored by the Communist Party of Turkey. He argued that the small group of Turkish communists had little influence with workers and peasants, but had close connections with the Soviet leadership. He described claims to the Straits as key to the tensions between the two nations, and argued that most accounts of this have existed in isolation, failing to take the context of the War into account. Turkey wanted to make the perceived threat of the USSR evident to the Allies. The international order was changing rapidly during this period, power dynamics were shifting, and Turkey’s uncertain position epitomises this.

All talks were followed by engaging discussion and questions. The day concluded with drinks in the College Buttery, during which all agreed it had been an extremely productive and stimulating programme.

Papers from the first two conferences were published earlier this year in a special issue of the Middle Eastern Studies journal, and a publication from this year’s speakers is in development. A fourth and final conference is planned for 2019 in Istanbul.

Claire Reynolds, BIAA

1968
The year of living vicariously

by Mehmet Ali Dikerdem
Associate Professor
Department of Law
Middlesex University London

Part 1

Good karma at birth, which I have since whittled away recklessly, ensured that I entered 1968 in London sharing a flat with my South African political exile friends; spent part of that Summer in Accra in the Turkish Embassy with my father; witnessed the student demonstrations against the visit of the US Sixth Fleet in Istanbul; started my first year at Manchester University participating in student-led teach-ins; and ended the year in considerable style on Park Avenue, New York, in

58 This is a condensed version of a longer piece which will be published in the next issue of the Journal of Global Faultlines, vol. 5, no. 1, October 2018.
the swanky residence of the Turkish Permanent Delegate to the UN, who happened
to be my mother’s second husband, and hanging out with Black Power militants at
Columbia University. What follows is a highly selective and subjective account of my
experiences of 1968, remembered and rendered as a youthful picaresque…

The London whirlwind
In 1968 I was a 19-year-old from a privileged (and unusually syncretic) background
with poplar breezes (kavak yelleri) blowing in my head as the Turkish expression
goes.

I had drifted into London during the Summer of Love, 1967, having blown my A-
Levels in a trendy liberal private boarding school. Through school connections, I
found myself in a flat around the corner from Hornsey College of Art, rented by
Moeletsi and Dot. Moeletsi’s father Govan was in Robben Island with the rest of the
ANC leadership, and some forty years later, his brother would become the second
President of post-apartheid South Africa.

Coincidentally, Tariq Ali, rising star of the anti-Viet Nam war demonstrations and
former Oxford University Union President, lived in the flats opposite us. But I
associated with seasoned black South African activists who despite their youth had
been through the mill of apartheid jails and violence. They thought that Tariq could
be more gainfully deployed in politics in his native Pakistan. Later in 1968, I would be
Tariq’s minder on his visit as guest speaker at the University of East Anglia to a
mass Viet Nam meeting organised by a friend of mine studying there.

Then, London sparkled and crackled with diverse energies, stirring desires through
the vibrant music of the times and the ever-more daring waves of avant garde art.
Gusts of creativity and sheer mischief were unleashed from all directions. We were
not only out to épater les bourgeois but squaring up to overthrow them. Or so it
seemed.

Hornsey College of Art was soon to erupt into one of the first major student protests
in Britain, successfully calling for changes to the curriculum and the management of
art schools nationally. I rubbed shoulders with art students and radical lecturers in
the Railway Tavern down the road. Then there were the LSE occupations, marches
denouncing the Greek Junta or Ian Smith’s regime in the-then Rhodesia, anti-
Apartheid marches and pro-Palestinian rallies. The massive Viet Nam marches in
March and October upped the ante, raucously calling for ‘Victory to the National
Liberation Front’ rather than the more mainstream left cries of ‘Peace in Viet Nam’.
We refused to believe the news of Che’s execution in Bolivia in October 1967;
instead we went around London singing triumphantly ‘HO, HO, HO CHI MINH ! CHE,
CHE, CHE, GUEVARA ! FLN vaincra!

‘Life was turning into one big ‘demo’ which inevitably pointed to socialism’s “And the
last fight let us face”… We celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Russian
Revolution in November 1967, with packed meetings throughout London, and a
torrent of pamphlets from various Trotskyite sects questioning the nature and
legitimacy of the regime in the USSR.

When we were not marching we read political texts avidly. For me, this meant an
almost criminal negligence of my A-Level resits due in January 1968. Instead, I
frequented the backroom of Collett’s Bookshop on Charing Cross Road, famous for
stocking virtually all the left-wing pamphlets published in the country however
obscure the political sect involved.
Turkish connections

This was also the time when you could tell how many Turks were in Britain, and their addresses, just by looking at the Embassy visitor’s book upon entering the soot-darkened solemn portals of 43, Belgrave Square. It was a forbidding place. On entering, one crossed the line from a London that rock-and-rolled with music, youth counter-cultures, free love and the vibrant rhetoric of emancipation, to come face-to-face with the reality of the patriarchal solemnity of the Turkish state. The Consulate was even more forbidding, run with an iron fist by a local administrator, an ancient, portly, bald ethnic Turk, who had long settled in London and seen off a dozen Consul Generals.

I soon fell in with the LSE Turkish Society crowd. Yusuf was a childhood friend, another ‘diplomatic offspring’ (*ekselans yavrusu*) as we jokingly referred to ourselves; Kemal, the quadrilingual *wunderkind*, a year younger than me at 18 was already in his second year at the LSE. His personal tutor was the famous Marxist Ralph Miliband. At the centre of the LSE’s Turkish students was Cavli, a graduate of Ankara’s Political Science Faculty (*Mulkiye*), and one of the group of bright students clustered around Sadun Aren, professor and Turkish Workers’ Party (TIP) member of the National Assembly. The Education Attaché at the Embassy was known to warn students against fraternising with Cavli lest they fell under his ‘subversive’ influence!

Wearing his privileged background lightly, Kemal possessed personal characteristics and attributes that would remain with him all his life. His patriotism was fused with an intellectual commitment to social democracy which in turn was underpinned by his precocious talent for economics. All around him, including myself, were veering off to various shades of red; we jokingly referred to him as “The Honorary Consul for Bülent Ecevit”.

I tagged along as the LSE Turkish Student Society and its allies in the Northern universities wrested control of the Turkish Student Federation of Britain (ITOF) from an older generation of Embassy-sponsored students. Kemal and I somehow ended up in charge of the Federation magazine called *Tug* – a martial symbol of a horsetail attached to a battle standard, denoting the conservative origins and values of the Federation. The first and only issue we edited had an article by the young rising star of Turkish politics, Bülent Ecevit, acquired personally by Kemal, and four or five illustrations donated to me by Abidin Dino in Paris, whom I had solicited as my father's friend. The majority of the articles were on economics, with contributions from Kemal’s circle including doctoral candidates working on Turkey. Cavli’s friend and classmate from *Mulkiye* Yılmaz, another rising star in economics along with Asaf Savaş, both at the University of East Anglia, also contributed. (Kemal, Yılmaz and Asaf emerged later as the leading economists of the ’68 generation in Turkey and built international reputations).

Despite all these distractions, and the disruptions of attending three different schools in three different continents in as many years, I somehow scraped through my A-Levels and bagged my way into Manchester University’s Politics and Modern History degree programme, jokingly referred to then as the ‘poor man’s PPE’. When, in April 1968, I triumphantly announced the good news to my father, he summoned me immediately to Accra, Ghana, where he had been in post as Turkish ambassador for
the previous four years. Kemal accompanied me to the BOAC terminal then near Victoria Station. Sometime later he would travel to Paris.

**Sitting it out in Accra**

One of the biggest upheavals in Europe since 1848, the May événements kicked-off in Paris and spread like wildfire with no respect for Cold War divisions or geographical distances.

![Image](image.png)

“We shall fight, we will win, Paris, Rome, London, Berlin!” was echoed in the major American cities erupting in the aftermath of Martin Luther King’s assassination in April, the Zengakuren student movement in Japan, prefiguring the massacre of students before the Mexico City Olympics, and the first march for civil rights in Derry, Northern Ireland, both in October. As the late Fred Halliday wrote twenty years later, the most dramatic events of 1968 were neither in Western Europe or North America but in the ‘second world’ of Eastern Europe: the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in August.

And here I was in Accra looking after my father who had been more-or-less exiled there after landing on the wrong side of Turkey’s 1960 military coup and the ensuing power struggles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was his fourth year in this posting. The first two years had been tolerable for my left-leaning father: under President Kwame Nkrumah, despite waste, corruption and a personality cult, Ghana had emerged as a centre for African socialism and Pan-Africanism, supporting anti-colonial struggles waged against apartheid and Portuguese colonialism. In 1966, some $12m US dollars dispensed by the-then US Ambassador (who was of African-American descent) funded a coup by the security forces when Nkrumah was out of the country on a grandiose mission to broker peace between the Americans and the North Vietnamese.

In short, my father was lonely and depressed. He had been a high-flying diplomat and part of the country’s tiny left-wing intelligentsia which was always regarded with suspicion and persecuted often brutally as Turkey sided with America after WW2. I had been named after Mehmet Ali Aybar, an academic with aristocratic background who would lead the Turkish Workers Party (TWP) into two elections in the later 1960s, opening chinks in the political armour of the Turkish state for socialist ideas to squeeze through. I grew up in a one-parent family, either ‘diplomatic baggage’ moving from one Middle Eastern country to another, or in Istanbul attentively listening to often heated arguments, vendettas, denunciations: the hurly-burly of a left intellectual circle which included the venerable Vala Nurettin and his wife Müzehher Hanım, Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir (my father’s classmate from Galatasaray), Haldun Taner, Behice Boran, Adnan Cemgil and others who used to refer to themselves in jest and in code-Ottoman as *Efrad-I Bolshevikiyye* (roughly, ‘groupies of the Bolsheviks’).
On our own from May to July 1968 in the Turkish Embassy residence I sat next to my father on the dot at 1pm for lunch and 8pm for dinner and listened to the BBC French Language service. We began to lock horns as events in Paris unfolded; he saw the student movement as essentially an ‘infantile disorder’ while I vicariously heaved paving stone after paving stone at the despised CRS (the French special riot police) and fantasised about attending mass meetings in the Sorbonne, manning the barricades and much else besides…

Thinking about it fifty years later, I realise that this was a generational conflict which cut across politics and ideology. My father showed the same ambivalences towards the dynamics of May 1968 and the forces that this unleashed as did his contemporaries like the Marxist philosophers Adorno and Althusser or the communist historian Eric Hobsbawm. They were haunted by the memory of the premature workers’ uprisings of the 1920s that, they held, had ultimately led to fascism. While I rooted volubly for workers’ control and turning student protests into the fuse of a political process towards socialism, father sided with the CGT (Confédération générale du travail, the dominant French trade union grouping) and the orthodox left.

But I do remember that sometime in June, he came out of his office flushed and seething with anger. “Philistines!” he shouted: “They’re going to make fools of Turkey”. A circular had just arrived from the Foreign Ministry in Ankara ordering all Turkish missions to refuse visas to a list of about 100 ‘undesirables’ headed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir, the renowned French poet Louis Aragon, the Marxist philosopher Roger Garaudy (later to convert to Islam), the Guatemalan poet Miguel Angel Asturias, the Chilean poet and diplomat Pablo Neruda, Herbert Marcuse and many other left liberal, political, artistic and literary figures from across the world. Having deemed that the student protests kicking off in Istanbul and Ankara were manipulated by a ‘foreign hand’ (kökü dışarıda), the Turkish state, in its infinite wisdom, was trying to manage the contagion of subversion by banning some of the world’s leading intellectuals from entering the country.

Years later my father would write that what he found the hardest to swallow was that nobody in the Ministry, which had the most highly educated and cosmopolitan civil servants in the country, had the courage to challenge this truly ridiculous banning order.

An Istanbul episode – another Turkish reality check: August – September 1968

I was met at Istanbul airport by my cousin Mehmet Ali who took us to the ancient and sprawling Ottoman köşk in Erenköy where I had spent my childhood summers with him under the watchful gaze of his mother, my father’s stern elder sister. We were now meeting more-or-less as adults for the first time after a five-year gap. His star was rising steadily in the national newspaper where he worked and had started dating the proprietor’s daughter. Like my London friend Kemal, he was attracted by the appeal of Bülent Ecevit. He warned, “Turkey is not what you are used to in London. This is a country which hanged its Prime Minister seven years ago. If you get a black mark against your name (eğer mimlenirsen), it sticks for life. So be careful”.

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In 1968 there were about half-a-dozen universities in Turkey in the country’s three largest cities. (Now there are over 180 institutions in all 81 Turkish provinces). The year had started with mass mobilisations in April under the banner ‘No to NATO’ and calling for a ‘fully independent Turkey’, even before the Paris May bug quickly spread across the entire sector.

It was this privileged student body which had confronted and repulsed the sailors of the US Sixth Fleet mooring in Istanbul for their customary R&R. The photographs of American naval rankings being thrown into the sea on Dolmabahçe pier by students near the Technical University (the alma mater to at least three subsequent prime ministers) was to gain iconic status. During this confrontation the first blood was spilt: Vedat Demircioğlu, a student, was murdered when beaten and thrown from the second floor of his hall of residence window – a sinister harbinger of state violence to come in the 1970s. In Paris there had been no deaths in the three months following the student uprising and mass factory strikes.

When I landed in Istanbul there were ongoing boycotts and occupations throughout the sprawling University of Istanbul faculties. The name most associated with these mobilisations was Deniz Gezmiş. I asked a childhood friend to put me in touch with him. He said, “You don’t wander in to see Deniz like strolling into a coffeehouse. Who are you affiliated with?” I hesitated a moment and then improvised, remembering that Mehmet Ali Aybar, TWP Chair was a family friend and would vouch for me. What better bona fides could I possibly have? Besides, he had also been very much in the news lately for opposing the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, saying he stood for ‘socialism with a smiling face’, echoing Alexander Dubcek, the ousted Czech leader. Socialism could not be exported by tanks – sentiments I agreed with. I therefore responded ‘TWP’ to my friend, hoping that this would open the way to my meeting with Gezmiş and his lot. “You revisionist!” my friend thundered, “Deniz ought to spit on your face!” and turned away.

It soon became clear to me that what was shaping up in Istanbul could not have been further from the boisterous carnivals of the London demos. The so-called Frukos, the armed special riot police (named after the resemblance between the open trucks ferrying them to trouble hotspots and the vehicles used in distributing the locally produced fizzy drink in Turkey’s pre-Coca Cola days) were armed and capable of meting out great violence.

Also unlike London, newsagents and kiosks stocked a wide range of newspapers and political journals from the fascist right to the newly emerging extra-parliamentary left student opposition. There was also an avalanche of publications, including left classics whose translators and publishers were still hounded by the courts and the censors. Ant and Sosyal Yayınlar led the way in an outpouring of left publications which you could buy crossing the Bosphorous by ferry (there was no bridge in those days) but which could be banned and sequestered a week later by a prosecutor.

The ambivalences of the Turkish state towards the written word, its instinctive mistrust of the free circulation of ideas has survived to this day, and has been the cause of my lifelong bibliomania and tsundoku. One of my father’s friends, Dr Vedat Günyol was arrested in 1965 for translating the selected articles of Gracchus Babeuf written during the French Revolution, thereby engaging in ‘communist propaganda’, even before the word ‘communism’ had entered the political lexicon! In 1972,
Professor Mümtaz Soysal, a future Foreign Minister, would be imprisoned for quoting from Marx’s philosophical *1844 Manuscripts*.

On a lighter note, along with a number of friends from the LSE circles and what appeared to be the radical section of Istanbul University’s Economics Faculty junior staff common room, I attended Kemal’s wedding in his family’s Büyükada villa. He was marrying into a TWP-connected family. Fuelled by the free flow of drinks, the beautiful starlit sky over the Marmara Sea, the sounds of crickets and the summer scents wafting from the well-kept gardens by the swimming pool, I vaguely remember a group of us serenading (if you can so call the cacophony we must have created) the *crème de la crème* of Turkish high society swirling around the upper terrace, with an unlikely medley of Spanish Civil War songs, then fashionable Turkish left-wing ballads, rounded off with a rousing rendition of the *Internationale*.

Part 2 to follow in TASR No 33

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**East of Trebizond**\(^{59}\) – A 2016 Update

**Trabzon to Batumi and Back**

*by John Moreton*

Fortunately *Pegasus*, the winged horse that had conveyed me and other bold riders from Istanbul, did not overshoot the modest runway at Trabzon Airport to find itself nosing the waters of the Black Sea, as one of its fellows did more recently. It was a Monday in mid-August 2016, exactly one month after the failed coup attempt in Turkey, and I was following through on my pre-existing plan to visit a part of the country I had not seen before, namely the Black Sea coast and the far north-east. I had been to other parts of eastern Turkey, including Lake Van, during my first visit to the country in 1971, but had never had a good chance to go back. By 2016 – a couple of years after my last visit to Turkey – a general nostalgia for eastern Anatolia (well, in summer, you understand) had been rekindled not only by some linguistic forays into the complexities of the Laz and Georgian languages but also by finally reading a book that had long languished on my shelves, Michael Pereira’s *East of* [59] Michael Pereira’s 1971 *East of Trebizond* was reviewed by John Moreton in TAS Review 28, 2016, p.61
**Trebizond**, which was first published in 1971 (the year of my own first Turkish experiences).

The itinerary I describe here was not an attempt to follow in the footsteps of Pereira and his companion (I didn’t have enough time for that) but it did pass through the general area and some of the places he describes. Within just one week I travelled from Trabzon over the mountains south-east to Erzurum, taking in Bayburt *en route*, revisited Erzurum and then ventured into the region to its north-east to see old Georgian churches and magnificent landscapes as far as Yusufeli before crossing back over the Pontic mountains to Rize; thence proceeding east along the Black Sea coast to Ayder in the Laz country and further east via Hopa into Georgia for twenty-four hours in Batumi; then back along the coast to Trabzon and the final few days in Istanbul. One of the many highlights was of course the brief and limited excursion into Georgia; but in this north-east corner of Turkey I also enjoyed a wonderful diversity of landscape, the special kind of summer light I could remember from 1971 and the friendliness and courtesy of the local people. The dramatic events in faraway Istanbul and Ankara a month earlier were reflected in various ways and their outcome welcomed (officially, at least); but life here in provincial Turkey seemed to be carrying on quite normally, and in fact during my week-long tour the big topic of the summer never arose in conversation. One phenomenon I also became aware of more than ever before was the growth of Gulf and other Arab tourism in Turkey’s green, alpine paradises as well as at its historical sites.

For some of us flights and bus or train journeys provide a good opportunity to get stuck into that book we’ve been meaning to read for …well, quite some time. During this trip I managed to read Rose Macaulay’s *The Towers of Trebizond* (1956), since it seemed an appropriate time to do so and, leaving aside the personal storyline and the ecclesiastical satire, I did find the ‘Turkey book’ aspects not only interesting but often highly amusing. If you’ve never read this unusual ‒ and now, it seems, almost forgotten ‒ masterpiece, then it’s really high time you did.

But as I entered Trabzon through its drab suburban sprawl by taxi from the airport there was no sign of ‘the towers of Trebizond, the fabled city…held in a luminous enchantment’. After a night flight I was more concerned, in any case, with finding my way to the hotel. Having achieved that, later in the afternoon I took a *dolmuş* out to visit Aya Sofya on its little hill above the Black Sea in the western outskirts, noting as we approached the first of those many red-backed posters at the time proclaiming that Turkey the invincible would never bow the knee… The original Byzantine monastery church here (showing some Georgian and Armenian influences) has apparently been something of a religious football over the years, being changed into a mosque and then to a church and a secular museum and in 2013 back into a mosque at the instigation of Turkey’s *Diyanet*. Consequently full access is restricted, but I enjoyed seeing especially the frieze on the south portico depicting the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden, along with some other frescoes and the surrounding gardens; it all reminded me of my brief but more adventurous visit back in 1971 to the famous Armenian church of Akhtamar on that little island in Lake Van. Visitors from the Arab Gulf states were now much in evidence here at Aya Sofya, and I learned later that another favourite destination for them was the nearby inland resort of Uzungöl (the Long Lake) to the south-east of
Trabzon – Swiss-like mountain scenery with the added bonus of a lakeside mosque. That first evening I strolled along to the busy hub of modern Trabzon, the tree-shaded Meydan Park, to eat and to take the pulse of the city. It seemed a normal enough Turkish provincial scene until I sat on a wall in the far corner of the square, glanced up and saw dangling from a tree above the heads of the locals an effigy that was clearly of a certain Mr Gülen. Since one or two other people took photographs of it I felt I could safely, if discreetly, do the same; and on closer inspection I managed to read the stern legends on the effigy demanding the death penalty for traitors, who deserved to burn in hell, etc. A short distance away from the square the faces of Turkey’s current great and good beamed over this scene from a line of posters, and I noticed that the building near this corner of the square was in fact the local headquarters of the governing party, strongly supported in this conservative region.

But Atatürk and his revolution had also been warmly welcomed here less than a century ago. So the next morning I took a trip out across the ravines of historic Trebizond to visit the Atatürk Pavilion, a fine mansion with well-kept gardens offering splendid views set in the wooded hills south-west of the city. It’s a pleasant spot (another favourite for Arab visitors, it appeared), with sundry Atatürk memorabilia inside the house; but the sad and darker side of history also hangs over it, since this Black Sea-style whitewashed property was originally built for a Greek banker in 1903 but two decades later was taken off him under the population exchanges and eventually presented to Atatürk before his death by grateful locals.

Later that morning I left Trabzon by bus over the mountains bound for Bayburt, my planned overnight stop on the way to Erzurum. My limited time available had ruled out a trip to Uzungöl, and having heard that the more famous Sumela Monastery south of Trabzon was still under restorasyon at the time I decided that this too would have to be left for a future visit. Nonetheless the opportunity to see the less known provincial capital of Bayburt was some compensation: having checked into my cheap but comfortable and spacious hotel on the main street after a scenic ride over the mountains, I set off in the late afternoon to explore this historic town some 1550 metres above sea level and dominated by its formidable medieval fortress. Climbing up the steep approaches to the kalı I fell in – Pereira-style, and with echoes of my own earlier travels – with a pair of friendly young men who chatted to me while showing me over the whole site with its marvellous views. Later they deposited me at a restaurant beside the River Çoruh. We had exchanged email addresses, of course, though I never heard back from either of them. Nevertheless I enjoyed the warm welcome to this proud town and locality, which offers a fine and detailed tourist guide in Turkish and English and would certainly merit more time than I could give it.

Erzurum was my destination the next morning, and I knew we were approaching it from the bleak look of the steppe landscape in which it is set. This main urban centre of eastern Anatolia and the country’s highest city is in fact pleasingly walkable and compact from the sightseeing point of view. After finding my bearings from the modest hotel I made my first port of call, going uphill towards the centre, at the fine and historic Rüstem Pasha Bedesten (bazaar). Then it was on to visit the series of great Selçuk monuments, starting with the fascinating Yakutiye Medrese and moving along the same street to the huge Ulu Cami, the famous Çifte Minareli Medrese and
the nearby and rather mysterious cluster of Saltuk tombs known as the Üç Kümbetler. Fortunately as it turned out, a man who approached me in time-honoured fashion with a commercial intent in the Ulu Cami was shortly able to put me in touch by phone with a local tour guide called Nuri Çiçek, who agreed to pick me up with a hired car early the next morning for a trip into the valleys north-east of Erzurum. This solved a problem for me: I had read about, and wanted to visit some of the ancient Georgian churches in this area (once part of the medieval kingdom of Georgia) while based in Erzurum, but had doubts about the wisdom of hiring a car to try to do this alone, and I decided it was best in the circumstances to pay a bit extra for a guide and driver. That evening, as the need for dinner made itself felt, I made a point of visiting the recommended Gel-Gör restaurant to sample Erzurum’s ‘signature dish’, the çağ kebap consisting of lamb marinated with onions and black pepper, grilled horizontally.

Mr Nuri appeared promptly to collect me at the appointed time, turning out to be an affable and engaging guide and companion, and bringing with him a very dour young man who was some kind of relative but hardly spoke a word. As we drove out of the city and along the plateau, chatting in Turkish and English, I tried to identify certain topographical features mentioned in John Buchan’s Greenmantle, that ‘classic spy adventure’ of exactly a century earlier that I’d been re-reading. A good portion of the action is set in Turkey, with the denouement taking place nearby, on the heights overlooking Erzurum, from where the Russian forces swept down to capture the city in 1916. Buchan’s novel reads as a prototype James Bond story, and although his hero never says in Greenmantle “The name’s Hannay – Dick Hannay…”, he might well have done. Most of the familiar ingredients are there, including the femme fatale in the shape of Frau von Einem and the formidable villain Baron von Stumm, who finally gets his comeuppance at the hands of galloping Cossacks somewhere up there to the south, near Erzurum’s present-day ski resort at Palandöken. Some research has been done into Buchan’s fairly nuanced and often non-stereotypical representation of German characters in the novel, but his representation of late (and of course wartime) Ottoman Turkey and Turks in Greenmantle still awaits similar examination.

Our first stop was for a tea break amongst friends of Nuri (males only, of course) at the çayhane at Tortum. Then we continued up the main valley past the crumbling ruins of Georgian forts perched upon dramatic rocky outposts until turning off the main road towards the first of our Georgian churches, the 10th-century Haho, now used as a mosque, situated in a beautiful wooded valley. It happened to be prayer-time, so we could only view the exterior and enjoy the immediate woodland surroundings. From there we moved on to stop and gawp down at the amazing, murky depths of Lake Tortum from its western shore before turning off again to drive up to the village of Çamlıyamaç and wander around the most impressive Georgian cathedral remains to be seen in the area, those of Öşkvank. There is at least one reasonably preserved aisle, various relief carvings and examples of the challenging Georgian script which was still mainly a mystery to me. As at Haho a bit earlier, I was pleased to see here too one of those informative signboards that indicated that the cultural heritage of eastern Anatolia, including its non-Turkish elements, was being respected and looked after.
It was now time for some lunch, and this was duly enjoyed at the beautiful and relaxing İskele trout farm by Lake Tortum, clearly another of Nuri’s regular stopovers. Tea and trout are indeed a regular and good combination in this part of Turkey. Then it was onwards and upwards to experience the spectacular Tortum waterfall (which I had read about in Pereira’s book) before heading towards the third and final destination on our Georgian church crawl. Visiting this one, called İşhan, is definitely not for the faint-hearted, and I was glad not to be driving there alone. Nuri skilfully negotiated the scary, narrow road that wound up and around a desolate mountainside until we found ourselves in the strikingly green and beautiful village with its apple, walnut and mulberry groves and the impressive dome of the originally eighth-century church, very similar to that of Öşkvank. Unfortunately the church was closed, as I recall for restoration work, while outside some archaeological surveying was in progress. For me the sheer beauty and tranquillity of the place reminded me of everything I had first loved about eastern Turkey.

Our final visit was to the nearby town of Yusufeli, apparently a well-known centre for white-water rafting on the fast-flowing River Çoruh as well as for hiking in the Kaçkar mountains and visiting the ‘western Georgian valleys’ from the north-east. Here also Nuri of course had mates, so we chatted and drank tea before heading home. The only brief stop we made as we thundereous back along that scenic and exhilarating road to Erzurum in the early evening was to haggle with women and children for some delicious figs.

The next morning – only Day Five of my trip – I took a bus from Erzurum back to the coast, this time by a different route over the mountains to Rize via the İspir visited by Pereira. As we descended towards Rize the dramatic change in the landscape and general environment was impressive, with the stark uplands of the interior now giving way to lush vegetation, extensive tea plantations and the rather humid, subtropical feel of the Black Sea coastline. Rize is a sizeable place and the centre of Turkey’s tea production but, since it was now afternoon and I had to move on to reach my hotel in the mountain resort of Ayder, my concern on arrival at the bus station was to find a bus or minibus heading into the Laz country further east. So there was no time to visit Rize’s Tea Research Institute or the local university bearing the name of the President, who hails from the nearby village of Güneysu. Before long I was aboard a minibus along the coast to Ardeşen, where I transferred to another one plying the popular route up to Birinci (Lower) Ayder, a mountain spa resort in the Hemşin valleys. As we sped up through the main town of Çamlıhemşin I had all-too-fleeting views of the Fırtına Çayı (‘Storm River’) and some of the ancient humpback bridges spanning it. Then we reached Ayder, where I spent the night in a welcoming alpine-type hotel and walked up in the evening to the higher part of the extended village, stopping to listen to a group gleefully singing, I assumed, in the Laz language. The following morning I was able to enjoy the full glory of Ayder, Turkey’s answer to the alpine scenery of Europe, with so much greenery, meadows with wooden bungalows and several small waterfalls cascading down the other side of the main valley. Most of the other visitors appeared to be either Turks or, once again, Arab families for whom there were evidently specially-targeted jeep or minibus tours of this highland area.

I would have liked, of course, to linger more in this special place, but my schedule obliged me to move on since that Saturday evening I was due to reach Batumi, just over the border in Georgia’s Adjara Black Sea region, in order to give my whole trip some added value. So after returning to Ardeşen I eventually boarded a bus for
Hopa and the frontier at Sarp. The impressive border crossing facilities here were certainly busy with countless other pedestrians, whether Georgians or Turks, at the time; but at least I didn’t need an entry visa, and the official actually smiled at me. Having changed money at the border I travelled into Batumi by matrushka minibus and eventually – after communicating with people on board in Turkish and then transferring to a taxi – managed to find my hotel on a street in the old town whose name had typically changed from the old Russian to a new Georgian one. I arrived there just in time for a power cut, so boldly sallied forth into Batumi …to end up eating in the comfort zone of a Turkish restaurant in this lively city which appeared to be popular with Turkish visitors, who also need no visa these days, and some of whom apparently come for the casinos that are banned at home. The next day being Sunday, I first looked into a couple of churches – Orthodox and Armenian – during services, before having a wander around the fascinating leafy streets and famous innovative architecture of the old town, and not neglecting of course to buy a bottle of Georgian wine to take home. I had to leave in the early evening, but in the time available that afternoon managed to experience some of Batumi’s other famous offerings: the 6th of May Park with its dolphinarium, the boardwalk promenade along the coast, the extraordinary ‘Alphabet Tower’ showing off the Georgian script and the zany, ethereally moving ‘Ali and Nino’ metal sculpture overlooking the bay with the mountains behind. It was wonderful after all this activity to end my brief stay by enjoying a beer in the sunshine of Batumi’s trendy Piazza. There was definitely a big contrast between this lush, vibrant city (perhaps not wholly typical of Georgia) and the relative austerity of the part of Turkey I’d been in where, although I’d noticed a few bottles of Efes Pilsen lurking guiltily outside a shop at Ayder, I’d been sufficiently conditioned by then against indulging in even any mild alcoholic refreshment.

The taxi driver who then conveyed me from my hotel back to the Georgian border post at Sarpi, referring scornfully as far as I could understand to past Russian activity in the area, seemed delighted at my modest tip. Crossing back into Turkey I noticed the mosque ahead of me and the church set against the green cliff behind me. Then it was simply a question of getting a bus back to Rize and another onwards to Trabzon, where I spent the night in a hotel close by the airport. By the Monday afternoon I was in a rather different world back in İstanbul, meeting friends from Leeds and extending my acquaintance with the city while staying three final nights at the appropriately-named Golden Rest Hotel in Kadıköy. I was to return home in time for the Bank Holiday, and sure enough the drizzle began in İstanbul as the bus approached Sabiha Gökçen Airport. It was 25 August.

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**CYPRUS**

We are looking for a contributor who will write a CYPRUS UPDATE for our two annual issues. This will continue the coverage of new events in the island which has been provided for many years by Professor Clement Dodd. If you might be able to write this feature for TAS Review please contact one of the Co-Editors.
Old reminiscences of a new biography

It was a warm June evening in 2003 and I was conducting the Istanbul Chamber Orchestra at an open air concert in the grounds of the old Archaeological Museum, near Topkapı Palace, on a portable stage placed on the steps of its Corinthian portico. This was during the Music Festival, popular among the city’s diehard musical aficionados, and held every summer since the 1970’s by the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts. *Waltzes with Sultans in Bosphorus by Moonlight* was the romantic title I had chosen for the concert, since we were performing popular European dances, such as polkas, mazurkas and waltzes written by members of the Imperial Ottoman family in the 19th century, including two reigning sultans, Abdülaziz and Murad V, who played the pianoforte and dabbled in musical composition while living in their palaces along the Bosphorus and being coached by Italian pashas, including Giuseppe Donizetti and Callisto Guatelli. As a final encore the virtuoso violinist Cihat Aşkın played my arrangement of a moving and prophetic *Elegy* composed in 1921 by the last caliph, Abdülmecid Efendi, three years prior to his exile from the country, thus bringing to a close more than six centuries of continuous reign of the once mighty and invincible House of Osman in the Turkish lands.

Among the audience that evening, seated in the front row, holding her silver-topped cane, distinguished as ever in her tall
outward demeanour, elegant dress and beautifully kept wavy white hair was Princess Neslişah, or Neslişah Sultan as she was known in Turkey. As the granddaughter of the composer of that Elegy and the last member of the Imperial family whose birth was recorded in the official court register, her presence that evening, alongside the other, younger members of her family, made the concert at the Archaeological Museum very special indeed, adding a real historic link to an otherwise imaginary thematic programme. I was so moved by this spectacle that at the end of the concert I walked off the stage and presented her, much to her surprise, with the bouquet of flowers originally given to me. I was invited a few days later to a luncheon at her home. It was a rare and very brief insight into the extraordinary life of this grand lady, ‘twice a princess and twice exiled’, who was 82 at the time and still very regal, even without a tiara on her head, but clearly imperious behind that composed and calm façade. It was not until Murat Bardakçı’s meticulously written biography, Neslişah, appeared in 2011, a year before her death, that I was finally able to have a fuller picture of the life of Neslişah Sultan, who was also the granddaughter, on her mother’s side, of the last Ottoman sultan, Vahideddin.

“I do not remember much of the night we were expelled. After all, I was only a three-year-old child… My mother gathered what she could of our belongings, but took very few other things with her. Some carpets, a few paintings, some porcelain, and books from my father’s library, especially the ones in German… For a child like myself; unaccustomed to going out much, a train journey was a real adventure. Perhaps this is why I only remember that until we reached Çatalca I was running up and down the train’s narrow corridors with my cousin Hümeyra. Everybody had sullen expressions, but we did not notice it on our mothers’ faces, and we went on playing. Besides, no one told us anything… In Çatalca we were to board the Orient Express, but we had to wait for the train to arrive. They took us to a kind of waiting room. That is when I realized that something was wrong, and I started to cry. Hiding behind some curtains, I said, ‘I want to go home’”.

That is how the dramatic life of the three-year-old Princess Neslişah began to unfold during the turbulent events in the deposition of the members of the Ottoman family from Turkey in 1924. When Fatma Neslişah Sultan was born in Istanbul on 4 February 1921, as the eldest daughter of Şehzade Ömer Faruk Efendi and his first wife and cousin Rukiye Sabiha Sultan, “cannons were fired in the four corners of the Ottoman Empire [and], commemorative coins were issued in her name”. But she was to grow up in Nice, where her family settled after their exile from Turkey. In those years Nice was home to many exiled families of deposed monarchs, including some members of the Habsburgs, the Qajar royalty who were expelled from Iran, as well as white Russian aristocrats who had fled the Bolsheviks. Their first abode was the Villa Xoulces in Cimiez, where the last caliph chose to settle, followed by a sixth floor spacious apartment at the Palais Prince de Galles. In her new surroundings in Nice, Neslişah did not have many friends and her time was mainly spent in the company of her two younger sisters, Hanzande and Necla, under the strict rule of her father. Great attention was given to the girls’ education, in particular by Caliph Abdülmecid, who wanted them to know all about Ottoman history. “So he made us learn by heart the names of all the sultans to rule the empire. He would make us sit in front of him saying, “Come now, enumerate your ancestors” and we would start in unison “Sultan Osman, Sultan Orhan, Sultan Murad, Sultan Bayezid…”, Neslişah was later to remember.
She had naturally witnessed, close up, the life of the deposed caliph in Nice, who by that stage had moved to Villa Carabacel and her firsthand account therefore provides us with much invaluable information, beyond just the political and the diplomatic, about the private life and the habits of her grandfather. And, as a musician, I was particularly struck by the vivid depiction of a private concert at the Villa Carabacel, undoubtedly one of many, which also reminded me of one of the caliph’s most famous paintings, *Beethoven in the Harem*.

“In the evenings, he would play the piano and he would ask us to come and listen to him playing. He was not interested in Turkish music, he only played classical music. At times, he would perform together with his wives and the kallas, in chamber music concerts. He would be at the piano, my grandmother and Hayrinüsa Hanım would play the violin, and Mehisti Hanım the cello. On other occasions, one of the kallas would play the piano, while he listened”.

Neslişah owed her love and appreciation of Western classical music to her grandfather and her childhood in Nice. “Neslişah lived in Nice for fifteen years. She had moments of joy and moments of sorrow in this pretty French town on the shores of the Mediterranean where she left behind her childhood – which was not an affluent one”, writes Bardakчи.

The second chapter in her life opens in Egypt when, in 1940, aged nineteen, Neslişah married Prince Abdel Moneim, the son of the last khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and became a princess of the Egyptian royal family. The outbreak of World War II had forced many deposed members of European royalty to seek refuge in Egypt – in those final years of the Gilded Age – along the banks of the Nile and in the palaces of Alexandria. What at first seemed a sheltered life for the newly-wed royals, however, was soon to turn into active participation in the running of the country. When King Farouk was deposed in 1952, Abdel Moneim was appointed regent for the infant King Fuad II and Neslişah thus became the ‘first lady’ of Egypt. Yet there was trouble ahead with the abolition of the monarchy the following year. Not only did the brief regency come to an abrupt end but, in 1957, Abdel Moneim and Neslişah found themselves accused of taking part in a plot against President Gamal Abdel Nasser and were duly arrested and charged with treason. They remained under house arrest for six months and were eventually released but were both exhausted by the ordeal and their health suffered as a consequence. “Exile followed once more, this time from Egypt”. With the amendment of the 1924 decree by the Turkish Parliament in 1952, when women members of the Ottoman family were allowed back in Turkey, 22 years ahead of men, Neslişah Sultan did not hesitate to return home, completing the full circle in her life. She died at the age of 91 in 2012; hers was a truly remarkable life. Murat Bardakchi’s highly commendable book is based on original documents and extensive personal interviews, so far only available in the original Turkish. The excellent English translation by Meyzi Baran, published by the American University in Cairo, makes the life of ‘the last Ottoman princess’ accessible to a much wider world readership.

Emre Aracı
Music historian, conductor, composer
RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

ARTS AND ARCHITECTURE


HISTORY


LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE


POLITICS AND ECONOMICS


MISCELLANEOUS


Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu
Media Quotations about Bernard Lewis

The ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA article on Prof Lewis reads as follows: LEWIS, BERNARD (1916-), British-born historian of Islamic studies. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the University of London (1939), then served in the British army and was attached later to a department of the Foreign Office. He was professor of history of the Near and Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, in the University of London (1949-1974). Subsequently, he was appointed professor in the Cleveland E. Dodge Chair of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and a long-term member of the Institute for Advanced Study. He retired from Princeton and the IAS in 1986.

Shalom Berger, H-Judaic, 22 May 2018

Professor Bernard Lewis, who has died aged 101, was the foremost western historian of Islam in the postwar era, an achievement all the more impressive in that, as a Jew, he was severely restricted in his access to Arab archives. Instead, Lewis made his name through research in the Ottoman archives and, in an academic world where specialisation is increasingly de rigueur, by developing an overarching expertise in Turkish, Persian, Arabic and Jewish affairs.

Telegraph Obituaries, The Telegraph, 20 May 2018
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2018/05/20/professor-bernard-lewis-historian-islam-obituary/

Bernard Lewis 1950’de Osmanlı arşivlerine girmesine izin verilen ilk Batılı isim olmuştu. 1998’de ise Atatürk Barış Ödülü’nü de aldı. (Bernard Lewis was the first person from the West allowed to use the Ottoman archives. In 1998 he received the Atatürk Peace Award.)

Deniz Gökçe, Akşam, 24 Mayıs 2018
www.aksam.com.tr/deniz-gokce/yazarlar/bernard-lewis-de-oldu/haber-738373

WHETHER he was drinking tea with Arab royalty or discussing his books on Islam with an American audience, Bernard Lewis was a bridge between the Muslim world and the West. He saw himself as a latter-day dragoman, referring to the Ottoman-era interpreters who mediated talks between Turkish, Arabic and Persian rulers and European governments.

The Economist, 22 May 2018
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/05/22/bernard-lewis-was-the-doyen-of-orientalists

Prof. Lewis, 1993’te Le Monde gazetesine verdiği bir röportajda 1915 yılında Ermenilerin Osmanlılar tarafından öldürülmesinin bir “soykırım” olmadığını, ‘savaşın bir yan ürünü’ olduğunu söyledi. (In an interview with Le Monde newspaper in 1993, Professor Lewis said the killings of the Armenians by the Ottomans in 1915 did not amount to ‘genocide’ but were a ‘by-product’ of the war.)
The Palestinian intellectual Edward Said called him a Zionist apologist and an orientalist who “demeaned” Arabs. To this, Lewis retorted: “If westerners cannot legitimately study the history of Africa or the Middle East, then only fish can study marine biology.” … Their spat continued for a quarter of a century. In the view of another scholar of the region, Charles Tripp, Lewis’s earlier work was ‘substantial and influential but through his later misguided political involvement in US policymaking, he reinforced Said’s argument about how forms of knowledge are produced to service power’.

Lawrence Joffe, The Guardian, 6 June 2018
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/jun/06/bernard-lewis-obituary

More than 30 years ago Lewis was engaged in a furious series of exchanges with the Palestinian literary critic Edward Said. Both great scholars struck heavy blows in this debate, but I believe that Said was onto something important when he argued that “Lewis simply cannot deal with the diversity of Muslim, much less human life, because it is closed to him as something foreign, radically different, and other.”

Peter Oborne, Middle East Eye, 21 May 2018
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/bernard-lewis-neocons-high-priest-war-and-bloodshed-middle-east-1876449346

He risks being remembered most for the 2003 Iraq war, by when he had become celebrity in-house historian to George W Bush’s US administration and ideological guru to the architects of the invasion. It was said in Washington at the time that Lewis had more influence on any administration than any academic since John F Kennedy’s era. Just as the “best and brightest” of JFK’s horn-rimmed Harvard types paved America’s path into the swamp of Vietnam, Lewis (from Princeton) furnished a veneer of respectability to a catastrophic venture.

David Gardner, The Financial Times, 25 May 2018
https://www.ft.com/content/2e3bc6c6-600a-11e8-ad91-e01af256df68

Few outsiders and no academics had more influence with the Bush administration on Middle Eastern affairs than Mr Lewis. The president carried a marked-up copy of one of his articles in his briefing papers and met with him before and after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.


George W Bush, who was seen carrying articles by Lewis, heard the historian cite the failed Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 as key to understanding the end of the once-brilliant Islamic civilisation. Lewis argued that Vienna represented the first significant defeat for Islam, which had led the world in science, art, literature and astronomy for more than a thousand years.

The Times 21 May 2018
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/professor-bernard-lewis-obituary-6wvjj6d9f

His orientalist work has been deconstructed, reconstructed, legitimized wars + denied genocides,” wrote Brooklyn College CUNY professor Louis Fishman. “Say what you want, his print on Middle Eastern studies was a heavy one – I was never a fan, but his work shaped so many scholars – for or against him.

Steven Nelson, The Washington Examiner, 20 May 2018

Compiled by Arın Bayraktaroğlu
My friend and colleague Chris Brewin, who has died of cancer aged 72, was Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. As a longstanding member of, first, the Department of International Relations and, after 2003, of the School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment (SPIRE), Chris’s ties to Keele University stretch over a long period, 36 years: from 1972 to his retirement in 2008. Chris taught both undergraduate and post-graduate level and supervised PhD students, teaching and researching mainly Europe, the European Union and its external relations, in particular with Turkey and Cyprus. A charming and witty conversationalist, Chris brought wide knowledge and passion to all the programmes and subjects with which he engaged. Discussion with him was often stimulating, sometimes really passionate, but he was always courteous and very interesting.

Chris was educated at the University of Grenoble, Études Françaises, the University of Oxford (where he held an Open Exhibition in English at College and an Open Scholarship in Modern History at Christ Church), and Harvard University (where he was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship, Frank Knox Memorial Fellowship, and Sinclair Kennedy Fellowship, as well as the Keith Feiling History Prize). While working in Keele, Chris was instrumental in introducing the Euro-Tour, an annual visit to key EU institutions, and took a coach load of students to Brussels and The Hague over many years. One of his former students, currently a Senior Lecturer at another British university, still talks about how interesting and exciting these tours were mainly because of Chris’s deep knowledge and passion for the EU. She said the students learned more than a whole degree course about Europe and EU institutions just during a short week of Euro-Tour led by Chris.

Even though he carefully avoided combining his academic work with his political views, one overwhelming and obvious aspect of Chris in relation to the politics of the UK and Europe was his strong belief in and personal commitment to the European project – he was unstintingly passionate about believing in a united Europe, which he considered as one of the most successful experiments of peace, freedom and collaboration for post-war generations. During the funeral service, we heard his son Peter recounting that during the last two years of his life, when he was struggling with incurable disease, he was so disappointed with the increased sense of Euroscepticism – even hostility toward the idea of a united Europe in this country, in particular during and after the Brexit debate.

Chris published many works on his research topics, including two books, The European Union and Cyprus (2000) and Turkey and Europe after the Nice Summit.
He also was very sensitive to all global developments and always ready to offer his fresh opinion and analysis on current affairs. We collaborated on a number of occasions: In 1996 we produced a special issue of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs on ‘Turkey and Europe’ where Chris contributed a very original article on Turkey and the EU. In 1998 we worked together on a special issue of TASG News (predecessor to this Review), where Chris wrote the main article ‘The implications for Turkey of enlargement of the EU to include Cyprus and applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe’ and in 1999 we published a book on the Kosovo conflict, in which Chris wrote a chapter entitled: ‘Should NATO bomb Serbia?’

For Chris, Turkey and Cyprus, and Turkish Studies in particular, always occupied a very special place, not only for his academic work but also in his life: he visited Turkey and Cyprus many times, took his wife and his children along with him on many of these visits, met many academic and non-academic colleagues and made many close friends. Of special importance to him was his work on the EU’s relations with Turkey. Chris was passionately committed to the Europeanisation project for Turkey and genuinely believed that Turkey would become an important member of the European Union in his life time. It is a pity that we are still as far away from this goal as in the 1970s when Chris first started to study Turkey’s relations with Europe.

When I first met Chris I told him that my favourite place in Ankara was the superb Museum of Anatolian Civilisations, and said that if he needed a complete silence and solitude especially during the dry hot Ankara summers the garden café of this museum was the best place for thinking, reading and writing. Just a few years ago one summer I received a post-card from Chris, sent from the Ulus Postanesi, Ankara, telling me that he had just visited “our best museum café” in Ankara.

His passion for outdoor pursuits – in particular playing tennis, hillwalking, and gardening – helped him maintain good health for most of his life. A visit to his home, where one was greeted warmly by Charmian, his wife, and his two children, Peter and Francis, was always a great pleasure. He was particularly proud of his garden, large, natural and very well designed and looked after. As an energetic gardener he did most of the work himself until his health deteriorated to the extent that he was not able to stand and work in the garden.

Chris had a full and active life and will be greatly missed by his family, friends, students, and those he worked with and many others to whom he so enthusiastically gave his time. He was loved and respected by students and staff, and widely recognised for his work and valued by the University. Those of us who worked with Chris will always remember and cherish memories of him warmly, in particular his very sharp sense of humour and the irreverence he showed towards self-important figures of authority.

Bülfent Gökay
Professor of International Relations
Keele University
Another Reminder!!

Invitation

We need a regular contributor for our Some Noteworthy Events feature. If you might consider compiling such a list for our two annual issues please contact one of our Co-Editors for more details.

We need a new Events Coordinator!!!!
Please volunteer and help

The Events Coordinator organises (with the help of others on the BATAS team) just two major events: The Spring Symposium and the annual John Martin Lecture in the autumn. Tasks include booking venues, liaising with speakers, and organising registration.

Don’t hesitate to contact celia.kerslake@orinst.ox.ac.uk if you are interested or would like more information.

Request for contributions

TAS Review welcomes articles, features, reviews, announcements and news from private individuals as well as those representing universities and other relevant institutions. Submissions may range from 250 to 2500 words and should be written in A4 format or, preferably, sent electronically to the Co-Editors at bayraktaroglu@btinternet.com and/or sigimartin3@gmail.com. Submissions for the Spring issue would be particularly welcomed by 15 February 2019.
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Turkish Area Studies Review

Co-Editors:
Dr Arın Bayraktaroğlu, 70 Queens Way, Cambridge, CB2 8AY, ☎ 01223-700130, email: bayraktaroglu@btinternet.com
Sigrid-B Martin, The Red House, 49 Hackington Road, Tyler Hill, Canterbury, Kent CT2 9NE, ☎ 01227-471222, email: sigimartin3@gmail.com

Editorial Team:
Dr Brian Beeley; Prof Clement Dodd; Dr Celia Kerslake; Stephen Parkin; Jill Sindall

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